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30.

Liyao jr vs Tanhoti Liyao


Liyao vs. Liyao
GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition
ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former
as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as
such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and
the deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965
until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the
deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the deceased.
HELD:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for
the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and
economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that
his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
31. Pe Lim vs CA
FACTS:
Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She also worked as a receptionist
in a Club
where she met petitioner during her first night on the job. Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love
and soon lived together. Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to Manila in October of
the same year. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter and he egistered the name Joanna Rose C.
Pe Lim on the childs birth certificate. After Joanna Roses birth, the love affair between Maribel and petitioner
continued.
Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioners feelings toward her started to wane. He subsequently
abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel then filed a complaint for support.
Petitioner negated all of Maribels claims and even his paternity. The trial court rendered a decision on in favor of
Maribel ordering herein defendant, Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural daughter.
Petitioner then elevated his case and argues before the Court that there is no clear and convincing evidence on record
to show that there was actual cohabitation between him and Maribel.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented sufficient to claim filiation therefore, making the father liable for support.
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
3. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
4. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good father to
Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Birth say it
all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.
32. Rivero vs CA
Facts: In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint againstdefendants for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father. During trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De
Guzman, one of the sister entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff whereby she is acknowledging the
petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and pay petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of their deceased father.
RTC Granted the compromised agreement .Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed for
annulment of judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss. CA directed Mary
Jane on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle. In her reply, she question assailed decision
of RTC since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise agreement. She further
alleged that the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and the
petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement.CA ruled in favor of the
defendants, hence a petition.
Issue: W/N the compromise regarding filiation is valid?
Held: NO. The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null and void. Article
2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such,
paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the
court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition
by Mary Jane , however, is ineffectual, because under the law, there cognition must be made personally by the
putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative
33. Bernabe vs Alejo
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian
Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole
surviving heir left was Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given a share of his fathers estate.
Trial courts ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment
of the Family Code did not take away his right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.
HELD:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the
putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are
usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.
Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the
filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.
34. Mossesgeld vs CA
Case Doctrines:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother , and this is rule regardless of whether or not the father
admits paternity.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law

Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy. The father, one Eleazar Calasan (married),
signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the childs name as Jonathan Mossesgeld
Calasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the
information contained therein were true and correct. In addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of
the child.
The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the childs surname in the certificate of live birth;
hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for
registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988,
of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate
children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their mother.
Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname. The RTC
denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for reconsideration. Later, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition
and to admit amended petition, substituting the childs mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was
denied. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child
using the alleged fathers surname where the latter admitted paternity?
Held:
No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar
correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child using the surname of the
alleged father, even with the latters consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may
legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the
adopter, entitled to use his surname.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate
child using the fathers surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the
performance of an act prohibited by law. (Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998)
35. Republic vs Vivencio
Facts :
The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City on January 19, 1971 to parents Pablo Castro
Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On January 10, 1927, after a marital disagreement, Vicencio left their
Meycauayan Bulacan conjugal property and never returned nor gave support to his family. Leabres found an ally in
Ernesto Yu who would later end up as her husband. On June 29, 1976, Leabres filed a petition , known as Civil
case number E-02009 with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the dissolution of her conjugal
partnership with Vicencio. In a decision given by Hon Regina C. Ordoez Benitez dated July 11, 1977, the petition
was granted. The petitioners mother filed another petition in 1983 to drop the surname of her husband therefrom
and this, known as Special Proclamation 8316346 was again approved in a decision rendered by Hon. Emeterio C.
Cui of Branch XXV. Yet again, under Special Proclamation number 84-22605, Leabres filed a petition to declare
Pablo Vicencio an absentee. Hon. Corona Ibay- Somera decided in favour of the petitioners mother on April 26,
1984. The positive results of these petitions paved the way for the marriage of the petitioners mother and Ernesto
Yu on April 15, 1986.
Evidence was established that the petitioner had not remembered much her real father, Pablo Vicencio, and that in
his absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken Vicencios place. Although petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her
school and other related activities, she contends that in such situations, confusion arose as to her parentage leading
to inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio as surname ; causing much embarrassment on her part. In two occasions
when she ran as a beauty contestant for Lions Club Affair and Manila Red Cross, her name was registered as
Cynthia L. Yu. His stepfather had given his consent thereto upon prior consultation with him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) , having participated in the cross examination of Cynthia Vicencio and
her witnesses, manifested opposition over the petition. The court argued that there was no valid cause for the denial
of the petition and that taking into account the fact that the court cannot compel the stepfather of the petitioner to
consider adoption , failure to observe the process should not be a cause for disallowing petitioner to legally change

