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MUST READ CASES (CRIMINAL LAW)

BOOK I

I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

1. Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that

"criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation

which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral

That which we call punishment is only an external

opinions of

of actions

means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in

People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).

Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four

(4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

Mala In se and Mala Prohibita

2. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.

Proximate Cause

3. People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

Impossible Crimes

4. Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119 Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality, the latter was not present in his room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual situation in the case at bar presents an inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

5. Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009

In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime ofqualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers.

Stages of Execution

6. People of the Philippines v. Malisce, G.R. No. 190912. January 12,

2015

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: a) The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; b) He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the

felony; c) The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance.

7. Rait v. People, G.R. No. 180425, July 31, 2008 Unlike in Baleros, the acts of petitioner clearly establish his intention to commence the act of rape. Petitioner had already successfully removed the victims clothing and had inserted his finger into her vagina. It is not empty speculation to conclude that these acts were preparatory to the act of raping her. Had it not been for the victims strong physical resistance, petitioners next step would, logically, be having carnal knowledge of the victim. The acts are clearly the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.

8. Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006 In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.

That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death does not negate petitioners’ criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder.

9. Aristotle Valenzuela v. People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007

Theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

10.Ramie Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 149988, August 14, 2009

Considering further that the victim sustained wounds that were not fatal and absent a showing that such wounds would have certainly caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance, we declare the petitioners guilt to be limited to the crime of attempted homicide.

11.People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico, we ruled that when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.

Conspiracy and proposal

12.People v. Carandang, G.R. No. 175926, July 6, 2011

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct participation.

As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of closing the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to

prevent any chance for the police officers to defend themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.

13.People v. Bokingco, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.

14. People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014 Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwin’s liability is not diminished since he and the others with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.

15.People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158754, August 10, 2007

Petitioners second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees of participation of Jinggoy in the crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if pursued to their respective logical conclusions, tend to cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the opposite of the other. For while the second argument attempts to establish animplied conspiracy between Jinggoy and his father - hence, the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the third argument eschews the idea of conspiracy, but respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless equally guilty as President Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation and/or direct participation in the crime of Plunder.

16.Fernan v. People G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007

It is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation

cannot be committed and successfully consummated. Thus, petitioners acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents.

17.Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989 Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.

Continuing Crime 18. People v Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974 Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes of theft.

19.Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993 The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407,

1410-1414).

The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).

20.Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110617 December 29, 1994 The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand, and those committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are definitely separate felonies. They were dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated ondifferent occasions, and caused injury to different parties.

Compound Crime/Complex Crime 21. Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-10364 and L-10376, March 31, 1958 There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability. Even assuming that he had no intention to defraud the offended party if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the culprits, appellant's participation together with the participation of his co-defendant the commission of the offense completed all the necessary for the perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document

22.People v. Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997

In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other person may consequently suffer. In this case, Josephine jumped from a window of her house to escape from Appellant Castromero; as a result, she suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. This

being the case, the court a quo correctly convicted Appellant Castromero of the complex crime of rape with serious physical injuries.

23.People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012 Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo.The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty.

24.People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453. May 29, 2002 Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide.This is in accordance with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x.

25. People v. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012 There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate information.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY Justifying Circumstances

- Self-Defense 26. Nacnac v. People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012 Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference between the act of drawing ones gun and the act of pointing ones gun at a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In People v. Borreros, We ruled that for unlawful aggression to be attendant, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the act of the [deceased] of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in real peril the life or personal safety of appellant. The facts surrounding the instant case must, however, be differentiated from current jurisprudence on unlawful aggression. The victim here was a trained police officer. He was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague.

27.People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011

An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. In this case, other than the self-serving allegation of Danny, there is no evidence sufficiently clear and convincing that the victim indeed attacked him. The prosecutions rebuttal witnesses Jaime Maquiling and Francisco Austerowho admittedly were among those whom Danny and Bingky had an encounter with on the night of August 19, 2001, never said in their testimonies that Romeo attacked Danny and a bladed weapon was used. These witnesses were categorical that Romeo was not with them during the incident. This testimonial evidence was not refuted by the defense. Even Bingky who claimed to be a friend of Romeowas not able to identify the latter as one of those present at the time. Candid enough, Bingky declared that it was only a certain Ago and Jaime who confronted Danny. Resultantly, Danny failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression, the most indispensable element

of self-defense. Where no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.

