D. Basosi, G. Bernardini: “The Puerto Rico Summit of 1976 and the End of Eurocommunism”, pp.


Pubblicato nel volume:
L. Nuti (ed.), “The Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985”, London: Routledge,
2009, pp. 256-267, ISBN 978-0-415-46051-4

’ They ascribe this failure to the PCI’s ultimate inability to rescind all its links with the Soviet Union and accept social-democratization.3 While these interpretations do raise a set of important issues. Recent analyses have highlighted the appeal of the PCI’s far-reaching diplomatic moves as the main reason for the early interest in Eurocommunism. However. but also dismissed Berlinguer’s goals as ‘unfeasible and destined to fail. and eventually to develop the idea of a form of communism respectful of political liberties at home and supportive of the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) put forth by Third World governments and liberation movements. West German and Italian archives. particularly in the period between 1973 and 1979. born in connection with the economic crisis of the early 1970s and the transatlantic disputes that it generated. In turn. intense activism on the international scene brought the party leadership to tighten relations with the French and Spanish communist parties. Eurocommunism quickly raised notable interest and concern in Italy. This does not imply that international factors did not play their part. This complex movement was soon given the name Eurocommunism. historians have cast new light on the international strategies pursued by the Italian Communist Party (PCI) under the leadership of Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer. In those years. Based on extensive research in US. By the end of the decade it was then forgotten just as quickly.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 256 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. began to decline as the PCI’s leadership 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 . this chapter argues that Eurocommunism.pdf 19 The Puerto Rico summit of 1976 and the end of Eurocommunism LY Duccio Basosi and Giovanni Bernardini1 PR OO F ON In recent years. rather than to philosophical disputes about the possibility of finding the desired ‘third way’ between Soviet communism and Western European social democracy. Western Europe and in the rest of the world – especially in United States and in the Soviet Union.2 A political shooting star around 1974–75. that highlighted both its distinction from the monolithic Soviet model and the European flavor of the endeavor. they took a path that did not replay the traditional Cold War scenarios. a neologism coined by the press and eventually accepted by the PCI itself. which also encompassed a new relationship with the continent’s socialist and social-democratic movements. the party’s electoral decline at the end of the decade appears more due to positions actually taken by its leadership in the Italian context during the crucial period 1976–78. it is our impression that Eurocommunism’s steep parabola simply paralleled the rise and fall of the PCI’s electoral performance.

in 1977 this endeavor caused the party to become the co-sponsor of a painful program of economic adjustment undertaken by the Christian Democratic Italian government and which badly hit the Italian political left’s own constituency. It goes without saying that these two aspects were mutually reinforcing. Berlinguer replied in an article published 29 May 1975 in the party’s newspaper ‘L’Unità’ that Italy should stop being the ‘wretched client of the United States. including Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. which aimed at achieving full legitimization in the Italian political system by obtaining government positions by externally supporting (and not opposing) its longstanding adversary. but also endorsed a major break with the tenets of the post-World War II Keynesian economic consensus.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 257 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. there would be no second chance for the PCI. the PCI’s electoral gains were not translated into concrete redistributive measures. just days after the party had reached its electoral peak in Italian political elections.’ always in search of political and economic support.’ and participate in the construction of Western Europe as a political subject . The country should instead take into account the ‘new European reality. fascinating some and scaring others. However. the heads of government of the most industrialized Western nations. As fascinating as talking about Eurocommunism might have been. given the general re-configuration of international relations that had accompanied the end of superpower détente and the shift toward new economic paradigms. achieved credibility both on the basis of the PCI’s electoral gains and. a discussion on this subject cannot be separated from an assessment of the party’s domestic strategy in the Eurocommunism years. While this desired legitimization was never fully attained. This subject is covered in the second section. Failing to understand this change. but was rather a set of values and general propositions that. by reaching outside ‘brotherly’ ties with other members of the communist family. the PCI invested all its strength in the attempt to be recognized domestically and internationally as a ‘responsible’ force. in the late 1970s and early 1980s. the network of contacts that the party was establishing in Europe. In Puerto Rico. Commenting on a rigidly anti-communist interview given to Time magazine by the DC leader Amintore Fanfani. The third section analyzes what might be called the defining moment. did not simply reiterate their hostility toward the PCI. As we briefly discuss in our conclusion.4 Eurocommunism’s strengths and weaknesses in the international context PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 257 Eurocommunism was never a program defined point-by-point.pdf The Puerto Rico summit OO F ON LY failed to understand the implications of the closing of the transatlantic rift at the end of 1975 and the changed model of capitalism produced by the newly found transatlantic unity. the Christian Democratic Party (DC). where we also highlight some underlying weaknesses in the PCI’s international assumptions. In the first section we analyze the rise of Eurocommunism in the context of the transatlantic rift. that is when the PCI leadership failed to grasp fully the outcome of the Puerto Rico G7 Summit in June 1976.

Local administrations in the red belt are models of efficiency and honesty compared to the average elsewhere in Italy. over the years the PCI’s connection with the Soviet Union has been downplayed. nor an anti-Soviet Europe. strongly emphasized the goal of building socialism in democracy and political freedom. US Ambassador to Italy. probity. the autonomous posture during the Middle-East and energy crises at the end of the same year. President Gerald Ford simply resorted to the traditional argument that communists desired the end of NATO and of Atlantic security in general.9 Thus. this did not imply that the United States would drop its long-standing opposition to the party’s coming to power in Italy. Berlinguer.pdf 258 D.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 258 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. which was called on to innovate its economic practices at a time of deep capitalist crisis. and connections with undesirable sources of support have been generally avoided by communists.9 per cent in the 1968 parliamentary elections to 33. and that the West should never allow ‘either Moscow or the internal [communist] forces’ to even get close to this. the progress of détente. and responsibility to the community. corruption. Unwise patronage. Berlinguer believed that to allay the US government’s fears by professing loyalty to NATO would help the PCI’s drive toward government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 . soon to be crowned in the Helsinki Final Act. At the same time. Two terms of reference provided the geopolitical context: Western Europe. International and national levels were intertwined from the very beginning.’5 In a public speech in Livorno in July 1975. cast in doubt by bona fide public differences between the PCI and the Soviet party. and finally. the US-driven collapse of the Bretton Woods economic system in 1971. and the Third World. Basosi and G. together with the Spanish communist leader Santiago Carrillo.6 While this analysis was fascinating to many. even in a destabilizing way. European rejection of the US-led ‘Year of Europe’ initiative in 1973. clashes over monetary policy in the following years.4 per cent in the 1975 administrative elections. its credibility derived from the set of electoral advances that the PCI had been able to achieve in the early 1970s by choosing to side with the numerous and strong social movements in Italian society. were all symptoms of a changing transatlantic relationship that the PCI needed to accompany with the slogan of ‘neither an anti-US. According to the PCI Secretary General.7 Despite some hopes held by the PCI leadership. The party’s electoral performance rose from 26. Notwithstanding his confirmed willingness to overcome Europe’s division into two blocks. a practical problem stood in the way of Eurocommunism to the extent that the US government was able to influence the Italian political system. Even a hard-line anticommunist like. Bernardini F ON LY autonomous from the US and the Soviet Union alike. John Volpe admitted that: PR OO The Communist Party has no difficulty in maintaining a high level of discipline.8 In the US. whose ‘vibrant’ reality was presented as the major factor in global change in recent decades.

Eurocommunism raised a great deal of interest. around 10 percent. where even the international conservative press had praised Berlinguer’s speech and open criticism of Moscow.17 In 1975.pdf The Puerto Rico summit OO F ON LY responsibilities in Italy. former chancellor Willy Brandt). nor did they suffice to move the most important single player in European social democracy. held in East Berlin in June 1976. while the economic challenges of the early 1970s had largely torn the US and the Europeans apart. When new elections were called in 1976 the PCI’s chances seemed to improve. and lacerated by internal rivalries among its leaders). domestically and internationally. even within a broad coalition. was the DC (the Italian Socialist Party was at its historical low. As US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told then-Prime Minister Aldo Moro in August 1975. and the only European country that had overcome the economic crisis of the early 1970s with relative success. German observers. the current party leadership.16 In brief. as witnessed by the intense debates that occurred within the Socialist International. Schmidt conceded that the PCI’s Secretary General probably really ‘thought what he was saying.18 .258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 259 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. led by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt himself. at least in the short run. the compromesso storico and ‘national unity’ As the PCI promised a renewal of the Italian political system and redistribution of wealth in Italian society (including some interesting hints of ecological thinking). reached the same conclusion as their American colleagues: with all its shortcomings. the DC and its minor allies seemed unable to agree on solutions for skyrocketing inflation coupled with rising unemployment. the only viable interlocutor in Italy. adamantly disliked the PCI.13 The German Chancellor’s apprehension about the rising popularity of the Eurocommunist project can be measured by his reaction to the conference of the communist parties of Europe. in the context of a free-falling lira and of a precarious balance of payments.14 The PCI did develop fruitful exchanges with some European socialist and social democratic forces. PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 259 10 Eurocommunism.11 Berlinguer’s pledges to NATO did not convince Washington. at least in the short run.15 But the PCI’s main interlocutors were either out of power (as in the case of the French Socialist Party) or in charge in geopolitical and economic light weights (the Scandinavian social democrats). in fact.12 While a certain degree of interest in the evolution of the PCI could be found in the SPD’s left wing (including the party chairman.’ but this was not enough to overcome his mistrust. he simply ‘didn’t care if [Berlinguer signed] on to NATO in blood’: an alliance that had been built to fight communism would lose all reason to exist if communists were ever allowed to enter the government of one of its members. This was largely illusory. As far as Berlinguer was concerned. there was little on either side of the Atlantic to justify Berlinguer’s hopes for a less stringent exclusion of his party from European mainstream politics. The West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) was then leading the government of the third largest economy in the world.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 . were often able to consolidate material gains for the lower classes in the Italian society. the PCI began to abstain in confidence votes on the DC-only government led by Giulio Andreotti. only four points behind the DC.21 It is questionable. although it seemed strongly intentioned to trade those concessions for much more structural gains. The PCI did not do this. the PCI’s program left little room for populism in 1976. and that could be regarded.25 In the spring of 1978. the DC’s leading exponent of its most radical anti-communist tendencies. In reaction. which was the PCI’s strategy to establish a close dialogue with the catholic forces in Italian society. then chairman of the DC. abstaining in confidence votes tied the party to the same mechanisms of Italian politics that it sought to change. whether the moves actually made by the party leadership were the most effective translation of that aspiration.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 260 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. Bernardini PR OO F ON LY Even according to hostile analyses. Although not enough to govern. the PCI had achieved virtual veto power over all important decisions and. albeit never full.22 Berlinguer’s intention was to enhance the perception of the party as a ‘responsible’ force. the party’s platform was not closed to antiinflationary measures. the PCI reached its all time electoral high. Starting July 1976. While internal divisions began to undermine the party’s ability to respond coherently to the challenge. the Red Brigade. kidnapped and later assassinated Aldo Moro. but came at very high price in terms of the party’s own electorate.pdf 260 D. the left-wing armed group.19 In fact. the opposite occurred: while in opposition in 1974 and 1975. The PCI made little mystery of the fact that its program aimed at privileging social – over private – consumption and the ‘democratic planning’ of production over production per se.’24 This was indeed praised by part of the Italian political establishment in the form of a greater. Instead. as underscored even by US government observers. legitimization. in the fragmented context of the Italian political system the PCI’s numbers were sufficient to make life difficult for those that chose to govern without it. in exchange for not voting against the Andreotti government. Basosi and G. together with support for antiimperialist struggles in the Third World. after 18 months of few gains by the PCI. In more practical terms. But the ultimate effect of the party’s decision was to deprive it of any real leverage to change the balance of the Italian political system. Eurocommunism cannot be thought of outside the context of the compromesso storico. obtaining 34. as two basic tenets of the Eurocommunist project.4 percent in the popular vote. however. the original caveats that accompanied their acceptance in principle of antiinflation programs were often overruled in practice by the actual measures approved from 1976 to 1978 in the name of a relatively unconditional ‘austerity.23 Rather than allowing the party a greater say in the government’s actions.20 On 20 June 1976. These were two features that were supposed to introduce elements of socialism into the Italian context.’ led once again by Andreotti. the PCI decided to step-up its post-1976 approach by unilaterally supporting a new DConly government in the name of ‘national unity. the PCI obtained the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and the chairmanship of several parliamentary committees. As correctly highlighted by several commentators.

US hegemony marked a definite push away from the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the post-World War II years. PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 261 .’ which meant a reversal from the construction of welfare states to the fight against inflation in domestic policies. especially those concerning the US–European relationship. 27–28 June 1976. While in the first half of the 1970s Berlinguer had been keen on the analysis of such global trends. Even more importantly. whereas Rambouillet marked European acceptance of the global dollar standard and floating exchange rates. the German social democrat Helmut Schmidt actually played a leading role in pushing for monetarist and laissez-faire solutions internationally. This was just days after the conclusion of the first G7 summit. In fact.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 261 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. in substance. the structural trends in the international economy.28 The final communiqué at Puerto Rico indicated clearly enough that the leaders of the western nations chose to go along with. And so did Aldo Moro. if the general picture sketched by the Puerto Rico summit was not sufficiently clear. Furthermore. namely the protracted centrality of the DC and incomplete acceptance of the PCI as an equal member in the Italian political system.26 The PCI’s shortcomings in a fast-changing environment OO F ON LY The events of the 1970s indeed demonstrated some continuity with the traditional patterns of post-World War II Italian politics. held in Rambouillet in November 1975. Rather the opposite. in the second half of the decade he and his closest advisors displayed a certain unpreparedness in facing the consequences of changing international equilibriums. on the international plane.30 Thus. toward deregulated forms of capitalism. rather than oppose or deflect. Their stated objective was ‘enlarging the pie rather than redistributing it. under renewed US leadership the Puerto Rico summit definitely brought to a close years of upheaval in transatlantic relations. which directly affected Italy as well. the world was undergoing huge changes. the European governments at the summit agreed with these principles. including conservative French President Giscard d’Estaing and the British Labor Prime Minister Jim Callaghan. the PCI should have heard a much closer alarm bell go off. The conclusions reached in those two summits challenged the most basic assumptions of Berlinguer’s strategy.4 percent of the popular vote. Outside the microcosm of Italian domestic politics. such as privatization and deregulation of capital flows.27 Furthermore. closure to Third World demands for a NIEO.29 Regardless of their left or right orientations. however. the PCI chose not to oppose Andreotti’s government in a context in which nothing indicated that there would be changes in the ‘economic practices’ of Western Europe in the sense desired by the party. and. accompanied ideologically by the theories of the Chicago School of Economics. the PCI had slid back to 30. held in Puerto Rico.pdf The Puerto Rico summit By the time new political elections were held in 1979. The PCI’s decision in 1976 to abstain from opposing the Andreotti government came six months after the first summit of the heads of government of the most industrialized Western countries.

West German. later. To a certain extent. the actual decisions were made elsewhere. In those months the Italian government was requesting new external financing to support its weak balance of payments. but also. One of the summit’s decisions gave a green light to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to test. the PCI was.33 Much more important than the anti-PCI clause. was the fact that the Italian loan was the first in the IMF’s history to include heavy structural conditions. from two points of view. in fact.36 The targets of the proposed structural adjustment were the scala mobile (the wage indexation system) and public sector expenditures.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 262 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. Chancellor Schmidt indicated the role that the IMF would frequently come to play in the following years: the IMF should act before other potential lenders and serve as a term of reference on the reliability of loan recipients.’35 At the same time. Bernardini PR OO F ON LY which.pdf 262 D. It did not involve Congress.’31 As far as the clauses conditioning the loan were concerned. in Puerto Rico the actual proposal of linking the communist question and the financial assistance program came from Helmut Schmidt. Basosi and G. Beginning with the Italian case. a target of the Puerto Rico summit and. went totally unheard. once again. however. a new lending procedure devised for ‘developed countries in special need [and] preconditioned on special corrective programs to insure a return of sound economic equilibrium. While the US had already aired this idea both privately and publicly. in Italy. while the post-Bretton Woods role of the IMF was re-designed according to the emerging conservative consensus. The PCI could count on the solidarity of many in the European left. did not impact the US budget and cloaked the ‘conditionality in a multinational mantle’ that diluted opposition within a borrowing country ‘to conditions imposed by the US or other outsiders. by external constraints. US Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Edwin H. the Chancellor himself revealed that the Italian situation had been discussed during the Puerto Rico summit in a restricted meeting of the US. of the actual IMF loan.32 Two weeks later. but. Yeo explained to President Ford that the IMF was the best institutional arrangement for producing conditional financing. two assets of great importance to the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 . the negotiations with the Italians were conducted under the continuous guidance of technicians from the United States and the FRG. the word ‘conditionality’ made its appearance on the world financial stage. it represented the forerunner of the much more burdensome ‘structural adjustment loans’ to Third World countries in the 1980s. In the wake of the PCI’s electoral advances. The loan’s goal was not only to provide liquidity to a country in need. to change the structure of that country’s domestic economy. British and French delegations and that communist non-accession to the Italian government was the basic precondition for providing the financial aid. the first was an actual ultimatum that accompanied the discussion about the Italian loan: Italy would not receive any economic aid if communist influence on the government were strengthened. In fact.’34 Transmission of Washington’s agenda to the IMF through the G7 framed the mechanisms that would later be called the ‘Washington consensus.

it returned to opposition. but economic monetarism also was embraced in October 1979. The numerous Italian fans of the ‘conservative modernization’ of the country had found a credible external constraint to implement unpopular policies. the acquiescent attitude taken by the party leadership on the IMF clauses definitely collided with their previous accusation that the DC was the ‘wretched client of the US. thus opening an entirely new era in international economic relations. when the Federal Reserve drastically increased US interest rates. the final agreement that the Italian authorities eventually reached with the IMF in April 1977 did take several steps to reduce its coverage. the PCI finally realized that few gains had been obtained in the preceding three years (both in terms of material results and in terms of the long desired legitimization). in the same year.37 The paradox is that they were able to attain their desired results with the compliance of the PCI. The new president repeatedly declared that he would not interfere in Italian domestic affairs.40 These would be frustrated in early 1978.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 263 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War.39 In this context. They wish to thank Dr Thomas Blanton and Dr William Burr of the National Security Archives for their comments on an unpublished version of the text. Furthermore. Carter’s international economic footprint was not as marked.’ Although the scala mobile was not abolished.pdf The Puerto Rico summit PCI’s electorate. beginning with the London G7 summit in 1977. his successor Ronald Reagan. Not only was the drive toward capital flows deregulation confirmed. and the PCI would never again be able to turn the tide. when US uneasiness with communist participation in the Italian government was restated clearly on the traditional ‘K factor’ basis. new and fundamental steps were made toward consolidation of the conservative turn in international economic policymaking. a game in which Andreotti was actively involved. nor as ideologically driven as that of his White House predecessor Gerald Ford and. the party did little to address the demands for social justice that had been at the root of its earlier success. the agreement included tight ceilings for public sector expenditures and extremely detailed provisions for bringing down inflation. but Italy and the West had changed dramatically since 1973. beginning with wages. . Democrat Jimmy Carter took over the US presidency. In particular. obviously.43 When. some PCI officials cherished hopes that some form of official recognition might finally come from the US government. during his presidency. Eurocommunism was not formally abandoned. Nevertheless.’ If anything. PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 263 Notes 1 The authors share in all the analyses and conclusions of this chapter and equally contributed to writing it.38 Concluding remarks OO F ON LY In January 1977. by that time.41 In the meantime. the political agenda had been completely subverted by the Moro assassination.42 Nor did the PCI’s influence grow when it opted to unilaterally support the DC-only government of ‘national unity.

Box 6638. 2005. Broad chapters on Eurocommunism are in: M. op. The Global Cold War. S. Leone. op. and the guarantee of all individual. Berlinguer. Giovagnoli and S. ‘Una Spagna libera in un’Europa democratica. Pons. AdSD. Massion to Schmidt and memcon (Schmidt. p. A. il PCI e gli Stati Uniti. R. nella pace. 2006. Tra guerra fredda e distensione. Rumor). p. 4. cit. 2004. US Embassy Rome to Secretary of State. L. Wall. secret in Declassified Documents and Reference System (hereafter DDRS). 3 In particular: S. 181–96. pp. Berlinguer. no.. Enrico Berlinguer. 678. Berlinguer. vol. Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino. 12 Although the keyword was ‘renewal’ of the DC. 2006.’ Mondo Contemporaneo. Both speeches are collected in E.’ speech given in Livorno.’ in A. 26 September 1974. Maggiorani and P.’ 20 May 1974. Pons (eds). 1976. op. cit. 2006. Nodis memcons.. 72–86 and 110–16. L’Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta.’ E. More generally on Italian politics in the 1970s in the international context: M. La politica internazionale dei comunisti italiani. 1 August 1975. Ferrari (eds). secret.’ Ricerche di Storia Politica. pp. 27 February 1976. Del Pero. 2007. Roma-Bari: Laterza.. Berlinguer declared in Moscow that. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time. cit. 461–88.’ in M. memcon (Ford. Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo. 2. Basosi and G. 2006. Barbagallo. op. ‘L’eurocomunismo nelle carte della Sed. 2006. pp. RG 56. Pons. College Park.’ Journal of Modern Italian History.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 264 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. HSA. 4 Comprehensive interpretations of the broad processes of the late 1970s are in: O. ‘Gli anni Settanta nel giudizio degli Stati Uniti: “Un ponte verso l’ignoto”. 63–95. Maggiorani and P. Abteilungsleiter VII to Schmidt. Di Nolfo. L’Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer. Fasanaro. Giovagnoli and S. there can be few doubts about the German preference for staunch anti-communists like Mariano Rumor: FriedrichEbert-Stiftung (hereafter FES). 7 Telegram. Helmut Schmidt Archiv (hereafter HAS). Bernardini PR OO F ON LY 2 Among recent works on Eurocommunism. Kissinger. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 . ‘Reflections on the current Italian political situation. bipolarismo e violenza: la politica estera americana nel Mediterraneo durante gli anni Settanta. 2. 2004. no. See: FES. ‘The Italian Political System and Détente. p. Westad..’ speech given in Moscow. 2005. NSA. Gentiloni Silveri. no. Italian Ambassador De Mestri). ‘I segreti della politica internazionale. pp. nella democrazia. pp. Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (hereafter AdSD). I.’ in A. pp. F. secret. Barca. 11 July 1975. see: F. HAK Files. pp. Pons. Berlinguer.’ l’Unità. 10 On the PCI and NATO in the 1970s. 6 E. ‘Distensione. Box 7171. Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino. Moro). Bologna: Il Mulino. Also see the interview with Sergio Segre. 5 E. 2003. Kissinger. Gualtieri. 11 National Archives and Record Administration. As noted by Pons. Memcons 1973–1977. Lussana. 1945–1984. ‘L’amministrazione Carter e l’eurocomunismo. ‘Innenpolitische Situation Italiens’ and ‘Persönlichleitswertung von Ministerpräsident Rumor. Torino: Einaudi. E. Dagli imperi militari agli imperi tecnologici. cit. Maryland. Roma: Editori riuniti. Box 6. 89–122. Moro. religious and cultural liberties. memcon (Ford. 2. Ferrari (eds). x. 123–44. 428–49. Box 12. Cronache dall’interno del vertice del PCI. 161–83. 9 GFL. pp. Pons (eds). This line was held consistently in the following years.pdf 264 D. ‘L’Italia. 3. Roma: Carocci. it strove ‘for a socialist society that would be the highest development of all democratic conquests.’ Studi Storici. ‘Il confronto con le socialdemocrazie e la ricerca di un nuovo socialismo nell’ultimo Berlinguer. 29 May 1975. while the PCI looked with interest at the experiences of socialist countries. United States (hereafter NARA). see: U. 13 January 1976. 23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.’ 21 August 1974. ‘Lottiamo per la costruzione di una società socialista nella libertà. collective. Some months later. the origins of this line of thought dated back to January 1973: S. no. 8 See: L.

Hajnal. London: Sage. Box 6681. 28 See: D. Santarelli. ‘Kongress der Sozialistischen Internationale in Genf. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 20 January 1976.pdf The Puerto Rico summit OO F ON LY 13 The perceived threat to NATO’s southern flank was at the heart of Schmidt’s worries. 1999. Nodis memcons. 2005. GFL. 17 November 1977.ca/summit/1976sanjuan/ communique. but they did lighten the tax burden on low income groups at the expense of corporations and the more affluent.. p. see: NARA. While pointing out that the PCI wanted at least ‘some official recognition. quite clearly indicate that the Republican leader thought. . 23 Clift to Kissinger. AdSD. 71–86. Box 16. ‘Vermerk über ein Gespräch zwischen Bundesminister Genscher und Mario Soares. 20 January 1976. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. . 7 July 1976. 649. 14 FES. ‘US response to the earthquake in Italy: special political considerations. 25 The personal papers of Ugo La Malfa. See: P.’ 30 August 1975.’ 30 November 1976. secret. 20 P. ‘US policy options towards Italian political situation. op. Harvey. Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits. 211–50.’ 10 September 1974. ‘Meeting with John Volpe. ‘Italian Debate on Historic Compromise. and memcon (La Malfa. Box 6683. secret in DDRS. rev. AdSD. 9. National Security Adviser (hereafter NSA). 21 On the historic compromise see: P. Putnam and N. Schmidt’s meeting with US reporters. for example: FES. at least since 1975. p. Evolution. Memorandum of Conversation (Ford.. National Security Adviser Scowcroft to Ford. HSA. 1996. ‘Briefing Book. Box 8. Danish Prime Minister Jorgensen). L’Italia dal 1945 al 1994. US Embassy Rome to Secretary of State. for example: Kissinger to the Vice-President. Role and Documentation. that the PCI must be brought closer to government responsibility.’ Corriere della Sera. Santarelli. Bayne. pp. secret in DDRS. 1987. Ginsborg. secret. Also see Gerald Ford Library (hereafter GFL). 27 On the G7 summits: P. secret. on the dissent about Eurocommunism between Kissinger and the Scandinavian social-democrats. 244–50. ‘Joint Declaration of the International Conference. deputy prime minister from 1974 to 1976. available G8 Information Centre www. 1990. Box 6. Battini (ed. Ashgate: Aldershot. ‘Berlinguer tra passato e presente. Fondo La Malfa. Heick to Schmidt. memcon (Kissinger. Barca.g8. PCFEC. confidential in DDRS. p.’ 6 November 1975. Italy 5. HAK Files. 1. Telegram.utoronto. contributed to the consolidation of the radical Movimento Settantasette. London: Penguin. pp.. ‘Your meeting with Giovanni Agnelli. Kissinger.’ May 1976. NSA. See. pp. 18 ‘L’incognita comunista. pp. E. 17 See. 6 July 1976. Storia critica della Repubblica.’ 22 May 1975. The G7/G8 System.’ US observers recognized that when the party collaborated constructively with the parliamentary majority ‘its amendments did not significantly reduce the amount of revenue [. 29 Puerto Rico Summit.html (accessed 15 December 2007). confidential in DDRS. Ginsborg. ed. Moro). Even more explicitly targeted PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 265 . Box 7107. Italy 4. 26 E.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 265 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. cit. in particular: Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS). A History of Contemporary Italy.’ 17 May 1976. An interesting analysis is in: GFL. 26 September 1974. 15 FES.. memcon (La Malfa. Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada (PCFEC). DC secretary Zaccagnini).’ La Repubblica. Parker to Ford. cit. 22 On the doubts within the PCI about the decision to abstain in confidence votes: L. 333–58. Ginsborg. AdSD. 1994. op.’ 15 September 1975. pp.] taken in by the program.’ 24 The widespread street protests against the austerity program implemented by Andreotti with the abstention of the PCI during 1977. 19 CIA.). 1 May 1976.’ 28 June 1976. German Foreign Minister Genscher). Dialogo su Berlinguer. HSA. R. NSA. See. cit. D. Firenze: Giunti. op. Milano: Feltrinelli. Box 8. HSA. Memcons.’ in M. Box 20. 16 See: ‘I socialisti europei si spaccano sul problema dei rapporti coi comunisti. 56–95.

AdSD. See. attached to Hormats to Scowcroft. FES. See: GFL. p. secret. the French daily Le Monde read: ‘Oh! Mr. Also see: memcon (Ford. Bernardini 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 . He will succeed in convincing us that we are all Italians. It is impossible to render the complexity of Schmidt’s position with a single documentary reference. 24 June 1976 in DDRS. Memorandum for the Chancellor. Kissinger. More generally. Andreotti). Schmidt’s finger! It points at Italy so that we put it aside. Genscher). Kissinger. Moro’s persuasiveness was not helped by the SPD spokesman. In a similar fashion. press conference (Kissinger. However. on the intense negotiating activity deployed by the US and West Germany with the Italians. confidential in DDRS. 27 July 1975. for a clearer definition of the conditions connected to the special corrective programs for the borrowing countries designed to ‘restructure their domestic economies’: Department of State memorandum. De Vries. secret in DDRS. 450–60.’ See ACS. Fondo Aldo Moro. DC: Institute for International Economics. 20 March 1976.’ 4 June 1976. revisione della politica di assistenza. Such a possibility was also taken in consideration by the National Security Council. ‘Copy of the Notes. 29 May 1975. DC: IMF.pdf 266 34 35 36 37 PR OO 33 LY 32 ON 31 against NIEO: GFL.’ La Repubblica. 21 July 1976. The quotation is from p. Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened. Williamson (ed. AdSD. Schmidt’s interview with German reporters. Ventunesimo Secolo. More generally. Box 14. Schmidt). 1. ‘Notes on the Economic Summit. ‘NSSM 242 – US policy toward Italy. Energy Raw Materials and Development’ secret. 3 June 1976.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 266 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. Memcons. ‘Puerto Rico (1976): le potenze occidentali e il problema comunista in Italia’. Moro speech draft. confidential in DDRS. A. In those days.’ 2 December 1975. see: M. and had not been informed afterwards. HAS. Schmidt declared himself ‘absolutely contrary to any form of international dirigism’ and suggested that the West ‘educate’ Third World countries to think in market-economy terms. Chairman of Economic Advisers Greenspan). 1. In Italy. Box 16. Yeo to Ford. July 1976. Hartmann Files. De Montvalon. secret. pp. FES.). Solomon and Assistant Secretary Bergsten to Blumenthal. Box 2. 24 of Hormats’ notes. Robert Hormats. International Economic Summit. HSA. NSA.’ 4 May 1976. 17–19 Januar 1977. 20 July 1976. secret in DDRS. 1972–78.’ 24 March 1977. NSA. Greenspan and Scowcroft to Ford. The phrase was coined by the IMF economist John Williamson in the late 1980s. claiming that his government ‘had not been informed previously. Memcons. ‘Besuch des italienischen MP Andreotti in Bonn. ‘Summary of Major Treasury Activities’ 24 February 1977. NSA.’ La Stampa. Box 6681. Washington.’ 20 January 1977. Memcons. Undersecretary Solomon to Secretary Blumenthal. had not participated in any meeting. for example: FES. 19 July 1976. ‘Washington: se il PCI andasse al governo. Treasury Secretary Simon. the scandal of the Chancellor’s declaration was strongly underlined by both the conservative and progressive press. AdSD. General Subject File. ‘International Financial and Monetary Issues. GFL. NSA. HSA. ‘Summary of Major Treasury Activities. Varsori. at Rambouillet. 1990.’ 25 June 1976 in DDRS. forthcoming 2008. ‘Puerto Rico Summit Overview. 18 May 1976. 1. Box 7251. according to whom the Italian prime minister was present at least when the Italian question had been raised in general terms. Large sectors of the European non-communist left reacted with disdain. Moro replied with a harsh parliamentary speech. Memcon (Schmidt. The possibility that changes be made to assistance programs in the case of a communist electoral takeover were also made public by the United States in March: V. ‘La Santa Alleanza di Portorico. See: J. memcon (Ford. 1985. Also see. Box 6688. Box 12. Schmidt. secret. Schmidt. Washington. The International Monetary Fund. memcon (Ford.’ R. Rambouillet. Basosi and G. Zucconi. Box 12. Third session. However. 19 F 30 D. p. ‘Le doigt de M. NSSM-NSDM. Kissinger).’ Le Monde. two conversations of the Chancellor with US officials are particularly enlightening: GFL. GFL. p.

455. NSA. Carter’s participation in the decision-making process of the so-called ‘Volcker shock’ is. one year later. that the PCI had taken ‘a conservative position in support of economic stabilization under IMF and EC guidelines.. op. Biven. The London summit’s final declaration stressed an enhanced role for the IMF.’ 17 January 1978. memcon (Ford. 2005. The US Embassy’s first secretary. See: Barca. the party’s huge summer festival. Andreotti).utoronto. ‘Agenda note for PRC Meeting on Europe. MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Only some days after the conclusion of the IMF-Italian agreement. the State Department doubted the PCI’s support for Andreotti could last for long. secret in DDRS. Aglietta. Carter’s Economy. 678. p. was even invited to the Festa dell’Unità. . NSA. op.g8.html (accessed 15 December 2006). Paris: Jacob. still subject to debate: W. 3. the European Community lent Italy another $500 million. ‘The Carter Administration and Italy: Keeping the Communists Out of Power Without Interfering.’ 11 April 1977. Lanham. 1997. Economic Policy in an Age of Limits. a CIA analysis clearly stated. . however. and supported ‘the linkage of its lending practices to the adoption of appropriate stabilization policies’: London Summit. For a neat anti-communist interpretation of the non-interference policy. 2002. ‘Declaration: Downing Street Summit Conference. by December 1976. Martin Weenick.ca/summit/1977london/communique. See GFL. ‘Implications of the Communist/Christian Democratic Accommodation in Italy. 56–94. O. pp. More generally: M. PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 267 . GFL. with some surprise. p. ‘The Impact on the European Community . PCFEC. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.’ 2 December 1976. secret. Memcons. Box 8. Treverton to Aaron. secret. Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War. M. 2001.. C.’ Journal of Cold War Studies. 6 December 1976. De Vries. Kissinger. Gardner. cit. p. cit. which amounted to $500 million. Régulation et crise du capitalisme. . Saunders to Kissinger. available www. 237. confidential in DDRS. Njølstad.’ CIA memorandum.pdf The Puerto Rico summit 42 43 LY 41 ON 40 F 39 OO 38 January 1977.258_19_Reheating Cold War 28/7/08 3:53 pm Page 267 Routledge Research 258_19_Reheating Cold War. Box 21. no.’ 8 May 1977. This conclusion seemed so obvious that. see: R.