RICARDO C.

VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND

ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of
the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July
1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by
the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to
speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru
these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to
search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Whether or not the installation of checkpoints violates
the right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures?

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in

Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection,
the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and
their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in
the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA
"sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all
sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect
its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Delos Santos v. Mallare
Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City
Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment
which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on
August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and
began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June
1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interimappointment by
the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the
Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public

Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office,

and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's
co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary
corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings.
whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his
present position for assignment to another position violates Section
4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law."
Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A
Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil
Service, except as those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examination." Section 670 of the
Revised Administrative Code provided that "Persons in the
Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified service," and
went on to say that "The classified service embraces all not
expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section
671 described persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other
than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus or
offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose
appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines
alone."
Three specified classes of positions policydetermining, primarily confidential and highly technical are
excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of
officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the
Constitution. None of these exceptions obtain in the present case.
The office of city engineer is neither primarily
confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. A confidential
position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the

appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy
which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer
policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of
action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to
execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City
Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down
for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are
essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city
engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not
required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training
in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which
"highly technical" is employed in the Constitution. There are
hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose
technical competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a
matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently
administrative in character and could very well be discharged by
non-technical men possessing executive ability.

Salazar vs. Mathay,

On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed
by the Auditor Generalconfidential agent in the Office of the
Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her
appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On
March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965she was extended
another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent
in the same office.On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice
from the Auditor General that her services as confidentialagent
have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31,
1966. On March 31, 1966, theAuditor General upon favorable
recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued
anappointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which
was approved by the Commission of CivilService. On the same day,
petitioner assumed the position.

On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil

Service requesting that she be reinstatedto her former position as
confidential agent. However, no action was taken on said letter.
Petitioner filed apetition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to
compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position
but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to
her filing the proper action to theCourt of First Instance.
(1)Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily
confidential or not.
(2)Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent
was validly terminated on thealleged ground of loss of confidence,
and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to
saidposition after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the
same office.
Held:
(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential.
There are two instances when a position may be considered
primarily confidential:
(1)When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner
of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the
position to be primarily confidential; or
(2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the
functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the
appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the
case before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring
...confidential agents in the several department and offices of the
Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be
primarily confidential brings within the fold of the aforementioned
executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office
ofthe Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily
confidential.

(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot

complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent
is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential
positionsare excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at
pleasure of officers or employees therein isallowed by the
Constitution.
This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent
of aprimarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only
of the appointing power. It should benoted, however, that when
such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not
removed or dismissed from office his term merely expires, in
much the the same way as officer, whoseright thereto ceases upon
expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or
elected,is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed
therefrom, upon the expiration of saidterm.
The main difference between the former the primarily confidential
officer and the latter isthat the latter's term is fixed of definite,
whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the
time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and
determined when the appointingpower expresses its decision to
put an end to the services of the incumbent.
When this even takesplace, the latter is not removed or
dismissed from office his term has merely expired.But even
granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was
not primarily confidentialand that therefore her removal from said
position for loss of confidence was in violation of her security of
tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the
position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on
April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned former position
of confidential agent in the same office.
Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327
Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City
Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described
as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to

the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent
and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better
qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and,
accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in
place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the
private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor
Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment,
questions the order and the validity of the respondents
appointment.
Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified
than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement.
Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but
permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The
appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had
the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse
him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the
Commission shall have inter alia the power to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the
civil service .and disapprove those where the appointees do
not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of
the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified
and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission
has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with
the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its

belief that another person was better qualified, which is an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act
upon the unions demands concerning the implementation of their
CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an
illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order
pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction
while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the
court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject
matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor
Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The
SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the
Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike.
They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may
enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and
Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to
organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes.
On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in
the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress
referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil
Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all

government officers and employees from staging strikes,

demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing
govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are
denominated as government employees and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions
memorandum prohibiting strikes.

projects, allegedly because, among other reasons, said projects

were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works
imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). On the
same day, Judge Tabamo issued a temporary restraining order and
required the petitioner to answer the petition within 10 days from
receipt.
The petitioner received the copy of the restraining order,
(being a lawyer) saw that it is not within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Hence this instant case, questioning the issuance of the temporary
restraining order and the jurisdiction of the court over Special Civil
Action No. 465.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management
Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of
injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of
SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction
to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

ISSUE:

COMELEC

No. The COMELEC is vested by the Constitution (Art IX-C,

Sec 2(2)) with the exclusive [original jurisdiction] charge of the
enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the
assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a case involving
the enforcement of the Election Code.

