You are on page 1of 12

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Judicial Power
Defined
Where Vested
Limitations
The Supreme Court
Composition
Qualifications
Appointment
Salary
Tenure
Removal
Prohibitions
Powers
Original Jurisdiction
Appellate Jurisdiction
Temporary Assignment of Judges
Change of Venue/Place of Trial
Appointment of Court Personnel
Administrative Supervision of Courts
Dismissal/Removal Powers
Contempt Powers
Other Powers
Decision-Making Process (En Banc/Division Cases); Stare Decisis
The Other Courts
Judicial Review
Defined
Functions
Requisites
Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Political Question
The Judicial and Bar Council
Composition
Function
Role of Congress in the Judicial Process; Limitations
Independence of the Judiciary
CASELIST:
Santiago, Jr. vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139
Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183
Almario vs. Alba, 127 SCRA 69
Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756
Lina vs. Purisima, 82 SCRA 244
Jandusay vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 376
Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 674
Disomangcop vs. Datumanong, 444 SCRA 203
Salonga vs. Pano, 134 SCRA 438
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
People vs. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994
Tatad vs. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436
Republic vs. Hereda, 119 SCRA 411
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1988
In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554
In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil 534
De Guzman vs. People, 119 SCRA 337
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284
De La Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
Garcia vs. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106
Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530
David vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051
IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141
Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470
Baker vs. Carr, 369 US 186
In Re: Manzano, 166 SCRA 246

People vs. Gacott, G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995


De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17. 2010
Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992
Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001
Judge Dadole vs. COA, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002

1 SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:22 PM
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970 [Judicial Power]

FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his
graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the
honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and
teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a
MTD claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper,
the question has become academic (bc the graduation already proceeded.
They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since
the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial
functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function
ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The
exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the
action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought
before a tribunal for hearing and determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment
and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to
the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the
law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy.
Judicial power is defined:

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and


determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an
act is the subject matter of adjudication.

The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases


before them.

The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor
quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary
that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board
clothed with power and authority to determine

2.

4.

Are the petitioners entitled relief?

ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

5.

Is the proposed Constitution in force?

October 26, 2012 Leave a comment


January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)

HELD:

PARTIES:
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to


an existing constitution is a judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the
judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the
manner required by the constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification (election
or plebiscite held in accordance with law and only with qualified voters). Due
to the environmental and social conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial law)
the Court cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to the proposed
Constitution. The majority ruled to dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the
proposed Constitution is the basic issue posed by the cases which
considerations other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new
constitution is in force as there are not enough votes to say otherwise.

FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner
Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice
Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC
not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
power
of
the
executive
to
grant
reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite
the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which
is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of
power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and
remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision,
however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement
of
their
decisions
after
their
finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life
of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
no
higher
right
than
the
right
to
life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
3.
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Ratification Cases. Date of effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution.

4. Aquino v. Enrile
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Powers of the President.
Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183

FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been
arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The
petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the
President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over
the Government by force..." General Order No. 2 was issued by the President
in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081
placing the entire country under martial law.

JAVELLANA VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973

ISSUES:

Ponente: Concepcion, C.J

1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to


declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?; and

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain
respondents from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
constitution not found in the present constitution. Javellana maintained that
the respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
proposed constitution and that the president is without power to proclaim the
ratification of the constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan,
Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of
Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and
proclamation which are similar in objective.

ISSUES:
1.

Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?

2.
Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
ratified validly in compliance to applicable laws?
3.

Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the people?

2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of


martial law?

HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to
judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one.
However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional
sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has
become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the
suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons
arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the
proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to
safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of
society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial
law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred
to in this case
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

5.
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath
of office as member of the National Assembly of the
Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those
who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the
adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua


filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly. The following
day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its
own resolution providing that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National


Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondents
protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II.

THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its


jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
protest

filed

against

notwithstanding

the

the

election

previous

of

the

confirmation

petitioner
of

such

election by resolution of the National Assembly.


The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of
its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the
National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex


necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
[W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.

6. Sanidad v. COMELEC
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Plebiscite Cases.
SANIDAD
73
SCRA
Ponente:

VS
333;

October
Martin,

12,

COMELEC
1976
J

FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad
petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD
Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that
the president has no power to propose amendments to the new
constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.
ISSUE:
1.
Is
the
case
2. Does the president have authority
Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the
time
frame
allowed
sufficient

at
bar
justiciable?
to propose amendments to the
proposed amendments within the
and
proper
submission?

HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent
assembly is a justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the
constitutional authority of the president to perform such act is in question.
The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental
powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time
for deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too
short especially since the questions are issues of the day and the people have
been living with them since the proclamation of martial law.

7.

Alex Almario vs Manuel Alba

127 SCRA 69 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political


Question
In January 1984, a plebiscite was to be held to allow the voters to either
approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Batasang
Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate
questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers.
Alex Almario and some other concerned groups seek to enjoin the submission
in the said plebiscite of Questions No. 3 (grant as an additional mode of
acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by

the government of a land reform program and a social reform program) to the
people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair
and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v.
COMELEC.
However, unlike in the case of Tolentino vs COMELEC, Almario et al do not
seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the
people to study the meaning and implications of the said
questions/proposals until the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and
properly submitted to the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on
a later date.
HELD: No. This is a political question. The necessity, expediency, and
wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to
adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not grant of public land and urban land
reform are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed
amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide.
The questions are presented for their determination.

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes


involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper
exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such
enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations
thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this
reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793
merely added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by
Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the
functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election
contests is essentially judicial.
9.
Maniago v. CA

Assuming that a member or some members of the Supreme Court may find
undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land
reform program, the remedy is to vote NO in the plebiscite but not to
substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the
millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes.

G.R. No. 104392, February 20, 1996

Further, Almario et al have failed to make out a case that the average voter
does not know the meaning of grant of public land or of urban land
reform

Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used int
ransporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio
City proper to itsplant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one
of his buses figured in a vehicularaccident with a passenger jeepney owned by
private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a resultof the accident, a criminal case
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property andmultiple physical
injuries against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a
civilcase for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitione
r Maniago.Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil
case against him, citingthe pendency of the criminal case against his driver
and because no reservation of the rightto bring it (civil case) separately had
been made in the criminal case. But the lower courtdenied petitioners motion
on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action couldproceed
independently of the criminal action.

8.

Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas

17 SCRA 756 Political Law Constitutional Law Judicial Power Defined


Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in
the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is
provided in the law that:
There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the
Philippines.
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez
assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding
with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not
provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot
be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise
once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new
function to the Supreme Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution
allowed Congress to determine which body should decide controversies
relating to the election of the President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not
create another court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, the
Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may
be established by law
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in
the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited
judicial power, but the judicial power under our political system, and,
accordingly, the entirety or all of said power, except, only, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the
fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House
Electoral Tribunal, respectively.

Mendoza, J.
Facts:

Issue:
whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent maynon
etheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following
provisions of the Civil Code:Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there beingfault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault ornegligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties,is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable not only forones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one isresponsible.
Held:
No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be
reservedas required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To
begin with, 1 quite clearlyrequires that a reservation must be made to
institute separately all civil actions for therecovery of civil liability, otherwise
they will be deemed to have been instituted with thecriminal case. Such civil
actions are not limited to those which arise from the offensecharged. In
other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery
of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (
ex delicto
) or from
quasi delict
under
Art.
2176of the Civil Code must be reserved
otherwise they will be deemed instituted with thecriminal action.On the basis
of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as
ageneral rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1)

when such actionarising from the same act or omission, which is the subject
of the criminal action, is waived;(2) the right to bring it separately is reserved
or (3) such action has been instituted prior tothe criminal action. Even if an
action has not been reserved or it was brought before theinstitution of the
criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of
civilliability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which
the civil liabilitymight arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code
10.

sALONGA vs PAO

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985


Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and
liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie
case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for
subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and
persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro
Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor
Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner
Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a
Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al.
(which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on
December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt
of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his
counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was
lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not
received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called
supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint
signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga,
along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD
885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed
a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution
to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge
Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano)
issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the
Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including
Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4
January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the
contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the
prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that
to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him
would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision
from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on
the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was
circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January
18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent
City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner.
Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied
its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as
one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent
Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and
signatures and to place it once again in the Courts crowded agenda for
further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of
subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and
academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and
academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in
similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this
Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation
of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of
the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of
the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was
mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to
the Presidents legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court
discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of
the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that
the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise
of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous
decisions ever printed in the Reports.
11. CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO
CITY,
respondents.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case
was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order
and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify
EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not
see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

12.
KilosBayan v Guingona G.R. No. 113375. May 5, 1994.
Facts:
On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given
the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country's on-line lottery
system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted
not later than 8 November 1993 "for final clearance and approval by the
Chief Executive."

1.5 The Lessor is expected to submit a comprehensive nationwide lottery


development plan ('Development Plan') which will include the game, the
marketing of the games, and the logistics to introduce the games to all the
cities and municipalities of the country within five (5) years.

1.7
The Lessor shall be selected based on its technical expertise,
hardware and software capability, maintenance support, and financial
resources. The Development Plan shall have a substantial bearing on the
choice of the Lessor. The Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least
sixty percent (60%) of its shares owned by Filipino shareholders. . .

1.8 Upon expiration of the lease, the Facilities shall be owned by PCSO
without any additional consideration. 3

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 11 April 1994 is hereby MADE


PERMANENT.
Ratio: A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which
it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of
the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court
brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (a)

The actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is
its franchise to hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC
which operates and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight
years.

As may be expected, it will induce in PGMC an active interest and


participation in the success of PCSO that is not expected of an ordinary
detached lessor who gets to be paid his rental fee whether the lessee's
business prospers or not. PGMC's share in the operation depends on its own
performance and the effectiveness of its collaboration with PCSO. Although
the contract pretends otherwise, PGMC is a co-investor with PCSO in what is
practically, if not in a strictly legal sense, a joint venture.
13. Francisco Tatad, John Osmea and Rodolfo Biazon v. Jesus Garcia, Jr.
(DOTC Sec.),EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd.
G.R. No. 114222 April 6, 1995
Quiason, J.

The petitioners raise the following points of law to wit:

FACTS:

a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited


from holding and conducting Lotteries 'in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity';

DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA, a major
thoroughfare inMetropolitan Manila, which shall traverse the cities of Pasay,
Quezon, Mandaluyong andMakati

b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional


franchise is required before any person may be allowed to establish and
operate said telecommunications system;

RA No. 6957 entitled An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction,


Operation andMaintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector,
and For Other Purposes orBOT Law provided for two schemes for the
financing, construction and operation of government projects through private
initiative and investment: Build-Operate-Transfer(BOT) or Build-Transfer
(BT)

c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60%
Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified
from operating a public service, like the said telecommunications system; and
d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the
Foreign Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate the
on-line Lotto and telecommunications systems."
Considering the above citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the
Berjaya Group "undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%," by
selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.
Issue: In the deliberation on this case on 26 April 1994, the issues are
regarding:
(a) the locus standi of the petitioners, and
(b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section
1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO
from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or
foreign."
Held: Requirement of standing was waived by the Court. (a)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the
challenged Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED contrary
to law and invalid.

Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Technical


Committee werecreated by the DOTC in relation to EDSA Light Rail Transit
III project
only the EDSA LRT Consortium (later called EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd.)
met therequirements of PBAC
DOTC requested presidential approval of the contract but then Exe. Sec.
Drilon conveyedthat the Pres. could not sign the same. So DOTC and private
respondents re-negotiated theagreement.
The agreement provided inter alia that upon full or partial completion and
viability thereof,private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the
completed portion to DOTCwhich shall operate the same.
RA No. 7718 amended RA No. 6957; it expressly provides for BLT scheme
and allowsdirect negotiation of BLT contracts
ISSUE:
WON EDSA LRT Corp., Ltd., a foreign corporation can own EDSA LRT III, a
publicutility
HELD:
Yes.
What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the
coaches, railstations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility.

While a franchise is needed tooperate these facilities to serve the public, they
do not by themselves constitute a publicutility. What constitutes a public
utility is not their ownership but their use to serve thepublic.

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act,
in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.

Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Const.: No franchise, certificate or any other form of
authorizationfor the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines orto corporations or associations organized under
the laws of the Philippines at least sixtyper centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificateor authorization be
exclusive character or for a longer period than fifty years.

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

there is a distinction between the operation of a public utility and the


ownership of thefacilities and equipment used to serve the public
ownership
- a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person
iscompletely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the
concurrencewith the rights of another
operation of a rail system as a public utility includes the transportation of
passengersfrom one point to another point, their loading and unloading at
designated places and themovement of the trains at pre-scheduled times
right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from
theownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without
operating them as apublic utility, or conversely, one may operate a public
utility without owning the facilitiesused to serve the public.

14. In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 568 (AC 1928)


22JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Marcial Edillon was dibarred due to non-payment of his IBP dues, hence
the petitioner on this case. He claimed that the provisions of Sec. 10 of Rule
139-A of the Rules of Court is unconstitutional as he is being compelled, as a
precondition in maintaining his good standing as a lawyer, to pay and settle
his dues to the IBP. Petitioner stubbornly insisted his take and refused to
admit full competence of the court in this matter. But after some time in
realization, his recalcitrance and defiance were gone in his subsequent
communication with the court. He appealed that his health, advanced age,
and concern to his former clients welfare be considered in his prayer so that
he can again practice law.

1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of
75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and
the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the
bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional,
while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that
was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1.

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who
flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due
to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

2.

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the


court on the petitions of the said candidates;

3.

The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to


determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore,
in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power
are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment
of the court on who can practice law; and

4.

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class


legislation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be reinstated as member of the bar.
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with condition. Failure to abide
entails loss of such privilege. Considered in addition was the two (2) years
Atty. Edillon was barred to practice law, and the dictum of Justice Malcolm
in Villavicencio v. Lukban that the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised in a preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. After contrition on the part of the petitioner, the court
finds reinstatement in order.
15. IN RE CUNANAN (CASE DIGEST)
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster
enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take
effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally
fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of
admission to the practice of law.
16. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7,1988]
FACTS:
Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt Special
Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in: (1) having
caused the filing of the information against petitioner in criminal case before
the Sandiganbayan, and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous
statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in where respondent is
claiming that he is acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman. A Resolution from the
Supreme Court required respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for

making certain public statements. Portion of the published article from


Philippine Daily Globe in his interview:
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that
while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due
course.
Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he
acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him
are substantially correct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Gonzales is entitled to invoke freedom of
speech as a defense.
HELD:
NO. Respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
RATIO:
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of
court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar.(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
[F]reedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests.
17. NITAFAN VS CIR
Posted by kaye lee on 10:16 PM
G.R. No. 78780 July 23 1987 [Salaries of the members of Judiciary, Tax
Exemption]
FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC,
NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries.

February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions
of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established
due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up
and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he
could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave
(during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due
to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting
all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed
by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego
his leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal
detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is
incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge.
Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as
required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he
is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also
questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ,
a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and
dishonesty as Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the
circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence.
Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench,
eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a
judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his control
prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court
looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being
detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection
with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or
working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the
government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the
principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate
of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices
purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income
taxes.

The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said


three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional
precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or
passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave
importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of
government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him
for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and,
worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other
than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless
to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is
discontinued.

HELD:

19.

No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general
income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and
inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention
that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of nondiminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only
the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in
government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees.

112 SCRA 294 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question if


there is no question of law involved BP 129

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."

18.

Paz Garcia vs Catalino Macaraig, Jr.

39 SCRA 106 Political Law Separation of Powers


Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna
and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly
created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to

Gualberto De La Llana vs Manuel Alba

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the


Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was
passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its
validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be
removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure
of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove
judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly
removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is
empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least

eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to


remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose
his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one
of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to
be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this
Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case
where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who
shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That
remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is
no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power.
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to
preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded
power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged
Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily
discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover,
such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in
the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be prefer

20.

David v Arroyo

GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006


Facts:
As the nation celebrated EDSAs 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued
PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the
AFP and PNP to immediately carryout necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.This
declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the
EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and
warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were
implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the
dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017,
PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial
review.
Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his
qualification to sue.
Ratio Decidendi: The Solicitor General is refute that the case has been moot
and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court,
courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave
Constitutional violation, the situation is exceptional character and paramount
public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on
the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies
under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to
impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he
sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given
this fact, the court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he

entitled to judicial protection. However, the court does not liberally declare
statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may
afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular
case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as
it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into
consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court
partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the
President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However,
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are
declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected
with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is
constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement
PP1017, but portion where acts of terrorism has not been defined and
punishable by congress is held unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held
unconstitutional: warrantless arrestof the petitioner, dispersal and
warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that saidpetitioners
were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or
violatingBP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices
and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials.
21. Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Facts:
The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern in a special civil action for mandamus against the CSC
pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing
of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of
legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government
employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the
information sought.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to
information
in
the
case
at
bar.
Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides
the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of
examining the public records by the government agency in custody thereof.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern
is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc.,
are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second
sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the
petitioner is of public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service
Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is a
public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as
to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted
that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is
released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not
unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to
verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.
22.
Estrada v Sandiganbayan/ G.R. No. 148560/ November 19, 2001
Bellosillo J.
Facts

:Petitioner calls for the Court to subject RA 7080(An Act defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) to the crucible of constitutionality for
reasons that the act:
is vague
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised
Penal Code
Issue:
Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?
Does the Plunder law require less evidence proving the predicate crimes of
plunder thus violates the rights of the accused to due process (specifically
Section 4 proposing that "it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused to establish beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of over or criminal acts inidcative of theoverall lawful scheme or
conspiracy)?

Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum(therefore does


notrequire that the mind of the offender be guilty to be penalized) and if so,
whether it iswithin the power of Congress to so classify it
Ruling:

Petitioner has
miserably failed
to show that the Plunder Law is unconstitutional due to itsvagueness.-"...the
Plunder Law contains
ascertainable
standards and
well-defined
parameterswhich would enable the accused to determine the nature of
his violation. Section 2 issufficiently explicit in its description of the
acts, conduct and conditionsrequired or forbidden, and prescribes the
elements of the crime with reasonablecertainty and particularity."

23. IBP VS ZAMORA


Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy
clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of
Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of
the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage
the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI
of the Constitution.
24.

Lorenzo Taada vs Mariano Cuenco

103 Phil. 1051 Political Law Constitutional Law Political Question


Defined Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado
Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but
was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a
decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the
SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices
of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from
the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two
SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP.
Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did
Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP
senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any
chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the
NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the
members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Taada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but
rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a
justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is
not being asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The
issue being raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP

members to the SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note that the SET
is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
legislative acts.

26. Blas F. Ople vs Ruben D. Torres, et al.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

FACTS:

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat
of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case,
the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would
fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring
to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may
set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the
Constitution.

Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized


Identification Reference System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On
December 12, 1996.Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate
A.O.
No.
308
on
severalgrounds. One of them is that: The establishment of a National Comput
erizedIdentification Reference System requires a legislative act. The
issuance of A.O. No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of
the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a
mere administrative order but alaw and hence, beyond the power of
the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects thelife and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly,violates
their right to privacy.On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O.
No. 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the
president without encroaching on thelegislative powers of congress.

25.

Teresita Fabian vs Aniano Desierto

295 SCRA 470 Political Law Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court


Remedial Law Civil Procedure Appeal from Decisions of Quasi-Judicial
Bodies
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the
incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District
(FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and
Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against
Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the
Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later
referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently
provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate
jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That
constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over
final judgments and orders of lower courts, that is, the courts composing
the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or
agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

293 SCRA 141 / GR No. 127685, 23 July 1998, J. Puno

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate
.RULING:Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them. The Constitution has vested this power in the Congress. The
grant of
legislative
power
to
Congress
is broad,
general,
and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislativeby usage and
tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitutionhas
lodged it elsewhere.The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the
President. It is generallydefined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying thelaws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance. As head of theExecutive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents thegovernment as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials andemployees of
his department. He has control over the executive department, bureausand
offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the
duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general
peace and publicorder. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under hiscontrol to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying polic
ies and enforcingorders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix auniform standard of administrative efficiency
and check the official conduct of hisagents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.From these precepts, the Court
holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is notappropriate to be
covered by an administrative order
27. Baker v. Carr
Facts
Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed
suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint
alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn its legislative districts
since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required
redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived
in an urban part of the state, asserted that the demographics of the state had
changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities, thereby
diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the
remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court denied
relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political question
and would therefore not be heard by the court.
Issues
1.

Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional


challenge to a legislative apportionment?

2.

What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political


question?

Holding and Rule (Brennan)


1.

Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional


challenge to a legislative apportionment.

2.

The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a


case presents a political question are:
1.

Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional


commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department (i.e. foreign affairs or executive war
powers)?

2.

Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and


manageable standards for resolving the issue?

3.

The impossibility of deciding the issue without an


initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.

4.

The impossibility of a courts undertaking independent


resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government.

5.

Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence


to a political decision already made?

6.

Would attempting to resolve the matter create the


possibility of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one
question?

The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and


whether a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases basis. In
regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive governmental
action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a
case. Regarding the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be
definable clarification for a decision, the court may be able to decide the
case.
The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political
question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by another branch of
the government. The court noted that judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to
courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an
act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is
enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a
political question and the Court will not answer it without further
clarification from the other branches.