28.People v. Mapait, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry

countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

29.People v. Patotoy, G.R. No. 102058, August 26, 1996

Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. There must exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of the person claiming self-defense. [18] This element, in the case before us, is sorely wanting. No veritable physical force on the part of Manuel has been shown that could have really endangered appellant's life. Manuel's alleged act of drawing "something" from his waist certainly is not the "unlawful aggression" meant in the law that would justify a fatal strike at the victim with such lightning-speed as appellant has delivered. In fact, no weapon, supposedly in the person of Manuel, is shown to have been found. Without unlawful aggression, self- defense cannot exist nor be an extenuating circumstance.

30.People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012 The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense. In other words, no self-defense can exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel. In People v. Dolorido, we held that unlawful

aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The unlawful aggression may constitute an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury upon the accused. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the x x x intent to cause injury.

31.People v. Credo, G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013

As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the part of Joseph because at the time of the incident, he was only holding a lemon and an egg. According to the trial court, the fact that Joseph was unarmed effectively belied the allegation of Ronald that he was prompted to retaliate in self-defense when Joseph first hacked and hit him on his neck. The trial court further pointed out that if Joseph indeed hacked Ronald on the neck, "it is surprising that the latter did not suffer any injury when according to them (Ronald, Rolando and Flora Credo), Joseph was running fast and made a hard thrust on Ronald, hitting the latter’s neck."

- State of Necessity 32.Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004 Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s hospital bills.

-Fulfillment of Duty 33. Cabanlig v. Sandiganabayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2005 Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon than the bamboo lance that the fugitive had run away with in People v. Delima. The policeman in People v. Delima was held to have been justified in shooting to death the escaping fugitive because the policeman was merely performing his duty.

In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape.[22] But Valino was not only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the loose firearm. By grabbing Mercados M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger.

- Obedience to a lawful order of a superior

34. Tabuena v. People, G.R. No. 103501-03. February 17, 1997 This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia.

Battered Woman Syndrome

35. People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes)

prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self- defense may be appreciated. We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.

36.Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner's contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."

Exempting Circumstances - Insanity 37.People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009 Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by

a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.

- Minority 38. Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006

Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.

In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.

39.Madali v. People, G.R. No. 180380, August 4, 2009

As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344. Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which states: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

40.People v. Sarcia G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009 The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

41.People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D.

603.

- Accident 42. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004

It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.

43. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007

Accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are: 1. A person is performing a lawful act; 2. With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4. Without fault or intention of causing it. By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellants defense

of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident.

Mitigating Circumstances -Praeter Intentionem 44.People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011 In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

-Immediate vindication of a grave offense 45.People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011 As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the same cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the act be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his equanimity. In the case at bar, the accused- appellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have regained his composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the accused-appellant.

- Sufficient Provocation 46.Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, January 20, 2009

Petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying to avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when petitioner’s lucky punch found its mark. In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused police officer shot and killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of Appeals, a case also involving a policeman who killed a man after the latter challenged him to a fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating circumstance should not be considered in favor of petitioner.

- Passion/Obfuscation 47. People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514 , September 30, 2003 The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same facts or motive. In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.

48.People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159. March 18,

2015

To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following elements: 1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and 2. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a

considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.

49.Romera v. People, G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004

But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.

-Voluntary Surrender 50.People v. Viernes, G.R. No. 136733, December 13, 2001 The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that search and capture would require. Going to the police station to clear his name does not show any intent of appellant to surrender unconditionally to the authorities

51.People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004 In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Aggravating Circumstances 52.People v. Cortes, G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001 As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the simple reason that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. "Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2)

the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or capture." In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.

"The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated separately as another aggravating circumstance." Here, treachery qualified the offense to murder.

As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not be considered as it was not shown that accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood. In fact, the accused mistook the victim for a man.

- Recidivism

53. People v Molina, G.R. Nos. 134777-78. July 24, 2000

On the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the trial court properly appreciated the same though not alleged in the information. Article 14(9) of the Revised Penal Code defines a recidivist as "one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code." To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information and to attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused. Nonetheless, the trial court may still give such aggravating circumstance credence if the accused does not object to the presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism.

-Reiteracion

54. People v. Cajara, G.R. No. 122498. September 27, 2000 The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been

convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8 November 1991. Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the accused has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua.Where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case.

- Treachery 55. People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was under the impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial court’s finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.

56.People v. Yam-Id, G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999

Treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death, treachery exists.

57.People v. Latag, G.R. No. 153213. January 22, 2004

In the present case, we find nothing in the records that shows the exact manner of the killing. Though Atienza turned around immediately after hearing a gunshot, he could not, and in fact did not, testify as to how the attack had been initiated. The fact that appellant was standing behind some shrubs when he shot the victim does not by itself sufficiently establish that the method of execution gave the latter no opportunity for self-defense. Nor was the attack deliberately and consciously adopted by the former without danger to himself.

58.People v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312. January 28, 1997 The Revised Penal Code provides that "(t)here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." In the case at bench, the presence of treachery or alevosia which qualified the killing to murder was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the manner by which the perpetrators commenced and consummated the stabbing of the victim Efren Lasona showed conclusively that the latter was totally surprised by the attack and not afforded an opportunity to raise any defense against his attackers. Efren Lasona could not have expected, while riding in that tricycle, that he would be savagely and fatally assaulted by knife-wielding attackers. The victim was defenseless during the attack as his hands were restrained by the accused-appellant to facilitate the stabbing of the victim by the other perpetrators. It is well-settled that "(a)n unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack, constitutes alevosia." Parenthetically, the fact that the attack on deceased Efren Lasona was frontal does not preclude the presence of

treachery in this case as the same made the attack no less unexpected and sudden.

- Ignominy 59.People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990

The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The testimony of the examining physician that he did not find mud on the victim's private organ, does not necessarily belie the latter's asseveration that the accused "plastered" (in the words of the lower court) mud on her private part. It is worthwhile mentioning that the victim was examined and treated by Dr. Claudio at 3:55 p.m. or about almost two (2) hours after the rape was committed. 17 Given this circumstance, the absence of mud in the victim's private part when she was examined by the physician, may be attributed to the possibility that the mud washed or fell off even before the victim left the house for her physical examination. Moreover, Rebecca's testimony was corroborated by that of Amelita Malong who swore that she saw mud smeared on Rebecca's private part when she (Amelita) saw Rebecca right after the incident. It is also difficult to conceive why the offended party, young as she was, and with a chaste reputation, would go to the extent of fabricating this portion of her testimony notwithstanding the consequent humiliation on her person and disgrace on her womanhood. We cannot but agree with the trial court's finding that the offense was aggravated by ignominy. We are of the opinion, however that the word "cruelty" used in the dispositive portion of the judgment, to describe an alternative aggravating circumstance, is unnecessary. The act of "plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right after she was raped, is adequately and properly described as "ignominy" rather than "cruelty or ignominy."

Alternative Circumstances 60. People v. Fontillas, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010 Accused appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The person pleading intoxication must likewise prove that he took such

quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. Accused-appellant utterly failed to present clear and convincing proof of the extent of his intoxication on the night of December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had taken was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. Not one of accused- appellants drinking buddies testified that they, in fact, consumed eight bottles of gin prior to the rape incident.

III. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE Principal 61. People v. Janjalani et. al. G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011

Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the crime. Such command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized.

Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would not have been performed. In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.

62.People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012 Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal

purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. While this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act

Accomplice 63.People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009 All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.

It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Idas consent.

Accessories 64.Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994

Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes aprincipal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses.

Anti Fencing Law 65.Dimat v. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012

The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit

source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.

IV. PENALTIES 66.People v. Rocha, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007

It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants could not avail themselves of parole if their appeal is dismissed, unless they also apply for executive clemency and ask for the commutation of their reclusion perpetua sentences. Republic Act No. 4108, as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment. In several cases, we have considered the penalty of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty.

67.People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006

Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead,prision mayor.

There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous

rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" isprision mayor.

68.Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,G.R. Nos. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987

Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677 [1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.

69.People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008

As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the majority being generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, does not result to a maximum term fixed beyond the prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from the next lower penalty, then, in this limited sense, the difference would naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the case of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is taken from reclusin temporal in its maximum period which is within the prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal, while the minimum term is taken from prisin mayor which is the penalty next lower to reclusin temporal; hence, the one-degree difference observed by the dissent.

In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can exceed the prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can be as high as 20 years of reclusin temporal while the prescribed penalty remains at prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere within prisin correccional minimum and medium, or from 6 months and

1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental penalty rule deviates from the afore-stated general rule.

70.Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions.

- Subsidiary Imprisonment

71.Narte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004

This Court clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 dated February 14, 2001 that there is no legal obstacle to the application of the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine. This should finally dispel the petitioners' importunate claim that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in this case is improper.

- Indeterminate Sentence Law

72.Spouses Bacar v. Judge De Guzman Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349. April 18, 1997

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory. In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules

and provisions of the Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted.

73.Romero v. People, G.R. No. 171644, November 23, 2011

In Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to both the Revised Penal Code and the special laws, and in the same ruling, this Court summarized the application and non-application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:

x x x It is basic law that x x x the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in the following cases:

a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.

b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114) conspiracy or proposal to

commit treason (Art. 115).

c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139) or espionage (Art. 117).

d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).

e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).

Recidivists are entitled to an Indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, February 22, 1974) Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime is committed while he is on parole. (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O. G. 6701, November 19, 1982).

f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded

sentence.

g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of

the same. (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).

h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed

one (1) year.

Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year, the accused cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of the court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452- CR, January 22, 1962).

i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.

74.People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion

perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.

75.People v. Gunda, G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. "It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that ‘persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended’."

- Probation Law 76.Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008 The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and

applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

77.Almero v. People, G.R. No. 188191, March 12, 2014

Petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

78.Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011 One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.

79.Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006 Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted.[15] Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of the State; those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable.

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.

80.Bala v Judge Jimenez, G.R. No. L-67301, January 29, 1990

The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested so that he can serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation period of one year is of no moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed earlier. Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty of one year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an order placing

the defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence," but is in effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. 12 It is not a final judgment but an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment if the conditions are violated."

- Modification and Extinction of Criminal Liability 81. Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, G.R. No. L-28841, June 24, 1983

The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filing of tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint, taking an appeal, etc. They do not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the information on the last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.

82.Romualdez v Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be

gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

83.People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012 Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. In the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

84. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that, is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period.

85.People v. Lim, February 13, 1992 G.R. No. 95753

To warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or

pardon should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action (People v. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250 [1991]). The present case was filed on February 24, 1988 while the Affidavit was executed only on March 1,

1988.

86. People v. Bacang, July 30, 1996 G.R. NO. 116512

While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994.

87.People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

x x x x

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of

this Code.

Article 344 of the same Code also provides

ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. x x x.

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. x x x.

On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages contracted between the offender and the offended party in the crime of rape as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity to totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may have been imposed upon those found guilty of the felony.

BOOK II

Crimes Against National Security (Arts. 114-123) - Treason 88.Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856 Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ruled that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government.

89. People v. Perez, 83 Phil 314

Perez for recruiting,

apprehending and commandeering numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral purposes of Japanese officers. The Supreme Court held that his "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the

enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the

7

counts

of

treason

were

filed

against

women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment.

- Piracy 90. People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997 Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat.

Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State

- Arbitrary Detention 91.People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001

Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person. Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused- appellants. Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him, he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused- appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they dealt on a

different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accused- appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay evidence, which has no probative value. In summary, Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accused- appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.

92.People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1

When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the arrest without a warrant under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime for an essential precondition under the rule is that the crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.

93.Albor v. Aguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003

Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused. Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived

of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on March 25,

1999.

- Expulsion 94. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties and deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. There is no law expressly authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new domicile against their will and in fact Article 127 punishes public officials, not expressly

authorized by law or regulation, who compel any person to change his residence.

- Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained

95. Burgos v Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/ or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or intending to publish since mere generalization will not suffice. Also, ownership is of no consequence and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.

Crimes Against Public Order -Rebellion

96. People v. Loverdioro, G.R. 112235, November 29, 1995

If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.

97.People v. Geronimo, October 23, 1956 G.R. L-8936

Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it was committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion and the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. The individual crime would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter.

- Sedition 98.People v. Hadji October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686

The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common

offenses of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. Where the acts of violence were deemed absorbed in the crime

of rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of sedition.

-Inciting to Sedition 99.Mendoza v. People, G.R. L-2990, December 17 1951

A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and

dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen may criticize his government and government officials and submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" but such criticism should be specific and constructive, specifying particular objectionable actuations of the government. It must be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.

Illegal Possession of Firearms

100. Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007

When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearms should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’ etat and conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. The constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are quite different from one another, with the first punished

under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law.

R.A 10591, SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. The use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.

If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat.

If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.

- Direct Assault

101. Justo v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 453

The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant is not actually performing the duties of his office

when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where there is a mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play.

102. People v. Dollantes, June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639 When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay and if in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.

103. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010

The prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial courts verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. WhenLydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider while she was going to the principals office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma.

- Evasion of Service of Sentence

104. Pangan v. Gatbalite, G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005

Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

Crimes Against Public Interest -Falsification

105. Galeos v. People, G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011

In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employees eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered No to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of

consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong, it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.

