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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

MATEO
G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004
Facts: Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten
counts of rape by his step-daughter Imelda Mateo.
During the trial, Imelda’s testimonies regarding the
rape incident were inconsistent. She said in one
occasion that incident of rape happened inside her
bedroom, but other times, she told the court that it
happened in their sala. She also told the court that
the appellant would cover her mouth but when
asked again, she said that he did not. Despite the
irreconcilable testimony of the victim, the trial
court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape
and sentenced him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual
findings of the trial and recommends an acquittal of
the
appellant.
Issue: Whether or
appeallable
to

not this case is
the
Supreme

directly
Court.

Held: While the Fundamental Law requires a
mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has
it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to
ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is
imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by
the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to
the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at
stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no
case in the evaluation of the facts can ever be
overdone. A prior determination by the Court of
Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If
the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it
could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and
elevate the entire records of the case to the
Supreme
Court
for
its
final
disposition.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules
of procedure is constitutionally vested in the
Supreme
Court

Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall
have
the
following
powers:
“(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice,
and
procedure
in
all
courts.”
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more
squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the

Supreme Court than the law-making power of
Congress. The rule here announced additionally
allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the
case is elevated to the Supreme Court on
automatic review is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and
Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124,
Section of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as
they provide for direct appeals from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where
the penalty imposed is death reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the
Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995,
in “Internal Rules of the Supreme Court” in cases
similarly involving the death penalty, are to be
deemed modified accordingly. A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST.
MARTIN
FUNERAL
HOME,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
and
BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent alleges that he started
working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995.
However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his
name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On
January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment
for
allegedly
misappropriating
P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle
of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St.
Martin’s Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an
overseas contract worker, asked for financial
assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then,
as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.
January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away,
so the latter then took over the management of the
business. She then discovered that there were
arrears in the payment of taxes and other
government fees, although the records purported
to show that the same were already paid. Amelita
then made some changes in the business operation
and private respondent and his wife were no longer

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

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allowed to participate in the management thereof.
As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his
employment.
the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between
the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. NLRC
remanded the case to LA. MR was filed by the
petitioner which was denied.
RULING:
1) HISTORY: the legal history of the NLRC. It was
first established in the Department of Labor by P.D.
No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were
expressly declared to be appealable to the
Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President
of the Philippines.
May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code
of the Philippines, the same to take effect six
months after its promulgation. 8 Created and
regulated therein is the present NLRC which was
attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment for program and policy coordination
only. 9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223)
thereof also granted an aggrieved party the
remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to
the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391
subsequently
amended
said
provision
and
abolished such appeals. No appellate review has
since then been provided for.
the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to
review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of
the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there
is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize
the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given
by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties; and that it is that part of the checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers
and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file
a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for
any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then
seasonably avail of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has
now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days

from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the
10-day period for finality of the decision of the
NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in
Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held
that this Court may still take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due
process
considerations
if filed
within
the
reglementary period under Rule 65.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion
that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of
certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for
judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of
the word “appeal” in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus
plumae because appeals by certiorari and the
original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.
The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned
here is that the special civil action of certiorari is
within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to
indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari
to the Supreme Court are allowed would not
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech
on Senate Bill No. 1495.
2)
Appeal.
-review of NLRC Decision is through Rule 65.
-jurisdiction:
SC
AND
CA
-by way of hierarchy: the review shall be initially
filed before CA.

In

re: Letter of Associate
Reynato S. Puno

Justice

Facts:
- The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first
appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals on 1980.
- On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized
and became the Intermediate Appellate Court
pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
- On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy
Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus,
he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
- After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a
reorganization of the entire government, including
the Judiciary.
- A Screening Committee for the reorganization of
the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower courts
recommended the return of petitioner as Associate
Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

2

and Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction. L-63557 October 28.000. After the expiration of the term.When the appointments were signed by Pres. (PHILCHEM). No. petitioner. usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence. . otherwise. The Appellate Court held that summons served through the Law Firm was valid and it further ruled that receiving evidence on whether or not LINGNER CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 3 . 33 is considered as an entirely new court. on the question of whether or not LINGNER was doing business in this country. 129. nor resident at the given address. it reiterated that the plea that summons could not be validly seved on it through the Law Firm. In their agreement.A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and it also requested that a hearing be held. Held: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to E. petitioner's seniority ranking changes from number 11 to 26. 1983 LINGNER & FISHER GMBH. A.. . moved for dismissal on the grounds (a) that LINGNER was not a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines and hence could not be sued locally. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986. PHILCHEM filed a complaint against BEECHAM alone in a civil case.The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.Petitioner Justice Reynato S. LINGNER.O. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. SAUER (DMW) and Philippine Chemical Laboratories. INC. FACTS: DEUTCHE MILCHWERKE DR. Subsequently. vs. The present Court of Appeals is a new entity. (the Law Firm. 33. conformably to the provisions of Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. both manufactures and sells chemicals. No. assuming that LINGNER could be sued in this jurisdiction. Inc. a subsidiary of BEECHAM. and PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL LABORATORIES." or "as sudden. radical and fundamental change in the government or political system. . RICARDO L. HON.They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the President. PRONOVE JR. PHILCHEM then filed an amended complaint. different and distinct from the courts existing before E.him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987 Revolution. . Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.055. 33." G. (b) that LINGNER could not be served with summons through the Law Firm The Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismiss. Upon appeal by LINGNER.O. it also provides that “all legal settlements within the compass of this AGREEMENT shall fall under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts”. No.Then. the DMW interests were acquired by LINGNER & FISHER GMBH LINGNER for brevity). The Court of Appeals that was established under E. . Aquino. for brevity) PHILCHEM was advised that LINGNER was interested in continuing business relationship with PHILCHEM PHILCHEM presented a claim to LINGNER for P1. Through the law firm of De Leon et al. executed a so-called Agency AGREEMENT. it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of E. No. No settlement having been arrived. .O. Issue: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the promulgation of E. No. It provides in their agreement that the term was five years and renewable automatically for five years unless one party gives due notice of termination to the other. 33. and. The summons issued could not be served on BEECHAM. and PHILCEM shall be entitled for royalty upon the termination of the contract. and holding that LINGNER can be served with summons through the Law Firm.O. the Sheriff having reported that BEECHAM was neither a company registered in the Philippines.R. this time making LINGNER and BEECHAM as the defendant. respondents. it was automatically renewed.O. . No.00 under the ROYALTY CLAUSE.

a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case No. failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and improper avenue. has jurisdiction over the complaint. G. petitioner. But when a party to a contract has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the written contract be demanded. HERRERA. Although private respondent's complaint in the court a quo is designated as one for a sum of CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 4 .was doing business in the Philippines could not be justified under the cited Batas Pambansa Blg. The payment of a sum of money is only incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of certain acts the performance of which being the more basic issue to be inquired into. and on November 17. 1972 filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with the City Court of Manila. private respondent on May 6. Branch II. is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court. the decisive question to be resolved in this present petition is whether or not the City Court of Manila.00. the petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim of private respondent in his complaint. Hence. there was a covenant on venue to the effect that LINGNER can be sued by PHILCHEM before Philippine Courts in regards to a controversy related to the AGREEMENT. the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with a special condition that should private respondent as purchaser complete the construction including the painting of his residential house on said lot within two (2) years from August 14. hence shall fall under the jurisdiction under the Philippine courts. and after issues have been joined. Branch II. to proceed to trial and judgment accordingly. the action is for specific performance of contract. In a case for the recovery of a sum of money. A reconsideration of the said order having been denied. 1972. Upon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation.430. HELD: Evidence whether LINGNER is doing business in the Philippines is no longer necessary in view of the fact that PHILCHEM and LINGNER were contractees in the AGREEMENT and the claim of PHILCHEM is based on the ROYALTY CLAUSE of that AGREEMENT. against petitioner docketed as Civil Case No.00. 1972 filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XXVII.R. In other words. L-36098 January 21. 1972 held in abeyance the resolution on the motion until after the trial of the case on the merits. and (b) actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation such as complaints for specific performance of contract are exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance. on May 17. 211673. 1969. Whether LINGNER is or is not doing business in the Philippines will not matter because the parties had expressly stipulated in the AGREEMENT that all controversies based on the AGREEMENT "shall fall under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts". 1969. SO ORDERED.00. A motion to dismiss was filed by private respondent. JUDGE JOSE B.00 per square meter. No. 1971 accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of the same and requested for his refund amounting to P4. A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. petitioner and private respondent entered into an agreement thereby for and in consideration of P55. respondent. Scandia Inc. private respondent.820. and summons could be served. being less than P10. 24 SCRA 479) because the obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. City Court Judge Jose B. 1983 ORTIGAS & COMPANY. ISSUE: Whether or not LINGNER was doing business in the Philippines. 129. petitioner on October 12. petitioner. as owner. Petitioner thus filed the present petition and argues among others that: (a) as determined from the allegations of the complaint. Herrera in his order dated June 27. Rule 14 in relation to Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. has agreed to refund to private respondent the amount of P10. as the collection of a debt.000. vs. the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation (Lapitan vs. The action involved in this case is one for specific performance and not for a sum of money and wherefore incapable of pecuniary estimation because what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under a written contract to make a refund but under certain specific conditions still to be proven or established. On August 14. Therefore. the action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation. The now Regional Trial Court is hereby directed to allow PHILCHEM to apply for the issuance of summons on petitioner LINGNER under the provisions of Section 17. When the aforesaid special condition was fulfilled. 88510.. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP.

1988 the trial court rendered a decision declaring the petitioner in default. Branch 20). plus interest. 1 G. 90503 September 27. the Court RESOLVED to reverse the order appealed from and the complaint filed with the City Court of Manila. Manila. DOROTEO CAÑEBA. on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint and the evidence adduced in support therefor.money and damages. petitioner. 1988 the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its decision that had become final and executory. Branch 20. DEPUTY SHERIFF OF MANILA (RTC. docketed as Civil Case No. pursuant to a promissory note.00 per square meter or in the total amount of P4. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. An opposition to both motions was filed by private respondent to which a reply was filed by petitioner.42 plus interest and other charges commencing from January 1. judgment is hereby rendered. Costs against the defendant. The issue in this petition is whether or not the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot. 211673 is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.00 or 25% of the amount of delinquency whichever is greater. FACTS: On August 20. HON. 1. 3. Presiding Judge. 1990 On September 28. On February 17. In view of the foregoing.820. 2. On September 30.00. a matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation. as and for attorney's fees. NESTOR SANDOVAL.000.867. 4. and ESTATE DEVELOPERS & INVESTORS CORPORATION.1. A motion for reconsideration of the writ of execution was also filed by petitioner.2. Such sum which shall not be less than P2. but only after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions that will give rise to petitioner's obligation. Manila. 1987 ESTATE DEVELOPERS & INVESTORS CORPORATION filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila for the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot.R. 5. 2 CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 5 . 1988 until fully paid. 1988 petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that its decision is null and void. The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and acted without jurisdiction in refusing to vacate his judgment rendered without jurisdiction and in issuing a writ of execution to implement his abovesaid void judgment. ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the following: Hence the herein petition wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion as follows: 5. It directed the issuance of a writ of execution anew. RTC. an analysis of all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under the written contract to make the refund of the rate of P10. SO ORDERED. The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the complaint before him notwithstanding that exclusive and original jurisdictio n over the subject-matter thereof is vested with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957. respondents. vs. The sum of P73. On January 29. Branch II. No. 1989 the trial court denied the motion to vacate the judgment on the ground that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to do so.

No. stating that "while there is no question that I still have complete and full trust and confidence in the judgment and wisdom of my father. assign and dispose of her 11 mining claims.Considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction under the circumstances obtaining in this case. petitioner. develop and operate all the aforesaid mining claims. Almost three (3) months after the Deed of Ratification was executed. exploit and operate the 57 mining claims owned by the claimowners including the 11 claims of private respondent.) The language of this section. business B. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. On January 15. Branch XCVII. developer. RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. 1974. CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 6 . the second portion thereof. 957 the National Housing Authority (NHA) was given the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases as follows: SEC. Petitioner alleges that he suspended payments thereof because of the failure of the developer to develop the subdivision pursuant to their agreement. broker or salesman. 1967. Seven (7) years later. it is not my wish to add any more to his already many a mounting problems. On January 21.1. she executed a Special Power of Attorney constituting her father. LEVISTE. It is as if no decision was rendered by the trial court at all.and C. Dizon. 1967. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner. 5. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. entered into an Agreement. 1991 BENGUET CORPORATION. Unsound practices: real estate The trial court. Dizon. Facts: 1. 957. the decision it rendered is null and void ab initio. 3. G. developer. confirming the assignment. HON OSCAR L. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (National Capital Judicial Region. transfer and conveyance unto Dizon Mines and its assigns and successors of the rights to possess. with Dizon Mine whereby the latter was granted the right to explore. The NHA was re-named Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and thereafter it was re-named as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). L-65021 November 21. vs. dealer. explore. Celestino M. 4. should have recalled and cancelled the writ of execution of the judgment. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner. Celestino M. as her attorney-in-fact with full powers to "transfer. on December 17. 1967. rather than reiterating the issuance of a writ of execution in this case. leaves no room for doubt that exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the petitioner and private respondent is vested not on the RTC but on the NHA.R. acting as such attorney-in-fact for private respondent and other claimowners. which it did. broker or salesman. the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Private respondent alleged that she is the claimowner of 11 mining claims all located in the province of Zambales. private respondent and the other claimowners executed a Deed of Ratification of Assignment. private respondent revoked Special Power of Attorney of January 15. Quezon City) and HELEN DIZONREYES. 3 Undeniably the sum of money sought to be collected by private respondent from petitioner represented unpaid installments of a subdivision lot which the petitioner purchased. respondents. dealer. occupy. (Emphasis supplied. develop. 2. particularly.

No. it is not disputed that the subject agreement is a mining contract and private respondent. Petitioners claim that jurisdiction over the complaint is vested with the DAR and not the RTC since the case arose out of agrarian relations. leases and/or operators thereof. Respondent sought for the annulment of both orders. 1976 on the private respondent's opposition to the registration of the subject Operations Agreement. To effectively discharge its task as the Government's arm in the administration and disposition of mineral resources. However. 1281 places within the exclusive original jurisdiction for the Bureau. 7. It claims that that decision had become final upon private respondent's failure to appeal to the Office of the President. this appeal.O. Held: No. noted that the trend is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. Invoking Section 7 (c) of Presidential Decree No. Navarro and Philex Mining Corp.D. In the case at bar. Dizon Mines and Benguet entered into an Operations Agreement whereby the former transferred to the latter the possession of the 57 mining claims for the purpose of exploring. CA 20.D. development and exploitation. developing and operating them for production and marketing of marketable products under the terms and conditions specified therein. in seeking a judicial declaration of its nullity. particularly said Section 7 thereof.D. No. 1281 which took effect on January 16. Issue: Whether or not the court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the action. which was granted by the CA. on September 6. constitutes res judicata to the question of the validity of the Operations Agreement.D. Machete. the basic issue remains one of its cancellation. including mining service contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are concerned.. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies. Ruling: Presidential Decree No. Private respondent prayed that the Operations Agreement be declared null and void and inoperative insofar as it covers her eleven (11) lode mining claims. Section 7 of P. does not wish to abide by its terms and conditions. Section 17 of E. These elements alone bring the action within the ambit of Section 7 of P. the case relied upon by petitioner. The RTC also denied the motion for reconsideration. the Court in Twin Peaks Mining Association. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint.1995) GR 109093 (November Facts: Private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint with the RTC of Tagbilaran City against herein petitioners for collection of back rentals and damages arising from a leasehold agreement. 8. the Bureau of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide case involving: (c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof.1978 vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses. Petitioners move to dismiss the complaint which the trial court granted. which is precisely what P. 9. Whatever the basis for the refusal to abide by the contract's terms and conditions. 7. 1281 confers upon the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as follows: Sec. Thus. 1975. petitioner contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the civil case at bar as jurisdiction over actions to cancel mining contracts is vested exclusively in the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences. et al. YES. Analyzing the objectives of P. It likewise adverts to the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources dated March 17. partnerships or persons engaged in mining exploration. 1281 and the ruling in Twin Peaks Mining Association vs. 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 7 .6. in spite of said notice. 1281. 1281. permits. vs.

all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year. the two being a co-equal branch. In an Order of October 21. CA (G. or any review center. The respondent court erred when it place he SEC and PRC in the same category. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. 77372) Facts: On or about October 6." to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy: No examinee shall attend any review class. or any tip from any school. 1986. Resolution No. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful. herein petitioners. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. respondent PRC. 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. The petition was granted. Not satisfied therewith. Held: CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. Art. In view of the foregoing. 1986. college or university. No. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. college or university. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary. Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law. it also infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Lupangco vs. SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution. As to the validity of Resolution No. There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC. or any tip from any school. 105. What is clear from PD No. 1987. 105 is constitutional. CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 8 . herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No.falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with law. Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC. or shall receive any hand-out. the resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and review class. conference or the like conducted by. 8. On the contrary. On October 16. although the resolution has a commendable purpose which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations. Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the RTC.R. review material. an appeal with the Court of Appeals. with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the abovementioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. conference or the like or receive hand-out. on November 10. filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them. They relied heavily on the case of National Electrification Administration vs. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 1986. SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. or any review center or the like or any reviewer. review material. briefing. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations. There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. lecturer. briefing. the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees.

that when Bernardo demanded "delivery of his orders. . to take delivery of the petroleum products thus purchased. FACTS: The "operator/dealer" involved is the petitioner. December 5. No. on that day. 1991. 1992. 1990. he placed with the same terminal another order. What the controversy is all about. as said Regional Trial Court posits in its order of August 14. .Another evident objection to Resolution No." as the Regional Trial Court opines in its challenged Order of August 14." As the facts make clearly apparent. But despite waiting until 6 P. as a dispute indeed "arising out of their relationship as debtor and creditor. Bernardo sent his tanker to the Pandacan Terminal as early as 11:20 o’clock in the morning of December 5. On December 4. impractical. Demands subsequently made by Bernardo for delivery of the petroleum products paid for by him.50 on December 5. the Energy Regulatory Board announced an increase in the prices of petroleum products effective at 6 o’clock in the evening of that day. the prices had already increased due to the ERB order on December 5. 1991. INC.M." On January 8. . BERNARDO. v. 1990. 1990. extends to" (a)ll disputes between any operator/dealer and an oil company regarding dealership agreement except those arising out of their relationship as debtor and creditor . Bernardo Placed with the Caltex Pandacan Terminal an order for 10. It appears that on that same day. . On the contrary.R. Respondent. .. 1990. in justification of its refusal. of persons and entities dealing in oil and petroleum products. ISSUE: W/N the Energy Regulatory Board or the Courts have original jurisdiction over the instant case HELD: The controversy between Caltex and Bernardo cannot be characterized as a dispute within the original jurisdiction of the Energy Regulatory Board. BUYER shall submit itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of the City of Manila or to SELLER’s places of transactions at SELLER’s option.000 liters of diesel fuel. Petitioner. because Caltex’s computers system had allegedly malfunctioned and broken down. .937. is simply the prices at which the petroleum products shall be deemed to have been purchased from Caltex by Bernabe in December. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. there is no "unsettled dispute as regards the pricing of the . According to Caltex. 1991. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass the examination. 1990.193. Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient. review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. to repeat." It is rather one cognizable by the Regional Trial Court." or its power of supervision over the operations and activities. The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE. 10 were refused by Caltex unless Bernardo paid the difference between the old and new prices." (a)t exactly 6:00 in the evening of December 5. Caltex claimed. This is obviously a civil law question. (petroleum) products.. one determinable according to the provisions of the Civil Code and hence. beyond CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 9 . this time for 10. 1990. Bernardo operates two (2) Caltex gasoline stations. Bernardo filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City Caltex moved to dismiss under date of January 23. 1990 at 6 o’clock P. which as already stated. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Inc. [G. and those prevailing prior thereto.50 on the same day. Their disagreement is as regards which of the two sets of prices shall apply to the transactions subject of Bernardo’s complaint. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized.000 liters of premium gasoline — for which he also made full payment in the amount of P84. Neither do the parties impugn the validity or the propriety or wisdom of the specific exercise by the Energy Regulatory Board of its power "to fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products. . 1930. Bernardo. 1990. The enforcement of Resolution No. December 1. generally. the parties are in agreement about the prices of the petroleum products in question which became effective on December 5. 1991.M. 101345.] NONITO J. CALTEX (PHILIPPINES). He made full payment therefor in the sum of P57. or riddled with corruption. on the ground that (a) venue was improperly laid — it being provided in the parties’ Purchase and Sale Agreement that in case "of any judicial proceedings to enforce any or all of the terms or conditions of . (said) Agreement.. Nonito J. . and the "oil company. (it) had to cut-off the delivery or hauling by dealers of products in order to make the necessary adjustments in its computers as a result of the price increase. . On December 3." the respondent Caltex (Philippines). . the tanker’s driver failed to take delivery.

Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78. demanded the defendants to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental therefore. ET AL. answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer. there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. its computation. ISSUE: WON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED AND THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY ARE RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE COURT’S JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY. the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 10 .the cognizance of the Energy Regulatory Board of the Oil Industry Commission. COURT OF APPEALS. the defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari. as well as a temporary restraining order against the RTC. or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well. The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual. it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. So. Hence. petitions. STEPHEN RO XAS. by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against three defendants.00 only. GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP. ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted. but such demands were refused. and Maximo Tacay. CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. nominal and exemplary damages. MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. meter land evidence by TCT No. the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the complaint. vs. Pineda was the owner of 790 sq.. Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited. Thus. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted.000. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Here. HELD: No. it is capable of pecuniary estimation. FACTS: A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Further. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER. Ponciano Panes. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future. namely Antonio Noel. The Motions to Dismiss were denied and the claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. As a consequence. since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint. that being a ground to bar the determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction in deciding the case. should be based on the original complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. nor the assessed value of the property. Pineda having himself the need to use the property. any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void. all complaints. ANDREW LUISON. and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. HELD: Yes. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint. respondents. T-56560. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. this case is an action for damages and for specific performance. the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00.750. petitioners. The previous owner of such land allowed the three defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. The docket fee. mandamus and prohibition.

on motion. as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant. the action may not be dismissed. Pineda having himself the need to use the property. J. Ponciano Panes. But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid. namely Antonio Noel. on motion. nor the assessed value of the property. or. MIGUEL SAMUEL A. which is what the respondent Courts did. wherein Dy signed a handwritten receipt allegedly made by petitioner CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 11 . but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual. meter land evidence by TCT No. vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte. Petitioner gave P5k as initial payment. the defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari. prescription has set in the meantime. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property. of course. of course. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are stated. respectively. 1989 FACTS: These were two separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against three defendants. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well. nominal and exemplary damages. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof. unless. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees. Thus. HELD: Yes. that being a ground to bar the determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction in deciding the case. moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified. or. Dy. Branches 1 and 2.: Facts: Respondent sold to petitioner with the help of a common friend. The Motions to Dismiss were denied and the claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. and then later paid P3k as promised. DEL CASTILLO. ELENA JANE DUARTE. Nos. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property. mandamus and prohibition. Pineda was the owner of 790 sq. petitioners. acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. unless. PATSITA GAMUTAN. vs. DURAN. a laptop computer which petitioner paid through installment basis for a total of P15k. a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefore within the relevant prescriptive period. G. 88075-77 December 20. prescription has set in the meantime. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof.related damages sought. and GODOFREDO PINEDA.E. The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual. But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid. ISSUE: WON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED AND THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY ARE RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE COURT’S JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY. but such demands were refused. acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. or allow. demanded the defendants to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental therefore. but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual. respondents. Marcial Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas. as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees. and Maximo Tacay. or allow. The previous owner of such land allowed the three defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are stated. which is what the respondent Courts did. a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefore within the relevant prescriptive period. Respondent. the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. Petitioner. TACAY v RTC of TAGUM DIGEST MAXIMO TACAY. moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified. if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading. as well as a temporary restraining order against the RTC. the action may not be dismissed. PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL. if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading. Clerk of Court.R. T-56560. Presided by Hon.

2004 or until June 11. 2004 denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision dated March 19. et al. 2004. Issue: WON the respondent’s filing of the Petition for Review with the CA was beyond the reglementary period. Inc. On January 19. Due to the refusal of petitioner to pay the remaining balance. 2004. and thus. Petitioner gave the money under agreement that the amounts she lent to respondent would be considered as partial payments for the laptop in case she decides to buy it. Thus.M. holding the MSU liable for damages. however. and received a copy of the RTC Order denying his MR on May 27. RTC: reversed the MTCC Decision. 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC. Sometime in March 2002. OCA I. 2005. the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). When petitioner refused to give it back. 2004. 41. Ruling: The Petition for Review was timely filed with the CA. 2009. 2004 since April 9 and 10 were holidays and April 11. counted from May 27. refused to pay and insisted that petitioner purchase the laptop instead. 2004 was a Sunday.M. he only had one day left from May 27. 2002 is an actionable document. 1997. 42. Court of Appeals: litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal. v. On November 29. Neypes v.. The (CA) affirmed the RTC decision and the CA decision subsequently lapsed to finality. the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. Respondents Arguments: Petition for Review was timely filed with the CA because he has 15 days from receipt of the RTC Order dated May 13. Marawi City Branch. filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 12. Thus. Petitioners Arguments: filing of the Petition for Review with the CA on June 1. 2004 within which to file a Petition for Review with the CA under Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. petitioner decided not to buy the laptop. Homena-Valencia: above ruling retroactively applies even to cases pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes on September 14. petitioner offered to pay only P2k claiming that the laptop was only worth P10k. for prohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje. [4] The MSU. respondent sent petitioner a demand letter. Petitioner claimed that there was no contract of sale. Since the instant case was pending in the CA at the time Neypes was promulgated. 2004. petitioners failure to deny under oath its genuineness and due execution constitutes an admission thereof. [3] On March 10.I. 2009. 43 and 45 of the Rules of Court. CABILI.. MTCC: ruled in favor of respondent. counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40.[5] The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution. But when Dy returned to get the remaining balance.[7] The petition of CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 12 . 2009 Order. within which to file his Petition for Review with the CA. albeit belatedly. the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision. Petitioner said that respondent loaned P5k and left the laptop with petitioner as security. Entry of Judgment was made.versus -BALINDONG A. 2009. the date respondent received the RTC Order dated May 13. Respondent received a copy of the RTC Decision on March 25. RTJ-10-2225 (formerly A.as proof of payment. Fil-Estate Properties. on March 24. Dy then asked petitioner to lend an additional P3k to respondent. 2004 within which to file a Petition for Review with the CA. 2004. 09-3182-RTJ) Fact Civil Case No. his period to appeal had not yet lapsed. 2004 was beyond the reglementary period. arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical injuries to several others. respondent is entitled to a fresh period of 15 days. there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSUs depository bank. 06-2954[2] is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC against the Mindanao State University (MSU). thus. The MSU responded to the denial by filing on April 1. No.P. CA: reversed the RTC Decision and reinstated the Decision of the MTCC. we find that when he filed the Petition for Review with the CA on June 1.[6] The Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in its March 31. Denied MR of petitioner. Respondent defends the ruling of the CA by arguing that the receipt dated February 18. No. in behalf of MSU. failed to comply with the writ. Respondent.

Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC. 2009 Order.189.189.[13] The respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC. Tomas Ong Cabili. but.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account. The respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2. may issue a temporary restraining order. in furtherance of justice. we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still pending.[27] In the present case.[25] A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power. Marawi City. to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. complainant Atty. noting that this is the respondent Judges second offense. other than the judgment obligor or his agent. for its execution and over all its incidents.[41] In this case.00. and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of P2. filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice:[22] no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 13 . the petition for injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.[16] It recommended a fine of P40. MSU filed the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court). and to control.[37] The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of execution. upon denial. In its December 3. the same court which issued the decision.[38] a third-party claimant of a property under execution may file a claim with another court[39] which.726. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria). by issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2. Section 16. the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary rule of noninterference with the proceedings of a court of coequal jurisdiction. to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts.[23] The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment.726.000.90 from MSUs account with the LBP. presided by respondent Judge.[9] On May 8.189. the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. for the advancement of justice. the proper recourse for MSU was to file a motion with. Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC. Marawi City Branch. counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case No. The respondent Judge was aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a coequal and coordinate court since he even quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8. the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain [36] Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a coequal court.726.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.MSU was raffled to the RTC. cited in the course of the Courts deliberations. 2009. so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. not from any other court. Branch 8. finds no application to this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person. [26] To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. or an application for relief from. Abuse of Discretion. in the exercise of its own jurisdiction. and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service for interfering with the order of a co-equal court. In this case. 2009 Report. [40] or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari. the judgment obligor. Issue: WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of authority. The Courts Ruling Yes. gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion for interfering with the order of a co-equal court. proceeded to seek recourse through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge. 06-2954.[24] Thus. Grave Abuse of Authority.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.Furthermore. It is. private respondent Vita Kalashian filed before RTC Baguio a complaint for damages against petitioners Irene Sante and Reynaldo Sante. FACTS: 1) In April 2004. 790). with the least possible delay. and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction. only if favorable. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. in a general sense is failure or neglect. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). and a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29) (Question on Court of First Instance's* Jurisdiction) Digested Case FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1. Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called. and VITA N. What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. could or should have been done earlier . In fact.TIJAM vs. complain that it was deprived of its day in court. Petitioners also allegedly went around Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais. and in the presence of other persons and police officers. Irene Sante uttered the words. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied. “How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60. No. EDILBERTO T. p. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. SIBONGHANOY Jurisdiction) 23 SCRA 29 Question on CFI's TIJAM vs. *now MTC G. Thus. Respondents.A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.J. after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties In the case at bar. : Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C. and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid. and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment.S. to do that which. 2010 IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE. a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2. Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!” Bert refers to a friend of the respondent and one of her hired security guards in said station. CA affirmed the appealed decision.HON. 173915 February 22.908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. therefore. SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time . The surety cannot now. . when adverse. KALASHIAN. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. HELD: YES. the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration.R. or estoppel by deed or by record. and to interpose a defense. appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction. CLARAVALL. a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. by exercising due diligence. Respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station in Pangasinan. Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs. Petitioners. rather. 792).versus .000 exclusive of interest. respondent prayed for the following: CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 14 . and of estoppel by laches. The orders appealed from are affirmed. Laches. it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits.

2004.R. It is clear.P.00.g. based on the allegations of the complaint. BRITISH AIRWAYS. the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has already been adjusted to P300. the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.000. is the main action. The CA held that the demand for exemplary damages was merely incidental. The Supreme Court also stated that since at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5. Hence.00. vs. 6) Hence. CA ruled in favor of petitioners. 5) Petitioners AGAIN filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. the totality of the claim for damages. Respondent. in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420. the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. ISSUES: a) Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction of the case b) Whether RTC committed grave abuse discretion in allowing the amended complaint attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. that respondent’s main action is for damages. vs. 000 Litigation expenses 20.000. Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. e. raising that RTC Baguio committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint. the complaint filed is for the recovery of damages for the acts of the petitioners. 2010 EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER. there is no doubt that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case sice the tital amount of damages being claimed y the petitioner in the case was P420..00 in the original complaint. petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint 2 for damages against CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 15 . or one of the causes of action. Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. of HELD: YES. Meanwhile. stating that MTCC had jurisdiction because considering ONLY the demand for P300. for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent. EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER. Thus. 000 Attorney’s fees 50.000. should be included in determining jurisdiction. Hence. No. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages. as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. exemplary damages. The exemplary damages being discretionary should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. 2005. the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300. DEL CASTILLO.000. BRITISH AIRWAYS.000 Exemplary Damages 50. on account of the necessity of dispensing justice.000.000 moral damages. RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint. attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. 171092 March 15.: Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good. 129 applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.000.Moral Damages 300. They claimed that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities instead of RTC Baguio should take cognizance. 000 2) Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of jurisdiction. this petition for certiorari.000. because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.00. Petitioner. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The nature of her complaint is for recovery of damages. in the amount of P300. Respondent. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under B. Facts: On April 28. Blg. RTC acquired jurisdiction. respondent filed an amended complaint increasing the claim for moral damages to P1. In the instant case. As such. including the exemplary damages as well as the other damages alleged and prayed in the complaint. there was no grave abuse of discretion. 3) The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the amount of demand P420. J.000 was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCC’s outside Metro Manila. 4) Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: The claim for moral damages.00. such as G. are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. However. Petitioner.

respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second. a judge in Olongapo. uneducated. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty. Batas Pambansa Blg. United Kingdom to Rome. Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her. suzerainty. Affronted. where the alleged tortious conduct occurred. Italy. Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the petitioner and menacingly told her that "We don’t like your attitude. Italy. whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment. Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides: 1. However. 2005. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress. United Kingdom while her place of destination was Rome. CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 16 . The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it. Italy. petitioner complained to respondent’s ground manager and demanded an apology. However. according to the contract made by the parties. was passed. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons. are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties. As such.00 as attorney’s fees. even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. 2. which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention. he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. Gualberto De la Llana. She alleged that on February 28. she took respondent’s flight 548 from London. the latter declared that the flight stewards were "only doing their job. when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties. petitioner filed the complaint for damages." Thus. mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this Convention. I would have a broken back!" Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome. praying that respondent be ordered to pay P5 million as moral damages. and cost of the suit. Thereupon. and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. petitioner’s place of departure was London. suzerainty. Held: The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel. was between the United Kingdom and Italy. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking. or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party. to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty. mandate or authority of another Power. singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture on plane safety. 129. said carriage is deemed an "international carriage". P300.000. the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.P200.000. one of the respondent’s flight attendants. Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan).00 as litigation expenses. luggage or goods performed by aircraft for reward. Once on board. petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the plane’s safety regulations being a frequent traveler. (Emphasis supplied) Thus. first of all." Upon arrival in Rome. P1 million as exemplary damages. Allegedly. and even sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight. Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”. DE LA LLANA VS ALBA FACTS: In 1981. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in which. was assailing its validity because. stupid. and thus is outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention. P2 million as nominal damages. In the case at bench. she allegedly requested Julian Halliday (Halliday). Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant. Issue: Whether Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed against a Filipino citizen and resident by airline personnel of a foreign carrier travelling beyond the territorial limit of any foreign country. the place of departure and the place of destination. another flight attendant. entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention.

DIONGON & PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORP. In case of removal. If such were the case. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint. for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished. it is devoid of significance. a complaint for specific performance with damages is a justiciable issue under the New Civil Code and jurisdiction to hear such issue is vested in the regular courts. the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Torres filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. as it was the HLURB. FACTS As agent of Pleasantville Development Corp (Pleasantville). no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Moreover. Removal is. the effect is one of separation.  EO 648 transferred the regulatory functions CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 17 . order their dismissal. such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute. In the implementation of the assailed legislation.ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. the former is to be preferred. to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. to the exclusion of the quasi-judicial bodies. Under the Judiciary Act. Having completed the payments on installment.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. it was the President who was vested with such power. therefore. After the abolition. C. RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the premise that pursuant to BP 129.T. HELD: Yes. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law. there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. As to its effect. There can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. among others. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts. No question of law is involved.  PD 957 (Subdivision and Condo Buyers' Protective Decree) provides that the NHA shall have the exclusive authority to regulate the real estate trade and business. this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. This prompted Diongon to file a complaint for specific performance with the RTC of Negros Occidental. neither Pleasantville nor Torres complied. TORRES ENTERPRISES. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and. Even then. Torres Enterprises (Torres) sold a subdivision lot to Diongon. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. ISSUE W/N the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case HELD NO. it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned. of course. which was the competent body to hear and decide the case. The RTC failed to consider the express provisions of PD 1344 and related decrees and erred in supposing that only the regular courts can interpret and apply the provisions of the Civil Code.  PD 1344 empowered the NHA to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under PD 957 and specified its quasi-judicial jurisdiction over cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condo units. Nonetheless. INC.T. by a vote of at least eight members.” C. it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. there is in law no occupant. the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. v HIBIONADA. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. Realistically. However.

moved for the Dismissal of the case based on different grounds. exploit and operate 57 mining claims. L-65021 November 21. No.1991 Facts: Helen Dizon-Reyes (private-respondent). A statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an admin agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. it is clear that the complaint for specific performance for damages filed by Diongon with the RTC comes under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. "Celestino" for brevity. does not wish to abide the terms and condition of the said contract. Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over cancellation of mining contracts. which was renamed Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by EO 90. This quasi-judicial function is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their expertise. Helen thereafter revoked the SPA. entered into an Operation Agreement transferring to Benguet Corp. Celestino. transferring. **** FAJARDO v BAUTISTA ***** Benguet Corporation vs Oscar Leviste GR No. Oscar L. 3. conveying and assigning Dizon Mines to possess. filed a case before RTC-Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. assign and dispose her 11 mining claims. The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the Civil Code is out of step with the fast changing times. Ruling: No. There are hundreds of admin bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. "Helen" for brevity. The antecedent of the facts are as follows: 1. entered into an Agreement with Dizon Mine granting Dizon Mine to explore. 4. L-65021 Benguet Corporation vs Hon. by virtue of an SPA to be her lawful representative to transfer. 1991 J. which includes the 11 mining claims of Helen. 6. the possession of the 57 mining claims. occupy. 5. thereby the said case is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines by virtue of Section 7 of PD 1281. The court ruled that the subject agreement of this case is a mining contract and Helen is seeking for its nullity. Paras Facts: CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 18 . Section 7 of PD 1281 provides: Section 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies. Q-30171 alleging ownership over 11 mining claims and seeking the cancellation of the Operations Agreement entered into by Dizon Mines and Benguet Corporation. explore.conferred on the NHA (under PDs 957 and 1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). However despite this revocation. the cardinal ground which is the focus of this case is that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the action and the venue was improperly laid. develop and operate the mining claims. Helen and other claim-owners executed a Deed of Ratification of Assignment thereby confirming. Dizon. Helen appointed his father Celestino M. 89741 March 13. The very definition of an admin agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. partnership or persons engaged in mining exploration. Helen now claims that the Operation Agreement lacks legal basis due to her revocation of the SPA.R. Benguet Corp. Dizon Mines and Benguet Corp. 2. Under PD 1344. develop. Leviste GR No. development and exploitation. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to admin agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of the admin agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by the regular courts. the Bureau of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: xxxx xxxx xxxx (c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide the terms and conditions thereof. Diongon was a buyer of a subdivision lot seeking specific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver to him the corresponding certificate of title. Sun v CA G.

there was a necessity of bringing suits against the Insurer within one year from the rejection of the claim. within twelve (12) months after due notice of the award made by the arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire. the cause of action in an insurance contract does not accrue until the insured's claim is finally rejected by the insurer. In this bidding. The insurance company filed a motion to dismiss due to prescription in 1987. (1984) The contention of the respondents that the one-year prescriptive period does not start to run until the petition for reconsideration had been resolved by the insurer (1985). 2010 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS). 1984. Tan’s request for an indemnity in 1983 was repeatedly denied. (ie. CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 19 . CABALLERO FACTS: Fernando and his wife. Respondent Tan admitted that he received a copy of the letter of rejection on April 2.The condition contained in an insurance policy that claims must be presented within one year after rejection is not merely a procedural requirement but an important matter essential to a prompt settlement of claims against insurance companies as it demands that insurance suits be brought by the insured while the evidence as to the origin and cause of destruction have not yet disappeared. started when the insurer denied his claim in the first instance(1984).Tan took from Sun Insurance a Php 300. informing him of the consolidation of title in its favor. the first letter in 1984) 3. Cotabato a Complaint against CMTC.No 3. October 04. the 12-month prescriptive period started to run from the said date of April 2.. It was clear in the letter. PETITIONER. GSIS scheduled the subject property for a 2nd public bidding after a failed negotiation with Fernando to buy back his property. When does the cause of action accrue? Held: 1. Ang v. No. WON the rejection of the claim shall be deemed final only if it contains words to the effect that denial is final. 158090. 2. This rejection of a petition for reconsideration as insisted by respondents wasn’t the beginning of the cause of action. is void. then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder. 2. Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. With this. 63. firstly in 1984. Thus. (PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM) G. This is because before such final rejection there is no real necessity for bringing suit. Fulton Fire Insurance Co. or in case of arbitration taking place as provided herein. A condition. limiting the time for commencing an action thereunder to a period of less than one year from the time when the cause of action accrues. prompting him to file a civil case in the same year. Jocelyn Caballero. and requesting payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando's continued occupancy of the subject property. The policy states in section 27. However. secured a mortgage secured by their residential lot from petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of P20. 3. GSIS wrote a letter to Fernando. 1984.The right of the insured to the payment of his loss accrues from the happening of the loss. VS.000.000 policy to cover his electrical store in Iloilo city. Sylvia Caballero. He wrote for a reconsideration in the same year. The provision in the contract was pursuant to Sec. filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan.No 2. Action or suit clause — If a claim be made and rejected and an action or suit be not commenced either in the Insurance Commission or in any court of competent jurisdiction within twelve (12) months from receipt of notice of such rejection. Fernando. under section 27.R. Eagle star. Issue: 1. then. However. At the time of the first rejection of the insurance company Ratio: 1. The cause of action. The company went to the court of appeals to petition the same thing. but this was denied. stipulation or agreement in any policy of insurance. Negotiation as to repurchase also takes place.00. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the twelve months prescriptive period to contest the denial of the insurance claim. Fernando’s daughter submitted a bid but unfortunately defeated by CMTC. Therefore. This was rejected in 1985. but this was denied. runs counter to the doctrine. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F.

i. DE HERRERA. Alfredo inherited the 700-square-meter lot. GSIS and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. Bernardo. represented by Emelita Bernardo. v. on the other hand. that judgment be rendered: declaring GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned by their predecessor-ininterest. FACTS: Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. EMELITA BERNARDO. Upon the death of Diosdado Herrera. Petitioner. Bernardo. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time. null and void for the irregularities in the conduct of the bidding.800. Caballero. representing back rentals. Respondents. Rizal. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in holding that GSIS’s counterclaim of rentals collected by the Caballero’s against CMTC is in the nature of a permissive counterclaim which required the payment of GSIS of docket fees before the Trial Court can acquire jurisdiction over the said counterclaim. the trial court granted GSIS's counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of P249. The Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims. alleged that the portion of the subject property consisting of about 700 square meters was bought by Diosdado Herrera.. harassment and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Dalig. among others. the RTC.e. the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. G. The COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the subject property. The judgment rendered by the RTC.800. No.993 square meters. on the other hand. with an area of 7.00. and was later on acquired by Crisanto S. This. CD006-0828 under the name of the respondents. GSIS did not do. the SC agreed with the CA's view that GSIS's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive.ggrieved. whether GSIS is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when it (GSIS) became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor. Cardona. The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award. the nullity or validity of the bid award. including additional interests from January 1973 to February 1987. 170251. petitioner CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 20 . In the same decision. Petitioner. Alfredo's father. The issue in the main action. unlawful claim. and the additional amount of P249.the GSIS and its responsible officers Fernando prayed.81. HELD YES. i.e.365. is considered null and void. because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim.The parcel of land was later on covered by Tax Declaration No. insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals which he collected from CMTC. The test was also established by the Supreme Court in this case to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not.R.00. 1989. disturbance. Tested against the above-mentioned criteria. from a certain Domingo Villaran. alleged that GSIS's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim. deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC. 199. 1994. CRISLYN AND CRISANTO BERNARDO. deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish GSIS's claim for the recovery of rentals. GSIS alleged that Fernando owed of P130. absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. Crisanto Bernardo. filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera (Alfredo) for interference. June 01 : 2011 CELIA S. After trial. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction. dated May 16. VDA. in its Decision. ruled in favor of GSIS and dismissed the complaint. even on appeal before this Court. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees. EVELYN BERNARDO AS GUARDIAN OF ERLYN.. is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim. the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim.

561. Further. as the surviving spouse of Alfredo. CIVIL LAW: Jurisdiction of COSLAP The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E. or any interest therein.The dispute between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature. issued on September 21. Bodullo bought the adjoining lot. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. which is an action involving title to or possession of real property. Respondents' allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches does not hold water. petitioner is already estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he actively participated in the proceedings before the said body. even on appeal.O. respondent Merlinda B. are null and void. (based on Tax Declaration). and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. No. and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. HELD: YES. BF CITILAND CORPORATION V. Having no legal effect. are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it. However. de Herrera. the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' complaint. taking into account the large number of parties involved. She also encroached upon petitioner's lot. Marcos. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned. It can also hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that requires immediate action. the presence or emergence of social unrest. On 24 February 1987. It leaves the parties in the position they were before the proceedings. On 13 October 2000. 561.The present case does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section 3. No. the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved. It cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation. Administrative agencies. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem In the instant case. because it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest. the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties PETITION GRANTED. the parties to the case. MARILYN B. Vda. with an assessed value of P48K. to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution. Petitioner submits that it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over controversies relative to ownership of the subject property.[18] The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter. OTAKE NATURE: Petition for review of the Resolutions of CA under RULE 45 FACTS: BF Citiland Corporation is the registered owner of a lot in Parañaque City. the present case cannot be classified as explosive in nature as the parties never resorted to violence in resolving the controversy. or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law. filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action.Celia S. ISSUE: Whether COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership between the parties. 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. the nature of the questions raised. even assuming that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the land dispute of the parties herein. Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject property. if such case is critical and explosive in nature. nor does it involve a large number of parties. like the COSLAP. 561.O. petitioner filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court a complaint for accion CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 21 . all the proceedings therein. nor is there a presence or emergence of social tension or unrest.O. the jurisdiction of which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending on the assessed value of the subject property Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action. Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has no adjudicatory powers to settle and decide the question of ownership over the subject land.[8]Under Section 3 of E. records show respondent occupied not just the lot she purchased.It is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers.) No. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue. paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. The CA ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive jurisdiction over the present case and. including the decision rendered.

MODES OF APPEAL - (a) ORDINARY APPEAL. for lack of jurisdiction. alleging that a suit for accion publiciana fell under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. even ordering Bodullo to pay P20K atty’s fees & costs of the suit. BF Citiland claimed Bodullon was estopped for participating in all the proceedings of the MeTC. 33.) Notice of Appeal – because the RTC decided the case in the exercise of its Original Jurisdiction. the action must be brought before first level courts. SEC. CA dismissed case .000. If the assessed value is below the said amounts. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxx (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to. or any interest therein where the assessed value1 of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20.00 if the action is filed in Metro Manila.) MeTC – Under BP 129. BF Citiland filed this Petition for Review in the SC. Thus. The MeTC ruled in favor of BF Citiland (except rent was P10K/month).00) or.00 per month by way of reasonable compensation for the use of the lot. ISSUES: 1) What is the proper mode of appeal from the decision of the RTC? 2) Who has jurisdiction on the accion publiciana case? HELD: 1.The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. Hence. 2. or possession of. Municipal Trial Courts. jurisdiction even in accion publiciana cases is determined by the assessed value of the property.publiciana praying: 1) that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to vacate the subject lot. as amended.000. . Merlinda Bodulla filed in the RTC a petition for certiorari under RULE 65.saying the proper appeal from the RTC decision is by way of notice of appeal. AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS IN CIVIL CASES. xxx (b) PETITION FOR REVIEW. notwithstanding petitioner's wrong mode of appeal. this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon.000. 2) that respondent be ordered to pay P15. With the modifications introduced by REPUBLIC ACT NO. The MeTC also issued writ of execution & granted the motion for special order of demolition. seeking dismissal of the case in the MeTC for lack of jurisdiction. Bodullon countered: lack of jurisdiction can be raised any time.00 or P50. in civil actions in 1 CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 22 . . JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS. the Court of Appeals should not have so easily dismissed the petition.000. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS.e. The case filed in the RTC was an Original Action for Petition for Review on Certiorari under RULE 65.The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42. (Emphasis supplied) x x x However. . 7691. RTC reversed the MeTC – case dismissed. in numerous cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts. BF Citiland filed a petition for review under RULE 42: PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS. RULES OF COURT: RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS SECTION 2. real property. i. the jurisdiction of regional trial courts has been limited to real actions where the assessed value exceeds P20.

R. as amended. Australia. (Emphasis supplied) The subject lot.000.00) and causing him actual. the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. Accordingly. Australia. DISPOSITION: petition. Costs against petitioner.522. comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MeTC under BP 129. telecommunications bills and CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 23 . Despite repeated follow-up calls.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia. 1998. with an assessed value below the jurisdictional limit of P50. ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City. an Australian national based in Brisbane. food. litigation expenses. He also spent for long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson. vs MORTIMER F. After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson.00. Go. GO. After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world. and costs: Provided. As such exclusive distributor. the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. including P800. Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights. the latter shall receive commissions totalling US$328. to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of the second vessel in the amount of US$328. That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes. or 22. Cordero instituted Civil Case No. Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7. Between June and August 1997. who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA). moral and exemplary damages. SP No.742.”. damages of whatever kind.512. doing business under the name and style “ACG Express Liner. Go. lawyers of Allan C. Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. WHEREFORE. we GRANT the We SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated 28 July 2005 and 5 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. No. respondent G. 2010 Facts: Sometime in 1996. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1. Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.742. 11868. CORDERO.00. a single proprietorship. Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero. Mortimer F. while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson. Cordero offered for sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.R. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner. He shouldered all the expenses for airfare. We REINSTATE the 25 April 2003 Decision and the 20 June 2003 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 77) of Parañaque City in Civil Case No. hotel accommodations. Cordero. he came to meet Tony Robinson.00 for Metro Manila. petitioner.000. transportation and entertainment during these trips. and on one (1) occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho. However. Tecson and Landicho. Go. VicePresident of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana). from the sale of each vessel. ALLAN C.000. no explanation was given by Robinson. attorney's fees. 88995. thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of US$31. 1997. where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50.00) exclusive of interest.Metro Manila. Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane.465. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson. On August 21.43% of the purchase price. only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found. 164703 May 4.

Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period granted by the trial court. (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract. such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines.R. 2000. Subsequently.R. On January 29. in the amount of US$31. In that capacity as exclusive distributor. 164703) and Cordero (G. 1999. On the contrary. In Go vs. a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. No.522. with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24. Tony Robinson. Held: While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions.000 as otherwise he will expose in the media the alleged undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. this was merely requested by Robinson but which Cordero misinterpreted as indication that Go was buying a second vessel. evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. SP No.R. No. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides: Art. respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. Landicho and Tecson had no transaction whatsoever with Cordero who had no document to show any such shipbuilding contract. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages. AFFA. and Vincent Tecson. however. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract. 164747). As to the supposed meeting to settle their dispute. As for Go and Tecson. AFFA. Respondents having acted in bad faith. the Supreme Court clarified that although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 24 . as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. The case before the Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G. 1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA. Moreover. on account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. 60354 and setting aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal. 1314. moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines. asserting that there was no act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. 1998 until the same is fully paid. On May 31. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December 20. and (2) whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal. the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G. In any case. Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25. 2001. The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable. Go. they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports and airing the client’s grievances to his principal. petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7.entertainment. Cordero. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of action. Issue: (1) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of contract. their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26.000. they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. 1999. In fact. which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. As to the inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship engine for AFFA’s other ongoing vessel construction. Felipe Landicho. the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C.09 or its peso equivalent. Respondents Go. this was due to the malicious demand of Cordero to be given US$3. 1998.

through counsel. Optima granted the request of Hertz. Aggrieved by the ruling of the appellate court. petitioner no longer entertained respondent’s notice. However. On appeal to the CA. wrote Hertz a letter requiring the latter to surrender and vacate the leased premises in view of the expiration of the Contract of Lease on 28 February 2006. by its own provisions. HERTZ PHIL. No. It likewise demanded payment of the sum of ₱420. G. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise. It then requested a 50% discount on its rent for the months of May. reminding the latter that the Contract of Lease could be renewed only by a new negotiation between the parties and upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor at least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease period. the RTC affirmed it by dismissing the appeal. Hertz appealed the MeTC’s Decision to the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the expiry of the period agreed upon by the parties is a ground for judicial ejectment HELD: The pertinent provision of the Contract of Lease reads: x x x.R. however. as the Contract of Lease provided that the notice to negotiate its renewal must be given by the lessee at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the contract. Optima. 2013 SERENO. he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial court’s jurisdiction. On 8 December 2005. it ruled that. due to the improper service of summons. As no letter was received from Hertz regarding its intention to seek negotiation and extension of the lease contract within the 90-day period. As the lease was set to expire on 28 February 2006. the latter still failed to pay its rental for seven months and utility bills for four months. The MeTC ruled that petitioner Optima had established its right to evict Hertz from the subject premises due to nonpayment of rentals and the expiration of the period of lease.967. Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in January and ended in November 2005. Thus. even before this Court. On 9 March 2004. On 1 March 2006. the Contract of Lease expired on 28 February 2006. refused to vacate the leased premises. As a result. petitioner then filed the instant petition. Consequently. July and August 2005.grounds the lack of “personal jurisdiction. the MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz. On 21 December 2005. CJ. Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time. June. 183035 January 9. unpaid utility bills and other charges. Optima entered into a Contract of Lease with Hertz Phil over a 131square-meter office unit and a parking slot in the Optima Building for a period of three years commencing on 1 March 2003 and ending on 28 February 2006. CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 25 . Hertz failed to communicate its intention to negotiate for an extension of the lease within the time agreed upon by the parties. the parties amended their lease agreement by shortening the lease period to two years and five months. Optima wrote another letter to Hertz. Optima informed it that the lease would expire on 28 February 2006 and would not be renewed. However.28 in rental arrearages. The lease can be renewed only by a new negotiation between the parties upon written notice by the LESSEE to be given to the LESSOR at least 90 days prior to termination of the above lease period. As a result. However. Hertz. INC. and finding no compelling reason to warrant the reversal of the MeTC’s Decision. OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs. Optima were constrained to file before the MeTC a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (Unlawful Detainer Complaint) against Hertz.” it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication. Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in its personnel’s productivity.: FACTS: On 12 December 2002. Hertz wrote a letter belatedly advising Optima of the former’s desire to negotiate and extend the lease.EXCLUSIVE CARS. Such motion did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons. but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Hertz had until 30 November 2005 within which to express its interest in negotiating an extension of the lease with Optima. commencing on 1 October 2003 and ending on 28 February 2006.

ISSUE: WON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED AND THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY ARE RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE COURT’S JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY. Ponciano Panes. and GODOFREDO PINEDA. 1989 FACTS: These were two separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against three defendants. acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefore within the relevant prescriptive period. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property. on motion. Presided by Hon. (1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy. if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading. which is what the respondent Courts did. T-56560. Nos. as well as a temporary restraining order against the RTC. moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified. or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof. Branches 1 and 2. G. Bibat. thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket. The Motions to Dismiss were denied and the claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. but such demands were refused. Desierto vs Heirs of Margarita Ventura GR No 151800 November 5. and Maximo Tacay. PATSITA GAMUTAN.Palamos Hierarchy of courts. exceptions to the doctrine. PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL. demanded the defendants to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental therefore. But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid. the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. namely Antonio Noel. the invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition. Jesus Matas. meter land evidence by TCT No. MAXIMO TACAY. vs. respondents. the action may not be dismissed.16 Nonetheless. or. (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice. The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual. unless.R. such as. nominal and exemplary damages. the expiry of the period agreed upon by the parties is likewise a ground for judicial ejectment. 2009 Facts: Heirs of Margarita Ventura ( the Heirs) filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and violation of Sec. mandamus and prohibition. that being a ground to bar the determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction in deciding the case. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte.Under the Civil Code. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well. DY v Hon. prescription has set in the meantime. Pineda was the owner of 790 sq. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are stated. or allow. The previous owner of such land allowed the three defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual. Pineda having himself the need to use the property. petitioners. of course. (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities. the defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari. 88075-77 December 20. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees. Clerk of Court. direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions. Thus. as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant. Marcial Fernandez and Hon. HELD: Yes. 3 (e) of RA 3019 against Zenaida Palacio and CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 26 . respectively. Under the principle of hierarchy of courts. nor the assessed value of the property.

Sante vs Claraval Topic: Jurisdiction Nature: Petition for certiorari Facts: 1) In April 2004. 129 applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under B. directives and decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. Meanwhile. raising that RTC Baguio committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint. Palacio being the OIC of DAR designated Celerina to investigate the claims of the Heirs agaist her former husband Edilberto. 3) The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the amount of demand P420. there was no grave abuse of discretion. respondent filed an amended complaint increasing the claim for moral damages to P1. and in the presence of other persons and police officers. “How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss. Celerina supported the report with public documents which she falsified and Palacio issed a recommendation based on that report to award the landholding in dispute to Edilberto. its ruling on the case is void. However. Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!” Bert refers to a friend of the respondent and one of her hired security guards in said station. is the main action. Ruling: The CA has jurisdiction over orders.000 was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCC’s outside Metro Manila. The DARAB recommended that the charged against the respondents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.000 moral damages. or one of the causes of action. Petitioners also allegedly went around Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. respondent prayed for the following: Moral Damages 300. including the exemplary damages as well as the other damages alleged and prayed in the complaint. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The nature of her complaint is for recovery of damages.000 Exemplary Damages 50. The CA held that the demand for exemplary damages was merely incidental.00.000. 6) Hence. They claimed that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities instead of RTC Baguio should take cognizance. private respondent Vita Kalashian filed before RTC Baguio a complaint for damages against petitioners Irene Sante and Reynaldo Sante. That since the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. Blg. 4) Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. Issue: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman. in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. Hence.spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang. in the amount of P300. Respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station in Pangasinan. 000 2) Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of jurisdiction. Irene Sante uttered the words. the totality of the claim for damages. this petition for certiorari. and a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative. Thus.000.00 in the original complaint. such as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. should be included in determining jurisdiction.000. therefore. RTC acquired jurisdiction. directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or nonadministrative cases. As such. review the orders. Ratio Decidendi: PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: The claim for moral damages. It cannot. Issues: Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction of the case Whether RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint Held: YES. the amount of such claim shall be CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 27 . Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss which was denied.000.P. stating that MTCC had jurisdiction because considering ONLY the demand for P300. The exemplary damages being discretionary should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300. 000 Litigation expenses 20. Thus. because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim. CA ruled in favor of petitioners. The CA then took cognizance of the case and granted the provisional dismissal the complaint against respondent for violation of Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 but denied the dismissal of the complaint for falsification of public documents. RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint. 5) Petitioners AGAIN filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. 000 Attorney’s fees 50.

When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27. Inc. the complaint filed is for the recovery of damages for the acts of the petitioners. exemplary damages. based on the allegations of the complaint. holding that it was filed eight days late. the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent. 1998. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal. 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. 1998. 1998. 1998. In the appellate court. Haldeman et al.R. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. 1998. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. the order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules. 1999. According to the appellate court. CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 28 . the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case. e. filed a motion for reconsideration. VHF Philippines. 1998 or the day they received the February 12. Later. the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22. COURT OF APPEALS G. 1998. On August 4. Based on the aforementioned cases. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3. petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.00.. 2005 469 SCRA 633 CORONA. this time dismissing his omnibus motion. On September 16. This was received by petitioners on July 31. Issues: I. 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1. 141524 September 14. 1998 and. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3. 12 days of the 15day period to appeal the order had lapsed. 1998.. Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420. On July 1. 1998 order dismissing their complaint. No.000. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65. 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22. the CA dismissed the petition. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent. 1998. 1998 order dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration II. In the instant case. J. petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal.g. Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. He later on received another order. the court a quo denied the notice of appeal. are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18. It is clear.considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. where the SC again considered the order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the February 12. that respondent’s main action is for damages. as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Five days later. NEYPES vs. When the omnibus motion was filed.: Facts: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. In the case of Quelnan v. in an order. He then filed his notice of appeal. on July 27. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3. Hence. The July 1. Whether or not petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time. Held: I. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages. petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3. 1998. the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1. the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of prescription.

The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases. to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial. Hence. this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40.” which we already determined to refer to the July 1. CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM 29 . Rule 43 and Rule 45 but does not apply to Rule 64(Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. Rule 42.II. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases. motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Henceforth. as a rule. Yes. It should. the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform. This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41. be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC.