G.R. Nos.

107200-03 November 9, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL DE GUIA y SAMONTE, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo D. Latorre for accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:
Illegal recruiters constitute one of the worst vultures of our society today. They prey on the gullible,
and often, they victimize the already marginalized Filipinos who will do anything to improve their
economic status. The case before us involves one of their kind.
Accused-appellant Manuel de Guia y Samonte was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XLI, 1of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale 2 and three (3) counts of Estafa, 3 in violation
of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended and Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively.
The Information in each case reads as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 92-103341:
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised between May
23, 1991 and December 11, 1991, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one
whose true name, identity and present whereabouts are still
(unknown) and mutually helping each other, representing himself to
have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully for a
fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to Cirilo
Lising y Mercado, Monteza (sic) Gazmin y Pascual, Leopoldo Realino
y Arceo and Jesus Sumalinog y Carin, without first having secured
the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Contrary to law. (Rollo, p. 4)
2. Criminal Case No. 92-103342:
That on or about November 24, 1991, in the City of Manila, the said
(accused,) conspiring and confederating with one whose true name,
identity and present whereabouts are still unknown, and mutually
helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and

feloniously defraud Leopoldo Realino y Arceo in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representation which he made to said Leopoldo
Realino y Arceo to the effect that he had the proper (authority) and
capacity to recruit and employ said Leopoldo Realino y Arceo as
factory worker in Japan and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced
and succeeded in inducing said Leopoldo Realino y Arceo to give and
deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount
of P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he did
obtain the amount of P120,000.00, which amount once in his
possession, with intent to defraud he, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
Leopoldo Realino y Arceo in the aforesaid amount of P20,000.00
Philippine Currency. (Rollo, pp. 5-6)
3. Criminal Case No. 92-103343:
That on or about and during the period comprised between October 3
and December 11, 1991, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused conspiring and confederating with one whose true
name, identity and presents whereabouts are still unknown and
mutually helping each other did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Jesus Sumalinog y Carin (in) the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representation which they made to said Jesus
Sumalinog y Carin to the effect that he had the proper (authority) and
capacity to recruit and employ said Jesus Sumalinog y Carin as . . .
contract worker in Japan and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced
and succeeded in inducing said Jesus Sumalinog y Carin to give and
deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount
of P50,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representation, said accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he did
obtain the amount of P50,000.00 which amount once in his
possession, with intent to defraud he, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own
persona use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Jesus
Sumalinog y Carin in the aforesaid amount of P50,000.00 Philippine
Currency. (Rollo, pp. 7-8)
4. Criminal Case No. 92-103344:

That on May 23, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true name,
identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually
helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Monteza (sic) Gazmin y Pascual in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representation which he made to said Montesa
Gazmin y Pascual to the effect that he had the power and capacity to
recruit and employ said Montesa Gazmin y Pascual as factory worker
in Korea and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and
by means of other similar decits, induced and succeeded in inducing
said Montesa Gazmin y Pascual to give and deliver, as in fact she
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P30,000.00 on the
strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused
well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made
solely to obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount of P30,000.00
which amount once in his possession, with intent to defraud he,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Montesa Gazmin y Pascual in the aforesaid amount
of P(30,000.00) Philippine Currency. (Rollo, pp. 9-10)
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. The cases were tried
jointly.
The prosecution presented the four (4) private complainants (Cirilo Lisong, Montessa Gasmin,
Leopoldo Realino and Jesus Sumalinog) as witnesses. They testified as follows:
CIRILO LISING, a 41-year old farmer from Gapan, Nueva Ecija testified that in August 1991, he was
summoned by his brother-in-law, Jose (Jhun) Cruz, to fix the septic tank in his house. 4 There, he was
introduced to the accused and a certain Loida de Guia who represented themselves to be husband and
wife. The two were boarders in Cruz' house. 5While fixing the tank, the couple engaged him in a
conversation and told him they could facilitate his employment in Korea. He was informed that the
placement fee was forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00). Relying on the couple's representations, he
decided to try his luck abroad. The couple promised him a job as factory worker in Korea with an income
of $500.00 per month. They asked him to prepare an initial amount of nine thousand seven hundred
pesos (P9,700.00) for his plane fare. They told him that he could pay for the balance of the fee when he
reach Korea for upon his arrival, he would receive a two-months cash advance on his salary. He agreed. 6
On August 12, 1991, he submitted to the accused his passport and biodata in their office, ML
Promotions, at Room 102, Marrieta Apt., 1200 J. Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila. He handed the
amount of P9,700.00 to Loida and the latter issued and signed a receipt therefore. 7
Lising, however, failed to leave for Korea. He then verified the status of the agency from the POEA
and discovered that the accused and Loida were not licensed recruiters. 8 Thus, on February 13, 1992,
he complained to CIS PO3 Romeo M. Cerezo and gave a written statement. 9

On cross-examination, Lising produced two (2) calling cards of ML Promotions: one showed Loida
de Guia as the general manager while the other showed the accused as its travel consultant. 10
MONTESA GASMIN, a 19-year old, high school graduate from San Juan, Tarlac testified that she
learned from her cousin, Joey Lino, that the accused and Loida de Guia were engaged in job
placement overseas. On May 15, 1991, she asked her cousin to accompany her to the couple's
Ermita office where the accused informed her that they deploy workers to Korea. Relying on said
representation, she applied as a factory worker in Korea and accomplished the corresponding
application form. She was told that she would earn $500.00 per month and was asked to pay thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to cover her traveling expenses. 11
She gave the couple the required amount in two (2) installments, viz: P10,000.00 on May 23, 1991
and P20,000.00 on June 4, 1991, as evidence by two (2) receipts of even date. 12 She gave the
money to Loida who signed the receipts in her presence. 13 The couple assured her that she could leave
for Korea by the end of June 1991. The promise proved to be false. On July 14, 1991, she again went to
the couple's office in Ermita to follow-up her departure. Again, the spouses assured her that she would be
allow to leave on the succeeding week. Nothing came out of the promise. Thus, together with the other
private complainants, she reported the matter to the CIS Camp Crame where she executed her written
statement. 14
LEOPOLDO REALINO, a 42 year-old driver, residing at Balibago, Angeles City testified that her
brother, Roger, brought him to the couple's recruitment office in Ermita where he met the accused.
He inquired from the accused whether he could work out his employment in Japan. The accused
replied in the affirmative. Still undecided, he told the accused he would just come back. 15
Sometime in August 1991, he returned to their Ermita office and applied as a contract worker in
Japan. The accused told him to prepare one hundred twenty thousand pesos (P120,000.00). He was
also asked to fill up and sign an application form. 16
On November 4, 1991, Leopoldo went to their office and handed the money to the accused. The
accused then ordered Loida, whom Leopoldo met for the first time, to prepare the necessary
receipt. 17 The accused failed to employ him in Japan despite repeated promises. He demanded the
return of his money but to no avail. He, together with his companions, went to no avail. He, together with
his companions, went to the POEA where they discovered that the accused was not licensed to recruit
workers for overseas employment. With the intention of confronting the accused, they proceeded to their
Ermita office but were informed that the accused was already detained at Camp Crame. Thus, they went
to Camp Crame where they gave their statements. 18
The last witness for the prosecution was JESUS SUMALINOG, an industrial electrician from Makati.
He testified that he first met the accused in May 1991 in the accused's Ermita office where the
inquired about the possibility of employment of Japan. The accused interviewed him. The accused
told him that the cost of processing his papers would run from P85,000.00 to P95,000.00. However,
when Sumalinog intimated that he could only afford to pay P50,000.00, the accused conferred with
Loida, who was introduced by the accused as his wife. The couple then agreed to be paid
P50,000.00 and he was told to fill up an application form. He was informed that he could work as a
contract worker in a computer firm where he would earn $1,200.00 per month. The couple asked him
to prepare the money. 19

He sought the accused in his Ermita office but found out that the accused was already in the custody of the CIS. owner of RTS Trading and a childhood friend of the accused. 1991. finding the accused Manuel de Guia y Samonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and for him to pay a fine of P100. He alleged that he was not a recruiter but a driver by profession from 1970 up to December 1991.000. He talked with the accused in Camp Crame and the latter asked him not to file any complaint. the accused instructed Loida to prepare the receipts and the same were duly issued and signed by Loida. According to the accused. He testified that the accused acted as his part-time driver from May 1991 until December 1991.700. the accused claimed that he met the complainants only while he was already detained in Camp Crame. Case No. corroborated his alibi. 20 The two assured Sumalinog that he could leave after two (2) weeks. October 30. In Crim. November 18 and November 21. Still.00 on December 11. He alleged that after work. 22 The evidence of the accused rests mainly on denial and alibi. Failing to leave as promised. He did not head said request and filed the complaint at bar.Sumalinog gave the money to the accused in four (4) installments. 25 On the basis of the above evidence. P8.000. 1991. In each instance. and finally. The accused assured him that his money would be returned. he was again made to wait for another two (2) weeks. Further. In Crim. He again went to Loida's house in July 1991 to follow-up his son's employment application. 1991. judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1.00.00 as and by way of actual damage. He was employed as a driver delivering various merchandise for the corporation. 2. 92-103341.000. 21 He then went to the POEA where he discovered that the accused was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. He met Loida to secure overseas employment for his son.00 on October 3. 23 He further testified that his legal wife is Paula Diones and the he has no illicit relationship with one Loida de Guia. Rizal. 24 Renato Samonte. Case No. thus: P10. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. 92-103342. He contended that he could not have participated in the recruitment of complainants since from May to December 1991.00 on November 25. The said accused is further hereby ordered to pay the complainant Cirilo Lising the sum of P9. the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. he always went straight home to Montalban.000. he was employed at RTS Trading Associate Corporation where he reported for work from 7:00 o'clock in the morning until 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. P2. the accused did not make good with said promise. finding the accused Manuel Guia y Samonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of Estafa and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to Fourteen (14) years Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal as maximum and for the said accused to . he first met Loida in the latter's house in Baclaran in May 1991.

In Crim. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN (UP) HOLDING THE UNLAWFUL ARREST OF THE ACCUSED IN A PUBLIC PLACE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT OR PROCESS ISSUED BY A COMPETENT COURT. 20-30) Accused appealed to this Court raising the following assignment of errors: I.indemnify the complainant Leopoldo Realino the sum of P120. . Gazmin the sum of P30. 92-103344. II.00 as and by way of actual damage.000. and 4. finding the accused Manuel de Guia y Samonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of Estafa and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from Three (3) years Six (6) months and Twenty One (21) days ofprision correccional as minimum to Seven (7) years Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days of prision mayor as maximum and for the said accused to indemnify the complainant Jesus Sumalinog the sum of P50. 3.00 as and by way of actual damage. The first (2) assigned errors are interrelated and shall be discussed together. Case No. WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS ONE OF THE ACCUSED CONSIDERING THAT SHE ISSUED AND SIGNED THE RECEIPTS EVIDENCING THE PAYMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS AND WHICH WERE THE ONLY BASES FOR FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.000.000. Costs against the accused. In Crim. III. case No. pp. SO ORDERED. (Rollo.00 as and by way of actual damage. 92-103343. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROSECUTE THE REAL MALEFACTOR. LOIDA DE GUIA. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF THE PAUCITY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION (receipts of payments) ALTHOUGH THE SAME ARE INADMISSIBLE IN CHARACTER FOR BEING PURELY HEARSAY EVIDENCE. finding the accused Manuel de Guia y Samonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of Estafa and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from One (1) year Eight (8) months and Twenty One (21) days ofprision correccional as minimum to Five (5) years Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days also ofprision correccional as maximum and for the said accused to indemnify the complainant Montesa P.

Her non-prosecution at this state. Ermita. Appellant's submission deserves scant consideration. appellant did not raise this argument in the trial court. the evidence also showed that it was the accused who asked the applicants to fill up their applications and to prepare their respective biodata. On appeal. Ermita. He submits that his mere presence at the Ermita office everytime the complainants paid the required fees cannot be made the basis of a finding that he was involved in the illegal recruitment of private complainants. The evidence shows that the receipts were signed by Loida in the presence of the complaining witnesses. provides no ground for the appellant to fault the decision of the trial court convicting him. instructed Loida to prepare the corresponding receipts. Bocobo Street. were jointly operating the recruitment business. he raises in this appeal the defense that he himself has been at the Ermita office to follow-up the job placement of his son in Korea. located at J. who are not licensed recruiters. More importantly. It is not also correct to argue that the guilt of the appellant was based alone on the receipts issued by Loida de Guia. in turn. 29 This is not all. . It is too late to raise it on appeal. identity and present whereabouts are still unknown. calling cards were presented showing the accused to be the Travel Consultant of said agency. Initially. He contends that Loida de Guia should have been charged as the proper accused. This was after private complainants were made to believe that the accused and Loida. aside from being husband and wife. with the former as travel consultant and the latter as the general manager. however. Manila. There is no obstacle for the State to charge this person who goes by the name of Loida de Guia as soon as her true identity and address become known to the prosecution. . Appellant also erred in dismissing the receipts issued by Loida de Guia as hearsay evidence. the Informations against the appellant show that the appellant was charged with "conspiring and confederating with one whose true name. The records show that Leopoldo Realino and Jesus Sumalinog testified that they personally handed the money representing the required fees to herein appellant. 26 Later on. . We are not also impressed by the defense of the appellant. appellant claimed during the trial that he could not have possibly been at the Ermita office and received payments made by the complainants for he was then employed as a professional driver for RTS Trading. The latter. he stated that he was arrested in Marrieta Apartment. " From the evidence. Moreover. with Loida as the General Manager. adopted a systematic and elaborate scheme to defraud the complainants through false promises of jobs abroad. however. he testified that he was arrested by the CIS officers at a department store in Ermita. All the complaining witnesses testified that the accused took an active and direct part in misrepresenting that he had the authority and the power to facilitate their employment abroad. Aside from their testimonial evidence. All these show that the accused and Loida de Guia. To begin with. Realino and Sumalinog had personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of these receipts and their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay evidence. Manila. He also demanded from them varying amounts of money as processing fees. At one time.Appellant's position is that the real perpetrator of the charges imputed against him is Loida de Guia whose signature appears on all the receipts issued to the complainants. 28 but at the same time. 27 He likewise claimed during the trial that he was not aware that Loida de Guia had an office located in Marrieta Apartment. appellant would have Us believe that during the period from May to December 1991 when private complainants went to the Ermita office . this co-conspirator is Loida de Guia who pretended to be the wife of herein appellant. Consequently. however. Glaring inconsistencies marred his short testimony.

he waived the alleged illegality of his arrest. Renato Samonte. 31 The credence of the private complainants is further bolstered by the admission of appellant himself that he does not know of any ill-motive why they would hurl such serious accusations against him. JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ.: We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the decision dated January 21. being a weak defense. 182601 November 10. 32 The private complainants were all previously unknown to him. DWIGHT MACAPANAS. To be sure. MIGUEL GACES. the plea comes too late in the day. including the appellant's conviction.Petitioners. For one. MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 2014 JOEY M. 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. 30 Appellant's corroborating witness. accused-appellant "just happened to be there" for he was himself following-up the job application of his son.to file their application and pay the corresponding fees. for falsely pretending to possess power and qualification to deploy private complainants for overseas employment. SO ORDERED. 34 we ruled that the illegality of appellant's warrantless arrest cannot render all the other proceedings. We note that upon arraignment. Time and again. 91541. We have ruled that alibi. WHEREFORE. Respondents. 1 2 .R. Samonte's testimony rendered the defense's theory more open to doubt. certification of SSS contributions and. is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. vs. Briones. Moreover. hence. must be proved by clear and convincing evidence which should reasonably satisfy the Court of its veracity. By so pleading. DECISION BRION. void. J. G. appellant's alleged warrantless arrest will not exculpate him from his guilt as found by the trial court. appellant pleaded not guilty to the Information and did not raise the alleged illegality of his arrest. even assuming that appellant was a part-time driver of Samonte. was equally unimpressive. SP No. such as pay slip/pay roll. It cannot deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability.R. the decision of the court a quo finding the appellant Manuel de Guia y Samonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale for having engaged in the business of recruiting the four (4) private complainants for overseas employment without any license or authority from the POEA and three (3) counts of Estafa. the nature of his job would not make it physically impossible for him to operate a recruitment business on the side. has little value. 2008 and the resolution dated April 17. Finally. 33 In People v. PESTILOS. his testimony that appellant has been in his employ from May to December 1991 was not corroborated by any documentary evidence. premises considered. In fact. Costs against appellant. No.

the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. the said accused. did then and there. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts.The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16. that is. 2005. Barangay Holy Spirit. Generoso badly beaten. qualified with evident premeditation. 8 9 10 In an Information dated February 22. with a bladed weapon. 14 15 . Acting on this report. Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. Quezon City. Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the incident. Generoso reside. together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. Moreno Generoso (Atty. 2005. SP02 Javier. Thus. 12 13 On March 16. At the inquest proceeding. the inquest proceeding was improper. 2005. A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street. Dwight Macapanas. conspiring together. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO. and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. denying Joey M. The Antecedent Facts The records of the case reveal that on February 20. treachery and taking advantage of superior strength. to his damage and prejudice. 2005. and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Jerry Fernandez. willfully. Generoso called the Central Police District. Miguel Gaces. Generoso with a bladed weapon. with intent to kill. but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance. the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 20th h day of February. as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2005. at around 3: 15 in the morning. the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. in Quezon City. an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. 11 On March 7. Atty. 4 5 6 7 Atty. said complainant was able to parry the attack. The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. confederating with and mutually helping one another. 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). by then and there stabbing one Atty. 3 Atty. Pestilos. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. CONTRARY TO LAW. the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Philippines. Branch 96. arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty.

The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. the present petition. pursuant to Rule 16. hence. 18 The Issues The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors: I. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2008. the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command.The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. " The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED. but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17. 17 The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. Generoso. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid . on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation. No arrest warrant was ever issued. 16 The Assailed CA Decision On January 21. III. Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT. 2008. They attributed grave abuse of discretion. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT. Thus. II. which actually used the word "invited. The petitioners moved for reconsideration.

which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness. 31 32 33 In our jurisdiction. " 19 20 21 22 23 This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. development and the current applicable interpretation. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that. we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right. We will sell to no man. but only those that are unreasonable. and the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused. nor condemn him. or exiled. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum). These Rules have evolved over time. the Philippine Bill of 1902. the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. and the 1935. but by lawful Judgment of his Peers. or by the Law of the Land. It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. or be disseised of his Freehold. But accepting things as they are. I. The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued. or free Customs. nor will we not pass upon him. this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. searches and seizures without judicial warrant. it is considered a seizure. specifically. or any otherwise destroyed. The Court's Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. or be outlawed. 1215. Brief history on warrantless arrests The organic laws of the Philippines.warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime. The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war. The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor. [Emphasis supplied] 29 30 In United States v. or imprisoned. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed. early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. With regard to an arrest. Snyder. It provides: 24 25 26 27 28 No freeman shall be taken. or Liberties. according to the . 1973 and 1987 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. England on June 15.

and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending. 39 40 41 In The United States v. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines. These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines. and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Wilson that Section 37 of Act No. Vallejo." while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative Code which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence. a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law of England and America. 44 For purposes of this case. . 42 43 These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence. we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the present case. et al. 29 and 30 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law. the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113. the person to be arrested has committed. or the Charter of Manila. . Presently. the Court applied Rules 27.. in his presence. Santos that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason. the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes or local ordinances. In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above. (b) When an offense has just been committed. 36 37 In The United States v. is actually committing. when lawful. Fortaleza. 34 35 In 1905. 28.Court. or is attempting to commit an offense. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. the Court held in The United States v. 38 The Court also ruled in The United States v. at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned. 183. Arrest without warrant. without a warrant. defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant.A peace officer or a private person may. arrest a person: (a) When. were not different from the Spanish laws.

Second. although there is no proof of a felony having been committed. Rule 113 A. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento. however. reasonably tending to show that such person has committed. In Santos. the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that: 45 Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court Prior to 1940." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] In the same decision. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento. to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him. if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities. and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him. the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila.We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application. within the territory defined in the law. to arrest: First. although no formal complaint has been filed against him. Fourth. or to cause to be detained. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested. the Court cited Miles v. Second. as well as of their agents. 46 47 . That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act. Weston. which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime. In Fortaleza. persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. which provided that certain officials. or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace. Third. amounting to a crime had been committed. It will be the duty of the authorities. the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. including police officers may. Evolution of Section 5(b). II. provided the following circumstances are present: First. to a defendant who gives sufficient bond. any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances. pursue and arrest without warrant.

is actually committing. However. (b) When an offense has in fact been committed. it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty. the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion. that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests. action in good faith is another requirement. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In addition. Prior to the 1940 Rules. the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach. Based on these discussions. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime. and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. 6. v. therefore.When lawful. without a warrant. it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed.The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. arrest a person: (a) When the person to be arrested has committed. 49 It appears. the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent. Arrest without warrant . Once these conditions are complied with. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion. . (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. . Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. 48 In The US. Notably. Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows: 50 SEC. B.A peace officer or a private person may. the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity. The 1940 Rules of Court (Restricting the arresting officer's determination of probable cause) Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially incorporated in Section 6. and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it. Hachaw. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion. it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court. or is about to commit an offense in his presence.

the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless
arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied
both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has
committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be
actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable
suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has
committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting
officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was reworded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In
cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced
under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the
commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just
committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for
purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of
Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by
the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be
arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the
arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests
based on mere suspicion or hearsay.
51

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the
element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and
the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable
cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting
officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of
determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable.
According to State v. Quinn, the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.
52

53

The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States that the Fourth Amendment
limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is
not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and
"reasonable grounds."
54

55

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis
supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in
a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a
warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the
arrest and not on the information acquired later.
56

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and
practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic
question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular
offense involved.
57

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession,
his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the
requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal
knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a
crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.
58

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al., the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
59

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held
for triat. In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, we defined probable cause as the existence of facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.
60

61

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses.
62

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet
tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient
that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest.
63

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief or
reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.
64

65

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer
arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial,
as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable
cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the
available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the
same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as
set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination
of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their
determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos, the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in
warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that
one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but
must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.
66

67

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal

another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. in People v. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation. one stated that the accused was the gunman. del Rosario. In People v. they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8. The unlawful arrest was held invalid. In Posadas v. 1994. the arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Indeed. one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. It was only on December 11. Ombudsman. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime. the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance." 72 . Burgos. 70 The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. a warrant of arrest must be secured. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime. the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Upon receipt of this information. the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. With this set of facts. 68 Similarly. the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest. 69 In People v. Additionally.knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b). CA. the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses. Hence. 71 In Rolito Go v. Hence. the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. The information upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting. stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA. Moreover. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge. Cendana. with a threat of physical harm.

one of whom was wearing his jacket. Jr. Jayson. the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. 79 In this case. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him. In this case. and his wife just left the place of the incident. coupled with the incident report which they investigated. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest.In People v. the Court held that Section S(b ). SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III. Gerente. Alvario. Upon the officers' invitation. they ran in different directions. The victim pointed them to the policemen. 74 In People v. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers. Thus. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. Hence. the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. Based on the reported statements of the complainants. the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation. The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. the arrest was held valid. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators. 77 In Cadua v. When the group saw the policemen coming. he informed him of the incident report. the warrantless arrest was held valid. 78 In Doria. Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense. the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime. they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. 73 In People v. there was a shooting incident. Acol. the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. In People v. Tonog. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio. CA. who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message.. P/Supt. there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. 75 76 In People v. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. were enough to raise a . Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. When they reached the place. The Court held that the arrest was valid. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house. who was implicated in the incident. P/Supt. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The warrantless arrest was held valid. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant.

Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with. even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing. "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts. The reason for the element of the immediacy is this . he could still make a warrantless arrest if. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest. Based on these discussions. the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the . However. the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b). he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation. gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors. the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. circumstances. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter. based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests. interpretations and hearsay. personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed. the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy. On the other hand. with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b). This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. in the alternative. Thus. In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b). for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners. According to the Black's Law Dictionary. 80 In other words. we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ). it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens. events or conditions. and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The phrase covers facts or. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification. However. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception. Hence.

with Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas. From a review of the records. more importantly. the petitioners and Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling. Quezon City. periorbital L. Eva P. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a. Dr. showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma. would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Application of Section S(b). 83 Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma. the attending physician. on the date of the incident. 81 Based on the police blotter entry taken at 4:15 a. right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma. the date that the alleged crime was committed. we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. o. Chest wall). Left Frontal Area.m. although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. although they narrated a different version of what transpired.m. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood. they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.. notably. along Kasiyahan St. Brgy. when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers. on February 20. Holy Spirit. The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. however.. Hence. 85 86 87 With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the . T6 area. 82 The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a. Atty. tenderness on L peripheral area. The medical check-up of Atty. left eye.. and traumatic conjunctivitis. Generoso. Generoso and the petitioners reside. would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. We note. In addition. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and.m. no visible abrasion. 84 To summarize.s. 2005. the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling. 2005. diagnosed Atty. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its decision. on February 20. Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative. Abrasion.m. Abrasion. the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded. right hand. Generoso. that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners. Javier. the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Abrasion. 4th and fifth digit.petitioners' arrest. distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm. the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. III.

As the victim. the personal circumstances of the parties. although they had another version of what transpired. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation. Generoso. the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him. the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers. the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation. the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances. Consequently. and lastly. Considering the circumstances of the stabbing. where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers.time of the arrest of the petitioners. and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place. the police officers in the present case saw Atty. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to mean as an authoritative command After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest. Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson. that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. its occasion. particularly the locality where it took place. the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. specifically. 89 In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests.the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed. the requirement of immediacy. to render personal assistance to the victim. The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the 91 . SP02 Javier. 88 This is also similar to what happened in People v. which are within their personal knowledge. personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision. Thus. More than this. however. instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson. This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed . Jr. SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer. prompting them to make the warrantless arrests. application of actual force. IV. physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested. Tonog. or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b). 90 1âwphi1 To reiterate. it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. manual touching of the body.

Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 91541. which was precisely what happened to this case. In other words. in its Order dismissing the motion. the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. Generoso' s account. G. 95 96 The RTC. 2008 and the resolution dated April 17. In resolving a motion. premises considered. in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter. 82585 November 14. as the RTC decreed. Furthermore. 93 To be sure. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings.parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit. is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case. under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Detailed evidentiary matters. SP No. and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21. Additionally. the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII. including the alleged perpetrators.R. The Order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is valid In their last ditch attempt at avoidance. is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case. SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners. SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty.R. 1988 . after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime. the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim. at the time of their arrest. 92 Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest. Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 16. SO ORDERED. No. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners. of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. WHEREFORE. The RTC. we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance. no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 94 V. was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense. is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Hence. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof. not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial. we hereby DENY the petition. the Court. in resolving the motion." We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order.

CITY FISCAL OF MANILA. Jose P. FREDERICK K. 82827 November 14. Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court. Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court. and GODOFREDO L. Fernandez for petitioner in G. three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In these consolidated cases. and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA. at Manila. 1988. Branch 35. MAKASIAR. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG. THE HON.R. MAKASIAR.R. LUIS VICTOR. petitioner. VICTOR. Fernandez. THE HON. at Manila. ANTONIO V. THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. LUIS C. 1988 LUIS D. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT. Concepcion. Abello. UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III. UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III. 1988. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. SOLIVEN.R. under the Constitution. 82827 and 83979. to determine probable cause. Perfecto V. BELTRAN.MAXIMO V.petitioners. LUIS D. MAKASIAR. No. 83979 November 14. Nos. respondents. and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines. RAMON P. GUERRERO. respondents. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ. 82585. No. BELTRAN. by the President. (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses. the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against . petitioner. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. ROCES. On March 30. G. Fernandez and Cristobal P. subsequently.R. G. AGCAOLI. vs. of the Department of Justice. AQUINO. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G. Angara. may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. vs. if any. MANZANAS. respondents. THE HON. and JUDGE RAMON P. RAMON P.

otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. on the basis thereof. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counteraffidavits if he is so minded." has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.petitioners. Sound policy dictates this procedure. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed. This is not an accurate interpretation. issue a warrant of arrest. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7. petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support. the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. the President. or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. 1988. affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. houses. Following established doctrine and procedure. calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. On June 30. The second issue. 1987. he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and. through the Executive Secretary. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 12. It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran. 1988. The pertinent provision reads: Art. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. On appeal. 1988. 2." in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. Sec. III. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. raised by petitioner Beltran. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. . With these developments. the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counteraffidavits.

Hence. through their separate acts. if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. Thus. an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. not by any other person in the President's behalf. Moreover. Paras. as by testifying on the witness stand. Sarmiento. Thus. 1988 is LIFTED. Padilla. continues Beltran. Melencio-Herrera. also demands undivided attention. there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Feliciano. concur. she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution. This. . 82827 and 83979. she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Cortes. Thus. would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit. Gancayco.It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction. the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties. Nos. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7.. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents. pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office. 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26. the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. C. Fernan. Cruz. WHEREFORE. R. As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom. JJ. Narvasa. considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that. aside from requiring all of the office holder's time. the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point. Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado. Bidin.. But this privilege of immunity from suit. As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character or the publication. with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest.J. the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit. petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit. finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents. 82585. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. Anent the third issue. a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge. of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to cause dishonor. We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic and one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist. However. the Court stated: xxx xxx xxx .Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ. I beg to reserve my vote. concurring: I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its opening statement. engages in unwarranted personal attacks. instead of observing accuracy and fairness. criticism is to be expected and should be borne for the common good. this case is not a simple prosecution for libel. discredit.. the decision in United States v. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. irresponsible twisting of facts. As early as March 8. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow. JR. Perfecto (43 Phil. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]). this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the demarcation line. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation. the managing editor and the business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel. the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. 1918. as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom. or contempt of the complainant. I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a newspaperman who. J. the Court should not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom. In People v. I believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather that later.. There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. However. Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Bustos (37 Phil. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. 887 [1922])." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized. Where the harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of sensitive issues and public affairs. the publisher and chairman of the editorial board.

and the other various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court. a ruler and a freeman. that hate menaces stable government. especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in society. a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue. instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges. . A. Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution. v.. 371 US 415. every man is a sovereign. the Court observed that high official position. A. N. See also the citations in Elizalde v. a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guaranty. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion. 9L ed 2d 405. Button. hope and imagination. that public discussion is a political duty. This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. I must call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as libel. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic. advocacy of unlawful acts.. 429... breach of the peace. would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. that it is hazardous to discourage thought. to wit: In deciding the question now. If. they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. that fear breeds repression.. contempt. and has equal rights with every other man. that repression breeds hate. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment. that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies. P. 34 SCRA 117 [1970]. the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals. C. instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column. we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high government official. . libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. Like insurrection. In other words." (at p.. xxx xxx xxx Those who won our independence believed . Again." (Lopez v. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws. the effect on a free press would be highly injurious. 415. 83 S Ct 328. where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous.. obscenity. and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel is good ones. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction. Gutierrez. 900) In fact. solicitation of legal business. the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials. and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. supra). Court of Appeals. They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject. there is likely to be a chilling effect.

and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest. But why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility of the trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore the more important areas of concern. 250) when he said: If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject. Luis Beltran. However. I know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public duty. There is no question that. Manzanas knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of these petitions. At the same time. concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to narrowly drawn ones. it is that criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression. Roces. Antonio V. which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure. Maximo Soliven. the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or maligns him or her. I limit myself to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. and wide open. I. Frederick K.. 700-701) Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. robust. is there a prima facie showing that Messrs. should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to publishers and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ. The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. JR. and that it may well include vehement. (at pp. the extremely difficult issues involving government power and freedom of expression. of course. the safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be faithfully applied. since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President should not be sued. To this. Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which have not been considered. caustic. Anent the third issue.. may really be intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality.. ordinarily. concurring: . Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v. J. The first issue on prematurity is moot. Agcaoili. . S. libel is not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative words. Illinois (343 U. I take exception.. In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them.Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited. and Godofredo L.

I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its opening statement. However. this case is not a simple prosecution for libel. of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to cause dishonor. the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. instead of observing accuracy and fairness. the Court stated: xxx xxx xxx . As early as March 8. the decision in United States v. or contempt of the complainant. Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. I believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather that later. criticism is to be expected and should be borne for the common good." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized. engages in unwarranted personal attacks.. 1918. discredit. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation. irresponsible twisting of facts. I beg to reserve my vote. We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic and one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. the managing editor and the business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow. Where the harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of sensitive issues and public affairs. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws. as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom. the publisher and chairman of the editorial board. However. the Court should not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]). Bustos (37 Phil.. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. a ruler and a freeman." (at p. Perfecto (43 Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the demarcation line. I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge. In People v. There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. 900) . every man is a sovereign. I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a newspaperman who. 887 [1922]). and has equal rights with every other man.

they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. Button. 9L ed 2d 405. 371 US 415. In other words. a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue. that repression breeds hate. that public discussion is a political duty.In fact. C. They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject. and the other various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court. and that it may well include vehement. where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous. obscenity. there is likely to be a chilling effect. See also the citations in Elizalde v. that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies. advocacy of unlawful acts. This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. that it is hazardous to discourage thought.. 83 S Ct 328. contempt. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction. breach of the peace. supra). and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.. P. robust. (at pp.. we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials. 415. I must call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as libel. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion. 700-701) . Court of Appeals. and wide open." (Lopez v. caustic. . the effect on a free press would be highly injurious. 34 SCRA 117 [1970]. hope and imagination. the Court observed that high official position. . and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. 429. N. Gutierrez. Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited. A. Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution. If. v. that hate menaces stable government. solicitation of legal business.. Like insurrection. would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges. A. especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in society. <äre||anº•1àw> The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic. xxx xxx xxx Those who won our independence believed ... It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high government official. and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel is good ones. to wit: In deciding the question now. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guaranty. Again. instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column. the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals. libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment. that fear breeds repression.

82544 June 28. No. Luis Beltran. petitioners. G. may really be intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. vs. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them. which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure. should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to publishers and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. Frederick K. since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT. is there a prima facie showing that Messrs. Anent the third issue. Roces. of course. the extremely difficult issues involving government power and freedom of expression. 250) when he said: If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject. ordinarily. Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which have not been considered. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest. Antonio V. Agcaoili. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v. But why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility of the trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore the more important areas of concern. libel is not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative words. I know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public duty. S. Manzanas knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of these petitions. Maximo Soliven. There is no question that.Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION. . I take exception. and Godofredo L. the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or maligns him or her. concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to narrowly drawn ones. 1988 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY. the safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be faithfully applied. considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President should not be sued.R. To this. it is that criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression. The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. At the same time. I limit myself to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO. In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners. The first issue on prematurity is moot. Illinois (343 U. I. respondent. However.

