A New Security Mechanism for Ad-hoc On-demand

Distance Vector in Mobile Ad Hoc Social Networks
Mohamed Amine FERRAG

Mehdi Nafa

Salim GHANMI

University of Badji Mokhtar - Annaba, ALGERIA
Faculty of Science Engineering
Department of Computer Science
Laboratory Network and System "LRS"
E-mail: mohamed.amine.ferrag@gmail.com

University of Badji Mokhtar - Annaba, ALGERIA
Faculty of Science Engineering
Department of Computer Science
Laboratory Network and System "LRS"
E-mail: mehdi.nafa@gmail.com

University of Badji Mokhtar - Annaba, ALGERIA
Faculty of Science Engineering
Department of Computer Science
E-mail: ghanemisalim@yahoo.com

Abstract— Routing is a primary function in
Mobile Ad Hoc Social Networks. This is the
mechanism by which the paths are created for
routing data to the right destination through the
social network. These routing protocols designed as
lack of security controls, which increases the risk of
attacks that can be orchestrated by external or
internal nodes taking into account the position of the
striker from the social network. In this paper, first,
we analyze the vulnerability of AODV routing
protocol. Second, we introduce a new system, called
AODV-MASN. Third, we introduce a new security
mechanism for this new system.
Keywords—Ad Hoc Social
Security, Routing Protocol.
I.

Networks,

AODV,

INTRODUCTION

An Ad Hoc network is a wireless network with no
fixed infrastructure in which all nodes participate in the
routing. Ad hoc networks are considered particularly
important in situations where the installation of a fixed
infrastructure is costly, difficult, impossible or simply
unnecessary.
The Ad Hoc routing protocols existing in the literature
currently being standardized within the IETF (Internet
Engineering Task Force) hypothesize an ideal
environment in which the operation of the network is not
under attack malicious about service availability and
data integrity. They also assume that all nodes
voluntarily participate in the operation of the network
regardless of their natural tendency to abstain in order to
save energy in their battery.
Securing the ad hoc routing is particularly difficult due
to the lack of administrative entity in the heart of the
network. There is much vulnerability allowing malicious
nodes corrupt the configuration of routing tables, modify
packets in transit or simply not participate in the effort

routing in order to save energy. For this reason, the
subject of this article focuses on the security of routing
protocols. We have chosen the AODV [1] [2] routing
protocol because it is the most widely used in ad hoc
community. In the next section, we present brief attacks
against MASN using AODV as routing protocol. We use
the abbreviation MASN for "Mobile Ad Hoc Social
Networks".
II.

ATTACKS AGAINST MASN USING AODV AS
ROUTING PROTOCOL

Many researchers address problems related to online
social network in [12] [13]. Contrary to our type of social
network that is completely mobile devices. In [15], we
applied a part of this method for the OLSR routing
protocol. Taxonomy of attacks against MASN is divided
into two classes: external and internal attacks. External
attacks nodes that are not part of the network. Internal
attacks nodes are a legitimate part of the network. We
present in Table 1 the various attacks which exist in the
literature.
III. A NEW SECURITY MECHANISM FOR
REACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOL AODV IN MASN
In this section, we introduce a new system "AODVMASN" then we describe our new security mechanism to
AODV protocol in MASN. In our approach, nodes first
try to detect suspicious links before the route request.
A. Overview of "MASN with AODV"

MASN with AODV is shown in Fig 1. Consists of two
layers: (a) a physical layer of ad hoc network and (b) a
layer of virtual social network. In the network layer
(virtual) social are connected by virtual links where
AODV is used as routing protocol. Each virtual link is to
a communication channel which may be composed of
several hops. Once the friendly relations are established,

called AODV with MASN. Datagram Message DetectReq . . DetectRep" and digital signatures "Champ_sig" to detect malicious links. EKUX1 Encrypted with the public key of the node "X1" DKUX2 Decrypt with the public key of the node "X2" EKRX1 Encrypted with the private key of the node "X1" DKRX2 Decrypt with the private key of the node "X2" B DetectReq encrypted D DetectReq decrypted C DetectRep encrypted A DetectRep decrypted DKUX1 Decrypt with the public key of the node "X1" 1 Distribution of public keys by annoncement public. a mobile node encrypts the field "Champ_sig" of message DetectReq and send it. CONCLUSION In this paper. Detect of suspicious links in MASN with AODV The fig. DetectRep To infer suspicious links. the mobile node addresses the DetectReq received as a normal Hello message else the node control the arrival time of received DetectReq and the arrival in the waiting period specified.2 represents our approach and our system parameters are presented in Table 2. but we added a field "Champ_sig" to detect suspicious links.Remove a shared file. System parameters IV. At the end. we presented our new security mechanism based on the use of two messages "DetectReq. Fig3. 3). Before the detection of suspicious links. sending messages. we define two messages new control for AODV "DetectReq & DetrectRep" (Fig. if there is no information about its previous requests. Parameter X1 X2 Mobile node in the circle of transmission from node "X1" X3 Mobile node in the circle of transmission from node "X2" KUX1 Fig 1. Presentation of MASN with AODV b. they have the same format of the HELLO message. Next. we introduced a new social network. . it decrypts the field value "Champ_sig" and checks if this contains information about DetectReq at each of its requests.friends can perform social such as resource sharing. Before it broadcasts a packet broadcast RREQ. the node performs the link between itself and the mobile node that sent the Description Mobile node in the circle of transmission from node "X2" Public key of the node "X1" (available at "X2") KUX2 Public key of the node "X2" (available at "X1") KRX1 Private key of the node "X1" (known only as "X2") KRX2 Private key of the node "X2" (known only as "X2") DetectReq Message to detect the attack DetectRep Message for acknowledge receipt of the message "DetectReq RREQ REEP DATA RRER The polling message of available routes The response message to the route request -See friend's online (nodes in the network). and navigation from each other. . we have provided the taxonomy of attacks and their influence on the security property in MASN using AODV as routing protocol. When a mobile node receive DetectReq. 2 Secret key distribution authentication with privacy 3 Detection of suspicious links 4 Establishment of the road 5 Transfer data on establishes the road 6 and Return to the applicant indicating roads error The link failure Tab2. When a source node wants to establish a route to a destination for which it does not yet have a way. DetectRep as suspicious and stops communicating with this mobile node.Delete a received message… The message indicating a route error.Step 2). first. the mobile nodes are changing their public key (Fig 2 Step 1) then he changed the secret keys with confidentiality and authentication (Fig2.