her name, in addition to the opportunity of the respondent to improve her personality and welfare under a socially
recognized surname, that of her stepfather. On August 31, 1987, the Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 52 granted
private respondent Cynthia Vicencios petition for change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. The same was affirmed
by the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989.
Issue :
Whether or not the appellate court made a mistake or violated standards in affirming the decision of the trial court to
allow the change in private respondents surname to that of her stepfathers surname.
Decision :
Recognized inter alia in Republic vs. Hernandez, the following are sufficient grounds to warrant a change in name ;
a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce , b) when the change is a
legal consequence of legitimation or adoption , c. ) when the change will avoid confusion , d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of an alien parentage, e)
when the change is based on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase sign of former alienage, in good faith
without prejudice to anybody and f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that desired
change of name was far a fraudulent purpose or would prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that she falls under one of the justifiable grounds, specifically under avoidance of
confusion since she has been recognized by society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu although she admits to having
used Vicencio in beauty pagents and in her debut.
In the argument of the Solicitor General , it argues that change in surname might give rise to legal complications
since her stepfather has two other children with her mother and such complications may affect even the issue of
inheritance should the stepfather die.The OSG further argues that change of name would be easy through adoption
which Ernesto Yu did not opt for.
The court contends that though confusion may arise with regard to parentage , more confusion with grave legal
consequences could arise if private respondent is to use his stepfathers surname even if she is not legally adopted
by him. Legal constraints lead the court to reject private respondents desire to use her step-fathers surname and no
assurance exists that the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, as it may trigger deeper
inquiries regarding her parentage. It is also noteworthy that as a result of Republic Act 6809, the private respondent
although already 18 when the appellate court rendered its decision , was still considered a minor.
The court reversed and set aside the appealed decision to allow private respondents change of name from Vicencio
to Yu and granted the instant petition to retain surname due to lack of legally justifiable cause for allowing such
change.
Adoption
1. Herbert Cang vs CA
G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial
court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole
custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest the adoption,
but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the
FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent
who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children.
Herbert elevated the case to the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground
that Herbert has abandoned them.

RULING:
Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the
adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption to be
valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their
children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his
natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary
evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and
send them packages catered to their whims.
2. Tamargo vs CA
GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries
that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the
natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on
November 1982 after the tragic incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the
biological parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority
which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident,
parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under
their parental authority in accordance with the civil code.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.
Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had
been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of
Adelberto.
3. Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired
the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who
died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son
named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named
Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The
spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration
proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed
for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition
dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.
HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence was likewise
offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws
presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate;
and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
4. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed
that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of
the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to
be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely
provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating
the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

5. Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, February 9, 1996_digested


(Special Proceedings Adoption: Change of Name)
Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the
prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson
y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the
joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that
these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in
substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct
sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the
adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity
of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but
related causes of action in a single petition.
Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a
petition for adoption.
Held: No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted
to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of
the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural
and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in
fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely
upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this
case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change
in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
6. Ching Leng vs. Galang

7. Reyes vs. Sotero, GR No. 167405, February 16, 2006_digested


(Special Proceedings Adoption)
Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of
the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that
real and personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the
deceased.

Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters
husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without
leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of her adoption from
the local civil registrars office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form
and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on Petitioners claim
that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain badges of fraud.
The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before
the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since, imputations of irregularities
permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.
Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities.
Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already
presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the official repository of
which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars
office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of
court regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are
prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners
adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere imputations of
irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are
presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

8. QUIMIGUING VS ICAO
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of
Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for amendment of complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through
force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop
studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorneys fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguings failure to allege the fact that a child
had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to
the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.
Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an independent
cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child, which includes
its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only en ventre de sa mere. Article 742 of the same Code holds

that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of
Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of
order.
Additionally, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of
the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused per Article 21 of the Civil Code,
a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or
other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the decision; with costs against
Icao.

9. Lacson vs Lacson 24 SCRA 837


Facts:
- Feb 14, 1953 when they got married
- Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila
- March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila
o Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner
Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen
o This was affirmed by the CFI
- May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she
only entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older
ones as well who are all below 7 years old.
- CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as
such the execution of said judgment is void too.
ISSUE: Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife
HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time
- NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure."
o Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and void since no
compelling reasons were stated otherwise
o However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with
(sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) already 1968
o Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence.
Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.
- However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid with respect to the
separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction.
(art 190/191 of NCC)
Corroborated by already 5-year separation

10. PERLA G. PATRICIO v. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Second Division
FACTS:
On 5 July 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife Perla G. Patricio and his two sons
Marcelino Marc Dario and R Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a
residential house and a pre-school building built theron in Cubao, QC, covering an area of 755 sq. m., more or less.
On 10 August 1987, P Perla, Marcelino Marc, and R Marcelino extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V
Dario. The TCT of the above-mentioned parcel of lands was cancelled and a new one was issued in the names of the
three heirs.
Thereafter, P Perla and Marcelino Marc formally advised R Marcelino of their intention to partition the subject
property & terminate the co-ownership. R refused to partition the property, hence P Perla and Marcelino Marc
instituted an action for partition before the RTC of Quezon City.
RTC: Ordered the partition of the subject property in the ff. manner: Perla, 4/6; Marcelino Marc, 1/6; Marcelino, 1/6.
It also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties may put up their bids. In case of failure,
the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner. RTC denied MR.
CA: Initially denied Rs appeal. In its MR, CA partially reconsidered its decision and dismissed the complaint for
partition for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as
long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heir could not partition the property unless the court found
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. It held that Rs minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a grandson
of P Perla and Marcelino V. Dario, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.
SUB-ISSUE: W/N partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such
partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
ISSUE: W/N Rs minor son can be considered a beneficiary under FC 154.
RULING ON THE SUB-ISSUE:
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones
lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the
land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family.
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and
is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its
beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something
merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by
the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in
Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated
by the Code.
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive
and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a
minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
As a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses
or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of
his or her separate property as family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family
home shall be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to
safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of
supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of
Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3)
they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

RULING ON THE ISSUE: No. He does not satisfy all three requisites to be considered a beneficiary.
(1) Must be among the relationships enumerated in FC 154.
The term descendants contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home
without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who
constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino
V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
(2) They must actually live in the family home.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent
Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
(3) They must be dependent upon the head of the family for legal support.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are
capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs
parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first
imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their
default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support
not from his grandmother, but from his father, who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct
from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which
bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised;
(5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to
prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandsons legal
support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property which shows an intention to
dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.

With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil
Code. Under the law of intestate succession, if the widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same
share as that of each of the children. However, since only one-half of the conjugal property which is owned by the
decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to be given exclusively to the surviving
spouse as her conjugal share of the property), the widow will have the same share as each of her two surviving
children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla
Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
11. AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANKLIN HARVEY HIRSCH, Respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which granted private
respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor daughter Simone.
Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin
insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money
and for Franklins permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention
not to come back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court, CA issued a
Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simone be brought before said court.

CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in utter disregard of the provisions
of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below.
Held:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of the minor child to
both parents.
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling
evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more
of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.7 Here, the mother was not shown to
be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
wrench the child from the mothers custody.1avvphi1
Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
12. DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122906
February 7, 2002
Facts:
- Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two
cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister.
- A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father
and grandparents.
- Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted the petition and appointed
Edgar as the legal guardian.
- Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the court set aside the original judgement and allowed Dinah
to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court
issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.
- Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and granted Edgar custody
over Gardin.
- Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of
Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
Issue:
Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?
Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away
from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child.
A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for compelling reasons.
Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years
of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise
its discretion by disregarding the childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance,
custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that the appellate court did not
err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be
wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment.

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special
proceedings before the trial court.
13. Sagala-Eslao vs CA
G.R. No. 116773 January 16 1997 [Parental Authority]
FACTS:
When Maria Paz's husband Reynaldo Eslao died, she entrusted custody of her youngest child Angelica to her
grieving mother-in-law. She then returned to her mother's house with Leslie. Years later, Maria Paz got married to a
Japanese-American and live with him in the US. After this she returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to the US. She then informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica her new
husband's willingness to adopt her children. Teresita refused, and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica
when she was 10 days old. Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the return of the custody of Angelica to
her. After the trial on the merits, the trial court granted the petition. CA affirmed in the full decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the child
RULING:
No. The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a
right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
Thus, when Maria entrusted the custody of Angelica to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary
custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. The law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution.

14. PEREZ V CA (G.R.No. 118870, March 29, 1996)


Facts:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse. After six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New
York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became
pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to
the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip
tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the
baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New
York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up
her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on good
terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husbands meager
income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced
his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a
car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile.
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her.
The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and held that granting custody
to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare.
Issue:
Who should have rightful custody of a child?
Held:
Nerissa. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision.
Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:
SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or
living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or

children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of
each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity,
habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its
mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor. (Italics supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated
from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article
213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in the
basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the courts
awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of
the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: In all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they
have ample means. Nerissas present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with
her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to
raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to
qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises
supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the
mother.
Although Rays is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on
retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother gives to his child.
15. Tijing vs CA
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001 [Habeas Corpus]
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest child, Edgardo
Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered Angelita Diamante to immediately
release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the
decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in this case.
ISSUE:Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.
RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons entitled thereto. The writ of habeas
corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the
custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be stressed out that in habeas corpus proceeding, the question
of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by the witness who
is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there are no clinical records, log book or
discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented. Strong evidence directly proves
that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no
offspring even after almost 15 years of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore
no offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas Lopez, the
alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician or midwife in attendance of
the birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent
register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with the LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status of
Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were typed in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself
had admitted that she is a "common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence

to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records and testimony of the midwife who attended
Bienvenida's childbirth.
16. Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007

(Special Proceedings Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts of
Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors)
Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing
with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons on the ground that
petitioners act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mothers care.
Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children and questioned
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that under the Family
Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that
jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has cognizance of
this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases was further
affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody
of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
17. bondagjy vs bondagjy
18. Laxamana vs Laxamana

19. RODRIGUEZ-LUNA v INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT


Topic: Persons Made Responsible for Others
Quasi-delicts under Art 2180, how interpreted
DOCTRINE:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company. [...]
FACTS:
1.The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took place at
the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business
executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.

2.In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Luna against Luis dela Rosa and his father Jose dela Rosa, the Court
of First Instance of Manila sentenced the defendants, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00
as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his
companionship, (May 22,1979)
CA: modified; defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna (June 19,1981)
3. The instant case is the separate appeal of the Lunas to set aside modification of CA and petition be given due
course.
Resolution:
1.the private respondents are hereby ordered to PAY to the petitioners within thirty (30) days from notice
the following amounts adjudged against them: P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the deceased
2. Still to be resolved shall be the following: whether the award for unearned net earnings shall be increased
to P1,650,000.00;
4. Respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they said that they had no cash money.
Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the execution yielded only a nominal
amount
5. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an
uncle but only casually employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no
assets of his own as yet.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose, the father, should be primarily or subsidiary liable with his son, Luis
RULING:
Jose is primarily liable. The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, where it was held that Article 2180 of the
Civil Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but
since Reginald had attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become merely subsidiary to that
of his son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the
liability of his father should be subsidiary only.
We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will not serve the ends of justice.
Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property either
in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1981, is hereby set aside; its decision dated
May 22, 1979, is reinstated
20. Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20
FACTS: Leouel and Julia were married on September 20, 1986. They were first married before the MTC in Iloilo.
Shortly, they married in a church. They lived with Julias parents. Soon, she gave birth to their first child. Some
disagreements the couple had was the issue of living independently from Julias parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia
finally left for USA to work as a nurse. Julia, via phone call, promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a
training program of AFP, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts
were of no avail. Having failed to get Julia to come home, Leouel filed with the RTC a complaint for voiding their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Julias failure to return home or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated

HELD: No. Justice Sempio-Diy opined that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The case at bar can ,in no measure at all, come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.

21. Sabina Exconde vs Delfin and Dante Capuno


101 Phil 843 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of Parents
Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil of Balintawak Elementary School. In March 1949, he
attended a boy scout parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. While they were inside a jeep, he took control of the wheels which he
later lost control of causing the jeep to go turtle thereby killing two other students, Isidoro Caperina and one other.
Isidoros mother, Sabina Exconde, sued Dante Capuno for the death of her son. Pending the criminal action, the
mother reserved her right to file a separate civil action which she subsequently filed against Dante and his dad,
Delfin Capuno.
ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means,
while, on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way by which
they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed to prove.
On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law, teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision
only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.
JUSTICE J.B.L. REYES Dissenting:
Delfin Capuno should be relieved from liability. There is no sound reason for limiting the liability to teachers of arts
and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as, concerns the
proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is
exempt from the duty of watching do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a
position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil.

22. Amadora vs CA
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15 1988 [Parental Authority]
FACTS:
17 year old Alfredo Amadora was shot and killed by his classmate Pablito Daffon inside the school campus. Daffon
was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. The parents filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180
of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose Recoletos, its high school principal, the dean of boys, the physics
teacher, Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaints against the students was
later dropped. Upon appeal to CA, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school should be held liable for the acts of its students.
RULING:
The responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends. Under the Article 2180 of the
Family Code, it is the teacher-in charge is the one who is imposed on the liability of his/her students and not the

school. As long as defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained
of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Art. 2180.
23. Salvosa and BCF v. IAC
Facts:
Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed against Abon. Salvosa being the
(Executive Vice President of BCF).
Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of the Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer of the
schools ROTC Unit. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. He
received orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit,
concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a
student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC
Unit of the BCF. 11 As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the
crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.
Issue:
whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Held:
, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]
called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase used in
[Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that
the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A
"recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of
temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not
permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its
nature does not include dismissal. 18 Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a
school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in
the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. . Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

24. St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos


GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School.
Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the
jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.
HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was
pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students
in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the
proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed
to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of
the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The
mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public
or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner
of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial
court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.
25. Elcano vs Hill
77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald
but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against
Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil
action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been
extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a
matter of equity.