7160)

106. Luagge v. CA, 112 SCRA 97 If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her spouse's name to the checks and encashed them to pay for the expenses of the spouse’s last illness and burial upon the belief that the accused is entitled to them and considering that the government sustained no damage due to such encashment, criminal intent may not be ascribed, and the accused should be acquitted to such crime.

107. People v. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120

If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses. Thus, where the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the money forming part of the road and bridge fund, effected payments to his co- accused for construction materials supposedly delivered to the province for various projects when in fact no such materials were delivered, and to camouflage or conceal the defraudation, the accused used six vouchers which had genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake, the crimes committed are not complex but separate crimes of falsification and

malversation and the falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.

108. Tenenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013 All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general, documents or instruments which are "used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions." Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.

-Usurpation

109. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013 We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on

the prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the DENR.

But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false

pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.

Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs

110. People v. Edgardo Fermin, G.R. No. 179344, August, 3, 2011 While Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 excuses non-compliance with the afore-quoted procedure, the same holds true only for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. Here, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural requirements cannot be excused since there was a break in the chain of custody of the substance taken from appellant. It should be pointed out that the identity of the seized substance is established by showing its chain of custody.

The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

111. People v. Chua 396 SCRA 657 The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.

112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012 While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise

dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.

113. David v. People, G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011 The deliberate elimination of the classification of dangerous drugs is the main reason that under R.A. 9165, the possession of any kind of dangerous drugs is now penalized under the same section. The deliberations, however, do not address a case wherein an individual is caught in possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs. In the present case, petitioner was charged under two Informations, one for illegal possession of six (6) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing dried marijuanaleaves weighing more or less 3.865 grams and the other for illegal possession of three (3) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing shabu weighing more or less 0.327 gram.

114. People v. Sadablab, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012

As this Court held in People v. Berdadero,[27] the foregoing provision, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy- bust operation x x x. [T]his silence cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.[28] In the case at bar, even if we assume for the sake of argument that Narciso Sabadlab and accused-appellant Marcos Sabadlab y Narciso alias Bong Pango could have been different persons, the established fact remains that it was accused-appellant who was caught in flagrante delicto by the buy-bust team. Following the aforementioned jurisprudence, even the lack of participation of PDEA would not make accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence obtained pursuant thereto inadmissible. Neither is prior surveillance a necessity for the validity of the buy-bust operation.

115. People v. Amansec, G.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011 The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy- bust money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court.

116. People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011

Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to carry or convey from one place to another. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content because when the latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest.

117. People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013

It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained that "marking" of the seized items "immediately after seizure and confiscation" may be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

118. People v. Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011 PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in

the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to be positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration of P200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs.

Crimes Against Public Morals - Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibits

119. Fernando v. CA, December 6, 2006 G.R. No. 159751 To be held liable for obscenity, the prosecution must prove that (a) the

materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials; that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. A picture being obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it. It is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.

-AntiTrafficking Persons Act

120. People v. Lali y Purih, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011

The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sisters passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.

Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.

Crimes Committed by Public Officers - Malversation

121. Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011

Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense.

122. Cua v. People, G.R. No. 166847, November 16, 2011

This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property and that he could not account for them, or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An accountable public officer

may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to satisfactorily explain.

In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven by the prosecution, petitioners retaliation against the BIR for not promoting him clearly does not constitute a satisfactory or reasonable explanation for his failure to account for the missing amount.

123. Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 415 When a collecting officer of a government institution assigns his or her work to another without the former being the one to misappropriate a government fund or property malversation may still be at hand. Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or converting public funds or property to one’s personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of them.

-Technical Malversation

124. Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 96025, May 15, 1991

In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information.

125. Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos

(P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

-Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)

126. Ambil Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011

In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private party rather than private person to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term party is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from person which, in general usage, refers to a human being. Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest. In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.

127. Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011

Despite APIs obvious lack of financial qualification and absence of basic terms and conditions in the submitted proposal, petitioner who chaired the PBAC, recommended the approval of APIs proposal just forty-five (45) days after the last publication of the invitation for comparative proposals, and subsequently requested the SB to pass a resolution authorizing him to enter into a MOA with API as the lone bidder for the project. It was only in the MOA that the details of the construction, terms and conditions of the parties obligations, were laid down at the time API was already awarded the project. Even the MOA provisions remain vague as to the parameters of the project, which the Sandiganbayan found as placing API at an arbitrary position where it can do as it pleases without being accountable to the municipality in any way whatsoever. True enough, when API failed to execute the construction works and abandoned the project, the municipality found

itself at extreme disadvantage without recourse to a performance security that API likewise failed to submit.

128. Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013

As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality.

129. Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013

In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is being held liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in performing the duties primarily vested in him by law, resulting in undue injury to private complainant. The good faith of heads of offices in signing a document will only be appreciated if they, with trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in whom the duty is primarily lodged. Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was established.

The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The damage to private complainant did not end with the canal’s construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and waste disposal site.

130. Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007

As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, the Court had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and private persons: x x x [T]he act

treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

131. Caunan v. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04, September 2, 2009

In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias City. These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to Paraaque Citys walis tingting transactions.

Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-

1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

132. Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 146 SCRA 508 An official involved need not dispose of his shares in a corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with another. The matter contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.

-Anti-Plunder Act

133. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

134. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October12, 2009 Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.

Crimes Against Persons Parricide

135. People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemars Death Certificate was also presented in evidence.

136. People v. De la Cruz, February 11, 2010 G.R. No. 187683 In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.

Death under Exceptional Circumstances

137. People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, Sept.14, 1987 There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.

Murder

138. People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013 To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.

139. Aguilar v DOJ, G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013 Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the elements of murder namely: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticideare, in all reasonable likelihood, present in Dangupon’s case. As to the first and second elements, Dangupon himself admitted that he shot and killed Tetet. Anent the third element, there lies sufficient basis to suppose that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended Tetet’s killing in view of the undisputed fact that he was restrained by respondents and thereby, rendered defenseless. Finally, with respect to the fourth element, Tetet’s killing can neither be considered as parricide nor infanticide as the evidence is bereft of any indication that Tetet is related to Dangupon.

140. People v. Galicia, G.R. No. 191063, October 9, 2013 Since the crime has already been qualified to murder by the attendant circumstance of treachery, the other proven circumstance of evident premeditation should be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. In this case, it was clearly shown that the two accused who were "riding in tandem" hatched the means on how to carry out and facilitate the commission of the crime. The time that had elapsed while the accused were waiting for their victim to pass by, is indicative of cool thought and reflection on their part that they clung to their determination to commit the crime; hence evident premeditation is duly proved.

Homicide

141. Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013 In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and

convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.

142. Escamilla v. People, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013 The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit.

Anti-Hazing Law

143. Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal. Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti- Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.

For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.

The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however,

that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Unintentional Abortion

144. People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988 The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.

Mutilation

145. Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008

A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the

elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the

Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation

of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused

purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of

some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation

as

defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not

in

any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still

very much part of his physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation. This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of the framers of our penal code.

Less serious physical injuries

146. Pentecostes v. People, G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010 Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to

petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor."

Rape

147. People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008 For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because although the offender has commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was performed.

148. People v. Achas, G.R. No. 185712, August 4, 2009 The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. This is because hymenal laceration is not an element of the crime of rape, albeit a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.

149. People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186129, August 4, 2009 Most important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to prove the following elements: 1. that the accused had carnal knowledge with a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. These elements were sufficiently established during trial and were not rebutted by the defense with any solid evidence to the contrary.

150. De Castro v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 155041, February 14, 2007

Petitioner insists that a “finger” does not constitute an object or instrument in contemplation of RA 8353. The insertion of one’s finger into the genital of another constitutes “rape through sexual assault”. Hence, the prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

151. People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013 In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear. Physical resistance is not an essential element of rape. Also, delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the finding of rape. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime and the medical certificate will then be rendered as merely corroborative.

152. People v. Funesto, G.R. No. 182237, August 3, 2011

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any certificate of live birth or any similar authentic document to prove the age of AAA when she was sexually violated.Neither did the appellant expressly admit AAAs age.

This conclusion notwithstanding, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime, as alleged in the Information. Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force or violence required in rape cases is relative; it does not need to be overpowering or irresistible; it is present when it allows the offender to consummate his purpose. In this case, the appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate rape. In fact, the medical findings confirmed AAAs non-virgin state.

Thus, the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, and was properly sentenced with the penalty

of reclusion perpetua

153. People v. Dahilig G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011 As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v. Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.

154. People v. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.

155. People v. Cadellada, G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013 A father who rapes his own minor daughter do not need to use any physical force or intimidation because in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.

Anti Child Abuse Law

156. Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011 In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs

breasts and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was just examining her. The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.

157. Roallos v. People, 198389, December 11, 2013 Roallos’ assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.

Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security Kidnapping

158. People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008 The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his

liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The totality of the prosecution’s evidence in this

case

homicide.

established

the

commission

of

kidnapping

for

ransom

with

159. People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013 If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.

160. People v. Baluya y Notarte, G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011 Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because he was not confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no evidence to show that Glodil sustained any injury, cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed above, leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. It remains undisputed that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that he did not know his way home from the place where he was left. It just so happened that the victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape, he ran away from the place where appellant left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read the signboards of the passenger jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going to his place of residence.

161. People v. Jacalne, G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move.

In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant tied the hands of Jomarie, the formers intention to deprive Jomarie of her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Because of her tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she was then and there deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a situation. It has been repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant, after more or less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could go home.

162. People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011 Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.

However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.

Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor

163. People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011

It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Meranos version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquezs version that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions, Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is satisfied.

As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case.

Grave Threats

164. Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009 In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a condition. Considering the mauling incident which transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband, petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person which constituted grave threat.

Grave Coercion

165. Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011

We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners.

There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material violence is not

indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient.

In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it was intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.

166. People v. Astorga, G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997

This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping. 31 Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing

something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.

167. Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009 The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the act. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion:

The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was lacking.

Unjust Vexation

168. Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006 Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the

crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private

complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their

collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21,

1997.

Anti-Wire Tapping Act

169. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112

(1986)

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to

determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

170. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28, 1995

Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

Crimes Against Property Robbery with Homicide

171. People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004 The rule is, whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the

occasion of a robbery, all those who take part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of death on them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of robbery carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of band, evident premeditation, craft and disguise against appellants. However, these circumstances were not specifically alleged in the information as required under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be deemed to have attended the commission of the offense, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on them.

172. People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, Mar. 11, 2004 There is no crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The crime is Robbery with Homicide notwithstanding the number of homicides committed on the occasion of the robbery and even if murder, physical injuries and rape were also committed on the same occasion.

173. People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013 In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery

and homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co- conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.

174. People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013 In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Accused can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly established, accused should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery with homicide.

Robbery with Rape

175. People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011 For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. In the case at bar, the original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery.

176. People v. Dinola, G.R. No. L-54567, March 22, 1990 If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed however, if the original design was to commit rape but the accused after committing rape also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses. In the case at bar, after the complainant was raped by the accused, the latter threatened to kill her if she did not give watch on her wrist to him and forcibly took it from her. Hence, the accused was convicted for two crimes of rape and robbery.

177. People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 140033, January 25, 2002 Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery only under Article 294, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to appellant Reynaldo Maniquez, who had raped Mary Ann Galedo, he should be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape, under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

Theft

178. Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008 There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the construction contract.

Qualified theft

179. Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013 The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or

intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18

All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.

180. Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013 Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. The element of grave abuse of confidence is present in this case. Verily, the petitioner, as sales clerk/agent of PCS, is duty-bound to remit to Ingan the payments which she collected from the customers of PCS. She would not have been able to take the money paid by LACS if it were not for her position in PCS. In failing to remit to Ingan the money paid by LACS, the petitioner indubitably gravely abused the confidence reposed on her by PCS.

Anti-Carnapping Law

181. People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the

unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the

important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.

182. People v. Lagat, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011

The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their unexplained possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle.

183. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003

The acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to the offender.

184. People v. Nocom, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013 To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."

Estafa

185. Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013 When the information alleges the crime of estafa specified under paragraph 1(b) and yet what was proven was estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same Art. 315 of the RPC, what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information and not the caption of the information. The information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act can give rise to two offenses, all the more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission.

186. Brokmann v. People, G.R. No. 199150, February 6, 2012 the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of confidence or (b) means of deceit. The acts constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas. In this case, the charge against the petitioner and her subsequent conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged with.

187. Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 199294, July 31, 2013 Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa under paragraph 2(a) of that provision does not require as an element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or converted the swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage sustained by the complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation. The prosecution in this case discharged its evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the installment payments made by Sy on the purchase price for the Club share. Petitioner and Ragonjan knew that the Club was a bogus project.

188. Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187919, February 20,

2013

Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents’ termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees.” The other bits of evidence were also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage.

189. People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013 In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Hence, he cannot be convicted of estafa.

190. Milla v. People, G.R. No. 188726, Jan. 25, 2012 In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla could not have novated the original transaction, as the checks were only intended to secure the return of the P2 million the former had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced and were thus unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover, the estafa involved here was not for simple misappropriation or conversion, but was committed through Millas falsification of public documents, the liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere novation.

BP 22

191. People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004 It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the Fiscals office without any confirmation that the demand letter

supposedly

sent

through

registered

mail

was

actually

received

by

appellant.

With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice violated appellants right to procedural due process. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

192. Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004 Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored.

193. Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005 A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.

The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the drawer or maker of the check gives the latter the option to prevent criminal prosecution if he pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the check has not been paid.

194. Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012 What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check

was not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence to her incurring criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

195. Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2, 2001

The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, 23 or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioner’s insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the respondent court’s affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.

196. Tan v. People, G.R. No. 141466, January 19, 200 The check in question was not issued without sufficient funds and was not dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. What was stamped on the check in question was Payment Stopped-Funded at the same time DAUD

meaning drawn against uncollected deposits. Even with uncollected deposits, the bank may honor the check at its discretion in favor of favored clients, in which case there would be no violation of B.P. 22.

197. Nissan Gallery Ortigas v. Felipe, 199067, November 11, 2013 A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. Though the accused has been acquitted from the criminal charge, the acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored upon its presentment.

- Other Deceits

198. Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005

For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a) false

pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.[40] It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property.

The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and intendment.

-Arson

199. People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006 In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or

arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.

200. Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013 Petitioners were property convicted of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Having affixed their signatures on the disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein, petitioners were properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in approving the "ghost" purchases. Their participation in facilitating the payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to a loss on the part of the government.

201. Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008 The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here. However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.

- Malicious Mischief

202. Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011

Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution

had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements.

First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioner's version that it was private complainant's CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private complainant.

In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malicious mischief.

Crimes Against Chastity -Qualified Seduction

203. People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968 While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it does not have to be proved or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. Under Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced is "constitutive" of the crime of qualified seduction even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge was voluntary on the part of the virgin.

204. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838, November 29,

1988

There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that

she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common

elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.

- Acts of Lasciviousness

205. Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009 In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation

be irresistible. It being sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. Here, the victim was locked inside a windowless room together with her aggressor who poked a gun at her forehead. Even a grown man would be paralyzed with fear if threatened at gunpoint, what more the hapless victim who was only 15 years old when she was subjected to such atrocity.

206. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143838, May 9, 2002

Petitioner’s acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness. The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.

207. People v Bonaagua , G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011

Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its

slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.

-Forcible Abduction

208. People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001 The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age.

All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as

probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.

209. People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012

The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting

AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck down, and in

having carnal knowledge of

that

order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.

her (in

210. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002 There can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape.

- Anti Sexual Harassment Act

211. Bacsin v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008 The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti- Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the

demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her. It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the evidence presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding of grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.

212. Alegria v Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, 04 April 2007

Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. Under Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is committed when the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which

in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.

In the case at bar, while it is true that the element of moral ascendancy is present, respondent being the person who recommended complainant to her present position, complainant has failed to prove the alleged sexual advances by evidence other than her bare allegations in the affidavit-complaint. Even her own actions or omissions operate to cast doubt on her claim.

Crimes Against Civil Status -Bigamy

213. Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011 The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner.

Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.

It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis

acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

214. Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

215. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18,

2004

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. 28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce

legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

Crimes Against Honor - Libel

216. Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007 The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, has the following elements: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even a dead person and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the person defamed.

217. Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011 An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. Moreover, [a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.

Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts finding that the phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND

SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial word NEVER used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondents performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.

218. Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25, 2007 The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to.5 Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons6 laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article.

The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient description or other indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.

219. Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008

Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, however, includes not only the author but also the person who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge or participation in the publication of the offending article is not required.

220. Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008

Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing company.

As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control of its management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the publication therein of a libelous article. On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, it is held that said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of the publication.

221. Bonifacio v. RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010

If

published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or

first

the

circumstances

as

to

where

the

libel

was

printed

and

supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.

- Slander

222. Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006

Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the

phrase Fuck You, which is

expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People, where the Court said that: This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer,

that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall bearresto menor meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not exceeding P200.00. We opt to impose a fine following Mari.

the

similar

to

223. Victorio v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-32836-37, May 3, 1989 Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, “kayabang,” “tunaw na utak,” “swapang,” and "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libellous per se.

- Intriguing Against Honor

224. Betguen v Masangcay 238 Scra 475 Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code defines "intriguing against honor" as any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor

and reputation of a person. This felony undoubtedly falls under the coverage of crimes involving moral turpitude, the latter term having been defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty and good morals."

Criminal Negligence

225. Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 172716, November 17, 2010 Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes