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The effects of interpersonal trust on joint eIDM innovations
Date Author(s) 8 June 2010 Tijs van den Broek Noor Huijboom Prof. Victor Bekkers (Review) Final report Alliantie Vitaal Bestuur
Version Assignor Report number Number of pages Number of appendices
35291 64 (incl. appendices)
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© 2010 TNO
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1 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 5 5.1 5.2 5.3 6 6.1 6.2 6.3 7 8 8.1 8.2 8.3 9 9.1 9.2 9.3
Introduction.................................................................................................................... 4 Motivation........................................................................................................................ 4 Research question ............................................................................................................ 5 Methodology.................................................................................................................... 6 Theory: trust in joint innovations .............................................................................. 10 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 10 Definition of trust........................................................................................................... 10 Concepts of trust ............................................................................................................ 11 Grounds for trust............................................................................................................ 12 Stages of trust ................................................................................................................ 13 Evaluation of trust in joint innovations.......................................................................... 14 Hypotheses..................................................................................................................... 16 Belgium: Belpic ............................................................................................................ 19 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 19 Technical solution: Belpic ............................................................................................. 21 The role of trust in the Belpic innovation ...................................................................... 22 Austria: Bürgerkarte................................................................................................... 26 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 26 Technical solution: Bürgerkarte..................................................................................... 28 The role of trust in the Bürgerkarte innovation.............................................................. 30 Finland: VETUMA ...................................................................................................... 34 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 34 Technical solution: VETUMA....................................................................................... 37 The role of trust in the VETUMA innovation................................................................ 38 Netherlands: DIGID .................................................................................................... 43 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 43 Technical solution: DigiD.............................................................................................. 44 The role of trust in the DigiD innovation....................................................................... 46 Cross-case analysis....................................................................................................... 51 Conclusions................................................................................................................... 54 Factors on which trust is grounded ................................................................................ 54 Factors that change the level of trust over time ............................................................. 56 The influence of trust on joint innovation process......................................................... 57 Policy implications ....................................................................................................... 60 General implications ...................................................................................................... 60 Implications for policy instruments ............................................................................... 60 Future research............................................................................................................... 62
Literature overview ...................................................................................................................... 63
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Motivation Internet is a vital instrument for the interaction between individuals and organisations. This interaction between individuals and government agencies can include the exchange of sensitive data. Therefore a digital identity infrastructure consisting of one or more electronic Identification Management systems is essential. Users should be aware of the government agency they are communicating with and government agencies, in turn, should be certain about the actual identity of the citizens they are communicating with. The Digital Identity (DigiD) is a first and essential step in the Dutch Public Sector for such a digital identification infrastructure. The present research is part of a broader research programme on digital identity infrastructure. It consists of three parts: • The role of trust in the realisation of national public eIDM systems by governmental networks • The role of government in the roll-out and take-up of electronic identities and eIDM systems? • Factors that influence trust of users (i.e. citizens) in eIDM systems within the public sector This research focuses on the first part: the role of interpersonal trust in the realisation of joint electronic IDentity Management (eIDM) systems. Government agencies increasingly cooperate to improve efficiency and the quality of their services. Therefore, processes and information systems usually cross organisational boundaries. Due to this trend, ICT innovations are increasingly undertaken by a network of government agencies, instead of just a single organisation. (Powel et al, 1996; Fountain and Atkinson, 1998). These joint ICT innovations are more complex and risky. Important hampering factors are: conflicting interests, complexity, low perceived importance of ICT, lack of interoperability of standards and limited interaction between individual actors. Consequently the adoption of joint ICT innovations lags far behind compared to the private sector (Huijboom and Van Staden, 2005). One of the areas in which more cross-agency cooperation is needed, is the electronic identification for the provision of government services. Several studies have demonstrated that the progress being made in this area remains behind expectations1. In addition these studies show that eIDM policy and practice in Member States is too fragmented with several public sectors having their own policy and eIDM solutions. According to European policy, the (eIDM) systems of European countries have to be integrated in one single system for all kind of electronic public services2. The past few years Member States increasingly try to integrate various systems into one eIDM solution for all government services. Therefore, multiple government agencies develop
Millard J (editor) (2007) “European eGovernment 2005-2007: taking stock of good practice and progress towards implementation of the i2010 eGovernment Action Plan”, for the European Commission, published in conjunction with the European Ministerial eGovernment Conference, Lisbon, 19-21 September 2007
IDABC, (2007), European eGovernment Services, eID Interoperability for PEGS, Brussels.
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and implement such a single system jointly. Yet, like joint ICT innovations in general, European research shows that the joint development of eIDM systems is often difficult3. This research does not aim to give a broad overview of innovation studies and sociology literature on trust. In contrast, it focuses specifically on the cross-road of innovation and interpersonal trust. Recent literature shows that interpersonal trust between individual actors in the process of a joint ICT innovation (e.g. Considine et al 2009, Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007, Nooteboom, Nooteboom, 20064) has an important influence on the success of such projects5. In addition, many researchers studied system failures of innovation, in which trust plays a role as well. For example, Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) describe interaction failures, such as strong and weak network failures. However, according to Edelenbos & Klijn (2007) it remains currently unclear how interpersonal trust precisely plays a role in the joint innovation process remains unclear. How does trust manifests itself on interpersonal level in the innovation processes (unlike the macro level in the systemic failure literature)? We focus our research on interpersonal trust in the innovation process of eIDM projects, as these projects are specifically interesting. First, developing and implementing an eIDM system is typically a cross-agency and complex endeavour. Therefore, it needs multiple stakeholders from different government agencies to build trust and cooperate. Second, several European nations develop similar eIDM systems, which isolates the system itself as an independent variable. This allows cross-country (and cross-culture) comparison. The consequence of this choice is that the conclusions and implications mostly hold for eIDM projects and to a lesser degree for other ICT projects. TNO and the Alliantie Vitaal Bestuur have addressed this research question and jointly invested in a research project to gain more insight into the influence of social factors – in particular trust – on joint-up innovation projects in the public sector. This report is the result of this research project and gives a detailed overview of the findings.
Research question The main research question of this study is: What is the role of trust in the realisation of public eIDM systems – in particular realised by governmental networks and chains? This research question has been operationalised in the following sub questions: 1 What can be understood by the notion of trust? 2 How does trust become manifest in tangible innovation projects? 3 How does trust influence the joint innovation process? 4 What can be learned from the manifestation of trust in joint innovation projects? The aim of this study is scientific in nature. This research aims to shed light on how trust is affected and how it effects the innovation process, e.g. the mechanisms,
Millard, Huijboom N. and Leitner C., (2007) European eGovernment 2005-2007:Taking stock of good practice and progress towards implementation of the i2010 eGovernment Action Plan, Brussels.
Bart Nooteboom, Essay for the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, as background document for the Innovation Lecture 2006, September 2006
Huijboom, N.M., (2006) The Domestication of ICTs in Government, DEXA eGovernment Conference proceedings, Philadelphia.
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strategies, techniques, requisites, rather than giving a quantitative assessment of the relationships. Therefore, the research methods (literature review and case study research) are qualitative in nature. Despite of the scientific nature of the report, the conclusions of the research will be translated in policy implications. Understanding the role of interpersonal trust in innovation processes give policy makers and other government practitioners insight how to stimulate trust or to deal with in joint eIDM innovations in in the public sector. The next paragraph describes how the research question has been answered.
Methodology Literature review First, existing scientific articles forms the basis of this research. The aim of the literature review (section 2.1) is to study the role and effect of interpersonal trust on the occurrence of joint, technological innovations in the public sector – in particular the development of eIDM systems. The most important academic papers were analyzed on 1) definition and concepts of trust 2) grounds of trust 3) process of trust and 4) trust in joint innovation. The yielding from this literature review will structure the analysis of each case. Case study research A multiple case study design is an excellent method to get an in-depth and qualitative insight in the complicated process of joint innovations. 51 semi-open interviews were held within a period of 3 months: 17 in Finland, 13 in Austria, 11 in Belgium and 10 in the Netherlands. Most interviews were held face-to-face at the interviewee’s office, but occasionally an interview was held by phone. The length of the interviews varied from 50 to 150 minutes. The decision was made to transcribe instead of record the interviews due to the sensitive nature of the data. The cases were selected based upon four selection criteria: • Maturity of the eIDM system • Type of application domain • Level of trust • Type of democratic model The next paragraphs will describe how these criteria were applied and which cases are selected in the end. Maturity of the eIDM system The maturity of the eIDM systems is essential to study all phases of the joint innovation process (initiation, development, implementation and diffusion). Cases qualify for this research when they are at least in the implementation phase. Table 1 shows that 17 European eIDM systems are mature enough to be selected.
Table 1: Phases of eIDM systems for each Member State 2009
Diffusion / consolidation
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Cyprus Czech Republic Greece Luxembourg
Germany Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Portugal Slovakia UK
France Ireland Malta Slovenia Netherlands
Austria Belgium Denmark Estonia Finland Italy Spain Sweden
Type of application domain eIDM systems are used for a wide range of applications, such as social security, tax, migration, transportation and health. The contractor prefers this research to focus on the social security domain6. Seven of the countries with mature enough eIDM systems apply their systems in the social security domain (see Table 2).
Table 2 Countries that implemented of diffused an eIDM system in the social security sector (marked grey) (Source: eID nteroperability for PEGS, 2007)
Most significant system Citizen Card
Application type Social security Tax Healthcare Municipalities Social security Tax Municipalities Health Education Tax Labour Social security Tax Education Social Security Employment Patent registration Healthcare
Most significant system Carta d’identitá elettronica
Application type Tax Municipalities Police Social security Tax Transport Municipalities Social security Tax Municipalities Healthcare Tax Company registration Tax Municipalities Tax Healthcare Registration of companies
SIS and Belpic
FINEID and TUPAS
Vitale/healthcare professional cards
Reach (Public service broker)
In sum, the countries that qualify for the maturity and application type are: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Malta and the Netherlands.
See minutes Alliantie vitaal Bestuur meeting on 16 juli 2009.
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Level of trust As we study the role of trust, the level of trust is an important criterion for sampling the cases. Many researchers (e.g. Fukuyama, 1996, Nooteboom, 2002, Koppejan and Klijn, 2004) argue that the role of trust in inter-organizational networks depends on the country’s specific social-cultural context. For example, spontaneous cooperation between individual actors happens more often in countries with a high level of trust than in countries with a low level of trust (Fukuyama, 1996). Therefore, the variable “high trust versus low trust countries” is chosen to study how the role of trust vary in different social-cultural contexts. The World Values survey measures the level of trust in countries7. More specifically, this survey asks: “would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” So, it measures to what degree citizens trust each other. Table 3 shows a ranking of the average trust level in the countries that have a mature eIDM system in the social security domain. The data have been collected between 1981 and 2007. It clearly shows that Malta and Estonia have the lowest levels of trust and the Netherlands and Finland have the highest level of trust.
Table 3 Average trust of citizens between 1981 and 2007 (source: The World Values Survey 2009)
Malta Most people can be trusted Most people cannot be trusted 18.8 % 81.2 %
Estonia 24.0 % 76.0 %
Belgium 31.5 % 68.5 %
Austria 32.8 % 67.2 %
Ireland 41.6 % 58.4 %
Netherlands Finland 52.0 % 48.0 % 55.5 % 44.5 %
Type of democratic model The type of democratic model is an important factor for the role of trust as well. Research (Lijphart, 1999) demonstrates that trust is more important in the decisionmaking of consensual democracies (i.e. “poldermodel”) than in the decision-making of Westminister democracy (i.e. two party system). For example, in a consensual democracy trust is necessary to get a democratic majority, as coalitions have to be built. The number of political parties that effectively participate in a country’s political system is a good measure to distinguish the type of democratic model. Lijphart (1999) measured the number of effective parties8. Table 4 ranks 6 candidate countries on the effective number of parties and the number of elections between 1945 and 1996. It seems that a slightly different picture than the level of trust emerges.
Table 4 Effective number of parties and the number of elections between 1945-1996 (source: Lijphart, 1999)
Country Finland Netherlands Belgium Ireland Austria Malta
Mean 5.03 4.65 4.32 2.84 2.48 1.99
Lowest 4.54 3.49 3.45 2.38 2.09 1.97
Highest 5.58 6.42 6.51 3.63 3.73 2.00
Number of elections 15 15 17 15 16 6
www.worldvaluessurvey.org Estonia was not studied by Lijphart (1999).
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Picture 1 shows the relative position of the 6 candidate countries, when plotting the level of trust against the type of democratic model. Two types of sampling are used: extreme cases and similar cases. Extreme cases (e.g. Belgium, Austria, The Netherlands / Finland and Ireland) provide insight in how trust holds in different social-cultural and political context. Similar cases (Finland – The Netherlands and Malta-Austria) show how the role of trust can differ in similar social-cultural and political context.
Figure 1 Confrontation of type of democratic model and level of trust
The contractor prefers to compare the Dutch case to enable this research to yield recommendations for Dutch policy makers. Therefore, it has been decided to take the Netherlands and Finland as similar cases and the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria as extreme cases. Initially the research team chose Belgium, Austria and Ireland as extreme cases (with this choice all quadrants of the figure would be covered). However, during the planning of the interviews of the Irish case it appeared that almost none of the Irish government practitioners was willing to give an interview and thus it became unfeasible to carry out the Irish case. One of the practitioners explained: “Success has many parents and failure is an orphan” Yet, current selection (Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland) still covers both low trust and high trust countries as well as consensual and West Minister democracies. Consequently we expect that different manifestations of trust can be found in the selected cases. In conclusion, the following cases were selected: • The Netherlands (high level of trust, consensual democracy) • Finland (high level of trust, consensual democracy) • Belgium (low level of trust, consensual democracy) • Austria (low level of trust, Westminster democracy)
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Theory: trust in joint innovations
Introduction Many academics have examined the concept of trust, in particular in the scientific areas of sociology and management (e.g. Nooteboom, 2002, Lane & Bachman, 1998, Rousseau et al, 1998). The concept has been approached from various perspectives; e.g. interpersonal trust, trust in institution and trust in objects. In addition, several mechanisms related to trust have been examined; e.g. on the one hand the effect of human behaviour, object characteristics and institutional arrangements on the presence of trust and on the other hand the influence of trust on behaviour, the attributes of objects and institutional features. The broadness and versatile character of the term trust however has resulted in theoretical contradictions on the concept, with partly overlapping and partly conflicting definitions, levels, types, sources, roles and limitations of trust (Nooteboom, 2002). Hence, for contemporary research on trust it is important to have a clear focus on specific types and manifestations of trust. The aim of this literature review is to study the role and effect of interpersonal trust on the occurrence of joint, technological innovations in the public sector – in particular the development of eIDM systems. First, it will describe the definition of interpersonal trust and the different concepts of trust in literature. Next, the foundations and stages of interpersonal trust are discussed: how is trust between persons developed over time and how does the presence of trust change? Last, literature about the role of interpersonal trust in innovation processes is briefly discussed. This chapter ends up with the theoretical hypotheses, which form the analytical framework for the case studies.