Gallardo v Judge Tabamo 218 SCRA 253

Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo and Gov. Antonio R. Gallardo were
both candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the positions of
congressmen and governor, respectively, of Camiguin. They
belonged to opposing political factions and were in a bitter
electoral battle.
On April 10, 1992 or about a month before the elections,
Cong. Romualdo filed a petition docketed as Special Civil Action No.
465 before the RTC of Camiguin (Br. 28) presided over by
respondent Judge Tabamo against Gov. Gallardo, the Provincial
Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor, the Provincial Engineer, and the
Provincial Budget Officer as respondents. In this petition Cong.
Romualdo sought to prohibit and restrain the respondents from
undertaking and/or pursuing certain public works projects and from
disbursing, releasing, and/or spending public funds for said

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over cases involving

violations of the Omnibus Election Code?
HELD:

Relampagos v Cumba 243 SCRA 690

A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction) revives the issue of whether the Commission on
Election (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cses where it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction.
Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto or habeas corpus?
Yes it does, but only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over
election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided

by courts of general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX(C),

Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It has concurrent jurisdiction
with that of the Supreme Court.

Edding v COMELEC 246 SCRA 502:

During the May 1992 elections, petitioner Edding and
private respondent Bernardo were among the candidates for the
office of municipal mayor of Sibuco Zamboanga del Norte. After the
canvassing of the election returns, Bernardo was declared winner
over Edding by 212 votes. Unconvinced and alleging massive
election fraud, Edding filed an election protest with the RTC. The
RTC rendered judgment proclaming Edding as the winner of the
election. Bernardo filed a Notice of Appeal while Edding moved for
the immediate execution of the decision. RTC granted both the
Notice of Appeal and Motion for Immediate Execution. Edding
assumed office while Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a petition
for certiorari with application for preliminary injuctions and for the
issuance of TRO. The petition were granted hence this petition
before the Supreme Court.
Whether the COMELEC have jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto or habeas corpus?
Yes the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs but only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over
election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided
by courts of general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX(C),
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It has concurrent jurisdiction
with that of the Supreme Court.
Galido v COMELEC 193 SCRA 78
In an election contest involving the elected mayor of
Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, the COMELEC declared Galeon as the
duly elected mayor. Fifteen ballots in the name of his rival, Galido,
was invalidated for being marked ballots.

Galido file the petition for certiorari and injunction with

prayer for a restraining order. Galeon moved for the dismissal of
the petition on the ground that according to the Constitution (Art
IX-C, Sec 2(2)) final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
election contests involving elective municipal officials are final,
executory, and not appeallable.
Whether the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests
involving elective municipal officials are unappealable?
Yes. Decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
election contests involving elective municipal officials but it does
not preclude a recourse to the Supreme Court by way of special
civil action of certiorari. In the instant case however, it does not
show that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
rending the question decision.
People v Inting 187 SCRA 788
In 1988, Mrs. Barba filed a letter-complaint against the OICMayor of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC, for allegedly
transfering her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, in the office of the
Mayor to a very remote barangay and without abandoning prior
permission or clearance from the COMELEC as required by law.
The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Dumagete (Atty. Lituanas) to conduct preliminary investigation of
the case pursuant to a COMELEC Resolution which in turn, is based
on Consitutional mandate that the COMELEC is charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections.
After the preliminary investigation, Atty. Lituanas found a
prima facie case. Hence, he filed with the respondent RTC of
Dumagete City a criminal case against the OIC Mayor. The RTC
issued a warrant of arrest against the accused which was later
cancelled on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to Sec 2, Art III of the
Constitution. The court stated that it will give due course to the

information filed if the same has the written approval of the

Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be
under the supervision and control of the latter.

believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,

therefore whether he should be subjected to trial; is the function of
the prosecutor.

Atty.Lituanas failed to comply with the condition. The RTC

quashed the information and denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Art IX-C, Sec 2, Constitution provides xxx The Commission

on Election shall execise the following powers and functions:

Whether a preliminary investigation conducted by a

Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to
be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal before the RTC may take
cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not
probable cause exists?
NO. The Court emphasizes the important features of the
constitutional mandate that xxx no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge xxx (Art III, Sec 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of
the judge. It is for the Provincial Fiscal nor for the Election
Supervisor to ascertain only the judge and the judge alone makes
this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does
not bind the judge. It merely assists him to make the determination
of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the
prosecutor presents to him. It is this report, the affidavits, the
transcriptions of stenographic notes, and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material
in assisting the judge to make his determination.
Third, judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminaryinquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for
trial or released. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper whether there is reasonable ground to

1)
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
xxx
6)
File, upon a verified complaint, or in its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of votes, investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
In effect, the 1987 Constitution madates the COMELEC not
only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of
election laws. This means that the COMELEC (exclusive power) is
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases
involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the judge
determine probable cause and for filing information in court.
The provincial fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the
prosecution of election offenses. If the fiscal files an information
charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election
law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does
not have the sole authority under his office to do so. It is only after
a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its
officials or deputies that Sec 2, Art III of the Constitution comes in.
People v Basilia 179 SCRA 87
Three complaintswere filed with the provincial fiscal
alleging violations of the Omnibus Election Code. After conducting
preliminary investigation, the fiscal filed the information with the
RTC. The judge, motu proprio, dismissed the information on the