Influence on the security property Attacks Confidentiality Authentication Target Detour attack [3] Black hole attack [5] x Wormhole attack [14] x Routing table poisoning [4] x Subset of nodes close to the hole Subset of node Nodes in the direct vicinity of the opponent Nodes specific Sybil attack [6] x x x Nodes specific Man-in-the-middle attack [7] x x x Nodes specific x Nodes in the direct vicinity of the opponent All nodes Rushing attack [8] Resource consumption [9] x x x Routing table overflow [10] x Location disclosure [11] x Result Availability Integrity x x Nodes in the direct vicinity of the opponent Nodes forming the path to a destination Not participate in routing Creating a tunnel disrupt routing Creating a tunnel disrupt routing Division of routing and and Create of multiple identities Use impersonation Attract traffic Weakening battery Overflow of routing table Discover the location of mobile nodes Tab. 2 Ekux2[N2] Ekux1[Ekrx1[ks] ] C=EKUX2 [EKRX1(A)] DetectReq 3 A=DKUX1 [EKRX2(C)] DetectRep B=EKUX1 [EKRX2(D)] D=DKUX2 [EKRX1(B)] RREQ RREP RREQ 4 DATA 5 RREP DATA RRER Fig .2 Our New Security Mechanism for Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector 6 .1 Summary of attacks in AODV with MASN Transmission Rang X3 X2 X1 1 Hop 1 Hop KUX2 KUX1 1 Ekux2[N1||ID1] Ekux1[N1||N2] The step of detecting suspicious links is applied between every two nodes in the transmission range before sending route request.

C. and D.” Online Social Net. J.Y. Realtime intrusion detection for ad hoc networks. In Proc. Limprasittiporn.A. 2006. [13] C. In Proc. K. [7] C. [6] J. An intrusion detection tool for AODV-based ad hoc wireless networks.org/html/rfc3561. December 2006. 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks (SASN’03). Perrig. Vigna. .G. Condie. Peer-to-Peer Systems. 1(1) :151–174.. 1 :251–260. Das. Belding-Royer. Kacholia. 2009. Assi. Balasubramanyam. Perkins and E. Secure routing in mobile wireless ad hoc networks. ACM. Royer. E. Perrig. A specification-based intrusion detection system for AODV.ietf. [14] Y. Stamouli. [12] S. and P. “Decentralization: The Future of Online Social Networking. pages 16– 27. In Proc. Proceedings (WMCSA’99). Tang . C. and K. [15] M. A. Nafaa . J. [2] C. Hu. and DB Johnson. pp. ACM. 2002. RFC3561. Guha . Tewari. 2006. 24(2) :370– 380. [10] S.. pages 374–380. Springer. EM BeldingRoyer. In Proc. 2004. In Proc. page 40. S. Induced churn as shelter from routing-table poisoning. Li. IEEE Computer Society. R. and A. and RA Kemmerer. Interlayer Attacks in Mobile Ad hoc Networks. [3] L. Hellerstein. Francis.B. Http: //tools. Rowe. 2003. Ghanmi . Guang. 1999. [8] Y. Gwalani. Hu. 40(10) :70–75. et al.” Future Social Net. Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols. October 2003. Levitt. Perkins. In Proc. volume 2. pages 90–100. Johnson. Gupte and M. Maniatis. Srinivasan.E. [4] T. P. Benslimane.M. S. Routing security in wireless ad hoc networks.. The sybil attack. IEEE Communications Magazine. Argyroudis. February 1999. Sankararaman. pages 436– 448. C. pages 125– 134. P. A. 2nd IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications. of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security. Proceeding of The 8 th International Scientific Conference eLearning and Software for Education . July 2003. [9] I. Deng. [5] H. 2012. IEEE Computer Society. W.A. Ko. Ferrag . 2008.M. 49–54. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. Ad Hoc Networks. Douceur. Singhal. 133-139. 2005.REFERENCES [1] C. M. of the 20th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC’04). and DP Agrawal. and H. of the 13th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS’06).C. K. of the Second International Conference on Mobile adhoc and sensor networks (MSN 2006). P. and S.OlsrBOOK: A Privacy-Preserving Mobile Social Network Leveraging on Securing the OLSR routing protocol. Wormhole attacks in wireless networks. [11] G. Yeung. Tseng. “NOYB: Privacy in Online Social Networks. In Proc. Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing. 2002. 2003. Of the Sixth IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM’05). (2). V. Ad-hoc on-demand distance vector routing. IEEE Computer Society. S.