Definition of trust There are many descriptions of trust. For some, trust is an expectation (see Lane & Bachmann, 1998; Rousseau et al, 1998); for others it is the cement of society (Fukuyama, 1995) or a container concept that can hardly be separated from the shared norm or rules (see for instance Putnam 1995). To be useful in empirical research however, the concept must be clearly and rather narrowly defined. When considering Edelenbos & Klijn (2007) on trust, two important factors predict the need for interpersonal trust: • Vulnerability (Based on Deaking & Michie, 1997). “When an actor trusts another actor, he or she is willing or assume an open and vulnerable position. He or she expects the other to refrain from opportunistic behaviour even if there is the possibility to show this behaviour”. In this sense, the actor trusts that his or her partner will take his or her interests into account (Nooteboom, 2002, Rousseau et al, 1998). • Risks (based on Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Gambetta, 1988a, 1988b; Lane & Bachmann, 1998). “Trust plays an important role in ambiguous, unpredictable and risky situations. In risky situations, trust is a precondition for undertaking any action. A conscious choice is made to take a risk because of the belief that the other party can be trusted”. In this risky and vulnerable situation trust is based on mutual expectations (based on Lane & Bachmann, 1998; Zucker, 1986). “Trust is reciprocal in nature: one expects the
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other not to behave in an opportunistic way. So, the concept of trust presumes a stable positive expectation (or prediction) of the intentions and motives of other actors. Trust reduces unpredictability, complexity, and ambiguity in interactions because one can anticipate (some of) the behaviour of the other actor”. 2.3 Concepts of trust This paragraph gives an overview of the different concepts of trust, which are all taken into account in the grounds, stages and evaluation of interpersonal trust in the innovation process. Although most concepts of interpersonal trust share the three common elements as set out in the previous section, theorists have conflicting views on the social grounds on which trust may be based. These theoretic divergences are predominantly caused by a different approach of the human nature (e.g. the extent to which mankind is seen as being rational). Some theorists (mainly economists) perceive trust as a rational assessment by an individual of the chance that the other will act in an opportunistic way (e.g. Williamson, 1993, Preisendörfer 1995). In this perspective, human action (and also trust in certain behaviour of the other) is based upon a rational calculation of the costs and benefits and chance of opportunistic behaviour. According to these theorists, a person is only willing to trust the other in situations in which he or she expects that – based upon a cost-benefit calculation – the other will not act in an opportunistic way. This instrumental approach of trust however has received much critique. Most critics contend that rational actor theories neglect the unpredictability of future behaviour and incompleteness of information, which hamper a clear-cut assessment of costs and benefits. Whereas Axelrod (1984) and Coleman (1990) for instance assume that actors share expectations about the future, more sociological accounts would stress that the unfolding of the future is in itself uncertain. Their uncertainty perspective of trust is built incrementally and the relationship may change in an unpredictable direction neither gain nor loss can ever be calculated with certainty. In other words, in every relationship there are uncertainties which require a basis of trust for certain human interaction and action. As Bradach and Eccles put it (1989: 108): “the future is rarely preordained; magnitude and timing of the trustee’s response is influenced by social norms which complicate calculation: and, most importantly, the first step in ‘a game without history’, taken in the face of incomplete information about the trustee, requires a one-sided precommitment from the trustor based on mere beliefs/expectations about the trustee.” There however is a third theoretical stream of scientists who contend that the grounds for trust will vary with the social context of trust and/or that the nature of trust will vary with the stage of a relationship reached. These theorists use a multidimensional concept of trust which is based upon a combination of theoretical viewpoints. Common combinations are cognitive trust with value- or emotion-based trust (e.g. Barber 1983, Lewis and Weigert, 1985) and a combination of calculative with either cognitive or morally based trust (Dasgupta, 1988, Chiles and McMackin, 1996). In both these two theoretical approaches of trust, common cognitions are considered to have a determining influence on the presence or non-presence of trust. Cognitions, defined as “the rules that constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott, 1995:40), are embodied in the expectations people have on the social order in general and on specific interaction with others. Cognitions form a basis for interpersonal trust or distrust in the sense that individuals base their expectations of the
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other’s behaviour on shared social norms. Zucker (1986) for instance argues that expectations are based upon social rules which provide a general framework for behaviour. In addition, Zucker (1986) contends that the stronger the common social framework of rules and routines (e.g. due to social homogeneity), the more likely it is that trust will develop spontaneously. This study will not specifically focus on one perspective on the concept of trust. However, these perspectives are important in relation to the grounds of trust. For example, the process of routinisation, which will be further explained in the next paragraph, is a prime example of Williamson’s (among others) rational perspective of trust. The third “dynamic” perspective on trust is for example important to study how presence of trust change over time, in other words the stages of trust. 2.4 Grounds for trust Now the definition, need and concepts of trust are clear, how can one know that the other will meet his or her expectation? Where does somebody ground his or her positive expectations upon? This paragraph describes these foundations. Personal characteristics Personal characteristics, such as integrity, benevolence and capabilities, have an important influence on interpersonal trust (e.g. Schoorman et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). The function of a person (including the organisation power) within the hierarchy of an organisation can increase the predictability of a person. For example, one will know that he or she is able (in terms of power) to live up his or her promises. Within personal characteristics, this research will specifically focus on personal capabilities, such as expertise. Norms and values Trust can be based upon the sharing of norms and values between individuals. The belief of reliability is not necessarily related to a long, intensive, emotional contact and the well-knowing of each other, but to generally shared norms and values (e.g. Sabel, 1993, Fox, 1974, Zucker, 1986). For instance, scientist X can decide to share his draft studies with scientist Y – who X does not know too well -, because X beliefs that Y will not publish his text – thus that Y will act in an honest way - as they both belong to the same academic community in which plagiarism is highly condemned (and thus the reputation of Y is at stake). Identification A more psychological basis for trust is the sharing of experiences. Nooteboom (2002:81) explains this as follows: “One will more easily help someone when one can identify with his need. One can more easily forgive someone’s breach of trust or reliance when one can identify with the lack of competence or the motive that caused it.” Research (Frissen and Huijboom, 2009) for instance shows that the level of trust between patients who suffer from the same disease is higher than the level of trust between random chosen individuals. The fact that people share the same experiences, concerns and struggles appears to have a bounding effect and increases interpersonal trust. Routinisation
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Several scientists argue that the higher the routinisation in actions of a person the more predictable the actions of that person and the more trust people have in the reliability of that person. An example may be the reputation of an individual; if the person always acts in a specific way, people will trust that he/she will act in the same way in the future. Routinisation is a rational process, in which positive experiences build up towards a positive reputation (Nooteboom, 1999). In contrast to transferability of trust, routinisation takes place without a third person interfering in the interpersonal relationship. Strong ties Several scientists argue that there are types of relationships in which there is in the vast majority of cases a strong belief of mutual trust between persons (e.g. Lane and Bachmann, 1998). Examples are ties within families, inner-circle of friends, but also within sectarian groups. These relationships mostly consist of a long, intensive, emotional and empathic contact and well-knowing of the other. Yet, also in these relationships there are cases of distrust deriving from a feeling of the other being unfaithful or dishonest. Trust is not a given element of a strong tie, but can often been found in strong relationships (e.g. Lane and Bachmann, 1998). Opinions of trusted persons – transferability of trust Theorists have also pointed to the transferability of trust (see e.g. Ferrin et al, 2006): person X knows and highly trusts person Z, who knows and trusts person Y; then person X may trust person Y because person Z trusts person Y. A person’s reputation is an example of transferability of trust (Shapiro, 1987; Mayer et al., 1995).
Stages of trust Trust built up over time. Sometimes it can take ages between two persons two gain trust in each other. Therefore the large majority of theorists argue that levels of interpersonal trust and trustworthiness are not static but dynamic; e.g. trust and trustworthiness can emerge and disappear (Zucker, 1986, Lindenberg, 2000, Nooteboom, 2002). In literature, in particular attention is paid to the construction of trust. Schapiro (1987:625) argues that “Typically (…) social exchange relations evolve in a slow process, starting with minor transactions in which little trust is required because little risk is involved and in which partners can prove their trustworthiness, enabling them to expand their relation and engage in major transactions.” This argument has been endorsed by others (e.g. van de Ven, 1992). McAllister (1995) proposes two stages of trust development: cognition-based trust followed by affect-based trust. These stages can easily be linked with the grounds for trust. Cognition-based trust is for example grounded in personal capabilities (such as expertise) and Routinisation. On the other hand, affect-based trust is based on identification and empathy. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) proposed three stages of calculus-based, knowledge based and identificationbased trust. Nooteboom (2002:90) distinguishes between the following three stages of the evolution of trust: 1 Stage of control in the absence of trust. In this stage trust is absent which forces individuals to assess the competences and opportunism of the other. One way in which people try to limit the risks is by taking small steps. 2 Stage of assessing trustworthiness and developing tolerance levels of trust. In this stage, the involved persons mutually obtain more knowledge and experience which
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forms the basis for setting tolerance levels of trust. The rational grounds for trust, mentioned in the previous paragraph, are most dominant. Stage of widening tolerance levels, In this stage the tolerance levels of trust are widened upon the basis of identification and empathy.
Interpersonal trust can not only increase over time but also decrease. A decline of trust between to individuals can emerge in case one of the involved parties does not live up to the expectations of the other. However, Zucker (1986:59) argues that those disappointments in the other do not necessarily break down trust. He states that: “A violation of expectations produces a sense of disruption of trust, or profound confusion, but not of distrust. Distrust only emerges when the suspicion arises that the disruption of expectations in one exchange is likely to generalize to other transactions. To distrust, then, implies an attribution of intentionality that continuous throughout all interactions or exchanges, at least of a particular type.” The joint solution of conflict can enhance and deepen trust, in several ways. On the one hand it may result in a learning process, which confirms the value of the relation and thereby increases mutual commitment. Moreover, the fact that the relation survived the test may increase interpersonal trust. On the other hand, in particular between people who have a weak tie a violation of expectations can result in mutual recrimination and suspicion. 2.6 Evaluation of trust in joint innovations Although the research area of trust and networked innovation is relatively immature, several theorists have argued that the presence or non-presence of trust can have a determining influence on the occurrence of networked innovation (e.g. Fountain, 2000, Lane and Bachmann, 1998, Van de Ven 1999, Nooteboom, 2006). This importance of trust can be explained by the risky nature of inter-agency cooperation. Nooteboom (2006) and other authors argue that trust is relevant in relation to the following three main risks underlying inter-agency cooperation: • Because of its explorative nature and strong interdependencies, collaborative innovation can imply substantial risks and uncertainties for involved actors (both individuals and organisations). As various partners are involved in the innovation, there can be a lack of mutual understanding, or ‘absorptive capacity’. This might be in particular the case in process innovation, where knowledge and competencies are being developed. Business models are new and a common language still has to be developed. On the one had cognitive distance and heterogeneity is needed in order to innovate (to combine knowledge) and on the other hand cognitive distance can hamper effective collaboration. Nooteboom (2006) speaks in this regard of ‘the optimal cognitive distance’; large enough to yield novelty and at the same time small enough to develop a mutual understanding. In the innovation literature Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) describe similar dilemma for interaction failures, such as the presence of too strong ties (tunnel vision) and presence of too weak ties (high transaction costs or inadequate knowledge transfer. Whether the relationship between trust and creativity / innovativeness is direct or mediated by other variables is not clear. For example, Sztompka (1999) argues that trust is needed for cooperation and cooperation in its turn is needed for creative process. On the other hand, Mamynika et al. (2002) shows that an atmosphere of trust directly affects the creative collaboration in teams. • A second problem of inter-agency cooperation is the risk of ‘spillover’: competitive advantage from commercially valuable new knowledge or competence may ‘leak’ to competitors. Although this problem seems not to exist in the public sector, there
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may be other forms of competition between public sector agencies. In cases of conflicting interests public sector agencies may use knowledge in a strategic way, e.g. to strengthen their position in their relation to other public sector agencies. Dependence on partners is mentioned by Nooteboom as the third risk in networked innovation. When separate organisations jointly innovate, they depend on the efforts and investments of the other during the innovation process, but may also be dependend on them when the innovation is implemented (e.g. if they jointly use the new product or share processes). The dependence on partners limits organisations to develop their own strategies, take their own decisions and act in their own interest.
In network collaboration there are several ways to manage relational risks. Nooteboom describes three strategies to control risks: • Control. The first type is opportunity control. In this situation the undertaking of or refraining from actions is heavily influenced by legal frameworks (e.g. contracts) or hierarchy (e.g. within or between organisations). Escalation of a problem up the hierarchy of two organisations is a prime example of hierarchical control. The second type is motivation control, in which case actions are based upon incentives (e.g. rewards). • Trust. Trustworthiness may be a result of an established ethic or practice of behaviour, based on widely shared social norms and values. Within the relationship trust may be based upon values developed during the relationship or empathy. Empathy may lead to identification, e.g. the sense of shared experiences among people who are in a comparable situation (e.g. patients). Trust and trustworthiness may also arise from routinisation, where trust and trustworthiness is based upon earlier positive experiences. • Third parties. For the control of conflict third parties may also play a role. A third party and thus transferability of trust may serve as an independent intermediary which manages conflicting interests, builds consensus and has a brokerage role in case of conflicts between parties. Nooteboom (2002) argues that trust may be needed to cooperatively innovate in a network of organisations. He states: “to deal with risks we can try to impose control, but control is never perfect, especially in innovation. In innovation there is too much uncertainty to manage risks completely by contract, monitoring and control. Innovation requires creativity, which requires freedom of action. And where control ends we need trust.” However, he also contends that trust should not be unconditional as a solid ground for trust may be missing (e.g. due to intense competition). Trust plays different roles during the different phases of the joint innovation process: initiation, development, implementation and diffusion. • In the initiation phase of a joint innovation, the sharing of (multi-disciplinary, intersectoral and/or inter-level) expertise is an important driver for the creation of new ideas. If the personal or company interests - such as intellectual property - are not contractually arranged; the risks high and the power balances unequal, then a high level of trust is needed to share expertise within the network. • Also in the implementation phase of joint innovations trust may be a prerequisite. Often the interests of involved parties are divergent or even conflicting and the risks for involved parties (poor return on investments or reputation damage) may be high. Trust then is a precondition for the ability of bridging deviating interests and the willingness of jointly taking risks.
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In the diffusion phase trust as a determinant may be less important as the risks may be lower because the impact and the outcome of the innovation may be less uncertain.
