1

Epicharis Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission CommitteeL-40779November 28, 1975Respondent: Fr. Lambino
Facts
:1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A.in Theology;2. That on May
30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-1976 respondent told
her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their
school reason in the letter: Petitioners frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class.3. Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were
unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate
School4. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her
graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical
Faculties, but that she would have to fulfil their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her
degree later in Theology which would entail about four to five years more of studies whereas inthe Loyola
School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more.5.
She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester
Issue:
Whether or not the Faculty Admissions Committee had authority and discretion in allowing petitioner to continue
studying or not?

Held:
Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner cannot
compel the mandamus to admit her into further studies since the respondent had no clear duty to admit the
petitioner. That respondent Fr. Lambino and Loyola School of Technology has the discretion whether to admit the
petitioner or not. Factors that were considered are academic standards, personality traits, character orientation and
nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary

DLSU VS CA
Facts: PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are
members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint
Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to
petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the
controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic
freedom. ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition
for certiorari against respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes,
Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration;3 (3) Order dated
January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to
reiterate writ of preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private
respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5 On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a
Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic
expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4 Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22 before
the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a LetterResolution23 dated June 1, 1995. The ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents,
representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and enjoyed from: 1.
Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and 2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner
and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith allow
all said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat. Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU
when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25,
1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of
court.34 Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent
Judge's Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued35 a writ of
preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which reads: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as your
subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other person assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to
immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of
petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of
May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the courses

2
offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation from said
school.36 On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719)
with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge's
September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995. On April 12, 1996, the CA
granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction. On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution
No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to
be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.38 Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner
DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private
respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.42 Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996,
private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that
CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic. Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was
allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary
injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122. On February 17, 1997,
petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issues
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of institutions of higher learning
that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules. 2. Whether or not petitioner
DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law? 2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic
freedom? 2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence? 3. Whether or not the penalty
imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.

Held:
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96 disapproved
the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU.
However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two
different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete
their degree courses until their graduation. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review
over disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning. On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No.
7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and
for other purposes." Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides: Section
3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the Commission
on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission. The Commission shall be
independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office
of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: x
x x x n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary
to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and o) perform such other functions as may be
necessary for its effective operations and for the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher
education. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996
and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997
areANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner DLSU
is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand,
it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and
their transfer credentials immediately issued. SO ORDERED.

CSC VS SOJOR 554 SCRA 160 (2008)

Facts: Respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of the Central Visayas
Polytechnic College (CVPC). In 1997, R.A. No. 8292, or the "Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997" was
enacted which mandates that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges.

3
The BOT of CVPC appointed Sojor as president, with a four-year term until September 2002. He was appointed
president of the institution for a second term, expiring on September 24, 2006.
On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU). A Board of Regents
(BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.
Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty members before
the Civil Service Commission regional office. Respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction. The CSC denied his motion to dismiss. Thus, respondent was formally charged with three
administrative cases.
He appealed to CSC proper, arguing that since the BOT is headed by the Committee on Higher Education
Chairperson who was under the Office of the President , the BOT was also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC
was appointed by the BOT, then he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the jurisdiction granted to CSC
by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 80714 enacted in October 1975, respondent contended that this was
superseded by the provisions of R.A. No. 8292, a later law which granted to the BOT the power to remove university
officials.
Issues:
1. Does the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over presidents of state universities or schools with
governing boards exclusively granted by their charters the corporate powers of administration?
2. Does the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of a state university exclusive to the Board
of Regents?
3. Does the assumption by the Civil Service Commission of jurisdiction over a president of a State University violate
academic freedom?
4. Does respondent's appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the pending administrative cases
against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him?
Held:
1. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every governmentowned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career service positions.
The Non-Career Service shall include:
1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their
personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential
staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the
specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of
the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the
governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
2. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of the
university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of administration." Although the BOR of NORSU is
given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that such
power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another
body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the
matter. In this case, the CSC also has jurisdiction to discipline all members of the civil service, career or non-career.
Hence the CSC has concurrent jurisdictionwith the BOR of the university in the discipline and removal of its officials.

3. The principle of academic freedom finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the matters
traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints filed
against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of
official documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are
classified as grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.
This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to
perform acts without any statutory basis. For that reason, a school official, who is a member of the civil service,
may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free to do so
under the principle of academic freedom.
4. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v. Santos are inapplicable to the
present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is
an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi
est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same
cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of
when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president. (CSC vs. Sojor, G.R. No. 168766,
May 22, 2008)

FLORD NICSON CALAWAG VS. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS AND DEAN CARLOS C BAYLON
GR NO. 207412
AUGUST 7, 2013
FACTS:
The petitioner enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas under a scholarship from the
Department of Science and Technology-Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and Development. He
finished his first year of study with good grades, and thus was eligible to start their thesis tentative in the first
semester of their second year. The petitioner then enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative thesis
titles, and obtained the consent of Dr. Rex Balena to be their thesis adviser. These details were enclosed in the
letters the petitioner sent to Dean Baylon, asking him to approve the composition of their thesis committees. The
letter contained the thesis committee members and the thesis advisers approval of their titles, as well as the
approval of Professor Roman Sanares, the director of the Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanology.
Upon receipt of the petitioners letters, Dean Baylon questioned the propriety of the thesis topics with the colleges
graduate degree program. He disapproved the composition of the petitioners thesis committees and their tentative
thesis topics. According to him, the thesis titles connote a historical and social dimension study which is not
appropriate for the petitioners chosen masters degree. He ordered the petitioner to submit a two-page proposal
containing an outline of their tentative thesis titles and informed them that he is forming an ad hoc committee that
would take over the role of the adviser and of the thesis committees.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC asking it to order Dean Baylon to approve
and constitute the petitioners thesis committee and approve of their thesis titles. The petitioner also asked the RTC
to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Dean Baylon and order him to perform such acts while
the suit was pending.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitioners request for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction

HELD:
No. To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioner must establish the ff requisites: a) the invasion of
the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; b) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakeable; and c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction justifies only in a clear case, free form doubt and dispute.
When the complainants right is thus doubtful, or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and therefore, the
issuance of injunctive relief is improper. The right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for
issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The right to education is not absolute. Section 5 e, Article XIV of
the Constitution provides that every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. The thesis requirement and the compliance with
the procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a person desiring to complete a
course of study would have to comply with.

TANADA VS ANGGARA

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via
signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on
its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector
cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted
benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted
as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt
servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a
regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it
consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did
was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO
allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic
self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice
following Renato Coronas departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members,
an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During
the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral
legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional
Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the
consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to
be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

6
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC
does not render JBCs purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress
will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of
legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of
Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

`
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is
violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a
well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously
discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, a representative of
Congress, the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind,
that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than
one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to
resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should
proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records
thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the
Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that
Congress, in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are
still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case
of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers.
Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of government
would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the
Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one
full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus,
any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC
in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not
be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount
law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply
made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the
government and the people who run it.

7
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions
are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1)
member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.