On 4 March 1988. is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan. One was released for lack of evidence. RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room. public health and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.MELENCIO-HERRERA. while Adriaan Van Elshout. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center. or on 29 February 1988. Laguna. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. Two (2) days after apprehension. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.: A petition for Habeas Corpus. being pedophiles. this Office charges the respondents for deportation." dated 27 February 1988 read in part: Noted: There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite sometime. J. 58 years old. deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case No. are inimical to public morals. 88-13). . are both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan. seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. in that: they. only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation. as undesirable aliens. another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. Laguna. The "Charge Sheet" read inter alia: Wherefore." on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988 stated: xxx xxx xxx ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys. 52 and 72 years. The "Operation Report. Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan. respectively. Laguna. Thus. of the original twenty two (22). The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission Report. Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman.

A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General. However. petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. including aliens. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile. On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.On 7 March 1988. On 22 March 1988. whether . 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. the Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. respondent denied considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. is available to all persons. who certified that petitioners were healthy. but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID where trial was on-going. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release." On 7 April 1988. as heretofore stated. To avoid congestion. On 4 April 1988. the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. On 14 March 1988. which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest. Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition. search and seizure as required by the said provision. 3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles. respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country. coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles. petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which. There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III. 2) Respondent violated Section 2. are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds: 1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed. however. respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners. Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37.

The Writ has served its purpose. January 31. People's Court. therefore. Section 5). p.1985 Rules on criminal Procedure). although such confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal.accused of crime or not (Moncado vs.. People vs. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code. 62 SCRA 543). Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section 37. But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception. the ones with John Sherman being naked. 77 SCRA 377. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives. 120 SCRA 525). spiritual. That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. 89 SCRA 717). are therefore. Rule 126. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed. the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity (Callanta v. Constitutional Law. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis p. 101. Bagcal vs. Director of Prisons.. 33 [1937]). 1971 ed. 1050 [1947]). been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113. April 30. cited in CRUZ. L-39823. actually committing. L-24646 & L-24674. 1665) [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ. February 28. Syjuco 64 Phil. 555. 64 Phil. In this case. L-61770. admissible in evidence (Section 12. Garcia. "It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal. At any rate. 1977. has become legal. 1 [1948]. Montoya. CFI. or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence. and (2) when an offense has. in fact. Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary. it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical. and social well-being of our youth (Article II. 1979. on 4 March 1988. June 20. Villanueva. as undesirable aliens. 77 Phil. 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code. "were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee. 1980." (People vs. L-49014. photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. The restraint against their persons. Villaraza." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. 1975. Section 13. the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. p. L-27360. the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them. . 1987 ed. Mago. 667 [1937]. November 17. 1968. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms. February 25. his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. 1987 Constitution). Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and.22 SCRA 857. 143). L-41686. 101 SCRA 86. 1983. Alverez vs. moral. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. on p. 80 Phil.

deportation proceedings .The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of cross-examination. 270 F." Before that. However. 16 F.S. (Maliler vs. xxx xxx xxx The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding. Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. 155). 155. Pedaris. The ruling in Vivo vs. It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action.S. relating the facts relied upon. 24576. that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him. 20 SCRA 562). Clark. vs. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. otherwise... June 30. Supp. 397). vs. Fabre 81 Phil. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37. July 29. which are substantially Identical. 55 F.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted. 32).. Uhl 211 F.. the very purpose of deportation proceeding would be defeated. 1967.S. before unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel.. Sercerchi vs. 153). An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. The order of deportation is not a punishment. Vivo. provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Eby. 53 F. 14. It is preventive. [2d]. The deportation proceedings are administrative in character. if he so desires. all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed. The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions. Clark. Montesa (G. and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Section 37(a) provides in part: (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. 1968. Ward. 53 F. Hughes. (U. Baker. not a penal process. 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. 33 Phil.S. Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein. [2d]. 437). 24 SCRA 155) that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration. Ex parte Jew You On. Murdock vs. 577. are administrative in character. L-22196.. De los Santos. 22) summary in nature. No. (Kessler vs. 264 U. (Lao Tang Bun vs. in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. [2d]. 682 [1948]). It is essential.S. 27 F. on the other hand. it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U. 104 F. 597. solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. R. Deportation proceedings. however. (U. [2d]. conflicts with paragraph 3. vs. [2d]. 628. Stracker 307 U.

No. which gives authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds required for the stay. "The requirement of probable cause. 613. 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo vs. citing Tiu Chun Hai vs." For. is not unconstitutional. supra. Vivo. expelled. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under Section 37[al of Commonwealth Act 613. that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel. 1967. Vivo. as heretofore stated. 69. leading to an administrative investigation. June 30. In such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. if desired. Thus. Deportation Board (G. 10145. as amended. G. Galang. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State. and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported. 1963. September 30. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides: Sec. to be determined by a Judge. does not extend to deportation proceedings. it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause. No. that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings. L-22196.. 20 SCRA 562). infra). Montesa. or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation. February 29. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country. The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. Deportation of subject of foreign power. (Ng Hua To vs.had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. R. Commissioner. 10280." (Morano vs. (Morano vs. conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent. which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment of the State. He shall also have the right to be . R. Section 37 of the Immigration Law. xxx xxx xxx . probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.. of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. 1964. 10 SCRA 411). supra.

38 Phil. WHEREFORE." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. No. 41 [1918]). February 28. 1981. in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners. 534 [1910]). to produce witnesses in his own behalf. the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. CATALINO YAMILO. 16 Phil.: . Deportation Board. DALMACIO YGOT and EUFROCINA ESTORES. 104 Phil. Petitioners. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect. supra). was in order because in deportation proceedings. The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs.R. and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV. cruelty. The power to deport aliens is an act of State. "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail. L-9700. 682 [1948]). the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied. 4 SCRA 442). J. As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action.1962. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. DECISION MELENCIO-HERRERA. Commissioner of Immigration.. an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick. HONORABLE JUDGE MONTANO A. exploitation. PEDRO BACLAY. SO ORDERED FIRST DIVISION [G. Fabre 81 Phil. Thus. PATES. Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. ORTIZ. and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses. SGT. Section 3[2]). REYNALDO MOSQUITO and MATILDE ABASTILLAS MOSQUITO. Respondents. Chuoco Tiaco et al. Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration. CIRIACA ALIMPOOS. Commissioner of Immigration. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. 949 [1958]). abuse.] ELISEO ALIMPOOS. MILLARDO M. L-27331 : July 30.heard by himself or counsel. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. acted in the interests of the State. vs. RAFAEL CAPANGPANGAN. the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. also challenged by them." (Tiu Chun Hai et al vs.

Sgt. which was a prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries. Pates was represented by Capt. and Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code. 1088. for short). The place allegedly robbed belonged to the Offended Parties. In an amended complaint. attorney’s fees. They contended that they had nothing to do with the Accused’s detention and arrest. Respondent Reynaldo Mosquito will hereinafter be called the Accused. The Municipal Judge. as well as for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Offended Parties and the Witnesses. by defendants therein who were said to have been instrumental in causing the detention and arrest of the Accused. Respondent Matilde A. the Chief of Police. The dispositive portion of the ORDER reads: cranad “WHEREFORE. The petition for habeas corpus is therefore granted and it is hereby ordered that said detention prisoner be forthwith released from custody. with offices located in Cebu City. and the Municipal Judge were added as codefendants. then detained. After due hearing in the Habeas Corpus case. and Patrolmen Libres and Galimba. cranad cranad The Accused was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan. shall hereinafter be called the Offended Parties. declaring the detention of the Accused illegal and granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as the Preliminary Injunction prayed for upon the filing of the required bond. Rafael Capangpangan. Named as defendants in the original complaint were the Offended parties and the Witnesses (as witnesses for the prosecution) all of whom are residents of Agusan. for short) in Civil Case No. In this Petition for Certiorari. the Chief of Police. 458 of the Municipal Court of Bayugan. Eliseo Alimpoos. judgment is hereby rendered declaring illegal the detention of plaintiff Reynaldo Mosquito by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued without the observance of the fundamental legal requirements prior to the issuance of said Writ. Millardo M. Mendoza and Associates. and set at liberty and that upon the . Agusan (hereinafter called Criminal Case) where the Accused had been arrested. (8). and the Municipal Judge. Igualdad Cunanan. and costs were also prayed for. vs.” wherein respondent Trial Judge granted the Accused’s petition for Habeas Corpus and declared his detention illegal. cranad cranad cranad cranad cranad cranad The Offended Parties and the Witnesses. and the Municipal Judge and/or their representatives. Pates. moral and exemplary damages. 1966.Petitioner-spouses. (17) and (19) of the Civil Code. (16). the two arresting policemen. (15). the Offended Parties and the Witnesses seek the reversal of the Decision of the Appellate Tribunal. and reiterated substantially the same defense. respondent Trial Judge issued the appealed Order (the ORDER. were represented by the law firm of Seno. as such. Eufrocina Estores and Sgt. upholding the disallowance of the Offended Parties’ appeal by the Court of First Instance of Agusan (the Trial Court. Petitioners Pedro Baclay. Ortiz. alleged that the Warrant of Arrest was validly issued. Actual. Pates may hereinafter be referred to as the Witnesses. except Sgt. cranad The Complaint of the Accused was premised on the alleged violation of Article 32 (4). respondent Judge Montano A. Mosquito is the Accused’s wife. the Accused. Agusan. and his wife instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the Trial Court. entitled “Reynaldo Mosquito. dated March 26. who were represented by the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Butuan City. from proceeding with the Criminal Case. It prayed for the Accused’s release from detention. Dalmacio Ygot. Respondent Court of Appeals will be termed the Appellate Tribunal. by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal Case. et al. Catalino Yamilo. He also enjoined the prosecution of Criminal Case No. as respondent Trial Judge. et al. Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos. Contending that the Warrant was issued without the observance of the legal requirements for the issuance thereof.

On April 4. for the crime of Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries. 1966.” 2 No reconsideration was prayed for by the Provincial Fiscal.’.’ however. 1966) which copy was handed to him by defendant (petitioner) Eliseo Alimpoos. moved for extension of time within which to appeal. the Appellate Tribunal. 458 entitled ‘The People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Mosquito et als.filing of the bond in the amount of P1. respondent Trial Judge dismissed their appeal thus: “The notice of appeal of the Provincial Fiscal or of Atty. Agusan.000. 1966 granting the habeas corpus is now final and executory. and on April 1. with costs against the defendants in these habeas corpus and preliminary injunction proceedings. 1966. 1967. The urgent ex-parte motion to grant extension to file notice of appeal does not interrupt the running of the period fixed by law for filing an appeal which is forty-eight hours from receipt of the order. 37781-R.” cranad cranad The appeal was opposed by the Accused on the ground that it was filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal in Habeas Corpus proceedings. this petition is hereby denied. having been filed out of time the Order of March 26. save of his own self-serving assertions. the case was considered submitted for decision on April 19. 1967. On January 11. On April 23. counsel for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses mailed from Cebu City a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals stating that: “Undersigned counsel received a copy of the order only today (April 4. We gave due course to the Petition on March 31. Costs against petitioners.R. 1966. denied Mandamus stating in part: “As the records show that copy of the questioned Order was received by counsel on March 30. 1966.00 a writ of preliminary injunction issue restraining the Municipal Judge of Bayugan. Petitioners’ appeal was therefore filed out of time and the judgment has become final. Annex ‘B’ on April 4. No. “In view of the foregoing. but eventually desisted from doing so. 1966. defendant Vicente Galicia and the rest of the defendants. their attorneys.” 1 The Acting Provincial Fiscal of Agusan received copy of said ORDER on March 31. Seno for the defendants. 1966. 1967. resorted to a Mandamus proceeding before the Court of Appeals seeking to compel respondent Trial Judge to give due course to said appeal. which cannot prevail . filed on March 13. over the Offended Parties’ objections. 1968. the notice of appeal was not filed within the 48-hour limit. however. SO ORDERED. agents or representatives from proceeding with Criminal Case No. has not presented a shred of proof to bolster his claim of actual receipt of the order. The Offended Parties.” Hence. The Offended Parties and the Witnesses pose the following Assignments of Error: “I The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that ‘counsel. this Petition for Certiorari. 3 in CA-G. and after the filing of the respective Briefs. praying that the Decision of the Appellate Tribunal be set aside and the appeal interposed by the Offended Parties in the Habeas Corpus case be allowed.

Counsel for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses further maintains that the period from which to reckon the period of appeal should actually be April 14. 1966 when he actually received. The crucial last page is reproduced hereunder exactly as it appears: “CIVIL CASE NO. and its affirmance by the Appellate Court. but to his counsel of record. 1966. notice should be sent. not to the party. The latter had received it on March 31. the notice of appeal was not filed within the 48-hour limit. 5 purportedly showing that the law office of counsel for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses received its copy on March 30. bearing the true actual date when the parties and counsel herein received their corresponding copies. 1966.’ IV The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that ‘petitioners’ appeal was. 1966 not on April 4. 4 Respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal alike found the foregoing assertion selfserving and relied instead on the last page of the ORDER. cranad II The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that ‘respondent Judge was fully justified in relying on its own record to determine the date on which petitioners’ counsel received copy of the order.’ V The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration without requiring the adverse party to answer the said Motion for Reconsideration. who handed him the copy in Cebu City. Counsel for the Offended Parties alleges that he received a copy of the ORDER only on April 4. The same certified true copy of the order shows that the law office of herein counsel received its copy on March 30.over the court record. 1966 and not on April 4. hence the disallowance of the appeal by respondent Trial Judge. Eliseo Alimpoos.” The technical issue of timeliness of the appeal will first be considered. because courts will take judicial notice of its records and of the facts which the same records establish and which are known to judges by reason of their judicial functions. his copy of the ORDER. VI The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in failing to pass upon the issues raised in the lower court and in the Court of Appeals. (Annex 1 of Answer) certified to by the Clerk of Court. without any proof thereof. therefore. through the mails. when a party is represented by counsel. as shown by the rubber stamp of his office appearing on the upper right hand corner of a duplicate copy of the ORDER. Counsel contends that the reglementary period to appeal can not be reckoned from the latter date because. filed out of time and the judgment has become final. 1966. 1966 from the Offended Party. 1966. under the Rules. 1088 ORDER .’ III The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that ‘as the records show that copy of the questioned order was received by counsel on March 30.

ORTIZ JUDGE MAO-bb.—5— and preliminary injunction proceedings. Ciriaco Alimpoos Pedro Baklay Catalino Yamilo .) B. 31/3/66 (initial) cranad Received: (Sgd. Recd. 1966 at the City of Butuan. Judge (Sgd.) Illegible 3/30/66 7:00 evening cranad 3/31/66 (Sgd. (SGD. SO ORDERED.) MONTANO A. 1966 8:00 A. Galimba 3/30/00 7:00 cranad (Sgd.M. Done this 26th day of March.) Eliseo Alimpoos cranad Received copy March 31.) Illegible Mun.

Rafael Capangpangan Dalmacio Ygot Eufrocina Estores By: (Sgd. 11634 that for Capt. CONDE (t) MACARIO C. Ruiz and Associates. Cunanan” were sent by registered mail with Receipts Nos. Cebu City” with the following markings: On the face of the envelope lower left hand corner: “REGISTERED CITY OF BUTUAN . Cunanan.. MAIL #11633 & #11634 A certified true copy: (s) MACARIO C. 11633 and 11634. copies of the ORDER intended for “Attys.) Illegible cranad For the Chief of Police 3-30-66 TO ATTYS. RUIZ & ASS. 11633 is the registry number corresponding to the copy for the law office.) Illegible (Sgd. SENO. Mendoza. Mendoza.) Eliseo Alimpoos cranad March 31. CONDE Clerk of Court” 6 (emphasis supplied) cranad Obviously. Seno. Cor. Receipt No. MENDOZA. 1966 (Sgd. and Receipt No. Magallanes-D Jakosalem Sts. & CAPT. Ruiz & Ass.. Aboitiz Bldg. & Capt. CUNANAN BY REG. This is borne out by the envelope 7 from the “Office of the Clerk of Court Butuan City” addressed to “Seno.

as alleged by it. 1966. 11633” On the back of the envelope appears a big diagonal stamp “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” and two post office stamp marks: “REGISTERED CITY OF BUTUAN PHILIPPINES March 31. The notation “(Sgd. or on April 14. 1966. 1966 “CEBU CITY Received April 11. Ruiz & Ass. Seno. 1966 Superimposed on it in ink is “No.PHILIPPINES March 31. Mendoza. 1966 Philippines Since the registered mail was received in Cebu City only on April 11. & . it is not unlikely that the law office and addressee.) Illegible 3-30-66” appearing above the following note: “To Attys. received the mail only three days after.

Ferris & Forrest G. Because the proceedings before the trial Court was a Habeas Corpus case. personal service would not have been possible in Agusan. It is apparent then that both respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal committed error in holding that the Offended Parties’ appeal was interposed beyond the reglementary period. therefore. April 4. reliance may be placed on the assertion of counsel that the Offended Party. It may be analogized to a proceeding in rem and instituted for the sole purpose of fixing the status of a person. A Habeas Corpus proceeding is not a suit between parties. we believe it would not be justifiable to reverse and to direct respondent Trial Judge to allow the Offended Parties to appeal. Eliseo Alimpoos. and resolved on March 26. The proceeding is instituted solely for his benefit. Ferris. most probably. 1966. Forrest G. a suit. had given him a copy of the ORDER only on April 4. Requisites of application therefor.. therefore. in keeping with the “speedy and effectual” character of Habeas Corpus proceedings. . 1. and as no judgment can be entered against anybody. and as there is no real plaintiff and defendant. 3. the complaint filed was obviously defective. mail #11633 & #11634” can not refer to personal receipt by the said law office for the obvious reason that its office being at Cebu City. — While the issuance of the writ is to all intents and purposes the commencement of a civil action. 2. the appeal was seasonably filed. The original and amended complaints filed by the Offended Parties with the Trial Court contained three causes of action. which must be deemed as the date of notice to said counsel of the ORDER. 1966 cannot be deemed as notice in law to his counsel. The lawyers of the Offended Parties attempted to appeal from the ORDER in accordance with Section 19 of Rule 41. on March 31. 10 The ORDER treated the case as exclusively a Habeas Corpus proceeding. The original complaint was filed on February 22. 8 Under the circumstances. captioned “who may appeal in Habeas Corpus cases. 28) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary The Accused. As it is not designed to obtain redress against anybody.” (Extraordinary Legal Remedies. we are opting to render a practical judgment. 1966. Instead. The person restrained is the central figure in the transaction.” The Appellate Tribunal resolved in the mandamus case as relating to a Habeas Corpus case. Eliseo Alimpoos. which enumerates what should be set forth in a petition for Habeas Corpus: “SEC. It is an inquisition by the government. should have limited his complaint against the Chief of Police of Bayugan. Cunanan by reg. at the suggestion and instance of an individual. but still in the name and capacity of the sovereign.Capt. p. yet technically the proceedings by Habeas Corpus is in no sense a suit between private parties. Jr. 1966 from Cebu. — Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended. Service on the Offended Party. the person having him in alleged illegal custody. “Not a suit between the parties. That is the clear implication in the following provisions of Section 3. ignoring the Accused’s prayer for damages. 9 Procedurally. Although the Appellate Tribunal had committed error in its appreciation of the date when the lawyers of the Offended Parties were served notice of the ORDER. 1966. the proceedings were conducted purely as a Habeas Corpus case. there can be no suit in the technical sense. and shall set forth: (a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty. Counsel lost no time in mailing his Notice of Appeal on the same day. principally for Habeas Corpus and for damages. or by some person on his behalf. Rule 102. However.

to recover damages or other money award. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. 430]). . in determine a disputed interstate boundary line. chanroble svirtualawlibrary It is indisputable that the Habeas Corpus case arose by virtue of criminal proceedings in the Criminal case. to punish respondent or to afford the injured person redress. Neither did he take steps for the reconsideration of respondent Trial Judge’s Order of April 23. cra chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cranad 3. 112 Misc. although the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan. — When the court or Judge has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner. if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority. 1966 dismissing the appeal. 93 Vt. Rule 102. which provides: SEC 19. therefore. and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal.” It will be observed that there is no provision for serving copy of the discharge on any other private party defendant.” The Accused’s allegation as to. (d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person. the prisoner shall be forthwith released. he shall forthwith order his discharge from confinement. NY — People vs. The Accused has challenged the personality of the Offended Parties to interpose the appeal. but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on the officer or person detaining the prisoner. if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy. 208 [39 C. 182 NYS 577. premised on Section 19 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended. his sound discretion on the . damages was out of place. Thus it has been held that the writ cannot properly be used: To enforce a right to service.S. if both are unknown or uncertain. In Habeas Corpus cases. if known. 15. which reads: “SEC. It has to be confined to what is provided for in Section 15. But if the detention is by reason of civil proceedings the party in interest or the person who caused the detention shall be entitled to control the appeal.(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained. the provincial fiscal or the city fiscal as the case may be. nor for an award of damages. for the illegal detention. and ordinarily it cannot properly be used for any other purpose. — The appeal in habeas corpus cases may be taken in the name of the person detained or of the officer or person detaining him. the judgment in favor of the applicant cannot contain a provision for damages. As in criminal proceedings. and if. by virtue of criminal proceedings. filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to Perfect Appeal” on April 1. As it has been held: “The sole function of the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment. such fact shall appear. The inaction of the Fiscal may be deemed to have been an admission on his part of the unmeritoriousness of an appeal.” (emphasis supplied) (Vt — In re St.J. (c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained. Pursuant to the aforequoted provision. or. such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation. subject to the right of the Solicitor General to intervene” (Rule 41). . Who may appeal in habeas corpus cases. to determine whether a person has committed a crime. he had nevertheless abandoned the same. In this case. it was the Provincial Fiscal who was entitled to control the appeal on behalf of the Government. and prayer for. 108 A203. Prior. or. Onge. 1966. is entitled to control the appeal on behalf of the government. 373.

” 12 Time and again.” When a preliminary investigation is not held. 13 . In a case where a warrant of arrest was assailed for an alleged improper preliminary examination.matter should be deemed controlling. They rarely. Noteworthy is the fact that in the instant case. “As a general rule. 4. 329 (1916) where it was said: cranad “Proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from the main case from which the proceedings spring. 26 SCRA. 323 (1968). 1239. That is error. if at all. speaking through now Mr. Casiano. a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort to another general remedy. was not to dismiss the information but to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. what should have been done was to set aside the warrant of arrest and order the discharge of the Accused. we believe that. Figueroa. since in its own Order it recognized that Fiscal Abaca had conducted a preliminary investigation although ‘hurriedly’ in its opinion. it has been explained that Habeas Corpus cannot function as a writ of error. if ever. Plaza. such as appeal or writ of error. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the present case. especially where the other remedy is deemed not to be as effective as that of habeas corpus. Habeas Corpus was not the proper remedy for the Accused. but to have the preliminary investigation conducted. It has been noted that the ORDER contains a provision enjoining the prosecution of the Accused in the Criminal Case. 310. or is improperly held. or enjoin its prosecution.” It is the general rule that Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to when there is another remedy available. As a matter of fact. but without enjoining the Municipal Judge from conducting a preliminary examination and afterwards properly issuing a warrant of arrest. the procedure is not to dismiss the case. this Court. 33 Phil. under the circumstances stated in this opinion. had stressed this as the proper procedure. the Offended Parties had alleged in their Answer 11 that they were not detaining the Accused and had nothing to do with the Warrant of Arrest issued against him. said: cranad “At any rate. This Court. As stated in People v. If the Accused was illegally detained because he was arrested without a preliminary examination. With all the more reason then that they had no personality to interpose an appeal from a judicial Order granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the release of a person detained. and it has to be held that the Offended Parties were bereft of personality to prosecute the appeal. This principle was enunciated in Lee Ching v. Habeas Corpus proceedings are not meant to determine criminal responsibility. 1247 (1969): cranad “Assuming that the trial court felt that the accused should have been given more ‘ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation. Collector of Customs. 27 SCRA.’“ 5.’ then what it could properly have done. But the existence of another remedy does not necessarily preclude a resort to the writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from illegal detention. in Luna v. touch the merits of the case and require no pronouncement with respect thereto. is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal. the remedy available to the petitioner herein. pointing out that ‘the absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Chief Justice Concepcion in People vs.

the costs shall be taxed against the Republic” 14 7.6. The error of the Municipal Judge has considerably retarded the turning of the wheels of justice. WHEREFORE. and the proceedings in the last two cases mentioned are invalidated. It should be meet to reiterate the following admonition made in the aforecited Luna-Plaza case: “We wish to stress. SO ORDERED. as well as the Decision of the Court of Appeals in its case CA-G. in the distinct understanding that this Court has not acted in a proper Habeas Corpus proceeding. 186529 August 3. JACK RACHO y RAQUERO. No. for it will leave the ORDER of respondent Trial Judge outstanding with its injunction against the further prosecution of the Criminal Case. 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. their statements before a person or persons other than the judge before whom the criminal complaint is filed. We wish to emphasize strict compliance by municipal or city judges of the provision of Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. it should be practical to resolve this case in a manner that will not further protract the matter brought to this instance. Appellant. It is obvious that the purpose of this amendment is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made. as amended by Republic Act 3828. in order to avoid malicious and/or unfounded criminal prosecution of persons. the Warrant of Arrest issued against Reynaldo Mosquito in Criminal Case No. and that the examination must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers.R. that what has been stated in this opinion is certainly not intended to sanction the return to the former practice of municipal judges of simply relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to accompany the complaints that are filed before them. 458 of the Municipal Court of Bayugan. It has further been noted that respondent Trial Judge erred in adjudging “costs” against defendants in the Habeas Corpus case. J.: . “When a person confined under color of proceedings in a criminal case is discharged. G. vs.” cranad cranad In view of the foregoing considerations. the Order of March 26. the Accused was able to institute the Habeas Corpus case which has pended to this date.R. 1088 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan. Appellee. It will not do merely to reverse and set aside the appealed decision of the Appellate Tribunal. are hereby set aside. 1966 issued in Civil Case No. No. Agusan. however. The Accused was charged with Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries in early 1966. or for fifteen years. That practice is precisely what is sought to be voided by the amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining the witnesses personally. Without pronouncement as to costs. and swore to. in determining whether there is a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. DECISION NACHURA. Through the error of the Municipal Judge in issuing the warrant of arrest without conducting a preliminary examination. 37781-R.

did then and there. CONTRARY TO LAW. When appellant alighted from the bus. the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant. of the same day. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8. feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5. unlawfully. On May 20. At around 3:00 p. the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. dangerous drugs. one for violation of Section 5 of R. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler. The case stemmed from the following facts: On May 19. 9165. the said accused. the said accused did then and there. 2008 in CA-G.C. appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu". The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. No. Article II of Republic Act (R. Aurora. of Section 11 of the same law for possessing.A.01 [or 4. at 11:00 a. Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. when opened. together with his physical description. a regulated drug without any permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same. a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. a white envelope slipped therefrom which. Aurora the following day. 2003. CONTRARY TO LAW. 6 Appellant was charged in two separate Informations.On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 22. but as he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket. for transporting or delivering. appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.) No.A.. Appellant immediately denied the accusation. 2003. 2003 in Baler. Aurora.4 The agent gave the police appellant’s name.R. a Genesis bus arrived in Baler."7 "That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20. 9165. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler. the accusatory portions of which read: "That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same. CR-H. As appellant was about to board a tricycle.01) [or 4. 5 The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation.m. The confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellant’s name. anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. 2003 in Baler. Aurora. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5. Having alighted from the bus.m. unlawfully. and the second. the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5."8 .

the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.A. coupled with . However. On appeal. we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest. brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. As to the circumstances of his arrest.00. forced him to alight. stripped his clothes and underwear. blocked the tricycle he was riding in. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. the present appeal. through their van. R. It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.A. this is not a hard and fast rule. then brought him to the police station for investigation. appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. Article II. 14 1avvphi1 After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below. This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters. The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500.13 Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet of shabu and. In his brief. Article II. misunderstood. appellant assails. the admissibility of the sachet. In fact. appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler. Considering this lapse. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC. he explained that the police officers. for the first time. even those not raised on appeal. 2004. the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10 convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5.12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts. At the trial. the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus. We have repeatedly held that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him. but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11. this is the first time that he raises the issue.During the arraignment.000.9 On July 8.11 Hence. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree. the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. 9165. R. consequently. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the team’s failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief. The appeal is meritorious. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked. or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him.

declaring that he was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler. it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.21 Thus. the arrest must precede the search. 19 The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto.20 Consequently. Search of evidence in "plain view. Customs search. and 7. otherwise. and the character of the articles procured. thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. be the basis of his acquittal. a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 4. 5. the place or thing searched. having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 22 . is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition. namely: 1.18 What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question. the process cannot be reversed. admits of exceptions. it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. the presence or absence of probable cause.16 The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. however.his active participation in the trial of the case. 2. Consented warrantless search. Nevertheless. Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot. determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest. the manner in which the search and seizure was made. Search of a moving vehicle. Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest. it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 6." 3. given the factual milieu of the case. we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant. including the purpose of the search or seizure.17 Said proscription. Exigent and emergency circumstances. we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. 15 As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence. in itself. Stop and Frisk. generally. Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.

29 . When asked about the contents of her bag. a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. While thus positioned. even without a warrant. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves. the team approached her and introduced themselves. 2003. 1999. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler. 24 We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine. the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves. they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.. The rule requires. "Aling Rosa. 2003. and at around 3:00 p. The instant case is similar to People v.m. At around 4:00 p. in addition. the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler. at 11:00 a. The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. and when the latter was about to board a tricycle.25 People v. is actually committing. that same day. a white envelope slipped therefrom which. At 8:00 p. Aruta. Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance.26 and People v. On May 19. Thereafter. a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed. Clearly. when opened. For five days. This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information. When appellant alighted from the bus. Upon inspection. the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. of the same day.27 In People v." who was then carrying a traveling bag.The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the established facts. 1999. Aurora. Davao City. Aurora carrying shabu. Reacting to the report. On May 20. The informant then pointed to the team members the woman. 23 The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant.m. the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. what prompted the police to apprehend appellant. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. 28 The facts in People v. Acting on said tip. or is attempting to commit an offense.. by itself. Tudtud show that in July and August. the Toril Police Station. a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler. Nuevas.m. Aruta. When he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket. Tudtud. a team of police officers posted themselves to await Tudtud’s arrival. the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with. On August 1. she handed it to the apprehending officers. is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.m.

the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III. 30 In all of these cases. The police accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers. they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches. As in the above cases. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed. or about to commit an offense. Maspil. At the time of the arrest. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellant’s physical description but also his name." hence. was actually committing. Were it not for the information given by the informant. the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan. Gonzales.35 People v. except in Valdez and Gonzales. Upon seeing the two male persons. introduced themselves as police officers. later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio. Balingan. 38 Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant.37 In these cases. appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree.34 People v. we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate probable cause." . with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand. the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant. Montilla. a member of the arresting team. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Tudtud. 2003. then inspected the bag they were carrying. and consequently. Valdez. carrying a plastic bag..33 People v. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design. they saw the accused who fit the description. 39 Obviously. We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking. would make a delivery of marijuana leaves.36 and People v. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19).32 People v. "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Bagista. In his bid to escape charges.In People v. Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution. the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. the police approached them. Nuevas. the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Lising. the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused had committed. their office received the "tipped information" on May 19. these include People v. was committing. appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made. there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). the police officers received information that a certain male person. Clearly. or attempting to commit a crime. 25 to 30 years old. Jr. But as aptly observed by the Court. Upon inspection.31 People v. and usually wearing a sando and maong pants. the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves. As cited in People v. more or less 5’4" in height.

2008 in CA-G. Ironically. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No.40 One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.R.R. despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. or the reasons for his confinement. As earlier mentioned. we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. vs.R. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Some lawmen. Truly. G. No costs. A waiver of an illegal. and its Resolution dated April 11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22. the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. within ten (10) days from notice. CR-H.C. Thus. Nuevas. Branch 259 in Criminal Case No. prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ongcoma Hadji Romar (petitioner) seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 10. DECISION BRION. CR No. and the eventual denigration of society. Petitioner. we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. J." 1 . an acquittal is warranted. 182534 ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society. 2008. unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause. Respondent. premises considered. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant. warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.41 x x x In the final analysis. 020986 which convicted the petitioner for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice. 29364. 2008 in CA-G.Without the confiscated shabu. SO ORDERED. the end never justifies the means. and to inform the Court of the date of his release. appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence.42 WHEREFORE. These assailed CA rulings affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parafiaque City.

otherwise known as shabu. ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing. They poked a gun at him. Article II of RA 9165. at around 8:50 in the evening. 5 After crossing the overpass. He was likewise investigated for alleged possession of shabu and detained for one day. 2 3 PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. Roxas Boulevard. The CA’s ruling The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC’s findings. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area. Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the incident. they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. the petitioner was found to possess one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0. He testified that on August 20. He was criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City. which he carried to cut cords. 7 The RTC also did not believe the petitioner’s defense of denial and ruled that it is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions in dangerous drugs cases. Alfredo C. and forced him to go with them. The RTC also noted that PO1 Eric Tan was straightforward in giving his testimony and he did not show any ill motive in arresting the petitioner. prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife. after selling imitation sunglasses and other accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center. . 8 The petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. their Chief. Valdez.03 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride. he was going home at around 6:30 p. They also confiscated the kitchen knife. Branch 77 for the possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually acquitted. Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the petitioner’s body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he suspected as shabu. As stated in the RTC decision. 2002. The petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment. a policeman and a civilian stopped and frisked him despite his refusal. 2002. accused him of being a holdupper. 6 The RTC’s Ruling The RTC convicted the petitioner. P/Chief Supt. The Information states that on or about August 20.The Factual Antecedents The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11. This defense is weak especially when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence as in this case. he testified that on August 20. The petitioner picked up something from the ground. It ruled that PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy were presumed to have performed their duties regularly in arresting and conducting a search on the petitioner. 2002.m. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile hunter. 4 The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense. Thereafter.

the sole testimony of Tan cannot sustain the petitioner’s conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 10 The CA likewise ruled that PO1 Tan clearly showed that the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of shabu. which was allegedly recovered from the petitioner. In fact. was not committing and was not attempting to commit any crime at the time of his arrest. the petitioner committed jaywalking in the presence of PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy. Hence. The non-filing of a criminal charge of jaywalking against the petitioner does not render his arrest invalid. One of these is when the person to be arrested has committed. paragraph (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the circumstances when a warrantless arrest is legal. Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a search that is directed only upon dangerous weapons or "anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a warrant. The petitioner has not committed. hence. Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. who allegedly recovered the shabu from the petitioner. According to the respondent. is actually committing. 9 Consequently. this appeal. He reiterates that the warrantless frisking and search on the petitioner’s body was an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking. the non-presentation of Tangcoy. his warrantless arrest for jaywalking was lawful." In the present case. for which the petitioner was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto. is jaywalking. or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or a private person. Section 5. The Respondent’s Position In his Comment. assuming for the sake of argument that there was a valid arrest. no report or criminal charge was filed against him for the alleged jaywalking. and proper. 15 Finally. is inadmissible as evidence because it was obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest and in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure. the shabu. In the present case. the respondent argues that the guilt of the petitioner was conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt. renders the prosecution’s evidence weak and uncorroborated. Section 13. 11 12 The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. the petitioner can no longer question his arrest after voluntarily . Consequently. The alleged confiscated drug has nothing to do with the offense of jaywalking. 14 Second. valid. 16 17 18 The respondent also assails the petitioner’s defense that the shabu is inadmissible as evidence.According to the CA. the offense. the subsequent frisking and search done on the petitioner’s body which produced the knife and the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest allowed under Section 13. 13 The Petitioner’s Position The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction on the following grounds: First.

21 22 Section 5. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare. 23 To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest. papers.submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea of not guilty and when he testified in court. For. the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime. without a valid warrantless arrest. two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed. The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly crossed.shabu. the exercise of this power and the implementation of the law should not violate the constitutional rights of the citizens. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. the . Any evidence obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 20 To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence. in a place not designated for crossing. These are pieces of evidence that could have supported the conclusion that indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant. and (2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer. we find that aside from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by the CA in its decision. or is attempting to commit a crime. is actually committing. For this purpose. the respondent failed to prove that the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area." Aside from this conclusion. As a consequence. Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard. 19 The Court’s Ruling We find the petition meritorious. 24 The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti of the crime . In the present case. Particularly. the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied with. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons. the respondent alleged that the petitioner’s warrantless arrest was due to his commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan and Tangcoy. the alleged confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner’s body is surely a violation of his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. On this point. houses. Thus. The petitioner was also not charged of jaywalking. There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest. the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence against him. The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted on the petitioner’s body. the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. which must precede the search.was obtained.

we saw a male person crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard. is required. Neither the application of actual force. Even if there is a criminal charge against an accused. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other. however. in a place not designated for crossing. in a place not designated for crossing? A: We accosted him. or physical restraint. that the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to prove a valid warrantless arrest. manual touching of the body. 25 It may not be amiss to point out also the contrary observation of the Court as regards the findings of the RTC when it held. This presumption cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. . so he was frisked by Ronald Tangcoy and a knife was recovered from his possession. The testimony of Tan. is as follows: 28 Q: What happened after you obeyed the order of your immediate superior? A: At 8:50 in the evening of August 20. This elementary principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. the most primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. the prosecution failed to prove this in the present case. Pero napansin namin siya na parang may kinukuha. Tangcoy recovered from his possession a knife and a small plastic sachet containing shabu. Neither can the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty save the prosecution’s lack of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest and search. under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. nor a formal declaration of arrest. rather hastily. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused. Q: How did you accost that person? A: We accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. 26 Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. as quoted in the CA decision. and the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution. Q: What did you do when you saw this person crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard. as quoted by the CA. and the findings of the RTC. 2002. 27 The pertinent testimony of Tan. Unfortunately. and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit. cast doubt on whether Tan and Tangcoy intended to arrest the petitioner for jaywalking.subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid. the prosecution is not relieved from its burden to prove that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the crime. We clarify. that in the process of accosting the petitioner for jaywalking.

the intent to arrest the petitioner only came after they allegedly confiscated the shabu from the petitioner. Q: After the drug was recovered from the possession of that man. what did you do? A: We brought him to our precinct and informed him of his constitutional rights and brought him to the Parañaque Community Hospital and the suspected shabu or methylamphetamine was brought to the PNP Crime Lab at Fort Bonifacio. Tan and Tangcoy "immediately accosted him and told him to cross [at] the designated area. they did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing." [emphasis and underscoring supplied] Clearly. Q: Did you know the contents of that plastic sachet which your companion recovered from that person who crossed the wrong side of the street? A: Yes. sir. according to the RTC.Q: After a knife was recovered by your companions (sic) from that person who allegedly crossed the wrong side of the street. Q: What is his name? A: Ongcoma Hadji Omar. Q: Is he the same Ongcoma Hadji Omar y Para. When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking. no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. This lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge that was filed against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area. 2002? A: Yes. Q: Did you come to know the name of that person whom you arrested in the morning of August 20. sir." 29 Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his liberty. . the accused in this case? A: Yes. for which they informed him of his constitutional rights and brought him to the police station. nakaalalay lang ako and he was frisked again by Tangcoy and a plastic sachet was recovered from his possession. From Tan’s testimony. sir. In fact. what happened after that? A: After recovering the knife. Q: What about the contents? A: Suspected shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride. sir.

WHEREFORE. being caught in flagrante delicto for violating an ordinance. but only after the initial search resulted in the recovery of the knife. could have been therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. the respondent’s argument that there was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking appears to be an afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search conducted on the person of the petitioner. thereby curing any defect in his arrest. its inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner. People of the Philippines. The Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissible as evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no intent to arrest him. 2008 in CA-G.R. he actively participated in the trial of the case. Petitioner ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention. unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal. warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. and its Resolution dated April 11. G. this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person.: . 2008. vs. In addition.The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. 29364. In fact. 30 This is notwithstanding the fact that the accused. Clearly. 1âwphi1 However. We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. As a result. Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. plaintiff-appellee. CESAR GIVERA y GAROTE. SO ORDERED. 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. according to Tan. the illegality of the search for the shabu is further highlighted when it was not recoveredimmediately after the alleged lawful arrest.R. CR No. the petitioner's right to be secure in his person was callously brushed aside twice by the arresting police officers. According to the Court. In the light of the discussion above. Thereafter. 132159 January 18. 32 Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest. if there was any. the subsequent search was unlawful. No. accused-appellant. due to the lack of intent to arrest. MENDOZA. 1avvphi1 31 The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 10. the petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. J.

1993 at Purok IV. 1996. charged as follows: That on or about the 2nd day of May. the decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification. 1âwphi1. dated June 6. Branch 104. Arturo Gayon. the victim's daughter Milagros Gardon and his niece Melinda Delfin were presented as witnesses. namely Epifanio Gayon. Accused-appellant's companions.000. 1994. in Crim. in Quezon City. willfully.00. assault.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.000. in Diliman.3 Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on April 10.nêt The information in this case.000. unlawfully and feloniously. with intent to kill. On appeal to this Court. Milagros Gardon testified on direct examination:5 . the said accused [CESAR GIVERA]. and to pay the costs of the suit. by then and there stabbing him with a knife hitting him on the different parts of his body. Quezon City finding accused-appellant Cesar Givera y Garote guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. confederating with EPEFANIO GAYON y GERALDE2 and ARTURO GAYON y GERALDE. Old Balara. were separately prosecuted and found guilty of murder by the Regional Trial Court. Q-93-44315. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50. Q-93-44315.4 For the prosecution. the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. On the other hand. did. Costs against accused-appellants. and docketed as Criminal Case No. and Maximo Givera. and striking him with a piece of stone on the head. dated April 10. conspiring together. with evident premeditation and treachery. Philippines. Branch 104. taking advantage of superior strength.m. We instead find accusedappellants EPIFANIO GAYON. 1995. and mutually helping one another who were charged with the same offense at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. CONTRARY TO LAW. 1993. Case No. thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death. Area 5.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the suit. whereupon he was tried. on May 2. Branch 102.This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court. ARTURO GAYON and MAXIMO GIVERA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER committed with grave abuse of superior strength and imposes upon each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetuawith the accessory penalties provided by law. Quezon City. then and there. Quezon City in a decision. only accused-appellant testified in his defense. to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of EUSEBIO GARDON y ARRIVAS. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P100. The three were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. The incident took place at about 4 p. attack. Laura St.. and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Eusebio Gardon in the amount of P100. and employ personal violence upon the person of EUSEBIO GARDON y ARRIVAS.

Q: At that time and place while you were watching your father. sir...Q: Particularly about 4:00 p. COURT: She mentioned that because her father was not coming out of the house... who was already arrested. A: [O)ur house was being stoned. sir. Q: You said a while ago that there was somebody with Cesar who went to your house. were you at your residence at that time? A: Yes. Q: Who was stoning your house? Could you tell us who was throwing stones to your house? . Q: What was your father doing at that time? A: I let him go to sleep because he was a little bit drunk. could you recall that somebody? A: Onying [Epifanio Gayon]. what else happened if any? . .m.. Q: Who was stoning your house? A: Cesar Givera. and I was watching him so that he will not go outside. by the name of Onying went inside the house... sir. but he was the only one stoning the house. And the other one. the accused started stoning the house. Q: And what were you doing there at that time? A: I was in the house because I was watching my father. sir. Q: Was he alone at that time? A: They were in a group. sir. Q: Why do you say you were watching him so that he would not anymore go out? A: Because he was warned by [accused-appellant Cesar Givera] that if he goes outside. he will kill my father.

sir. Then Onying got my father from the house. sir. correct? A: Yes. Cesar caused my father to run after him until they reached the place where there was another person.. . Then Cesar scampered away and my father followed him. Q: What happened to your father after you said he was stabbed or mauled? A: After he was stabbed.Q: You said he was already "nakakulong"? A: Yes. the person who stabbed him ran away. Milagros Gardon said:6 Q: Who else were with you at that time? A: My brother and sister.. Cesar was waiting for them. sir... Q: And your father inside the house because he was already resting after having been from a drinking spree. Q: Now.. Turing [Arturo Gayon] told the other one to stab my father while the one who stabbed my father was waiting under the bridge. and that person stabbed my father. correct? A: Yes. Q: So how many persons in all have you seen? A: They were four in all.. what happened after this person Cesar and the other one Onying went inside the house? A: Onying asked my father to go out of the house while Cesar was stoning the house. and when they were already outside. sir.. sir.. Q: They were Laura Gardon and Leonardo Gardon.. . . Q: What did these 4 persons do when her father was with them if any? . Onying led my father out of the house. A: Cesar was stoning the house. On cross-examination. sir.

.. sir. Q: Why? Where were you at that time? A: I was in the sala. sir. sir.. is that correct? A: Yes. Q: At that time were you in a position so as to see him actually effect his entrance through the front door? A: Yes. . sir.. . sir. correct? A: Yes... they were situated right near to your father. is that correct? A: Yes. Q: How did he effect his entrance in your house? A: He went inside directly. correct? A: Yes.. Q: He was alone when he entered your house. correct? A: Yes. Q: And you were watching TV at that time..... sir.. Q: And likewise with your two other companions Laura and Leonardo. sir. correct? A: Yes. Q: This Onying [Epifanio Gayon] suddenly entered your house. sir. Q: And then suddenly you heard stones being thrown on the roof of your house. sir. Q: You were in the sala right next to your father. .. .

sir... .. sir. And Onying asked him to go out with him. We followed him outside.. Q: But you stayed inside the house. Q: Then you together with your two other companions got back to watching the television show is that correct? A: No. is that correct? A: Yes. sir. sir. Only my father and my sister. Q: And your father stood up and joined Onying in going out of the house? A: Yes. did he give any response thereto? A: Yes.. sir. sir. Q: And your father. you and your two other companions? A: No. Q: Now.. Q: What was his response if any? A: He asked Onying if he need anything. . did he call out the name of your father if you can remember? A: Yes.. Q: But just the same. Q: What is the name of that sister of yours who was also hit? .Q: Now. . thereafter you heard stones thrown again towards your house... sir. when this Onying entered the house. Q: Was Onying also hit by any of those stones? A: No. ... you did not peep out through any opening of your house for safety? A: We were already outside when they were stoning the house..

. sir. Q: Who were these people running away? A: Onying and Cesar. sir. with Onying. Q: And then you lost sight of them yes or no? A: No. Q: Likewise. is that what you mean? A: Yes.. he followed Cesar Givera? A: Yes. Q: Are you saying that Onying also stoned your father? A: No. Q: You saw Cesar Givera actually stoning towards the direction of your father.. . Q: And they ran quite a distance. sir. correct? A: He was boxing him. . sir.. Q: Because he was right next by your father at that time. sir. because while they were stoning they were running away. sir.. Q: And your father followed Cesar Givera. sir. Q: And how many stones if you know hit Laura? A: Only one. sir. sir.. Q: And where was Laura hit? A: At her left shoulder.. correct? A: Yes.A: Laura Gardon. sir. is that what you mean? A: Yes. that is why he was not at all stoning your father.

I was already outside the house. using as reference the front door of your house? How far did they get as they ran away? A: About fifteen meters away. sir. where was Cesar at that time? . Q: They turned a corner after your father was stabbed? A: Yes. Milagros said:7 Q: Madam witness. sir. They only made a turn after the stabbing incident. correct? A: No. sir.. and the name of that person is Onying who stabbed your father? A: Maximo Givera. Q: How far did they get. sir. correct? A: Yes. that is why we did not follow them.. Q: Did they not turn corners? A: It is straight. sir. you said a while ago that you saw while your father was stabbed. sir. .Q: But you stayed in the house. When the incident happened. Q: Only one of the accused stabbed your father. . does that mean that you just stayed in front of your house? A: We stopped because we already saw the place where my father was stabbed. sir. because they ran away. I was outside the house. Q: And who was this? A: Bingo Givera [Maximo Givera]. Q: But because you did not state that you also followed your father as he ran after Cesar... sir.. sir. Q: Now.. On re-direct examination. Q: Did you actually see him stab your father? A: Yes. when you saw Maximo Givera stab your father. sir.

) . Q: You said you were about to arrive at the residence of Eusebio Gardon at 4:00 p.A: He was also at the same place. they both helped each other in boxing Eusebio Gardon. sir. Not quite far.. of May 4.. 1993. could you tell us where they were when Maximo was stabbing your father? A: They were also at that place. what did you notice or observe when you were about to arrived at that place of his residence? A: I saw "Onying" [Epifanio Gayon] with his hand on the shoulder of Eusebio Gardon going out of their yard. sir. and then they back to the house of Eusebio Gardon and my uncle followed them... 1993.m. Q: And the other 3 accused Arturo Gayon and Efipanio Gayon. could you tell us where you were at that time? A: Yes. (Nakita ko si Onying akbay akbay si Eusebio Gardon palabas sa bakuran nila. corroborated the testimony of Milagros Gardon. I was about to reach the house of Eusebio Gardon. . sir. (Paglabas ko ng bakuran nakita ko si Cesar na sinalubong ng suntok si Eusebio Gardon.m.... Bingo [Maximo Givera] and Turing [Arturo Gayon] were there. Q: What was your purpose in going there? A: Eusebio Gardon called me up because he has just come from Bicol and he will give me rice. She said: 8 Q: At about 4:00 p. Q: What else did you see aside from the fact that you saw Cesar Givera boxing Eusebio Gardon? A: Cesar boxed him and also Onying boxed him.. Q: What else did you notice? A: When I came out of the gate I saw Cesar Givera boxed Eusebio Gardon. niece of the victim.) . Q: And what happened when you said this Bingo was there? .. on May 4. Melinda Delfin.

sir. bato at sipa. how many persons were there when [Eusebio] Gardon was stabbed and being boxed? A: I saw four of them. Your Honor. sir. and then his children arrived. Q: Actually.A: Onying and Cesar gave fistic blows to Eusebio Gardon and he was also stabbed by Bingo. Q: Would you made these four (4)? A: Turing.... Cesar and Onying.. . the witness said she saw that fellow by the name of Onying and Cesar boxing --? WITNESS: "Suntok. Q: Eusebio Gardon was boxed by Onying and Cesar Givera? A: Yes. Q: You said earlier that you saw Cesar Givera and Epifanio Givera threw stones towards the victim's house. whom you said was boxed. sir. MASCALAS: Q: Where did you see them doing these acts on Eusebio? A: Outside the premises. is that true? PROSECUTOR CONCHA: Excuse me." ATTY.. sir.. Q: And stabbed by? A: Bingo. . Bingo. and they were also kicking Eusebio Gardon. mauled and then stabbed? A: He was lying down under the bridge for about thirty (30) minutes. . Q: And what happened to Eusebio Gardon.

Q: Are you saying that Cesar while throwing stones to your uncle was so close to him that he was able to box him? A: Because they were advancing towards my uncle and Onying.Q: Whose premises? A: The premises of Eusebio Gardon.. They were going towards them. sir. Q: Did you not say earlier that Onying came out with Eusebio Gardon from the latter's house? A: I saw Onying. Q: Did you see who were throwing those stones? A: It was Cesar. Q: Who boxed your uncle? A: Cesar....." Q: You even saw Onying embracing Eusebio Gardon. sir.. sir... how near did Cesar get to your uncle? . sir. Q: And you also saw Onying hit by stones... . "akbay-akbay niya. correct? A: Yes.. . . sir. correct? A: No. .. sir. Q: And when they were able to come near. sir. Q: Were there stones being hurled to Onying and Eusebio? A: Yes.. Q: Did you see if Gardon was hit by any of these stones? A: Yes.

. . sir. Q: And upon reaching the bridge which is about fifteen (15).A: Maybe three to four meters. Q: That was when Cesar boxed your uncle? A: Not yet.. meters away from the victim's house. you saw Bingo stabbed your uncle? A: Yes. Q: When did Cesar box your uncle? A: When they come near to my uncle. sir. . Q: Because Milagros Gardon was still in their house? A: She was already outside their house. Q: So you were also about 15 meters away from the bridge where the alleged incident took place? . sir. Q: And then Cesar Givera ran away and your uncle gave chase? A: Yes. sir. sir.... Q: And that premises of the victim was about 15 meters away from the bridge where the alleged incident took place? A: Yes. but she saw the incident. Q: She was outside their house -. Q: Were you also with Milagros Gardon at the time that stabbing was done? A: We were not together but I was approaching their house.although outside their house she was still inside the premises of their lot? A: She was still inside. sir.. Q: There were only — You said that there were only four (4) persons in that place where your uncle was stabbed and those persons do not include Milagros Gardon? A: No.

sir. todasin na yan!" A: Yes. . . You said that you saw it? A: Yes. he sustained abrasions in his lower chin. shock and eventual death of the victim. on his posterior middle left arm. . Q: And that is your distance when you were claiming that you saw this incident? A: It was just a little less. the victim? A: Yes.A: Yes. possibly hitting a rough surface. Q: Givera was doing that? I was asking you about Cesar Givera? A: He was boxing and kicking my uncle. as well as an incised wound caused by a bladed weapon. Florante Baltazar. To prove the fact and cause of death of Eusebio Gardon. sir. sir.12 A death certificate13 evidencing the death of the victim was presented by the prosecution. Q: You said that it was Bingo who stabbed the victim Eusebio Gardon.. P/Maj.. Q: Who. The testimony shows that the victim sustained one fatal stab wound possibly caused by a single bladed weapon. Eusebio Gardon.10 In addition. Q-93-44315.. which could be the immediate effect of hemorrhage. sir. sir.. Q: What was Cesar Givera doing when the victim was stabbed by Bingo? A: They were kicking and boxing my uncle... (Makalampas lang ng konti). the prosecution presented in evidence the testimony9 of medico-legal officer. Q: And it was Bingo [Maximo Givera] whom you saw stabbed your uncle? A: Yes.11 The stab wound appears to be fatal because it pierced the pericardium and left ventricle of the heart. given in Criminal Case No. Q: It was Turing Gayon [Arturo Gayon] whom you heard shout: "Sige.

16 Accused-appellant was arrested on May 4.. 1993. Accused-appellant's sole assignment of error is thatDUE TO THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT. The accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant said he was fetched by his cousin. He went to pacify the protagonists and then led the victim to his house. Recto Gardon. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:18 WHEREFORE. He denied any involvement in the killing of the victim who was his relative by affinity. that it was accused-appellant who was stoning their house when in fact. He added. The prosecution presented evidence which shows beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant and his companions (Epifanio Gayon. Old Balara. 1993.m. Milagros Gardon's testimony. with the accessory penalties of the law. all of whom were convicted of murder in another case. some 30 meters away from the victim's house. He was a resident of Laura St. He.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On the other hand. The defense tried to discredit it through cross examination.000. were responsible for the killing of Eusebio Gardon on May 2. Maximo Givera and Arturo Gayon were in the victim's house also having drinks. as shown earlier. First. THE COURT A QUO HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED The appeal has no merit. There are apparent lapses in the testimony of Milagros. Accused-appellant said he was going to help the victim get up. arid consistent. judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Cesar Givera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged. Hence. that he did not see if his three companions did anything more than box the victim.15 Accused-appellant said he learned that the victim had died only two days after the incident. coming with a bolo. at around 4:00 p. therefore.Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. it . Quezon City at the time of the incident. and to pay the costs. she only knew this because the victim said so. Eusebio went back and again engaged Maximo in a fist fight. as a result of which the victim Eusebio was knocked down. because Maximo and the victim Eusebio Gardon were having an altercation. this appeal. the defense only succeeded in enabling her to give further details of her testimony in chief.. but. ran away and left the victim behind. he was having a drink in his cousin's house. Moreover. Arturo Gayon. detailed. 1997. an excerpt from which is quoted at the beginning of this opinion. 1996 at the East Avenue Medical Center. and Maximo Givera). Ronilo Gardon. is spontaneous. SO ORDERED. He stated that the children of the victim implicated him in the killing of Eusebio Gardon only because he was present when the incident happened. but he saw the victim's son. and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50.17 On August 29. the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder. however. as when she testified that she knew at the very beginning. as she admitted. Without his knowledge.14 Accused-appellant claimed that at the time of the incident on May 2.

Laura was also hit.may be doubted whether the victim's other daughter. I voluntarily testified. As Melinda explained.-You testified in this case in the sala of Judge Asuncion after the children of the victim asked you to? Correct? A: They did not tell me. For this purpose. because according to accused-appellant. It is contended that. Q: What do you mean by saying that you voluntarily testified? Did you just come to court and asked the court to take you as witness in this case? . was hit by the stones hurled by accused-appellant as she came out of their house. she saw accused-appellant throwing stones at their house. kicking and pummelling him and finally stabbing him. There was no reason for the victim's son to want to attack accusedappellant. Melinda Delfin. she was not really present at the incident. Nonetheless. Q: You were only asked by your relatives . contrary to her claim. armed with a bolo. such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony. charged at him (accused-appellant). since the door of the house was so narrow that only one person at a time could pass through it. The contention has no merit. according to Milagros Gardon. The defense also tries to discredit the testimony of the other prosecution witness. correct? A: No. because I saw the incident. Milagros' testimony belies accused-appellant's claim that he was merely trying to pacify the victim and Maximo Givera and that he ran away because the victim's son. Nor is it probable that accused-appellant did not see what his companions did to the victim aside from giving him fist blows and kicks. these discrepancies are minor and insignificant and do not detract from the substance of her testimony. sir. sir. a close reading of the records will show that indeed it was accused-appellant who was stoning the house because when the witness followed the victim outside. After succeeding in drawing the victim out of his house. accused-appellant and his companions ganged up on him. Instead of weakening their testimonies. it is pointed out that she failed to give a sworn statement regarding said incident to the police.19 Thus. Melinda testified: 20 Q: The police did not get your statement because you did not tell them that you were an eyewitness and if it is true. In any event. This Court has time and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. he ran away shortly after they had attacked the victim. In the process. she did not give a statement to the police because she was told they would call on her later for her statement. Laura. She then saw accused-appellant hitting the victim with stones. this could only be after they had been done with their victim. accused-appellant taunted the victim and challenged him to come out of the house. if the latter was merely trying to help the victim. As accused-appellant said he saw the assailants run way.

one of them. accused-appellant pelted him with stones. From the fact that the victim died and that accused-appellant and his companions were the last persons seen with the victim before he died. it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method. Where conspiracy is directly established. accused Cesar Givera and the other accused in this case are all residing within the vicinity where the crime was committed. The evidence thus clearly and convincingly shows a coordinated action by the group in the execution of the crime. There is. were waiting. It is noteworthy that both Milagros Gardon and Melinda Delfin knew accused-appellant and the other assailants. Second. In conspiracy. the victim went with Onying.A: No. because in the police station the police told me that they will not take my statement. When the victim reached the place. and that in fact some of them are related to the witnesses. He was kicked and boxed by Onying and when Arturo shouted "Sige todasin na yan!. and are even related by affinity to the deceased. Accused-appellant has not shown that these witnesses were motivated by ill will against him. when the accused-appellant and his companions stoned his house to force him to come out. time and means of executing the crime. They will just "ihahabol na lang ako. Consonant with this legal principle. In the first place. Disoriented because he was drunk. What is important is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the death of the victim. accused Cesar Givera has not shown any motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify as they did against said accused. The act of each conspirator in furtherance of the common purpose is in contemplation of law the act of all. it can be concluded that they are responsible for the victim's death. That was the first time that incident happened to my life. 22 Third. 23 But in an . evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case. sir. we think the trial court correctly dismissed accused-appellant's claim and gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of murder as if he himself dealt the deathblow that sent the victim to his grave. no reason to doubt their identification by the prosecution witnesses. The allegations of conspiracy in the information have been established." Q: Did you not inquire from them why your statement will not longer be taken and what do you mean by that "ihahabol na lang ikaw"? A: I did not ask because I do not know anything about that. The victim was at home sleeping after coming from a drinking session. while Onying started raining fistic blows on him. However. As correctly observed by the trial court:21 [T]he court has no reason to doubt the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Epifanio (Onying) Gayon. Arturo Gayon and Maximo Givera. Then Onying and accused-appellant ran away to lure him to go toward the bridge where the other two." Maximo stabbed the victim. went inside the victim's house and told him to come out. the existence of evident premeditation can be appreciated. he was attacked by the gang. Second. When they failed. Once the victim was outside." All things considered. therefore.

the victim showed that he was prepared for the attack by accused-appellant and his gang and could have been hardly surprised when he was actually attacked. which is why she stayed beside her father to make sure he did not go out of the house.implied conspiracy. . He was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the court on April 27. the victim had been forewarned of the danger posed by accused-appellant and his group. with one of them armed with a knife.[T]reachery will also be deduced from the evidence on record. The victim was unarmed and was clearly outnumbered by the four assailants. 1996. as the records show. Indeed. evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of proof as to how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. the victim had been threatened with harm by accused-appellant the moment he went out of his house. otherwise. the same remains enforceable until it is executed. . He was finally found only on May 4. The deceased was unarmed when he was stabbed by on Maximo Givera and boxed and kicked by accused Cesar Givera and two other accused.29 . 1995. For treachery to be appreciated. This is not true. no alias warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest. it cannot be considered. 1995 as accused-appellant could not be found.28 Fourth. §4 is only a directive to the officer executing the warrant to make a return to the court. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113. his daughter Milagros testified that prior to the stoning incident. Unless specifically provided in the warrant.26 In the instant case. In fact. such as in this case. the victim cannot be said to have been totally oblivious of the impending attack by all the group of accused-appellant. The fact that the victim may have been surprised because he had not expected that he would be outnumbered when he saw two other attackers waiting for him under the bridge is not sufficient to show that the victim was completely unaware of the attack that might come from his assailants.24 Nor can the qualifying circumstance of treachery be taken into account. even if present at a subsequent stage. 1996 was made without a warrant. Moreover. Now. without any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. The trial court held: 25 . it must be shown to be present at the inception of the attack. the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superiority was correctly appreciated in this case. so that it cannot be determined if the accused had "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences.. Treachery must be proven by convincing evidence. From the evidence adduced. accused Givera and Epifanio Gayon taunted and provoked the deceased by throwing stones at him and then lured him to run after them towards the bridge where the other accused were lying in wait ready to pounce on the deceased without risk to themselves as the deceased was then defenseless. ." Treachery is the deliberate and unexpected attack on the victim. the warrant of arrest was returned unserved by the arresting officer on June 7. recalled or quashed. by coming out of his house and running after two of the assailants. He thus had every opportunity to escape from the attack." There should be a showing that the accused had the opportunity for reflection and persisted in effectuating his criminal design which the prosecution failed to establish in the case at bar. 27 However. Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4. However..

the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. Nos. FIDEL V.00 as indemnity. RAMOS. where the opposing party failed to cross-examine a witness. As correctly contended by the defense. 1991 . because they did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. SESE.000. vs. MAJ. Branch 102. BRIG. RENATO DE VILLA.000. Aside from the award of P50. G. RAMON MONTANO. 1âwphi1. accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object thereto because he failed to move for the quashal of the information before the trial court. petitioners. GEN. his testimony cannot be used in evidence against accused-appellant. G. involving the three other accused for the death of the same victim. corroborated by the offer in evidence of the death certificate of the victim.R.30 As this Court has held. entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial. this Court must declare the same inadmissible. Still and all the fact and cause of death of the victim had been sufficiently proved by the accounts of the two eyewitnesses. GEN. in addition to the amount of P50. Indeed.00 as moral damages. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL.00 as moral damages irrespective of proof thereof. Quezon City finding accusedappellant Cesar Givera y Garote.At any rate. that is. BRIG. The award of damages by the trial court. otherwise the objection is deemed waived. guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that. respondents. Fifth. DURAL.R. MANOLITA O. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness. ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.00 to be paid as indemnity. 81567 October 3. accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of Eusebio Gardon amount of P50. if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea. GEN. Baltazar.000. FELICITAS V. UMIL and NICANOR P. No.nêt SO ORDERED. 84581-82 October 3. this Court in several cases held:32 Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete. 33 WHEREFORE. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE. the decision of the Regional Trial Court. 31 On the matter of the admissibility of the testimony of the medico-legal taken in the first case.000. plus the costs of the suit. the heirs of Eusebio Gardon are entitled to an award of P50. in favor of the victim should be modified. offered in evidence in the case at bar.

DOMINGO T. 85727. MALTRO AROJADO.ALFREDO S. Nos. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. Potenciano A. LIM. S/SGT. Efren H. respondents. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE. petitioner. G.respondents. CONRADO DE TORRES. 84581-82 Josefina G.R. petitioners. GEN.R. BRIG. petitioners. Quezon City. Flores. and Commanding Officer. Camp Crame. No. Metro Manila. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. vs. COL. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. Nos. for petitioner in G. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. The Solicitor General for the respondents. BRIG. HON. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. REX D. P/SGT. OCAYA. LT.R.petitioner.R. GEN. vs. COL. P/SGT. petitioners. Muntinglupa. respondents. Jr. COL. G. EVARISTO CARIÑO. COL. 83162 October 3. RICARDO REYES. Mercado for petitioners in G. 84583-84. JACINTO MEDINA. Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G. No. COL. R. Nos. vs. ARNOLD DURIAN. 84583-84 October 3. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. 86332 October 3. G. RESOLUTION . 85727 October 3. vs. vs. 83162.R. 1991 IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU. NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO. respondents. NESTOR MARIANO. No. and P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE. RAMON MONTANO. DE VILLA. No. LEVI SOLEDAD. GEN. G. FIDEL V. No.AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA.R. THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION. PC-INP Detention Center. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G. No. HERCULES CATALUNA.R. RENATO S.R. PIAD. T/SGT. RAMOS. respondents. P/SGT. 81567 and G.

the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. 3. It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested. to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not. with the following dispositive part: WHEREFORE. In the petitions at bar. except that in G. and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court. 2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990. in sum. in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant. the decision merely applied long existing lawsto the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions. in this connection. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts. seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision.000. No. 5 so that if detention is illegal. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. maintain: 1.00. The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. It is elementary. .R. No costs. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic. We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration. particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest). 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. if the arrests were made in accordance with law. filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. In their separate motions for reconsideration. No.00 to P10. ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest.R. 5. looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms. would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law. Lim). it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal. inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions. if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people. Enrile 2 should be abandoned. change or modify them. the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Moreover. petitioners. For.PER CURIAM:p Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions. the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60. 4Therefore. 4. That G. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). That the assailed decision. for brevity) which dismissed the petitions. the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.000. 85727 (Espiritu vs.

he (Dural) was committing an offense. . or incident thereto. except in those cases express authorized by law. the focus is understandably on Section 5. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that. simply because he was. or is attempting to commit an offense. within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5. without warrant. Viewed from another but related perspective. 8 a continuing offense.. His arrest was based on "probable cause. . It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. where membership penalized. thus: The crimes of insurrection or rebellion. 2045. The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G. without warrant. which . Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest." as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter. an outlawed organization. 7 and for subversion which. no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest. or became less of a subversive. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.e. and . as a general rule. Dural did not cease to be. In the present cases. confined in the St. conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes. and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof. the person to he arrested has committed. subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained. which read: Sec. adultery. or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. at the St. without a warrant. (Emphasis supplied). Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government.There can be no dispute that. are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses. given another opportunity. is actually committing. under the facts of the Umil case. had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. subversion. in his presence. Arrest without warrant. arrest a person: (a) When. at the time of arrest. paragraph (b). . murder. . and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5. . Dural. Agnes Hospital. No. can be conducted. it may also be said. Enrile. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST. etc. when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army. arson. like rebellion is. under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses. i. — A peace officer or a private person may. when lawful. would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. 5.R. aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. which generally end upon their commission. paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113. Agnes Hospital.

it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest.. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. that based on the same information. South City Homes. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. Parenthetically.requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first. Section 5(b). 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. on 1 February 1988. in fact. two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario. before a road hump along Macanining St. or on 31 January 1988. "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural. therefore. were dispatched to the St. In G. In fine." in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause. 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. third — as the records of this case disclosed later. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Bagong Barrio. of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5. 11 These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar. Biñan. without warrant. Agnes Hospital. based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person. is based on actual facts. Lot 4. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before. Quezon City. i. without warrant. Rule 113. the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and. to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital. It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. Roosevelt Avenue.. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest. 14 and. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound. which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. and second. refers to arrests without warrant. or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon. Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural. No. it was found to be true. is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. Rule 113. the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon. 81567 (Umil case). The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before. that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense. it will be noted. an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed . came from reliable sources. considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. military agents.e. about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. 12 Said confidential information received by the arresting officers. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law. Laguna." twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10.R. Caloocan City. to verify a confidential information which was received by their office. the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith.

19 5. radio and other communications equipment. . are also justified. Anonuevo. with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof. Rules of Court. Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities. the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988. More specifically.R. On 27 June 1988. They were. therefore. Buenaobra. On the other hand. Furthermore. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G. at the time of her arrest. 84921. located in the Villaluz Compound. their arrests. 3. subversive documents. when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date. Marikina. it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant. he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988. that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms. caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant. No. that in view of this information. Molave St. With regard to Vicky Ocaya. she was arrested. pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court. Parenthetically. without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA. the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque.. Nos.against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. 84581-82). 17 that. Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple(G. he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 83162). the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine.R. As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G. 20 It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque. 18 4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988. Rule 113. Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G. and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. ammunitions. On 31 August 1988. 16 2. and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. under Sec 5(a). C-30112). Marikina Heights. explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations. the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions. and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms. No. the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are: 1. thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition. without warrant.R. He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). a search of the house was conducted. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya.R. informations were filed in court against said petitioners. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra. and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. that when the agents frisked them. and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.

during and after the arrest of the aforenamed persons (Dural.. For. where he said. was arrested without warrant. and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. Espiritu had not lost the right to insist. In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5. The records also show that. then. In G. Sta. Manila. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved. as in the case of Dural. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5. and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment. on 23 November 1988. Mesa. at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St. to conduct an arrest without warrant. during the pre-trial or trial on the merits. In view of these circumstances. third: at the time of their arrests. Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers. the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention. 23 The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Anonuevo. 27 (Emphasis supplied) and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988.And at the time of the actual arrests. 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions. no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. in their possession were unlicensed firearms. Rule 113. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. 85727. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities. But. not for subversion or any "continuing offense. among other things: Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988. Anonuevo and Casiple). Espiritu. the arresting officers are not liable. in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order.R. ammunitions and/or subversive documents. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant. Rule 113 are met. that he was just exercising his right to free speech . Roque. With all these facts and circumstances existing before. 22 Not evidence of guilt. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5. Casiple and Ocaya). this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. . And then. shortly after their arrests. Rule 113. but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers. the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. Buenaobra. Buenaobra. Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine. . in the perception of the arresting officers. No. which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse. one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. hanggang sa magkagulona." but for uttering the above-quoted language which. the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque. do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed. the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house. even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted. particularly paragraph (b) thereof. was inciting to sedition.

the police agents arrested Nazareno. Branch 24.regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus.R. the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988. was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II. As shown in the decision under consideration. . one of the suspects in the said killing. an information charging Narciso Nazareno. the Court has. On 13 January 1989. that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988.00 to P10. since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly. the peace officers did not appear.000. 86332 (Nazareno). or soon thereafter. earlier filed by his co-accused. Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. On 7 January 1989. the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan. (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight. For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation. it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. in . in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention. as follows: . Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. is still another thing. was granted by the same trial court. even as the motion to post bail. while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988. . Ramil Regala and two (2) others. that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988). a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989. or 14 days later. Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled. the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. Metro Manila. In G. without warrant. this Court. even without warrant. Manuel Laureaga. Laguna. which obviously becomes difficult at times. retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian. No. the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113. In the balancing of authority and freedom. Muntinlupa. with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati. ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition. 731. At the conclusion of the hearing. Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60. the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest. Metro Manila. in this case. without warrant. Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang. Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989. at the time the words were uttered. tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant).000. for investigation. Because of this development. But. 29 Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988.00. or on 1 February 1989. Ramil Regala.

then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted. reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. with the least delay. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups. for stress. On the other hand. as warranted by the evidence. the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. on the other hand. Rules of Court. 84581-82). Nos. as elucidated in this Resolution. Enrile. as revealed by the records. This Court. particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno. 5 of Rule 113. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G. are not met. still undocketed). Parenthetically. these admissions. In the case of Buenaobra (G. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests. As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him). but if such conditions are met. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.fact. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant. is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion. it is true. are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers. took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA. and which. are supported by probable cause. then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released. the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same. To note these admissions. But again. a long existing law. Rules of Court. and. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits. it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. ammunitions and documents in their possession. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. . Rule 113. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding.R. and Ilagan vs. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions. as the records show. she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms. ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest. further. in compliance with Section 5. but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5.R. he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier.e. on the basis of. as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses. The Court. belonged to her. A Final Word This Resolution ends as it began. i. No. what is important is that the Court be right. Enrile should be abandoned. in the case ofAmelia Roque.

That the arrested person has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" . especially if it would result in the violation of any right of a person. such statement was. . concur. . hanggang sa magkagulo na. not for subversion or any 'continuing offense. 1990 and an exhaustive evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said decision. concurring and dissenting: After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9. Melencio-Herrera. Medialdea and Davide. Secondly. SO ORDERED.' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . Separate Opinions FERNAN. JJ. I am inclined to agree with the.. C. are DENIED.orcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at the However. pp. inciting to sedition. the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990. in the perception of the arresting officers. warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what particular provision of law had beeri violated by the person arrested. errneous perception. Griño-Aquino. the law enforcement agents had time. In the first place.ACCORDINGLY. Bidin. Espiritu mav not be considered as having "just committed" the crime charged. 23-24). short though it might seem. In the words of the resolution. to secure a warrant for his arrest. may not be tolerated." The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14 days after the commission of the crime imputed to him." I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions warrantless arrests provided they are made in accordance with law. Under these circumstances.. Espiritu "was arrested without warrant. Espiritu's apprehension may not therefore be considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests "when an offense has in fact just been committed. This denial is FINAL. The second allegedly seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same afternoon (Decision. not to mention ineptitude among their ranks. 1988. True it is that law en. Narvasa." Apparently. Jr. majority's resolution on said motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and petitioner Alfredo Nazareno for the crime of murder.J. He allegedly first uttered seditious remarks at the National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12.. Paras. Padilla. the resolution nonetheless supports the authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest. realizing that it is indeed possible that Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech. While not conceding the validity of such perception.

Hence. L-32613-14. 1972.R. Similarly. Certainly. On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. a subversive may be arrested even if has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government such as bombing of government offices trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable cause to believe that he is in the roll of members of a subversive organization. the arrestor must have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it' (instead of just 'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed it' under the old rule). therefore. p. in Morales. 90 Phil. A crime must in fact or actually (has just) been committed first. G. In People vs. 408). While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and presents largely a question of policy (Espuelas vs. It devolves upon the accused to prove membership by force or ciorcion. while the police should act swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in view of the jeopardy it may cause the government. 18) that he was exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law. Enrile.144 SCRA 1)." (Dissenting opinion in Ilagan vs. We categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was provided by the Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Jr. Here lies the urgency of judicial intervention before an arrest is made. (Supra. a single act of urging others to commit any of the acts enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to hold anyone liable for inciting to sedition. 48 SCRA 382). Thirdly. No. 1986. vs. 61016. 15). 121 SCRA 538). It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent application. Burgos (G. 1983. it should be remembered that any of the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe upon the fundamental freedoms of speech and expression.. Thus. April 26. No. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed. By its nature. the Court considered as illegal the warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's personal knowledge such subversion and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be strictly construed. That crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition.R. at p. People. Enrile (G. No. 139 SCRA 349. one may not be in such a roll without undergoing the concious act of enlistment. inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested without a warrant duly issued by the proper authority. I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without warrants. 1985. those of the State as against those of its individual citizen. the Court laid out the procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested: . it should be underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator is knowing member of a subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs. 524 [1951]). Moreover. December 27. No person should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived his action. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. Section 5. 70748. 68955.(Resolution. the necessity of balancing interests. September 4. is beside the point. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. speedy action should consist not in warrantless arrests but in securing warrants for such arrests. October 21. There arises.R. "it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. Earlier. "connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense 'has in fact been committed' no how long ago. Added to this is the subjectivity of the determination of what may incite other people to sedition. Ferrer.

After all.At the time a person is arrested. triggered by the difficulty in finding evidence that could stand judicial scrutiny — to pinpoint a subversive. If existing laws are inadequate. concurring and dissenting: The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order. it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. I believe we should move with the people of the world who are fast liberating themselves. if any. a relative. in whole or in part shall be inadmissible evidence. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. This Court. Victims of abuses should resort to legal remedies to redress their grievances. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages freedom and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real progress. can only go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit behind them.. I. vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without warrant.. the theory that enhancing order through constraints on freedom is deceptive because restrictions on liberty corrode the very values Govenment pretends to promote. and that any statement he might make could be used against him. when lawful. by any person on his behalf. we are not wanting in laws to hold any offending peace officer liable both administratively and criminally for abuses in the performance of their duties. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes with a political or ideological element. to wit: Sec. The person shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer. (121 SCRA at 554). therefore. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. for the orderly administration of government and the maintenance of peace and order in the country. GUTIERREZ. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. or appointed the court upon the petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arressted. Arrest without warrant. — A peace officer or a private person may. police officers usually have to make long persistent surveillance. However. good faith should be reposed on the officials implementing the law. Such abuses are more often than not. without a warrant. the policy-determining branches of the government may be exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. or appointed by the court upon petition on his behalf. mandated b the Constitution to uphold the law. JR. 5. J. Otherwise. It is disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead of liberty in har cases coming before us. These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the military and civilian components of the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary citizen who faces a situation wherein civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in the community. arrest a person: . we hail be entering the dangerous ground of judicial legislation.

If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found roaming around. 83162 involving Amelia Roque. If we allow public speakers to be picked up simply because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of a peace officer or critical of government policy and action. the tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal. no matter how well grounded on past events.R. which is freedom of expression. 84581-82. the non-rebels who are critical. In case of doubt. I concur in the denial of their motions for reconsideration.R. 81567 is concemed. the petitioners were arrested after having been apprehended while in possession of illegal firearms and ammunitions. At the very least. They were actually committing a crime when arrested. the person to be arrested has committed. Insofar as G. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. intimidation. This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of speech. or illegal method. xxx xxx xxx Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. The belief of law enforcement authorities. Nos. 84583-84 and G. or sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. Nos. and Vicky Ocaya are concerned. Ramon Casiple. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. "Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ when applied to actual cases.R. I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. If warrantless searches are to be validated. it should be Congress and not this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards. a warrant of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is essential in this type of offense. or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up arms against the Government. Insofar as G. I doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole country who would know the full dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the nation's interest in the liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national importance on one hand and the application of the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of national security and public safety are asserted. But until a person is proved guilty. we will undermine all pronouncements of this Court on the need to protect that matrix of all freedoms. No. G. Otherwise.R. he may be arrested. is actually committing. that the petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate warrantless . (3. and (5) what is a scurrilous libel against the Philippines. the percentage of knowledgeability would go down further if we consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the ability to define. (4) what constitute the five objects or ends of sedition. in his presence. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the ground that that was inciting to sedition. No. I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations regarding "continuing oftenses. In fact. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. or is attempting to commit an offense." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion.) when does a certain effort amount to force. on the other. noisy. among other (1) what kinds of speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of rising publicly and tumultously.R. Domingo Anonuevo. No. I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G. Rebellion.(a) When. insurrection. Wilfredo Buenaobra.

need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of the offense is bailable. or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion. The arrest. No. No.and (4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G..arrests. and G. CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING. (2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G. In G. The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures is not cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was seized. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time. But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla vs. 84581-82. 81567. whether as its fighting armed elements. which was quoted with approval in the originalponencia: The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion.R. and pounce on him with no legal authority instead of securing warrants of arrest for his apprehension. The information that Narciso Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers only on December 28. I VOTE TO: (1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G. A government of laws must abide by its own Constitution. A warrant of arrest is essential in this case. Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14. No. 86332. or subsequently posted bail or chose to remain in the custody of the military. 121 SCRA 472. the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govenment .R. J. No. G. No. (3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G. 84583-84. The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not the warrantless arrest.R. We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation. I do not think that under the applicable circumstances the petitioners can validly complain that they are being unlawfully detained.R. Separate Opinion: I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of those who were arrested inflagrante. therefore. 1988. 85727. to quell the rebellion. Enrile.R. to justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other petitioners on the ground that they were apprehended for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied crimes. To say that the offense "has in fact just been committed" even if 14 days have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on warrantless arrests into ridiculous limits. CRUZ. 83162. 1988 or fourteen (14) days later. 86332. I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration. than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict.R. The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into the past and render legal what was illegal. await the petitioner's surfacing from underground.R. No. or voluntarily permitted the search of the house without warrant. Obviously. Nos.

or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla. conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes. and presuming the innocence of the accused. (Emphasis supplied. But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended.forces. (Emphasis supplied. It is in such a situation that the processes of the local courts are not observed and the rebels cannot demand the protection of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed to have renounced by their defiance of the government. resulting in the application of the laws of war in the regulation of their relations. however. Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders — or combatants — is not justified in the present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own laws. Principal among these — in our country — are whose embodied in the Bill of Rights. the Court says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information" that he was in the . aside front their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide manitude. including and especially those guaranteed by the Constitution. and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof. the decision contained the following pronouncement which this Court has also adopted as its own: . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion. usually by simply placing the suspect "under surveillance. engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. The rebels are then considered alien enemies-to be treated as prisoners of war when captured-and cannot invoke the municipal law of the legitimate government they have disowned. . subversion." no matter that what he may be actuallly doing at the time is a perfectly innocent act. allowing bail. The legitimate government cannot excuse the suppression of these rights by the "exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an intemal matter governed exclusively by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. as he lay supine in his sickbed." to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous act of undergoing medical treatment. . In further justification. the legitimate govenment must treat the rebels as its citizens. 2045.) The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities. particularly those guaranteeing due process. are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses. In the case of Dural. The decision itself says that the arrest "need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the absence of a judicial warrant is no impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the authorities of the "continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes. Once so placed. International law is thus substituted for municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic with its own citizens in a purely domestic matter. subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided thereunder. or incident thereto. The fiction was indulged that he was even then. he may at any time be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he is in the process of committing the "continuing offense.) The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when a recognition of beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels. As for the duration of the offenses. all persons suspected as rebels are by such suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the unceremonious capture of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.

is actually committing. As the ultimate defender of the Constitution. and for allegedly seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were supposed to continue their effects even to the following day. according to Webster. i. 91107. as revealed by the records. these admissions. No. not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary. it is true. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself.R." I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal arrests made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights were wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national security. means "a very short time ago. I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses. of the Rules of Court) despite the considerable time lapse. In other words. out of mistaken zeal. June 19." which. no matter how long ago the offense was committed. thus suggesting that the validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense but from the time of the Identification of the suspect." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an offense "has in fact just been committed. as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms. Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter "has committed. My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance of a warrant. 1991. It seems some of us have short memories of that repressive regime. probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing the warrant. who was also arrested without warrant. The offense was considered as having been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113. But again. In the case of Espiritu. the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping. in compliance with Section 5. It was worse in the case of Nazareno. which information "was found to be true. Malmstedt. Whatever . it was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure." This is supposed to have validated the determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the absence of a warrant. took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA.hospital. ammunitions and documents in their possession. strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon wmch the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant.e." The arrest must be made almost immediately or soon after these acts. not at any time after the suspicion of the arresting officer begins. the Court says that it was only on the day of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable killers. this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who. Section 5. but I for one am not one to forget so soon. where I noted: "The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. not to dispense with it. I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not be the start of another dangerous doctrine: The Court. moreover.. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. G. are supported by probable cause. In sustaining this act. and no less than fourteen days after the killing.

their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours.. i. they have been made and.e. the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights. I believe. . The subsequent developments in several of the cases here consolidated. FELICIANO. which are carefully detailed in the majority Resolution. arrests. It seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta. make this even clearer. 5.. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads: Sec. or a private person for that matter. Rule 113 follows: Sec. We start at the beginning. may lawfully arrest a person without previously securing a warrant of arrest. That is what democracy is all about. 1. Arrests made without a warrant issued by a judge after complying with the constitutional procedure. is actually committing. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. however. the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual members of society. This was summarily pointed out in my very brief statement concurring in the result reached in the original Decision of the Court dated 9 July 1990. Although the above statements are obiter. be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest. At the same time. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. or is attempting to commit an offense. without a warrant. The full text of Section 5. Arrest without warrant. arrest a person: (a) When. Those exceptions are. must. the rendition of which complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2. when lawful. that is. houses. are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons within the meaning of Article III Section 2. essentially found in Section 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. concurring and dissenting: I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for Reconsideration. I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the majority principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests without warrants. — A peace officer or a private person may. however. (Emphais supplied) Under the above provision. 2. in his presence. certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests are unreasonable seizures of persons. the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. the majority Resolution has taken the time and trouble expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes" doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless arrests. no more and no less than any other person in this country. the person to be arrested has committed. need to be addressed to some extent and the inter-relation of the "continuing crimes" doctrine with constitutional rights explored. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the situations where an officer of the law. 2. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. in our day. Nonetheless. There are. since they are quite unnecessary for sustaining the actual results reached in the majority Resolution. J. papers. as a general rule.

and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision. [2d]. 28 Fed. Since the proceeding is a drastic one.. In Alvarez vs. At the time of the appellant's arrest. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail. Burgos. 198 Pac. 1 This rule must apply with special exigency and cogency where we deal. Perry vs.. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife. 362. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers. He was. Leonard vs. State vs. All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are reasonable. or gradual depreciation of. The statute or rule . .(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b). State. it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. 4 In People vs.S. and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court. 88. 6 Fed.. stressing that: II. [2d]. The ordinary rule generally applicable to statutory provisions is that exceptions to such provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in which they are cast fairly warrants. Exceptions to such a norm must be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless the constitutional rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of individuals may be lawfully constrained and seized. McDaniel. 3 this Court. (emphasis supplied) held that: .. 3. 231 Pac. [2d]. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. 965. Section 7. 613. Court of First Instance.. but with a constitutional guarantee. these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual. Custer County. 189. The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 118 So.. not with an ordinary statutory provision. 2 Exceptions to such a guarantee must be read with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits of their language so to keep vital and significant the general constitutional norms warrantless arrests. 14 Fed. Clair. 373). the rights secured by them (State vs. it is important to recall that judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for what they are: they areexceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. 5 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms: There is no such personal knowledge in this case. U. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described as subversive.S. 237 Pac. Cofer vs. rather than the exception. . to prevent stealthy encroachment upon. 353. he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. U. it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. in fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest. St.

Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the presence of the arresting officer. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. While 1-day may be substantially different from 14-days. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. of course. The arresting officer must. a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been committed" would obviously render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime must have been committed "[in] the presence" of the arresting officer. the necessity which serves as the justification in law of warrantless arrests under Section 5(a). in other words. 7 If no overt. or of the attempt to commit an offense. cannot by any standard be justified under Section 5(b). there must also be an actus reus. There would. No. cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. not be that imperious necessity for instant action to prevent an attempted crime. 5. he has personal knowledge of facts which render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the criminal deed. In the second place. in principle. the killing of the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City far away from the St. not externalized in overt physical acts of a human person. or to capture the doer of the perceive criminal act. such officer could not. the warrantless arrest of Alfredo Nazareno 14days after the occurrence of the killing with which he was charged along with other persons. In such situation. or a person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. Section 5(a) may. two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may be sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the arresting officer arrived in the scene. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in the presence or within the sensor perception of the arresting officer. In G.R. 86332. The fact of the occurrence of the offense. become aware at all that a crime is being committed or attempted to be committed in his presence.g. In the first place. to repress the crime being committed. action on the part of the arresting officer to suppress the breach of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there. Turning to Section 5 (b)." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from sense perception the arresting officer. moreover. 6 (emphasis supplied) 4. even instantaneous. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not . The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the time interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief indeed. for the securing of a warrant of arrest. be ample time to go to a magistrate and ask for a warrant of arrest. For a crime to exist in our legal law. Dural was arrested without warrant while being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of the policemen in which he was suspected to have been a participant. there would. recognizably criminal. In G. under the circumstances. still it must be pointed out that at the time Dural was arrested in the hospital. there is an obvious need for immediate. the first requirement imports that th effects or corpus of the offense which has just been committed are still visible: e.which allows exceptions the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. no matter what his reputation for. 9 Thus. No. a person sprawled on the ground. in the presence of the arresting officer. the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b) by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures. perceive through his own senses some act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of a crime which has "just been committed. it is not enough that mens rea be shown. acts occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer. 8 It is elementary that purely mental or psychological phenomena. and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating tha the person to be arrested has committed the offense. The arresting officer may not ha seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim. be seen to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. may be seen to be the substitute.R. 81567. That requirement would exclude informtion conveyed by another person. In somewhat different terms. dead of gunshot wound. and thereto the offense can not be said to have been committed "in [his] presence. truth and reliability might be. where the arresting officer comes upon a person dead on the street and sees a person running away with a knife from where the victim is sprawled the ground. in other words. no doubt in order to underscore the point here being made." 6. The term "presence" in this connection is properly and restrictively construed to relate to acts taking place within the optical or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often vilated and so deserving of full protection.

Enrile10 does not sustain warrantless arrests of person to be arrested is. unless he has in fact committed physically observable criminal acts in the presence of the arresting officer or hadjust committed such acts when the arresting officer burst upon the scene. arson. Even a person secretly guilty some earlier crime is constitutionally entitled to be secure from warrantless arrest. or because less of a subversive. In the present Resolution. that doctrine. (Emphasis supplied) 9. Agnes Hospital. quite beside the point. i. 8. the magistrate may rely upon the personal knowledge of the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a warrant of arrest. The stricter standard is properly applicable to the officers seizing a person without a warrant of arrest. FOR PURPOSE OF ARREST." shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under Section 5(a) that the offense "has in fact just been presence of the arresting officer arrived. as it were. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually found in our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. simply because he was. Dural. which generally end upon their commission. . etc. the majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal knowledge" in Section 5(b).e. Dural did not cease to be. is in a sense more exacting than the standard imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who. course. for they are acting in derogation of a constitutional right. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer who is determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime. The pertinent portion of the majority Resolution reads: . . That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. but rather because the person to be arrested is suspected of having committed a crime in the future. at the time of arrest. 7. . if the warrantless arrest it to be lawful. More specifically.subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objectives of overthrowing organized government is attained. would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. given another opportunity. . murder. in the seclusion of his chambers. adultery. in my submission. ascertains "probable cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him. confined in the St. that the arresting officers had been in "hot pursuit" of Dural beginning at the scene of the killing and ending the next day in the hospital. That the person unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be guilty of the offense he was suspected of in the first place is. merely resting in between specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to do so. the second problem is that of determining whether a single crime or multiple crimes were committed where the defense of double jeopardy is raised. It is in this sense that subversion like rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. . or must have just been committed when the arresting officer arrived.. does notdispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably criminal in character must take place in the presence of the arresting officer. The "continuing crimes" doctrine in our case law (before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes. nor did the Court require it. but winds up in the next page with a very diluted standard of "reasonable belief and "good faith" on the part of the arresting officers. The arresting officer must himself have "personal knowledge".reasonably be said to have been just committed. .. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses. There was no showing. Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to two (2) problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.

In respect of the first problem. the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a crime. the defense of double jeopardy becomes available where a second information is filed covering acts later in the series. In the latter case. For in such cases. correspondence. and the unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved." which has its own legitimate function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence. continued to be committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. . the double jeopardy defense is non-available. Turning to the second type of problem. evasion of service of sentence). Where all of the essential elements of a crime take place within the territory of one court but "by reason of he very nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be "continuing. the question is normally presented in terms of whether one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine.g. a subversive association or organization. xxx xxx xxx f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. multiple offenses. 12 The point worth stressing is that in passing upon the issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of offense committed. where the acts of the accused constituted discrete. Where the series of acts actually alleged and proven to have been committed by the accused constituted only one and the same crime. 12. or any other document of the organization. My final submission. The criminal acts are regarded as repeated or as continuing within the province or city where the defendant was found and arrested. the doctrine of "continuing crimes. estafa or malversation) either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. 11 Clearly.10. the gist of our case law is that where some of the ingredients or elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some other ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the territory of another court. the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive association:" 13 a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists. for instance. is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of.. the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves. (e. Note. loans or in any other forms. begun or committed elsewhere. the overt acts of the accused constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses. b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever. kidnapping and illegal detention. the offense is deemed to be continuing because some or all of the elements constituting the offense occurred within jurisdiction of the second court (e. each act comprising a distinct and separate offense. 11. libel. Upon the other hand. must be shown. assessments. is that. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested without warrant. records." then the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed.g. overt acts of the accussed constituting elements of the crime charged must be shown to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where he is charged.. c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues. has jurisdiction to try a person charged with such offense.

that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988). "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988. the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113. xxx xxx xxx It may well be. the resolution has emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b) that the . It is not our Court's function. or any other type of publication to promote the objectives and purposes of such association or organization. REGALADO. while authorizing a peace officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest. while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988. No. or purposes of such association or organization." I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which. whether through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal. since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II. the particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed. Metro Manila. leaflets.xxx xxx xxx h) Preparing documents. 86332. or 14 days later. the police agents arrested Nazareno. books. to enforce the law by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law.R. specifically conditions that grant of authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed. J. that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and seizures makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. Ramil Regala. Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang. objectives. Now. as the majority implies. Muntinlupa. to make life easy for police forces but rather to protect the liberties of private individuals. planning action. without warrant. that at about 5 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988. xxx xxx xxx k) Participating in any was in the activities. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy. for investigation. according to the resolution. Ramil Regala." Since.: Separate Opinion: While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such concurrence. was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of Rights. clearly. one of the suspects in the said killing. the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the suspects. however. and the Bill of Rights was not designed. the very freedoms which make our polity worth protecting and saving. I wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the rationale adopted in G. It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988." It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. pamphlets.

Further. of suspicion. According to the majority. . According to the majority. precisely. 1 the majority has not shown why the arrests in question should after all be sustained. at the risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum. is supposedly no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . It is correct to say that prevailing conditions affecting national security and stability must also be taken into account. i. when. the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced. SARMIENTO." and suspicion is supposedly reasonable: . such warrantless arrests could be validly made even for a crime committed. Definitely. The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest. 815667) was validly arrested without a warrant and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution. it is now required that the crime must have just been committed.. at least. A reasonable . paragraph (b). of the Rules of Court. if the rules on arrest are scrupulously observed. . However. for the reasons above elucidated. J. The longer the interval.: dissenting: I reiterate my dissent. Rule 113. The recency contemplated here. No. the more attenuated are the chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. "Personal knowledge." according to the majority. was after all committing an offense (subversion being supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military did have personal knowledge that he had committed it. is the time when the crime was in fact committed. that amendment requiring such personal knowledge must have been designed to obviate the practice in the past of warrantless arrests being effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information obtained from third persons who merely professed such knowledge or. in this instance. In the case under consideration. in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest. as an ad hoc proposition. say. he.R. is another cause for controversy. Rolando Dural (G. Yet. as now required by Section 5(b). the obtention of information of a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier necessarily undermines the capacity of the arresting officer to ascertain the reliability of the information he is acting upon and to acquire personal knowledge thereof after such verification. It may be granted. that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable cause and it was not whimsical. . It is true that the corresponding information was filed against Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that. worse. that by reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence. is based on actual facts. Otherwise.person making the arrest must have had personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the complicity or liability of the arrestee for the crime. and not the time when the person making the arrest learned or was informed of such commission. . the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. must have been dictated by the consideration. more than a year ago but of which the arresting officer received information only today. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilty of the person to be arrested. concocted such reports for variant reasons not necessarily founded on truth. Dural. if not assured.e. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant may result from imputations based on dubious motives. there would be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for unwarranted incursions into civil liberties. among others. and not the time when the crime was in fact committed. I take exception to the conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied with in this case.

the arrest is nevertheless subject to question.i. . 2 As I said. that above "overt acts" should be visible to the eyes of the police officers (if that is possible). Santos suggested that notwithstanding good faith on the part of the police. in the second place. Santos did not say that so long as he." and as Ferrer has taken pains to explain. . 167. What. deceit." 4 In People vs. we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man" had been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital. the peace officer. I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge. "[w]hatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers came in its entirety from the information furnished by [another] . did in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved the peace officer on grounds of good faith. the hospital authorities (the alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under existing laws. As Ferrer held. 276. in this case." 11 Here. Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as follows: . " 6 I submit that personal knowledge means exactly what it says — that the peace officer is aware that the accused has committed an offense. coupled with good faith . as amended by Executive Order No. First. . furthermore. and. we would have made "subversion" to mean mere "membership" when. Section 5(b) as amended. previously rejected such a species of information because of the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. however. and needless to say. to overthrow the existing government by force. that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion. As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned. what we have is second-hand. and that "it was found to be true. based on actual facts . . it should be noted. however. to justify police action. subversion. coupled with good faith" referred to by the majority. without more would suffice to secure their punishment. the Rules (then Section 6) spoke of simple "reasonable ground" — which would have arguably encompassed "actual belief or suspicion . membership in a subversive organization with intent to further the objectives thereof. It is to be noted that prior to their amendment. was acting in good faith. knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective. the majority would quite evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the first place. . in relation to Republic Act No. Santos. subversion means more that mere membership. Santos involved a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest without a warrant). . But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. otherwise the accused can not be said to be committing any offense within the contemplation of the Rules of Court. and that that person was Rolando Dural. and as I held.. speaks of "personal knowledge"." as the majority would interpret it. 3 is made up of "overt acts. I respectfully submit that to give to "personal knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the amendment as useless exercise. Indeed. information. the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive organization to make the accused liable." 8 I do not see how We can act differently here. it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court. the arrest is valid.e. not personal knowledge. as the law alone. . coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. hearsay. We have. Santos 9 to be well-taken. I respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without a warrant. . and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power. as Ferrer tells us. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly. 1700. indeed. . and that they joined the Party. I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. as an offense punished by Executive Order No. I dissent. there truly was an information. [and] founded on probable cause. as no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion. Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar arrest because of lack of personal knowledge. and otherwise. it is worse. because we do not even know who that informant was. and that it was reliable. were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder. Quite to the contrary. . willfully and by overt acts. Clearly." 10 and as if. I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. . . as the majority here says that the military was acting in good faith. . "suspicion .suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. as the Court held." that is.

The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 13 Espiritu however was arrested on November 23." According to the majority. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest. 85727. 86332). the very basis of the claim rests on dubious "confidential information. we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. to which the Constitution after all. Domingo Anonuevo. Burgos held: More important. immediatearrests were "prudent" and necessary. It is to me immaterial that the guilt of the accused still has to be established. More important. 1988. I can not. et al. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question before the trial court and precisely. Evidently. the following: Bukas tuloy and welga natin .R. in uttering supposedly. admit to being NPA's. 12 I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque. and Vicky Ocaya (G. there was no reason for the military to ignore the courts. the Court is not bound by bare say-so's. it is nothing to crow about (a mere "administrative measure"). Nos. the accused are in fact being deprived of liberty. that Roque. 84581-82. moreover. Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting to sedition. As People vs. Ramon Caspile. et al. Likewise. gives the authority to issue warrants. I do not think that the majority can say that since Amelia Roque. on November 22. 169. we are talking simply of the legality of the petitioner's arrests. Second. and evidently. Nos. 212. after the majority referred to Rolando Dural as a "sparrow man" and having Amelia Roque. a mere say-so of the military. if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime." It is to gloss over at any rate. et al. As the majority points out. hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of violence to "government health authorities" — not to the military. Arrest to me. amending Presidential Decree No. 83162) could have been lawfully picked up under similar circumstances. 1988. we can not approve an arrest simply because the military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway")— that would be abdication of judicial duty and when. . "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque. the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. I certainly hope not. the subject of controversy. is something to crow about. that Roque. there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G. a day later-and in no way is "inciting to sedition" a continuing offense. . allegedly admitted). we are not talking of the guilt or innocence of the accused. As I said. hanggang sa magkagulo na. we are speaking of simple arrests. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently.R. the military had (again) acted on a mere tipthe military had no personal knowledge (as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). I think it is imprudent for this Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the petitioners-since after all. again. Wilfredo Buenaobra. since meanwhile. but that: . the majority is not saying that it is either. and as the majority points out. et al. et al. even if in the opinion of the majority. Obviously. I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense.

00. instant police action can not be justified. is still another thing. that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my mind. Burgos. the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113. the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all. I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . and apparently. I do not understand why these cases are apparently. "In the balancing of authority and freedom. 20 this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed. without warrant. either. on the side of liberty — as the custodian of the Bill of Rights — even if we were talking of "simple" arrests. First. since: (1) that is a matter of defense. in this case. in this case. titled in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). 23 . 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or escape" 19 and there was no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes. in this case. 16 Secondly. I do not think this is the contemplation of the Rules of Court. is that inciting to sedition is in no way a continuing offense. special cases. protected speech. It is to my mind plain. In the balancing of authority and freedom. because it does not contain enough "fighting words" recognized to be seditious. but apparently. the majority would anyway force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest.00 to P10. is still another thing. titled the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). or soon thereafter. and as far as arrests are concerned. because this Court has leaned." 21 It is a strange declaration.. and in no way is "the following day" "soon thereafter". or soon thereafter. 14 And obviously. while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988. Espiritu was picked up the following day. What the majority has not answered. . . Espiritu has not lost the right to insist. the majority is not telling us neither. . Of course. people who think differently from the rest of us. titled in favor of authority. in this case.000. as I indicated. I am wondering why. . at the time the words were uttered. at the time the words were uttered. the scale in favor of authority . first. or 14 days later. (2) we are talking of mere arrests. because it is supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side of Government). . the Court has. But. since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II." and unless there existed an urgency as where a moving vehicle is involved. given a reduced bail to the accused.000. In the case of People vs. and as I said. "the Court has. that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered." 17 First. Second. the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest. as there was none in the case of Burgos. apart from the fact that these cases involved." 15 and (3) we have. it is the very question before the Court—whether or not the statement in question constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless arrest." 22 as if to say that normally. during the trial on the merits. by tradition. But. we would have stretched the authority of peace officers to make warrantless arrests for acts done days before. It is a perfectly legal question to my mind and I am wondering why we can not answer it. this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. without warrant. that is also of no moment. . the majority is not apparently convicted that it is. then. The majority goes on: Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988. "the Court has. it is a question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without shirking the Court's constitutional duty." states the majority. and second. Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Aminnudin. Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60. anyway. incidentally. As in the case of Burgos in People vs. which obviously becomes difficult at times.

With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra. Garcia and Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified in a regime that respects the rule of law — that the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential document (Garcia) and that the filing of an information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan). tomorrow. can not be arrested at all — but that the military should first procure a warrant from a judge before effecting an arrest. Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and the authorities must have "personal knowledge. and sooner. a decade. "Communism" and "national security" are old hat — the dictator's own excuses to perpetuate tyranny. and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I am saying it. I am co-responsible for the acts of my colleagues and I am afraid that I may. It is not too much to ask of so-called law enforcers. I submit that a year. I respectfully submit." 28 First and foremost. Third. I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases. that arrests may be done only through a judicial warrant. (or worse. the basis for Buenaobra's arrest. I am not to be mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be presumed) but I can not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the military that he was an NPA courier so that the military could pounce on him. because Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military. would not be in fact unreasonable. rightly or wrongly. following the theory of the majority. As it is. I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. an uncounselled confession) was precisely. that I am "coddling criminals"). As it is. a discretion the law denies even judges 24 — today it is fourteen days. to the general rule. I submit that the majority has. whatever "personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal knowledge" of a crime that had "just been committed. I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure" alone—we are talking ofarrests. one year. if he can not be arrested without a warrant. I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its pronouncement on individual rights (and statutory construction in general)." The case of Deogracias Espiritu. we do not know if we are in fact dealing with "Communists. precisely. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old excuses. mandated by the Constitution no less. and as the majority has conceded. ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually. precisely. Second. the majority has in fact given the military the broadest discretion to act. of depriving people of liberty—even if we are not yet talking of whether or not people are guilty." as the majority did not find it unreasonable for the Capital Command to claim that it "came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II" 25—and none of us can possibly dispute it. when the Rules have purposely limited it by way of an exception. pounced on him. for one." whatever "personal knowledge" they have is necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks before. and it will not minimize the significance of the petitioners' predicament. In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of the Rules." In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact (allegedly) committed. I do not see how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security and stability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. as in the cases of Amelia Roque. be in time made to defend such an indefensible pronouncement. Enrile 27 have been better days. a decade. In no way can the authorities be said to have "personal knowledge" two weeks thereafter. I respectfully submit. and I feel I am appropriately concerned because as a member of the Court. et al. since the military can claim anytime that it "found out only later.. I am not saying that a suspected criminal.With all due respect. hardly involves subversion. the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act. to approve the military's action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the point. It is to beg the question. .