2.7.1 Overall trust model As described in the introduction of this report, the present research project is part of a broader research programme on eIDM systems. In order to create as much synergy between the separate research projects as possible, we have tried align the conceptual frameworks of the research projects. Hence, we have used the trust model used by the other projects as a basis and tried to fit the variables as found in literature into this model. During this exercise we however found that the model used by the other project did not fully cover the variables and trust mechanisms as described in innovation literature. The theoretical sections 2.1-2.6 show three perspecitves of interpersonal trust in joint innovation: • Factors on which trust is grounded • Factors which change the level of trust over time • The influence of trust in the joint innovation process.
Table 5 Overview of hypotheses
Grounds Factors on which trust is grounded H1 Personal characteristics H2 Norms and values H3 Identification and empathy H4 Routinisation H5 Transferibility of trust
Stages Factors changing the level of trust over time H6 Control in absence of trust H7 Unmet expectations H8 Joint solution of conflict
Evaluation Influence of trust on innovation process H9 Hierarchy H10 Legal mechanisms H11 Trusted third party H12 Creativity H13 Motivational control H14 Bridging deviating interests H15 Risks
The following hypotheses (see table 5) can be made for these three perspectives. The intra and inter case analysis in chapters 3-7 will substantiate or nuance the hypotheses. 2.7.2 On what factors is trust grounded?
H1 (PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS): Trust can be based upon personal characteristics, such as integrity, benevolence and capabilities. H2 (NORMS AND VALUES): Trust can be based upon the sharing of norms and values between individuals.
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H3 (IDENTIFICATION AND EMPATHY): The fact that people share the same experiences, concerns and struggles appears to have a bound. H4 (ROUTINISATION): The higher the routinisation (more knowledge and experience) in actions of a person the more predictable the actions of that person and the more trust people have in the reliability of that person. H5 (TRANSFERABILITY OF TRUST): Trust is transferable between individuals.
What factors change the level of trust over time?
H6 (CONTROL IN ABSENCE OF TRUST): When trust is absent, individuals are forced to assess the competences and opportunism of the other. H7 (UNMET EXPECTATIONS): A decline of trust between individuals can emerge in case one of the involved parties does not live up to the expectations of the other, as it decreases the reciprocity of the trust relation. H8 (JOINT SOLUTION OF CONFLICT): The joint solution of conflict can enhance and deepen trust.
How does trust influence the joint innovation process?
H9 (HIERARCHY): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by mechanisms of hierarchy. H10 (LEGAL MECHANISMS): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by legal mechanisms, e.g. contracts. H11 (TRUSTED THIRD PARTY): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by putting a third party / opinion in place. H12 (CREATIVITY): Trust is a necessary requisite for creativity in a team . H13 (MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by motivational control, such as (financial) incentives. H14 (BRIDGING DEVIATING INTERESTS): Trust is a precondition for the ability of bridging deviating interests.
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H15 (RISKS): Trust is a precondition for the willingness of jointly taking risks.
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Introduction This introduction paragraph gives a chronological overview of the eIDM innovation process in Belgium9. Initiation 1999 The e-Signature directive10 of the European Commission inspired Belgian government The National Register Department11 of the Ministry of the Interior commissioned researchers to develop the legal framework and technical specifications of the Belgian electronic identity card (Belpic) 2000 November 2001 March July The Cabinet of Ministers formally decided to develop an electronic identity card. The Ministry of the Interior commissioned the consultancy company CSC to conduct a concept study A plan to develop the Belgian electronic identification card passed the Cabinet of Ministers A public tender for the development of the exploitation structure of the Belpic, development of certificates and production of the card was published. The Steria (formerly Bull N.V.) consortium won the tender.
Development 2002 January 2002 September 2003 February & March The development of the exploitation structure by the Steria consortium started. The infrastructure of the National Register and involved parties had to be modified within six months. Zetes and Belgacom carried out the project to develop the card and certificates which had a timeline of five months. The central government worked on the legal implementation of the Belpic: • The sectoral committee of the National Register12 was established to assess in concrete requests for access to personal information whether the requirements of the legislation concerning population registration and privacy law are met13. Amendments to the National Register laws of 1983 and 1991 were
Mostly based on interviews and desk research (see also Huijboom, N.M. The influence of social capital on joint innovation processes, forthcoming). 10 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/l24118_en.htm 11 http://www.ibz.rrn.fgov.be/index.php?id=141&L=1 12 http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/decisions/national_register/ 13 http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/pdf/50/2226/50K2226007.pdf
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2003 31 March 2003 End
made in order to be able to use the National Register as an authentic source for electronic identity data . The first electronic identity card was presented by two ministers during the “eID Contactdag”. This day was also the start of the Belpic pilot implementation in eleven municipalities. Belpic’s pilot phase was finished. At that time around 55.000 electronic identity cards had been distributed by the pilot municipalities14.
Implementation 2004 March 2004 July 2004 The decision to introduce the Belpic nation wide was made by the Cabinet of Ministers and enacted by Royal Decree15. Establishment of a governmental agency responsible for the management of the electronic identity cards. In addition, Fedict became responsible for the management of the electronic identity card. The federal government organised trainings for the employees of municipalities and provided municipalities with extra human resources for the duration of three years16. Technical support was provided by the Belpic helpdesk, a unit of the National Register.
Diffusion 2004 October 2004 December 2005 February 2005 The electronic identity card was implemented in the first group of municipalities (out of 578 municipalities) The electronic identity card was implemented in the second group of municipalities (out of 578 municipalities) The electronic identity card was implemented in the third group of municipalities (out of 578 municipalities) Some installation difficulties at municipalities were mentioned in the Belgium parliament. Minister Dewael argued that the complaints were based on one incident. Increasingly critique raised on the Belpic, as a report from FEDICT showed a very low usage17. Merely 28% of the Internet users who had and eID had used it at least one time18 The disappointing usage of Belpic was confirmed by a report of the Federal Government Agency19.
2006 and 2007 2008
http://www.zdnet.be/news/38028/elektronische-identiteitskaart-vier-keer-duurder/ http://www.poureva.be/IMG/pdf/DOC_51_1371_021.pdf 16 Verantwoording van de algemene uitgavenbegroting, 9 November 2005, http://www.dekamer.be/doc/flwb/pdf/51/2044/51k2044003.pdf 17 http://www.fedict.belgium.be/nl/binaries/diversiteit_tcm167-16726.pdf 18 FEDICT, Fed-e View Citizen, Longitudinaal onderzoek naar internet en eGovernment in België. De burger aan het woord, page 21-22. The most important applications for which the eID was used in 2006 concerned entrance to public spaces such as libraries and waist and recycling centres and the retrieving of official documents at the local governments.
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An overview of the online services accessible through eID on the federal eID website reveals that the number of services was in November 2009 still relatively low20. Until now only a few applications are accessible with the Belpic solution. Future goals are putting new services (e.g. on health) in place, integrating the card with the social security card and herewith the stimulation of the usage of the Belgian eID21.
Technical solution: Belpic The Belpic card is a mandatory electronic identity (eID) card that is intended to facilitate access to e-Government services for all Belgian citizens from the age of 12 and up (IDABC, 2009). The Belpic solution is a PKI-based smartcard solution. The identity card itself is an Axalto Cryptoflex JavaCard with 32K memory, equipped with a 16 bit microcontroller and an additional crypto processor (IDABC, 2009). The card has ROM, EEPROM and RAM. A Java Applet handles all communications with the outside world, through the interfaces described below. The eID card can be read various kinds of smart card readers22. Figure 3 shows the appearance of the Belgium Belpic card. Apart from personal information, the card has a chip that contains two PKI key pairs and certificates: one for authentication and one qualified signatures. The Belpic card is a key to the databases of the National Register. The database of the Belgian National Register consists of a set of authentic attributes for all Belgian citizens registered in it. Many of the attributes stored in the authentication certificate of the Belpic card are obtained directly from the National Register. The National Register uses a Register number, which functions as a unique identifier for Belgian citizens in e-Government services. Apart from being the main access key to the National Register, this number is also included as a serial number on the certificates of the eID card. The price of the eID card ranges between 10 and 15 €.
Federale Overheidsdienst Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie, (2008) Toekomstgerichte studie over de potentiële economische mogelijkheden van het gebruik van de elektronische identiteitskaart en de elektronische handtekening, Brussel. 20 http://welcome-to-e-belgium.be/nl/home.php?nav=6
http://www.ibz.fgov.be/download/activiteitenverslag_2007/Instellingen%20en%20bevolking/55298%20Inst ell_Bevolk_NL.pdf 22 http://www.cardreaders.be/en/default.htm
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Figure 2 A typical Belgium eIDM card (Source: ZETES)
Alternatives for the Belpic card are (IDABC, 2009): • The paper federal token which can be issued to certain residents of Belgium, the social security card (SIS-card), private sector issued certificates (e.g. Verizon), • The kids-ID, an eID card intended for children under 12. • The Belgium Cross road bank stores information about legal persons and natural persons (entrepreneurs) in as co-called Crossroads Bank for Enterprises.
The role of trust in the Belpic innovation
On what factors is trust grounded?
H1 (PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS): Trust can be based upon personal characteristics, such as integrity, benevolence and capabilities. Expertise and independency were important drivers of trust in the Belpic case. The academic persons involved in the Belpic innovation was trusted by many parties for their independency. They did not have a direct buyer-customer relation. In addition, their thorough academic expertise on the legal and technical aspects of eIDM was highly valued and often mentioned as an important driver for trust. Independency and expertise seem to be rational drivers of trust: they increase the predictability of the trustee’s behaviour and therefore decrease chance of being confronted with unexpected opportunistic behaviour. H2 (NORMS AND VALUES): Trust can be based upon the sharing of norms and values between individuals In the Belpic case, shared norms and values seemed to be important to build trust. High trusted relationships (e.g. between two former colleagues) were characterized by shared norms and values, whereas in distrusted relationships only a few norms and values were shared. Trust was mostly build in bilateral discussions and meetings. One of the respondents said that trust had to be “checked” on a personal basis. Some norms and values seem to be a must to share and some just as optional. Examples of necessary values are integrity, honesty and loyalty. Values like professionalism or customer value
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of eIDM systems were not always shared between the parties, but did not seem to block cooperation. H3 (IDENTIFICATION AND EMPATHY): The fact that people share the same experiences, concerns and struggles appears to have a bound No examples of identification and empathy in relation to trust were found in the Belpic case. H4 (ROUTINISATION): The higher the routinisation (more knowledge and experience) in actions of a person the more predictable the actions of that person and the more trust people have in the reliability of that person Routinisation seemed to be an important mechanism to build interpersonal trust. For example, the consortium partners of the Steria consortium knew each for a long time. It helped to reduce the complexity of working together with so many parties. H5 (TRANSFERABILITY OF TRUST): Trust is transferable between individuals There were no particular cases of transferability of trust found in the Belpic case.
What factors change trust over time?
H6 (CONTROL IN ABSENCE OF TRUST): When trust is absent, individuals are forced to assess the competences and opportunism of the other The Belpic cases had some serious incidents of distrust originating from conflicts. It seems that in these situations control was taken in several ways. First, the integrity of actions is assessed extensively and opportunistic behaviour is directly opposed with consequential behaviour of the other. For example, when manager X intentionally asks too much money for a service, manager Y will show the superior’s X that this money is not substantiated. Second, escalation was an important mechanism in case of distrust. Although bilateral meetings are important to solve conflicts, several cases were solved using the organisational hierarchy within the Belgian administration, even up to the highest level when necessary. H7 (UNMET EXPECTATIONS): A decline of trust between individuals can emerge in case one of the involved parties does not live up to the expectations of the other No particular cases of unmet expectations decreasing trust were found. H8 (JOINT SOLUTION OF CONFLICT): the joint solution of conflict can enhance and deepen trust Solving conflicts helped to build trust, after it was lost. There were many technical difficulties in the Belpic innovation, e.g. with the installation of the card readers. Consequently, the National Register often came with change requests for the Steria consortium. Interviews revealed that adequately solving those problems helped the Steria consortium to gain trust at the National Register. 3.3.3 How does trust influence the joint innovation process?
H9 (HIERARCHY): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by mechanisms of hierarchy
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As described earlier, escalation up the organisational hierarchy was an important instrument in case there was not enough trust to solve issues person-to-person. Although it solved the problem, it did not enhance the trust between the two persons. In this case, the solution implied a winner and a loser, whereas in solving joined conflicts (Hypothesis 8) no one explicitly loses. H10 (LEGAL MECHANISMS): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by legal mechanisms, e.g. contracts Respondents explicitly mentioned contracts or in a weaker form “joint statements” as both a compensation of trust and a driver of trust. At beginning of Belpic, two CIOs had to work in the same organisation. As there was no tie between them, they made their own contract (or co-existence agreement), in which they agreed on their task division. It helped to make their collaboration more predictable and therefore increased interpersonal trust. The contract had also an external function: they showed their own organisation and external parties that they were cooperating and not easily to be separated. As one of the CIOs said: “the contract made a strong coalition of us. We have a very strong tie now”. H11 (TRUSTED THIRD PARTY): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by putting a third party / opinion in place There was one case of a trusted third party. To ensure that the Steria consortium will meet its obligations, the National Register hired a consultant to monitor and assess the contract. Presumably, the trust in this consultant was not high enough as the National Register fired the consultant shortly. H12 (CREATIVITY): Trust is a necessary requisite for creativity in a team Interviews revealed that creative or innovative solutions can be blocked by others for irrational reasons. Looking closer, it seems that there was not enough interpersonal trust between the cooperating parties. In the Belpic case, such a situation occurred when the idea for an additional barcode on the eID card was blocked. H13 (MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by motivational control, such as (financial) incentives Motivational control was very apparent in the Belpic case. Especially, the buyersupplier relation was used for motivational control. For example, the Belpic tenders were important for consultants to gain access to the European eIDM systems markets. The buyer was aware of this dependency and could optimally control the buyer-supplier relationship. This was opposed by the more independent position of the academics. As one of the respondents stated: “Consultants would do a lot to please the customer, but researchers are not directly paid and are therefore not that dependent”. It must be noted that academic parties can be dependent in other ways, e.g. in reputation, data availability or visibility. H14 (BRIDGING DEVIATING INTERESTS): Trust is a precondition for the ability of bridging deviating interests. In one case, respondents said trust was needed to bring in an opposing opinion. For example, a consultancy firm needs a strong trust relation with their customer to persuade them to agree on a critical report. However, in the Belpic case there was not enough trust and the consultancy firm was fired. H15 (RISKS): Trust is a precondition for the willingness of jointly taking risks.
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Organisational complexity was an important risk for suppliers in the Belpic case, as they had to work with many different parties in their consortium. They needed to have a high level of trust among them to efficiently work together. H OTHER (EFFICIENCY) Apart from the hypotheses, respondents stated that trust had a very positive effect on the speed of the innovation process and on accessing knowledge within the social network. For example, it was easier to agree and get things done in the inter-organisational teams that highly trusted each other.
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Introduction This introduction paragraph gives a chronological overview of the eIDM innovation process in Austria23. Initiation 1999 1999 The e-Europe initiative of the European Commission put the Information Society high on the Austrian political agenda The Austrian Secure Information Technology Centre (A-SIT) was founded as a National Confirmation Body, which was required by the eSignature Act.24 The Austrian government officially decided to use smart card technology in order to simplify their citizen’s official business25. The e-Europe initiative led to the initiative “e-Austria in e-Europe”26. The Federal Ministry for Public Service and Sports set up the Task Force e-Austria, existing of leading experts, to implement the e-Austria in eEurope project27. The development of a Bürgerkarte or “citizen card”28 was one of the significant e-government projects of the taskforce. An ICT board to coordinate e-government services was established29. The members were the Chief Information Officers (CIOs) of the Ministries, who were nominated by their respective ministers. Working groups were formed to provide advice and assistance to ministries, provinces, cities and local authorities. One of those working groups concerned the development of an eIDM system for government services to citizens. Development 2001 The federal chancellery established the ICT Strategy Unit30, which existed of a technical unit which developed applications, a public relations unit which was responsible for the marketing of the applications and an administrative unit which dealt with internal procedures. This unit developed the PKI infrastructure for the Bürgerkarte. The providing of certificates was mandated to the company A-Trust, which is a shared service provider of several Austrian banks and
1999 November 2000 2000
Mostly based on interviews and desk research (see also Huijboom, N.M. The influence of social capital on joint innovation processes, forthcoming).
24 25 26
http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/22.pdf http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/documents/Austria_000.pdf 27 http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/eipascope/scop2001_Special_ENGLISH.pdf 28 http://www.sibis-eu.org/files/D4-2_Annex.pdf 29 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=1305 30 ftp://ftp.freenet.at/beh/buergerkarte‐grundlagen.pdf
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companies and thus far the only accredited and certified trust centre in Austria according to EU law. 2002 2002 The inspection and approval of Bürgerkarte certificates, signature creation devices and underlying infrastructure was mandated to A-SIT31. The Austrian government established the Central Residents Register, in which all Austrian residents are registered and assigned a unique personal identification number (PIN). This PIN is one of the key identifiers used by the application of the Bürgerkarte concept.32
Implementation 2002 – 2003 The first pilot project with the Bürgerkarte concept was launched in 2002 by the Austrian Computer Society (ACS)33. The electronic ID cards were issued by the ACS from 24 February 2003 on, in cooperation with ATrust and the ICT Strategy Unit of the Federal Chancellery34. The Master card of several Austrian Banks and the student chip card of the Vienna University of Economics and Business became Bürgerkarte prepared35. The Austrian Parliament passed e-Government legislation building a legal framework for the Bürgerkarte. A mobile application (A1) for citizen authentication became available as well as the social security card, which included the possibility to activate the Bürgerkarte function. The contracts of the employees of the ICT Strategy Unit terminated. It was decided to continue some of the work in a unit called Chief Information Office under the Federal Chancellery and to mandate the technical work to EGIZ, a new established unit of the Technical University of Graz. The ICT Board was replaced by the platform “Digital Austria” in which the counties and municipalities were also represented36.
End of 2005
Diffusion 2007 The take-up by citizens was behind expectations: 20.000 Bürgerkarten had been activated, whereas the government had planned 50.000 by 200637. The federal Chancellery undertook several actions to stimulate take-up: • A large campaign started to encourage students to use their student’s ID card as Bürgerkarte by giving them free card-readers. Acceptance rate was limited due to privacy concerns.
http://www.a‐sit.at/pdfs/About_ASIT_2009_en_MH.pdf http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/4486/5584 33 http://www.rechtsprobleme.at/doks/burgerkarte-gerstbach.pdf 34 http://www.epractice.eu/en/news/284155 35 http://www.rechtsprobleme.at/doks/burgerkarte-gerstbach.pdf 36 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288171 37 http://www2.argedaten.at/php/cms_monitor.php?q=PUB-TEXT-ARGEDATEN&s=18047gle
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• • • 2008 January 2008 November 2009 November 2010 - ?
The federal chancellery participated in eGovernment conferences to explain and promote the Bürgerkarte among service providers. A-SIT published many flyers and instruction videos38 on the Bürgerkarte. A Bürgerkarte website39 was launched.
The eCard of the social security institutions fully replaces the traditional signatures40 and new legislation simplified the issuance of the Bürgerkarte The first version of the new online citizen card middleware architecture MOCCA was released41. This middleware aimed to lower usage thresholds by making the software more user-friendly. 120.000 Bürgerkarte certificates are issued and only few services were available through the Burkerkarte concept The future diffusion, maintenance and development of the Bürgerkarte concept is coordinated by the Chief Information Office of the Federal Chancellery42. Diffusion will focus on offering more services and stimulating citizens to activate the Bürgerkarte functionality. Also the participation of the Austrian government in European projects such as STORK will have a strong priority.
Technical solution: Bürgerkarte The Bürgerkarte is a technology-neutral concept that allows for different technical solutions. It is a concept rather than a specific token, which defines minimal requirements that an eID token needs to fulfill. The most important requirements are: (1) qualified electronic signatures and (2) storage of the identity link or electronic mandates. Generally, most of the tokens are prepared technically, but the activation of a token as a citizen card is voluntary (except the profession’s card). Several tokens of the Bürgerkarte eID are available (IDABC, 2009): (1) each bank card issued since March 2005, (2) the health-insurance card (e-card) (3) profession’s cards (e.g. notaries or pharmacists), (4) public official’s service cards, or (5) student service cards of universities. From 2004 to 2008 mobile phones could be used as a token. The Bürgerkarte combines PKI-based electronic signatures as a means of authentication and identification. The Central Register of Residents provides a unique source of identification for registered residents and is linked to the Bürgerkarte. A supplementary register allows for integration of foreign natural persons that are not covered otherwise. Registration of organisations is covered by the Commercial Register, the Central Register of Associations and a Supplementary Register of Other Data Subjects. The Bürgerkarte uses an unique sourcePIN solution (see figure 4): “The Bürgerkarte uses a sector-specific identification model that enforces data protection aspects for natural
http://www.a‐sit.at/de/dokumente_publikationen/videos/index.php http://www.buergerkarte.at/en/index.html 40 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288173 41 http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288168 42 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VB3‐4T0FF98‐ 2&_user=603085&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=10 90110470&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000031079&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=603085 &md5=b345d0ab93053ea6e50118980b670861
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persons is used. The core element is a so-called identity link The identity link is an attestation signed by the authority that links a citizen’s qualified electronic signature to the unique identifier “sourcePIN” derived from the base registers. The sourcePIN may only be stored in the identity link in the citizen card, thus is under sole control of the citizen” (IDABC, 2009).
Every Person has a sourcePIN
1. price 14.12.2005 in Madrid for best practice of data protection of all European Administrations
sourcePIN of Prohazka, František: 2411
The sourcePIN of natural persons may at no time be stored by the authorities as an identification feature
Source PIN 2411
Central Register of Residents
service sector number Central Register of Residents: 109
irreversible cryptographic hash derivation
Sector specific personal identifier (ssPIN) Register of residence: 7011 Prohazka, František
Each administrational unit has its own service sector number
Ministry of Finance
Service sector number Tax authority 911
irreversible cryptographic hash derivation
Sector specific personal identifier (ssPIN) ministry of finance: 8924 Prohazka, František
Sector specific personal identifier (ssPIN): 1818
irreversible cryptographic hash derivation
Matriculation number: 356
Figure 3 Overview of the sourcePIN system (Source: Siemens, 2009)
The sourcePIN Register Authority (which is the data protection and privacy commission) provides services in connection with the sector-specific eIDM model. The sourcePIN model allows data exchange between sectors without involvement of the citizen where such data exchanges are admissible. The unique identifiers sourcePIN and also the sector-specific PINs are legally protected by the eGovernment Act (IDABC, 2009). The token itself is a secure signature-creation device that contains (IDABC, 2009): • a qualified electronic signature (i.e. the signature-creation data and a qualified certificate) • an identity link is issued by the sourcePIN Register Authority. • the sourcePIN which is the citizen’s unique identifier from the CRR • the citizen’s name and date of birth • data that links the identity link to the qualified certificate stored on the token • the signature of the sourcePIN Register Authority The token has two PKI-based key pairs – a qualified signature for authentication and the second key pair for electronic signatures or encryption. Just the qualified certificate is needed for the citizen card function. The certificates are provided by the private sector certification service provider A-Trust.
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The role of trust in the Bürgerkarte innovation
On what factors is trust grounded?
H1 (PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS): Trust can be based upon personal characteristics, such as integrity, benevolence and capabilities. Expertise (a personal trait) was very important in the Austrian case. If a stakeholder in the innovation process did not have the right capabilities, trust was low (happened in 2 cases). One of the respondents argued that trust in expertise is important in lower hierarchical levels: ”In lower levels: it is more trust in expertise, expertise at higher level does not matter so much, assume people don’t really understand. In higher level it is trust in decision power and broad network.” H2 (NORMS AND VALUES): Trust can be based upon the sharing of norms and values between individuals Several respondents stated that shared norms, values and interests were highly important for trusted relationships. For example, members of one of the teams in the Bürgerkarte project described themselves as young, enthusiastic and tolerant, which increased trust within the team. Respecting cultural values seemed to be important as well. One respondent visited each county involved in the Bürgerkarte project to “show them their interest and respect in their cultural values”, which was according to her an important driver for trust. H3 (IDENTIFICATION AND EMPATHY): The fact that people share the same experiences, concerns and struggles appears to have a bound Affective factors (such as identification and empathy) were not often mentioned to influence trust. However, a respondent said that you can “just have the feeling that you can trust somebody”. This is more intuition perspective on trust. H4 (ROUTINISATION): The higher the routinisation (more knowledge and experience) in actions of a person the more predictable the actions of that person and the more trust people have in the reliability of that person Like the Belgian Belpic case, routinisation seems to be a very important mechanism for building trust. The basis for the “intense and good collaboration” within the technical team of the Federal Chancellery was rooted in the previous cooperation at the Technical University of Graz. One of the respondents stated: “During my master thesis we had a good opportunity to trust each other, after 6 or 8 months, we had good trust relationship”. The intense collaboration on defining and developing the eIDM system increased the trust in the team. As one of the respondents stated: “Everybody knows each other and for about 10 months you make a project and meet more often” as a reason for high trust in the team. Difficult situations (e.g. technical barriers) helped to test the predictability of behaviour. One of the stakeholders entered the Bürgerkarte project in a later stage. Several respondents did not trust this person, because his presence was abrupt and they found it hard to explain his behaviour. One of the respondents at the Federal Chancellery stated that he trusted a specific stakeholder at the Ministry of Finance, because he worked with him (routinisation).
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H5 (TRANSFERABILITY OF TRUST): Trust is transferable between individuals Transferability of trust occurred within high trust teams. One of the respondents stated: “If you have a core team with trust relation, it is easier to trust external bodies, with the knowledge that your personal trust partners trust some body else.” The trusted team members formed a first basis to decide if somebody could be trusted: “it was for me the first thing to decide whether I could trust the person or not. It helped a lot in first contact phase.”
What factors change trust over time?
H6 (CONTROL IN ABSENCE OF TRUST): When trust is absent, individuals are forced to assess the competences and opportunism of the other Respondents stated that in case of a trust relationship there was no need to assess opportunistic behaviour (e.g. playing games as they described it). In case of distrust, they assessed the integrity of the other’s statements and actions and clearly planned their own statements and actions. One of the respondents explained: “There were a lot of political issues and we have to be careful in meetings: what can I tell them? What not? We had to consider before meetings: what should we say? What not? Is this the right timing?” This behaviour can slow down the innovation process, e.g. by slowing down decision making and consuming too much relational transaction costs: “(in case of low trust) there is a little decision how you can develop towards decision. You can explore this before you go there”.
H7 (UNMET EXPECTATIONS): A decline of trust between individuals can emerge in case one of the involved parties does not live up to the expectations of the other How often someone changes his or her opinion is an important hampering factor for interpersonal trust. A few respondents stated that one of the key stakeholders in the Bürgerkarte case changes his opinion on the Bürgerkarte very often. It is hard to predict his or her actions (routinisation) and often he does not meet the expectations of all stakeholders. For example, this happened when new software modules of the Bürgerkarte were developed. As one of the respondents put it: “He has good ideas, but when he has the idea he wants to realize it and next day he has a new idea” or “(no trust because) he jumps around with new technologies.” H8 (JOINT SOLUTION OF CONFLICT): The joint solution of conflict can enhance and deepen trust As described in Hypothesis 4 (routinisation), keeping your word even in hard circumstances is an important test for trust. For example: “(I trust them because) they kept their word and also in very hard circumstances.” Solving a severe conflict can be fairly effective. One respondent made an agreement after a fight: “…for three years he did not do it. I trust him, he can count on me: I will never say something in public on certificates.”
How does trust influence the joint innovation process?
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In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by mechanisms of hierarchy Hierarchy was clearly recognized as a compensation for trust: “you have personal trust and trust you have to obey” or in other words you have to trust or without it you have to follow the hierarchical norms. We found institutionalization in the Bürgerkarte case when government agencies from different organizations needed to cooperate and there was not a basis of trust that the ICT board would recognize all interests. For example, there were 15 to 20 working groups in which central and local government dealt with specific issues around e-government. Another example is the integration of the ICT Strategy Unit into the Federal chancellery. As one respondent puts it: “A reason that some people don’t want to have the taskforce on same level is that they want to control it, under their power.” A necessary prerequisite for trust is the backing of a superior for decision making. As one of the respondents puts it: “trust in the influence of people: decision power is necessary.” So, top managements support seems to be an important basis for trust. On the other hand, when trust is present, hierarchical measures were not necessary in the Austrian case. One of the managers said that trust made him feel like one of the team members instead of a superior: “I trusted everyone and from hierarchy point of view I was not superior, but one of them.” H10 (LEGAL MECHANISMS): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by legal mechanisms, e.g. contracts Respondents see contracts, agreements and official minutes as signs of distrust. Some did not want to work at all with contracts, because it diminishes the role of trust: “it won’t work out. I don’t want contracts, I want trust, I build network with people I trust. It’s my character; I can not play a role”. H11 (TRUSTED THIRD PARTY): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by putting a third party / opinion in place We found no specific instances of trusted third partiers in the Bürgerkarte case. H12 (CREATIVITY): Trust is a necessary requisite for creativity in a team The technical developers of the Bürgerkarte case, working at the Federal chancellery, stated that the high level of trust allowed them to work efficiently and in a creative way. As one of the respondents stated: “it made us definitely more efficient, it is place of work no need act politically at least in our unit”, H13 (MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by motivational control, such as (financial) incentives Market mechanisms make the interests of parties clearer and therefore less susceptible for opportunistic behaviour. A-trust saw itself out of scope of political interests: “for them I am private party, not playing in there game”. Commercial goals are often clear and can be used as a control mechanism. Again the motivations of private parties and academia are different (e.g. selling certain products vs. experimenting and innovation), but in both cases present. H14 (BRIDGING DEVIATING INTERESTS): Trust is a precondition for the ability of bridging deviating interests
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Within the team of developers in the Federal chancellery, everybody was able to express his own ideas. Status (hierarchical mechanism) did not play such an important role due to the presence of trust. However: “only the best ideas prevailed, not part of who had the idea. If you had the right idea and right arguments you had it”. Trust was also needed to bridge the technical and legal aspects of the Bürgerkarte: “if we would not have a good relationship, it would not function: it was a problem of putting the technical and legal part together” H15 (RISKS): Trust is a precondition for the willingness of jointly taking risks The Austrian eIDM system is technically, legally and organisationally complex. Therefore, the risks of spilling resources was very high and trust was needed. One of the respondents stated “If you can not trust, you won’t spend money or time with him in the project.” H OTHER: CLOSURE In the absence of trust, people will try to keep the distrusted person out of decisions in the innovation process. This group closure occurred in the Bürgerkarte. For example, one of the members of the ICT Strategy Unit said: “he (one of the CIOs) tried to not to involve him (a rival CIO) in each and every decision he made, he tried to do so by making decisions not only in the official board, but also in internal meetings where officials met regularly, he makes decisions in the network.”
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Introduction This introduction paragraph gives a chronological overview of the eIDM innovation process in Finland43. Initiation 2002 2003 2003 March 2003 Two government practitioners of the municipalities Vantaa44 and Espoo45 developed the idea to create an eIDM system. The municipalities of Helsinki46 and Kaunianen47 became involved The founding members decided to involve the Information Society program of the Prime Minister’s Office Two new laws were enacted: • the Act on Electronic Services and Communication in the Public Sector48: “to improve smoothness and rapidity of services and communication as well as information security in the administration, in the courts and other judicial organs and in the enforcement authorities by promoting the use of electronic data transmission49.” the Act on Electronic Signatures50: “to promote the use of electronic signatures and the supply of products and services relating to them and to enhance the information security and data protection in the field of electronic commerce and electronic services51.”
Development 2004 A steering group and project group were established. In the steering group were representatives of the Ministry of the Interior (JUHTA), Ministry of Finance, the four initiating municipalities and the Information Society Programme. In the project group were the municipalities, JUHTA and the overall project management was with the city of Vantaa. One of the key activities of the project group was the definition of tender specifications for the procurement of an eIDM system.
43 Mostly based on interviews and desk research (see also Huijboom, N.M. The influence of social capital on joint innovation processes, forthcoming). 44 http://www.vantaa.fi/i_etusivu.asp?path=1 45 http://www.espoo.fi/ 46 http://www.hel.fi/wps/portal/Helsinki_en?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Helsinki/en/Etusivu 47 http://www.kauniainen.fi/ 48 http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E0030013.PDF 49 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=28744 50 http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20030014.pdf 51 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=28744
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In a strategic document of the project group, published in February 200552, one of the leading requirements is defined, namely that the VETUMA platform should support several electronic identification systems to provide services to citizens, such as the FINEID card, bank solutions (such as TUPAS), mobile and username and password authentication. In the development phase, there were two important discussions: • • A similar eIDM system for the Finnish Tax Administration, Ministry of Labour and the Social Insurance Institution of Finland53 - called KATSO54 - could not be used for the purposes of VETUMA. The Finnish law requires organisations to jointly submit a call for tenders55. For ministries, Hansel Ltd56 is the central procurement, but in 2005, there was not a central procurement unit for municipalities.
2005 October 2006 Spring
Helsinki was able to publish the bid on behalf of the VETUMA team, Fujitsu was awarded the project57. Fujitsu developed the first version of VETUMA and in the first pilots were launched in a pilot group of municipalities. Based on the evaluation the system was improved and ready for the implementation of the first services. Implementation
2006 Begin 2006 2007
One of the first electronic services which made use of the VETUMA platform was the tennis court payment of the city of Helsinki58 Other municipalities started to use VETUMA for the provision of online services to citizens. Fujitsu presented the VETUMA solution during several gatherings of municipalities in Finland.59 In addition, the project group launched a website on which municipalities could find information on how to implement and use the VETUMA solution60. Fujitsu provided trainings to municipalities on how to use VETUMA Discussions emerged on the ownership and financing of VETUMA. Information Society Programme had stated that the central government
52 Internal docuement of the cities of Espoo, Vantaa, Helsinki and Kaunianen; Londblad‐Ahonen, A. and T. Karakorpi, report on the governance and funding of VETUMA, February 2005, paragraph 2.2. 53 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/documents/eid_good_practices_modinis _study.pdf 54 https://www.tunnistus.fi/, 55 http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1992/en19921505.pdf 56 http://www.hansel.fi/en/activities/publicprocurement 57 See power point, Tapani Puisto, Government IT‐service center, State Treasury, page 2 58 https://asp.innofactor.com/hki‐liikunta/EnrolmentClient/calendarselect.aspx 59 See for instance http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/documents/7/Verkkotunnistautuminen_Jukka%20Keso.pdf 60 http://www.suomi.fi/suomifi/laatuaverkkoon/asiointi_ja_lomakkeet/sahkoinen_asiointi/verkkotun nistaminen_ja_maksaminen/
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2007 2006 – 2007
was willing to pay a substantial part of the VETUMA development and implementation, but this programme would end in 2007. Several systems were already integrated in VETUMA, such as the FINEID card identification, the TUPAS identification of the banks and the next step would be to also integrate mobile identification into the platform. However, the Finnish organisation for Telecom Operators, faced several problems. Fifteen services of government entities were available61 making use of the VETUMA platform. A statistical analysis of the ministry of Finance showed that in 2007 over 80% of the citizens who used the VETUMA platform to obtain a government service used it in combination with the TUPAS online identification solution of the banks62.
Diffusion 2008 January 2008 January 34 government organisations had joined up the VETUMA project.63 Ministry of Finance together with Fujitsu continued to present the solution during seminars across Finland, to stimulate government organisations to join up. The National Audit Office published a critical report on Finnish eIDM systems64. The main conclusions & recommendations: development of eIDM systems has been inefficient due to the lack of central coordination and presence of competition between several eIDM systems. • development and operating costs of eIDM systems were from in total approximately 40 million euro. Stronger coordination could have reduced this expenditure. • more uniform and streamlined operation and monitoring of online identity management is needed. The VETUMA project moved from the VALT IT Department of the Ministry of Finance to the State IT Service Centre of the State Treasury65. The VETUMA solution was used by around 60 government organisations66 A new tender was published for the further development of the VETUMA platform.67 Plans included that the VETUMA service would be made interoperable with other identity services (e.g. KATSO system)68. The Act on Electronic Authentication and Signatures came into force69, which implied that all service providers offering strong eIDM services will fall under the supervision, controls and new regulations70. •
2009 2009 Spring 2009 June September 2009
See http://www.vtv.fi/files/145/161_2008_Tunnistuspalvelut_NETTI.pdf http://b2cpro.vtt.fi/documents/seminar/b2c‐pro‐seminaari‐mikkola.pdf 63 http://www.fujitsu.com/fi/services/sahkoinenasiointi/ 64 http://www.vtv.fi/files/135/1622008_Metsahallitus_NETTI.pdf 65 http://www.statskontoret.fi/public/Default.aspx?culture=sv‐FI&contentlan=3&nodeid=15808, see http://www.ica‐it.org/conf43/docs/Conf43_The_Status_of_ICT_in_Governments_2009.pdf, page 4 66 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305 67 http://www.hankintailmoitukset.fi/sv/notice/search/?all=1 68 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305
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2010 - ?
More legislative changes are anticipated to change the Finnish eIDM landscape in 2010. A new Population Register Act, the amendments to the Passport Act and a totally new Identity Act are under preparation at the Ministry of Interior and will come into force in 201071. Most of these changes are still underway and not currently implemented in practice today. Mobile PKI services are most likely to appear soon in the Finnish eIDM market as well as Open ID. The future of the FINEID card is still unclear. By the end of December 2009, Citizen Certificates had been issued to a total of 286,000 people72. There are no concrete plans to boost its adoption among citizens.
Technical solution: VETUMA VETUMA system is a Citizen-to-Government service, which offers identification and authentication to National and Local eGovernment services. It is not a single identification solution, but combines different eID solutions to identify and authenticate citizens for services. VETUMA service includes e-identification (e-Signatures) by Finnish national eID cards (FINEID), individual pin codes (PIN-TAN codes) of the biggest e-banks in Finland (TUPAS) and mobile identification of the two biggest Finnish mobile operator's services (IDABC, 2009). The FINEID solution of the Population Register Center (PRC) is a strong (PKI-based) authentication method. TUPAS has a lower security level, but will be upgraded to PKI in the near future. Most people use TUPAS for authentication and even for signatures. A also user can authenticate oneself using the paper token in a number of applications that are integrated into either the VETUMA service, using a two-factor authentication (IDABC, 2009). Figure 4 (see next page) shows how the VETUMA system works in practice73. The VETUMA authentication service for citizens is integrated into different communal websites in order to users to access eServices. VETUMA system verifies the users credentials through an LDAP framework offered by either PRC or the users‟ bank service. Upon successful authentication by either of the services, the end user can access the local service. The user visits the communal website to access a local portal, which redirects the user to the VETUMA authentication service website, from where the user is identified by querying the Population Information System (in case of FINEID) or the user’s bank service (TUPAS). When authentication is successful, the VETUMA service logs in the end user at the local Internet service.
69 http://www.epractice.eu/en/news/293726 and http://www.ficora.fi/en/index/viestintavirasto/uutiset/2009/P_32.html 70 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305 71 http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305 72 In 2009 the TUPAS identification system still dominated the Finnish eIDM practice. In July 2009, the TUPAS tokens were used up to 99% as eID to obtain online government services http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=32305 73 Adopted from www.suomi.fi/vetuma and IDABC
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Figure 4 Progress diagram of how a user authenticate, identify and pay with the VETUMA service
The role of trust in the VETUMA innovation
On what factors is trust grounded?
H1 (PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS): Trust can be based upon personal characteristics, such as integrity, benevolence and capabilities. Personal capabilities were important. In specific, technical and legal expertise were important sources for trust. For example, expertise played a role in the buyer-supplier relationship with Fujitsu services. Interestingly, some of the respondents said that trust in expertise is stronger than hierarchical trust: “In Finland we don’t care who says something, but what he says”. This egalitarian view is in line with the high level of trust in Finland. H2 (NORMS AND VALUES): Trust can be based upon the sharing of norms and values between individuals. Having the same interests was an important prerequisite for trust. The municipalities and central government agencies shared the interest to deploy the VETUMA system on a larger scale. Most stakeholders said that this shared interest or vision was present in the initiation phase of the project. However, respondents hardly mentioned the role of shared values, except honesty (which is obviously strongly related hypothesis 7: unmet expectations) and being a professional. However, they mentioned trust as a social norm in Finland a lot. It seemed that the fact that Finland is a high trust country came not as a surprise for them. The social norm of openness (e.g. no hidden agenda’s) was appointed as a result of the high level of trust in Finland. H3 (IDENTIFICATION AND EMPATHY): The fact that people share the same experiences, concerns and struggles appears to have a bound. Identification and empathy showed to be very important in the early phases of the innovation. The two project managers at the municipalities of Vantaa and Espoo
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struggled with the same problem: there was no common identification mechanism for their e-Government services, which hampered service innovation. Although they worked for many years together, this critical concern brought them together. Additionally, the project managers stated that they went through many things (in other words experiences) together: “We have worked for so long, and made so many things together.” In the contrast, distrust raised when the ministry of finance had to take over the ownership of VETUMA in the implementation phase. Some initial team members doubted if the ministry of finance shared the same concern (and passion) for VETUMA as the manager of the Information Society programme. One respondent described his trust with another team member as “chemistry”: a quick and implicit feeling that he could rely on this person. This intuition for trust was also observed in the Austrian case. H4 (ROUTINISATION): The higher the routinisation (more knowledge and experience) in actions of a person the more predictable the actions of that person and the more trust people have in the reliability of that person. The four municipalities in the Helsinki region have been working together on ICT projects for decades. This working experience that resulted in a network of strong ties was essential in the initiation phase of the project: “Trust played a role especially in the planning phase, it was not just that we were geographically close, we knew each other very well from different working groups, so sure trust was important”. In the initial planning team everybody knew each other: “it affected yes, because I knew them almost everybody in a way, at least in a name, easy to join the group”. These routinized strong ties helped to speed up the project in the beginning: “It helped a lot in, without it we did not get to fly”. Knowing each other very well can have a negative effect as well. According H5 (TRANSFERABILITY OF TRUST): Trust is transferable between individuals. VETUMA’s project manager was very well connected and known in the Finnish government ICT world. Therefore, she was a linking pin for most project members throughout the whole VETUMA project: “Anna was the common background for all of us”. Transferability of trust seemed to be a mechanism here: that a new project member knew the project manager was seen as a qualifier for trust.
What factors change trust over time?
H6 (CONTROL IN ABSENCE OF TRUST): When trust is absent, individuals are forced to assess the competences and opportunism of the other. There were only a few occasions in the VETUMA project where trust was low. First, trust was in general low between the VETUMA project team and the KATSO project team, when VETUMA was not able to join their procurement process. The secretary of the VETUMA and legal experts were investigating and assessing the possibilities, but did not succeed in making an agreement. The individual members of the VETUMA team dealt with care in communicating with the members of the KATSO consortium: “We thought carefully which info we gave to which organisations, but communication in our core group was open”. Some respondents mentioned that distrust did not happen at all, because of the process op group closure before the collaboration starts. One respondent said: “I would not do something (innovative) with someone I do not trust.”
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H7 (UNMET EXPECTATIONS): A decline of trust between individuals can emerge in case one of the involved parties does not live up to the expectations of the other. Strangely, despite the initial urgence expressed by the Helsinki region municipalities, the number of e-Government services that use VETUMA identification is still lagging behind. The expectation was that some large municipalities that were pressing innovation in the start already had services on the shelf waiting for VETUMA. These unmet expectations decreased trust in the diffusion phase of the VETUMA project: “in the working group Project Manager X always said that their time schedule is so rapid, have to have it (VETUMA) fast. Now it is 4 or 5 years after these statements and VETUMA has still not been implemented. We trusted that their signal that it will be implemented, but that is not the case”. So, it is important to meet the individual expectations expressed at the start of a project. When expectations are not met due to barriers, these have to be timely and explicitly communicated. H8 (JOINT SOLUTION OF CONFLICT): The joint solution of conflict can enhance and deepen trust. There were not that many conflicts in the VETUMA case. The large conflict between the VETUMA and KATSO consortium was not solved in the end. The reasons why there were not many conflicts can be the generally high level oftrust in Finland, presence of group closure and the bottom-up approach of the project. Most respondents stated that trust is already there when collaboration starts anyway. Next, due to the bottom-up approach at the beginning people that did not trust each other by forehand were not hierarchically forced to cooperate. A downside of such a voluntary and bottom-up approach is the lack of coordination between different bottom-up eIDM initiatives (e.g. KATSO and VETUMA system) as stated by the Audit report.
How does trust influence the joint innovation process?
H9 (HIERARCHY): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by mechanisms of hierarchy The VETUMA team consisted of two groups: a project team and a management board. These organisational structures were seen as an institutionalization of trust: “the whole system that you have committees, working groups and agendas, therefore I would not do something without trust”. Respondents were aware of hierarchical mechanism, such as escalation, that can compensate trust. The openness of communication between all individuals (e.g. between the project board and the management board) was an enabler for hierarchical mechanisms. One of the respondents said: “It is such an open area, if someone is doing so (opportunistic behaviour), it is clear that also his or her boss will know about it”. So, creating an open environment, in which all hierarchical layers can follow the innovation process enables hierarchical mechanisms for trust. H10 (LEGAL MECHANISMS): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by legal mechanisms, e.g. contracts. The trust between the parties working on VETUMA was high. As a consequence respondents did not feel the need for formal minutes: “When you have trust you don’t have to put everything on paper, everybody knew I would do it, informal, not on paper”.
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Minutes were actually made, but had a technical communication function: “during formal follow up meetings there are minutes written, but these are mostly technical: everything is written down as specifications”. Specifically, no contracts or formal minutes were made before the procurement of the system (so initiation phase). One respondent recognized the absence of contracts and minutes as a problem: “some people expect that you have all agreements on paper, but we did not. Sometimes watch dogs (e.g. political parties, inspectors, auditors) have distrust and when you do not agree you can show that on paper.” This refers to the state audit commission that assessed the identity management infrastructure in Finland. That high trust can lead to an absence of legal mechanisms can be problematic for the accountability and transparency of an eIDM project. H11 (TRUSTED THIRD PARTY): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by putting a third party / opinion in place. Within the VETUMA innovation process there was no such case of a trusted third party. On a national scale of Finnish eIDM systems there was. The distrust between the KATSO and VETUMA consortia hampered innovation: it made the Finnish eIDM landscape fragmented and too expensive. The state audit commission came between both teams in the role of a trusted third party. This did not help to increase trust, but it stimulated the innovation process in general: after the state audit report it was decided to integrate the KATSO system into VETUMA. H12 (CREATIVITY): Trust is a necessary requisite for creativity in a team. No specific comments were made on the creativity of the team. However, it was described that a high level of trust stimulated cooperation. As one of the VETUMA team members stated: “There was a high level of trust. We had a perfect a group and collaboration was good.” H13 (MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by motivational control, such as (financial) incentives. Motivational controls did compensate trust, but increased trust. One of the influential members in the management board of VETUMA gained trust of stakeholders by giving them incentives. For example, an IT manager of one of the municipalities was offered to go to an international conference to promote VETUMA, which was actually one of her responsibilities. Next, a prize (in the form of a medal) was given to show respect and trust. H14 (BRIDGING DEVIATING INTERESTS): Trust is a precondition for the ability of bridging deviating interests. Although trust was high, interests were not always the same. For example, the ministry of interior was also committed to the FINEID card, the banks to their TUPAS identification measure and the telecom operators to their mobile ID solution. However, the high level of trust created openness: there were not really closed agenda’s between the individuals: “In project group we can give our opinions freely”. Trust allowed the VETUMA project members to discuss their interests and concerns openly without damaging the interpersonal relation: “If there were problems we could discuss them, if we want it or something new, we could tell it” and a respondent that worked with the management board: “we might have loud discussions, but we have still
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a close relationship. Somebody coming from outside the group or from different culture (e.g. low trust), will say that we would be arguing and would not lead to anything”. Another respondent said that everybody could see their role / interest: “I did understand the role of some people, and they are acting by their roles. ...we have very tight discussions going on, but we can change the roles, no problem. There is a basis for trust.” So, interpersonal trust enables open communication within a project group, which makes it easier to come to a consensus. H15 (RISKS): Trust is a precondition for the willingness of jointly taking risks. The deployment of the VETUMA eIDM system was a risky business. Respondents for example, said that there were privacy or hacking risks. To bear these risks, it was important that that the VETUMA stakeholders could rely on each other, even when difficulties in the project happened. Specific examples are difficulties with procurement law or the slow take-up of VETUMA by services. Fujitsu’s business model was also based on trust: the government agencies should pay per user instead of a fixed amount for the development and implementation of the VETUMA system. This means a high risk for Fujitsu when the number of users lags behind. H OTHER (CLOSURE) A question that was raised several times is: how open is the high level of trust organised in the VETUMA project? Are distrusted people from the start avoided? One can conclude that there were signs of group closure (e.g. see hypothesis 6). As one of the respondents puts it: “We Finnish people are not so open, outgoing, and when we are around the table we have same issue. When we come at same table, trust is not the issue at all. We won’t have them at the table if we do not trust them. We just will not work together.” So, to what extent are groups of individuals with high trust really open? Is this potential closure not a potential risk to the innovation process?
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Introduction This introduction paragraph gives a chronological overview of the eIDM innovation process in the Netherlands74. Initiation 1999 The Ministry of the Interior had been developing a nation wide Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the identification and authentication of citizens and businesses. The development of the PKI was conducted by a Taskforce PKI, a commission which consisted of senior managers of various ministries and government agencies and was coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior. It seemed that the costs of the PKI solution were too high in relation to the benefits of the system: a study revealed that the frequency of contact between citizens and government were far too low to counterbalance the expenses. The use of the PKI would also be complex and difficult to use for citizens. Interviews revealed a lack of trust between parties involved in the taskforce. Three senior managers of separate national social security agencies agreed to jointly develop an eIDM system. Their organizations wanted to offer their clients electronic services but did not have the means to securely identify and authenticate those clients. In their view, the PKI process was too complex, cumbersome and inert The three senior managers convinced other social security agencies to draw up a white paper in which the parties jointly stressed the importance to speed up the process. The white paper was signed by the CEO’s of six social security agencies, namely: the Centre for Labour and Income, the Board of Health Insurances, the Institute for Employers Insurances, the Information Management, the Social Security and the Tax Office. Development 2003 May The steering committee National Authentication Provision (NAP) was set up, which aim was to coordinate the development of an eIDM system. The intention of the NAP was to create a simple solution as around 80% of the interaction between government and clients concerns relatively insensitive data exchange which can be supported by a low security level tool. A simple tool was also easier to implement than the complex PKI. The NAP gave the Bureau Chain Automation Labour (BKWI) and Income the mandate to build the application. BKWI hired the consultancy company Zenc to carry out a feasibility study and to define the technical specifications. BKWI commissioned the company Alfa & Aris to develop the DIGID
74 Mostly based on interviews and desk research (see also Huijboom, N.M. The influence of social capital on joint innovation processes, forthcoming).
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application for the six manifesto parties. 2003 NAP needed the cooperation with the Board of Privacy Protection to solve the issue that the social security number to identify user, could not be used due to privacy legislation. Legislation was changed which enabled the use of the social security number. BKWI started pilot projects to test the solution developed by Alfa & Aris.
Implementation / diffusion 2004 Summer 2004 The DIGID was ready for nation wide adoption by government agencies and BKWI organised several conferences to stimulate the adoption. The management of DIGID solution shifted from the NAP group to the ministry of interior. They temporarily delegated the management of DIGID to the Tax Office and ICTU. The Ministry of the Interior established a joint management organisation, called Gemeenschappelijke Beheer Organisatie (GBO) which task would be the management and further development of DigiD. 2006 the GBO started its activities and herewith the financing and management of DigiD became structural DigiD has been adopted by around 300 municipalities, 4 provinces, 8 Water Management Boards, 4 Health Insurance Companies and some 20 other government agencies Noteworthy however is the recent discussion which has started about the limited security level the DigiD system offers and the question has raised how to increase the security level, for instance by using PKI technology
2004 – 2005 2006 January 2009
2010 - ?
Technical solution: DigiD DigiD (digital identity) started as NAO. DigiD identifies and authenticates Dutch citizens to enable the interaction between government and individuals. DigiD works on the basis of a unique national identifier, the citizen service number (BSN BurgerServicenummer).Currently, DigiD has two security levels75: (1) username and password (low security level) (2) username and password combined with a unique code provided by text message (medium security level). In practice, citizens can apply for a username and password by a digital form on the DigiD website. Five days after having completed the electronic form, the user will receive a code by post with which he/she can activate his/her username and password. When the username and password are activated, the user can obtain the digital services of governments which require this low security level. To use the medium security level citizens have to apply for the Short Message Service (SMS) authentication through the DigiD website. This process is similar to the application of the low level security. According to IDABC (2009), a third security level was originally planned in the form of a national electronic identity card
See ePractice.eu and IDABC (2009)
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(eNIK). However, the introduction of the eNIK card is delayed, as a judge ruled in 2007 that the procurement process would need to be redone. Figure 6 shows how the identification process works when the citizen acquired his username/password and/or SMS service. According to IDABC (2009): 1 A citizen approaches a Service Provider (SP) for an eGovernment service. authentication is necessary to receive this service 2 The SP sends a message to the DigiD to receive a Request Identifier (RID) 3 The SP receives a RID 4 The SP sends this RID to the citizen 5 The citizen is (with the RID) redirected toDigiD 6 DigiD checks whether the username and password are available in the DigiD database 7 In cases where a higher level of assurance is required, DigiD sends an additional SMS with a one-time password to the citizen’s mobile phone. If all is correct, DigiD sends a message via the user to confirm that the user is authenticated 8 Via a direct and secure channel between DigiD and the SP, the SP can request the Citizen Service Number 9 This Citizen Service Number is delivered to the SP 10 If necessary this number can be used by the SP to request additional information about the user from a basic register .
Figure 5 Overview of DigiD’s identification process (IDABC, 2009)
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The role of trust in the DigiD innovation
On what factors is trust grounded?
H1 (PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS): Trust can be based upon personal characteristics, such as integrity, benevolence and capabilities. Personal capabilities, both in personality and expertise, were important indicators for the presence of interpersonal trust. Several respondents said strong expertise qualified unknown persons for a trust relationship: “I highly trusted him. He really knew what he was talking about. He was a big wall of knowledge, a real expert. I immediately knew that I wanted to hire him.” Expertise is a specific ground, but can also help to build trust over time: “In the beginning the contact with him was very remote and reversed, trust emerged at the moment we mutually recognised each others technical expertise and professionalism.” One of the respondents stated that they matched several personal characteristics: “We all pay a lot of attention to non-verbal communication, to mutual feelings, to the emotional underflow”. Similar personal characteristics can be the underlying mechanism of the “chemistry” trusted people feel. Also in cases of distrust, norms and values were addressed. One of the respondents did not trust another, because this person was too busy with materialistic and status enhancing activities. H2 (NORMS AND VALUES): Trust can be based upon the sharing of norms and values between individuals. In the initial phase of DigiD, the three initiating stakeholders shared several norms and values together: pragmatism, decisiveness, technically-oriented, goal-getters and openness (or transparency). They wanted to focus their time rather on solutions than problems. One of the initiators describes the common elements as follows: “We had in common that we all were very practical, pragmatic, decisive and wanted to accomplish concrete goals; we are the executive agencies, we want to execute.” Another respondent described similar values as a basis for trust: “We both had the same frame of reference, we were interested in ICT, were very practical and decisive”. They opposed their shared norms and values to the norms and values they perceived at the policy makers working for the PKI-based system: “Our rationality differs very much from the rationality of policy makers. They wanted to make policy and legislation, a process that is very cumbersome”. This was a cultural issue, as norms and value add up to culture: “The culture of policy makers does not fit the culture of executive agencies.” H3 (IDENTIFICATION AND EMPATHY): The fact that people share the same experiences, concerns and struggles appears to have a bound. As shown in the previous cases, experiencing similar problems give a special bond. This is important in all phases of an innovation process. For example, the initial stakeholders of DigiD shared the same experiences and struggles. Their services (in the domain of social security) needed an identification infrastructure, but the one that was planned (PKI) progressed in their view too slowly. Other respondents identified with each other as they had experienced similar scandals in their government agency. Also in latter phase of the DigiD project identification and empathy played a substantial role. One of the stakeholders in the development / pilot phase mentioned that he felt mutual dependency: “The mutual dependency was that he was looking for an authentication tool and that we were developing such a tool that could be interesting for central
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government and that we, in turn, were looking for potential pilots.”, Sharing the same interests in a project increases trust as well from a more rational perspective, One of the stakeholders told in an interview: “I really trusted him, because he had the same agenda and interests as I had. He never played a trick on me.” H4 (ROUTINISATION): The higher the routinisation (more knowledge and experience) in actions of a person the more predictable the actions of that person and the more trust people have in the reliability of that person. When we asked the stakeholders of DigiD why they trust someone, the strength of the tie was answered in most cases. For example, one of the stakeholders said:“You can call the trust within this network solidified trust, it is trust with a history, trust that over time has become so strong and so settled that no member will break it.” Next, the degree of predictability in keeping appointments and promises by a person seemed to be important indicator for trust. This is closely related to Hypothesis 7 (unmet expectations), which is a form of deroutinisation. One of the project members said on this topic: “I trust him. I know him for a long time, he has always kept his appointments and lived up to his promises.” On the other hand, persons that regularly change their opinion in the project were often distrusted, like in the Austrian case. As one of the respondents put it: “He is a good guy, but he is jumpy and always has a hidden agenda. He can be dangerous, can pursue his own interests and damage those of other.” or: “He is a very enthusiastic and sympatric guy, but always agrees with the last person he spoke to and therefore it is difficult to rely on him.” or: “His opinion highly depended on the political opinion and therefore he was unpredictable. He did not have his own opinion which made it difficult to trust him.” Predictability is also traded off against shared norms and values: “He was very transparent and honest about the interests of his organisation and about what he could accomplish and what not. He really tried to move the national authentication system a step further; he was constructive, transparent, open. However, his organisation had her own interests. So I trust the person, but because of the interest within the organisation he belonged to, he was not always predictable.” Routinisation assumes that trust is not just a given fact; it is built up over time. In the DigiD case, trust was reaffirmed during project meetings, by stressing the common interests and vision. One of the project managers states: “we had to mutually reassess and reconfirm the level of trust at the beginning of each meeting. I constantly reminded the group of our common interest: the creation of one, shared infrastructure.”
H5 (TRANSFERABILITY OF TRUST): Trust is transferable between individuals. Many interesting cases of transferability were found in the DigiD case. There seems to be a direct and an indirect form of transferability in this case. The direct form refers to sharing a friend of acquaintance that introduces you. This was mentioned several times, for example: “I trusted him. He has and had a very strong tie with my colleague, so we had a shared acquaintance”. A more indirect form of transferability is reputation. This refers the knowledge the personal network has of the trustworthiness (e.g. based on personal capabilities, etc.). As one of the respondents stated: “I met or saw him once or twice and I think he is a professional in what he does. He has a good reputation. I know some people he also knows very well.” A respondent stated that the mechanism of
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transferability (in the form of reputation) is an important instrument for selecting people: “If someone new enters the sector, for example if I want to hire someone to carry out an important task, I have a network of people who I can call to check if this person is all right; if he or she is trustworthy. It works like an informal ballot commission”. “If someone I very much trust that trust a third person, than I will also trust that third person.”
What factors change trust over time?
H6 (CONTROL IN ABSENCE OF TRUST): When trust is absent, individuals are forced to assess the competences and opportunism of the other. The absence of trust surely increased the transaction costs (and the duration) of cooperation, because trust needed to be reassessed over and over again. For example, it was stated earlier that trust had to be reassessed in project meetings. Also on person-toperson basis (like in the Belgian case) it needed more time to align interests: “Back then I tried to meet with him once a month in order to tune interests. He is a man of tricks.” Project membere were taking specific measurements (e.g. hierarchical, financial or legal) in case of distrust: “If I cannot trust someone I have to take some measurements to ensure everything goes well, and I will not take any risks. Trust makes that you can take risks that you can take big steps and that you can be more effective.” One of the respondents stated very explicitly on the consequence of distrust in actual behaviour: “If I cannot trust someone I have to take some measurements to ensure everything goes well, and I will not take any risks. Trust makes that you can take risks that you can take big steps and that you can be more effective.” H7 (UNMET EXPECTATIONS): A decline of trust between individuals can emerge in case one of the involved parties does not live up to the expectations of the other. Meeting expectations is closely related to the concept of routinisation: does someone structurally keep his word? A stakeholder in the DigiD case gave an example of unmet expectations in a buyer-supplier relationship: “I find reliability very important. If I cannot trust somebody I won’t work with him or her. We had a supplier once, who was not honest about 5.000 euros. One may think that this is a small amount of money, but it had severe consequences for this supplier. He has never been hired by me again. Everybody knows that you cannot fool me without consequences. You have to be honest.” H8 (JOINT SOLUTION OF CONFLICT): The joint solution of conflict can enhance and deepen trust. Not many cases of solved conflicts were found in the DigiD case. One of the respondents stated that he would try to solve situations of distrust on a personal basis: “I trust everyone of the chart, and if I do not trust someone, I will have some good conversations with him or her. I deliberately invest in building trust.”
How does trust influence the joint innovation process?
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In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by mechanisms of hierarchy. Hierarchal mechanisms worked in two ways. In the absence of trust, you have to trust in the decision power or formal procedures. However, hierarchy instead of trust makes decision processes slower and can therefore impact the speed of the innovation process. In the view of some respondents in DigiD case, this has been the case in the PKI project: Hierarchical trust is seen as decision power: “The lack of trust in the PKI project was an important barrier for progress, it made the process cumbersome, the lack of trust paralyzed the process”. On the other hand, having decision power over others or within the organisation increases trust. This has been the case in the hierarchical relationship between the consultant and the contractor in initiation phase of the DigiD case. H10 (LEGAL MECHANISMS): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by legal mechanisms, e.g. contracts. Not many legal mechanisms were mentioned by the respondents of the DigiD case. Obviously, the relationship between contracted commercial parties is based on a contract (apart from relational and expertise based trust). H11 (TRUSTED THIRD PARTY): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by putting a third party / opinion in place. The DigiD case shows that a Trusted Third Party can work like a broker: it can link persons that distrust each other. This happened between policy makers and executives in the DigiD case. One of the respondents saw his / her self as a broker: “There is a lot of distrust between the policy makers and the executive agencies. They have never communicated well. I think I was a linking pin between the two worlds, because I agreed with the executive agencies.” However, this was not seen by all other respondents. H12 (CREATIVITY): Trust is a necessary requisite for creativity in a team. No specific cases of trust increasing or decreasing creativity have been found. H13 (MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL): In the case of a low level of trust during joint innovation, trust is compensated by motivational control, such as (financial) incentives. Motivational control was strongly related to hierarchy. A buyer-supplier relationship between contractor and consultancy firm was seen as hierarchic. As a respondent puts it: “I surely believed that he would act in an honest way. There was a hierarchic relationship, he was the contractor.” H14 (BRIDGING DEVIATING INTERESTS): Trust is a precondition for the ability of bridging deviating interests. In a high trust environment it is easier to put all different interests openly on the table, without necessarily resulting in large conflicts. In the initial and development phase of the DigiD case this proofed to be important. As one of the project managers stated: “I really tried to lay all conflicts of interests on the table, to discuss it in all openness. Hidden agendas would have fatal consequences, would drive the group apart. I constantly reminded the group of our common interest: the creation of one, shared
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infrastructure.” Although the parties had their different (and sometimes conflicting) interests, they were open about it and stressed the common goal rather than the deviating interests. The lack of trust between the rivalling projects (PKI and DigiD) did certainly not help to bridge their deviating views on eIDM. As one of the respondents puts it: “I said to him “stop the PKI development it is not going to work” and he just couldn’t cape with my critique.” H15 (RISKS): Trust is a precondition for the willingness of jointly taking risks. With a rival project in the background (PKI), the DigiD project was not without any risks. Financial and organisational (e.g. loss of jobs) risks seemed to play an important role in the start of the project. Were the different stakeholders able and willing to invest in a new system? Respondents stated that the high trust at start of the project was critical in bearing these risks: “The trust between parties was that large that we dared to take risks and to invest money. The trust was large because all members had a good reputation as regards keeping appointments, we were dependent on each other and we all knew that not being reliable would have severe personal consequences.” In case of high risks, trust between the persons was a necessary prerequisite: “In risky situation you have to trust each other for a 100%, I worked with the people I fully trusted.” H OTHER (CLOSURE): Apart from taking hierarchical, financial and legal measures, group closure was mentioned as an important instrument in case of distrust. In the DigiD case this showed that the initiators were reluctant to let people enter the group that did not want to make the same progress: “He wanted to join the group, but I did not want him to join the group, neither did the others. This had to do with his personality and the low level of trust. Besides we did not want the policy machinery to slow down the project.” Another respondent explicitly mentioned closure mechanisms as well: “If someone is not trustworthy he or she will not be actively involved in the network”
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Table 6 shows how every hypothesis is manifested in each case. Such a table allows to analyse the hypotheses on a higher aggregation level and to test if an observation in one of the case studies is substantiated by the other case studies.
Table 6 Overview of hypotheses and cases
Variable Level of trust Democratic system Process
Belgium (Belpic) Low Consensual Top-down
Austria (Bürgerkarte) Low Westminster Top-down
Finland (VETUMA) High Consensual Bottom-up
The Netherlands (DigiD) High Consensual Bottom-up
On what factors is trust grounded? H1 (PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS) All cases confirm
Independency and expertise were important grounds for trust. Expertise was an important ground for trust and was especially important in lower hierarchies of the organization. Highly important and present in the high trust in the team designing and developing the eIDM solution Technical and legal expertise proofed to be an important source for trust. Respondents said it was more important than Norms and values were less important for trust. Basis norms and values were shared on a macro level: openness and professionalism. Identification and empathy were very important in the start of the project. The initiators struggled with the same problems. The four initiating municipalities had a routinised and strong relationship. They knew what to expect. Personality and expertise were important indicators for trust. Expertise can help to build trust over time.
H2 (NORMS AND VALUES) 3 out of 4 cases confirm
Norms and values was present in trust relationships, but too a lesser degree in distrust relationships
High trust team that initiated the DigiD project shared specific norms and values, and persons that explicitly did not share these norms and values were distrusted. Identification and empathy were very important in the start of the project. The initiators struggled with the same problems.
H3 (IDENTIFICATION AND EMPATHY) 2 out of 4 cases confirm H4 (ROUTINISATION) All cases confirm
No specific examples of identification and empathy
No specific examples of identification and empathy, apart from personal capabilities.
Routinisation and strong ties were an important mechanism to build trust.
The basis for intense and good collaboration in the development team was found in strong ties at the university.
The strength of the tie and predictability of persons was mentioned as most important for trust relationship, more than values or personals capabilities. Many cases of transferability
H5 (TRANSFERABILITY OF TRUST) 3 out of 4 cases confirm
There were no particular cases of transferability found.
Transferability occurred occasionally between the members of high trust teams.
Trusting a common person (in this case the Project Manager) formed basis for trust.
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What factors change trust over time? H6 (CONTROL IN ABSENCE OF TRUST) All cases confirm
Serious cases of control in absence of trust. Integrity of action was assessed and opportunistic behaviour is opposed with hierarchical measures (i.e. escalation). No particular cases of unmet expectations. Mild cases of control in absence of trust. Control manifested in being more closed and institutionalizing trust in working groups. Only few cases of control in absence of trust. Control manifested in being more closed to external parties (e.g. the KATSO consortium) One case of unmet expectations happened. Respondents expressed the need to live up the promises made in the early stage of VETUMA. Not many conflicts. The only large conflict was not solved, so no data. Respondents were very much aware of how to control a relationship when distrust was high. Closure and hierarchical measures are taken.
H7 (UNMET EXPECTATIONS) 3 out of 4 cases confirm
Unmet expectations happened: it is the opposite of routinisation, as it decreases the predictability.
Unmet expectations happened: it is the opposite of routinisation, as it decreases the predictability.
H8 (JOINT SOLUTION OF CONFLICT) 2 out of 4 cases confirm
Solving conflicts clearly helped to build trust in the case no hierarchical measures were needed to solve it.
Solving conflicts clearly helped to build trust. It is closely linked to identity and empathy.
No cases of solved conflicts were found, but respondents knew solving conflicts would help to (re)build trust.
How does trust influence the joint innovation process? H9 (HIERARCHY) All cases confirm
Hierarchical measures (formal minutes, decision power and escalations) were taken in case of conflict and high level of distrust. Contracts and joint statements were mentioned as compensation and driver of trust. It simply decreases risk and increases predictability. Hierarchy was clearly seen as a compensation for trust. Formal structures (e.g. working groups) were needed to bring distrusting parties together. Respondents see contracts, agreements and official minutes as signs of distrust. Hierarchy played a mild role. Involving all hierarchical layers enables trust: it create an open environment, where actions can be watched. No formal documentation was seen as needed and contracts became important when commercial parties entered the project. After the project legal mechanisms were seen as necessary for external parties that did not trust the project (e.g. auditors) On national scale, the state auditor commission was trusted third party (and mediator) between KATSO and VETUMA system. In absence of trust, decision power and formal procedures are important. Hierarchy makes the innovation process slower.
H10 (LEGAL MECHANISMS) 2 out of four cases confirm
Not many legal mechanisms were mentioned by the respondents of the DigiD case.
H11 (TRUSTED THIRD PARTY) No cases confirm
An external consultant was used as a trusted third party, but was not successful as it was not trusted enough.
No specific instances of trusted third parties were found.
Trusted Third Party worked as a broker in the DigiD case: bridging interests and so compensating the absence of trust.
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H12 (CREATIVITY) 1 out of 4 cases confirm H13 (MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL) All cases confirm
Creativity can be blocked in cases of low trust (e.g. do not trust the ideas of the other). Motivational control was very much apparent in the Belgian case. Dependency was used to control e.g. commercial parties. Independency makes people more trustworthy. In the Belpic case, trust was needed to express opposing views.
Trust made the development team rather efficient and open. Creativity was not explicitly mentioned. Commercial goals were clear and used as a control mechanism. Market mechanisms made the interests predictable.
No specific examples of influence of trust on creativity were found.
No specific examples of influence of trust on creativity were found.
Motivational controls (such as incentives) did not compensate, but increased trust.
Motivational control was seen in hierarchically asymmetric (i.e. dependent) relationships.
H14 (BRIDGING DEVIATING INTERESTS) All cases confirm
High level of trust in the development team created an open environment and allowed criticism. Trust brought also technical and legal perspectives on eIDM together. Without trust, parties would not have invested in the eIDM project.
High level of trust allowed expressing opposing interests, opinions and ideas in an open environment, without interpersonal relationships. Trust was needed to bear the financial and organizational risks, especially in the initiation phase. Distrust would block collaboration. There were several signs of group closure in the Finnish case.
High level of trust is easier to put all different interest openly on the table, without provoking conflicts. This was important in the initial and development phase.
H15 (RISKS) All cases confirm
Trust was needed to deal with organizational complexity in the consortium that developed the eIDM infrastructure.
In case of high risks (organizational, technical and financial) in the DigiD project, trust between persons was crucial. Closure was explicitly mentioned as an important instrument in case of distrust.
H OTHER (CLOSURE)
In the absence of trust, people will try to keep distrusted persons out of decisions in the innovation process. Trust had a positive influence on the speed of the innovation process, because it speeded up decision process and knowledge exchange.
H OTHER (EFFICIENCY)
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In this chapter conclusions and recommendations for each hypothesis studied in the case studies are discussed. The mechanism, role in the innovation process and recommendation for policy-makers and other government practitioners are outlined.
Factors on which trust is grounded
8.1.1 Personal characteristics The case studies show in specific that exposure of knowledge can contribute to the trust that somebody will do his job accurately. In this uncertain stages where people has to be selected as project members, it appears that project managers tend to involve persons of whom they know professionally and of whom they can trust their expertise and track record. Role of innovation: In highly specialised society, knowledge is the key for innovation, therefore it is important to have the right expertise in the innovation team. Recommendation: It is important to have a large amount of weak ties (persons only indirectly involved in the innovation process) to have access to large amount of potential expertise for the innovation process. By valuing expertise instead of, for instance, the knowing of somebody, the innovation process (e.g. the decision making) becomes more rational.
8.1.2 Shared norms and values It appears in the cases that if individuals share specific norms and values, they are more able to estimate the behaviour of others. It seems even the case, that in groups with very strong norms and values the expectation that someone will act compliant is greater and therefore their level of trust is higher. Role in innovation: Strong norms and values and high level of trust can impact innovation in two ways. First, it enables and speeds up the innovation process as no control mechanisms are needed. Second, strong trust based on norms and values can cause group closure (see the conclusion & recommendation on closure in 8.3.9). Recommendation: This hypothesis shows that for policy makers it is important to mutually and deliberately build trust at all stages of the innovation process by involving people with the same norms, values and interests. On the other hand it is important to ensure enough diversity of ideas within the group. Therefore, one should not confuse diversity of ideas with a variety in norms and values.
8.1.3 Identification and empathy It appears in two confirmed cases that in case of high level of uncertainty, for instance at the initiation of the project were the aims, strategies and technology are still unclear; shared experiences and problems strengthen the relationship between the interpersonal relationships. In addition, it seems that in highly competitive environments, where there
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are several similar innovations build by separate groups, identification and empathy is more important as groups feel that they have a shared enemy. Role in innovation process: Identification and empathy yield mechanisms of group bonding, which may result in group closure processes and thus eliminates openness for deviant ideas. It can polarizes groups within or between projects and therefore frustrate the innovation process. Recommendation: This hypothesis demonstrates that identification and empathy can be irrational grounds for trust, which highly influences the innovation process. This can increases competition between coalitions and not necessarily result in the most optimal innovation.
8.1.4 Routinisation Routinisation increases the information individuals have of the others; herewith it increased the predictability of the other and decreases the uncertainty. In many cases we have seen that people tend to rely on persons they already professionally know and their track record, so that they can estimate the behaviour of the other. Role in innovation process: On the one hand strong information of the expertise and track record of others enable project managers to select the strongest team, but on the other hand as the selection may be based on prejudices and can be implicit and irrational. This can result in overlap and lack of expertise and skills within the innovation process. Recommendation: This hypothesis shows that project managers need to choose deliberately the project members that encompass the right expertises and skills and on the other hand their reputation and proven track record. Professional HRM policy at the start of ICT projects can counter this risk. 8.1.5 Transferability of trust In cases of high uncertainty and a weak tie between two persons, people may ask a third person with whom they have a strong tie and have a strong tie with the other to give his opinion on the reliability of the third person. The intermediate person through which trust flows can be seen as a opinion broker in the sense that the deciding person grounds his opinion on the assessment of the opinion broker. The cases also demonstrate that the opinion broker has a very powerful position as he is able to control the information flows. He can decide to give access to information or not, or can bring persons into contact or not. Role in innovation: In groups with many brokers, the information flow is not optimal, as the opinion brokers control the access to contacts and information based upon their interest. In optimal situation people are able to access unbiased information and trust based on their assessment. Recommendation: In innovation, dissemination of unbiased information is important, e.g. to choose what technology to use. In a network where people are well connected (so with less opinion brokers) information flows are less biased. In networks in which people are very well connected, there is a continuous information flow between many actors, but within a network with many brokers, information flows are controlled by a
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few. This can be very efficient during the implementation or diffusion phase of the innovation process, but can hamper the more divergent processes needed for the initial phases. So, government practitioners should pay attention to connectedness of the actors involved and prevent that few opinion brokers control information in the process. Therefore, it is necessary balance efficiency with an open environment, in which weak ties feel welcome.
Factors that change the level of trust over time
8.2.1 Control mechanisms in absence of trust Various control mechanisms have been used to counterbalance distrust: examples are written documents such as minutes of meetings, hierarchy (in the sense that people higher in the hierarchy rely that their employees will follow their command). In addition we found in all cases that in absence of trust, people tend to be very careful in the provision of information, knowledge and skills. Role in innovation: Control may counterbalance trust in herewith support the innovation, however, crucial for innovation is knowledge and information sharing. In case of distrust, control mechanisms can stimulate knowledge and information sharing, but not as strong as trust does. For instance, although there is copyright if there is not trust in the design team, not all information will be shared (secrecy). Recommendation: Trust is very important in the innovation process, in specific the initiation and development phase. Control mechanisms can not fully replace this. Therefore, it is important to deliberately and mutually build trust at these stages of the process. The conclusions and recommendations for the grounds of trust gives directions for trust building. 8.2.2 Unmet expectations In all cases reciprocity was an important fundament of trust. However, cases have also shown that in weak and strong ties this reciprocity can be damaged not living up to the expectations of the other. The cases show that there are several levels of damaging trust by not meeting expectations. Most frequently the decrease of trust was caused by actors not meeting the expectations of the other, for instance not achieving certain goals, not committing that much funds or time, not communicating well, lack of management, deviating from agreements made. The level of impact of the unmet expectation, combined with the type and strength of the relationship, seem to determine the need for control mechanisms to compensate. Role in innovation: The trust that decreases by unmet expectation seems to be compensated by control mechanisms. This can help to rebuild trust on the long term, but it slows down the innovation process on the short term. Recommendation: This hypothesis stresses the importance of setting realistic and feasible goals and openness on the strengths and weaknesses of actors. Trust can lower the threshold for communicating vulnerable information. If stakeholders have open, honest and instant communication about the progress being made, including the risks and failures of the innovation process, the chance that trust is damaged in a later stage decreases.
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8.2.3 Joint solution of conflict The cases show that a joint solution of a conflict is a prime example of mutual emotional involvement. Just like other emotional incidents, conflicts increase the exchange of emotions between persons. It is a form of intimacy, which strengthens ties. So, it seems the joint solution of a conflict strengthens the identification and empathy between two persons, which is a ground for trust. Role of innovation: It might be the case that conflicts without a solution seem to polarize persons within the innovation process, whereas jointly solved conflicts build trust and support cooperation. The conflict disrupts the innovation process, but the end result might be that the trust after the conflict trusts, which may support and speed up the innovation process in later phases. Recommendation: This hypothesis suggests that project managers should allow conflicts to a certain degree in teams with high trust relationships and that the mediation and management of conflicts needs attention. Project managers should not be conflictaverse, especially in heterogeneous groups, which often encompass many perspectives and views. 8.3 The influence of trust on joint innovation process
8.3.1 Hierarchical mechanisms of control The trust of the superior in his subordinate is in most cases higher than vice versa. This, as the superior has a more powerful position compared to subordinate and can put consequences to the behaviour of the subordinate. The subordinate can not counter behaviour of the superior, the superior can. Second, actors may trust individuals higher in the hierarchy as they have decision power, network, and access to resources and therefore trust their promises. Third, the subordinate-superior relationship of person you have conflict with can be used to escalate and force a specific outcome. Role in innovation: As the subordinate is dependent on the superior, the superior may have more trust that the subordinate will act in his interest than vice versa. The effect in innovation processes may be that the subordinate will serve the interests of the subordinate rather than fully exploiting his or her knowledge or skills to support the innovation process. In addition, the involvement of individuals higher in the hierarchy may be particularly important in the initial phase of the innovation process, where decisions are made and resources are allocated. Recommendation: This mechanism shows the subsidiarity of trust in the innovation process. Project managers should be aware that persons from the right hierarchical level are around the table, or elsewhere in the project organisation. 8.3.2 Legal mechanisms of control Legal mechanisms (such as formal minutes, contracts with markets parties, etc.) increase the predictability of the contracted party and decrease the risk as puts consequences to opportunistic behaviour as a counterbalance. Like hierarchy it is way to compensate trust. Role in innovation: Legal mechanisms are more rational and explicit than trust as governance mechanisms. Although legal mechanisms will take more time in the
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innovation process than trust, it creates an open environment with an explicit clear cut overview of the rules of the game. However, it may decrease the benevolence and spontaneous collaboration, which can particularly be needed in the design and development phase. Recommendation: Especially in the design and development phase of an eIDM innovation, a high trust network of persons in which spontaneous collective action can happen is needed. In later phases, such as the implementation and diffusion, legal instruments can enable open dissemination of the innovation. 8.3.3 Trusted Third Party As evidence is lacking on this hypothesis, we can not make any conclusions or recommendations. 8.3.4 Creativity It seems that in high trust networks both limited and high creativity are present. Creativity is grounded in the values of the groups, such as openness of deviant ideas. In high trust networks, people can be closed or open to deviant ideas. Not trust, but the value and norms within the group ultimately affect the creativity of the group. However, a certain basis of trust is needed for information exchange. The values however determine if deviant ideas are shared. Role of innovation: The strength of weak ties (persons that are only indirectly involved in the innovation process) for innovation depends on whether the group of trusted people are open to deviating ideas from these weak ties. Recommendation: Not a certain level of trust in the development of in phase is needed to be ensured, but also shared values, such as openness to deviating ideas. 8.3.5 Motivational control (incentives) It appears that individuals who know the interests of other individuals can use incentives to stimulate certain behaviour. Incentives increase the predictability and thus trust that an actor will demonstrate certain behaviour. Role of innovation: Incentives can be used to stimulate innovative behaviour, e.g. innovation awards, certain allocation of resources. Recommendation: Incentives appear to be an important stimulus for innovative behaviour and could be used for this purpose. Especially in situations of distrust, praising constructive behaviour with awards good be favourable to rebuild the level of trust. 8.3.6 Bridging deviating interests In high trust environment information on conflicting can be more often openly discussed, whereas in low trust environments conflicting interests are hidden agendas and more tricks are played, which enhances the distrustful relationship. Role of innovation: Open discussion on conflicting interests stimulates creativity and finding of a shared solution. Distrustful networks can cause an innovation lock: no progress will be made as conflicting interests can not be overcome.
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Recommendation: The development and design of and eIDM innovation can only take place with a certain basis of trust. If this is lacking, policy makers could question the viability of the project. In case of only a severe innovation lock-in, actors could be replaced by others to unlock the situation 8.3.7 Risks Trust is clearly needed to jointly take risks. In order to be able to take a risk, actors have to be certain that there interests will be respected by the other partners. In case there is not this basis of trust, interdependencies can compensate this trust, e.g. creating the feeling that we are all in the same boat. If the interests are in line, people are more wiling to take risks, as they are more certain that the other will act in their interest. Role of innovation: At the start and the development of the innovation, uncertainties are high and there are many risks for the involved persons. This uncertain situation requires a high level of trust to enable the development of the innovation process. Recommendation: In the first stages, it is important to deliberately build a certain basis of trust on the basis of shared interests. 8.3.8 Efficiency The observation that a high level of trust in the innovation process can stimulate efficiency was only found in one of the four cases. However, this is an interesting observation. A low level of interpersonal trust between actors involved can be one of the barriers for the development and implementation of an eIDM system. In low trust environments actors need to reconfirm agreements, to formalise decisions, only limited information is shared and a high level of involvement is needed (e.g. all partners have to attend all meetings as they do not trust that the other will take into account their interests). In cases of low interpersonal trust the cooperation appears not only to be slower but also less effcient than in in cases of high levels of trust. 8.3.9 Closure In several cases we found that group closure caused a lock-in effect: opposing views were not taken into account and distrusted people were excluded from the network. Role in innovation: Lock-in effect can help to speed up the innovation process, but there is a huge risk: it limited the access to new ideas in most cases. Lock-in and closure can hamper rational and well-balanced decision making in the innovation process. Recommendation: Policy makers and practitioners can counterbalance closure effects with control mechanisms, discussed earlier in this conclusion section.
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General implications This study shows that trust has two sides in the innovation process of eIDM systems. One the one hand, a high level of trust between the persons involved in such a project enhances the speed and reach of sharing of information, knowledge and skills. eIDM projects are knowledge intensive due to the technical, organisational and legal complex nature. Therefore, a certain level of trust is necessary to deal with this complexity is absolutely necessarey. On the other hand, most cases show that high levels of trust combined with very strong norms and values can cause group closure and lock-in effects. This might have severe consequences for the creative side of the innovation process, as influence from weak ties (persons that are indirectly involved in the innovation process) or outside the network is seen as undesirable. As a soft factor of innovation, trust is often neglected compared to financial, technical, legal, and organizational factors. This seems logical at first instance, as trust is a complex and intangible concept. However, this study shows that trust should be deliberately build and perverse effects such as group closure deliberately need to be compensated by control mechanisms, such as strict procedures and organisational hierarchy, to ensure the inclusion of all important stakeholders and knowledge. All cases made clear that the level and role of trust in the innovation process highly differs over time. At the early stages of innovation, high levels of interpersonal trust are needed, whereas in later stages (implementation and diffusion) control mechanisms, such as hierarchy, market incentives, regulation and law, is needed. Although the case studies provide only explorative evidence, it seems that the right balance of control and trust in the innovation process can help to find an optimal combination of process speed and effectiveness (e.g. end-user take-up). The case studies show that trust is a crucial factor which influences the innovation process, outcome and impact. However, the cases also show that the notion is versatile and ambiguous. Whereas other factors, such as funding and legislation are explicit and tangible, trust is implicit and difficult to grasp. This makes that policy recommendations are more difficult to make for researchers. However, what we have seen in the cases is that the large majority of policy makers did not deliberately pay attention to the social setting and its impact. Before starting a joined-up ICT innovation process, project managers could more deliberately assess the social characteristics of the network involved (e.g. the level of interpersonal trust among partners) and based on this estimate the feasibility of the cooperation.
Implications for policy instruments This study points to the fact that different projects and project stages need rational assessment of the trust configuration. Ouchi (1980) calls these trust configurations ‘network governance structures’. According to him, there are three governance mechanisms possible during an innovation process: based on trust, based on market agreements (such as contracts and buyer-supplier relationships) and based on hierarchical control (see figure 6). A critical trust assessment based on Ouchi’s network
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governance triangle (Trust-Market-Hierarchy) can help to balance the positive and negative effects of trust on the innovation process.
Figure 6 Triangle of network governance structures (Ouchi, 1980)
Future research (firmly grounded in the practice of government projects) should give more normative guidance on these interpersonal trust configurations. A specific trust configuration assessment for innovation could be used at three specific moments: (1) start of a project (2) during a project and (3) after a project. 9.2.1 Start of a project At the start of a project to map the current social capital of the stakeholders involved. It can complement current investment or risk analysis of complex ICT projects in the Public Sector. Such an ex-ante analysis should focus on the existence of grounds of trust at the start of a project: 1 Personal characteristics (e.g., is there enough expertise in place?) 2 Norms and values (e.g., is there a balance between shared vision and heterogeneity in ideas / opinions?) 3 Identification and empathy (e.g., did the stakeholders experiences the same problems / issues?) 4 Routinisation (e.g., did the stakeholders work together in the past?) 5 Transferability of trust (e.g. how were team members from the different organizations selected?)
9.2.2 During a project During a complex innovation project a trust configuration analysis can monitor whether there is enough trust, market or hierarchy mechanisms in place. In this sense it can complement current project and program management methodologies. Monitoring could focus on different roles of interpersonal trust during the different phases of a project and the specific barriers of innovation that relate to social capital (e.g. conflicts, mediation, opportunistic behaviour, etc.).
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9.2.3 After a project After the project such an assessment can be used to evaluate the most important drivers and barriers of innovation related to social capital. It can help to draw up lessons learnt for future projects.
Future research Future research should aim to design such a trust configuration assessment by translating the variables of this research into a practical survey. Evidence from other inter-organisational systems, such as eProcurement, tax or eHealth, can help to generalize the conclusions of this report to other joint innovations.
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