ground that the COMELEC has the exclusive authority to conduct

preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses. Hence
this review.
Whether fiscals may conduct preliminary investigations
and prosecute election offenses?
YES, they may. Although the COMELEC is granted exclusive
authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
election offenses, it is also authorized by the Omnibus Election
Code to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of
the government. To ensure credible elections, the COMELEC may
deputize law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities, whether
before or after elections. Pursuant to such authority granted by
law, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1862 providing that fiscals
may conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election
offenses.
People v Delgado 189 SCRA 715
Upon recommendation of the provincial election
supervisor, who conducted a preliminary investigation of the
alleged election offenses of Delagado and others, the COMELEC
filed an information against the latter. The respondents moved for
reconsideration and the suspension of the warrant of arrests on the
ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. The trial
court ordered reinvestigation. The COMELEC opposed the order on
the ground that only the Supreme Court may review the decisions,
orders, resolutions of the COMELEC. The trial court denied the
COMELEC motion. Hence this certiorari.
Whether the COMELEC action may be reviewed only on
certiorari by the Supreme Court?
NO. According to the Constitution, the COMELEC has the
following functions: (1) enforcement of laws; (2) decision of
election contests; (3) decision of administrative questions; (4)
deputizing law enforcement agencies; (5) registration of political
parties; and (6) improvement of elections. What are reviewable on

certiorari by the SC are those orders, decisions, resolutions, etc.

rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Thus decisions
of the COMELEC on election contests or on administrative
questions are subject to judicial review only by the Supreme Court.
In the instant case, no COMELEC adjudicatory power is
exercised. As a public prosecutor, the COMELEC has the exclusive
authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code before the
competent court. But when the COMELEC files the information, the
subsequent disposition of the case is subject to the court's
approval. The COMELEC cannot conduct reinvestigation unless so
ordered by that court nor refuse its order of reinvestigation.
COMELEC v Judge Silva et. al. 286 SCRA 177
Pursuant to its power under Article IX-C, Sec 2(6) of the
Constitution, the COMELEC charged private respondents
Tanciongco and Castillo with violations of Sec. 27 of RA 6646,
together with Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the RTC
of Bataan. The three were accused of having tampered, in
conspiracy with one another, with the certificates of canvass
during the May 1995 elections.
Twelve (12) cases were raffled to three branches of the
court presided over the respondent judges, Hon. Silva and
Hon.Vianzon. On October 30, 1996, Tanciongco and Castillo filed a
joint Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to Determine
the Existence of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest; and Dismissal of the the Cases. Chief State
Prosecutor Zuno, who had been designated by the COMELEC to
prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private
respondents' request. On March 31, and April7, 1997, respectively,
Judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases against
private respondents.
The COMELEC sought appeal of the dismissal of the cases
to the CA but the judges denied due course to its appeal. Such

denial was grounded on the fact that the prosecutor, whom the
COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases. Hence, this
petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the nullification of
the orders of the judges, denying due course to the Notice of
Appeal of the COMELEC.
Who has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal
from the orders of dismissal the COMELEC or its designated
prosecutor?
The COMELEC. The authority to decide whether to appeal
the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC pursuant to Art IX-C, Sec
2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function
to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws including acts or omission constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. The 1987 Constitution
madates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to
prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the
COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in
cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the
Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in
court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. Prosecutors
designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its
deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their
offices.
Torres v COMELEC 270 SCRA 583
On May 9, 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Tanza, Cavite issued a Certificated of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation of the Winning Candidates of the Municipal Offices
(Councilors) where petitioner Rosauro Torres was proclaimed as
fifth winning candidate for councilor.
Two days after or on May 11, 1995 the same Municipal
Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for correction of the
number of votes garnered by the petitioner. The votes intended for
Mr. Dimaala in the subtotal was erroneously added to Mr. Torres.

Mr. Torres should have been number ten (10) in the winning column
and that Mr. Peralta should have landed in the 7th position.
Petitioner filed his answer alleging that the subject matter
of the letter-petition, which was the correction of votes garnered by
him, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to
Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code. After due course,
respondent COMELEC issued the assailed en banc resolution
granting the letter-request for the correction of the number of
votes garnered by petitioner.
Whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in granting the request of the municipal board of
canvassers to correct the votes garnered by petitioner and in
ordering the proclamation of private respondent.
NO. The position of COMELEC is well-taken. Sec. 7, Rule 27,
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides
Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by
the Board of Canvassers. (a) where it is clearly shown before
proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation
or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the
canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one
precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass were
tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or
certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a
mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate
of canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) socalled election returns from non-existent precincts were included in
the canvass, the board may motu proprio or upon verified petition
by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of
political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors
committed.
In Castromayor v. Comelec we held that although the
above provision applies to pre-proclamation controversies, and
even if the proclamation of a winning candidate has already been
made, there is nothing to prevent its application to cases like the

one at bar in which the validity of the proclamation is precisely in

question. In Duremdes cases, where a proclamation is null and
void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of
the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation.

counting in favor of petitioner Aquiles Rees votes for Reyes only,

considering that the was another candidate (Epitacio Reyes)
bearing the same surname. Without resolving his petition, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed on the same day
petitioner as the eight winning candidate.

Sarmiento v COMELEC 212 SCRA 307

On June 1, 1992, private respondent filed an election

protest before the trial court. Municipal Board of Canvassers file its
answer in which it admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting
private respondent with only 858 votes when he was entitled to
915 votes in the Statement of Votes. On June 23, 1992, trial court
rendered its decision annulling the proclamation of petitioner and
declaring private respondent as the eight winning candidate for the
position of councilor.

The COMELEC, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and

decided the appeals (Special Cases), without first referring them to
any of its Divisions.
Whether COMELEC has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of and decided the appeals of special cases without
first referring them to any of its Divisions?
YES. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of the
petitioners in the said special cases without first referring them to
any of its Divisions.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC and in

addition filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the CA.
The CA dismissed the petition because of the petitioner's pending
appeal in the COMELEC. On the other hand, the COMELEC's First
Division dismissed the petitioner's appeal on the ground that he
had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.

Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution

expressly provides:

Hence this instant petition, petitioner contends that the

COMELEC's First Division committed grave abuse of discretion.

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in

two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard
and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Reyes v RTC of Oriental Mindoro 244 SCRA 41
Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo
Comia were candidates for the position of Sanggunian Bayan of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 elections. On May
13, 1992, during the proceedings of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, private respondent moved for the exclusion of certain
election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in the

Whether this petition for certiorari would prosper?

NO. The filing of the present petition, without petitioner
first filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc, violates Art. IX, A, Sec 7 of the Constitution because under
this provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
National Press Club v COMELEC 207 SCRA 1
Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media
which were prevented from selling and donating space or air time
for political advertisement under RA 6646.

Whether RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right

of freedom of expression?
NO. The COMELEC has been expressly authorized by the
Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
the franchises or permits for the operation of media of
communication and information. The fundamental purposes of
such power are to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and
the right to reply, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of
charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with
public information campaigns and forums among candidates.
Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and of
access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation
however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
objective set out in the Constitution. For it is precisely in the
unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time
that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to
make a crucial difference.
Telecommunications
Philippines v GMA

&

Broadcast

Attorneys

of

the

The petitioner questions the validity of Sec 92 of BP 881 against

claims that the requirement that radio and television time be given
free takes property without due process of law. Petitioners contend
that (1) it is violative of the eminent domain clause of the
Constitution which provides for the payment of just compensation
(2) it denies broadcast media the equal protection of laws and (3)
that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise
or regulate the operation of media communication and information
during the election period.
Whether Sec 92 of BP 881 is (1) it is violative of the
eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the
payment of just compensation (2) it denies broadcast media the
equal protection of laws and (3) that it is in excess of the power
given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media communication and information during the election period.

NO. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television

stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencieshave
to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequences to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject to amended by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provisions that any such franchise or right granted
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires it. The free time for
the benefit not only of one candidates but even more of the public,
particularly, the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the
issues in an election? It is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
NO.What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or
regulate by Art. IX-C, Sec 4 of the Constitution, among other
things, is the use by media of information of their franchises or
permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the
sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads.
Adiong v COMELEC 207 SCRA 712
Petitioner Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails
COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 insofar as it provides the posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limits
their location or publication to authorized posting areas.
Whether the resolution is constitutional?
NP. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's
fundamental right of free speech. There is no public interest
substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in
this case. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places does
not endanger any substantial government or public interest. Under
the clear and present danger rule, not only must the danger be
patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be
avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's
mouth or writing instrument to be stilled.

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the

prohibition is not so much that of the candidate of the political
party. The regulation of strike at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince
others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a
candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it place on his
private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else.
Moreover, the restriction is so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately
owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal
right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

Sanidad v COMELEC 181 SCRA 529

On the occasion of the ratification campaign for the
Autonomy Act of Cordillera, the COMELEC, issued a resolution
prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from using
their columns or radio or television time to campaign for or against
the plebiscite during the period of the campaign. Reliance was
made on the Election Code and on Article IX-C, Sec 4 of the
Constitution authorizing the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of media communication or information. Sanidad, a
columnist, challenged the validity of the resolution as a violation of
freedom of expression.
Whether the
unconstitutional?

resolution

issued

by

the

COMELEC

is

Yes. The resolution is unconstitutional. The authority given

by the Constitution is over holders of franchises. The purpose is to
assure candidates equal opportunity and equal access to media.
Sanidad is not a candidate and in fact in a plebiscite there are no
candidates. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and the

people's right to be informed must be preserved. Morever, the

people's choice of forum for discussion should not be restricted.
Social Weather Stations v COMELEC (May 5, 2001)
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private
non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys
in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and
social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and
publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard,
a newspaper of general circulation, which features news- worthy
items of information including election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from enforcing Sec 5.4 of RA. No.9006
(Fair Election Act) which prohibits the publication of elections
surveys 15 days and 7 days before election, for national and local
candidates.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election
survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national
and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey
as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish
election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May
14,2001.
Whether Sec 5.4 of RA 9006 is valid?
We hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other
than suppression of freedom of speech.
Mitmug v COMELEC 230 SCRA 54

The turn-out of votes during the May 11, 1992 election in

Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, was abnormally low. As a result,
several petitions were filed seeking the declaration of failure of
election in precincts where less than 25% of the electorate
managed to cast their votes. But a special election was ordered in
precincts where no voting actually took place. The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) ruled that for as long as the precincts
functioned and conducted actual voting during election day, low
voter turnout would not justify a declaration of failure of election.
Whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying motu proprio
and without due notice and hearing the petitions seeking to
declare a failure of election in some or all of the precincts in
Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.
Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first,
no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date
fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless
results in failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would
affect the result of the election.

It is indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect

the outcome of the election. But, the first requisite is missing, i.e.,
that no actual voting took place, or even if there is, the results
thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since actual voting
and election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts
have taken place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and
excluded. COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of
discretion, much less grave, in denying the petitions outright.
There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein
did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought.
For, the language of the law expressly requires the concurrence of
these conditions to justify the calling of a special election. The fact
that a verified petition is filed does not automatically mean that a
hearing on the case will be held before COMELEC will act on it. The
verified petition must still show on its face that the conditions to
declare a failure to elect are present. In the absence thereof, the
petition must be denied outright.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Guevarra v Gimenez 6 SCRA 813

In 1954, the District Engineer of Sorsogon prepared a
program of work and detailed estimate for the reconstruction of
the Sorsogon Central School building. Specifications consisting of
five pages were likewise prepared. The Cost of painting was left out
in the detailed estimate and specifications. The papers were
submitted to the Division Engineer in Lucena, Quezon, who
returned them duly approved with an authorized appropriation of
P40,000.00 "provided that painting shall be included". Whereupon,
the specification for painting was accordingly made and appended
to the specifications as page six.
In August 1954 the District Engineer advertised an
invitation to bid for furnishing of all materials, labor and plant, for

reconstruction project. Fernando Guevarra's bid of P37,500 was

declared lowest and the contract was awarded to him. Eighty five
days after completion of the project, Guevarra file with the Director
of Public Works a written claim for the payment of P4,620.00
representing cost of painting not covered by the contract.
After
hearing,
Secretary
of
Public
Works
and
Communications denied the claim and two motion for
reconsideration were also denied. On appeal,the Auditor General
also denied the claim. Guevarra appealed to the Supreme Court
pursuant to CA 327.
Whether the contract for the reconstruction of the school
building included the painting.
Yes. Testimonies of the employees' should be given more
weight than those of the contractors. These government
employees testified as to what transpired in the performance of
their duties. The presumption is that official duty has been
regularly performed.
[Note:The main issue of the case has nothing to do with
COA. However, note that, claims and disbursements of public funds
should have be coursed to COA]

Orocio v COA 213 SCRA 109

On accident occurred at the Malaya Power Plant of the
National Power Corporation (NPC) where two individuals suffered
injury Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC employee, and Domingo Abodizo,
a casual employee OPLGS, the janitorial contractor of the NPC. The
two injured personnel were brought to the hospital.
NPC initially advanced the amount for hospitalization
expenses for the treatment of Abodizo, and set up this as an
account receivable from OPLGS deducted on a staggared basis

from the latter's billing against the NPC util the same was fully
satisfied. Subsequently, OPLGS requested a refund of the total
amount deducted from their billings representing payment of the
advances made by the NPC. In the light of the favorable
recommendation of the NPC legal counsel, the amount of
hospitalization expenses was refunded to the contractor OPLGS.
The Unit Auditor of the Commission on Audit disallowed the
refund of the hospitalizattion expenses of Abodizo contending that
under the contract, there is no employee-employer relation
between the NPC and the OPLGS employees. Hence,NPC is not
answerable for such expenses. General Counsel asked for a
reconsideration of the said disallowance denied. The COA Regional
Director, herein respondent, confirmed the disallowance. NPC
General Counself submitted a second request for reconsideration
and justifies that his legal opinion is based on Sec 15-A of RA 6395
(NPC Charter) which provides that ... all legal matters shall be
handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation...
Whether the disbursement on the basis of the legal opinion
of the legal counsel of the NPC (quasi-judicial function) is within the
scope of the auditing power of the COA?
The Constitution grants the COA the power, authority and
duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the
expenditures or uses of funds and property pertaining to the
Government
or
any
of
its
subdivisions,
agencies
or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. The matter of allowing in audit a disbursement
account is not a ministerial function, but one which necessitates
the exercise of discretion. Besides, the OPLGS, Abodizo's employer,
admitted that the incident was purely accidental and that there is
no showing whatsoever in the accident report of any negligence on
the part of the NPC or its employees.
The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the
COA's audit power. The COA should not be bound by the opinion of
the legal counself of said agency or instrumentality which may
have been the basis for the questioned disbursements, otherwise it

would become a toothless tiger and its auditing functions would be

a meaningless and futile exercise.
Osmena v COA 238 SCRA 363
Reynaldo de la Cerna was stabbed and was rushed to Cebu
City Medical Center but died in the same day due to severe loss of
blood. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were
it not for the ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility,
stupidity and incompetence of the medical staff of the Medical
Center. The parents subsequently instituted in the RTC an action
for recovery of damages which the City of Cebu was impleaded as
defendant on the theory that as employer of the alleged negligent
doctors, it is vicariously responsible for the latters' negligence.
To put an end to the controversy, a compromise agreement
was entered into by the plaintiffs and defendant City of Cebu for
the payment of the sum of P30,000. The agreement was ratified by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City and authorized the City
Budget Officer of Cebu to include in Supplemental Budget No. 6 of
the Ciy for the year 1989 the amount of P30,000 for financial
assistance to the parents of the late Reynaldo de la Cerna.
However, the respondent COA disallowed the financial
assistance granted to the spouses de la Cerna holding that it is not
within the power of the Sangguniang to provide financial
assistance, either on general welfare clause or humanitarian
grounds, to promote economic and private interests of certain
individual only. Respondent further stressed that not being a party
to the compromise agreement, it was not bound by it and that any
money claim arising therefrom was subjected to its usual audit in
the pursuance of the valid exercis and discharge of its
constitutional power, authority and duty. The City of Cebu filed a
Motion for Reconsideraton but was denied.
Hence this instant petition.

Whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion in

disallowing the city's appropriaton of P30,000 made conformably
with the compromise agreement in the civil suit against the City?
YES. There can be no question of COA's competence to act
on the supplemental budget for 1989 of the City of Cebu. It
appears that respondent COA greivously misconstrued the
undertaking of Cebu City to pay P30,000 to the heirs of the
deceased Reynaldo de la Cerna. It was construed as intended only
to promote the private welfare and interest of the de la Cerna
family. The respondent is well aware that the appropriation was a
part of the package agreed upon by all parties in a civil case for
the amicable settlement of the controversy. Judicial compromise is
conclusive and binding on all the parties.
Sambeli v Province of Isabela 210 SCRA 80
An agreement was entered into by and between the City of
Isabela and ECS Enterprise for the purchase of 300 units of
wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels, and 1 set of radio
communication equipment. Based on the finding of the Price
Evaluation Division COA Technical Services Office, the Provincial
Auditor advised the Provincial Treasurer that an overpriced in the
total amount of P619,042.20 exists out of the total price of
P761,077.20 offered by ECS Enterprises or an overpayment of
P195,893.10. It recommended that the future claim of ECS
Enterprises be withheld. Provincial Auditor formally forwarded the
matter with the Regional Director who formally endorsed the stand.
ECS appealed the decision but was denied for lack of merit.
Hence this instant petition. Petitioner assails the ruling of
the COA as not valid. It contends that the contract of sale has not
only been perfected between the Province of Isabela and petitioner
but delivery has been made by it with the corresponding partial
payment by the Province of Isabela. Thus, it is allegedly incumbent
upon COA to authorize the payment of the balance because to act
otherwise will constitute an impairment of contract.

Whether the ruling of COA is invalid so far as it will

constitute impairment of contracts?

Petitioner appealed this denial to the Commission on Audit

which denied do due course. Hence this petition.

In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it by

the Constitution, the Commission on Audit adheres to the policy
that government funds and property should be fully protected and
conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property
should be prevented. On the proposition that improper or wasteful
spending of public funds or immoral use of government property,
for being highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously
excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign people's will, it
behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto.

The petitioner takes exception from the coverage of said

circular contending that such circular did not mention the NPC as
one of the corporations/offices covered by it ( COA Circular No. 756)

. . . No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall
have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or use of government funds and properties. (Art. IX D,
Sec. 2 (2) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines)

Whether NPC takes an exception from such coverage of the

said circular contending that such circular did not mention NPC as
one of the corporations/offices covered by it.

Bustamante v COA 216 SCRA 134

Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of National Power
Corporation (NPC). As such he was issued a government vehicle
with plate number SCC 387. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected in
the Board Resolution No. 81-95 authorizing the monthly
disbursement of transportation allowance, the petitioner, in
addition to the use of government vehicle, claimed his
transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. On May
31, 1990, the petitioner received an Auditor's Notice to Person
Liable dated April 17, 1990 from respondent Regional Auditor
Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing
aforesaid transportation allowance. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the disallowance of the claim for transportation
allowance which was denied.

Whether such denial to give due course to the appeal of

herein petitioner constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction?

NO. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
NO. It is very patent that the circular is addressed, among
others, to managing heads of Government-owned or Controlled
Corporations, the NPC being held under such category of
corporations. We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's contention
that the Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the
Constitution, usurped the statutory functions of the NPC Board of
Directors for its leads to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board
of Directors of a government-owned and controlled corporation, by
issuing a resolution, can put to naught a constitutional provision
which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino people. If We
will not sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit
and settle accounts pertaining to this particular expenditures or
use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this

government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be

rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to
be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately, the people's property.

Saligumba v COA 117 SCRA 669

On the basis of the sworn complaint of Editha Saligumba,
the COA instituted the administrative case against Leonardo
Estella, Auditing Examiner III, in the Auditor's Office of Misamis
Occidental. The charge was that the respondent raped Editha
Saligumba on several occasions. For insufficiency of evidence, the
charge was dropped by COA.
Saligumba now wants the Supreme Court of review the
COA decision. She insists that the decision of the COA is contrary
to the evidence and the same time raises factual issues.
Whether the action will prosper?
The petition has to be dismissed for the following reasons:
1.
Our power to review COA decisions refers to money
matters and not to administrative cases involving the discipline of
its personnel.
2.
Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review
decisions on administrative matters as mentioned above, We can
not do so on factual issues; Our power to review is limited to legal
issues.
Rebecca Barbo v Commission on Audit (October 10, 2008)
Petitioners are officials of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) and designated members of the Interim
Board of Directors of the San Fernando Water District (SFWD).

On December 4, 1995 and February 12 1996, the LWUA

Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 313, Series of 1995
and Board Resolution No. 39, Series of 1996 respectively. These
Board Resolutions authorized the Board of Directors of SFWD to
receive reimbursable allowances in the form of Representation and
Transportation
Allowance
(RATA),
Travel
Allowance,
and
Extraordinary & Miscellaneous Expense (EME); Christmas Bonus;
Uniform Allowance; Rice Allowance; Medical and Dental Benefits;
and Productivity Incentive Bonus.
Pursuant to the said Board Resolutions, petitioners
received EME, Rice Allowance, Christmas Bonus, and Productivity
Bonus from SFWD during the calendar years starting 1994 until
1996.
On June 30, 1997, a Special Audit Team of COA Regional
Office No. III at San Fernando, Pampanga audited the financial
accounts of SFWD for the period covering January 1, 1994 to July
15, 1996. The COA Special Audit Team disallowed the payment of
the above-mentioned benefits and allowances received by
petitioners after the same were found to be excessive and contrary
to Sections 228, 162 and 163 of the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual (GAAM) and to Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Resolution No. 954073 in relation to Section 13 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973) as
amended. Petitioner were directed to refund the benefits and
allowances subject to the disallowance.
Petitioners contend that the COA lacks jurisdiction to
declare whether or not LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 are
consistent with Section 13 of PD No. 198, as amended, on matters
pertaining to the compensation and "other benefits" of the
Directors of the LWD. This is allegedly the function of the courts.
The Regional Director affirmed the disallowance.
Petitioners elevated the matter to COA. COA declared that the
subject bonuses and allowances received by petitioners constituted
additional compensation or remuneration. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence this instant petition.

1.
Whether respondent has the jurisdiction to motu proprio
declare LWUA Board Resolution No. 313, S. 1995, as amended by
Resolution No. 39, S. 1996, to bbe totally in conflict with Sec. 13 of
PD No. 198 as amended.
2.
Whether Sec 13, PD 198, as amended, prohibiting
petitioners' entitlement to RATA, EME, Bonuses and Other Benefits
and Allowances.
The Court has already settled this issue in a myriad of
cases. Particularly, in Rodolfo S. de Jesus [Catbalogan Water
District] v. COA, the Court upheld the authority and jurisdiction of
the COA to rule on the legality of the disbursement of government
funds by a water district and declared that such power does not
conflict with the jurisdiction of the courts, the DBM, and the LWUA.
Citing Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
the Court declared that it is the mandate of the COA to audit all
government agencies, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters. Indeed, the Constitution
specifically vests in the COA the authority to determine whether
government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements
of
government
funds.
This
independent
constitutional body is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately
the people's, property.
Anent the second issue, a water district is a governmentowned and controlled corporation with a special charter since it is
created pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree (PD) 198. It
is undeniable that PD 198 expressly prohibits the grant of RATA,
EME, and bonuses to members of the board of Water Districts.
Philippine Air Lines v COA 245 SCRA39
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
petitioner Philippine Airlines. Inc. (PAL) seeks to review, annul end
reverse Decision No. 1127 of the Commission on Audit (COA) dated
January 5, 1990 and to prohibit, enjoin and prevent COA from

enforcing or in any way implementing Department Order No. 19, s.

1974 of the then Department of General Services as implemented
by COA Circular No. 78-84, Memorandum No. 498 and
Memorandum No. 88-565. COA Decision No. 1127 required PAL to
purchase its fuel requirements solely from Petron Corporation
(Petron).
PAL is a domestic corporation organized and existing under
the Philippine laws, principally engaged in the air transport
business, both domestic and international. At the time of the filing
of the petition on February 8, 1990, majority of its shares of stock
was owned by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a
government corporation.
To assure itself of continuous, reliable and cost-efficient
supply of fuel, PAL adopted a system of bidding out its fuel
requirements under a multiple supplier set-up whereby PAL
awarded to the lowest bidder sixty percent (60%) of its fuel
requirements and to the second lowest bidder the remaining forty
percent(40%), provided it matched the price of the lowest bidder.
On August 17, 1989, COA wrote PAL a letter stating It has
come to our attention that PAL international fuel supply contracts
are expiring this August 31, 1989. In this connection, you are
advised to desist from bidding the company's fuel supply contracts,
considering that existing regulations require government-owned or
controlled corporations and other agencies of government to
procure their petroleum product requirements from PETRON
Corporation.
PAL sought reconsideration of the August 17, 1989 advice,
reiterating its reasons contained in an earlier letter, for preferring
to bid out and secure its fuel supply from more than one supplier
and for its contention that Department Order No. 19, s. 1974, as
circularized by COA Office Memorandum No. 490, should not apply
to PAL. The final appeal for reconsideration however it was denied.
Hence this assailed decision.

Whether the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse

of discretion amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that
Department Order No. 19, of the defunct department of general
services applies to PAL?
[the Court is compelled to dismiss the petition pursuant to
the government's privitization program, PAL's shares of stock were
bidded out earlier this year, resulting in the acquisition by PR
Holdings, a private corporation, of 67% PAL's outstanding stocks.
PAL having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled
corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COA..
Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become
moot and academic.]
Had it not been for this supervening event, PAL would have
obtained the relief sought in the instant petition. For although COA
was correct in ruling that Department Order No. 19 applied to PAL
as a government agency at the time, it nonetheless gravely
abused its discretion in not exempting PAL therefrom.
The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution with the "exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and
regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." The
authority granted under this constitutional provision, being broad
and comprehensive enough, enables COA to adopt as its own,
simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of
repromulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may also
expand the coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities
under its audit jurisdiction.
The reasons given by PAL for seeking exemption from the
operation of Department Order No. 19 were, to our mind,
meritorious. They far outweigh the policy enunciated in
Department Order No. 19 of giving preference to government

sources in the filling of the needs of the government for supplies.

Thus, PAL's bidding requirement conformed to the accepted policy
of the government to subject every transaction/contract to public
bidding in order to protect public interest by giving the public the
best possible advantages thru open competition and to avoid or
preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of
public contracts.
Its multiple supplier set-up was designed precisely to meet
every contingency that might disrupt its fuel supply. It bespoke of
foresight, careful planning and sound business judgment on the
part of PAL. As a business operation heavily dependent on fuel
supply, for PAL to rely solely on a single supplier would indeed be
impracticable. To compel it to do so would amount to a grave
abuse of discretion on its part as this might well lead to irregular,
excessive or unconscionable expenditures, the very evil sought to
be avoided in the creation of the COA.
Bagatsing v Committee on Privitization 246 SCRA 334
PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1966 under the corporate name
"Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO) as a subsidiary of Esso Eastern, Inc.
and Mobil Petroleum Company, Inc.
In 1973, at the height of the world-wide oil crisis brought
about by the Middle East conflicts, the Philippine government
acquired ESSO through the PNOC. ESSO became a wholly-owned
company of the government under the corporate name PETRON
and as a subsidiary of PNOC.
In acquiring PETRON, the government aimed to have a
buffer against the vagaries of oil prices in the international market.
It was felt that PETRON can serve as a counterfoil against price
manipulation that might go unchecked if all the oil companies were
foreign-owned. Indeed, PETRON helped alleviate the energy crises
that visited the country from 1973 to 1974, 1979 to 1980, and
1990 to 1991.

On December 8, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino

promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her legislative
power under the Freedom Constitution.

Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of bidding when:

1) there is only one offeror; or (2) when all the offers are noncomplying or unacceptable.

The Proclamation is entitled "Proclaiming and Launching a

Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of Certain
Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof, and Creating
the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust."
Implicit in the Proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the
Government and the ideal of leaving business to the private sector.
The Government can then concentrate on the delivery of basic
services and the performance of vital public functions.

In the case at bench, there were three offerors: SAUDI ARAMCO,

PETRONAS and WESTMONT.

On March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring

and Coordinating Committee (GCMCC) recommended a 100%
privatization of PETRON.

Petitioners urge that in effect there was only one bidder

and that it can not be said that there was a competition on "an
equal footing". But the COA Circular does not speak of accepted
bids but of offerors, without distinction as to whether they were
disqualified.

Petitioners claims, among others, that there was a failed

bidding, contend that there were only three bidders. One of them,
PETRONAS, submitted a bid lower than the floor price while a
second, failed to pre-qualify. Citing Section V-2-a of COA Circular
No. 89-296 dated January 27, 1989, they argue that where only
one bidder qualifies, there is a failure of public auction.

While two offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for

submitting a bid below the floor price and WESTMONT for technical
reasons, not all the offerors were disqualified. To constitute a failed
bidding under the COA Circular, all the offerors must be
disqualified.

The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on

bidding procedure to be followed by government offices and
corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned
bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be
given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the
law it is merely tasked to administer.