Nazareno was picked up fourteen days after it (allegedly. Yet. As I indicated. the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information" (manufactured or genuine. "values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso Nazareno are concerned. "what is important is that the Court be right. if they could have been defended. In spite of "EDSA". saturation drives. it is not the Section 5(b) I know. With all due respect." 29 I supposed that goes without saying. I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent jurisprudence (e." states the Constitution. "What is important. any information with which the military (or police) were armed could no more than be hearsay. Umil is a question of whether or not this Court.g. in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered. Apparently. "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality. 1990. in the first place. Burgos. I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority insists on can not justify the arrests in question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113." concludes the majority. and effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable .419. of whether or not the military (or police). is right. bombings. we have no way of telling) and in the second place. the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found: An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988." 32 The Constitution states the general rule — the majority would make the exception the rule. supra). "The right of the people. 94% of them illegally. it is evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds for warrantless arrests under Section 5(b) of Rule 113. murder). in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers in the bar. "to be secure in their persons. But it is also to patronize the petitioners and simply.Fourth and finally. as incidences of disappearances. doubtful. and the rule the exception. had complied with the requirements of law on warrantless arrests. when after all." says the majority. . allegedly. this Court is validating their continued detention. ." 31 "The State." I submit that the majority has read into Section 5(b) a provision that has not been written there. inciting to sedition. illegally. 4." 33 Nobody has suggested in the first place. 1989 to September. A Final Word As I began my dissent. 1990. houses. Four thousand four hundred eight (4." the Charter likewise states.. I submit that it is nothing for which the public should be elated. Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule. in approving the military's actions. People vs. Espiritu was arrested one day after the act. . not personal. torture. on the contrary. I reiterate one principle: The State has no right to bother citizens without infringing their right against arbitrary State action. Umil is a question.408) political detentions from January. 30 With all due respect. hamletting. and various human rights violations increase in alarming rates. "More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups. the rule the majority insists is the applicable rule. they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no longer be defended. this is not what constitutionalism is all about. information. to offer a small consolation. certainly. . the majority would approve the police's actions nonetheless because the police supposedly "found out only later. I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are. that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability. in effecting the arrests assailed. via habeas corpus proceedings. papers. a climate of fear persists in the country. In its update for October.

and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. 40. without being authorized by law. of frustrated salvage. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 361 children were detained for no apparent reason. 280 were eventually salvaged. Metro Manila.Of those arrested. I am hopeful that despite my departure. vs. 2014 DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ. did then and there. 1986. The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations. 1 2 3 THE ANTECEDENT FACTS Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11. Since February. One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1. shellings.R.409) have been injured as a consequence of bombing. and food blockades undertaken by the military since 1988. From January to June 1990. Nonetheless. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. it will not be too late. . 54 cases of frustrated massacre.) No. The Information reads: 4 That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City. C. Forty (40) cases of massacres. CONTRARY TO LAW. 34 It is a bleak picture. Petitioner. 32582. the above named accused. 535 showed signs of torture. No. DECISION SERENO.63 gram knowing the same to [be a] dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law. in which 157 were wounded. with 218 killed. G. Respondent.010. No. willfully. CJ: We resolve the Petition filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from the Decision dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.R. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. I am also disappointed that it is the portrait of the Court I am soon leaving. Article II of Republic Act (R. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. and 109 remained missing after their arrest. 199042 November 17.R. Motions denied.A. 532 of those illegally arrested were women.

After recording the incident in the police blotter.R. DEFENSE’S VERSION 6 7 The accused testified that at the time of the incident. the accused. he was subjected to a body search and. pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. which hinged on one issue. PO3 Coralde marked the sachet with the initial "DAV 0615-04".A. in the process. There. convicted petitioner of the offense charged. proceeded to the house of Villanueva.On 15 July 2004. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: 9 WHEREFORE. 10 The CA reviewed the appeal. 11 RULING OF THE CA On 4 May 2011. Article II. along with three others. PO3 Jonathan Coralde. the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court: . (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya. SPO3 Enrique de Jesus. judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ. 8 RULING OF THE RTC The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City. and (4) Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones. Navotas City. a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants. together with Resco. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section 11. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against him. invited him to go with them to the police station. he was at home watching TV when PO3 Coralde. The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with the law.000. 9165. the accused was then frisked and detained at the police station. viz: THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS ILLEGAL THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT’S WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH. (2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan Coralde. They invited him to the police station. this Court hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as the minimum to seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months as the maximum and to pay the fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300. SO ORDERED. Henceforth. Informed that he had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco.00). SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony Asiones. premises considered. in its Decision dated 6 April 2009. Their testimonies reveal that a Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road. and PO2 Reynante Mananghaya brought it to the National Police District Scene of the Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for examination. duly assisted by counsel de oficio. 5 PROSECUTION’S VERSION Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127,
Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. 70854 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

12

On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated 18 October 2011.
13

14

Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following lone issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER’S
CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DESPITE THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN
THE HANDLING OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG.
15

Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid warrantless arrests, since it
took place on the day of the alleged shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without
any warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently, inadmissible. The Office of
the Solicitor General filed its Comment stating that the shabu confiscated from petitioner was
admissible in evidence against him; that the search conducted on him was valid; and that he cannot
raise the issue regarding the apprehending officers’ non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A.
9165 for the first time on appeal.
16

OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer
or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer show none of
the above that would make the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accusedappellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who
had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right
to question the validity of his arrest.
17

The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. Records have established
that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the accused has already
waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally waived his right
to contest the legality of the search.
18

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be
conducted. These searches include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3)
customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to
a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.
1âwphi1

19

The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not of a moving
vehicle, a customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not have been a
seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside the left pocket of accusedappellant’s pants. Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While thistype may seemingly fall under
the consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but shown by clear and convincing evidence."
20

Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
mustbe unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. In
this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents of his pocket. The testimony of the
police officer on the matter is clear:
21

Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?
A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring out the thing which I felt.
Q. : And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to bring out the contents of his
pocket?
A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic containing shabu.

22

The evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence
against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous
tree." Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2)
of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction
23

of accused appellant cannot be sustained. This being the case, we see no more reason to discuss
the alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the confiscated drug.
As a final word, we reiterate that "[ w ]hile this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law
enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with · deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and
the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means."
24

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution dated
18 October 2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No.
32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191532

August 15, 2012

MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
PEREZ,*
REYES,**
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the November 26, 2009
Decision 1 and the March 9, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
31957, which affirmed the September 1, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123,
Caloocan City, (RTC) in Criminal Case No .. C-73029, finding petitioner Margarita Ambre y
Cayuni (Ambre) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
THE FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against Ambre, and co-accused, Bernie Castro (Castro) and
Kaycee Mendoza (Mendoza), before the RTC charging them with illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73028, and illegal use of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73029. The
Informations indicting the accused read:
Criminal Case No. C-73028
That on or about 20th day of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1)

unsealed transparent plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance,
(METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) rolled aluminum foil strip containing traces
of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) folded
aluminum foil strip containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE) and two (2) disposable plastic lighters, knowing the same are paraphernalias
instruments apparatus fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting or introducing
dangerous drug (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE) into the body.
Contrary to law.4
Criminal Case No. C-73029
That on or about the 20th of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one
another, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use
and sniff Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), knowing the same to be a dangerous drug
under the provisions of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law.5
When arraigned, Castro and Mendoza pleaded guilty to both charges. Consequently, they were
meted the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8)
months and a fine of P25,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-73028. For their conviction in Criminal
Case No. C-73029, the RTC ordered their confinement at the Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation
of Drug Dependents (CUREDD) for a period of six (6) months.6
Ambre, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. 7 Trial on the merits ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), PO1 Ronald
Allan Mateo(PO1 Mateo), PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), and P/Insp. Jessie dela Rosa
(P/Insp. dela Rosa), it appeared that on April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal DrugSpecial Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that
a certain Abdulah Sultan (Sultan) and his wife Ina Aderp (Aderp) were engaged in the selling of
dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City; that the buy-bust operation resulted in
the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao (Tagoranao); that Sultan ran away from the
scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in
the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that inside the house, the
police operatives found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre, in particular,
was caught sniffing what was suspected to be shabu in a rolled up aluminum foil; and that PO3
Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for
illegal use of shabu.
The items confiscated from the three were marked and, thereafter, submitted for laboratory
examination. Physical Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05 stated that the urine samples
taken from Ambre and her coaccused were positive for the presence of shabu while Physical
Science Report No. D-149-05 showed that the items seized from them were all found positive for
traces of shabu.8

2)In Crim. claimed that no pot session took place on the afternoon of April 20. C-73029. premises considered. 2005. finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI not guilty of the crime of Violation of Section 12. No.A. who was convicted in Criminal Case No. acquitted her of the crime of violation of Section 12. and that she was not brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for drug testing. She averred that she and Ambre were merely inside the residential compound. 2005. 15. II RA 9165 and hereby sentences her to be confined and rehabilitated at the government rehabilitation center in Bicutan. the RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of Ambre for illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or violation of Section 15. was a resident of Phase 12. C. that ten minutes later. Taguig. that her mother asked Rosete to accompany her because Rosete’s daughter-in-law. 9165. Case No. Case No. judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1) In Crim. The trial court adjudged: WHEREFORE. C-73029. Art. the defense claimed that on the afternoon of April 20. The six (6) month period of rehabilitation shall commence only from the time that she is brought inside the rehabilitation center and its promulgation by this court for which the accused shall be notified. she returned fifteen minutes later and learned that the policemen had arrested people inside the compound including Ambre. Ambre was inside the residential compound in Caloocan to buy malong. The shabu subject of these cases is hereby confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with the rules governing the same. Nancy Buban (Buban). Article II of R. Article II. Caloocan City. Article II of R.The Version of the Defense Ambre vehemently denied the charges against her. Mendoza and Tagoranao.73028. an area inhabited by Muslims. Mendoza and Lily Rosete(Rosete). Rosete and Buban left her inside the residential compound to look for other vendors. that she was detained at the Caloocan City Jail where she met Castro. 9165 for failure of the prosecution to prove with particularity the drug paraphernalia found in her possession. that when they failed to buy malong. Rosete further testified that after she had left Ambre inside the compound to find other malong vendors. finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. Metro Manila for a period of six (6) months. Mendoza. Costs against the accused. Through the testimonies of Ambre. SO ORDERED. however. when policemen suddenly came in and pointed guns at them. 2008.A. No. 9 The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On September 1. RA 9165.10 The Decision of the Court of Appeals . the policemen barged inside the compound and arrested her. The RTC.

In this regard. SO ORDERED. Ambre appealed the judgment of conviction before the CA professing her innocence of the crime. HER CO-ACCUSED. She argues that the alleged "hot pursuit" on Sultan which ended in the latter's house. The Decision dated September 1. where she. Hence. 3. and 2. On November 26. Ambre cites the April 29.Undaunted. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE THAT WERE SEIZED DURING THE ILLEGAL BUY-BUST OPERATION ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S PENALTY OF SIX (6) MONTHS REHABILITATION IN A GOVERNMENT CENTER IS A NULLITY GIVEN THE LACK OF CONFIRMATORY TEST AS REQUIRED UNDER R. 9165 ("COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002"). WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER ON APRIL 20. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER WERE PART AND PARCEL OF THE DISMISSED AND DISCREDITED BUY-BUST OPERATIONS OF THE POLICE AND/OR "FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE" AND HENCE. KAYCEE MENDOZA. WERE ILLEGAL. 2009.) Whether the items seized are inadmissible in evidence. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. 2010 Resolution. ON THE GROUND THAT THE LATTER EARLIER PLED GUILTY TO SUCH ILLEGAL USE. 4. 5. Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made against her were illegal because no offense was being committed at the time and the police operatives were not authorized by a judicial order to enter the dwelling of Sultan. the CA rendered the assailed decision. HAD VIOLATED THE RULE ON INTER ALIOS ACTA UNDER SECTION 26. was more imaginary than real. 2. Branch 123. RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT. the appeal is hereby DENIED. Mendoza and Castro were supposedly found having a pot session. 2005 Resolution . 2005 (THAT YIELDED ALLEGED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA) CONFORMED WITH THE MANDATED LEGAL PROCEDURES IN CONDUCTING A BUY-BUST OPERATION. she filed this petition THE ISSUES Ambre raised the following issues: 1. premises considered. Essentially. 12 A perusal of the pleadings filed by the parties leads the Court to conclude that the case revolves on the following core issues: 1. Caloocan City is AFFIRMED. 2008 of the Regional Trial Court.A.) Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid. WHETHER OR NOT THE EXCLUSION OR DISREGARD OF THE FAVORABLE TESTIMONY OF PETITIONER'S WITNESS.11 Ambre's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its March 9.

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed.of the Prosecutor's Office of Caloocan City dismissing the case against Aderp and Sultan for insufficiency of evidence because the April 20. 5.14 This exclusionary rule is not. is actually committing. recognizes permissible warrantless arrests: "Sec. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges this Court to affirm the challenged decision for failure of Ambre to show that the RTC committed any error in convicting her of illegal use of shabu. there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed. Arrest without warrant. She claims that the omission of the apprehending team to observe the procedure outlined in R. In the language of the fundamental law. based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer.A peace officer or a private person may. 2005 buy-bust operation was highly suspicious and doubtful. an absolute and rigid proscription. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. One of the recognized exception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest. 15 In this exception. however. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. above. an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. in his presence. Section 2. As a rule. provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Section 5. the person to be arrested has committed. however. 9165 for the seizure of evidence in drugs cases significantly impairs the prosecution’s case. The OSG insists that Ambre was lawfully arrested in accordance with Section 5. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. Lastly. it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. THE COURT'S RULING The conviction of Ambre stands. Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. . (Emphasis supplied) Section 5. when lawful. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. the law requires that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. arrest a person: (a) When. She posits that the items allegedly seized from her were inadmissible in evidence being fruits of a poisonous tree. No. (b) arrest of a suspect where. or is attempting to commit an offense. Article III13 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause. It is of the opinion that the credible and compelling evidence of the prosecution could not be displaced by the empty denial offered by Ambre. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. hence. (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final . without a warrant. the imposition of the penalty of six months rehabilitation was not justified. For the State. Ambre maintains that she was not subjected to a confirmatory test and.A.

Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante delicto. The urine samples taken from them were found positive for the presence of shabu. No. together with Castro and Mendoza. To write finis to the issue of validity and irregularity in her warrantless arrest. as indicated in Physical Science Report No. or is attempting to commit a crime. Thus. DT-04105 to DT-043-05. because the evidence against her was obtained in violation of the procedure laid down in R. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro. Accordingly. and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. These findings were unrebutted. 2005. even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of . the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. D-149-05 dated April 21. No. 17 Ambre. In arrest in flagrante delicto. After all. can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. in reality. even granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be present in the dwelling of Sultan. Article II of R. were illegally using shabu. two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed.21 In this case.A. the physical evidence corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Ambre.A. thus. While ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest. the subsequent search and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful. a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons. The argument is specious. the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised. the Court holds that Ambre is deemed to have waived her objections to her arrest for not raising them before entering her plea. Ambre's assertion that her conviction was incorrect. and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 9165. there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu and. is actually committing. 20 This Court. It was likewise found that the items seized from the three were all positive for traces of shabu as contained in Physical Science Report No. 19 Further.18 Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid. however. 9165. however. Hence. it would not render unlawful the arrest of Ambre. it is not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.16 In the case at bench. has consistently held that the most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers. is untenable. made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in the residence of Sultan. Clearly. PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Section 15.

First. this will not render Ambre's arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible. and P/Insp. the following items were confiscated from them: one (1) unsealed sachet with traces of suspected shabu. As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. PO2 Hipolito brought the confiscated items to the PNP Crime Laboratory and delivered them to P/Insp. Upon arrival at the police station. It must be emphasized that in no instance did Ambre challenge. a forensic chemist.the drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu. The presumption remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. All the pieces of evidence were placed inside an improvised envelope marked as "SAID-SOU EVIDENCE 04-20-05. except the disposable lighters. the testimonies of the police officers have adequately established with moral certainty the commission of the crime charged in the information and the identity of Ambre as the perpetrator. the defense of denial offered by Ambre must simply fail. positive for traces of shabu. It was too late in the day for her to do so. dela Rosa. the Court affirms the RTC's finding that the police officers' testimonies deserve full faith and credit. in view of the alleged lack of confirmatory test. No. Ambre only questioned the alleged omission when she appealed he·r conviction before the CA. who found all the items. PO1 Mateo.24 Besides. PO3 Moran turned over the seized items to PO2 Hipolito who immediately marked them in the presence of the former. Bare denials cannot prevail over positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Likewise. the prosecution had adduced ample evidence to account for the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized items. one (1) strip of rolled up aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu. this Court has held in a catena of cases that the defense of denial or frame-up has been viewed with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act." With the Request for Laboratory Examination. Records bear out that after the arrest of Ambre with Castro and Mendoza. PO2 Hipolito. At this juncture. at the RTC.23 The Court finds no reason to deviate from this rule in this case. Ambre will not be exculpated from criminal liability. the Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. 9165. Appellate courts. Even if the Court strikes down the seized drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu as inadmissible. one (1) folded piece of aluminum foil with traces of white crystalline substance also believed to be shabu.A. ingested or used a dangerous drug and creates a presumption that he has violated Section 15 of R. Ambre contends that the penalty of six months of rehabilitation in a government center imposed on her was a nullity. 22 Secondly. The Court is not persuaded. let it be underscored that proof of the existence and possession by the accused of drug paraphernalia is not a condition sine qua non for conviction of illegal use of dangerous drugs. generally. The law merely considers possession of drug paraphernalia as prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked. The presumption was not overcome as there was no showing that PO3 Moran. dela Rosa were impelled with improper motive to falsely impute such offense against Ambre. Verily. and two (2) yellow disposable lighters. Wellentrenched is . will not disturb the trial court's assessment of a witness' credibility unless certain material facts and circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded. the supposed absence of confirmatory drug test conducted on her. 25 Finally.

R. Respondent. custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0. 205926 July 22. the petition is DENIED. 31957 are hereby AFFIRMED. 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. they spotted.R. not having been lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs. a dangerous drug. Petitioner. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. G. CR No. 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements. 2003. at a distance of about 10 meters.R. two (2) men . MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11.26 WHEREFORE. 2009 Decision and the March 9. 2003. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road." with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. they immediately 7 . Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim.15 gram (sic) and 0. 1 2 3 4 5 The Facts On July 31. 6 According to the prosecution. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. 32813. (RA) 9165. 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road. 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19. an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of Section 11. Article II of RA 9165.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) . did then and there willfully. Case No. Barangay Hulo. unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have in his possession.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated October 20. Article II of Republic Act No. the above-named accused. to wit: That on or about the 30th day of July 2003.43 grams which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu". CONTRARY TO LA W. in the City of Mandaluyong. vs. Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle. DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu.the rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. which affirmed in toto the Judgment dated July 28. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. J. Mandaluyong City. CR No. The assailed November 26. Philippines. 2015 ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES. SO ORDERED. at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30.

10 The RTC Ruling In. The CA Ruling In a Decision dated October 20. 13 Aggrieved. this petition. Comerciante appealed to the CA. that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter. arrested Comerciante and Dasilla. Further. and thereafter. 8 After the prosecution rested its case. considering that P03 Calag saw. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.00. they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings. however. the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence. in plain view. and accordingly. the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence. 14 15 Dissatisfied. 9 In his defense. were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. which was granted by the RTC. 16 17 18 The Issue before the Court . he must be presumed to have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante. the R TC opined that there was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest. Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok". and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. 2009. In this relation. However. sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. 2013.stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of around five (5) meters. denied in a Resolution dated February 19. the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11. P03 Calag had every reason to inquire on the matter right then and there. 11 12 The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante. this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that those sachets might be shabu. given that the latter was committing a crime in flagrante delicto. and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of P300. Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence. 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. were arrested and taken to a police station. when suddenly. It held that P03 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante. who was a notorious drug pusher in the area. According to the CA. Comerciante moved for reconsideration which was. he and Dasilla. thus his acquittal. There. a Judgment dated July 28. When they failed to accede to the demand. the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that P03 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive. who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road. and that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer. Hence. Article II of RA 9165. and thus. which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu.000.

Consequently.The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another..the process cannot be reversed. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending. arrest a person: (a) When. however. necessarily resulting in his acquittal. without a warrant. Section 2. Section 3 (2). as follows: 24 25 SEC. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures. such search and seizure becomes. as a general rule. in his presence. in the absence of such warrant. . especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs. Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.5. . One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. when lawful. In this instance. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. Comerciante essentially contends that P03 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him. i. the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest. or is attempting to commit an offense. 21 22 23 The exclusionary rule is not. the person to be arrested has committed. an absolute and rigid proscription. Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause. Section 5.e. the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made . evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 20 The Court's Ruling The petition is meritorious. In other words. In his petition. the Office of the Solicitor General. the plastic sachets containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible. Article II of RA 9165. 19 On the other hand. is actually committing. Arrest without warrant. "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.A peace officer or a private person may. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests. maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule. on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines.

26 For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate. the officer himself witnesses the crime. On the basis of the foregoing. On the other hand. P03 Calag's testimony on direct examination is revelatory: Pros." with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Hulo. Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan? A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group. ma'am. or is attempting to commit a crime. kindly tell the court where were you? A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma' am. (b) arrest of a suspect where. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. what unusual incident that happened if any? . two (2) elements must concur. 29 A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest. Under Section 5 (a). xxxx Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling? A: Eduardo Radan.In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above. Silao: Q: Now on July 30. P03 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements. he decided to effect an arrest. Q: While you were along Private Road. namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed. is actually committing. an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Ma' am. and ( b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer. there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed. 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. 27 28 In both instances. he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. while in Section (b). ( c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Mandaluyong City.

I invited them. Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other. ma'am. what did you do? A: We stopped ma'am. Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped. Q: And who was driving the motorcycle? A: Eduardo Radan. ma'am.A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to someone. xxxx Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male persons you already identified? A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am. Mandaluyong City? A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour. 0: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this Private Road. ma' am. xxxx Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as police officer? A: They were surprised. Q: After they were stunned. Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that particular act? A: They were quite facing me then. Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped. Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they were surprised? A: They were stunned. what was the reaction of these two male persons? A: They were surprised. what did you do next. Hulo. ma'am. . police officer? A: I arrested them. more or less? A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.

Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. even assuming that he has perfect vision. Silao: Eh. just listens. or was about to commit a crime. Kaliwa. That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu. Pros. was committing. xxxx Q: From what portion of his body.Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short. and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu. no problem.miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. bakit di ka makapagsalita? Court: You keep touching your eyes. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour . kanan or you cannot recall? 30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) On the basis of such testimony. napakasimple Lang ng tanong ko sa yo eh.especially from a distance of around 10 meters. Q: Left or right hand? Pros. would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy . ano sinabi mo sa kanila? Pros. the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. Silao: Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit? Witness: Wala po. Answer the question. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed. Verily. stop making unnecessary movements. 31 32 . the Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag. In fact. Pros. even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag. Did you say anything? Court: Mr. the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a). Sabihin mo Kung Hindi mo matandaan. Just relax. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala? Witness: Wala po. I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you recover the plastic sachet? A: From his hand ma'am. Witness.

" it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk. one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence. Rule 113. the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that P03 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. with his or her personal knowledge. must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. 33 In this relation. Malacat v. However. they should have the ability to discern .Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b). have been committed first. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. in fact." A genuine reason must exist. It does not have to be probable cause. the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk" searches: 34 "Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. have been complied with. In People v. Verily. That is. Section 2 of the Constitution. a crime must.based on facts that they themselves observe . Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime. to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception: Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk. a basic criterion would be that the police officer. For warrantless searches. law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. In Posadas v. that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. but it cannot be mere suspicion.whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. As already discussed. this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause: The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Clearly. the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante untenable. in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions. Cogaed. "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause.e. . which does not obtain in this case. Hence.. this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III. xxxx Normally. Court of Appeals. i. 1a\^/phi1 The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or herself in.

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. heading towards P. 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. respondents. M. the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. 1 on 2 July 1991. Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. Petitioner entered Wilson St. which. Metro Manila. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there . No. unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason. There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity. SO ORDERED. reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search. Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability. Guevarra St.. As such. 1992 ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING." Certainly. taken together. vs.In his dissent for Esquillo v.R. 9165. there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. In this light. petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. J. Article II of Republic Act No. CR No. petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11. WHEREFORE. Accordingly. the petition is GRANTED. 1âwphi1 In sum. Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged. FELICIANO. 'the Decision dated October 20. People.. At the corner of Wilson and J. These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former.. Regional Trial Court. 101837 February 11. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release.. Branch 168. Presiding Judge. petitioner. Accordingly. where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction.: According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report. [35]] (Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this case.R. 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19. NCJR Pasig. THE HON. 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity. G.M. San Juan." The Constitution prohibits "umeasonable searches and seizures. walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful. Abad Santos Sts. Petitioner alighted from his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. THE COURT OF APPEALS. PELAYO. BENJAMIN V.

that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro. the police launched a manhunt for petitioner. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner. the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. An eyewitness to the shooting. the Prosecutor.000. the victim. and before an information could be filed in court. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. on 11 July 1991. filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. No bail was recommended. petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police. instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide.000. The police forthwith detained him. acting on the omnibus motion. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner. On 12 July 1991. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge. counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation. petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. who was at the police station at that time. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991. On 8 July 1991. At the bottom of the information. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver. In the afternoon of the same day. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from. On 16 July 1991. Accordingly.00. died of his gunshot wound(s). Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. in the presence of his lawyers. he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The following day. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day. 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. on the same date. wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100. they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. 11 July 1991. . who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100. the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation 8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. On 9 July 1991. positively identified petitioner as the gunman. while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor.00. Eldon Maguan. That same day. who. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop.retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol.

The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19. on the one hand. the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. petitioner was arraigned. he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.Also on 16 July 1991. the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision (2) petitions. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled. (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled. petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. On 19 July 1991. issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic. 14. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition. however. however. On 17 July 1991. (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991. and on 7. of his refusal to enter a plea. 21 and 22 November 1991. this motion was. on 2. 11 On 27 August 1991. petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself. 8. were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals. denied by respondent Judge. 15. petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment. On 19 September 1991. the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation. 24 and 26 September. By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991. On 19 August 1991. On 23 July 1991. respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. The Court of Appeals. upon the other. prohibition and mandamus. On 16 August 1991. petitioner surrendered to the police. this Court remanded the petition for certiorari. On 23 September 1991. respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order. 11 and 17 October. on the following grounds: 14 dismissing the two . He alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him. on 2 September 1991. however. contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted. respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991. prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order. prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals. On 30 August 1991. 13 The petition for certiorari. and the petition for habeas corpus. trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness. the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. In view. in violation of his right to due process. after the lapse of more than a month. On 23 August 1991. thus prolonging his detention. 3. On the same date.

In respect of the first issue. the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Thus. in the view of the Solicitor General. On 4 October 1991. petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Ramos. d. b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. Moreover. the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary investigation. Rule 112 of the . Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden). with petitioner's conformity. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work. petitioner argues. whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. v. there had been an existing manhunt for him. none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest.. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. We consider these issues seriatim. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had been "freshly committed. etc. et al. the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. the provisions of Section 7. Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court.. and second. Accordingly.a. one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit. On 14 October 1991. He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice. In this Petition for Review. whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go. etc. At the time he showed up at the police station. Station Commander. On the other hand. et al. petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant.. c." His identity had been established through investigation. the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court. the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted. Section 7. 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil. On 3 October 1991. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first. petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case.

the person to be arrested has committed. — A peace officer or a private person may. which provides: . It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112.Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation. Ramos is. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: Sec. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman. Section 7. could not apply in respect of petitioner. misplaced. in the circumstances of this case. arrest a person: (a) When. is actually committing. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. without warrant. That information did not. Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112. Ramos. when lawful. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present. an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime. membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending." Secondly. at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan." 18 It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. by an eight-to-six vote. or is attempting to commit an offense. The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). etc. within the meaning of Section 5(a). the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder. however. the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses. another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. Moreover. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In the instant case. none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. in his presence. constitute "personal knowledge." Those offenses were subversion. 5 Arrest without warrant. In Umil v. upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes.

The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor. ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. before the filing of such complaint or information. petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. Moreover. in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. since petitioner had not been arrested. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party. When he walked into San Juan Police Station. the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information. If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted. he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person However.Sec. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor. Mogul. as amended. the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead. (Emphasis supplied) is also not applicable. the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule. on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself. petitioner was not arrested at all. Indeed. Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor. As earlier pointed out. as noted earlier. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted. with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer. accompanied by two (2) lawyers. not by the Regional Trial Court. the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation. a responsible person of his choice. In Crespo v. for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. This was substantive error. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. with or without a warrant. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion. the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. 19 this Court held: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is . we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. Notwithstanding such waiver.

Finally. and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty. it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament. once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.. a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion). emphasis supplied) Nonetheless. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process. the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save. 20 (Citations omitted. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. In turn. xxx xxx xxx The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. since it has in fact been established by statute. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety. on the 5th day after filing the information for murder. since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7. The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasijudicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not. is not a mere formal or technical right. not to speak of expense. aggravation. to hardened criminals. at such stage. The rule is that the . . the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. is a valuable right. Mogul involved a re-investigation). or the right of the People to due process of law. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. it is a substantive right. . . Thus. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation.terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. as above stated. the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable. perhaps. humiliation. the permission of the Court must be secured.

upon the other hand. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might.22 In the instant case. he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one. we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. Accordingly. the constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. If he submitted to arraignment at trial. in the circumstances of this case." 24 In the instant case. Selfaison. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. prohibition and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial. petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation.At the time of his arraignment. impact upon. that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation. conclude that probable cause exists. trial on the merits has already commenced. We would clarify. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. in the instant case. with extraordinary haste. Accordingly. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991.right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment." in a manner of speaking . was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest. to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. however. firstly. petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. the date set for arraignment of petitioner. the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses. petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail? Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation. we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari. During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991. in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand. they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation. counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and . we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within fortyeight (48) hours from notice. In any event. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation. did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that. In People v. secondly. In fact. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. 25 It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. and just before arraignment. Again. petitioner did so "kicking and screaming. while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice. petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and. the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause.

It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point. it would not be idle ceremony. SO ORDERED. petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100. In respect of the matter of bail. This Decision is immediately executory. after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record. and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor. could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue. and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process. and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go. in any case. No pronouncement as to costs. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. To reach any other conclusions here. . The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED.00). 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout. it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection.objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. strong. Meantime. promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. ACCORDINGLY. During the trial. and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED. to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. rather. it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge. And. 30 If he did not walk out on the trial. before the prosecution called its first witness. It would then be up to the trial court. we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. that is.000.

00 — a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills 3 — as money for the buybust operation. Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom).08 grams in violation of the above-cited law. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp.00. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH. Philippines." accusedappellants. Kamuning. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City. accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4. vs. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. P03 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. From this sum. As arranged by one of the CI's. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1. deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7. 125299 January 22. a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5. conspiring. At 7:20 of the same morning.G. Cortes designated P03 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up. 1995. "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. plaintiff-appellee. 1 The information reads: That on or about the 5th day of December. 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law.R. the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA.641. 4 The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area. 1995 at E. did. CONTRARY TO LAW. 1995. J. gave the team P2. unlawfully and feloniously sell. 000. the above-named accused. No. On December 5. P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1. Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom. received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. P/Insp. members of the North Metropolitan District. the CI and the rest of the team were waiting.00. PO3 Manlangit set aside P1. 00 to cover operational expenses. "Jun" instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. 5 An hour later. at 6:00 in the morning. 2 The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995. "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where P03 Manlangit. "Jun" took out from his bag an object . administer. and the rest of the team as perimeter security. then and there willfully. 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong.600.600. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit.: On December 7.600. Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. PUNO.

later identified as P03 Manlangit. Simultaneous with the box's discovery. That day. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. a 33-year old carpenter. When Violeta entered her house." His suspicion aroused. overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. 9 The bricks. aged 5. Standing by the door. pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about three minutes. They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy. namely. then still at the door. a 35-year old rice vendor. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door.641. Accusedappellant Doria. he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun. 10 The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. eleven (11) in all.600. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. and Jason. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. 6 "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal. Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children." For five (5) minutes. 1995. she was at her house at Daang Bakal. Doria saw box on top of the table. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were. claimed that on December 5. the twins Raymond and Raynan. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. aged 3. however. Violeta Gaddao. the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy. Totoy Gaddao. Turning towards them.08 grams. Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. aged 10. Arvy. When accused-appellant denied the charge. One of the men. 11 Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao. 1995. is the wife of his acquaintance. accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal . Totoy's wife. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. P03 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. Florencio Doria. he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house. accused-appellant stayed in the car. "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth. This closeness. its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. Thereafter. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7. testified that on December 5. at 7:00 in the morning." 8 The policemen arrested "Neneth. did not extend to Violeta. Upon inquiry." together with the box. aged 8." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community. P03 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. Arjay.wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers. surrounding them. The box was open and had something inside. by that time. 7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1." They took "Neneth" and "Jun. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate. three men were already inside. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE. 13 of Republic Act No. Along the way. also of Republic Act No. Totoy. had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. she carried her youngest son. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person. Branch 156. They asked her about a box on top of the table. she and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v.for her children's breakfast. Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. She found out later that the man was P03 Manlangit. they passed the artesian well to fetch water. Her eldest son. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt. the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500. the guilt of accused. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. . She woke her children and bathed them. however. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500. Ten minutes later. Then they headed for home.M. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. 23. left for school at 6:45 A. 4 of Republic Act No. This was the first time she saw the box. Jayson.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. and accompanied Arjay to school. After seeing Arjay off. Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. the provisions of Sec. Simon. Her husband. a housepainter. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband. confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.000. 234 SCRA 555. 12 After trial. and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. they are both CONVICTED of the present charge against them.00 each. 7659 which explicitly state that: The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. Arvy. the Regional Trial Court. Taking into consideration. An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating.000. The man pulled her and took her to her house.

14 Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST WAS CONDUCTED.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board.The confiscated marijuana bricks (7. II THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY. INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER. Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women. 13 Before this Court. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE . Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review. accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors. NBI for destruction in accordance with law.641. SO ORDERED. Mandaluyong City. II THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons. thus: I THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES.

AT BEST. there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. Not every deception is forbidden. IV THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. NEBULOUS. 26 Where. 21 The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him." 23 It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of percuasion. United States. WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE. 24 It is recognized that in every arrest. percuasion or fraud of the officers. trickery. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law. the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state. the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed. or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure . however. 20 In the American jurisdiction. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes. OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME. 17 Entrapment was unknown in common law. or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime. AT WORST. and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant. 18 Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery. 25Where the criminal intent originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. 22 the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer. 19 It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist. there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law. and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accusedappellant Gaddao. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer. particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. 15 The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria.INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER. and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom. the search of her person and house. the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him. 16 Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. NIL. Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense.

the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be
convicted. 27 The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.

Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense 28 that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the
nature of a confession and avoidance. 29 It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of
providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established,
the burden shifts to the governmet to show otherwise. 30 When entrapment is raised as a defense,
American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid
down in Sorrells v. United States 31 to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the
inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination
before his initial exposure to government agents. 32 All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and
character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc.,
are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. 33 The predisposition test emphasizes the
accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and reflects an attempt
to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." 35 If the
accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the
entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement. 36 Some states,
however, have adopted the "objective" test. 37 This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case
of Grossman v. State 38 rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by
judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police

The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not
on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter
unlawful police conduct. 40 The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent
was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the
offense; 41 for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the
temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. 42 Official
conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as
badgering, cajoling or importuning, 43 or appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas
of desperate illness, are not. 44 Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an
entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his
guilt has been established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime
"cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become
tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties. 45 Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense,
the interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the
officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission
are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would on a normal person. 46
conduct. 39

Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed
that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e, if the court determines that an accused
was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory
practices will be deemed impermissible. 47 Delving into the accused's character and predisposition
obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally.
It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused
might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements. 48 On the
other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular
accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important
bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and and their agents was proper. 49 The
undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and
active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. 50

Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United
States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" 51 In Cruz v. State, 52 the Florida Supreme
Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this objective test is
satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. 53 In Baca
v. State, 54 the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a
criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of
predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of
proper investigation. 55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests
alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the
accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps, 56 we acquitted the accused from the
offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced
him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps'
apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some
occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who
went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could
smoke this drug. 57 The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible." 58 In People v.
Abella, 59 we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the
apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, .
. . a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement,
"direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no
evidence sufficient to convict the accused. 60 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 61 we convicted the
accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated
that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to
Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the
apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending
to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the
prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. 62
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid down the distinction between
entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris, 64 we held:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of
entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to
be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often
been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being
criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a
crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently
assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield
defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation
of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate
of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original
design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by
the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being
authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is

nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for
an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired
informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. 65
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v.
Galicia, 66the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense
and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. 67 In People
v. Tan Tiong, 68 the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and
conviction of the lawbreaker. 69
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People
v. Tiu Ua. 70Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed
contrary to public policy and illegal. 71
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation
or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to
the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause. 72 To determine
whether there is a entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the
apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first
applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases. 73 Nevertheless, adopting
the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v.
Boholst, 74 we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and
admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik
Gang. We also considered accused's previous his convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his
opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him.
Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal
record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 76thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents
to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders.
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes. 77 They are rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to
crimes mala prohibita. 78 They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape,
theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. 79 Laws
defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but against
public order. 80 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with
any particular harm to a definite person. 81 These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort
to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how
furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is
necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon
the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that
the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or
through informants, spies or stool pigeons. 82
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant
system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the
apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive

the police. The informant himself maybe a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For
whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the
underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring
one. 83 Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law
enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion — harassment,
extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. This Court
has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases 84 where we observed that it is a
common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly
unsuspecting provincial hicks. 85 The use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative ease
with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the
imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in
deciding drug cases. 86 Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in
the arsenal of the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and
the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza, 87
[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures,
wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless
enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. Each is a substitute for
skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the
end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal class,' justifies the
employment of illegal means. 88
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty
by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This
presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionallyprotected rights of the individual. 89 It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from
the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. 90 Courts should not allow themselves to
be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually
severe penalties for drug offenses. 91
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
sale. 92 The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer
to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to
the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that lawabiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all
cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into
ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual
delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look
at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are
relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
1âwphi1.nêt

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted
accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3
Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed the marked money to
accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria
was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to P03 Manlangit.

PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner and his
credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, P03 Manlangit's
testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The nonpresentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to
the police. 93 It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs
and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, 94 or there are reasons to
believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant, 95 or that only the
informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, 96 the testimony of the
informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers'
eyewitness testimonies. 97 There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually
witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses. 98
The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers'
testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence.
The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is
enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in
consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3
Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants'
apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant
Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton
box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick
recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and marked
in court. Thus:
ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how
were you able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which
contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick we confiscated from
the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box. . .
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact
that we are now dealing with eleven items when the question posed
to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.

your Honor. despite reconsideration. your Honor. your Honor? PROSECUTOR Your Honor. Q What are you sure of? . your Honor. Q Point to the court. Q Whose signature is that? ATTY. my signature. COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?" A Yes. PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature. sir. ATTY.ATTY. Q Now tell the court. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out them after item from the box showed to him and brought in front of him. COURT Noted. VALDEZ We submit. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought it to the PCCL. your Honor. may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what was handed to him by the accused Jun. your Honor. my initials with the date. VALDEZ Your Honor. Q What makes you so sure? A I am sure that this is the one. sir. there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court. sir. sir. COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the court. where are those markings? A Here. A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun. how did you know that those are the eleven bricks? xxx xxx xxx A I have markings on these eleven bricks.

. and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper. Q Now. who made the entries of this date.A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun. Exhibit A. ARIAS Your Honor. sir.. xxx xxx xxx PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as Exhibit "D?" COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D." Q How about this one? A I don't know who made this marking. sir. I made the signature. Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul." etc. there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95 also Exhibit "A. Mark it. Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this plastic? A This one." I was the one who made these markings. . I want to make it of record that there are other entries included in the enclosure." Q To stress. Q What makes you so sure? A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought it to the PCCL. that was not pointed to by the witness. . COURT Noted. the date and the time and the Exhibit "A. the signature. PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning. etc. 970 grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?" COURT Tag it. sir." A This CLM. your Honor. the date and the time and this Exhibit "A. The court saw it. PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed. with a newspaper wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D394-95. ATTY.

Q Whereat? A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St. is actually committing." "D-l. the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom? A It was given to me by suspect Jun. 102 We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined . because during our follow-up. without a warrant. Q How about the other items that you were able to recover? xxx xxx xxx A These other marijuana bricks." and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. sir.Q This particular exhibit that you identified. 100 We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1. — A peace officer or a private person may. including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D. to wit: Sec.00 strains credulity. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur. the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant.. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. This brick. 5. sir. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. or is attempting to commit an offense. sir. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system.600. because according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth. arrest a person: (a) When. the person to be arrested has committed. when lawful. Arrest without warrant. in his presence. xxx xxx xxx 99 The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets.101 Again.buyer and the pusher. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters. the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. To be lawful. the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom? A It was given to me by suspect Jun. a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed. or is attempting to commit an offense. sir. the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: 106 (1) search incident to a lawful arrest. sir. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation. the arresting officer. 104 The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao. 105 The rule is. Q How about.107 (2) search of a moving motor vehicle. . that there will be no basis for that question. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 110 (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Q Whereat? A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street. that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest. however. 109(4) seizure of evidence in plain view. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture. 108 (3) search in violation of customs laws. the search of her person and residence. is actually committing. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. the other items that you were able to recover? ATTY. not absolute. VALDEZ. 111 The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. as above-quoted. It is claimed. Q This particular exhibit that you identified. xxx xxx xxx 103 Under Section 5 (a). your Honor.while his case is pending. however shows otherwise: ATTY. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit. your Honor. however. Counsel for appellant Gaddao: We submit at this juncture. that there will be no basis for that question.

Q But the fact is. sir. Q And what happened? A At this instance. xxx xxx xxx 112 SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that: Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth? A To arrest her. sir. because during our follow-up. it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money. Aling Neneth was there? A Yes. Answer. Q As far as you can see. Mr. sir.COURT There is. Q Whereat? A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard. sir. she was just inside her house? A I saw her outside. A These other marijuana bricks. sir. Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact? A She was 'sa bandang poso. sir. Q And what happened upon arrival thereat? A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money. the marked money which Jun gave her. when you reached the house of Aling Neneth. Witness.' Q Carrying a baby? . because according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth. We asked her to give us the money. Q You mentioned "him?" A Her. sir. sir. sir.

she was not committing any crime. sir. Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily chores. is it not? A Yes. she was just outside the house? A No. Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house. you were just in the side lines? A I was just watching. Q And the money from Aling Neneth? . Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. sir. Q You did not approach her because P03 Manlangit approached her? A Yes. Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing. That is correct. sir. Am I correct? A I just saw her outside. arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place. sir. sir. sir. Neneth? A P03 Manlangit. Q During all the time that this confrontation. sir. sir. Q Manlangit got the marijuana? A Yes. according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her? A PO3 Manlangit.A No. sir. sir. Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. if any memory of your testimony is correct. because precisely according to you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up? A Yes. Q Now.

Q Alright. the amount of P1. sir. Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth? PROSECUTOR: There is no basis for this question. sir. sir. ATTY. not from the person of Aling Neneth. According to the records. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness. your Honor. sir.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. your Honor. PROSECUTOR: No basis. ATTY. it was Manlangit maybe? A I saw it. Is that what you are trying to tell the Court? A No. the buy-bust money. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. Money. there 's no testimony on that. Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth. VALDEZ: I was asking him precisely.600.A I don't know. That's right? A Yes. Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth? A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth. COURT: Sustained. Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth. sir. 113 .

he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent. Contrary to the finding of the trial court. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was. the arrest is legally objectionable. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view. 120 Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal. there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit. contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. is based an actual facts. knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. its transparency. 117 Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. 123 In the course of such lawful intrusion. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. PO3 Manlangit. 119 with or without her knowledge. i. whether by its distinctive configuration. (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime. with or without any conspiracy.. 122 The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in evidence. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word. she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her."114 In fact.e. 116 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. in his own right. or if its contents are obvious to an observer. 126 It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." 115 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. making its warrantless seizure valid. if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its . if the package proclaims its contents. However. the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. Where the object seized was inside a closed package. 121 The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area. She was not committing any crime. however. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had. 127 In other words. then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. 124 The object must be open to eye and hand 125 and its discovery inadvertent. 118 Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business. the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.

the Narcom agent who found the box. sir. contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. then the article is deemed in plain view. sir. 129 PO3 Manlangit. Q I noticed that this carton has a cover? A Yes. dining table. Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money? A Yes. sir. VALDEZ: So here we are. sir. A Like this. Not like that. Show to the court. Q This carton. INTERPRETER Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box. Q At that particular instance. sir. PROSECUTOR Can we describe it? ATTY.appearance that it contains the prohibited article. sir. sir. Aling Neneth was inside the house? A Yes. COURT Go down there. 128 It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime. When you and Badua arrived. VALDEZ . you saw the carton? A Yes. testified on cross-examination as follows: ATTY. Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed? A It was open. according to you was under a table? A Yes.

Q At this juncture. you went inside the house? A Yes. Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton. . COURT Noted. no. . Q You were the one who got this? A Yes. is it not [sic]? A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua. sir. Q No. Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth? A I asked her. no. what's this. Q Who got hold of this? A I was the one. Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun? A Yes. nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir. Q And got hold of this carton? A Yes. sir. . PROSECUTOR One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible. Aling Neneth was not yet frisked. sir. sir.Yes. sir. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton? A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buybust money and he asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito. sir.

Q In fact. Q Somewhere here? A It's far. you did not know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her? A Yes. Q Under the table according to you? A Yes. Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton? . sir. dining table. Q You went inside the house? A Yes. PROSECUTOR May we request the witness to place it. It was in plain view. you did not know if the alleged buybust money was already retrieved by Badua? A Yes. there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs.Q At that particular point in time. sir. sir. sir. Q You did not have any search warrant? A Yes. sir. Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop? A Yes. sir. Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you. sir. sir. with plastic. sir. Q What you see is a carton? A Yes. where he saw it? A Here. sir. Q How far was this from the door? A Two and a half meters from the door.

. PRESECUTOR Panero. sir. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. PROSECUTOR By reading it. A piece of plastic may be big or a small one. no even Superman . . . wait. . Q You were only able to verify according to you . And according to the Court. Fiscal? I'm asking you? PROSECUTOR With due respect. it will connote . VALDEZ What is that? What can you say. . PROSECUTOR Leave that to the court. VALDEZ That's a piece of plastic. . . Q The only reason according to you. ATTY. PROSECUTOR For the record. you were able to . I withdraw that. Q That is all that you saw? A Yes. ATTY. . your Honor. this is not a piece of plastic.A Yes. sir. . what I am saying is. for record purposes. . Look at this. By reading it . ." is it not [sic]? . let's place the size of the plastic. it could be "tikoy. . COURT Leave that to the court.

Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop.A Yes. I'm asking you what it could possibly be. Next question. VALDEZ I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. xxx xxx xxx 130 P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant Doria. . Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. 132 On cross-examination. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria name her and led them to her. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. A It's the same plastic. In his direct examination. ATTY. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. 134 It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. COURT Continue. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. sir. Q Siopao? A Yes. Ice Pop? A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may . . Let the prosecutor do that for you. PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. however. sir. he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana. sir. 133 PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. P03 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Q Canned goods? A Yes." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. 131 Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house. pink or blue in color. 136 . The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags — white. sir. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box.

thecorpus delicti. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order.The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was found in the house of accusedappellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. Aminnudin.000. 6425. The prosecution. shall sell. 140 Section 4 of Republic Act No. especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 7659 punishes the "sale.000.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another. give away to another.00). Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500.00 which he received. distribute. 4. however praiseworthy their intentions. delivery. however. said. .600. distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500. 138 Apropos is our ruling in People v. administration. xxx xxx xxx In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. as evidence in court. or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.e. again. Delivery. Sale. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows: 1. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. including the basest of criminals. what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug. 141 The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1. 139 viz: The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people. the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities. 142 IN VIEW WHEREOF. accusedappellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit. as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm.. the decision of the Regional Trial Court.00 to P10 million. the poseur-buyer. deliver. Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. As Justice Holmes. especially the susceptible youth. administer. unless authorized by law. to wit: Sec. Branch 156. has failed to prove that accusedappellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. i. Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. But as demanding as this campaign may be. 'I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Administration.

. Chief of the Security Force of the U. 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto.. petitioners.: Dennis Venturina. as suspects in the killing of Venturina. on December 12 and. an information4 was filed against them. objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them. officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity. Dizon. Quezon City. Chancellor. Jr. Eduardo Bentain. Lambino. and Rosario Torres-Yu. J.2. Villamor with violation of P.3 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders. Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. counsel for the suspects. then Chancellor of U. Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI. asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. alleging that: That on or about December 12. knowingly and criminally obstruct.D. Police. also of U. Diliman in Quezon City. Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity. vs. THE HON. above-named accused.1 However. Diliman. It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U. both principal suspects involved in . and MARICHU LAMBINO.P. 131492 September 29. was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8. respondents. and ORLANDO V. respondent Orlando V.P. taking advantage of their official duties and committing the crime in relation to their office. THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR. DIZON. VILLAMOR. On May 18. Philippines. did then and there wilfully. In a letter dated December 11. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted. criminal charges were filed later against the two student suspects. Marichu Lambino. G. a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines. 1995.P. while in the performance of their respective official functions. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. impede and frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG. Villamor. No. and Atty.P. 1994. ROSARIO TORRES-YU. Security Force. 1829.R. EDUARDO BENTAIN — Chief. petitioner Roger Posadas. attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag. 1994. In response to the request. and COL. and a certain Atty. charging petitioners Posadas. MENDOZA. all of the University of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. Torres-Yu. ATTY. OMBUDSMAN. As a result of their intervention. Posadas and Atty. and his men went to U. in Quezon City. Leandro Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang. Legal Counsel. all public officers. MARICHU LAMBINO — Asst.P. conspiring and confederating with each other and with a certain ATTY. on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses. 2 Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Petitioners Posadas. 2000 ROGER POSADAS. Col. namely: ROGER POSADAS. ROSARIO YU — Vice Chancellor.

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. a U. that said above acts were done by the above-named accused public officials despite their full knowledge that said suspects were implicated in the brutal slaying of said Dennis Venturina. leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and another principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA. §5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads: (a) When. in his presence. 1997. the Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA. Petitioners contend that: I.D. AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER. III. The exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113. and delaying the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and concealing said suspects thus. is actually committing. AND FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS. Student Council. prosecution and conviction. WHO CONDUCTED THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE. We answer these questions in the negative. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION. SECTION 1. §2 of the Constitution. graduating student and Chairperson of the UP College of Administration. the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. But the recommendation was disapproved. thus preventing the suspects arrest. the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case.P. 1829 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. on motion of petitioners. 1829. THE DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR. First. II. 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION. PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Later. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners. No. to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant. In a memorandum. and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P. dated September 8. the person to be arrested has committed. In view of Art. . CONTRARY TO LAW.5 Two issues are raised in this case. or is attempting to commit an offense.

In the words of Rule 113. Pat. Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may." In contrast. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.6 They invoke the ruling in People v. In that case. 7 in which it was held: It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they apprehended Accused-appellant.(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. Tonog. the arresting officer found blood stains on the pants of the accused. First. the accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's invitation. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts.. A . the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. without a warrant. in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were probably guilty. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at the crime laboratory. the crime had "just been committed" and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c).e. Third. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. The warrantless arrest. however. the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of the crime. Leguarda." In this case. on the basis of which he concluded that the accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses. Jr. was justified under Section 5 (b). The question in that case involved the admissibility of the maongpants taken from the accused. the arrest was made on the same day the crime was committed. Upon reaching the police station. i. We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers: "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this case. which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI. Second. §5(b). had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation indicating that Accusedappellant was one of the perpetrators.

delay the apprehension and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members positively identified. police. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from arresting the SJ members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be effected did not conform with Sec.D. Art. Otherwise. 1997: From the facts adduced. under the supervision of the U. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina. To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the courts. In fact. Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P. the Office of the Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8. on respondents' part. frustrate or. No. III. show their good faith. at the least. thereby averting. the reliance on the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent. what would be in their opinion. respondents do not dispute the identification made on the alleged participants in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina. While this justification may. . coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements. eventually leading to the latter's demise. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Respondent U. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. at best. to wilfully obstruct. 5. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. 1829. Besides. §2 of the Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons.reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. we hold that their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal. it does not detract from the fact that they had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the heinous crime of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two eyewitnesses. Taparan and Narag.P. On the contrary. were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus. §1(c). When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag. houses. A reasonably prudent mind could not just ignore this positive identification. papers.8 Indeed.P. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects. these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. It must be remembered that these SJ members were positively identified by two eyewitnesses. an illegal arrest. at the time Dennis Venturina was killed.

§5. 1995. No. The U. The absence of an arrest warrant. were acting within the bounds of law. Bentain and Atty. officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of students on campus. Based on all the foregoing. dated May 18. 1994. The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant issued by a court. in recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners: All told.000 to 6. the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December 12. he having the quasi-judicial authority to rule on this matter. frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts: xxx xxx xxx . Only courts could decide the question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P. the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI. all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of Justice. respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless arrests.10 Third.000 pesos. 1829. It is in this forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not the warrantless arrest effected was valid. there are various remedies under the law which respondents may have likewise availed of or resorted to in order to secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested. without prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have filed against the arresting NBI agents. Neither were the warrantless arrest being sought to be made on campus that night. On the contrary. 1829: SEC. police headquarters had committed a crime. the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule 113. Rules of Court). Rule 12. impedes.P. 1. Torres-Yu.P. the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that the students had committed a crime. or both. there is no probable cause to charge Posadas. As the Special Prosecutor stated in his memorandum. petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest without warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Lambino. Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1. the circumstances show that the accused. considering that.D. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death Dennis Venturina. The-penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period. Of course. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P. it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a manner that obstructed and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement agency like the NBI. the obvious conclusion is that.D. or a fine ranging from 1. legal.To be sure. the accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who were then at the U.9 The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty. as already explained. Regardless of their suspicion. However. in safeguarding the rights of students. shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs.

Labang. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law. 43 Phil. Guingona. The rule. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. Rafferty. CAG. has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest. 19 SCRA 95). 109 Phil. Castelo. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. h. 1984. f. 304. Yu Cong Eng vs. Cf. (1953). L-19272. supra. et al. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. 47 Phil. 4760. CA G. Fortun vs. g. "[i]nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. There are. 18 L. 18 SCRA 616). 1960). settled exceptions to this rule. or facilitating the escape of. L-38383. to wit: a.J. such as those enumerated in Brocka v.11 But as has been held. Fernandez. 128 SCRA 577).R. prosecution and conviction. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga. Gil. . Enrile. 1967. Alvendia. vs. or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect. L-60033. Albano. et al. Albano. vs. of course. Hernandez vs. Desierto:13 Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition."12 As we held in the similar case of Venus v. January 25. c. e. 30720R. however.. 389). 62). City Judge. to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. thereafter. is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. 385. 67 Phil.R. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and. et al. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. Trinidad. 202). October 29. any person he knows.(c) harboring or concealing. April 4. No. 1966. 556. i. cited in Rañoa vs. L25795. 1140). October 8. 1981. d. b. City Fiscal. No. 33 Phil. 1962. et al. 70 Phil. 104 SCRA 607). Ocampo. ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Mabanag. People and Alvendia. March 25. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. May 27.

1829. Police Station as they did not have a warrant at that time. They cannot be indicted because they dared to uphold the rights of the students. the NBI should have applied for a warrant before making the attempted arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands. That they chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their responsibility alone. they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their undertaking. however. In the second place. whether or not petitioner Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is immaterial. No. just because petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard constitutional requirements. et al. Castelo. leading to the successful escape of these students and another principal suspect. The absence of probable cause for the filing of an information against petitioners is evident from the records. 188. we see no other recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners. For a cardinal rule of constitutional adjudication is that the Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law. L-6374. Indeed. they could not have interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina.j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. §1(c). only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. and k. the information against them charged that petitioners willfully obstructed the apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag.) In this case. The Office of the Ombudsman. §1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. 1994. February 18.14 Hence. 1829. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider petitioners' challenge to P. 1995 and the information. If the NBI believed the information given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses. Paño. August 1.D. the fact remains that the NBI agents could not have validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U. p. But it must be remembered that the need to enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights.P. Villamor failed in their undertaking to surrender the students the following day. On the other hand. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor. We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public clamor to bring to justice those responsible therefor.15 The student suspect mentioned by both the resolution dated May 18. found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in the escape of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty.D. a certain Joel Carlo Denosta. Moreover. In the first place. 1988 Ed. petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of P. Hence. L-59524. Fourth.16 . Remedial Law Compendium. 1953) cited in Regalado. was not one of the students whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners prevented on December 12.. We also recognize the pressures faced by law enforcement agencies to effect immediate arrests and produce results without unnecessary delay. Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal. No. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Hence. 134 SCRA 438). a certain Joel Carlo Denosta. 1985.

2015 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. CHAN QUE and HUI LAO CHUNG a. the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are hereby prohibited from prosecuting petitioners for violation of P. Occidental Mindoro. they conducted an inventory of the plastic bags which were forty five (45) in . that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said island. Looc. 4 5 6 Upon reaching the shore.a. As they moved closer to the area. the police officers directed appellants to transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed appellants’ speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc. Immediately thereafter. finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 14. In the presence of the appellants and Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico. SO ORDERED.a. Occidental Mindoro. one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other. methamphetamine hydrochloride. DECISION PERALTA. 1 2 3 The facts. Branch 44. 2009 and Resolution dated April 24. 6425. are the following: At 10:00 a. went towards the speed boat. Article IV of Republic Act (RA) No.k. J.k. Article III. CHI CHAN LIU a. 189272 January 21. in Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to dismiss the information in Criminal Case No. of December 3. On board the speed boat. Mamburao. the police officers headed towards the specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side.m. R. in relation to Section 21 (a). 1829 §1(c) as a result of the incident complained of in Criminal Case No.k. ChanQue and Hui Lao Chung a. otherwise known as "shabu. On their way. as culled from the records. 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. 7659. No. big amount of money" which they ignored. the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a. the fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic bags containing a white. G. as amended by RA No.a. Z-1058. Occidental Mindoro. Looc. Maximo Torreliza. the police officers were prevented from chasing the same and instead. Appellants. received a radio message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil Island. SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon. CR HC No. a speed boat.D. to the police station.WHEREFORE. 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). the officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station. 22801 against petitioners. Thus. Due to the strong waves. 00657 affirming the Decision dated June 21." They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants failed to do so. LEOFE SENGLAO. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.k. 1998. Appellee. crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be the regulated drug. the police officers led the appellants.: For this Court's consideration is the Decision dated January 9. No. the police officers testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered them "big. together with the bags containing the crystalline substance. vs.R.a. They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who were transferring cargo fromthe former to the latter. which seemed to be experiencing engine trouble.

against appellants for violation of Section 14. the appellants did not answer any of SPO3 Yuson’s questions. indeed. Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc Province of Occidental Mindoro. Regional Office IV. 14 15 16 17 18 Thereafter. Laguna. with the assistance of the arresting officers. 1998. big money. appellant Chi Chan Liu only kept saying the phrase "call China. PNP. SPO3 Yuson reported the incident to their superiors.he was able to confirm that the appellants are Chinese nationals from Guandong. the right to counsel. China. They talked with Mayor Telebrico and the arresting officers and then brought the appellants with the suspected illegal drugs to Camp Vicente Lim. Occidental Mindoro. as well as the right tobe informed of the charges against them. Immediately thereafter. 1998. According to Inspector Culili. in relation to Section 21 (a). the appellants did notdivulge any other information. requested for their physical and medical examination. Laguna conducted an examination of the white. The PNP Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his arrival the following day. PNP Provincial Command in San Jose.number. the interpreter arrived. Because of this difficulty. 6425 as amended by RA No. moreover. However. weighing about a kilo each. Inspector Culili informed and explained to the appellants their rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the right to remain silent. crystalline substance in the forty-five (45) bags seized from the appellants. Laguna. Calamba. the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed an Information with the RTC of Mamburao. Inspector Culili. SPO3 Yuson requested proper documentation from the appellants as to their identities as well as to the purpose of their entry in the Philippine territory. He also assisted the arresting officers in the preparation of their affidavits. 1998 at the coast of Brgy. Inspector Culili sought the assistance of Inspector Carlito Dimalanta in finding an interpreter who knew either Fookien or Cantonese. There. the above-named accused being then the persons not . After performing three (3) tests thereon." Apart from their names. for further investigation. With the assistance of said interpreter. who attempted to communicate with the appellants using "broken" English. Tambo. which he could not understand. crystalline substance inthe bags seized from them. and the consequences thereof. aliases and personal circumstances. Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo. of the Intelligence and Investigation Division. Again. appellants only kept repeating the phrase "big money. then prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the appellants. and Quezon Province. However. 7 8 9 10 On December 4. methamphetamine hydrochloride. Article IV of RA No. PNP Chief Forensic Chemist/Physical Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office. Camp Vicente Lim." 19 20 On December 8. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. the appellants and the suspected prohibited drugs were turned over to Police Inspector Julieto B. According to Inspector Culili. 11 12 13 On December 5. she positively confirmed in her Chemistry Report that the same is. 7659. Occidental Mindoro and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp Vicente Lim. as well as the laboratory examination of the white. General Acop arrived together with Colonel Damian on a helicopter. based on an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite. Calamba. He allowed appellants to call said number in which they spoke with someone using their native language." giving him a certain cellular phone number. call China. otherwise known as "shabu. Culili. Article III. Inspector Culili also requested the interpreter to ask the appellants whether they wanted to avail of said constitutional rights. committed as follows: 21 That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 3. 1998.

Lozada. IN RELATION TO SECTION 21 (A). Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision dated January 9. unlawfully. Article IV as amended by R. II. did then and there wilfully. SO ORDERED. or reversal of its assailed Decision. 23 On appeal. to the damage and prejudice of public interest. the present appeal raising the following issues: I. trial on the merits ensued. . in relation to Section 21 (a). ARTCILE III. where the facts earlier stated were testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution. a Member of the Looc Municipal Council. ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425. amendment. WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF IMPORTATION OF REGULATED DRUGS PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 14. Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu contained in forty-five (45) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags having a total weight of 46. the Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUA and to each pay the FINE of One Million (Php1. On April 24. with cost de officio. Article III.00) Pesos Philippine Currency. Thereafter. The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense.60 kilograms) placed inside another forty-five(45) separate self-seling (sic) transparent plastic bags which is prohibited by law. essentially maintain that the subject crystalline substance was merely recovered by the apprehending police officers from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not actually from the speed boat the appellants were on. namely: Jesus Astorga and Fernando Oliva. WHETHER OR NOT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.000. AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7659. SPO3 Yuson. Hence. 22 The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in its Decision dated June 21. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. Leopoldo S. a former Supervising Crime Photographer of the PNP. ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE. 2004. both residents of Ambil Island.600 grams (46. it further denied the appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution finding no cogent reason to make any revision. 2009. J. finding both accused CHI CHAN LIU @ "CHAN QUE" AND HIU LAO CHUNG @ "LEOFE SENG LAO" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING Section 14. as amended. A. and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles. Police Inspector Culili. feloniously import and bring through the use of sea vessel into the above-mentioned place. and Police Inspector Geronimo. specifically: SPO2 Paglicawan.000. 2009.authorized by law conspiring and mutually helping one another. 7659 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. III.

Appellants assert that unless there is proof that a ship on which illegal drugs came from a foreign country. WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Thus. V. Article III. Appellants further call attention to the invalidity of their arraignment for they were not represented by a counsel of their choice. 24 Appellants maintain that there is no importation of regulated drugs in the instant case since the elements of the crime of importation. 7659. which provide: ARTICLE III Regulated Drugs Section 14. unless authorized by law. appellants cannot be convicted of the crime charged herein. Article IV of RA No. namely: (1) the importation or bringing into the Philippines of any regulated or prohibited drug. IV. xxxx ARTICLE IV . The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. 6425. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. the offense does not fall within the ambit of illegal importation of said drugs. in relation to Section 21 (a). In addition. they emphasize the irregularities attendant in their arrest and seizure of the illegal drugs in violation of their constitutionally protected rights. as amended by RA No. Appellants also claim that the prosecution failed to substantiate beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs subject of this case was not sufficiently established. considering the prosecution’s failure to prove the place of origin of the boat on which appellants were apprehended. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS IS VALID. The information filed by the prosecutor against appellants charged appellants with violation of Section 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. were not established herein. shall import or bring any regulated drug into the Philippines. This Court finds merit on appellants’ first argument. and (2) the importation or bringing into the Philippines of said drugs was without authority of law.WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES CAN PREVAIL OVER THE GUARANTEES ENSHRINED AND KEPT SACRED BY THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION IN THIS CASE.

those which are brought into the Philippines from any foreign country. Without it. it must be shown that the vessel from which the opium is landed or on which it arrived in Philippine waters came from a foreign port. necessarily connotes the introduction of something into a certain territory coming from an external source. wherein We said that: 25 There can be no question that. they cite our ruling in United States v. importation was construed as the entry of products or substances into the Philippines through the seaports or airports of entry. On the basis of the foregoing provisions. . in finding that there was importation in the present case. are subject to duty upon each importation." As used in our tariff and customs laws. stated: The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellants were. indeed. 26 Moreover. the Black’s Law Dictionary defines importation as "the act of bringing goods and merchandise intoa country from a foreign country. into the Philippine Islands. no crime under that section can be established. 2381 provides that: Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands. The drugsseized were properly presented and identified in court. guilty of importing regulated drugs into the country in violation of aforesaid law. Jose. Logically. Similarly. for example. Appellants’ admission that they were Chinese nationals and their penchant for making reference during custodial investigation to China where they could obtain money to bribe the police officers lead this Court to no other . could not be sustained no matter how much opium she had on board or how much was discharged. In support of this. it is a prime essential of the crime defined by that section. . in a statute controlling the entry of toxic substances and hazardous and nuclear wastes. the crime of importation of regulated drugs is committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being authorized by law. there cannot be any importation of the same. Attempt and Conspiracy. shall be punished . Appellants were caught by police authorities in flagrante delictoon board a speedboat carrying forty-five (45) plastic bags of shabu. the charge that opium was illegally imported on her into the port of Olongapo. Section 4 of Act No. or assist in so doing. According to appellants. 27 28 29 The CA. there is no importation. if the article merely came from the same territory.. Indeed. If the ship came to Olongapo from Zamboanga. The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to commit the same in the following cases: a) importation of dangerous drugs. i. In order to establish the crime of importation as defined by the Opium Law.e. if it is not proven that the regulated drugs are brought into the Philippines from a foreign origin. It is clear that a breach of this provision involves the bringing of opium into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country. Importation then. imported articles.Provisions of Common Application to Offenses Penalized under Articles II and III xxxx Section 21. there is no importation. unless a ship on which opium is alleged to have been illegally imported comes from a foreign country. .

such possession was not an essential element of the crime of illegal importation and was not necessarily included therein. free them from all criminal liability for their possession of the same is clearly evident. importing illegal drugs in the country from an external source. As will be seen from this provision. The records only bear the fact that the speedboat on which the appellants were apprehended was docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc. but it must necessarily be included. It was not necessary that the opium be discharged or that it be taken from the ship. does not sufficiently prove the allegation that appellants herein were. possession is not necessarily included in the charge of importation and thus. This. 6425 does not. we have taken it up and decided it. is not a necessary element of the crime of illegal importation nor is it necessarily included therein. 32 . either actual or constructive. came from a source outside of the Philippines. to wit: 31 Counsel for neither of the parties to this action have discussed the question whether. the commission of which is necessarily included inthe charge in the complaint or information. in fact. While. they cannot be held liable thereof. it is rather difficult to suppose how appellants made their way to the shores of Occidental Mindoro from China. notwithstanding. to say the least. All elements of the crime of illegal importation of regulated drugs being present in this case. and Quezon Province. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as well as their penchant for making reference to China where they could obtain money to bribe the apprehending officers does not necessarily mean that the confiscated drugs necessarily came from China. appellants may argue that as We have ruled in United States v. to convict of an offense included in the charge in the information it is not sufficient that the crime maybe included. in acquitting the appellants of the charge of illegal importation. At the outset. That being the case it is clear that possession. the importation contention could have been sustained. 30 We disagree. or of any frustrated or attempted offense. the accused may still be convicted. nevertheless. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo. the case before us. Therefore. of the crime of illegal possession of opium. the possession of the opium by the appellants was proved beyond question and they might have been convicted of that offense if they have been charged therewith. The importation was complete. Article III of RA No. and not necessarily from China or any foreign port. when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. We. but. as held by the CA. we cannot legally convict them of the crime of illegal possession. under the information. conviction thereof is in order.reasonable conclusion but that China is the country of origin of the confiscated drugs. have not had the aid of discussion of this proposition. Appellants’ exoneration from illegal importation of regulated drugs under Section 14. believing that it is a question which might fairly be raised in the event of an acquittal on the charge of illegal importation. in case the charge of illegal importation fails. This Court notes that for a vessel which resembles a speed boat. Occidental Mindoro. Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that: The court may find the defendant guilty of any offense. therefore. Jose. an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite. Moreover. But it could have easily come from some other locality within the country. however. had the prosecution presented more concrete evidence to convince this Court that the prohibited drugs. indeed.

this Court finds that while appellants cannot be held liable for the offense of illegal importation charged in the information. (U. was charged with illegal importation of the articles under Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code and illegal possession of the same articles under Section 1 of Act No. upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. this Court held that possession is inherent in importation. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant. in our more recent ruling in People v. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. he is neither an importer nor a possessor within the legal meaning of the term. therefore. The possession ensuing from the importation may not be actual. but legal. . Ruling that double jeopardy exists in view of the fact that possession is necessarily included in importation. There can hardly be importation without possession. Indeed. the crime of importation of regulateddrugs is committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being authorized by law. importation can never beproven without first establishing possession. their criminal liability for illegal possession. The owner of the merchandise at the time it enters Philippine water is its importer and possessor. As previously mentioned. this Court affirmed the dismissal of the information on illegal importation. and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge. or constructive. in the following wise: 33 Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court reads: When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted. by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus. it seems plain beyond argument that the latter is inherent in the former so as to make them juridically identical. when one brings something or causes something to be brought into the country. 573). he necessarily has possession of the same. may nevertheless be sustained. this Court sustained the dismissal of one of the two informations which charged the accused with importation to avoid the implications of double jeopardy for possession is necessarily included in the charge of importation. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. who was suspected of being the owner of sixty-five (65) large boxes of blasting caps found aboard a ship of American registry docked inside Philippine territory. if proven beyond reasonable doubt. affirming the fact that possession is a condition sine qua nonfor it would rather be unjust to convict one of illegal importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to be in possession thereof. 3023.If he parts with the ownership of interest in the article before it reaches Philippine territory. 18 Phil. Look Chaw. but whatever its character. Necessarily. the importer. Elkanish. Applying the aforequoted ruling. the accused. With reference to the importation and possession of blasting caps. 34 As We have explained in our more recent ruling above. in our opinion. there is double jeopardy therein since the offense charged in the information on possession is necessarily included in the information on importation in view of the fact that the former is inherent in the latter. Possession on ownership of a prohibited article on a foreign vessel on the high seas outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country. in two (2) separate informations.S. he necessarily has the possession of it. is a possessor in the juristic sense and he is liable to criminal prosecution. and he is not subject to prosecution for either offense under the Philippine Laws. In that case. the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. When one brings something or causes something to be brought into the country..However. vs. He who puts merchandise on board a vessel and alienates the title thereto while it is in transit does not incur criminal liability.

Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is therefore an element of and is necessarily included in illegal sale. 39 The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a regulated drug. the apprehending officers were conducting a surveillance of the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc. 6425. this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession when the information filed against them charges the crime of importation does not violate their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against them.At this point. one of the boats hurriedly sped away. Occidental Mindoro. this Court shall determine appellants’ culpability under Section 16. convicting the accused with the former does not violate his right to be informed of the accusation against him for it is an element of the latter. when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former. (b) such possession isnot authorized by law. in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal importation of regulated drugs. and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved. as they moved closer to the area. was convicted of illegal possession thereof. 37 In a similar manner. the persons on which were transferring cargo from one to the other. the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. As mentioned previously. Upon reaching the other boat. this Court upheld the prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the illegal possession thereof except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of dangerous drugs not covered by or not included in the illegal sale. An offense charged necessarily includes thatwhich is proved. does not amount to a violation of their right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. In those cases. appellants were found to be in possession of the subject regulated drugs. where an accused is charged witha specific crime. Hence. he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein. Interestingly. if duly established beyond reasonable doubt. this Court is not legallyprepared to accept the version of the appellants that they had nothing todo with the incident and that they were being framed up as the drugs seized from them were merely planted by the apprehending officers. this Court observes that appellants did not provide any explanation as tohow the apprehending officers were actually able to plant forty- . The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information. on the date of appellants’ arrest. they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side. Indeed. At the outset. convicting appellants of the former. considering that illegal possession is likewise an element of and is necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs. Clearly. upon being informed by the Municipality’s Barangay Captain that a suspicious-looking boat was within the vicinity. constitute the latter. Not long after. We have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused. and the other quantity of dangerous drugs was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. the police officers found the appellants with several transparent plastic bags containing what appeared to be shabu which were plainly exposed to the view of the officers. and that proved or established by the evidence. 38 Thus. Article III of RA No. Moreover. and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the regulated drug. 35 36 Indeed. 40 The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in possession of the bags containing the regulated drugs without the requisite authority. as this is alleged in the complaint or information.

They have not executed any prior affidavit on the matters concerning their testimonies unlike the prosecution witnesses SPO3 Yuson and SPO2 Paglicawan who executed their joint affidavit almost immediately after their arrest. without a warrant. Due to the absence of probable cause. Occidental Mindoro. Fernando Oliva. they did not even give any explanation as to the purpose of their presence in the coast of Ambil. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the words of the lower court: Moreover. Evasco. 5. arrest a person: . as the trial court noted. Section 2. however. 41 This Court has consistently noted that denial or frame up is a standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. and particularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things to be seized. Also. Looc. More importantly. This defense has been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. the former counsel of the accused. and Godofredo Reyes. procured the testimonies of Jesus Astorga. aside from saying that the confiscated bags of regulated drugs were merely implanted in their speed boat. to wit: Sec. Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides: Section 2. appellants allegea violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Their testimonies appear to be merely a product of an [afterthought]. Clear enough their intent or motivation is not for the truth to come out but for the monetary consideration in exchange of their testimony.five (45) bags of regulated drugs weighing about one (1) kilo each in the speed boat of appellants in the middle of the ocean without their knowledge. deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-serving claims of frame up by appellants. the story of defense witnesses Jesus Astorga. A settled exception. Fernando Oliva. Arrest without warrant. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. houses. to the above guaranteed right is an arrest made during the commission of a crime. It is so apparent from the testimonies of these three (3) above-named defense witnesses that they [did not] know anything about the case. their warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure on their persons and possession is unjustified and hence. The right of the people to be secure intheir persons. – A peace officer of a private person may. and Godofredo Robles that the subject shabu were taken only by the police authority from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza taxes only one’s credulity. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Without proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute to appellants the commission of a crime. papers. which does not require a previously issued warrant. 42 43 Going now to appellants’ arguments that their criminal liability is negated by certain irregularities in the proceedings of this case. In order to prosper. the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect. What is even worse is that Atty. First and foremost. the confiscated bags of regulated drugs therefrom are inadmissible against them. when lawful. under Section 5(a). the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. they did not provide the court with sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim.

the apprehending officers were performing their duty of ascertaining whether a criminal activity was indeed happening at the time and place reported by the Barangay Captain. As to appellants’ assignment of failure on the part of the prosecution to substantiate beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delictiof the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs was not sufficiently established. This Court has ruled that for anarrest to fall under the above exception. who had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. 44 In this case. Consequently. the circumstances prior to and surrounding the arrest of appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they were actually committing a crime within the view of the arresting officers. objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area. one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a search warrant. naturally arousing the suspicion of the officers. this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure conducted on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the regulated drugs were in plain view of the arresting officers. two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed. spotted appellants transferring cargo from one boat to another. As previously stated. the person to be arrested has committed. he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. and its discovery inadvertent. the same cannot be sustained as a review of the records of the case . Soon after. when the officers were transporting appellants and the illegal drugs to the shore. The object must be open to eye and hand. appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the apprehending officers in flagrante delicto. or otherwise subject to seizure. However. in his presence. It is undeniably clear. or is attempting to commit a crime. while acting upon a report from the Barangay Captain. appellants refused to show them anything much less respond to any of their questions.(a) When. big amount of money. the confiscated drugs are admissible as evidence against appellants. or is attempting to commit an offense. the records reveal that on the date of their arrest. is actually committing. (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent. Under the plain view doctrine. that the seizure of illegal drugs conducted by the officers falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine. who has a right to be in the position to have that view." Hence. In the course of such lawful intrusion. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. 45 46 In the case at hand. one of the boats hastily sped away when they drew closer to the appellants. are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. In addition. contraband. In fact. the apprehending officers. and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. therefore. the appellant Chi Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting officers "big. is actually committing. which became inadvertently and immediately apparent from the point of view of the arresting officers. When they requested appellants to show proper documentation as to their identity as well as their purpose for being there. appellants were seen in the act of transferring bags of illegal drugs from one boat to another and thereafter caught in possession of the same. the police officers found them with the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of the officers. In broad daylight. and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime.

But even assuming that the police officers intentionally delayed the filing of the Information. Verily. big money. it must be remembered that the proceeding taken against the detained persons for the act they committed remains unaffected. 51 In this relation. There. It was only when appellants again appeared without counsel on February 23. the evidence was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office for an examination which yielded positive results. an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated drugs was established by the prosecution. militate against the contention of the appellants. as the records clearly show. 1999. who signed a receipt evidencing that the confiscated drugs were turned over to the PNP Regional Headquarters. 48 49 50 Anent appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for during custodial investigation. the seized bags of regulated drugs were properly marked and photographed. neither one of the appellants executed an admission or confession. there was no violation of appellants’ constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation. It is clear. such as the language barrier. considering the absence of any assurance that the interpreter was able to explain to appellants the charges against them in the language they understood. as well as the disparity in the distances between the different offices. for the two acts are distinct and separate. the unresponsiveness of the appellants. appellants should havetaken steps to report or file charges against the officers. appellants barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase "call China. appellants therefore did not validly enter their plea. 1âwphi1 52 . This Court is nevertheless mindful of the difficult circumstances faced by the police officersin this case.provides otherwise. This Court does not find a violation of appellants’ right to counsel for evenin their own narration of facts. In fact. who merely understood a little Chinese language. From the time of appellants’ arrest. Unfortunately. however. they cannot now rely on administrative short comings ofpolice officers to get a judgment of acquittal for these do not diminish the fact that illegal drugs were found in appellants’ possession. and receipts were all made part of the records of this case. appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings in saying that during their arraignment. Evidently. 1998. Proper inventory was also conducted in the presence of the appellants and Mayor Telebrico. But while the law subjects such public officers who detain persons beyond the legal period to criminal liability. In this case. In fact. 1999 that the court appointed a counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office. the bags containing the crystalline substance were presented before the trial court during the hearing held on October 12. 1999 which was identified by SPO3 Yuson. the fact that one of the days fell on a Sunday. the trial court gave appellants time to secure the services of counsel of their choice. appellants stated that when they appeared without counsel when the case was called for arraignment on January19. photographs. As such. Appellants assert that the trial court likewise appointed a special interpreter. 1998 or five (5) days after their arrest on December 3." The trial court convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during custodial investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 47 Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally charged in an Information on December 8. this deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction. they were not represented by a counsel of their choice but were merely represented by a court-appointed government lawyer. the officer who confiscated the same. beyond the thirty-six (36)hour period in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The laboratory report. The facts borne by the records of the case. they did not have counsel of their choice nor were they provided with one.

7659. misconstrued.therefore. As pointed out by the CA. xxxx . If appellants were unsatisfied with the competence of the court-appointed interpreter. especially when such findings are adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence. therefore. It is clear. as affirmed by the appellate court. Sections 16 and 17 of RA No. The accused on two (2) occasions have even submitted written requests in English (Exhibit "N" and Exhibit "O")which were granted by the Court allowing them to call their relatives but still they failed to secure the services of an interpreter. that appellants had ample opportunity to secure the services of a counsel of their own choice. this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the lower court as to appellants’ guilt of the offense charged against them. accused could not still secure the services of a Chinese interpreter when as borne out by the records.The penalty of reclusion perpetuato death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. the trial court gave appellants the authorization to seek. the Chinese Embassy’s assistance for purposes of procuring a Chinese interpreter. provide: Sec. 6425. It is highly unbelievable that for such period oftime that this case has been pending in court. through several postponements. would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. Appellants were even given time. in view of the well-entrenched rule that the findings of facts of the trial court. 56 As to the penalty imposed on appellants. To the mind of the Court. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. appellants were. it should have taken the opportunities given by the trial court. having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses’ deportment during the trial. subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. appellants had every opportunity to secure the services of a Chinese interpreter with such competence at par with their standards. 6425. to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court in criminal cases.to properly secure the services of one. on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it. The instant case has been filed in Court since December 8. or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which. It is a settled policy of this Court. 1998 or six years more or less until now. They cannot now assign error in the proceedings conducted by the trial court for the fact remains that they were appointed with counsel in full compliance with the law. as amended. that based on the findings of the courts below. x x x 54 Indeed. founded on reason and experience. known as the Dangerous DrugsAct of 1972. if considered. accused can also understand English as proven by their letters. In this relation. through their counsel. in fact. in possession of regulated drugs without the requisite authority. absent any evidence that both courts ignored. amending RA No. the trial court’s observations are worth mentioning. 16. 55 Moreover. . to wit: 53 Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure to testify on their own behalf. this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the above findings. are conclusive on this Court. is amended to read as follows: Section 16. the defense is trying to justify for want of Chinese interpreter. In much the same way. they were able to secure the services of several lawyers one after the other.

9346. 14-A. No. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. JR. accused-appellant." As regards the fine. which is more than the two hundred (200) grams stipulated above. From the foregoing. Branch 88. The Decision dated January 9. Section 20.: This case is here on automatic review of the decision. [G. the instant appeal is DENIED. We find that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1.. [1] dated October 5. FIDEL DECISION MENDOZA. in accordance with R. J. The information against accused-appellant alleged: That on or about August 26. 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. in the City of Cavite. of the Regional Trial Court. the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.Section 17.R. 2001] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1998.000. vs.38 revolver. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride. ABRENICA CUBCUBIN. guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Application of Penalties. -The penalties for offenses under Section 3. 6425. 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14.R. with no .000. finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin. 2009 and Resolution dated April 24. 136267. No. premises considered. plaintiff-appellee. 7. 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: xxxx 3. 20. 00657 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants herein are found GUILTY of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs. is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. the abovenamed accused. otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. July 10.A. Article IV of Republic Act No. 1997. CR HC No. 4. Cavite City. considering that appellants were found to have possessed forty-five (45) kilograms of methylamphetamine hydrochloride. in view of the quantity seized from them. Jr. as amended. WHEREFORE.00) for each appellant imposed by the RTC is proper. armed with an unlicensed homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .

went to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano. 1997 (Exh. told him that accused-appellant and the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe. National Bureau of Investigation ballistician Isabelo D. a food server/waitress in Sting Cafe. PO3 Manicio. responded to the call and found Henry P.. attack and shoot with the aforesaid unlicensed firearm a certain HENRY PECHO PIAMONTE. Rosal. and Danet D. A-1. Chief of the Records. and that she did not know if they left together as she was . Silvestre.[2] Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in the head which caused the latters instantaneous death. about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene.. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao. did. located in San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point. Rogel. willfully. composed of SPO1 Malinao. Dr. For this reason. A-2. The prosecution evidence is to the following effect: At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26. Pilapil. Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame. was dispensed with in view of his certification. A. a food server at the Sting Cafe in San Antonio. with intent to kill. acting with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of the darkness of [the] night. [6] The other policemen at the police station called up City Prosecutor Agapito Lu who also proceeded to Sting Cafe. Quezon City. [3] that accused-appellant is not a licensed/registered holder of firearm of any kind and caliber. [5] PO3 Rosal testified that a tricycle driver. that the two stayed in the cafe until 3:30 a. Eight witnesses were presented by the prosecution: police officers Florentino M.serial number. whereupon trial on the merits ensued. Raymundo D. PO3 Estoy.. Garcellano told the police investigators that she had seen accused-appellant arrive at Sting Cafe at about 12:00 midnight and drink beer. Enrico A. and Virgilio L.m. Cavite City. NBI Forensic Chemist II Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum. Nemenzo. all of whom belong to the Cavite City Police Department.. Jr. Forthwith.. Sgt. Garcellano. Jr. dated October 7. 1997.. Jr. unlawfully. CONTRARY TO LAW. Jr. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road. Malinao. Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene (Exhs. N). assault. a police team. who refused to divulge his name. desk officer of the Cavite City police station. and A-3) [4] showing the victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle. the victim arrived and joined accused-appellant. The testimony of Police Chief Inspector Edwin G. and SPO3 Manalo. PO3 Rosal. City Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of Health (DOH) in Cavite City. Estoy. Jr. then and there. and feloniously. received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio. Cavite City.. Regalado D. that at about 2:30 a. Sosa.m. Jr. Cavite City.

The police operatives identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting near the cemetery. PO3 Estoy. They then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells. PO3 Estoy. F).38 caliber gun (Exhs. B-2-B). he said that he found it to be bloodied. While PO3 Estoy. said that he inscribed his initials RDE (for Raymundo D. SPO3 Manalo. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object.PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao. said accused-appellant refused to tell him where he hid the gun so he sought his (accused-appellants) permission to go back to his house to conduct a further search. Jr. who knew where accused-appellant lived. M-2. H) [9] and the name Dhenvher written in the inner portion of the shirts hemline.. Accused-appellant was then taken to the police station. Garcellano described accused-appellant as a lean. B-1). Cavite City. B-2. Armando Plata. Jr. Jr. [13] and the two spent .. Chief Investigator of the Criminal Investigation Division. and M-4). M-1. SPO1 Malinao. and mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short pants. Upon close examination.38 revolver (six shooter). testified that on August 26. SPO1 Malinao. M-3. without a serial number (Exh. accused-appellant was positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the victims companion.38 caliber shells (Exhs. two spent . and Prosecutor Lu to accused-appellants house in Garcia Extension. 1997. Accusedappellant denied involvement in the incident. Jr. The police investigators asked accusedappellant where the fatal gun was. SPO4 Virgilio Pilapil. said that upon entering the house. SPO1 Malinao. they saw accused-appellants 11-year old son Jhumar. B-3) [15] along with the things seized from him. PO3 Manicio. he noticed a white t-shirt. proceeded thereto. and PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant in the sala.[10] Inside the house. accompanied by Prosecutor Lu. then asked accused-appellant to go with them to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. Jr. [8] SPO1 Malinao.[7] Armando Plata. B-2-B)[14] were all photographed. Jr. bearing the brand name Hanes (Exh. placed over a divider near the kitchen. and PO3 Rosal. PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant while he conducted a search. the case involving the killing of Henry Pecho . He found the gun loaded with five live bullets (Exhs." When he picked up the t-shirt. Thereupon.serving other customers. that Garcellanos description fitted a person known as alias Jun Dulce. was conducting the search. There. Jr. told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao. Jr. Jr. [12] the white Hanes t-shirt (Exhs. another tricycle driver.. PO3 Estoy. Jr. The policemen knocked on the door for about three minutes before it was opened by a man who answered the description given by Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be accused-appellant. Jr. B-2. Jr. SPO1 Malinao.38 caliber shells fell from it. led PO3 Rosal. M. B. darkcomplexioned. then asked permission to enter and look around the house. SPO1 Malinao. found on top of a plastic water container (drum) outside the bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber . B-2-A. [11] The . where he was photographed (Exh.

1. = The left frontal lobe of the brain is perforated and the frontal lobe is enveloped with liquid and clotted blood. Note: One diagonal incised line was marked on the slug. and two deformed slugs. 0.. 0. = The lead slug is found at the inner surface of the left frontal lobe.38 revolver with five live ammunitions. described as follows: = Gunshot wound. After an evaluation of the evidence. in d[iameter] with inverted irregular borders located at the left frontal region 5 cms.5 cms. = Stomach contains liquid and little rice and with alcoholic (beer) smell. elevation/height located at the angle of the right jaw and/or 5 cms. . in d[iameter] at the left frontal region. = The right mandibular region was incised near the gunshot wound and the area is severely hematomatous and explored until a lead slug [was] found at the 1st cervical vertebrae at the right side. a . = Other internal organs are significantly normal. below the inferior level of the right ear. INTERNAL FINDINGS: = Presence of circular complete fracture. He took blood samples of the victim and submitted the same to the NBI for laboratory examination. = Gunshot wound.5 cm. x 0. City Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of Health in Cavite City. The wound has irregular and inverted borders.6 cm. oval in shape with powder burns more on top of the wound to 2. Regalado Sosa. O) [17] which showed the following findings: AUTOPSY REPORT EXTERNAL FINDINGS: A medium built fair complexioned male adult human body in its cadaveric state with gunshot wounds . he formally filed a criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant. conducted a postmortem examination of the cadaver and prepared an autopsy report (Exh. The length of the slug is 1. It is directed inwards and downwards fracturing the bone (frontal) underneath into [the] intracranial cavity. above the temporal end of the left eyebrow. .5 cm.8 cm. It is directed inwards fracturing the lower edge of the angle of the right mandible and the lead slug is embedded at the right lateral portion of the first (1st) cervical vertebrae hence extracted. in d[iameter] lead slug with one end is markedly deformed.6 cms. [16] Dr. 1 cm. Slugs extracted: 1.Piamonte was forwarded to him by PO3 Rosal together with the evidence consisting of a bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt. .

(b) precipitin test. she conducted three kinds of laboratory examinations. marked as HPP-1 (Exh. called tatooing.. the NBI conducted a ballistics examination to determine whether the two slugs taken from the body of the victim were fired from the firearm recovered from accused-appellant. [20] Upon written request (Exh. A 0. C)[21] of Prosecutor Lu. to determine the blood group. NBI Forensic Chemist II. roundly/ovally deformed [on] one end. Accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin. near the spinal column. (a) benzidine test.[25] For its part. the defense presented accused-appellant himself. [23] Prosecutor Lu also made a written request (Exh. Note: Two diagonal incised lines [were] marked on the said slug. in d[iameter] lead slug . G-5). which had been recovered from the victims head and the three test bullets (Exhs. and (c) ABO grouping test. and. G-4. 1997. [22] The empty shells from the three test bullets fired were duly marked (Exhs. and his sister Yolanda Cubcubin Padua. Sosa testified that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds (Exh. an NBI ballistician. No photographs were taken. Flor Landicho. Q) that the victim died of shock secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds. Supervising Ballistician Ernie Magtibay. testified that on September 26. . namely. Jr. to determine if the bloodstains came from human or animal blood. [18] the first one located on the right jaw below the ear while the second wound located at the left temporal side above the left eyebrow. surrounding the first wound which showed that the victim was shot point-blank. Jr.7 cm. K). R). . G-2) fired from the seized .38 caliber firearm. The length of the slug is 1. E) and HPP-2 (Exh.38 caliber empty shells recovered from accused-appellant were no longer examined. his son Jhumar. conducted on September 10. The slug from the first gunshot wound remained at the base of the neck. Dr. The second slug was also embedded at the front lobe of the brain. Isabelo D. G-3. the bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt and the blood sample of the victim yielded positive results for human blood belonging to blood type O (Exh. Silvestre. to determine the presence of blood. Sosa indicated in the Certificate of Death (Exh. testified that he enlisted in the Philippine Constabulary as a soldier in 1974 but was discharged in 1977 for being . When tested and matched together. [19] Dr. J) [24] for a laboratory examination of the bloodstains on the white Hanes t-shirt of accused-appellant to determine whether such were identical to the blood of the victim. E-1). 1997 a comparative examination of the two evidence bullets. another ballistician. G-1.8 cm. There were powder burns.2. The tests showed that the evidence bullets were fired from the subject firearm. Senior Ballistician Elmer Pieded. Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum. The two . G. Silvestres findings were confirmed by four other NBI ballisticians: Chief Ballistician Rogelio Munar.

Accusedappellant testified that from 10:00 in the evening to 12:00 midnight of August 25. He denied the claim of the policemen that the white t-shirt had blood stains. Jhumar immediately went to his aunt. He was later employed as a driver by a friend. Accused-appellant said that he did not ask them why they were searching the place as he was afraid they would maltreat him. He claimed that the policemen did not have any search warrant nor a warrant of arrest when they took him into custody.. a tricycle driver. he was sleeping on the second floor of the house when he was roused from his sleep by loud knocks on the door. Jhumar.38 caliber revolver presented to him by Prosecutor Lu and SPO4 Pilapil or that the same had been recovered from his house. a van with some other policemen on . Cavite City. San Antonio. testified that at about 4:00 in the morning of August 26. He was sleeping on the sofa in his bedroom when he was awakened by the arrival of three policemen. He also denied the prosecutions claim that he was taken to the Sting Cafe where he was allegedly identified by Danet Garcellano as the person last seen with the victim before the latter was killed.m. He said he left for Saudi Arabia where he worked as a driver and came back in 1979. the victim left as a passenger was waiting to be given a ride.m. and reported to her what had happened. As the policemen were about to leave. After a while. He denied owning the .m. Yolanda Cubcubin Padua. two of them he recognized as SPO1 Malinao. and took a tricycle home to 1151 Garcia Extension. He told them that his father was not around. They put his father in a police patrol car waiting outside. but he was shoved away. he saw three policemen who were looking for his father. the policemen took from the clothes stand a white t-shirt belonging to his son Denver. he proceeded to the Sting Cafe where he had some drinks while waiting for food to be served. the victim again left to transport another passenger. He said he was handcuffed while the policemen searched his room. Henry Piamonte. They proceeded upstairs to the room of his father where they took from the clothes stand a white Hanes t-shirt belonging to his brother Denver. and had another bottle of beer with accused-appellant. Jr. His son. He admitted knowing the victim whom he addressed as Kuya. stood beside him. who owned a junk shop in Cavite City. Jr.[27] Jhumar Cubcubin. Cavite City. After that. who pointed their guns at him and told him to lie face down.. He went back to the house and saw some policemen still conducting a search. Before leaving. At about 1:30 a. [26] Accused-appellant said he left Sting Cafe at about 2:00 a. 1997. He also said that he was made to stay in a police patrol car for almost two hours before he was brought inside the police station. 1997. son of accused-appellant. When he opened the door. the victim did not come back anymore. and PO3 Estoy. Afterwards. arrived and had drinks with him. Nor did they inform him of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel.AWOL. The victim came back to the restaurant before 1:00 a. he and some friends played a card game called tong-its on Molina Street. turning the sala set upside down and opening the cabinets.

spread the t-shirt and told Jhumars aunt Eto. It based its finding on circumstantial evidence. Armando Plata. SPO1 Malinao. that the two later had an argument as accused-appellant wanted to have two more bottles of beer which the victim paid for. his aunt was arguing with the policemen. found a . that accusedappellant had been apprehended by some policemen. saw accused-appellant arrive at about 12:00 midnight of August 25. accompanied the policemen to the house of accused-appellant.38 caliber shells. she was told by her nephew. a waitress at the Sting Cafe. Trias. the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder.board arrived. Jr. (4) That when accused-appellant was taken to the Sting Cafe. Jhumar said that while his father was inside the police patrol car. [29] On October 5. when they came out. Jr. which was then photographed. accused-appellants sister. while the victim arrived at about 2:30 a. 1997 and drink beer. (5) That when the investigators returned to the house of accused-appellant. and that at about 3:30 a. another tricycle driver who knew accused-appellant as the person being described by Garcellano. Jr. 1998. who told her that some policemen were searching accused-appellants house and found a gun. 1997. of August 26. She went back to her house to call up her mother in Gen. Cavite to let her know what had happened. Yolanda said she saw the confiscated white Hanes t-shirt. She then went out to see accused-appellant and saw Jhumar. He said that he and his father never gave permission tothe policemen to search their house. (6) That . that the crime scene was about 50 meters away from the house of accused-appellant. 1997 and joined accused-appellant in drinking beer at the bar. he found a white Hanes t-shirt with bloodstains on it and also recovered two spent . with bullet wounds on his head.38 caliber revolver placed on top of a plastic water container located outside the bathroom. and that when they were told by an unidentified tricycle driver that the victim and accused-appellant were seen leaving the Sting Cafe together. puro dugo damit niya. They asked him where the water container was located. he was positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the victims companion moments prior to his death. slumped on the handle of his tricycle. She and Jhumar then went to the police patrol car where she saw her brother in handcuffs.m. At that instance. testified that they saw the lifeless body of the victim. but she claimed the same did not have any bloodstain on it. [28] Yolanda Cubcubin Padua. they went to Sting Cafe and interviewed Danet Garcellano who described the appearance of the victims companion. although the t-shirt had no bloodstains. She said that she served them beer and they stayed for about an hour. one of them announced that he had found a gun.m. PO3 Estoy. testified that at about 5:30 in the morning of August 26. was allowed to enter the house. (2) That PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao. She said she protested to the policemen that there was no evidence that accused-appellant had killed the victim. Jhumar.. Jr. They went inside the house and. (3) That after SPO1 Malinao. to wit: (1) That Danet Garcellano. the victim and accused-appellant left and boarded the victims tricycle.

This affidavit of desistance. the Court received a letter. the same was not done by accused-appellants counsel. showed that the bloodstains on the white Hanes t-shirt were human blood. by reason thereof. 1997 without a warrant. Piamonte. giving full credence to the testimonies of Danet Garcellano and the police investigators whom it found to have no motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant. We now consider accused-appellants assignment of errors. sought the dismissal of the criminal case against him.38 caliber revolver. mother of accused-appellant.38 caliber revolver seized from accused-appellants house.laboratory examination conducted by the forensic chemist. 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 1997. effected on August 26. for unknown reasons. widow of the victim. . this appeal. Dulce said that the affidavit of desistance was supposed to be submitted to the trial court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It ruled that since Dr.[31] executed by Marilou B. has no probative value. 5. Arrest without warrant. A peace officer or a private person may. and the . Hence. on the ground that these items had been seized as incident to a lawful arrest. stating that accused-appellant had been mistakenly identified as the assailant. It held that the use of an unlicensed firearm in killing the victim constituted an aggravating circumstance. which matched the blood type of the victim. the assailant went around and shot him on the left temple. provides: Sec. when lawful. the two slugs recovered from the head of the victim were fired from the . type O. Silvestre. Accused-appellant contends that his arrest. the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present. Jr. and (7) That per ballistic examination of NBI ballistician. not being formally offered before the trial court. Hence. [30] from Victoria Abrenica Dulce. was illegal.. Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum. dated April 5. however. In her letter. First. The trial court rejected accused-appellants alibi. in his presence. but. Rule 113. 2000. On this point. On April 18. Sosa testified that the victim was shot point-blank while on his tricycle and was not in a position to see the assailant. with an attached affidavit of desistance entitled Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-Uurong. arrest a person: (a) When. Isabelo D. or is attempting to commit an offense. dated November 14. is actually committing. and. The trial court theorized that while the victim was on his tricycle. the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of murder and accordingly imposed on him the penalty of death. the person to be arrested has committed. not to mention that the victim was unarmed and thus totally defenseless. as amended. without a warrant. two spent shells. 2000. It admitted the prosecution evidence consisting of the white Hanes t-shirt.

In an analogous case. who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean. by Danet Garcellano. Thus.Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accusedappellant was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others. The question. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. It was pointed out that at the time of his arrest. . mustachioed. the arresting officers. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.[33] the police was informed that the accused was involved in subversive activities. the accused was not in possession of the firearm nor engaged in subversive activities.[32] In this case. which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26. allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and some subversive materials from the latter. The two did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had committed the crime. This Court held that the arresting officers had no personal knowledge since their information came entirely from an informant. Under 5(b). Jr. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao. by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano fitted accused-appellant. alias Jun Dulce and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived and accompanied them to accusedappellants house. two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first. the offender has just committed an offense and. His arrest without a warrant could not be justified under 5(b). the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. therefore. waitress at the Sting Cafe. the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. in the course of the arrest. merely relied on information given to them by others.. It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause. 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city. the police arrested the accused and. We hold that there was none. second. Jr. On the basis of this information.(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. is whether there was probable cause for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao. to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe. dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants.

which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI. these [NBI] agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime.When [the NBI agents] attempted to arrest [the students].[35] this Court. The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. he was not doing anything overtly criminal. and two spent . 1997.[34] the accused.38 caliber shells in his house. Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe accused-appellant to be guilty of the killing of the victim because they found a bloodstained t-shirt. dated September 9. The alleged discovery of the gun came after his arrest. in a case of robbery with rape. . at the time [the victim] was killed.. under the supervision of the U.In another case. as will presently be explained. Be that as it may. At the time accused-appellant was arrested. he filed a petition for reinvestigation in which he alleged that he had been illegally detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. Indeed. Moreover. This Court held the arrest to be illegal for lack of personal knowledge of the arresting officers. More recently. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses. [they]. accused-appellant cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a warrant. 1997. Ombudsman. the objects allegedly seized from accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. in Posadas v. were arrested solely on the basis of the identification given by one of the victims. the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that [the students] were probably guilty. police. in declaring the arrest without warrant of two University of the Philippines students to be illegal. a . held: There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c).38 caliber revolver... On the contrary. [T]he NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest [the students] four days after the commission of the crime. In its order. 1997. the trial court granted his motion and ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary . They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.P.The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on November 11. It is true that on August 28.

[39] On the same day. they said the search was made with the consent of the accused. methinks. and the . not only does accused-appellant stoutly deny that he ever consented .38 caliber revolver allegedly found in his house are inadmissible in evidence.[37] Accused-appellant did not object to the arraignment. his motion for preliminary investigation had become moot and academic and. at the scheduled arraignment. 1997 to the first week of November. Lu moved for the resetting of accused-appellants arraignment from October 8. Locsin. Instead. Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right.investigation and submit his findings within thirty (30) days thereof. but is merely a demonstration or regard for the supremacy of the law. insists that accusedappellant consented to the search of his house. 1997. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. with the assistance of counsel.[42] As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen. but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent or an invitation thereto. [40]Accused-appellant thus waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest. 1997. on the search show laborious effort to emphasize that accused-appellant gave them permission to search his house. therefore. the Hanes t-shirt. therefore. even when they were not being asked. the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person. As Shakespeare would put it. the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force. Accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission to the arresting police officers to search his house and. To be sure. The prosecution. on the other hand. [41] Second. set the case for trial. For as Justice Laurel explained in Pasion Vda de Garcia v. the lady doth protest too much. on November 11. or waiving his constitutional rights. City Prosecutor Agapito S. At every turn. A mere failure on the part of the accused to object to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. and PO3 Rosal. The City Prosecutors request was.[38] Nor did accused-appellant move to quash the information on the ground that his arrest was illegal and. peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented. Jr. It is noteworthy that the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses. the trial court issued an order stating that. 1997. accused-appellant. 1997 on the ground that the findings on the laboratory and ballistics examinations had not yet been received from the NBI. therefore. [36] On October 7. Indeed. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. pleaded not guilty to the charge. SPO1 Malinao. the two spent slugs. accordingly. granted and the arraignment was reset to November 11. as a result of accusedappellants arraignment.

It is clear that the warrantless search in this case cannot be justified on this ground. the white Hanes t-shirt. Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the plain view doctrine. Brown. however.S.After bringing accusedappellant to the Sting Cafe where he was positively identified by a waitress named Danet Garcellano as the victims companion. The prosecution says the search can be justified as incidental to a valid arrest. 2d 502 (1983)] Here. the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. Ed. the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine: What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. 75 L. the search of accused-appellants house was illegal and. As this Court held in People v. or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. the U. consequently. i. 29 L. according to the rosecution. [Coolidge v. the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them. It cannot be said that the . two spent shells. For neither the t-shirt nor the gun was within the area of accused-appellants immediate control. 460 U. hot pursuit. Even assuming the warrantless arrest to be valid. [Id. 443.38 caliber gun. are inadmissible in evidence against him. 730.S.. 29 L. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object. but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Of course. See also Texas v. 2d 583. New Hampshire. A valid arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. In fact. and the .Ed.e. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore. the arresting officers allegedly asked . The rationale for such search and seizure is to prevent the person arrested either from destroying evidence or from using the weapon against his captor.38 caliber gun was discovered through inadvertence.Ed. be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt.to the search of his dwelling but the prosecution has not shown any good reason why accused-appellant might have agreed to the search. the things obtained as a result of the illegal search. search incident to lawful arrest.S. Musa:[43] The plain view doctrine may not. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused.. 403 U. the police found the gun only after going back to the house of accused-appellant.

accused-appellant where he hid the gun used in killing the victim. that the victim joined him at about 2:30 a. From the photograph of the t-shirt (Exh. they talked and afterwards.. Jr... Q How about Cubcubin. On cross-examination. Q How did he follow Henry. Q Did you actually see Henry Piamonte leave the Sting Cafe? A They were about to leave already at that time because they were already bringing with them the two bottles of beer. Third. because I already served inside.. Thus. The actual t-shirt (Exh. the t-shirt was not bloodied which could have directed his attention to take a closer look at it. the gun was purposely sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon it. it is not visible that there were bloodstains. when accused-appellant refused to answer. 1997. because I already served the other customers inside. Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white Hanes t-shirt placed on top of the divider in plain view as such is not contraband nor is it incriminating in nature which would lead SPO1 Malinao..38 caliber revolver on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom.[44] . Jr.. said. Sir.. Q Were they together when they left Sting Cafe or they left one after the other? A When they were already bringing along with them the two bottles of beer. Sir. Henry boarded a tricycle. H) merely had some small specks of blood at its lower portion. to conclude that it would constitute evidence of a crime.. Thus. Sir. Danet testified: PROSECUTOR LU: .m.m.. on foot. BAYBAY: Q When he left. I already left them and I served the other customers. Jr. Danet Garcellano said that accused-appellant arrived at about midnight of August 25. Sir. how did he leave the Sting Cafe? A He followed Henry. Sir. B-2). Danet said: ATTY. Contrary to what SPO1 Malinao. According to SPO1 Malinao. he sought accused-appellants permission to go back to his house and there found the . and that although both left the Sting Cafe at about 3:30 a. on board a vehicle or what? A I do not know anymore. Q But did you see Henry Piamonte actually leave the Sting Cafe? A When Henry Piamonte left the Sting Cafe. . he left alone? A I do not know anymore. There is no evidence to link accused-appellant directly to the crime. she really did not know if they left together.

This is the second type of positive identification.[46] it was explained that positive identification refers essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. however... how could you be sure of the time when you were serving other people at that time? A That is only my estimation.Q Are you saying to us that you did not see him when he left? A No. Q And. Gallarde. BAYBAY: Q The accused Fidel Cubcubin left Sting Cafe at 3:30? A Yes. Sir. you are not really sure what time Fidel Cubcubin left? A Yes. what was the basis of your estimation? A Because at that time there were only few customers in that place. which. what I know is that he and Cubcubin were together because of the two bottles of beer which were paid by Piamonte inside. This rule. Sir. Sir.[45] In People v. when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain. cannot be applied in the present case because Danet Garcellano did not actually see accused-appellant and the victim leave the Sting Cafe together. This constitutes direct evidence. as when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. Sir. Q You also did not see him leave? A No. There is thus serious doubt as to whether accused-appellant was really the last person seen with the victim. Or. Sir. . Q You only estimated? A Yes. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime. Her testimony is insufficient to place accused- . Sir. ATTY.. Sir. Q So. Sir. he may not have actually seen the crime committed. leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. but is nevertheless able to identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Q Now.

appellant in the scene of the crime so as to form part of the chain of circumstantial evidence to show that accused-appellant committed the crime. but the tricycle driver was not presented to confirm this fact.38 caliber gun allegedly found in his house was not examined for the possible presence of accused-appellants fingerprints. (3) SPO1 Malinao.. B-2-B). testified that the white Hanes t-shirt was bloodied. Danet Garcellano. testified that these were placed . Motive is proved by the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense. did not actually see accused-appellant and the victim leaving the cafe together at about 3:30 a. by deeds or words that may express the motive or from which his reason for committing the offense may be inferred. they were informed by a tricycle driver that the victim and the accused-appellant had earlier left the Sting Cafe together. supposedly taken at the time of the search. shows that it had no bloodstains and this discrepancy was not explained by SPO1 Malinao. Jr. a waitress at the Sting Cafe. Jr. and (9) The allegation that the gun was placed on top of a water container in accused-appellants house is unbelievable as it is improbable that accused-appellant could be so careless as to leave the fatal weapon there when he could have hidden it or thrown it away. Jr. i.m. Nor can we rest easy on the prosecutions claim as to where the two empty shells and the t-shirt were allegedly found. testified that when they arrived at the scene of the crime. SPO1 Malinao. there are serious doubts as to whether the crime was committed by accused-appellant in view of the following: (1) As already stated. (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. (2) PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao. (5) Accused-appellant was never given a paraffin test to determine if he was positive for gunpowder nitrates. Suspicion alone is insufficient. The beer was later paid for by the victim.[48] There is no showing that the killing of the victim was by reason of a supposed altercation they had as to who would pay for the two bottles of beer ordered while they were at the Sting Cafe. (4) The fact that the t-shirt was tested positive for type O blood does not necessarily mean that the bloodstains came from the victim who also had a type O blood. the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant testified that he could not have killed the victim because the latter was his friend whom he considered his kuya or elder brother. while the photograph of the t-shirt (Exhs. but the evidence shows that it had some bloodstains only on its lower portion (Exh. H). of August 26. Jr. In the case at bar. 1997. and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.. B-2-A. 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence requires the concurrence of the following in order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (a) there is more than one circumstance. [47] Nor is there adequate evidence to prove any ill motive on the part of accusedappellant. (8) The .e. [49] Rule 133. B-2.

Q This white t-shirt. that was near the kitchen. Sir. SPO1 Malinao. Q How about these 2 empty shells that fell when you lifted the t-shirt. then after entering the same. and he even gave me the permission to get the same. Sir. Q Where exactly was the white t-shirt placed at that time when you saw the same? A Because after entering the house you will see the entire portion of that house and there is a table there and that t-shirt was placed on the table. Q Was that t-shirt visible from the front door of the house? A Yes. while we were in the sala near the kitchen we saw the white Hanes t-shirt there. on cross-examination. on the floor or on the wall? A It was immediately in front of the door because the house has no divider anymore. and I saw the t-shirt was with blood stains. Q How about the blood spot or blood stains. BAYBAY: Q Where was this t-shirt again when you first saw it? A In the kitchen area.[50] However. On direct examination. . he said he found the empty shells on top of a cabinet (tokador) in the bedroom on the second floor of the house. Sir. Sir. Sir. Sir. bullets. Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw? A Before I got the t-shirt. said: PROSECUTOR LU: Q What else did you tell Cubcubin at that time? A We asked him to allow us to go inside the house and he let us go inside the house. I did not count the blood stains anymore but there were blood stains on the tshirt.beside the white Hanes t-shirt and fell when he took the shirt. can you tell us the brand of the t-shirt? A Hanes. Sir. Jr. Q Where in the kitchen area. can you tell us how many. Thus. Sir. can you describe to us these 2 empty shells? A Empty shells of . he testified: ATTY. after getting the t-shirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell. I even asked his permission for me to be able to get the t-shirt. Q And that t-shirt was immediately near the door. if you can remember? A We were in a hurry. on the floor? A Yes. Q What did you do with the empty shells? A I got the t-shirt as well as the 2 empty shells and I showed them to him.38 cal. Sir. Sir.

I placed them together with the t-shirt. you stated that you got the tshirt and when you lifted the t-shirt. Sir. . Q You found it when you went up? A I first asked his permission to look around inside the house. Sir. they were placed on their tokador on a place where there is a curtain. [51] . two empty shells fell off? A After finding the two empty shells for a .Q What did you do after that. Q You also testified that you found two empty shells? A Yes. you looked at it? A Yes. Sir. you looked at it. the t-shirt does not belong to him. I put it on the original place where it was.38 caliber. Sir. Q Bedroom upstairs? A Yes. it is a two-storey house? A Yes. Sir. did you ask him whose t-shirt is it? A I asked him if that t-shirt belongs to him. when you saw the t-shirt there? A I asked his permission so that I could take a look at the t-shirt. Q Where did you find these two empty shells? A From the bedroom upstairs. there is a bedroom upstairs. Q You mean. Sir. that is what you are telling us now? A After finding and taking a look at the t-shirt. Sir. Q And when you spread it out in front of him.. Q When you said. sir. Q In your previous testimony and this is found on page 41 of the TSN. Q And when you went upstairs. I showed to him the t-shirt as well as the empty shells.. Sir. how did you look at it? A I spread it out in front of him. it so happened that the investigator was behind me so after that. you found two empty shells and you put them together with the t-shirt. Sir. Sir. Sir. Q And he allowed you? A He allowed me. and after finding the two empty shells. you found the two empty shells? A Yes. because I was asking him also about the whereabouts of the firearm he had. Q What you are telling us now is that you went upstairs. Sir. Sir. Q What did he say? A According to him. Q And you said..

which you said. according to him. Q And you were referring to the time that you entered the house? A Yes. Q When you said you placed that from the place where you found it. Sir. the empty shells fell on the floor. I placed it on its original place. Q And that was the time that you lift[ed] the t-shirt when you saw it and you got it? A What I said before was that.. Sir.Q Also in your previous testimony. is that true? A Yes. I placed them on top of the t-shirt. then I asked him about the firearm that he used. He said he found the empty shells on top of the tokador on the second floor of the house. caught in his own contradiction.. Q I am just referring to two empty shells that fell. there were 2 empty shells which fell. Sir. after getting the t-shirt. he found them by accident when they fell from the t-shirt which he found immediately after entering accused-appellants house and before going up to the . and I saw the t-shirt was with blood stains. sir. after that. brought them downstairs. I lifted it. and he even gave me the permission to get the same. I remember it. Sir. how did you put it on the place where you found it? A I placed it there the way I saw it before. something fell. But how could he have gotten the shells from the second floor if. but I first placed them on top of the t-shirt because I was planning to wrap these empty shells in the t-shirt. because I was planning to bring the t-shirt. Q You also testified here on page 40 that the t-shirt was visible from the front door of the house. do you remember that this happened? A These two empty shells which I recovered upstairs. there were empty shells that fell.. Q Do you remember having been asked this particular question: Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw? A Before I got the t-shirt I even asked his permission for me to be able to get the t-shirt. I spread it out and nothing fell yet at that time. When he got the t-shirt. I got the t-shirt. I got the t-shirt. when you got the t-shirt. SPO1 Malinao. after getting the t-shirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell. . Sir. the way it was previously placed there. you got the t-shirt and you asked the permission to get the t-shirt. is that true? A Yes. in your direct testimony? A While Fidel Cubcubin was just beside me. Sir. The question is.[52] Thus. and then placed them on the t-shirt. Jr. Sir. Sir. Q You said. so I asked permission from him to go upstairs to look around. and I asked him about the firearm but he was not commenting anything on that. A Yes. prevaricated but in the process committed more contradictions.

R. 5-6. Immediately upon receipt of such information. arrested him and told him to remain stationary. pp. 110569 December 9. is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.:p Given credence by respondent Court of Appeals is the following narration of the factual antecedents of this case by the People. Sta. Esguerra and Pat. the decision of the Regional Trial Court. No. received reliable information that appellant Diosdado Mallari. Upon reaching the place. Thereupon.m. p. Cavite City. 3-5. The incident was then entered in the police blotter after which the spot and investigation reports were prepared (tsn. guilty of the crime of murder. accompanied by Pat. immediately proceeded to Sitio 14. Tarlac. June 27. April . petitioner. Rita. FRANCISCO. Tarlac (tsn. Capas. G. Rita. at around 2:30 p. 1990. Sometime on December 27.second storey? It is also noteworthy that whereas at first SPO1 Malinao. April 18. Jr. 3-4. Pfc. April 18. 1991. WHEREFORE. 7). was seen at Sitio 14. Jr. 1991. SO ORDERED. 8. who has a standing warrant of arrest in connection with Criminal Case No. said he found the t-shirt placed on the table near the kitchen. pp. J. 471 for Homicide in 1989. Sta. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Narciso Sirnbulan. 1991. 3). The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report to the Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof. June 27. the arresting officers surrounded the house of appellant. Appellant was handcuffed and brought to the Capas Police Station where he was endorsed to the chief investigator while the homemade gun and live ammunition were endorsed to the property custodian. 471 for Homicide. vs. pp. Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being held for some other lawful cause. he later said he found it on the floor. Capas. 1991. Esguerra. respondents. the arresting officers searched him and found a homemade gun (paltik) with one M-16 live ammunition (tsn. who were both then assigned at the Capas Police Station. with personal knowledge of the existence of a standing warrant of arrest against appellant in connection with Criminal Case No. Manipon and Pfc. Branch 88. June. Manipon.. finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin. THE HON. Pat. 1996 DIOSDADO MALLARI.

thereby making the search and seizure invalid. anent petitioner's insistence that there was no standing warrant for his arrest. accused Diosdado Mallari is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of seventeen years. after which. Trial on the merits ensued. Sec. 1991. Rules of Court . In seeking the reversal of his conviction. the Court of Appeals stated that. The threshold issue is factual: whether or not there indeed existed a standing warrant for the arrest of the petitioner.18. 471. . the Regional Trial Court of Capas. Tarlac convicted petitioner of the crime charged. still appellant's arrest would fall squarely within the context of Rule 113. it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to uphold his conviction. SO ORDERED. In its decision. Thus. 2 Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming in toto the abovequoted decision of the trial court. the prosecution failed to prove that he had no license therefor and absent this essential element of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. after compliance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. 471. the petitioner was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Accused. Petitioner posits that the absence of the requisite warrant is fatal and renders the search and seizure unlawful. while in the act of committing the crime of illegal possession of firearms in the presence of the arresting officers. even in the absence of a warrant. Pfc. Esguerra "unequivocally proved that the handgun (paltik) and the live M-16 ammunition were recovered from the person of the appellant (herein petitioner)". 1 After investigation. June 27. 5 (b). Manipon and Pat. . petitioner questions the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that at the time of his arrest. 6 A careful scrutiny of the records of the case at bench leads this Court to concur with the Court of Appeals in its finding that when the petitioner was arrested. as follows: WHEREFORE. 5. this Court reiterates the general rule that when supported by substantial evidence. "under the prevailing factual milieu. Petitioner also contends that it was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the search and seizure could be validly effected as it was done on the occasion of a lawful warrantless arrest. there was a standing warrant against him in Criminal Case No. the Court of Appeals held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 3 The Court of Appeals further held that the search conducted on the petitioner and the seizure of the subject firearm and ammunition were done on the occasion of a lawful arrest as there was then an outstanding warrant for petitioner's arrest in Criminal Case No. who is a detention prisoner is given full credit for the period of his preventive imprisonment. 4 It likewise found that petitioner was arrested while committing the crime of illegal possession of firearms in the presence of the police authorities. 6). Corrolarily. the hand gun and ammunition seized from him are inadmissible in evidence. there was then a standing ." 5 which cites the instances when a warrantless arrest may be valid. petitioner claims that even assuming that the handgun and ammunition had in fact been found in his possession. 10. p. factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. 1991. particularly. four months and one day as minimum to eighteen years and eight months as maximum. p. and pleaded not guilty on arraignment. At the outset. Finally.

471? COURT: Will you clarify. 471. 471 you do not have a warrant of arrest issued by this court? A There was. COURT: Alright. ma'am. COURT: You are referring to what case? A Homicide. Danilo Manipon: Q When you arrested Diosdado Mallari Mr. ma'am. COURT: . COURT: What about with respect to Criminal Case No. I know that there was a warrant of arrest issued. Criminal Case No. Q Was the seizure of the home made gun related to the warrant of arrest being issued by this honorable court with respect to criminal case No. Pfc. This fact is manifest from the testimonies of the arresting officers which the defense failed to rebut during trial. were you carrying a warrant of arrest then? A No. is that correct? A Yes. ma'am. sir. that is why we proceeded to Sitio 14. Q Neither you did not have with you a seize and search warrant and despite the fact that you have no search and seize warrant you have still pursued in getting the ammunition you have just mentioned. sir.warrant of arrest against him in connection with Criminal Case No. witness. I heard him saying that he did not have a warrant of arrest. ma'am. 471. the home made gun and the live bullet? A Yes.

but we know that he has a standing warrant of arrest. . sir. we did not have a warrant of arrest because we were in a hurry but when we returned. absent strong and convincing proof to the contrary. we reached the warrant officer. DULDULAO: Q You said you did not bring the warrant of arrest when you arrested the accused how did you come to know that Diosdado Mallari was indeed the accused despite the fact that you did not bring with you the warrant of arrest then? A When we went there. ma'am. COURT: Q Did you have with you the warrant of arrest you mentioned with respect to CR. ATTY. Proceed. No. law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 471? A When we went to him. we did not have a warrant of arrest because we were in a hurry if we will wait our warrant officer. we may not reach Diosdado Mallari. a search and seize warrant? A None. Q Where did you return? A When we returned to the Capas Police Station there was the warrant officer already. your Honor. And it has been repeatedly held that without proof of such motive. your honor. 8 [Emphasis provided] Further bolstering the arresting officers' testimonies is the absence of any motive on their part to falsely testify against the petitioner. your honor. this Court is bound by the presumption that the arresting officers were aware of the legal mandates in effecting an arrest and strictly complied with the same. is that correct? A Yes. 471.Alright you proceeded to Sitio 14 because of the warrant of arrest issued by this court to apprehend Diosdado Mallari in Criminal Case No. 9 Thus. Jose Esguerra: Q Do you have with you at the time when you arrested or when you seized the gun and the live ammunition. 7 [Emphasis supplied] Pat.

however. 12 Finally. according to the Solicitor General. the Court would like to stress that this is not a case of a warrantless arrest but merely an instance of an arrest effected by the police authorities without having the warrant in their possession at that precise moment. 8. . Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and on the merits of both the petitioner's and the Office of the Solicitor General's arguments with respect thereto. When. Fajardo. Acol. appellant's arrest being lawful. but Section 7. This is where the prosecution's case fails and miserably so. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant — When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest. it stated that: . This Court has ruled that: We do not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a homemade gun. 13 This. a very logical proposition. The illegality of the search is independent from the illegal possession of prohibited arms. is illegally manufactured as recognized in People vs. it could not have been the subject of license. The officer need not have the warrant in his at the time of the arrest but after the arrest. 11 where the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty and the taking of thecorpus delicti. The applicable provision is not Section 5. the Office of the Solicitor General does not even attempt to point out any evidence on record of petitioner's non-possession of a license or permit for there really is no such evidence. this Court held that the unlicensed firearms may be seized without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant." [Emphasis supplied] The abovequoted rule clearly allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. Finding as it does. yield to it because Fajardo did not say that paltiks can in no case be issued a license or permit and that proof that a firearm is a paltik dispenses with proof that it is unlicensed. this Court deems it unnecessary to delve into the applicability of Section 5. This appears to be at first blush. Thus. . dispenses with the necessity of proving that petitioner had no license to possess the firearm. if the person arrested so requires. the offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person. and cannot be issued a license or permit. except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.At this juncture. Rule 118 of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. The illegality of the search did not make legal an illegal possession of firearms. 14 . Rule 113 which provides as follows: Sec. petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving that he did not have the requisite license for the firearm and ammunition found in his possession. the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. 10 In the case of People v. It relies on the theory that as the firearm involved is a homemade gun or "paltik" and is illegal per se. albeit conducted without a warrant. in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense. We cannot. Expounding thereon. the search and seizure made incidental thereto is likewise valid. it is no longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. Anent this contention.

or a certification from the PNP (FEU) that petitioner was not a licensee of the said firearm would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession. No. DECISION LEONEN. testified that the rifle concerned is the type of weapon which only military men are authorized to possess . 15 The latter is a negative fact which constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession. this Court dispensed with a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit (FEU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to establish the alleged lack of license or permit on the part of the accused-appellant to possess the M-14 rifle found in his possession. Petitioner Diosdado Mallari is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence aid ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his continued detention. 19 The above enunciated doctrine is not applicable to this case. 197597 April 8. vs. . . Petitioner. The records are bereft of any evidence similar to that offered by the prosecution in Mesal to prove that the petitioner "did not have and could not possibly have" the requisite license or authority to possess the "paltik" and the M-16 live ammunition.In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm. .: Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. and it is the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. G. BJMP BUILDING. 16 In the case at bench. premised on the fact that: The records reveal that the allegation was successfully substantiated by other evidence which firmly and undisputably established that accused-appellant did not have and could not possibly have. Technical Sgt.viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same. Mesal 18. In such cases. Respondents. J. DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO. QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX. 17 The absence of the foregoing is fatal to the prosecution's case and renders petitioner's conviction erroneous.R. 2015 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO. the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof. the requisite license or authority to possess the M14 rifle concerned. True that in the case of People v. the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained. the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Alfredo Romasanta. the testimony of a representative of. This was. CAMP BAGONG DIWA. WARDEN. TAGUIG CITY and all other persons acting on his behalf and/or having custody of DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO. SO ORDERED. however. Supply Officer of the PC-INP 253rd PC Company. In view of the foregoing.

however. 2009. Camp Bagong Diwa. making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court. boarding passes and other documents" tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19. where he is currently detained. the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7. "While in Saudi Arabia. Malang.. Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice). Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the November 23. 2010. Datu Andal Ampatuan. he explained that he was not Butukan S. 2010. Mina and Jeddah. the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Taguig City. Branch 153. et al. 2009. Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of Medina. 2009. Malang. Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a. 1 2 3 From November 7.the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus. hearing set on September 27. ." He returned to the Philippines on December 20. . Mecca. While in Cotabato City. . 2010. 4 5 6 On August 3. 15 On September 17. 2010. Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building. 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. 2010. where he was detained for another 10 days. Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus. Proceedings before the trial court 19 20 21 . 14 On August 20. Arpa. Jr. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex. 13 The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City. Malang. 7 Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23. 9 To support his allegations. 16 17 18 In the Resolution dated September 21. There. 2009 to December 19. Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport. Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S.m. He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. 10 11 The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not Butukan S. 12 Afterwards. 2009. 8 Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.

during the September 29. Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology. 2009 to December 19. the trial court granted Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Romeo L. Information. the trial court ruled. Since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. 2010 at 2:00 p. Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. Reiterating that he was not Butukan S." 31 32 Moreover. 37 38 . on behalf of the Warden and argued that only the Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding. in the Decision dated October 29. and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. the Warden appeared with Atty. 2011. He also appeared without counsel during the hearing. 33 34 35 36 Thus. 0652113 also showed this fact. This fact was supported by a Certification from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo’s departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights. 2010 hearing. as accused. however." Salibo countered that the Information. Jr.. Warrant of Arrest. 23 On September 28. The trial court reset the hearing on the Return to October 1. a petition for habeas corpus was "no longer availing. the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought Salibo before the trial court. Jr. Villante. Through its Decision dated April 19. 24 25 The September 29. Villante. 22 Thus. Salibo. The Resolution. 2010 hearing on the Return. Romeo L. Proceedings before the Court of Appeals On appeal by the Warden.m. 26 The Return was finally heard on October 1. 2010. therefore.m. the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. Malang. 2010 at 9:00 a. A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. and Amended Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. The Warden. Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29. 2010. the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the country" from November 7. the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. A Philippine passport bearing Salibo’s picture showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo.On September 27. or amended information. 2009. information. however. was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court. 2010. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre. was canceled. the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s Decision. not Datukan Malang Salibo. failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. However. 29 30 The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his release from detention. 27 28 The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged" under any resolution. 2010. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August 27. Amended Information. 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate.

Malang charged with 57 counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court. the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law. Branch 221. he. 44 45 46 Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. not a Petition for Habeas Corpus. whether petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution dated July 6. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return. the trial court’s Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals. Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. I Contrary to petitioner Salibo’s claim. Branch 153. A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted. respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal before this court. the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]" According to the Court of Appeals. 49 The issues for our resolution are: First. the Court of Appeals found that Salibo’s arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. Thus. 47 48 As for respondent Warden. We grant the Petition. respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals. Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. contrary to the Court of Appeals’ finding. Pasig City on petitioner Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals. 42 43 Proceedings before this court On July 28. he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. after which petitioner Salibo filed a Reply. petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction). Branch 153. was not duly charged in court. Respondent Warden filed a Comment. Therefore. petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest. Salibo’s proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. and Second. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges. Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest. 39 40 41 Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration.Contrary to the trial court’s finding. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and. 50 51 52 53 54 . An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its members. 2011. Datukan Malang Salibo. his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus. Quezon City. therefore. 2011.

The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus. 67 68 69 70 This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court. 64 65 66 In Medina v. . "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court . Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus. whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[. the Court of First Instance granted Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be released from detention. the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body. . . the superior court only resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty. Saulo [(Saulo)]. By virtue of the designation. arguing that the Court of First Instance heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely delegation[." This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ." The Court of Appeals. Applying Saulo and Medina. the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. Gen. should be regarded as operative. petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. 61 Saulo appealed before this court.]" Therefore. Since the Court of 74 . "acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the case[. the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus. was the decision of the trial court. Pasig City. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus. not of the Court of Appeals.The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Cruz. Alfredo B. . making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court." It ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus. denied the Motion. Branch 153. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.]" The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower court. After trial on the merits. 71 72 73 In this case.]" Consequently. filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court." citing Saulo as legal basis. and only [this court’s decision] . Brig. Quezon City. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable. making it returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The Court of First Instance of Rizal. in deciding Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus. however. [o]n behalf of ." 62 63 This court rejected Saulo’s argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent than real.]" Consequently. 58 59 60 After hearing the Commanding General on the Return. we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to determine the merits" of petitioner Salibo’s Petition. . not of the superior court. the Court of First Instance denied Saulo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus. therefore. Gen. counsel for Medina. Amelito Mutuc. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals. Yan. once the superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court. the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court. . Atty. However. "this Court should have the final say regarding the issues raised in the petition. etc. the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals. 55 56 57 In Saulo v. This court made the Writ returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Citing Harris v. Padua. The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers.Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts. habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III." 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. Gumabon. and Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus. 90 91 Based on the Hernandez ruling. They prayed for their release from incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply to them. Agapito. Nelson. Agapito. 92 This court ruled that Gumabon. and Palmares were serving their sentences. Epifanio Padua (Padua). Mangyans who refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned. and Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. 25. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected. Bagolbagol." The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature. Provincial Board of Mindoro. the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of llegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. Under the Resolution. consistent with the law’s "zealous regard for personal liberty. Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Agapito. respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals. Padua." "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.]" the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Padua. Mario Gumabon (Gumabon). Section 1 of the Constitution. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and compelled them to permanently settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. v. et al. or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. ruling that the complex crime of rebellion with murder does not exist. Seriesof 1917." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary. Bagolbagol. Hernandez in 1956. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right. and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. They commenced serving their respective sentences of reclusion perpetua. 88 89 While Gumabon. Section 1 of the Rules of Court. 96 97 . Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito). . 75 II Called the "great writ of liberty[. the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued Resolution No." Under Rule 102. In other words. and Palmares properly availed of a petition for habeas corpus. this court promulgated People v. courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes. Bagolbagol. . 84 85 86 87 In Gumabon. Blas Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol). this court said: 93 94 [T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode. 95 In Rubi v. .

rebellion.] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens[. 111 112 113 Rule 102.—If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. to make a Return of the Writ. however. failed to make a Return. 98 99 A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their liberty." Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process. . judgment. of their privilege of domicile.]" The women had the right "to change their domicile from Manila to another locality.An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi and all the other Mangyans being held in the reservation. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. Mayor Justo Lukban. The restraint then has become legal. 4. the writ shall not be allowed. it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. As to the legality of his acts. "[T]o exterminate vice. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban. it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.]" Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion. or make the order. or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed." 104 105 106 107 The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ. The women were expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without their consent. specifically. Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance. 103 This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of the Writ. and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[. or order. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. 108 109 110 III It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines. or when the public safety requires it. among others. "despite their being in a sense lepers of society[. The female sex workers previously employed by these brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ. Lukban. render the judgment. the writ itself may not be suspended. arguing that he did not have custody of the women. Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 100 101 102 On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women. It said that the women. Since the application questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans. On the other hand.

elements of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police arrested Atty. 117 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines. this court ordered the temporary release of Attys. Arellano. Attys. Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano. and Risonar. Laurente C. and General Tan-Gatue contended that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Risonar).L. and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Hon. Arellano. This court set the hearing on the Return on May 23. Ilagan. the Free Legal Assistance Group. and Risonar in court: 127 . Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion. 116 Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan (Atty. the Free Legal Assistance Group. and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio TanGatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ. Arellano. Ilagan. Ilagan. 124 125 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Ilagan. 123 Instead of releasing Attys. and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for being moot and academic. Minister Enrile. Ramos (General Ramos). Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Arellano. Risonar toleave. Antonio Arellano (Atty. however. Arellano. Reyes. Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). the military informed the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Ponce Enrile. Ilagan. and Risonar were deprived of their right to due process. and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood. They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Minister Enrile. 126 This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus. 118 This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile." 121 122 After hearing respondents on their Return. no preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of the Information. and Risonar. Arellano. Ilagan’s arrest. To verify his arrest papers. 2045-A. 119 120 In their Return. Regional Unified Commander.In Ilagan v. Ilagan. no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based on an unsigned Mission Order. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National Defense. and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood. LikeAtty. On the day of Atty. General Ramos. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Ilagan. retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B. allegedly "played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. 1985. Arellano. the Information was void. General Ramos. where he was detained. Atty. The lawyers. Ilagan’s visitors was Atty. according to respondents. and Risonar on the recognizance of their counsels. 114 115 Among Atty. According to them. Arellano. the military did not allow Atty. Arellano. 15 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Consequently. Arellano). ruling that it became moot and academic with the filing of the Information against Attys. and Risonar. Atty. however. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan. He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria.

(Emphasis in the original) In such cases. or if such person is charged before any court. 132 133 134 At any time before a plea is entered. Atty. and Narciso B. (Citations omitted) 128 This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. in all the petitions here considered. the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion. Ocaya. . the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117. rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and academic. (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Ramos. Nazareno were all arrested without a warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army. instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus. Now that the detained attorneys’ incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. Amelia Roque. Ramon Casiple.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense. (d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so. Domingo Anonuevo. persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. according to this court. however. The rule is. The filing of the Informations. 3. Informations against them were filed before this court. (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest. Rolando Dural. 129 130 During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings. Wilfredo Buenaobra. (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. Deogracias Espiritu.As contended by respondents. the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. Grounds. (e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order. thus: 131 It is to be noted that. The Writ had served its purpose.Renato Villanueva. Roberto Umil. Vicky A. (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Section 3 of the Rules of Court: 135 SEC. a capital offense. that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpusis to inquire into the legality of one’s detention.

" "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be considered. arrest a person: (a) When.(h) That it contains averments which. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. therefore. in his presence." If after amendment. Branch 221. the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the information. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. He was illegally deprived of his liberty. the trial court shall quash the complaint or information. Ilagan and Umil do not apply to this case. Rule 113. 139 140 141 IV However. and (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged. without a warrant. . 142 The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court. Jr. 5. correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. or is attempting to commit an offense..charged and accused Butukan S. et al. or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information. when lawful. the trial court shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. the person to be arrested has committed. not Datukan Malang Salibo." If the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an offense. Datu Andal Ampatuan. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. Arrest without warrant. or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent." 136 137 138 "If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment. of57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending." If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash. Malang. Furthermore. the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law. the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information]. In cases falling under paragraphs(a) and (b) above. if true. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. is actually committing. would constitute a legal excuse or justification. and. Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made: SEC.—A peace officer or a private person may. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. In filing a motion to quash. petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant.

Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. of his right to due process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus: The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions of Rule 112. Again. sec. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Then and there. (Emphasis in the original." 148 149 151 150 . 7 and Rule 113. this is erroneous premise. the arrest was not a citizen’s arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto violating the law. Risonar in the "disturbing" case of Ilagan. Risonar. citation omitted) 143 144 145 146 147 Petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. In fact. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case. this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. the Rule now requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed. Atty. and clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation all bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo. had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25. the rules would be rendered nugatory. Clearly. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. 5 which authorizes arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. Otherwise. There is evidence. Thus. A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. then. for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued. the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Quite obviously. that the person detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Like petitioner Salibo. therefore. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant. Ilagan and Arellano. his identification card from the Office on Muslim Affairs. the arrestor must have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule). an information could not just be filed against the petitioners without due process and preliminary investigation. his Tax Identification Number card. sec. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law. Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary investigation deprived Atty. however. Similarly. he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash. Malang.It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. The police officers. Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one’s whim and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself. Malang but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo. In his dissenting opinion in Ilagan. Sec. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. together with Attys. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station." This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. 1985. in the act of committing the offense. viz. Atty.

" Moreover. Until then. is probably the most complex case pending in our courts. we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence. the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. two (2) of which have become state witnesses. Malang. 1âwphi1 A Certification from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7. To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Jr. we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. As of November 23. Malang. A Certification from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7. The Court of Appeals Decision dated April 19. we will rule in favor of the citizen. Datu Andal Ampatuan. 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20. 157 WHEREFORE. 2009. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted. 152 153 V People of the Philippines v. However. it must pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in our Rules. 111 of the accused have been arraigned. is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Malang Salibo from detention. 154 155 156 In ordering petitioner Salibo’s release. 2009. Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building.None of these government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Taguig.. and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved. there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23. et al. 2014. 2009 and that he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20. Quezon City Jail Annex.Camp Bagong Diwa. between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of law and the government that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its] command" to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so. 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden. Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo. SO ORDERED. . The case involves 57 victims and 197 accused. 2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S. The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby NOTED.