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Case Digest: COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs.

ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES
AND FACULTIES OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS
G.R. No. 141471.

September 18, 2000

Facts:

During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement


with the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the
union. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner,
through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the
parties. However, the union members rejected the said CBA. Thereafter, petitioner
accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner. This decision was reversed on appeal with
the NLRC.

The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on
new five-year CBA. During the pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was
informed that her work schedule was being changed. Ambas protested and
requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old
CBA.

After the petitioners inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to strike. After
meeting with the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for renegotiation, Ambas
received a letter dismissing her for alleged insubordination. The petitioner then
ceased negotiations when it received news that another labor organization had filed
a petition for certification.

The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered them
to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back. The Secretary of Labor
and Employment later rendered judgement that the petitioner had been guilty of
unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.

Issue(s):

Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the
union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and

Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the


employees right to self-organization.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.

The petitioners failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-day
period exemplified in Article 250 of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the
governing procedure of collective bargaining. As the Court has held in Kiok Loy vs.
NLRC, the companys refusal to make counter-proposal to the unions proposed CBA
is an indication of bad faith. Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs
that the petitioner had merely been employing delaying tactics to the passage of
the proposed CBA. Moreover, in order to allow the employer to validly suspend the
bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a
legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification
election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer.
The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the Court to no other
conclusion that she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would
fight for the right of her co-workers in the bargaining table. While the Court
recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a
just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made
within the parameters of aw and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.
Even assuming arguendo that Ambas was guilty of insubordination, such
disobedience was not a valid ground to terminate her employment. When the
exercise of the management to discipline its employees tends to interfere with the
employees right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a
prohibited act.

ALU vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 173 SCRA 178

FACTS:
Petitioner Associated Labor Unions (ALU) informed private respondent GAW Trading,
Inc. that a majority of the latter's employees had authorized it to be their sole and
exclusive bargaining representative. Petitioner thereafter requested that private
respondent conduct a conference with it for the execution of an initial CBA.
On the ff day, ALU's Chairman furnished GAW Trading 10 final copies of the CBA for
Comment, or otherwise, for signing. Two days later, ALU (in behalf of majority of the
employees of GAW Trading, Inc.) signed and executed the collective bargaining
agreement.
In the meantime, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) together with
nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a strike after it failed to get
the management of GAW Trading, Inc. to sit for a conference respecting its
demands. Specifically, SPFL wanted GAW Trading, Inc. to make a turn-about of its
standing recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
its employees.
GAW Trading filed a petition for a Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin SPFL from continuing with the strike. Acting on the petition, the Labor Arbiter
declared the strike illegal.
Later, the Med-Arbiter issued an order declaring that a certification election be held
for all branches of GAW Trading, Inc. Aggrieved by the decision, ALU filed an appeal,
which the Bureau of Labor Relations Director granted. However, the decision was
reversed by respondent Director, on the ground that the CBA between petitioner
and GAW Trading was defective.
Petitioner thus filed SCA-C, asserting that the Med-Arbiter committed GAD in issuing
the order declaring that a certification election be held for all branches of GAW
Trading, Inc. It asseverated that the CBA between it and GAW Trading was not
defective
ISSUE:
W/N the CBA entered into between petitioner and GAW Trading was defective.
D/R:
NO.

The public respondent was correct in its holding that the CBA between petitioner
and GAW Trading was defective, for various reasons. First, the mechanics of
collective bargaining are set in motion only when the ff jurisdictional preconditions
are present:
1) possession of the status of majority representation by the employees'
representative in accordance with any of the means of selection and/or designation
provided for by the Labor Code;
2) proof of majority representation; and
3) a demand to bargain under LC251, (a). (PPD)
In this case, petitioner's status as an exclusive bargaining representative was found
to be dubious. Respondent GAW Trading sent a letter to the petitioner, merely
indicating that it was not against the desire of its workers and required petitioner to
present proof that it was supported by the majority in a meeting to be held on a
specified date. Yet petitioner did not positively establish that the employees
expressly recognized it as their exclusive bargaining representative. Clearly,
respondent GAW Trading acted with undue haste in recognizing petitioner as the
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees, for it merely relied on the latter's selfserving claim that it was indeed recognized as such by said employees. Hence,
there is no clear compliance with the jurisdictional preconditions for collective
bargaining.
Second, there was a failure to post the CBA in at least two conspicuous places in the
establishment at least 5 days before its ratification. Petitioner ratiocinated that the
illegal strike staged by SPFL made it impossible to comply with the posting
requirement, for it resulted in the absence of impartial members of the bargaining
unit who could be apprised of the CBA's contents.
The SC found petitioner's justification puerile and unacceptable. In the first place,
the posting of copies of the CBA is the responsibility of the employer, and not the
petitioner. Secondly, the formulation and finalization of the CBA was suspect, for
there appeared to be undue haste in the conduct thereof. Hence, that an illegal
strike was conducted by the SPFL is of no moment.
Third, the public respondent director found that 181 of the 281 workers who
supposedly ratified the CBA had soon manifested their strong and vehement denial
and/or repudiation of the alleged negotiation and ratification of the CBA. This
indicates that the CBA would be detrimental to industrial stability.
Hence, the public respondent was correct in finding the CBA to be defective.

MANILA MINING CORP. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS


CHAPTER vs. MANILA MINING CORP.. G.R. Nos. 178222-23, 29 September 2010

FACTS:

Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) is a publicly-listed corporation engaged in largescale mining for gold and copper ore. MMC constructed several tailings dams, as
mandated by law, to treat and store its waste materials. One of these dams was
Tailings Pond No. 7 (TP No. 7), which was was operated under a permit issued by the
DENR.

When MMC-Makati Employees Association-Federation of Free Workers Chapter


acquired its legitimate registration status, it submitted letters to MMC relating its
intention to bargain collectively. Then, CBA proposal to MMC.

Upon expiration of the tailings permit, DENR-EMB did not issue a permanent permit
due to the inability of MMC to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC). Due to this, it was compelled to temporarily shut down its mining operations,
resulting in the temporary lay-off of more than 400 employees in the mine site.
MMC called for the suspension of negotiations on the CBA with the Union until
resumption of mining operations.

The Union insists that MMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it unilaterally
suspended the negotiation for a CBA. They alleged that MMC did not want to
bargain collectively with the Union, so that instead of submitting their
counterproposal to the CBA, MMC decided to terminate all union officers and active
members.

ISSUE: Whether or not suspension of the CBA negotiations due to the temporary
shutdown of operation is tantamount to refusal to bargain, hence, an unfair labor
practice.

RULING:

No. Unfair labor practice cannot be imputed to MMC since, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the call of MMC for a suspension of the CBA negotiations cannot be
equated to refusal to bargain.

The Union based its contention on the letter request by MMC for the suspension of
the collective bargaining negotiations until it resumes operations. Verily, it cannot
be said that MMC deliberately avoided the negotiation. It merely sought a
suspension and in fact, even expressed its willingness to negotiate once the mining
operations resume. There was valid reliance on the suspension of mining operations
for the suspension, in turn, of the CBA negotiation. The Union failed to prove bad
faith in MMCs actuations.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the CA that MMCs suspension of its
mining operations was bonafide and the reason for such suspension was supported
by substantial evidence. MMC cannot conduct mining operations without a tailings
disposal system. When the renewal permit was not immediately released by the
DENR-EMB, MMC was compelled to temporarily shutdown its milling and mining
operations. Here, it is once apparent that the suspension of MMCs mining
operations was not due to its fault nor was it necessitated by financial reasons. Such
suspension was brought about by the non-issuance of a permit for the continued
operation of TP No. 7 without which MMC cannot resume its milling and mining
operations.

New Pacific Timber Supply Co. v. NLRC [G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000]
Tuesday, January 27, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Labor Law

FACTS: The NFL was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for the rank
and file employees of petitioner. NFL started to negotiate for better terms and
conditions of employment; which were met with resistance by Petitioner Company.
The NFL filed a complaint for ULP on the ground of refusal to bargain collectively. LA
issued an order declaring the company guilty of ULP and ordering the CBA proposals
submitted by the NFL as the CBA between parties. Later, 186 of private respondents
claiming they were wrongfully excluded from the benefits under the CBA filed a
petition for relief. Petitioner asserts that private respondents are not parties to the
agreement and may not claim benefits thereunder. As for the CBA, petitioner
maintains that the force and effect of the CBAs terms are limited to only three
years and cannot extend to terms and conditions which ceased to have force and
effect.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the terms of an existing CBA as to its economic provisions can be extended
beyond the period stipulated therein, even beyond the three year period prescribed
by law, in the absence of a new agreement.

2. W/N the rank and file employees hired after the term of the CBA, considering
their subsequent membership in the bargaining unit, are parties to the agreement
and may claim benefits thereunder.

HELD:
1. Yes. It is clear from Art. 253 that until a new CBA has been executed by and
between the parties; they are duly bound to keep the status quo and to continue in
full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. In the case
at bar, no new agreement was entered between the parties pending appeal of the
decision in the NLRC. Consequently, the employees from to the year 1985 (after
expiration of the CBA) onwards would be deprived of a substantial amount of
monetary benefits if the terms and conditions of the CBA were not to remain in
force and effect which runs counter to the intent of the Labor Cod to curb labor
unrest and promote industrial peace.

2. Yes. When a CBA is entered into by the union representing the employees and the
employer, even the non-union members are entitled to the benefits of the contract.
A laborer can claim benefits from a CBA entered into the company and the union of
which he is a member at the time of the conclusion of the agreement even after he
has resigned from said union. Therefore, the benefits under the CBA should be
extended to those who only became such after it expired; to exclude them would
constitute undue discrimination
ORIENTAL TIN CAN LABOR UNION

VS

SECRETARY OF LABOR

294 SCRA 640

[ August 28, 1998]

FACTS

-Company entered into CBA with OTCLU (Oriental Tin Can Labor Union). -248 rank
and file workers FFW to file a petition for certification election. However, this
petition was repudiated by waiver of 115 signatories who ratified the new CBA.

-OTCWU-FFW filed petition for certification election, accompanied by authentic


signatures of 25% of employees.

-OTCLU filed motion for dismissal of the petition for certification election. It said the
petition was not endorsed by at least 25% as some of the employees allegedly
withdrew their support.

-Company filed comment alleging that the new CBA was already ratified.

-OTCWU-FFW filed a reply, alleging that the employer has no legal personality to
oppose petition for certification election.

-DOLE issued certificate of registration of the CBA. It showed that the CBA between
the OTCLU and the company has the force and effect of law.

-OTCWU-FFW officers walked out of their jobs. The union filed notice of strike with
NCMB.grounded on alleged dismissal of union members/officers. Company directed
the officers to return to work. None of them did.

-Med-arbiter dismissed petition for certification election.

-OTCWU-FFW appealed to Sec of Labor. Pending appeal, they staged a strike. They
prevented free ingress and egress of non-striking employees, and vehicles. NLRC
issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

-Labor Usec issued resolution granting the appeal and setting aside the order of
Med-arbiter.

-After denial of their MFR, the company and OTCLU filed petitions for certiorari
before SC.

ISSUE/S

1. WON the employer can challenge petitions for certification election

2. WON the DOLE correctly granted the petition for certification election

3. WON it is proper to dismiss a petition for certification election because a new CBA
has already been ratified.

4. WON the 25% support requirement has been met in this case

HELD

1. NO

-Certification elections are exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the


employer lacks the legal personality to challenge the same.

-The only instance when an employer may concern itself with employee
representation activities is when it has to file the petition for certification election
because there is no existing CBA in the unit and it was requested to bargain
collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of Labor Code. After filing the petition, the role
of the employer ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. Companys interference
in the certification election below by actively opposing the same is manifestly
uncalled-for and unduly creates a suspicion that it intends to establish a company
union.

2. YES

-Since question of right of representation as between competing labor organizations


in a bargaining unit is imbued with public interest, law governs the choice of a
collective bargaining representative which shall be the duly certified agent of the
employees concerned. An official certification becomes necessary where the
bargaining agent fails to present adequate and reasonable proof of its majority
authorization and where the employer demands it, or when the employer honestly
doubts the majority representation of several contending bargaining groups. IArticle
255 of the Labor Code allows the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit to designate or select the labor organization which shall
be their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.

-The designation or selection of the bargaining representative without, however,


going through the process set out by law for the conduct of a certification election
applies only when representation is not in issue. There is no problem if a union is
unanimously chosen by a majority of the employees as their bargaining
representative, but a question of representation arising from the presence of more
than one union in a bargaining unit aspiring to be the employees representative,
can only be resolved by holding a certification election under the supervision of the
proper government authority.

3. NO

-Petition for certification election was filed 28 days before expiration of existing CBA,
well within 60-day period provided for.

-Filing of petition for certification election during 60-day freedom period gives rise to
a representation case that must be resolved even though a new CBA has been
entered into within that period. This is clearly provided for in the aforequoted
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The
reason behind this rule is obvious. A petition for certification election is not
necessary where the employees are one in their choice of a representative in the
bargaining process. Moreover, said provision manifests the intent of the legislative
authority to allow, if not encourage, the contending unions in a bargaining unit to
hold a certification election during the freedom period.

4. YES

-The support requirement is a mere technicality which should be employed in


determining the true will of the workers instead of frustrating the same.

-All doubts as to the number of employees actually supporting the holding of a


certification election should, therefore, be resolved by going through such
procedure. It is judicially settled that a certification election is the most effective
and expeditious means of determining which labor organization can truly represent
the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit.