In July, 1941, the undeclared war between China and Japan
will enter its fifth year. One of the most significant features
of t~e strugGle has been the organization of the Chinese people
for unlimi ted guerrilla lNarfare. The development of this war­
fare has followed the pattern laid out by Mao Tzu Tung and his
collaborators in the pa.mphlet "Guerrilla. ',.arfare tl whic~l. ,'JaS
published in 1937 and has been widely dis ributed in "Free
China" at ten cents a copy.
'ao Tzu Tung, a memLer'of the Chinese Communist party
ane:. former political comrnissar of the Fourth Red Army, ts no
novice in the art of war. Actual battle experience with both
reGular and guerrilla troops has qualified him as an expert.
This I believe the biographical sketch extracted from Edgar
Snow's ":'1ed Star Over China ll will indicate.
T~e influence of the ancient ~ilitary philosophor Sun Tzu
on I'Eao' s 'nili tary thouSht will be apparent .to those who have
read "The Sook of ·,:ar." Sun Tzu wrote that speed, surprise and
d~ception were the prLnary essentials of the attack and his
succinct advice lfSheng Tung, Chi Hsi" (Distraction in the T:l;ast"
3trike in the ~est) is no less valid today than it was when he
\frote it twenty four hundred years ago. The tactics of Sun
Tzu are in large messure the tactics of China's guerrillas to­
:'10.0 says that unlbli ted guerrilla warfare with vas t time
and space factors establishes a new silitary process. This
seems a true statement as there are no other historical examples
of guerrilla. hostilities as thoroughly organized from the mili­
tary, political, and economic point of view as those in C£llna.
','e in the Harine Corps have as yet encountered nothing but
relatively primitive and strictly li;ilited guerrilla war. Thus
1} rha t
l :'Tao has wri tten of this new type of guerrilla war :may be
of interest to us.
I have tried to present the author's ideas accurately,
but as the Chinese language is not a pcrticularly suitable
~ediQ11 for the expression of technical thought the translation
of some of the modern idioms not yet to be found in available
dictionaries is probally arguable. I can not vouch for the
accuracy of the retranslated quotations. I have taken the
liberty to delete froll the translation matter which wa.s purely



Eao Tzu Tung was born on a farm in Hunan Provinco in 1893.
~e began working in the fields at the age of six. From his
eighth to thirteenth year he attended a local primary school
during the daytime ane worked in the early mornings and at
night on the farm. His father was a strict &isciplinarian
and ~\:ao developed. rebellious habits in his early youth. At the
ase of thirteen, in a fight with his father I-.1ao lenrnec1 that,
"';hen I defended my rights \I'li th open rebellion my father relented,
but when I remained meek and sabmissive he only cursod and beat
111e the :ilore." Shortly after this battle he gained his father's
consent to return to school. 'rhis time he studied lI·;estel"n
Learning l' including geo~raphy, natural sciences, and history.

In 1911 he served six months in the Revolutionary Army.
The succeeding six years were spent in the provincial library
of Hunan and at the ;Iunan Normal Schoo 1. ~;1ao became an ardent
physical culturist and whenever opportunity afforded, took
long walking tours and hardened himself physically by swimJing
in the winter, sleeping in the snow, and nalking in the rain.

It was while he was an assistant librarian at the 7eiping
lJational Univer.3ity that he beca~'ne a convert to the ):arxist
philosophy, and from this time on he was constantly active
in the Chinese Corrmunist Party. In 1927 the split occurred
between the ~uomintang led by Chiang Kai Shek and the Commun­
ist Party. From 1927 to 1928 Mao held to~ether those elements
of the arny that were cOll1J11.mistic •. During that year the army
increased in size and in the autumn of 1928 was organized as
the Fourth Army under' the COliL'Tl8.nd of Chu Teh. 118.0 becmne
political commissar. In the meantime, a price had been put on
his head by tho Kuomintang, his properties confiscated, and his
wife and youneor sister arrested and executed e

From 1931 to 1934 Chian~,­ undertook the five extermination
campaigns and in t~e latter year the Red Army was forced to
move from south China to the northwest~ This ~ovement, now
famous as the "Long I1arch,ll terminated in Shensi in October,
1935. From the fall of 1935 to the spring of 1937 the Ded
Government led by Mao consolidated its position in the north­


CHAyrLfl Ofm

... In a war of revolutionary character guerrilla operations. are
a necessary part. This is particularly so in a \/8.1" vra:;ed for tlle
emancipation of a people ~ho inhabit a vast nation. China is
such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose
communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a
stronG and victorious Japanese imperialism c Under these circUJ.ll­
stances the development o:f t;le type of guerrilla warfare charac­
terized by the. quality of nass is both necessary and natura.l.
This warfare must be developed to a de6ree unprecedented and it
must coordinate wit:1. the operations of our regular arr,1ies. If we
fail to do this vve will find it diffj.cul t to defeat the enerlY.
These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an in­
dependant form of warfare. They are but one step in tae total
war; one aspect o£ the revolutionary struggle. They are the in­
evitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when·
the latter reach the limits of t~eir endurance. In our case
these hostilities began at a tirtle w~"len the people were unable to
endure any nore fron t 1"le Japanese il:lperialists. LenIn said: "A
peopleTs insurrection and a people's revolution are not only
natuY'al but inevitable,,11 (People and ~:evolution) V·e cOl1sider
guerrilla operat::'ons as but one aspect of our total or .. laSS vrar
because they, lackin~ the quality of independence, are of them­
selves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.
Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to
itself.. It is a 1rTeapOn t:.lat a nation jnferior in ariilS and mili­
tary equipment may employ age.inst a nore pOYTerful aGSressol'
nation.. V:hen the invader pierces deep into the heart of the
weaker country and occupies Iter territory in a cruel and oppres­
sive manner there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate,
and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be
used to advantaGe by those who oppose him., In (;uerrilla warfare
we turn these advantages to the purpose of resistin.:; and defeat.
ing t~·18 enemy.
During the pror;ress of ::'ostilities Guerrillas gradually dev­
elope into orthodox ·forces t>at operate in conjunction with other
uni ts of t':le regular army. Thus t:le ree;ularly org8.nized troops,
those::;uerrillas who have attained that status, and t~lOse who
have not reached that level of development conbine to forD the
military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no
doubt that the ul t.ir.w. te re8'l1 t of this will be victory.
Both in its development and in its met~od of ap~lication
guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. V'e
first discuss t'le relationship of guerrilla warfare to nationp.l
policy. Because ours is t~le resJ.stance of a seni-colonial

country against an imperialism our hostilities Tmst have a clearly
defined political goal and firmly established political responsi­
bilities. Our b8.sic policy is t:le croation 0: a national united
anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to ~ain our
political goal w:licD is the complete enanc ipat ion of the Ch5.nes e
people. There aI'e certain fundamental ste:;.Js necessar-;l il1 the
realizatj.on of this policy, to wit:
1. Arousing and org~llzing the people
2. internal unification politically
3. Establishing bases
4. Bquipnent of forces
5. recovery of national strength
6. Destruction of enemy's national strength
7. Regaining lost territories.

There is no reason to consider f"Uerilla warfare separately from
national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized an<l con­
ducted in complete accord Yli.th national anti-Japanese policy. It
is only thoSe""'lho misinterp:r'et guerrilla act:i.on who sa], as does
Jen eh'i Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely
a military matter and not a political oYle."Those who maintain
this simple point of view have lost 'siGht of the political goal
and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple
point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and Will
result in our defeat.
V!hat is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people?
Without a political goal guerrilla war:::'are must fail, as it must
if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations
of the people and their sympathy, cooperation aDd assistance can
not be Gained. '11 he essence of guerrilla warfare is thus I'evolu­
tion.J.ry in character. On the other hand, in a war of counter
revolutionary nature there is no place for guerrilla hostilities.
Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and
is supported by them it can neither e:;cist nOl" flouris,h' if it
separates itself from their s~npathies and cooperation. ~here are
those wllO do not comprehend guerrilla act ion and who therefore do
not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people's suerilla
war who say: "Only regular troops can carryon .::;uerrilla opera...
tions." There are others who, because they do not believe in the
ultim.ate success of guerrilla action, mistakenly say: "Guerrilla
warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized type of opera­
tion in which there is no place for the r,lasses of the people."
(Jen Ch'i Shan). There ai."e those who ridicule the masses and
undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no
understanding of the war of resistance. (Yeh Ch'ing). The Doment
that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the nasses of
the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from
hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.


What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all
guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people su:C'fer
from lacle of organization at the time of their formation they all
have in common a basic quality that raakes organization possible.
All guerrilla units must have political and military leader­
ship. This is true regardless of the source or size of such
units. Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the
people; they may be formed from an admixture of regular troops
with groups of the people, or they may consist of regular army
units intact. Nor does mere quantity affect this matter. Such
units may consist of a squad of a few nen, a battalion of
several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand '·,len. All
these y.mst have leaders who are unyielding in their policies,
resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These nen must be 'well
educated in revolutionary technique,self confident, able to
establish severe discipline, and able to cope with cOQ~ter~pro-
,pae;anda.' In short, t:iese leaders must be models for the people.
As the war progresses such leaders will gradually overcome the
lack of discipline, which at first prevaj.ls; they will establish
discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing
thej,r cOi'lbat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.'
Unorganized guerrilla warfare ~an not contribute to victory
and those who attack the moverilent as a combination of ba:C1ditry
and anarchism do not understand tiJ.e nature of g1.1errilla action.
They say: "This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists,
vagabonds and bandits," (J en ell T i S~lan) hoping thus to bring the
movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt
guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of
guerrillas indulge in unlav.Jful activities. Neither do we deny
that the r.10ve-'nent has at the present time symptoms of a lack of
orga..Ylization, symptoms which night indeed be serious were we to
judge guerrilla 'varfare solely by the corrupt and te~nporary
phenomena we have nentioned. V;'e should study the corrupt phen­
omena and attempt" ·-to eradicate them in order to encourage guel'­
rilla warfare, and to incr0ase fts military efficiency. "This is
hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem can not be
solved irmlediately~ The whole people must try to r~form them­
selves during the course of the war. We must educate t:ler,l and
reform them in the light of past experience • Evil does not e:xist
in guerrilla warfare but only in the Unorganized and undisci­
plined activities which are anarchism." (Lenin-Guerrilla Warfare)
What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must

primarily be based on alertness, lliQbility, ~~d attack. It must

be adjusted to the enemy situation~ the terrain, the existing

lines of cOYJ1m1..mication, the'relative strength, the weather, and

the situation of the people.

In guerrilla warfare select the tactic of seeming to come from
the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the
hollowl attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightn­
ing decision. Wllen guerrillas engage a stronger enemy they with­
draw when he advances; harass him when he·stops; strike him when
he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy
the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital
points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, ex­
hausted and annihilated. Only in this way eRn euerrillas carry
out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination
with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most
complete preparation, there can be no victory if nlistakes are made
in the matter of conraand. Guerrilla warfare based on the princ­
iples we have mentioned and carried on over a vast extent of ter­
ritory in which comrm.mications are inconvenient will contr:tbute
tremendously towards ultimate defeat of PIe Japanese and consequent
emancipation of the Chinese people.

A careful distinction Dust be made between two t~rpes of
guerrilla warfare. The fact that revolutionary guerrilla war­
fare is based on the masses of the people does not in itself
mean that the organization of guerrilla wiits is impossible in
a VI.'ar of counter revolutionary character. As e::ar.lples of the
former t~()e we ~:1ay cite Red guerrilla hostilities durin:; the
Russian revolution; those of t:le Reds in C:lina; of the Abyss­
inians against the Italians for the past tlu'ee years; those of
the last seven years in I1anchuria" and the vast anti Japanese
guerrilla VIal' that is carried on in China toda:r. All these
struggles have been carried on in tlill" interests of the whole
people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis In the
national man power, and all have been in accord y{ith the laws
of historical development. They have existed and will continue
to exist, flourish and develop as long as they are not contrary
to national polley. The latter type of guerrilla warfalle
directly contradicts the law of historical develop~ent. Of this
type we Ylay cite the examples furnished by the VIhite Russian
guerrilla units organized by Denilcin and Kolchak; those organized
by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in Abyssinia;
those supported by the puppet govel"lllrlents in Hanchuria and
! Mongolia; and those that will be organized here by Chinese
traitors. All Sllcn have oppressed the masses, and have been
contrary to t!16 true interests of the people. r:2hey must be
fir~nly opposed. They are easy· to destroy because they lack a
broad fotLYldation in the people. If we fail .to differentiate
between the two types of guerrilla hostilities T:lentioned it is
~ likely that we VTill exa3~erate their effect.when applies by an
invader. Vfe might arrive at the cO~iclusion that lithe invader
can organize guerrilla units from a1:1on8 the people. II Such a
conclusion might well di~inish our confidence in guerrilla war­
fare. As far as this matter is concerned we have but to re':'
member the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.

Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from
those of a purely 1!class tl type. In the former case the whole
people of a nation without regard to class or party carry o~ a
guerrilla struggle which is an instrunent of tho national policy.
Its bas is is t~1.erefore mUQh broader than is the bas is of a
struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war it has been
said: "When a nation is invaded t~'1e people become sympE\.thetic
to one another and all aid in orgilllizing guerrilla units. In
civil war, no I:1atter to what extent guerrillas are developed they
do not produce the same results as when they are formod to resist
an invasion by foreigners.1! (Civil War in Lussla). Th~ one strong
feature of guerI'illa warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of
internal purity. One class l!lay be easily united and peI'haps fight
with gI'eat effect r whereas in a n,tional revolutionary war guer­
rillaunits are faced with the proble}:,l of internal unification of
different class grouI)s. This necessitates the use of propaganda.
Both types of guerrilla war are however similar i.n tha.t they both
em.,.Dloy the s arae r1il i tar~T methods.
National guerrilla warfare, thouGh historically of the same
consistency has ehployed varying implements as tlnes, peoples and
conditions differ. 'rhe guej... . rilla 6.s~ects of t:l.e Opium \[ar, those
of the fi2;ht ing in f'Ianchuj... . ifl since the Hukden inc ident, and thos e
employed in China today are all slightly diffe:.... . :,mt. The g~errilla
warfare conduc ted by the I1orroccans s.c;e.ins t the r'rench and the
Spanish was not exactly similar to that-which \'Ie conduct today in
China., These d:i.l'ferences express t:18 characteristics of d~_fferent
peoples in different periods. Although t~'lere is a general similar­
ity in the quality of all these struggles there are dissimilar ...
ities in fo:,:,m. This fact vIe Y:lust recognize. Clausew:i.t 4 in "On
VTar tl wrote: tT Wars in every period have independent forms and in­
dependent conditions and therefore every period must have its in­
dependent theory of war." Lenin in "On Guerrilla 'v','arfare tT said:
"As regards the form of fighting it is unconditionally requisite
that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions
of environment, the state of economic progress and the political
ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs and
degree of civilization. ll Again: "It is necessary to be conpletely
unsympathetic to abstract formulae and rules and to study with
sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting fOl' these will
change in accordance with t:le political and economic situations
and the realization of t~e peoplefs aspirations. These procres.
sive c~langes i11 conditions create new methods."
If, in todayfs struggle, we fail to apply the historical truths
of revolutionary Guerrilla VIaI' we will fall into the error of be­
lieving with T f OU Hs i Shen~ that under the impact of Japan's mec­
hanized army "the guerrilla unit has lost its historiGal function."
Jen Ch'i Shan writes: "In olden days guerrilla warfare was part of
regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it can be
applied today." These opinions are harmful. If we do not make

~708 ... 9008

an estinate of t~lG charact8r~~8t:·cs peculiar to our cmti-Japanese
guerrilla 'war but insist on a~)plyil1C; to it r.18Clw..nical formulae
derived frolil Po.st ~listor:T we are 'Jlakinc; the mistake of ~lacing
our hostilities in the SaLle category as all other national guer­
rilla strus~.sles. If we hold t' ..is view we will s~_Llply be beating
our heads aga:I.nst a stone \iJ8.11 2.nd v!e w~_ll be lli'lable to profit
fro:'l su.errilla hos ti.li ties.

To sunmar5.ze: 'iIhD.t is t1w guerrilla lIar of resistmlCe 2.c;ainst
Japan? It is one aspect of the entire war, w~ich alt~ouGh alone
incapable of producing the decision, attacks the el'.emy in every
quarter, diminishes the extent of a:c'ea 'Lmder hj.s control; in...
cr'3ases onr national strenc;t_l and ass ists our regular e_r~]ies. It
is Ol:~e of the strategic instruments 'L~sed to ini'lict defeat on our
enelj1Y. It is the one pUi'e e:cpression of e.nti-Japimese :')01ic:r:
that is to say, it is military strength organized by the active
people and inseparable fro:.l them. It is a porrerf1.:1 special
1jiea:JOn "J:: ttl. v!!lich ,,-;e res j.s t t~le J a)ancse n:nd w:!.thout which we
can not defeat them.




The general features of orthodox hostilities, that is, the
war of po~d. tion and the vrar of movement, c.iffer fundamentally
from guerrilla warfare. There are other readily apparent differ..
ences such as those in organization, armament, equipment, supply,
tac tic s, l,ommand; in the conception of the terms 'I fron t II and
lI rear ll: in the matter of military responsibilities.

v~hen considered from the numerical point of view guerrilla
units are many; as individual combat units they may vary in size
from the smallest of several score or several hundred men, to
the battalion or the regiment of several thousand. This is not
the case in regularly organized units. A primary feature of
guerrilla operations is their dependence upon ~he people them­
selves to organize battalions and other units~ As a result of
this} organization depends largely upon local circumstances. In
the case of guerrilla groups the standard of equipment is of a
low order, and they must primarily depend for their sustenance
upon what the locality affords. .
The strategy of guerrilla varfare is manifestly lli~like that
employed in orthodox operations, as the basic tactic of the former
is constant acti vi ty and movement, r.Vhere is in guerrilla warfare
no such thing as a decisive battle; thare is nothing comparable
to the fixed, passive defense that features orthodox war. In
guerri lla warfare the trf)nsforma tion of a moving sj.. tua ti on in to
a positional defensive situation never arises. The general
features of reconnaissance, partial deployment, general deploy~
ment, and development of the attack that are usual in mobile
warfare 'are not common to guerrilla war.
There are differences also in the matter of leadership Rnd
command v In guerrilla warfare small units acting independently
play the principal role and there must be no excessive inter­
ference ~ith their activities. In orthodox warfare, partic~larly
in B. moving situation', a certain d.egree of ini tiati ve is accorded
sUbordinates, but in principle, cor.wand is centralized. ~his is
done because all units and all supporting arms in all districts
nlust coordinate to the highest degree. In the case of gUerrilla
warfare this is not only undesirable but impossible. Only ad­
jacent guerrilla units can coordinate their activities to any
degree. Strategically, their activities can be roughly correlated
wi th those of the regular forces, and tactically the..y must co­
operate with adjacent units of the regular army. But there are
no st~ictures on the extent of guerrilla activity nor is it primar­
ily characterized by the quali ty of cooperation of many uni ts,

1 IDec/50b
When we discuss the terms "front" and "rear" it must be
remembered, that while guerrillas do have bases, their primary
field of activity is in the enemy's rear areas. They themselves
have no rear. Because an orthodox army has rear installations
(except in some special cases as during the 10,000 mile march of
the Red Army or as in the case of certain units operating in
Shansi province) it can not operate as guerrillas can.
As to the matter of military responsibilities: those of the
guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy: to harass
a~d weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of co~~unication;
to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations
in the enemy's rear; to force the enemy to disperse his strength,
and to coordinate all these activities with those of the regular
armies on distant battle fronts.
From the foregoing summary of differences that exist between
guerrilla warfare and orthodox warfare it can be seen that it is
improper to compare the two. Further distinction must be made in
order to clarify this matter. While the 8th ~oute Army is a
regular Army, its North China campa.ign is essentially guerrilla
in nature for it ope~ates in the enemy's rear. On occasion, how­
ever, 8th Route Army commanders have concentrated powerful force~
to strike an enemy in motion and the characteristics of orthodox
mobile warfare were evident in the battle at PIing Rsing Kuan
and in other engagements.
On the otM,r hand, after th.~ fall of Feng Ling Tu, the oper­
ations of Central Shansi, and Suiyan troops were more guerrilla
than orthodox in nature. In this connection the precise chara9ter
of Generali ssimo Chiang's instructions to tre effec t that inde­
pendent brigades would carry out guerrilla operations should be
recalled. In spite of such temporary activities, these orthodox
units retained their identity and after the fall of Feng Ling ~
they were not only able to fight along orthodox lines but often
found it necessary to do so. This is an example of the fact that
orthodox armies may, due to changes in the situation, temporarily
function as guerrillas. Likewise guerrilla units that are formed
from the people may gradually develop into regular units and when
operating as such, employ the tactics of orthodox mobile war.
vfuile these units function as guerrillas they may be compared to
innumerable gnats wlich, by biting a giant both in front and in
rear, ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as unendurable
as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain
gigantic proportions they will find that their victim is not only
exhausted but is practically penishing. It is for this very reason
that our guerrilla activities are a source of constant mental worry
to Imperial Japan.

While it is improper to confuse orthodox with guerrilla
operations it is equally improper to consider that there is a
chasm between the two. Vfuile differences do eXist, similarities
appear under certain condi tions and this fact must ')e appre­
ciated if we wish to establish clearly the relationship between
the two. If we consider both types of warfare as a single sub­
ject, or if we confuse guerrilla warfare with the mobile oper­
ations of orthodox war we fall into this error: we exaggerate
the function of guerrillas and minimize that of the regular
armies. If we agree with Chang Tso Eua who says llGUerrilla
warfare is the primary war strategy of a people' seeking to
emancipate itself ll , or with Chao Klang who bel-ieves that
llGuerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for an op­
pressed people ll we are exaggerating the importance of gUerrilla
hostilities e What these zealous friends I have just quoted do
not reali ze is this: That if 'vlTe do not fi t guerrilla operations
into their proper niche we can not promote them realistic~lly.
Then, not only would those INho oppose us take advantage of our
varying opinions to turn them to their own uses to undermine us,
but guerrillas would be ·led tn assume responsibilities they
could not succe ssfully discharge and which should properly be .
carried out by orthodox force s. In the meanti.me the important
guerrilla function of coordinating activities with the regular
forces would be neglected. Furthermore, if the theory that·
guerrilla warfare i3 our only strategy were ac~ually applied,
the regular forces would be vveakened, we would be divided in
fturpose, and guerrilla hostilities would decline. If we say:
'Let us transform the regular forces into guerrillas ll and do not
place our first reliance on a victory to be ga:i.ned by the regular
armies over the enemy we may certainly expect to see as a result
the failure of the anti-Japanese war of resistance. The concept
that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla
ac ti vi tie s can be di vorced from tho se of the regular foroe sis
incorrect~ If we assume that guerrilla warfare does not progress
from beginning to end beyond its elementary forms we have failed
to recognize the fact that guerrilla hostilities can, under
specific conditions, develop and assume orthodox characteristics.
An opinion that admits the existence of guerrilla war but isolates
it is one that does not properly estimate the potentialities of
such war.
Equally as dangerous is the concept which condemns guerrilla
war on the ground that war has no other aspects than the purely
orthodox. This opinion is often expressed by those who have seen
the corrupt pbenomena of some guerrill~l regimes, observed their
lack of di scipline, and have seen them used as a screen behind·
which certain persons have indulged in bribery and other corrupt
practices. These people will not admit the fundamental necessity


19/Dec/5 0b
for ~erriila bands which spring from the armed people_ They
say I Only the regular forces are capable of conducting gu~rrilla
operations. 11 This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to
the abolition of the people's guerrilla war.
A proper cor-ception of the relationship that exists between
guerrilla effort and that of the regular torces is essentj.al. Vie
believe it can be stated this way: "Gue:.:·rilla operations during
the anti-Japanese war may for a certain time and temporarily
become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the enemy's
rear is c oncerne.d. However, lf we view the war' as a whole there
can be no doubt that our regulal forces are of primary importance
because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision.
Guerrilla warfare assists t':lem in pl'oducing this favorable d~­
cision. Orthodox forces may under certain conditions operate as
guerrillas, and the latter may, under certain conditlons, develop
to the status of the formero However, both guerrilla forces and
regular forces have their own respective development and their
proper combinations. 11
To clarify the relationship between the mobile aspect of
orthodox war and guerrilla war, we may say t~at general agreement
exists that the principal element of our strategy must be mobility.
With the war of movement we ma~T at times combine the wa~ of posi­
tion. Both of thase ars assisted by general guerrilla ho~tilities.
It is true that on the battle field mobile war often become s
positional; it is true that this situat10n may be reversed; it is
equally true that each form may combine with the other. The
possibility of such combination will become more evident after the
prevailing standards of equipment have been raised. For exmaple,
in a general strategical counter attack to recapture key cities
and lines of communication it would be normal to use bJth mobile
and positional methods. Eowever, the point must again be made
that our fundamen~al strategical form must be the war of movement.
If we deny this ~l,Je can not arrive at the victoI'ious solution of
the war.' In sum, while we must promote guerrilla warfare as a
necessary strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations we must
neither assign it the primary position in our war strategy, nor
may we subst:i.tute it for mobile and positional warfare as conducted
by orthodox forces.




GU~::.. RRI LLAdA l;FA R.2: IN ]:IS 1'0 HY

Guerrilla warfare is neither a product of China nor is it
peculiar to the present d~y. From the earliest historical days
it has been a feature of wars fought by every class of men
against invaders and oppressors. Under suitable conditions it
has CI'eat possibilities. The 111<Jny guerrilla wars in history
have their points of difference, t,heir peculiar characteristics,
t~eir varying processes ~nd conclusions, and we must respect
and profit by the experience of t.illse whose blood was shed in
tllGm. 'dhat a pity it i.s that '~he priceless experience gained
during the several :'mndreQ wars Yl8ijed by the peasc.ll1t of China
can not be marshalled tOdBy to Dulde us. Our only experience
in ~uerrilla hostilities 113S be::m thElt .:;ainec: fro"ll the several
conflicts that have been carried on cgainst us by foreign im­
peri81isms. But those experie:nces s;lould help the fl[:hting
Chinese recognize the necessity for cuerrilla warfare and
should con;irm the'n in confidence of ultimate victory.

In Septe',lber 1812 t~l.e French Napoleon, in the course of
swallowins all of Europe, invaded Russia ct tbB head of a ~re~t
aF)Y totalling several hundred thoUSDnd infantr~, cavalry and
artillery. At that time Russia was weak ~nd her ill prepared
ar;,ly was ,not concentrated. T}le ,lost iwportant phase of her
stratesy wc:..s the use made of cossacl{ cavalry and detaCl:~:-;'l9nts
of peasants to carryon g'l1errilla opera tions. After' giving up
Moscow the Russians formod nine guerrilla divisions o.f about
five hundred men each. These and vast groups of organized
peasants carried on partisian warfare and continually harassed
the Prench ariay. \.'Vhen the French arny we. S ' d i thdrawing, cold
and starving, ~ussian guerrillas blocked the way 2nd in combi­
nation with regular troops carried out coun te:e at ta ckson the
French rear, pursuin[c, thed and de i'88 tin.:., them. T11e ar:ny of
the herioc ~apoleon was almost entirely annihilated ~nd the
guerrilla S c3ptured 1'1any offi cers, _:len, cannon ,nd rifles.
T~lolr)l t:le vic tory 'No.S the re sul t of various fa ctors, and de­
pended larijely on the activities of the regular army, the
) function of the partisian srou,ps N8S extre:uel? import8nt. "The
corrupt and poorly organized country tho.t was Russia defected
and l~e stroyed &n <Jr.ilY led by the 10 s t fa:llous soldier of ::"::urope
and won the war' in ~~pite of the fnct that .l1.e1 ability to 1

organize guerril18 re.::.;i .18S V:J":':S no c f:)_llJ developed. f\t tLles
Guerrilla groups were ~indered in t~eir operetions ~nd ~he
supply of equip;';le:!:1l; 0nd crr;lS was L1sufficient. If ,;e use the
Russi8.n sayin.'~, it W8S a case of;] b8ttle bet;vlsen ll-~:l.e :::'irst
and the axe. 11 (Ivanoff).

FrO·1 1918 to 1920 tile rtUSSiui-l Soviets clue to l;~:e OppOl""


si tions 2nd intervention of forei --,n im.perialisll1S and the
internal disturbances of ~Jhi te Russia'~l groups were forced
to organize themselves in occu~ied territories ~nd fight a
real war. In SibeI'ia a:1d AlasI.t':::':l, in tile: I'ear of tb.e Jr~,ry
of tile traitor De,lildn and in t::le rear of the Poles there were
many Red Russ:i.an Gncrr:illas. These not G~lly disrupted and
dest:c'oyed t:::le com....1Uriic8tions in the ene:,l?' s rear but 8lso fre­
q~~ntly preve:1ted his adv8~ce. On one occasion t~c guerrillas
c'Onpletely destroyed 8 :retr3atin:_ ,t:litc &.r:::,;y ti18t :'lUc1 pI'8Vious­
ly been del:'e.Jted by re:'u18r Red forces. Eolchak, Denildn, the
Jalxmese, andc:le Poles, owin....; to t::.le necessit~' of stavi.nc off
the at ta cks 01' 2:uerl'ill13.s were Corc :;d to wi tild:r'8.VJ re:3ulc;r
troops frOl1J. tile front. lIThu.s not only W8S the e118dly's ',lan
power iml)Over ished but ;18 fo und lliuse If U::"18 'ole to c')pe .Ii th
. tile ever 'ilOvin:', ".'.HJrr'il18.!l ('1:118 "JatuI'e of Guerrill<.l I\.ction).

Th';:; developEl-2nt of ~'uerriJ.l8s at th?!::; ti':1C had only
reacl:1ed the s tcl.e v<lhere 'i:;hcre '.fere detc c~led '.,::ronps of' severa 1
thoU8c3:::lds in strength, oJ,d, .lidci12 [J'~;ed, 3m:; youn:;. rrhe: old
men orsanized tiie ,lse~.ves into pI'opaG£Tld::i groups lUlOW~l as
lI~:;ilver llaired L,nits rt ; there was a s1.lit,)'ole Cjuer'rilJ.<.: activity
for the .Jicldle aged; Lleyoun::; !"r:e.'l forii13cl combo t un.i ts, and
there were even sroups for the children. .timol1'::' the leader's
were deteI"nined connunists who caI':..~ied on 2,eneral poJ,itical
'JJorL a Jane; ti1.e people. The 8;:;, a1 t;.JOuc;h t;ley 0ppo sed the
doctrine of extre~e guerrilla warfare were ~uick to oppose
tilose VJ~1.0 condenmed l t. ;±;xperie:lce tells us :iOrtllodoz: armies
are the fundamentol 8nd principal pO'jieI'; Guerrilla lmi ts 8re
sec~:mdary to the,n .'::~ld assist in tEiG 8CCO"lp1isl'lElent of the
missiol?- c,ssigned t:'18 re"_:u.J.:-.r l'OrC8fJ. 1! (Lessons 0: the Civil
\ lOn l,JUS"'l'"
.1. k) ...<. )
• •'11'£11"'"
... <.>. ... ,,J 01-'
.J.. C'>,e
'o_~ '''l1~r'r'loll':l
U ~.t:; .,....t:>~l·
.I...._.C{.L ".;> .,.'e~
,:> -':r1
.1... ... DusC!loa
,1.. 00'

8radually devoloI)ed until in Dattl:3 tlley \:ere able '(;0 dis­

charge the· fUllct10~s 0; orcanized re: ulars. T~e 8~1) of the

fdillOlJ.S Ge ' leral G3len was er1th~ely (erivGd i'l'om '"~uerrill13.sti

t"J.e seven "lont;hs ::'n 1935-1900 the Abyssinians lost
t~1eir VV21'"l 83~i11St
I"b31?". ·~·.~.e CCU.SG of '~ei\:),~,t, clslde _t'rIJIU -~he
most L:portc:nt i.Jolitic8l r88sons t:'iCI t t;"lere were disse~1t1.ent
political ~roups, so stron.~ ;OVGr~,len~ )~rt;, ,_~ld unst_.ble
policy, ;Jc.S 'Che fai~,ur3 ~::;o . . c1o:Jt a positive }015.cJ of' ..:011le
warfare. There "f:"~ s never' 8 c~)nbind tlon Of;';~18 'V"ar of ;lOv8;;lent
with 1ar~e scale lwrrillc 0gerations. UltiJ3tely the Abys­
sinians ~dopted a purel~ passi~e JeZanse ~ith the result that
t~ley were unable to defea t LiB Italisns. In addi tiorl to tilis,
t~e facts that Abyssinia is a rel~tive s~dll and sparsely
;)()puL~ted cOIJ.ntI1Y 'vVere contri'.Jutor) •. ~vGn in spite of tIle fact
that the Abyssinian ar!'t1y ~Lld its (qu~·.p:ile:L1.t \i!T3S not'(loder'n, she
was able to withst~nd a mech~nized It~lian force of 100,000
for seven i",lOnths. DurL1..3 that period there were s8v8ral oc­



casj_ons when a war of .!love::ent was cO';'ibined ,-Jitb. lar-se
scale ~uerrilla operations to strike the Italians heavy
blows. LIoreover, several ci ti.c: S,lere re-tc,ken ::md casuali­
ties totallil1..: lLl0,OOO were inflicted. Hud tl::,-is polic~' been
steadfastly continued it w8uld have been difficult to have
nB.;led the ul ti(tkl te winner. kc tile pre sent ti~:te ~ uerrillD.
activities continue in Abyssi~ib 0nd if the internal pOlitical
questions can be solved an exte~sion of such ~ctivities is

In 1,341. a;1.d 1842 when brL. ve people from Sen Yuan Li
fou~ht che Enzlish; assin from 1850 to 1864 during the T'si
prinG war, und for a tnird time in 1899 in the Boxer up­
rising guerrilla tactics were employed to a ra~8rkable de­
gree. Particularly wes this so durin; the flai P'ing W8r
when guerrilla oper8tions 'PIers nost extel1sive and the Gl1.' lng
troops were often CO:11pletely ex~:.austed [ll1.d .forced to flee for
their lives.

In tliese wars· Llerc ViTerc no :c.UJ_a:"-l1::; principles or guerrilla
aC~lon. Perhaps these ~uerrilla hostilities vere not carried
out in conjunction 'ide;l reS;J.l::.r op8rations, or perhaps there
was a lack of coordination. But the fnct that victory was·
not cained was not Lecause of any l~ck in gucrrillc activity
but ratLer because of the interference l)r poli tics in ,;lilitary
affairs'. Experience s-;,ows t:l!o::t if precedence is not:;iven to
the question of conquerin~ the eneny Q,)t:l in politicol Gnd
;nilitsry affDirs, f.:r'.d if re:ul2.r ~iostiliti:;;s ore rlOt conducted
with tenacity, 3uerrilla operations 31o~e con not ~roduce
f:LrlB 1 vi c tory.
Prom 1927 to 1~)33 the Chinese ~ed Anrq .'~oug:nt; cLnDst
continu811y Bnd e~ployod ~u8rrilla tactics constuntly., At
t~e very be~~I~lirlG a positive polic~' was adopted. Dany bases
weree sta blished and from guerri II;:. bunds tl~e :'leds Vlere able
to cevel'op into r2,~ular arenes. As these 8r.Ees fou.::;ht, new
tuerrilla re~i~es were developed over c ~ide &rea. T~ese re­
eLle s coardina ted ti:;.e ir efforts \-Ji th tllO S:;3 of the regular
forces. 'IJrlis policy accounted for ti-:.e !i1c.:my victories 2~::i.ned
by guerrilla tr'oo[ls relcJtively few in nu;nber \,'Vr.a ',vere E,r.,;ed
~!ith weapons inferior to those of their opponents. The lenders
of t~d~ period properly combined 3uerrillaaperatlons with a
war of .novc:uen t bo th s tra te'~:i ca 11y G;ld i:;s ct ically. Th9:/ de­
lEuded primt,rily Up021. alert!less. 'T'lley stressed t~le (:orrect
basis for both political affairs and roilitciry operations.
They developed their:uerril1a bands into trained units. They
then deterJined upon ~ ten year period of resistance which
th(te they overcame in:1Ul:lerable difficulti3s Emd ~1~1ve only late­
ly reached their goal of di:cect pc-;rticipation L~ tl~8 un-i.;i­
J&pcmese WDr. T~lere is no dou.bt that the internal u~lificE,tion


of China 18 nov! a per:l1a,1ent Gnd definite fact [Hld th2t the
experiences gained duril1,'2~ our internal struggle;:} have proved
to be both necessary end advanta5eous to us in the strugcle
ago ins t Jepane se inperiaLism. There are 'l18ny VD lua ble le Ssons
vve can learn frail;' (;:le eXl'Jerience of those years. PY·inc:J.pal
8,,10n;; the::l is the fact thQ t guerrilla success largely depends
upon powerful politic81 leaders who work unceasingly to bring
about internal unification. Such leaders ~ust work with the
people; they must have a correct conception of the pol;Lcy to
be adopted both as regards the people and the ~nemy.

After September 18tb, 1931 stron3 anti-Japanese 3uerrilla .
cc.Llpb i ).18 were opened in ea ch of the three north Gas t )rovince s,
G7uerrl 11 C 8ctlVl t 'J persls1~s
o o. "" . Spl'Ge
G.Llere Ul . , O.[-;le
.n t' ~
0 L. • '.

and deceits practiced by the Japanesa at the expense of the
people, end in Sljite of the fElCt t~1.at her GY':,lies l18ve occupied
t~8 land Dnd oppressed the people for the last seven years,
Tll.e struSGle can '..,e c1ivlJed into t,'",) periods, Durin::; the
first, which extended fro.,l Sep-ce;·,:..ber 18tll, 1931, to January
1933,anti-J8)snese :uerr111a activity 8xplodedconstantly in
all three province s. 1.1a Chan Shan ,.nd Ssn Pin::; Vie i e s ta blish­
ed an anti-cTapanese X'e~·.. i,le in lIei Lun::~ C;:lial1':;. In Chi Lin
the ITa tiona 1 Sa 1 va t ionl'Ar:,1Y:' ndi;.~le Se Ie' De;' ense Army were
led by Nang Te Lin and Li Tu respectively. In Fang T'ien,'
Chu Lu and others, COl:L;lEmc1ed guerrIlla uni ts. The i.nfluence
of these forces was reat. Thev harassed the Janane8e un­
ceasincly but becaus~ there wasvan indefinite political goal;
i:nproper leadership; failure to coordinate military comm~md
and operations and to work with the people, and finally
failure to delegate proper politicul functions to the ar~y,
t~:le whole organization 'Nas feeble, end its strength was not
unified. As a direct result of these conditions the campaigns
failed and the troops were finally defeated by our enemy.

Durins the second period, which has extended from January
1933 to the present tLle, the situation has ,z:reatly improved.
This 118S come about because great nLvlbers of people who have
been oppressed by t:le enemy l18,Ve decided to resist him; be­
cause of the pclrticip8tion of tlOte C:'linese cO.n'O!lUnist in th~
onti-Japanese war, Dnd because of the fine work of the volun­
teer un1 ts. The:iuerrillas 'lave final.ly educa ted the people
to the me~nin~ of 3uerrill& warfare and in the northeast it
has acain becone an i0portant bnd powerful influence. Al~
ready seven or eJ<,ht 2:\1e1':1:"il18 re::iments and a wJj':lbe1' of in­
dependent platoons have been formed, Gnd t~eir activities
make it i.1ecessar~1 for t::18 Japat18se to send troops after the;il
;'J,Ol1th after month. These units h8'."I11)er t~l.e Japanese and under­
i:line their control in the north east:; \oil1ile at the sa~~le time
they inspire a Na t ionslis t revolut ion in ICorea. Such ac t i vi­
ties are not ::ler'81y of tx'ansi8nt and local importance but 8re


are still some weak points. For inst~nce: national defense

police ha s noc been suffi.ciently dave lo~)ec1; participa tion of

the people is not :eneral; internal political organization is

still in its priTiary ste_Jes, cJnd t~.le force used to attac:" the

Japanese 2nd the puppet gover~uents is not yet sufficient.

But if present policy is cO!ltinued tenaciously 211 these weak­

n8 S Be sv,iill be overCO,IS. Ex:per'iei:1ce proves t::18 t suerrilla,'

war will develop to even grouter proportions and that, in

spite of the cruelty of the Japanese and thelony methods

t~ey have devised to cheat tne people they can not extinGuish

guerr'illEl ac ti vi tie s in the three northea stern pI'ovi.nc3 s.

Tile guerrilla experiences of China and of other countries
which have been outlined prove that in a war of revolutionary
nature such hostilities are possible, Dbturul a~d necessary.
They prove that if the present anti-Japanese war for the
e;ilc::llCipo.tion of t:1e ;~C.3ses of t~le Chinese people is to gain
ultL'nate victory suc:::. hostilities ;LUst e:cp.nd tre.:l3ndousl~l.
Historical 3xperience is written in iron and blood. 4e must
point out tila t t~V) c;uerr'Lll8. C&;'ilpa i::';l12, be in~ '1:0 _oed in C:.lill8.
today are a pa-...:e in tl"lat ~~is tory -Chat ll.JS no precedent. Their
influ.ence will be confined not s(;·181y to CllinD in her present
anti-Japanose war but ~ill be world wide.


2708-9 008
19/Dec!50 b

Guerrilla hostilities are but one phase of the war of re­
sistance against Japan and the answer to the question of whetheD
or not they can produce ultimate victory can be given only after
investigation and comparison of all elements of our own strength
with those of the enemy. The par.ticulars of such a comparison
are several. First, the strong Japanese bandit nation is an
absolute monarchy. During the course of her invasion of China
she had made comparative progress in the techniques of industrial
production and in the development of excellence and skill in her
army, naVJ~, and air force e But in spite of this industrial
progress she remains an absolute monarchy of inferior phyaical
endoMnents. Her man. power, her raw materials and her financial
resources are all· inadequate and ins1.lfficient to maintain her
in protracted warfare or to meet the situation presented by a
war prosecuted over a vast area. Added to this is the anti-war
fee ling nOViI manife s ted by the J &pane se pe ople, a fee ling which is
shared by the junior officers and more extensively, by the sol­
diers of the invading army. B~lrther.more, China is not Japan's
only enemy. Japan is unable to employ her entire strength in the
attack on China; she can not, at most, spare more than 1,OJO,.000
men for this purpose as she must hold any in excess of that num­
ber for use against other possible opponents. Because of these
important primary considerations the invading Japanese bandits
can hope neither to be victori.ous in a protracted struggle nor
to conquer a vast area. Their strategy must be one of lightning
war a.nd speedy decision. If we can hold out for three or more
years it will be most difficult for Japan to bear up under the
In the war the Japanese brigands must depend upon lines of
communication linking the principal cities as routes for the
transport of war materials. The most important considerations
for her are that her rear be stable and peaceful and that her
lines of communication be intact. It is not to her advantage to
wage war over a vast area with disrupted lines of communication r
She can not disperse her strength and fight in a number of places
and her greatest fears are thus eruptions in her rear and dis­
ruption of her lines of communication. If she can maintain
communications she will be able at will to speedily concentrate
powerful forces at strategic points to engage our organized units
in decisive battle. Another important Japanese objective'is to
profit from the industries, finances, and man power in captured
areas and wi th them to augmen t her own ins,ufficient strength.
Certainly it is not to her advantage to forego these benefits, nor


19/De c!SOb
to be forced to dissipate her energies in a type of warfare in
which the gains 1;vill not compensate for the losses. It is for
these reasons that guerrilla warfare conducted in each bit of
conquered territory over a wide area will be a heavy blow struck
at the Japanese bandits. Experience in the five northern provin­
ces as well as in Kiangsu, Che Kiang and An Hui has absolutely
established the truth of this assertion.
China is a country half colonial and half feudal; it is a
country which is politically, militarily, and economically back­
ward. This is an inescapable conclusion. It is a vast country
with great resources and tremendous population; a country in
which the terrain is complicated and the facilities for communi,:"
cation are poor. All these factors favor a protracted war; they
all favor the application of mobile warfare and guerrilla opera­
tions. The establishment of innumerable anti-Japanese bases be'­
hind the enemy's lines will force him to fight unceasingly in
many places at once both to his front and his rear. -He thus
endlessly expends his resources.
We must unite the strength of the army with that of the
people; we must strike the weak SpotB in the enemy's flanks; in
his front; in his rear. We must make war everywhere and thUS,
cause dispersal of his forces end dissipation of his strength.
Thus the time will come when a gradual change will become evident
in the relative position of ourselves and our enemy and when that
day comes it will be the beginning of our ultimate victory ove~
the Japanese.

Although China's population is great it is unorganized. This
is a weakness which must be taken into account.
The Japanese bandits have invaded our country not merely to
conquer territory but to carry out the violent, rapacious and
murderous policy of their government which is the extinction of
the Chinese race. For this compelling reason we must unite the
nation without regard to parties or classes fild follow our policy
of resistance to the end. China today is not the China of old.
It is not like Abyssinia. China today is at the point of her .
greatest historical progress. The standards of literacy ~ong
the masses have been raised; the rapprochement of comrl1unists
and nationalists has laid the foundation for an anti-Japanese war
front that is constantly bel.ng strengthened and expanded; govern­
ment, army and people are all working wi th" great energy; the raw
material resources and the economic strength of the nation are
waiting to be used; the unorganized people is becoming an organized

nation. These energies must be directed toward the goal of pro­
tracted war so that should the Japanese occupy much of our .
territor"'lT or even most of it, tt 1.S we who will gain final vic­
tory. Not only must those behind our lines organize for resis~­
ance but also those who live in Japanese occupied teIlritor;,T in"
every part of the country must do the same. The traitors. who
accept the Japanese as fathers are few in number and thos~ who
have taken oath that they would prefer daath to abject $l~very
are many. If we resi~t with this spirit what enemy ean,we-riot
conquer and who C~~ say that ultimate victory will not be ours, .
The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivili~ed
lines. For th~t reason Japanese of all classes oppose the pol~­
cies of their government, as do vast international groups" On the
other hand, because China's cause is righteous, our countr~~en of.
all classes and parties ar'e united to oppose the invader; we have
sympathy in many foreign countries, including even Japan !tself.
This is perhaps the most important reason why Japan will lose and
China will win~ I

The progress of the war for the emancipation of the Chinese
people will be in accord with these facts. The guerrilla war of
resistance will be in accord with these facts, and that guerrilla
operations correlated with those of ourregular forces will produce
victory is the conviction of the many patriots who devote their
entire strength to guet'rilla hostilities •


ORGAliIZA'rr;r- '-:'on GUlmnILLA

Four points Dust be considered under this sUbject. These are:
l~ How are guerr:i,l;La bands formed ?
2. IIow aI'e guerrilla bands organized?

3 ~ The f:1.ethods of armin.g guerrilla bands.

4 0 Vfha t elements constitute a guerrilla band ?

These are all questions pertaining to the organization of armed
guerrilla units; they are questions which those who have had no
experience in guerrilla hostilities do not understand and on
which they can arrive at :00 sound decisions; indeed, they Vlould
not know in what Danner to begin. First: How are guerrilla
units originally fornled? The unit may originate in anyone of the
following ways:
(a) rro:-,l the masses of t~ie people.
(b) I'ron regular army Ull.its temporarily detailed for the
purpose .•

{c) From regular army units permanently detailed.

(d) From the cormination of a regular army unit and a unit
rec~uited from the people.
(e) From the local militia.
(f) From deserters frOl.l the ranks of the enemy.
(g) From former bandits and bandit groups.

In the present hostilities no doubt all these sources will be
In tIle first case above the guerrilla unit is formed from the
people. This is the fundamental type. Upon the arrival of the
enemy arny to oppress and slaughter the people tlleir leaders call
upon then to resist. They assemble the most valorous elenents,
arm them with old rifles or bird guns and thus a guerrilla unit
begins. Orders have alr0ady been issued throughout the nation
which call upon the people to form guerrilla units both for local
defense and for otller combat. If the local governments approve
and aid such movements they can not fail to prosper. I~ some
places where the local gov.eril.ment is not deter:i1ined or where its
officers have all fled, the leaders among tne masses (relying on
the sympathy of the people and their sincere de.sires to re~ist
Japan and succor the country) call upon the people -to l;"esi~t ang.
they respond. Thus many guerrilla units are organize4. In
circumstances of Vl.is kind the duties of leaderspip usually fall-,
upon the shoulders of young students, teachers, pr~fesso~s,
other educators, local soldiery, professional men, arti~an~ and

19!Dec!5 0b
those without a fixed profession who are willing to exert them­
selves to the last drop of their blood. Recently in Shansi, Hopei,
Chahar, Suiyuan,Shantung"Chekiang, Anhui, Kiangsu, and other
provinces extensive guerrllla hostilities have broken out,. All of
these are organized and led by patriots. The amount of such acti­
vity is the best proof of the foregoing statement. The more such
bands there are, the better will the situation be. Each district
each country, should be able to organize a great n'umber of guerrilID
squads which when assembled form a guerrilla company~ There are
those who say: "I am a farmer" or "I.am a student"; "I can discuss
literature but not military arts." This is incorrect. 'Ilhere is
no profound difference between the farmer and the soldien. You
must have courage~ You simply leave your farms and become soldiers.
That you are farmers is of no difference and if you have education
that is so much the better. When you take your arms in hand you I

become soldiers; when you are organized you become military units,
Guerrilla hostilities are the university of war and aften you have
fought several times valiantly and aggressively you may become a
leader of troops and there will be many well known regular soldiers
who will not be your peers. Without question the fountain head of
guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people who organize
guerrilla units directly from themselves.
The second type of guerrilla unit is that which is organized
from small units of .the regular forces temporarily detached for
the purpose. For example, since hostilities commelced many groups
have heen temporarily detached from armies, divisions and brigades
and assigned guerrilla duties. A regiment of the regular army may,
if circumstances warrant, be dispersed into groups for the purpose
of carry~ng on guerrilla operations. As an example of this there
is the 8th Route Army in North China. Excluding the periods when
it carries on mobile operations as an army iti$ divided into its
elements .and these carryon guerrilla hostilities. This type of
guerrilla unit is essential for two reasons< First, in mobile
warfare situations the coordination of guerrilla activities with
regular operations is necessary. Second, until guerrilla hostili­
ties can be developed on a grand scale there is no one to carry
out guerrilla missions but regulars. Historical experiences shows
us that regular army units are not able to undergo the hardships
of guerrilla campaigning over long periods~ The leaders of regular
units engaged in guerrilla operations must be extremely adaptable.
They must study the methods of guerrilla war. They must u.nderstand
that initiative, discipline, and the employment of stratagems are
all of the utmost importance. As the guerrilla status of regular
units is but temporary their leaders must lend all possible support
to the organization of guerrilla units from among the people. These
units must be so disciplined that they hold together after the
departure of the regulars. . .
The third type of unit consists of a detachment of regulars
who are permanently assigned @lerrilla duties~ This type of
small detachment does not have to be prepared to rejoin the
regular forces. lts post is somewhere in the rear of the enemy

19lbe c/5 0b
and there it becomes the backbone of guerrilla orgilllization. As
an example of this type of organization we may take the Wu T'ai
Shan district in the heart of the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi area. Along
the borders of these provinces units from the 8th Boute ~rmy have
established a framework for guerrilla operations. Around these
small cores many detachments heve been organized and the area of
guerrilla activity greatly expanded. In aneas in which there is
a possibility of cutting the enemy's lines of supply this system
should be used. Severing enemy sl:..pply routes destro~Ts his life
line and is one feature that can not be neglected.
. - , If at the time
of withdrawal of the regular forces from a certain area some units
are left behind these should conduct guerrflla operations in the
enemy1s rear~ As an example of this we have the guerrilla bands
now continuing,their independent operations in the Shanghai-Woo
Suno~ area in spite of the wi thdrawal of regular force s.

The fourth type of organization is the result of a merger
between small regular detachments and local guerrilla un~ts. The
regular forces may despatch a squad, a platoon, or a company,
which is placed at the disposel of the local guerrilla commander,
If a small group experienced in mili tal'y and political affairs is'
sent it becomes the core of the local guerrilla unit. These
several methods are all excellent and if properly applied the in­
tensity of guerrilla warfare can be extended. In the Wu T'ai Shan
area each of these methods has been used.
The fifth type mentioned above is formed from the local
mili tia, from police and home guards. In. ever;T North China prov­
ince there are now many of these groups and they should· be formed
in ever;! locali ty. The government has issued a mandate to the
effect that the people are not to depart from war areas. The
officer in command of the county, the commander of the Peace
Preservation Unit, the Chief of Police are all require6 to obey
this mandate. They can not retreat with their forces but must
remain at their stations and resist o
The sixth type of unit is that organized from troops that
come over from the enemy - the Chinese "traitor troopsll <?mployed
by the Japanese. It is continually possible to produce o.is­
affeqtion in their ranks and we must increase our propaganda
efforts and foment mut:Lnies among such troops. Immediately after
mutinying they must be received into our ranks and organized.
The concord of the leaders and the assent of the men mqst be
gained and the uni ts rebuilt poli tically and re-organi z,ed mili~
tarily. This having been accomplished they beCOme successful
guerrilla units. In negard to this type of unit it may be said
that political work amon'?; them is of the utmost importance.
19/Dec/5 0b
The seventh type of guerrilla organization is that formed
from bands of bandits and brigands. This, althou~~ difficult, must
be carried out with utmost vigor lest the 'enemy use such bands to
his own advantage. Many bandit groups pose as anti-Japanese guer­
rillas and it is only necessary to correct their poiitical beliefs
to convert them.

In spite of inescapable differences in the fundamental types
of guerrilla bands it is possible to unite them to form a vast sea
of guerrillas. The ancients said nT'ai Shan is a great mountain
because it does not scorn the merest handful of dirt; the rivers
and seas are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams."
Attention paid to the enlistment and organization of guerrillas
of every type and from every source will increase the potentiali­
ties of guerrilla action in the anti-Japanese war. This is some­
thing that patriots will not neglect.

The Method of Organizing Guerrilla Regimes

Many of those who decide to participate in guerrilla activities
do not know the methods of organization. For such people, as well
as for students who have no knowledge of military affairs th~
matter of organization is a problem that requires solution. Even
maong those who h&ve military knowledge there are some who know
nothing of guerrilla regimes because they are lacking in that par­
ticular type of eAperience. The subject of the organization of
such regimes is not confined to the organization of specific units
but includes all guerrilla activities within the area where the
regime functions.

As an example of such organiz.ation we may take a geographical
area in the enemy's rear. This area may comprise many counties.
It must be subdivided and individual companies or battalions
formed to accord with the sl..1.bdivisions. To this lI militarv area"
a military co~nander and political commissioners are appo~nted.
Under these the necessary officers 9 both military and political,
are appointed. In the military headquarters there will be the
staff, tbeaides, the supply officers, and the medical personnel.
These are controlled by the chief of staff who acts in accordance
with orders from the commander. In the political headquarters
there are bureaus of propaganda organization, people's mass move­
ments and miscellaneous affairs. Control of these is vested in
the political chairmen.

The military are as are subdi vided in to splaller di s tric ts in
accordance with local geography, the enemy situation locally, and
the state ()f ~erIilla development. Each of these smaller divi­
sions within the area is a district, each of which may consist of
from two to six counties. To each district a military commander
and several political commissioners are appointed. Under their
direction military and political headquarters are organized. Tasks


19/Dec/5 0b
are assigned in accordance with the nlimber of guerrilla troops
available. While the names of the offices in the ttdistrict"
correspond to those in the larger, "area,!t the number of 'function­
arie s assigned in the forme'r Case should be reduced to the least
pos8ible. In order to unify control, to handle guerrilla troops
that come from different ~ources and to harmonize milit~ry oper­
ations and local political affairs a committ8e of from seven to
nine members should be organized in each area and district. This
committee, the members of which are oelectedby the troops and
the local poli tical officers, should function as a forum for the
discussion of both military an1 political matters.
All the people in an area should arm themselves ~nd be organ­
ized into two gro~p~. One oftilese groups is a combat g~oup, the
other a self defense unit with but limited military quality.
Regular combatMlt guerrillas are organized into one of three gen­
eral types of unite The first of these is the small uni't,. the
platoon or company. In each county three to six units may be
orga~ized. The second type is the battalion of from two to four
companies. One such unit should be organized in each county.
While the unit fundamentally belongs to the county in which organ­
ized it may operate in other counties. While in areas other than
its own it must operate in conjunction with local units in order
to take advantage of their manpower, their knowledge of local
terrain, local customs, and their information of the enemy. '
The third type is the guerrilla regiment which consists of
from two to four of the above mentioned battalion units. If suffi­
cient manpower is available a guerrilla brigade of from two.to
four regiments may be formed.
Each of the units mentioned 'above has its own peculiarities
of organization. A squad, the smallest unit, has a strength of
from nine to eleven men including the leader and the assistant
leader. Its arms may be from two to five western style rifles,
with the remainin~ men armed with rifles of local manufacture, bird
guns, spears or big swords. Two to four such s~uads form a platoon.
This too has a leader and an assistnnt leader, and when acting
independer,tly it is assigned a political officer to carryon poli­
tical propaganda work. The platoon may have about ten rifles with
the remainder of its weapons being bird guns, lances, and big
swords. Two to four of such units form a company which, 'like the
platoon has a leader, an assistant leader, and a political' officer.
All these units are under the direct supervision of the military
commanders of the areas in which they operate.
The battalion unit must be more thoroughly organized and
better equipped than the smaller ~~its. Its d~scipline and its
personnel should be superior. If a battalion 1S formed ~rom
19j1)ec/50 b
company units it should not deprive subordinate units entirely
of their manpower and their a~lS. If in a small area there is a
peace preservation corps, a branch of the militia, or police,
regular guerrilla units should not be dispersed over it.
The guerrilla unit next in size to 'the battalion is the
regiment. This must be under more severe discipline than is the
battalion. In an independent guerrilla regiment there may be ten
men per squad; three squads per platoon; three platoons per com­
pany; three companies per battalion; and three battalion~ to the
regiment. Two of such regiments form a brigade. Each of these
units has a commander, a vice commander and a political officer.
In North China guer.rilla cavalry units should be established.
These may be regiments of from two to four companies, or battalions.
All these units from the lowest to the highest are combatant
guerrilla units which receive their supplies from the Central
government. Details of their organization are shown in the tables.
All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to
forty-five must be organized into anti-Japanese self defense units,
the basis of which is voluntar;' service. As a first step they
must procure arms, then both military and political traiping must
be gi ven them! 'rheir responsibilities are: local sentry duties,
securing information of the enemy,' arresting traitors and pre­
venting the dissemination of enemy propaganda. - When the enemy
launches ,a guerrilla suppressjon drive these units, armed with
what weapons there are, are assigned to eertain areas to dec~ive,'
hinder and harass him. Thus the self defense units assist the
combatant guerrillas. Ths;T have other functions. They furnish
stretcher bearers to carry the wounded, carriers to take food to
the troops and comfort missions to provide the troops with tea'
and porridge. If a locality can organize such a self defense unit
as we have described the traitors can not hide nor c=an bandits and
robbe~s disturb the peace of the people. Thus the peop~e will
continue to assist the guerrillas and supply manpower to our reg­
ular armies. "The organization of self de.fense units is a trans­
itional step in the development of universal conscription. Such
uni ts are re servoirs of manpower for the orthodox force s. "
There have been such organizations for some time in Shansi,
Shensi, Honan, and Suiyuan. The youth organizations in different
provinces were formed for the purpose of educating the young, They
have been of some help. However, they were not vol.untary and-the
confidence of the people was thus not -gained. These organizations
were not widespread and their effect was ahnost negligible. This
system was therefore supplanted by the new type organizations which
are organized on the principles of voluntary cooperation ~d
19fDe c/50b
non-separation of the members from their native localities~
When the members of these organizations are in their native towns
they support themselves. Only in case of military necessity are
they ordered to remote places and when this is done the government
must support them o Each member of these groups must have a weapon,
even if the weapon is only a knife, a pistol, a lance or a spear.,
In all places where the enemy operates these self defense
units should organize within themselves a small guerrilla group
of perhaps from three to ten men armed wi th pis-tols or revolvers.
This group is not required to leave its native locality.
The organizations of these self defense uflits is mentioned in
this book because such units are useful for the, purposes of incul­
cating the people with military and political knowledge, keeping
order in the rear, and replenis,hing the ranks of the regu:l.ars.
These groups should be organized not only'in the active war zones
but in every province in China. "The people must be inspired to
cooperate voluntarilK' We must'not force them for if we do it
will be ineffect~al~ , This is extremely important. The organiza­
tion of a self defenso army similar to that we h~ve mentioned is
shoVlffi in 'lIable 5.•
In order to control anti-Japanese military organization as a
whole it is ne.eessary to esta1~lish a system of mili tary areas ,and
districts along the lines we have indicated. The organiz~tion '
of such .areas and districts is shovm in Table 6.
Equipment of Guerrillas
In regard to the problem of guerrilla equipment it must be
understood that guerrillas are lightly armed attack groups that
require simple equipment. The standard of equipment is bqsed upon
the nature of duties assigned; the equipment of low class guerrilla
units is not as good as that of higher class units. For example,
those who do not have the duties of dest.raying railroads are not as
well ~quipped as those who have that duty. The equipment of guer­
rillas can not be based on what ~he guerri'llas want, or even what
they need, but must be based on what is available for their use,
Equipment can not be furni shed immediately but must be acq,uired'
gradually. These are points to be kept in mind.
The question of equipment includes the collection, supply,
distribution and .replacement of weapons, ammunition, blankets"
cOl11..l 11unication materials, transport, and facilities for propaganda
work. The supply of weapons and ammunition is most difficult
particularly at the time the unit is established, but this problem
can always be solved eventually. Guerrilla bands which oniginate
in the people are furnished with revolvers, pistols, bird guns,
spears, big swords, and land mines and moptars of local manufacture.
Other elernentary weapons are added and as many new type rifles as
are available are distributed. After a period of resistance it is
possible to increase' the amount of equipment by capturing it from
the enemy! In this ,respect the transport companies are the easiest


... to equip for in any successful attack we will capture the enemy's
transport. An armory shoulQ be established in each guerrilla
district for the manufacture and repair of rifles and for the
production of cartridges, hand grenades and bayonets. Guerrillas
must not depend too much on an armory. The enemy is the principal
source of their supply. For destruction of railway trackage,
bridges, and stations in enemy controlled territory it ,is necessary
to gather together demolition materials. Troops must be trained
in the preparation and use of demolitions and a demolition unit
must be organized in each regiment. "
As for clothing minimum requirements, these are that each man
shall have at least two suits of summer weight uniform, orie suit
of winter clothing, two hats, a pair of wrap puttees and a blanket.
Each man must have "a haversack or a bag for food. In the north
each man must have an overcoat~ In acquiring this clothing we
can not depend on captures made from the enemy for it is forbidden
for captors to take clothing from their prisoners. In order to
maintain high morale in guerrilla forces all the-clothing and equip­
ment mentioned should be furnished by the representatives of the
government stationed in each guerrilla district. These men may
confiscate clothing from traitors or ask contrioutions from those
best able to afford them. In subordinate guerrilla groups uniforms
are unnecessary.
Telephone and radio equipment is not nece~sary in lower groups
but all units from regiment up are equipped with both o This mater­
ial is best obtained by contributions from the regular forces and
by capture from the enemy.
In the guerrilla army in general, and at bases in particular,
there must be a high standard of medical eqliipment, Besides the
services of the doctors, medicines must be procured. Although
guerrillas can depend on the enemy for some portion of their medi­
cal supplies they must, in general, depend ~pon contributions. If
westeI'n medicines are not available local medicines must be made
to suffice.
The pr~blem of transport is more vital in ~orth China than in
the south for in the south all that is necessary is mules and hor­
ses. Small guerrilla units need no animals, but regiments and
brigades will find them necessary. Commanders and staffs of units
from companies up should be ftwnished a riding animal each. At
times two officers will have to share a horse. Officers whose
duties are of minor nature do not have to be mounted. "
Propaganda materials are very important. Every'large guerrilla
unit should have a printing Press and a mimeograph stone. They
must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and
notices. They must be supplied with chalk and large brushes. In
guerrilla areas there should be a printing press or a lead type
pre SSe


For the purpose of prin~lng training instructions this
material is of the greatest in~ortancep

In addition to the equipment listed above it is necessary to
have field glasses f compasses f and military maps. An accomplished
guerrilla group will acquire these things.

Because of the proven importctnce of guerrilla hostilities in
the anti-Japanese war the headquarters of the nationalist govern­
ment and the commanding officers of the various war zones should
do their best to supply the guerrillas with what they actually
need and are unable to get for themselves. However it must be
repeated that guerrilla equipment will in the main depend on the
efforts of the guerrillas themselves. If they depend on higher
officers too much the psychological effect will be to weaken the
guerrilla spirit of resistance.

Elements of the Guerrilla Army

The term lIelementll as used In the title to this section refers
to the personnel, both officers and men f of the guerrilla army.
Since each guerrilla group fights in a protracted war its officers
must be brave and positive men whose entiro loyalty is dedicated
to the cause of emancipation of the people. An officer ~hould
have the following qua::'ities: great powers of endurance so that
in spite of any hardship he sets an example to his men and is
a model for them; he must be able to mix easily with the people,;
his spirit and that of the men must be one in strengthening the
policy of resistance to the Japanese. If he wishes to gain vic­
tories he must study tactics. A guerrilla group Witll officers
of this calibre would be unbeatable. I do not mean that every
guerrilla group can hdve, &t its inception, officer's of such
qualities. The officers must be men naturally endoweC; with good
qualities which it is possible to develop durin~ the course of
campaigning. The most important natural quality is that of com­
plete loyalty to the idea of people's emancipation. If this is
present, the othe~s will develop; if it ~s.not present nothing
can be done. When officers a::c'e first selected from a group it is
this quality that should receive particular attention. The offi­
cers in a group should be inhabitants of the locality in which
the group is organized as this will f~cilitate relations between
the~'" and the local civilians. In addi tion, officer s so cho sen
would be familiar with conditions. If in any locality there are
not enough men of SUfficiently high quali£ications for officers
an effort must be made to train and educate the people so these
qualities may be developed and the potential officer material
increased. There can be no disagreements between officers native
to one place and those from other localities ..
19/De c/5 0b
'. A guerrilla group ought to operate on the principle that
volunteers only are acceptable for service. It is a mistake to
impress people into service. As long as a person is willing to
fight his social condition or position is no consideration, but
only men who are courageous and deterTIined can bear the hardships
of guerrilla campaigning in a protracted war.
A soldter who habitually breaks regulations must be dismissed
from the army. Vagabonds and vicious people must not be accepted
for service. The opium habit must be forbidden and a soldier who
can not break himself of the habit should be dismissed. Victory
in guerrilla war is conditioned upon keeping the membership pure
and clean.
It is a fact that during the war the enemy may take advantage
of certain people who are lacking in conscience and patriotism
and induce them to join the guerrillas for the purpose of betraying
them. Officers must ther'efore continually educate th.e soldiers
and inculcate in them patriotism. This will prevent the success
of traitors. The traitors who are in the ranks must be discovered
and expelled, and punishment and expulsion meted out to those who
h.ave been influenced by them. In all such cases the officers
should summon the soldiers and relate to them the facts, thus
arousing in them hatred and datestation for traitors.· This pro­
cedure will serve as well as a warning to the other soldiers. If
an officer is discovered to be a traitor some prudence must be used
in the punishment adjudged o However, the work of eliminating
trai tors in the army begins 1I1}"i th their elimination from 8nlOng the
Chinese soldiers who have served under puppet governments
and bandits who have been converted should be welcomed as indi­
viduals or as groups. They should be well treated and repatriated.
,But care should be used durin:~ their reor~anization to distinguish
those whose idea is to fight the Japanese from those who may be
present for other reasons.




9rg~nization of an Independent Guerrilla CompAn~

....-- C_ompany Cfi1.dr.
P~litical Officer Executiv Officer

Mobile Prtlpaganda. Company Headquarters
Unit Message sOC-tTofi-­
Administrative Secti~n
1st Aid c';-Hospital Sec.

1st 21ld"-~f
Pls.t P~at Plat

1 T---, I
Squad SquP..d Squad


RANK J Persom~--:~rm ==1
Jompany Leader
;>olitical Officer
--- j
I ~istOJ
1 pistol ,
~xecutive Officer I ,- 1 pistol !
--cornpan;YHeadquarters I ,- I
Message S~ct~o_r:_~lie~_.~1-_ _-l
1 - :.
1 - - -
1-1--.- . .
"'l-_~_-_"'A""dmC'-:-i-n""i-s""t-r-a';:;:t~l~e s~. Ch,
~ifle __.__._ _'_1
Publ~~!el~~_ 1
Duty Personnel
3 _rifl.e
_---2...-- __-=--=-_.:.. 1
! Barber 1 i

=r - -
'Co6ks I 10 ,- - - -------,
L- Medi..cal Section Chief I 1 ~ i
II '{:~\id & JlJursing--
Intell :J.ge~1ce Sec.. Ch.
-i--i- 1':-:-:-- rifle - - - ~ - -
Intelligence --1--'---- I9 <

rifle II
1 Platoon LefJders
Squad Leaders---------- 1 - - . 9
- ­----­
rifle I
Nlne Squads Of_~lght
T_o_t_a_l..--,=t_E:..~ J rifle
PlstO.iS, 96 nfles
NOTE: For notes, soe next page. (Tables in Chapter Five)



l~ Each squad consists of from nine to eleven men. In case men 0r '=trillS are
npt sufficient the third Platoon may be dispensed with, or one squad or~
ganized as company head~uarters.
2. The mobile propaganda unit cons ists of members cf the company ",rho are
not relieved of primary duties ex:cept to carry out propaganda when they aloe
not fighting.
3. If there is insufficient personnel the medioal section is n~t separately
organized. If there are only two or three medical personnel they may b~ at­
tached te the administrative section.
4. If there is no barber, it is unimportant. If ther~ is an insufficient
number of cooks "l.ny memuer of the company may be designated to prepare food.
5. Each c0mbatant spldier should be armed with the rifle. If there are
not enough rifles~ each squad should have two ~r three. Shntguns, lances
and big swords Can also be furnished, The distribution of rifles does not
have to be equalized in platoons. As different missions may be assigned
platoons it might be necessary to give cme platoon more rifles than the
6. The strength of a company at the most may be 180, divided into- twelve
squads ~f 11 Juen each. The minimum strength of a company may be 82 men di­
vided intn six squads of ~ men each.



Battalicn C0mmand~r
, I .
PolAial Executive
Officer Officer

& Three Companies

Battalion Headquarters

·"t""1_ .- - - , ­

Intelligence Mess~ge Machine Gun Medical Admin.
Section Center Sect inn Section Sec.
r-------- . - - - - ­
1st C0
~I --+--, ----1 2d Co 3d Co 4th Co

t -Ri;N~. _~._- _...~~.. .~" ... -~__..... ':-.
··.PERiQiJlJEL "'..-.. b.RI~J
Ba~-calion Commander
Executive, _Officer
=== i 1
1 _

Battalion Headquarters __. I
Sir;na1 Section 2 - - - !
~-----A~&~T~nl;·-n-l~·;trative Septinn ~
Section Chief 1 Carbine I
f------.--=:-n--.-- 1 C··--I
.ttunner . arOlne
Public Relations 10 Carbine
Duty Perso~~el 2 - ~ - ­
.- Barbers
Supp ly
- 3
- - - ­
-- - - ­
Cook~ 10 - - - ­
Medi~al Section
~edical Officer 1
--'--S"'"t-;-"-etc her Be a re r s ---'~---:6:;-----+--------------;
Nursing 4 - - - - I
1 - - - - - - - . Section Chief ------4---....,1.---t--::P::'"1:-·s~t;-o·..,l;---1
~·---'":;I:-n..,.t-e..".l·""l'"':'i-g-e-n-c·e----·-~I----- 30 =~ I Pistol
Hachine Gun Se,)ticn As Avail. As Avail.
1---------- ---..,.---+-------·-~34Pisto:!l:

TOTAL, Headquarters 75 12 Car'l"ir:8S

Three Companies (122) 366 288 CaiDines
43 Pistilil
TOTAL 441 i 300Rifles

NOTE: For notes, see next page. (Tables in Chapter Five)


1. Total Headquarters, Independent Guerrilla Battalion may vary from a minimum
of 46 to a maximum of 110.
2. When there are four companies to a battalion, regimental organization she-uld
be used.
3. Machine glln squnds may be heavy or light. A light machine gun squad is fr()m
5 tn 7 men. A heavy machine gun squad is from 7 to 9 men.
4. The Intelligence Section is organized in from 2 to 4 squads at least one ef
which is plain olothes men, If horses are available, one squad should be moun­
ted. .
5. If ~0 men are availablo for stretcher bearers omit them and use the cocks
or a~k aid from the people.
6. Each company must have at least 25 rifles. The remaining weapons may be
bird,guns, big swords, or localiy made shotguns.





Regimental Co~~anie~
I .­
Political Chief of

Officer Staff

_ _I.
Regimental Headquarters & Thr!_e__
B _a~talions

1st Sec.
2d Sec.
3d i
Operations Intolligence Public
-+-- 4th' Sec.
Aclrnini~ .
& Relations stratiop

First Battallon
• ----~.\r_-----------._.,
Second B£,ttalion Third Battalion


20/Dec/SOa br


-"-..;,.---'-'-;::--7"'-'~--~-.----. -------.'-..;,.-";"'--'-~-~'-';"'~";""'=;~'--- ~ -.--.- • - - _ •• _ - - - - - .. ~ - . • •- -"'-' .- - .

.. FAIIl\~;:;-··-,---=:=~-=~";;;;;",,;,;;__,,,'_.;l...i.....
_ ..............
, P.E-,R...
,...... . . SO...,l,'n... _......I.oi.............._~A:"'"PJ_·~O:--,::-- _ _....
JJ!;.....L.. oc;;==..==....._=....,.=---.0/1

z ........
: Regimental Commander 1 i pistol
Pol;""':i,.-';'t"":-i-c-al' Officer --;----- l -t----Pisto...,l,.------·-----1


Three Battalions

; TOTAL 1·160


1. See Tables 1 and 2 for company and battalion organization.
2'. Battalions and companies have no transport sections.
3. The hand weapon may be either revolver or pistol. Of these eRch battalion
should have over 100.


2','C3-') 003
2C: /'.:;ec7GOaor
I ,





,·-r--------­ I
_._._.__._- - - - - - ­
Supply & Finance Staff I
Supply Kccou- Disbur- Operations Intell- Public Adminis- Personne
port nting sing & igence Relations tration
Training ~
.' 3dl Regt ----.-.- ----·~--t-h-~t ·R-e-g-t----E-n-g-i-n-}ers --.....
1st Regt

l!t En Zd Il~-kB!l
1st Co 2d Co
3d Co


7;£-9 00 8


In Chapter One I mentioned the fact that guerrilla troops
should have a precise conception of the political goal of the
strug~le and the political organization to be used in attaining
that goal. This means that both organization and discipline of
guerrilla troops must be at a hi~h level so that the-v- cap. carry
out the political activities ~hich are the life of both the
guerrilla armies and of revolutionary warfare. First of all
political activities depend upon the indoctrination of b9th mili­
tary and politic&l leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through
thej11 the idea is transmi tted to the troops. One must not feel .
that he is anti-Japanese 111erely because he is a member of guerrilla
unit. The anti-Japanese ide8. must be an ever present conviction
and if it is forgotten we Y:'lay succumb to the tempta ttons of the
enemy or be over come with discouragenents o In a war of long dur­
ation those whose conviction that the people must be emancipated
is not deep rooted are lik01,-r to become shaken in their fai th or
actually revolt. ~ithout tho general educatio~ that enables
ever;Tone to understand our goal of d:-1 ving out Japanese Imperialism
and es tabli shing a free a.'ld hap),T China the soldiers fign. t without
conviction and 10se their determination.

The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to
inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national c0nsciousness
awakened.' Hence a concrete explanation of' the political systems
used is important not only to guerrilla troops but t9 all those
~nlO are concerned with the realization -of our political goal. The
fl.-UO I'Ein Tang has issued a pamphlet entitled "System of Natlonal
Organization for War" which should be widely distrHmted through­
out guerrilla zones. If we lacle national organizat:l.on WI!? will lack
the essentia.·l unity that should exist between the soldiers and the

A study anQ comprehension of the political objectiv~s of this
war and of the anti-Japanese front is particularly important for
o~ficers ~f guerrilla troops. There are some militarist$ who say
"Vile are
11 D10t intere sted in T)oli
_. tic s but only
, in -
the profe
. ssion of
arms. ."'It is vital t}:lat these simple minded militarists be made
to rea14ze the relationship th2t exists between polities and mili­
tary af~fairs. Military action is a method used to attain a poli­
tical 3"~oal. vvhile mili tary affairs and political affairs are n.ot
identi',cal it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

It is to be hoped that t~16 world is in the last era of strifet
The 'vast majori ty of human beings have already prepared or are ppe ...·
par~_ng to fight a war that will bring justice to the oppressed
19!Dec/5 0b
peoples of the world. No matter how long this war may last
there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented
epoch of peace. The war that we are fighting today for the
emancipation of the Chinese is a part of the war for the freedom
of all human peings and the independent, happy, and liberal China
that we are fighting to establish will be a part of that new
world order. A conception lite this is difficult for the simple
minded militarist to grasp and it must therefore be carefully
explained to him~
There are three additional matters that must be considered
under tQe broad question of political activities. These are,
first, political activities as applied to the troops; second, as
applied to the people, and third as applied to the enemy. The
fundfu~ental problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers
and men within the army; second, spiritual unification of the
army and the people, and last, destruction of the unity of the
enemy. The concrete methods for achieving these unities are
discussed in detail in pamphlet Number 4.of this series entitled
tlpolitlcal activities in anti-Japanese Guerrilla vVa.rfare. ll
A revolutionary army must have discipline which must be
established on a limited democratic basis. In all armies obed­
ience of the subordinates to their superiors must be exacted.
This is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, but the basis
for guerrilla di8cipline must be the indi vidua.l conscience. Y:i th
guerrillas a discipline of compulsion is ineffective. In any
revolutionary army there is uEity of purpose as far as both offi­
cers and men are concerned and therefore within such an army
discipline is self-imposed. Although discipline in guerrilla
ranks is not as severe as in the ranks of orthodox forces the
necessity for discipline exists. This must be self-imposed because
only when it is is the soldier able to understand completely why
he fights and why he must obey. This type of discipline becomes
a tower of strength wi thL1 the army and it is the only type that
can truly harmonize the relationship that exists between officers
and soldiers. In any system whe~e discipline is externally imposed
the relationship that exists between officer and man is cqaracter­
ized by indifference of the one to the other. The idea that offi­
cers can physically beat or severely tongue lash their men is a
feudal one and is not in accord wi th the conception of a self-.· _
imposed discipline. Discipline of the fe'.1dal type will destroy
internal unity and fighting strength. A discipline self i~posed
is the primary characteristic of a demOcratic system in the army.
A secondary characteristic is found in the degree of liberties
accorded officers and soldiers. In a revolutionary army all
individuals enjoy political liberty·and the question for &xample,
of the emancipation of the people, must not only be tolerated put
discussed and propaganda encouraged. Further, in such an arQY the
mode of living of the officers and the soldiers must not differ


19 ec75Gb
too much and this is particularly true in the case of guerrilla
troops. Officers should 11. ve under :'he same condi tions as their
men for that is the only way in which they can p.;ain from their
men the admiratlon and confidence so vital in war. It is incor­
rect to hold to a theory· of equali ty in all things but there must
be equality of existence in accepting the hardships and dangers
of war. Thus we may attain to the unification of the officer and
soldier groups, a unity both horizontal within the group itself ­
and vertical, that is, from lower to higher echelons. It is only
when such unity is present that units can be said to be powerful
combat fac tors.
There is also a unitv of spirit that should exist between
troops and local inhabitants. The 8th Route Army put into prac­
tice -- a Code known as liThe Three Rule::l and the Eight Rerr..arks, II
which we list here: .

Rules 1. All actions are subject to comr.land-.
2: Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks 1. Replace the door when you leave the house.

2. Roll up the be0.cing on which you have slept.

3.~ Be courteous.

4 Be honest in your transactions

5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.

7.. Do not bathe in the presence of women.

8 Do not without authority search the pocketbooks

of those you arrest.
The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the 8th Route
Army and other units have since adopted it.
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for
long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of com­
prehension of the relationship that should exist between the
people and the troops. l'he former l11ay be likened to water and
the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that
these two can not exist together? It is only undisciplined troops
who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of
its native element, can not live.
We further our mission of dedtroying the enemy by propagan­
dizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with con­
sideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into
our hands. ::r:f we fail in these respects we stI'engthen the
solidarity of our enemy.


T~-I:::;; S'I'7I.AT~GY 0::' CUI:J.RILLA ~:::-~SIS"I'A~Jc·r:~ AGAn~ST JAPAN

It has been definitely decided that in the strategy of our
war against Japan guerri:j.la strategy must be auxiliary to funda­
mental orthodox methods. If this were a small country guerrilla
activities could be carried out close to the scene of operations
of the regular army and directly complementary to the:n. In
such a case there would be no question of guerrilla strategy as
such. Nor would the question arise if our country were as
strone as Russia for exa:nple and able speedily to eject an
invader. The quostion exists because China, a weak country of
vast size, has today progressed to the point where .it has be­
come possible to adopt the policy of a protracted war featured
by guerrilla operations. Although these nay at first glance
seem to be abnormal or heterodox such is not actually the case.

Decause Japanese military power is inadequa te:a;1ch of the
terri tory her arms have over'run is wi tilOut sufficient ~~arrison
troops. Under such circumstances the primary functions of
suerrillas are three: first, to conduct a war on exterior
lines, that is, in the rear of the enemy; secondly, to establish
bases, and lastly, to extend the war areas Thus guerrilla Q

participation in the vIaI' is not merely a matter of purely local
guerrilla tactics, but involves strategical considerations.
Such war with its vast time and space factors establishes a new
·'.J~i Ii tary process the focal po int of 1:;hich is China today. The
Japanese are apparently atte~pting to recall a past that saw
the Yuan extin3uish the 3ung and the Ch I in::; conquer the ~'=ing;
that witnessed the extension of the ~nflish E~pire to North
A~8rica and India; that saw the Latins overrun Central and
South America. As far as China today is concerned such dreams
of conquest are fantastic end without reality. Tooay1s China
is better equipped than was the China of yesterday anf a new
type of Guerrilla hostilities is a part of that equip:::lent. If
our enemy fails to take these facts into consideration and. makes
too optimistic an esti~at0 of the situation he courts disaste~,


Though the strategy of guerrillas is insep'arable fro:;1 IiJar
stra·~egyas a vlhole the actual conduct of these hostilities
differs from the conduct of orthodox operations. =ach type of
warfare has methods peculiar to itself and methods suitable to
regular warfare can not be applied with success to the special
situations that confront guerrillas.•



~efore we treat the practical aspects of g6errilla war it
might be well to recall the func'amental 8xiom of combat on which
all mil i tary action is based. rr'his can be s te. ted: "Conserva""
tion of one's own strength; destruction of ener1Y stren3th."
A military policy based on this axiom is consonant with a na~
tional policy Cirected towards the erection of free and prosper~
ous Chinese state and the destruction of Ja?anese imperialism.
It is in furtherance of this policy thut govGl'nment applies its
military strength. Is the sacrifice demanded by war in conflict
with the idea of self preservation? ~ot at all. The s~crifices
ce,nanded are necessary both to destroy the enemy and to preserve
ourselves; the sacrifice of a part of the people is necessary
to preserve the whole. All the considerations of military action
are derived from this axiom. Its application is as apparent in
all tactical and strate3ical conceptions as it is in the simple
case of the soldier who shoots at his en81Y fro~ a covered posi~
4 t.:: E\
All Buerrilla units start from nothinG and Grow. :hat
methods should we select to insure the conservation and de~elop­
m.ent of our OWll S t~cer·.gth and the des truc t ion of that of the
enemy? The es sent ial reqnice_rwn ts are the six 1 is ted below:
1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned
tactJ-cal attacks in a war of strategical defense; tactical speed
in a war strategicully protracted; tactical operations on ex~
ter'ior lines in a war cOlloucted strategically on interior lines ~
2. Conduct of oper9tions to complement those of the regular
3. The establishment of bases.
4. A clear understanding of the relctioDship that exists
between the attack and the defense.
5. '1"he dove lopment of :110 bi le operations.
6, Correct cormnand.

1'he enemy, thOUGh :lUlnerically \i,JeaK, is strong in tll.e
quality of his troops and their equipment; we on the other
hand are strons nwnerically but weak as to quality. These con­
siderations have been ta]-een into account in thr:; devolopmcmt
of the policy of tactical offense, tactical speed~ and tactical
opera t ions on exteI'ior 1 ine s in a war which, s tra te,:;ically
speaking, is defensive in character, protracted 1n nature, and
cocducted along interior lines. Our strategy is based on these
conceptions and they must be kept in mind in the conduct of all
Although the elelsnt of surprise is not absent in ort~odox
warfaro there are fewer op)ortunities to apply it than there
are during guerrilla hostilities. In the latter speed is
es sen t ial. [1[1he "novements of guerri 110. troops mus t be secret
and of supernatural ra~icity; the enemy ~ust be taken unaware >(
Q~d the action entered speedily. There can be no p~ocrastina­
ti.on in t.1:1e execution of plans; no assu.:nption of a, nS,:',ative
or passive defense; no ~reat dispersion of forces in many local
engage~ents. The basic qethod is the attack in a violent and
deceptive form~ Chile thero may be cases v\There the attack
will extend over a period of several Cays (if that len3th of
time is necessary to annihilate an ene~y Group) it is more prof­
i table to launch and push an attack Ifili t11 naximllil1 speed. The
tactics of defense have no placo in the realm of guerrilla ~ar­
fare. It a delayinG action is necessary such places as defiles,
river crossings and villages offer the most suitable conditions
for it is in such places that the enemy's arrangements may be
disrupted and he may be annihilated.
The enemv
u is much stron~er_ than we -.::re and it is true that
we can hinder, ~istract, disperse and destroy him only if we
disperse our own forces. Although guerrilla warfare is the
warfare of such dispersed units it is sometimes desirable to
concentrate to destroy an enemy. Thus the principle of con­
centration of force aSa ins t a r e 113. t i vc 1:( ',veaker ene'lY is appli­
cable to guerrilla warfare •
. e can prolon3 this struggle and make of it a protracted
war only by [aining positive and lishtning like tactical deci­
sions; by employing our manpower in proper concentrations and
dispersions, and by operating on exterior lines in order to
surroun~ and destroy our ene~y. If we can not surround whole
ar~ies we can at least partially destroy them; if we can not
kill the JapanasG we can capture them. The total effect of
many local succ~sses will be to change the reJ.ative stren;ths
of the opposing forces. The ~estruction of Japan's military pow­
er co~bined with the international sympathy for China's caUBe
and the revolutionar¥ tenCencies evident in Japan will be
sufficient to destroy Japanese Inperialism.
':']C will next discuss ini'ciativG, alertness, and the wltter
of careful planning. ~,ha t is ~!18ant by ini t ia t i ve in "varfare?
In all tattles and wars a struggle to gain and retain the ini­
tiative goes on between the opposing sides, for it is the side
that holds the initiative that has liberty of action. ~hen an
army loses the initiative it loses its liberty; its role be­
comes passive; it faces the danger of defeat and destruction o


It is more difficult to obtain the initiative when defonding
on interior linos ti1at it is while attacking on exterior lines.
This is what Japan is doing. There are, ho~ever, several ~eak
points as far as Japan is concerned. One of these is laQk of
sufficient manpower for the task, another is her cruolty to
the inhabitants of conquered areas, a third is the underestima,..
tion of Chinese strength which has resulted in the differences
between military cliques Which, in turn has been prod.uctive of
many mistakes in the direction of her military forces. POI'
instance, she has been gradually compelled to increase her
manpower in China while, at the same time, the many arGwnents
over plans of operations and disposition of troops have resulted
in the 10s3 of Good opportunities for improvement of her strateg­
ical position. This explains the fact that although the Japanese
are frequently DLle to surround large bodies of Chinese troops
they have never yet been able to capture 'nore than a fe1l'l. The
Japanese military machine is thus being weakened by insufficiency
of manpower, inadequacy of resources, the barbaris~ of her
troops and the 8eneral stupidity that has characterized the con­
duct of operations. Her offensive continues unab&ted but because
of th6 weaknesses pointed out her attack must be limited in ex­
tent. She c~n never conquer China. The day will come, indeed,
already has in some areas, when she will be forced into a pas­
sive role. "J,hen hostilities cO:"rLmenceo. China VIas passive but' as
we enter the second phase of the war we find ourselvos pursuing
a stro.tegy of ~obl1e warfare with both Guerrillas and regulars
operating on exterior lines. Thus with each pnssin3 day we
seize SallS degree 0f initiative from the Japanese.


The matter of initiative is especially serious for :,;uerrilla
forces w~o must face critical $ituations unknown to rOGular
trp-ops. The super iori ty of the ene,ny and the Inck of un! ty [tnd
experience within our own ranks may be cited. Guerrillas can
however gain the initiative if they keep in mind the weak points
of the enemy. Because of the enemy's insufficient manpower
guerrillas can operate over vast territories; because he is a
foreicner and a barbarian, guerrillas can _ain the conficence
of millions of their country men; because of the stupidity of
enemy com~anders guorrillas can nake full use of their own
cleverness. Both guerrillas and regulars ~ust exploit these
enemy weaknesses while, at the so-me time, our orm are rO:i1edied.
Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality,
sources of strength. For exa;nple, the very fact that most
guerrilla groups are small makes it desirable and advantageous
for them to sPDear and disappear in the enemy's roar. ~ith such
activities the enemy is simply unable to cope. A similar
liberty of action can rarely be obtained by orthodox forces,

~jhen the enemy attacks the guerrillas with more than one


cohUYL."1 it is difficult for the latter to retain the initiative.
Any error, no matter how slight~ in the esti~ation of the situa~
tion is li~ely to result in forcing the guerrillas into a passive
role •. They will then fir~d themselv8s unable to beat off tbe
a ttacks of the ene~i1Y. It is apparent that 'Ire can ::;a in and re­
tain the initiative only by a correct estimation of the situation
and a proper arrange~ent of all ~11itary and political factors.
A too pessimistic estimate will operate to force us into a
?assive position with conse~uent loss of initiative; an overly
optiJuistic estimate with its rash arrangement of factors will
produce the sa~e result.

o military leader is endowed by heav8n with an ability to
seize the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so
after a careful study and estimate of the situation and arrange­
::ilent of the military and. :t.:;olitical factors involved., \Ihen a
guerrilla unit, due either to a poor estimate on the part of its
leader or pressure from tho enemy, is forced'into a passive posi­
tion its first duty 1s to extricate itself. No method can be
prescribed for this as tho nethod to be e3ployed will in every
case depend on the sitnation. One can, if necessary, run away ..
~ut there are tines Ihen the situation seems hopeless and in
reality is not so at all. It is at such ti~es that the good
leader recognizes and se izes the::o:nent when he can resa in the
lost initiative.

Let us revert to alertness. To conduct onets troops with
alertness is an e.ssent'ial of guerrilla comIns.nd. Leaders must
realize that to perate alertly is the most Lnportant factor in
Gainine the initiativ8 anc vital in its effect on the rel~
ative situation which exists between our forces and thODe of
the enemy. Guerrilla comnanders adjust their operations to
the enemy situation, to the terrain, and to prevailinc local
conditions. Loaders must be alert to sense changes in these
factors and sake necessary modifications in troop cispositions
to accord with them. The leadel:' ;nus t be like the fisherman
Who, with his nets, is able both to cast them and pull them
out in aNareness of 'the depth of the water, the strensth of the
cur~ent, or the preS8nce of any obstructions that may· foul them.
As the fishernan controls his nets through the lead ropes so the
guerrilla leader ~2intains contact with and control over his
units. As the fishorman 11J.USt change his position, so must the
guerrilla cO~Nnander. Dispersion, concentration, const2nt change I
of position--it is in these \/aJB t~2t guerrillas employ their
stren=th. In ~cn8ral, 3uerrilla units disperse to operate:

1. ~ hen the eneey is in over extended defense and suffi­
cient force can not be concentrated acainst him guerrillas must
(isperse, h8.rass hi 1 and e,8,lOralize him.

19/De c 150J ,lgm

2. "hen encircled by the enemy, guerrilles disperse to
wi thc.ro.w.
3. lisperse vrhen the nature of the srounc1 lL:nits acti.on.
4. :Sisperse ,7hen the aV8ilabilityof supplies Iblits
s. :Gisperse in ordor to promote mass rll0VemGnts over a
wlde area.
3esardless of tho circ~TIstances which prevail at the tine
of dispersal, caution must be exercised in certain matters:
1. A relatively large ~roup should be retained as a .central
force. The re~ainder of the troops s~ould not bd divi~ed into
Groups of absolutely equal size. In this way the leader is in
a position to c;eo.l witIl any circwnstances thAt may arise.
2. [8ch dispersed unit should have clear ane definite re­
spans i bi.l it ies. Ord ers 8hotl10. spec ify 2. placo to '·hich to pro­
ceed, the time of proceedln3, and the place, time, and met~od
of asse,nbly.
Guerrillas concentrate when the enerilY is adlT8.nclDg upon
them and there is opoortunity to fall upon him and destroy him.
Concentration may te ~esirablE when the enen] is on the def~nsive
and guerrillcs wish to destroy isolatec detac:lillonts in particular
localities. Dy the term !lc()ncentI'ate~' we do not :n.ean the as­
serntly of all man power but rather only that necessary for the
task. The re~aininG ~uerr11las are assigned missions of hinder­
ing and delaying the ene~y, of dostI'oyinS isolated groups, or of
conducting mass propaganda.
In addition to the dispersion and concentration of forces
the L38.der must understand what is terned Il a l er t shifting." '.Ihen
the enemy feel the danger of guerrillas he will cenerally send
troops out to ttack thew. The ~uerrillas must consider the
situation and deci.de at vihat t:L::1O and at what place they "Nish
to fiGht. If thoy fine that t:1ey- can not fight they raust im­
:nediately shift. Then the enel:1Y may be destroyed in detail.
For example, after a guerrilla Group has destroyed an enemy de­
tachment atone place it runy be shifted to [mother area to
attack and destroy a secone. detachment. Sometimes it v1ill not
be profitable for a unit to become engaged in a certo.in area
e.nc. in that case it ,nust:J.oYe i.m.media.tely. ·'hell. the situation
is serious the guerr i llas nus t ''love wi th th<3 flu id1 ty of Von; tor
and the ease of the blowing wind. Their tuctics ~ust deceive,
te.'rlpt and confuse the eneNy. 'i'hey rL111st leac. the enemy to believCi
that they 'Nill atte.ck him from tIle east and nOlth and they must
then strike him from the ~est and the south. They must sbrike,

19/D e c /5 Om;;y.:1
ti1en rapidly ci i sperse. They :T1US t ;:'lOve at nisht.
Guerrilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentra­
tion anJ the alert s~iftin; of forces. If guerrillas are stupid
and obst~nate they will be led to passive positions and severely
ea~a~ed. Skill in conductin; guerrilla operations 1 however, lies
not merely in the understandins of the things we have discussed
but rather in their actual ap,lication on the field of battle.
!J.lhe quick intolligence that constantly 1}\Jatc~1es the ever changing
situation and is able to seize OD the right moment for decisive
action is found only in keen and thoushtful observers.
I 1 < /
Careful plannins is necessary if victory is to be won in
guerrilla war and those who fiGht without~ethod do not undor­
stan( the nature of cuerrilla action. A plan is necessary recard­
less of the size of the 11nit involvod; a prudent plan iSGS neces­
sar: in the case of the squad as in the case of the re:sL:1Emt.

il'~1e situation must be cC:.l"efully stuCied, then an assil~nHIGnt of
duties made. Plans must include both political and ~ilitary in­
s truc t ion; the ::ua t te.r of su_pply and equip~lent, und tiJ.e mo. tter
of cooperation with local civilians. ~Jithout a study of these
factors it is impossible either to seize the initiative or to
opera te 8.1ert ly. It is true t"l:la t guerrillas can "Take onl~T 1 imi ted
plans but even so the factors we have .Jent ioned :(1'US t oe cons ldered.
Ths initiative cnn only be secured nnd retained following
a ?ositivB victory that results frOM attack. The attack must
be made on ~uerrilla initiative; that is to say ~uerrillas Dust
not permi t themselves to be -1D.neuvered into a pos i tion ·.1here they
are robbed of initiative an~ where the ~ecision to attack is
forced upon them. Any victory 1Nhich t~1ere is will result from
careful planning an~ alert control. ~VOll in defense all our
efforts must be directed towards a ros~nption of the attack for
it is only by attacl~ that we can extinguish our enemies and pre­
serve ourselves. A defG~se or a withdrawal is entirelv . ...1 useless
as far as Gxtinzuishing our one21e8 is concerned and only of
te-",lpore.ry value as far as the consel'vation of our forces is can...
cerned. This prtnciple is valie both for guerrillas and rSGular
troops. The differences are of degree only; that is to say,
in the ~anner of execution.


The relationship that exists between ~uerrillas an( the
orthodox forces is L-:lportant 8_nd :-11... lS t be apPI'ec ic,ted. Genera lly
Sl)eal~ing, there are three types of coopera t ion between .-uerrillas
and orthodox groups. These are:
1. Strategical cooperation
2. Tactical cooper~tion

3. Battle cooperation
Guerrillas who harass the enemy Is roar ins talla tions B.nd hinder his
transport are wealcening him and encouraging the n'ltj.onal i3pirit of
resistance. They are cooperating stratogically. POI' exa~~le the
guerrillas in Hanchuria had no functions of stl'ategical cooperation
with orthodox forces until t 11e war in Cll~na started. Since that
tirJe their function of strategical cooperat~on is evident; for if
they can kill one enemy, make the enemy expend one round of ar!Jmuni­
tion, or hinder one enemy group in its advance south'Nard, our
p0wers of resistance here are proportionately increased~ Such
guerrilla action has a positive actIon on the enemy nation and on
its troops while at the same time it encourages our own country men~
Another example of s-tratee;ico..l cooperation is furnished Oy the
guerrillas who opera.te a.long the pi ing-S ui; piing-Iran, Chin-P I u,
T lung-Pu and Cheng-T I ai railways. This cooperation began v<fhen the
invader attacked, continued d 1 1ring the per:'Lod viI"hen he held gar­
risoned cities in the al~eas and was intensified when our regllle.r
forces counter attacked, ~.n an effort to restore the lost terri­

As an example of tac t lcal cooperation we Llay c l-ce tllo opera­
tions at Hs ing-I\: lOU when guerrillas both r-ort}:l and south of Yeh
Men destroyed the Tlung-Plu rt\ilway and. the notor ~oads near Piing
Rsing Pass and Yanr; 1-:'ang :~IOU. A nunber of snaIl operatiYlg bases
were established and organized guerrilla act:i.on in Shansi complem­
ented the activities of the regular forces oot,h t}lere and in the
defense of IIonan. Similarly, during the south Shantun,z c8npaign
guerrillas in the five northern provinces cooperated with the
arr.J.ies operation on the IIsuchvw front.

Guerrilla cOf.'lID8.nders in roar areas and those in cOi':Liland of regi­
ments assigned to operate vJlth ortll.CJdox units l'mst cooperate in
accordance with the situation. It is their fUIlctlon to d<3termino
weak points in the enemy dispositions, to harass them, to di.srupt
the 11' transport and to 'lmde:2r:J.ine tho 11' lilorale. If guerr ilIa action
were independent tlw results to be obtained frOM tactical coopera­
tion would be lost and those that result from strategical coopera­
tion greatly dininished. In order to accomplish their mission and
improve the degree of cooperation guerrilla lmits I'lUSt be equipped
with sose means of rapid cOlill1unication. For t~is purpose two way
radio sets are reco£illlended.

Guerrilla forces in the i~rrilediate battle area are responsible
for close cooperation with regular forces. Their principal func­
tions are to hinder eneny transport, to gat~ler infor:nation and to
act as outposts and sentinels. Even without precise instructions
from the comr.:ancleI' of the regular forces, t::1ese m:':.ss ions, as well
as any others t~at contribute to the general success, should be

The probler,l of establishrr1ent of bases is of particular

importance. '1'his is so 1)ecause this Vfar is a cruol and pro­
tracted strug!Jle. The lost territories can be restored only by
a strategical counter attack and this we can not carry out until
the enemy is well into China. Consequently some part of our
country 01" indeed nost of it no.y be captured by the enemy and
becolne Ills rear area. It is our task to develop intensive guer­
rilla warfare over tILls vast area and convert the enemy's rear
into an additionql front. 1 11us the enej~llY will never be ablo to

stop f:tghting. In order to subdue the occupied ter'ritory the
enemy will have tv become increas j.ngly severe and oppress ive.
A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically
located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of
training, self pr0servation al1d development, Ability to fight a
war without a r8ar area is a fundamental characteristic of guer­
rilla action but this does noy mean that guerrD.las can exist
and functi.on IJver a long p8riod of thew vdthout the developnent
of base areas. IUstory shows us many examples of peasant revolts
that were unsuccessful and :tt is fanciful to believe t>.at such
move:ments, characterized by banq.itl'Y and brigandage, could suc­
ceed in tllis area of impr>oved.· communicat~.ons and rllilitary equip­
ment. Sone guerrilla 18aders seem to think that those qnalities
are present in today Is movemmlt and before such leaders can com­
prehend the iI:1poptance of base aroas 5_n the long term.yar tlle1.r
minds must be disabused of this idea.
Tlw subject of bases ~ay be b0tter understood if we considor:
1. The various categories of bases
2. Guerrilla aroas and base aroas
3. '1'he establisilI'1ent of bases
4. The development of bases
Guerrilla bases may be classified accordin3 to their loca­
tion as" first, mountain bases; second, plains bases, and last
river, lake and bay bases. 'rhe advantaGes of basos in mountain­
ous arems are evident.· 'Those which are IWW established are at
ChIanG ?IO Chan, \':u 1'lai Shan i 'rlr.i Heng Shall, Tlai Shan, Yen
Shan and Mao Shan. These bases are strongly protected. Similar
bases should be established in all enemy rear areas. Plains
country is generally not satisfactory for guerrilla operating
bases, but this does not mean that guerrilla warfare can not
flourish in such country or that bases can not be established
there. The ex.tent of guerrilla development in·Hopci and wcst
Shantung proves the o:Jpos :tte to be the cas e. VJhcther we can
count on tile use of t~tO~1e bases over long periods of time is ques­
t iomible. VIe can, however, es tabl tsh small bas os of a seasonal
or temporary nature. This Y'!8 can do because our barbar'ic ellElmy
s imply- does not have tl18 manpower to occupy all the areas he has
over run and because the population of China is so numerous that
a base can be established anywhero. Seasonal bases in plains


country may be established in the winter when the rivers are fro"';
z en over, and in the SUiill1Wr when tho crops are growinG; rrempol"­
ary bases may be es tablished 1711en the enemy is otherwise occ1.1pi.8d l

Vihen the enemy advances t'.le guerrillas who 11.a<l'e established bases
in the plans area are tho first to engage him. Upon their with­
drawal into mountainous country t~ley should leave behind them
guerrilla groups dispersed over the entire area~ Guerrillas
s~lft from base to base on the theory that they r1ust be one place
one day and another place the next.

There are rnany historical examples of the establish1"lent of
bases in, river; bay and ls.ke country anJ this is one aSIJOct of
our activity that l1as so far received little attention~ Bed
guerrillas held out for ':,l8.ny years in the Hung Tzu Lake regicm.
We should establish bases in the HUl1i3 Tzu and ~!.' I ai areas and
along rivers and water courses in territory controlled by the
enemy so as to deny him access to, and free use of, t)le water

There is a difference between the terns baso area and guer~
rilla area. An area com~letely surrounded by territory occupied
by the enemy is a ilbase area ll • V:u 'J.1'ai Shan, 'I'laiSh8.n, and
T lai l]eng Shan are eXaraI)les of I)a;.:;e ar8D.S e' On the oth3r hand
the area eas t and north of ':'1.1 '1'1 ai Shan (tlJe Shans i-Hope i-Cllahar
borde~ zone) is a iuerrilla arGa. Such areas can be controlled
by guerrillas only while they actually physically occupy them.
Upon their departure control reverts to a puppot pro-Japanese
government. East IIOP';3i for example was at first a guerrilla
area rather than a base area. A p-<lppot governrl1ent functioned
there. Eventually the people, ox'ganizecl and inspired by guerril­
las from the Pu T1ai mountains, assisted in the transformation
of this ~uerrilla area into a roal base area. Such a task is
extrei'lely difficult for it is largely dependent upon t:18 dogree
to which the people can be inspired. In cert8.~_n garpisoned
areas such as the cities and zones contiguous to the railroads
the guerrillas are 'Lmable to drive the JRpanese and puppets out.
These areas rem9.in guerrllla areas. At other times base areas
might become guerrilla. areas duo either to oU.r own mis takes or
the activities of the enemy.

Obviously, in any given area in tl'le IJar zone anyone of

three situations may devolop; the area may remain in ChInese

hands; it may be lost to the Japanese and puppets, or it uay be

divided between the combatants. Guerrilla leaders should en­

deavor to see that either t~e first or last of these situations

is assured.

Anotl18r point essential in the establislT"clent of bases is the

cooperation that must exist between the armed guerrilla bands

and the people. All our strength l!1USt be used to spread the



doctrine of armed resistance to Japan; to arm the people; 'to
brganize self defense units, and to train guerrilla bands. This
doctrine must be spread among tl18 people who must be orgapized
into anti-Japanese group8, Their political instincts must be
sharpened and their martial a.rdor increased. If the workers, the
farmers, the lovers of liberty, the young men, tb,e women, and the
children are not organized they will never realize their own anti­
Japanese power, Only the united strength of the people can elim­
inate traitors, recover the Dcasure of political power that has
been lost and conserve and improve that VJ11ich wc still retain.

We have already touched on geographic factors in our discus­
sion of bases and we must also nention the econonic aspects of
the problem. What economic policy should be adopted? Any such
policy must offer reasonable protection to cO~uerce and business.
1j1.T e interpret II roasonable protect ionl! to rilean that people mus t con­
tribute money in proportion to the money they have. FarElers will
be required to furnish a certain share of their crops to guerrilla
troops e Confiscation, e:ccept in the case of businesses :PUll by
traltors is prohibited,

Our activities must be extended over the entire periphery of

the base area if we wish to attack the enemy's bases and thus

strengthen and develop our own. 'This will affoI'd us oppol"tlini ty

to organize, eq::.:.ip, ar:.d train the people, thus furthering guer­

rilla policy as well as the national policy of protracted war.

At times we must emphasize the development and extension of base

areas, at other times the organization, training, or equipment

of the peoplee

Each guerrilla base will have its own peculiar problems of
attack and defense. In general the enemy in an ondeavor to con­
solidate his gains will attempt to extinguish [~uerrilla bases by
despatching numerous bodies of troops over a number of different
routes. This must be anticipated and the enci.rclement broken by
counter attack. As such enemy columns are wi thOll.t reserves we
should plan on us inE; our r.1ain fopces to at tacl: one of thEm by
surprise and devote our secondary effort to continual hindl"ance
and harrassment. At 'the saEle time other forces isolate enemy
garrison troops and operate on their line$' of sv.pply and com­
munication. When one column has been disposed of Vie may turn
our attention to one of the others. ~n ~ pa~e area as large as
\'iu T' ai Shan for example· there ape flour or £'i ve military sub...
divisions~ .Guerrillas in these must cooperate to form a primary
,force to counter attack the enemy or tlj,e area from which he came
"lNhile a secondary force harrasses and l.l.inders hin.

After doi'eating the ener.w in etny area we must take adv1'mt­

age of the period he roquires for reorganization to press home

our ,attacks. We must not attack an objectIve we are not certain

of Winning. We must confine our operations to relatively small



areas and destroy the enemy and traitors in those places. 'Fhen
t~e inhabitants have been inspired, new volunteers accepted,
trained, equipped and,organized, our operations may be Gxtended
to inclu<1e cities and lines of C0l1u:1\mication not stI'ongly held.
Vie may at least hold these for temporary (if not for per:aanent)
periods. All these are our duties in offensive strategy. Their
ob ioct is to lengthen the period t11at the enemy must remaln on
the defensive. Then our military activities and our organization
work araong the r.lasses of tJle people must be zealously expanded;
and with equal zeal the strength of the enemy attacked and dim­
inished. It is of great importance that guerrilla units be
rested and in~tructed and during such times as the enemy is on
the defensive the troops may got SODe rest and instruction may
be carried out ..

The development of mobile warfare is not only possible but
essential.. This is the case because our curr'ent war is a desper­
ate and protracted struggle. If Chilla were able to conquer the
Japanese bandits speedily and to recover her lost .territories
there would be no· question of long term war on a national scale.
Hence there would be no question of the relation of guerrilla
warfare and the war of movoment. Exactly the opposite is. actu­
ally the case. In order to insure the development of guerrilla
hostilities into mobile warfare of orthodox nature both the
quantity and quality of Guerrilla troops LIt-cst be improved. Pri­
marily, mor'e nen must join the armios; tllen the' quality of equip­
mentand standards of training r.1USt be improved. Political
training must be emphasized and our organization$ the teclmique
of handling our weapons, our tactics, all must be improved. Our
internal discipline must be strengthened. The soldiers must be
educated politically. Tllere must be a gradual change from guer­
rilla fo~mations to orthodox regimental organization. The neces­
sary bureaus and staffs, both political and Hilltary must be
provided o Attention at t::1e sane time must be paid to the creation
of suitable supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standards of
equipm.ent must be raised and t~Tpes of wea]!ons increased. Com­
mQ~ication equipment DU3t not be forgotten. Orthodox standards
of discipline must be establis~18d.

BecmlDe guerrilla fOI'I:lations act indel-ondantly and because
they are the nost elemente.ry of armed formqtions commapd can not·
be too hiShly contrali 7 od. If it were Vlerrilla action would be
too Ihlited in scope 0 At the same tiIn.e guerrilla activities to
be most effective nust be coordj.nated not only insofar as they
themselves are concerned but additionally with regular troops
operating in the sane araas. This coordination is a function of
the war zone commander and his staff. In guerrilla base areas
the cOlmJand must be centralizad for strategical purposes and de­
centralized for tactical purposes. Centralized strategical com­
mand takes care of the general raanagement of all guerrilla w1its,



their coordination within war zones and the 3eneral policy regard­
ing guerrilla base areas. Beyond tDis centralization of coru~and
will rosult in interference with subordinate units, as naturall:l,
the tactics to apply to concrete situations call. only be deter:ilined
as these various situations arise. This is true in orthodox 1)"i'ar­
fare when communicat:!.ons between lovlJel' and higher echelons break

down. In a word; proper guerrill~ po~icy will provide for unified
strategy and independent activity.

Each guerrilla area is divided into districts and these in
turn are divided into subdistricts o r.ach subdivision has its
appointed commander; and w~1.ile general, plans ai-'e made by higher
command.ers, the natu.ee of actions is determined by inferior com­
manders ~ '11 he former l'l1ay su[;gest the nf'_t1..1.re of t>.e action to be
taken but c ari not define it. Thus infer ior groups have r,lore or
less complete local Gontrol •


51, NAVY..,DPPO lND~ Newport, R. I.


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3 1695 00530 3276

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