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CP

Thus we present the following plan The United States Federal Government can do
their plan, end of all trafficking, processing, and sale of Chinese political prisoners
organs within china, only after substantially increase its engagement with China by
publically calling for an end to human rights abuses and requiring affiliate
corporations to improve working and living.

Human rights promotion develops the recognition of a common


humanity Prevents extinction
Annas 2 (Prof. and Chair Health Law at Boston U. School of Public Health, George, Lori Andrews,
(Distinguished Prof. Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and Technology at Illinois
Institute Tech, and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics Fellow at Health Law Dept. of Boston U. School of
Public Health), American Journal of Law & Medicine, THE GENETICS REVOLUTION: CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND
CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and
Inheritable Alterations)

The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the
prospect of total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear
family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of
the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now
suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with
the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2 Prevention, of course, must be
based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same ,
rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis,
the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in
an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing
similarities for our survival: [L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us
also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those
differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link
is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our
children's future. And we are all mortal. n3 That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the
same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the

The recognition of universal human rights, based on


human dignity and equality as well as the principle of
nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species
consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna
Human Rights Conference: Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to
a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality
before which the significance of human differences quickly fades . . . . We are all
"International Bill of Rights"). n4

capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation.
Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill,

The idea of universal human rights


shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum
solution to deal with its miseries. n5 Membership in the human species is
central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect
for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species .
torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . .

The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights
in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare

of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately
seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and
inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations
can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of
humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into
our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman."
n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide
benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could
potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no
such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon.

1nc
a. Framework: How we imagine and represent China matters
because it reveals and affects the knowledge we produce in
debate. Before we can debate the best policy towards China,
we must examine our epistemological position.
Turner 14 [Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow at the University of
Manchester, PhD from the University of Manchester, April 2014, American Images
of China: Identity, Power, Policy, pp 23-30]

The world is a product of interpretation, and interpretations are vulnerable to


disagreement and conflict. 53 Accordingly, the evil and threatening Fu Manchu
represents a particular truth about China in equal measure to the genial and
Americanised Charlie Chan. This precludes a strictly positivistic logic of
explanation, the purpose of which is to search for a singular, definitive
understanding of what China represents at any given moment. Instead, a logic of
interpretation, which concerns itself less with identifying causality within
international relations than it does with interrogating the consequences of
representational processes, is required. 54 This is what enables the transference
from why to how questions described in the introduction, since the principal concern is
not why the United States has chosen to engage in certain practices towards China,
but how those practices have been made possible through the historical
production of subjective truth . Social constructivist and postcolonial IR scholars are
now among the most active in formulating the types of (how) questions about
representation and the interrelations of power and knowledge around which this
analysis is conducted. 55 A key source of inspiration is Edward Saids Orientalism , in which it is argued
that, for centuries, the identity of the global East has been constructed and
reconstructed (as exotic, threatening, technologically inferior, etc.) so as to
enable its domination by the West. 56 As such, the Asian region (like any other) is
less an objective, natural reality than it is a product of Western
imaginations. 57 It exists for the West, or so it appears in the mind of the
Orientalist. The imaginative geography of China has always been constructed
within American imaginations, for American imaginations , to enable
particular courses of US China policy. Yet while China has always been the product of American
discourse and representation, the argument here is not that ideas are the primary or even singular drivers of
international affairs. Crucially, the intention is to emphasise the co-constitution of the ideational and material
worlds. As Alexander Wendt explains, the claim is not that ideas are more important than power and interest, or
that they are autonomous from power and interest. Power and interest are just as important and determining as

power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the


ideas that make them up. 58 To suggest, then, that American understandings about
China simply shift and evolve as a result of external developments most notably of
Chinas behaviour, which, as illustrated in the review of the literature above, has been a strong tendency of
many authors and thus that they can be attributed little or no consequence to the
dynamics of Sino-US relations and the formulation of US China policy, is
fundamentally misguided. Increases in Chinas military capabilities today , for example,
before. The claim is rather that

do matter (see Chapters 5 and 6). What is important, however, is not simply the
emergence of those capabilities, but that China which so many people (rightly or
wrongly) consider potentially dangerous now possesses them. Like China, India has a
large standing army, nuclear weapons, an increasing defence budget and so on, but
it is rarely perceived as a threat to the United States. The UKs 500 nuclear
weapons are considered less threatening to American interests than North Koreas
(unsophisticated and unreliable) five. 59 Unavoidably, then, identity also matters.
Discourses and imagery define, to varying extents, what China is and how it
must be approached, regardless of its intentions or observable behaviour . Discourse and
imagery: constructing the reality of China American images of China are understood here to be
the products of discourse about that land and its people. Michel Foucault described
discourse as the general domain of all statements, representing either a group of individual statements, or a

American discourses of China are


thus envisioned as the articulation of ideas about that country in the broadest
possible sense. Ultimately, American images of China constitute the discursive
construction of truth or reality about it. Of course, imagery in the form of art or photography,
regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements. 60

for example, is overtly visual rather than discursive, yet, like that of the world around us, its meaning will always be
interpreted and articulated through language. For the purposes of this analysis American images and
representations of China are considered synonymous. This is an assumption reinforced by Szalay et al., who argue
that images are selective, often affect-laden representations of reality. 61 Peter Hays Gries explains that

Americans look at China as though staring at the inkblots of a Rorschach test,


revealing more about themselves than about China itself. 62 This central role
of American identity in the construction of China is reiterated by Jesperson:
[American] images of China have largely come from Americans assumptions
about themselves, he argues. 63 As outlined already in this chapter, the relevant literatures as a whole
do little to support this claim. However, the identity of any actor is meaningless without the
presence of another because meaning itself is created in discourse . 64 This mutual
constitution of opposing identities, of self and other, is articulated by David Campbell:
identity whether personal or collective is not fixed by nature . . . rather, identity
is constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference fixed by nature .

b. Links: The affirmative representations reveal a larger


position of epistemic anxiety about international relations and
China itself.
L Democracy/HR Promotion
Link: The 1ACs mindset views China as a repulsive other
because their protests arent democratic and American enough
Turner 11 (Oliver, A Critical Thinkers Lecturer in International Politics, Sino-US
relations then and now: Discourse, images, policy, Political Perspectives, Vol. 5, No.
3)
After the death of the popular statesman Hu Yaobang in April 1989 widespread protests erupted across China which
lasted for several weeks. Their participants were socially heterogeneous and the movement was nationwide but the
attention of the Western media inevitably fell upon Beijing. The Tiananmen Square protests were relatively peaceful
until government troops were ordered to restore control and in the early hours of 4 June the movement was broken
up by force. The Chinese government claimed that three hundred people were killed, with another seven thousand
injured. These figures, however, are heavily disputed and may have been much higher. An Amnesty International
Report, for example, suggests that at least 1,000 people had been killed. The cover of Time magazine declared

simply massacre in Beijing (Time, 12 June, 1989). The New York Times reported, Crackdown in Beijing; Troops
attack and crush Beijing Protest; Thousands fight back, scores are killed (New York Times, 4 June, 1989). Unlike in
the past, the Chinese were no longer so brazenly identified as uncivilised or inferior but that imagery can prove
both stable and enduring and that Uncivilised China remained a powerful, naturalised construction was firmly
evidenced by the events of 1989 and American reactions towards it.

The events in Tiananmen, observes

caused revulsion for Americans not only because of the deaths that occurred, but
because the episode did not end as they had hoped (Madsen, 1998: ch.1). Illusions of an
impending free China had appeared but the American understanding of freedom, of
the mutually-reinforcing liberalisation of the economic and political, was not shared
by the Chinese protesters (Madsen, 1998: ch.5). Indeed, some confessed not to even know exactly what
they wanted (Madsen, 1998: 17). The demands for political reform were particularly
misrepresented since the protesters understanding of democracy diverged
significantly from those of Americans. The majority of student participants were
demanding an end to corruption and economic inequality rather than the
establishment of Western-style democratic elections. The movement, then, was
interpreted through the values of American identity so that discourse remained
tightly controlled and regulated. Confirmation of China as an uncivilised other in
relation to the superior and law-abiding West soon followed as Washington lobbied the
Richard Madsen,

worlds leading multilateral economic organisations for a withdrawal of support. Weapons sales to the PRC were
banned and high level military exchanges were postponed. Another round of sanctions later followed in which

Sanctions
against Beijing were legitimised on the basis that China had once again failed to
conform to the superior standards of Western civilisation . As Suettinger puts it, the West
recoiled in horror and disgust, expelling it from the company of modern civilized
nations (Suettinger, 2003: 1). The movement, then, was interpreted through the values of
American identity so that discourse remained tightly controlled and regulated. Confirmation of China as an
uncivilised other in relation to the superior and law-abiding West soon followed as
lending to China by international financial institutions and official diplomatic exchanges both ceased.

Washington lobbied the worlds leading multilateral economic organisations for a withdrawal of support. Weapons
sales to the PRC were banned and high level military exchanges were postponed. Another round of sanctions later
followed in which lending to China by international financial institutions and official diplomatic exchanges both
ceased.

Sanctions against Beijing were legitimised on the basis that China had once
again failed to conform to the superior standards of Western civilisation . As Suettinger
puts it, the West recoiled in horror and disgust, expelling it from the company of modern civilized nations
(Suettinger, 2003: 1).

1. The aff sees China as a problem, puzzle, or paradox


engagement, whether positive or negative, presupposes
Americas role as the manager and savior of all world
problems. Dominant discourses view China as either a threat
or an opportunity, but either way, a plan is needed. This
anxiety ruins effective policy predictions and locks in status
quo violence.
Zhang 13 (Yongjin Zhang, professor of M3014 Theories of International Relations
M3033 Sino-American Relations in Global Politics POLI29008 Power Politics and
International Relations of East Asia at Institute of International Politics, Beijing
China Anxiety: Discourse and Intellectual Challenges ) ABDU

For many centuries, China has been a fixture in the Western imagination. In the
words of Jonathan Spence (1999: xi): The sharpness of the feelings aroused by China in the West, the
reiterated attempts to describe and analyze the country and its people , the apparently
unending receptivity of Westerners to news from China, all testify to the levels of
fascination the country has generated. Imageries of China as either the Yellow
Peril or the Red Menace have been an integral part of Western obsessions and
anxieties about China (Pan, 2012). The discourse on the rise of China has informed,
and been informed by, these imageries . Few would deny that the Anglo-American discourse on the
rise of China is a fast-moving one. Claims such as the coming conflict with America (Bernstein and
Munro, 1997) and the coming collapse of China (Chang, 2001), made only a decade or so ago, now seem light
years removed from the present. Ezra Vogel's contemplation of living with China in a non-confrontational USChina
relationship (Vogel, 1997) is a far cry from Bergsten's proposed partnership of equals or a Group of Two (G2) in
managing global economic affairs a decade later (Bergsten, 2008). Gerald Segal's (1999) poignant question does

China matter? has become no more than rhetorical now. Yet the rise of China continues to
be a source of anxiety for a variety of reasons. Those who view the power
transition as a zero-sum game are concerned that China's rise is synonymous with
American decline. China has built up its soft power, Joseph Nye (2005) asserts, at the expense of the
United States. China is also said to have mounted a charm offensive worldwide through its diplomatic, trade and
cultural initiatives (Kurlantzick, 2007). In an endorsement of Kurlantzick's book, Orville Schell claimed that Chinese
soft power has begun to transform the world balance of power in a way that makes it essential for Americans to
recalibrate their presumption of US pre-eminence.2 While some argue that China is increasingly becoming a status
quo power, others are convinced that China continues to follow Deng's grand strategy of hiding its capacity and

For Brzezinski (2009: 56),


China remains a fundamentally cautious and a patiently revisionist power , and for
biding its time (Foot, 2006; Friedberg, 2011; Johnston, 2003, 2007; Taylor, 2007).

Barry Buzan (2010: 18), China is no more than a reformist revisionist. Aaron Friedberg (2011) goes much further
and claims that China has engaged in a contest for supremacy with the United States in the struggle for mastery
of Asia, whereas Peter Navarro (2008) predicts the coming China wars not because China possesses weapons
of mass destruction, but because of its invention of the weapons of mass production. At the same time, Robert

Zoellick (2005) argues that the China of today is simply not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s and that China
does not believe that its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of
the international system. This is at odds with the conviction of offensive realists such as John
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt that China, the rising power, and the United States, the hegemonic power, are

A rising China will inevitably challenge the hegemonic United


States; the question is thus not whether, but when this will happen (Mearsheimer, 2001, 2006; Walt, 2010).
preordained to clash violently.

Offensive realists may indeed support their proposition by pointing out that China has increased its military
spending at a double-digit rate annually in the last two decades and has a military budget second only to that of the
United States. China's successful attempts at testing its anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missiles technology in 2007
and 2009 can be cited as clear evidence of China's strategic and purposeful challenge to American dominance in

China is also said to have developed offensive capability in cyber


warfare and has launched the most egregious cyber-attacks on US commercial and government networks
space (Lampton, 2010).

(Lampton, 2010; The Wall Street Journal, 2013). Stephen Walt counsels at the same time that there is no need for
panic about China's phenomenal rise since China has a long way to go before it becomes a true peer competitor

The cauldron of anxiety in the United States, to borrow the phrase


is not just about China as a rising power but about the uncertain
strategic intentions of China. In the words of Jeffrey Legro (2007: 515), the rising China problem is not
just about power, but purpose. According to Legro (ibid.: 516), neither realists nor liberals have
suitable policy responses to China's rise, because China's diplomatic futureis likely to be more
of the United States (Walt, 2010).
of Zoellick (2005),

contingent than either the power or interdependence positions allow. Legro argues that the key is to understand
and to seek to shape, if possible, core ideas held by the Chinese leadership and the way they inform China's
strategic foreign policy goals. For democratic peace theorists, such a proposition is obviously
problematic. If China remains authoritarian and its policy-making processes continue to be opaque, its strategic

intentions are likely to be shrouded in secrecy. For them, nothing short of fundamental democratic change in China
would solve the problem, simply because a

democratic China is much less likely to find itself in


a conflict with the United States, partly because Americans will be more tolerant of a rising great power
democracy than a rising power autocracy (Kagan, 2007: 99). Others are even more concerned about the
implications of a rising authoritarian power for the future of the liberal global order championed by the United
States. The question is not whether China is likely to challenge the hegemonic power or seek to change the rules of
the game, nor whether China and the United States are destined to come into conflict. Rather the big question is

can the liberal system survive [the rise of China]? (Ikenberry,


China's dream turn into America's
nightmare? (Saunders, 2010). Beyond the pure power paradigm, the rise of China has
instigated no less intensive anxiety. The source is China's growing prosperity.
China is to blame for the slow global economic recovery from the financial crisis .
simply, and more poignantly,

2008). In this scenario, another question has been asked: will

According to Paul Krugman (2010): Most of the world's large economies are stuck in a liquidity trap deeply
depressed, but unable to generate a recovery by cutting interest rates because the relevant rates are already near
zero. China, by engineering an unwarranted trade surplus, is in effect imposing an anti-stimulus on these
economies, which they cannot offset. Krugman proposes what he calls a turn to hardball policy towards China
(ibid.). Even an increase or decrease in China's purchase of US Treasury bonds causes serious concerns. In
July 2010, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) in Beijing had to go out of its way to publicly rule
out the so-called nuclear option of dumping its vast holdings of US Treasury bonds for political purposes (China

There are also acute concerns about the dark side of China's relentless
pursuit of high-speed economic growth, from environmental degradation to
climate change. Even before it overtook the US as the largest emitter of CO2 in
2007, China was regarded as the worst polluter. China was accused of having either wrecked or
Daily, 2010).

hijacked the Copenhagen climate deal (Lynas, 2009; Vidal, 2009). Together with India, China is said to have
sabotaged the UN climate summit at Copenhagen (Rapp et al., 2010). Furthermore, China's forays into Africa raise
serious concerns about its global ambition beyond securing sufficient energy and resources for rapid economic
development. Its presence in Africa is seen as having significant impact on the development path of the continent
and policy decisions of other powers involved (Alden and Hughes, 2009; Taylor, 2007). As erstwhile pariah state,
China is now said to be in pursuit of the pariah through its energy security strategy, which shapes its relationship

there are anxieties about


continued human rights abuses, political repression, ethnic conflicts and rampant corruption in
China, and about the Chinese Communist Party's stubborn resistance to democratization. There is
with Iran, Myanmar and Sudan (Canning, 2007). Last but certainly not least,

nevertheless a real shift to be discerned in the dominant Anglo-American discourse on the rise of China compared
to that of a decade ago. The difference is that there is now an underlying consensus that this time the rise of China
is for real and it is highly likely to continue, which urgently requires an effective and rigorous response, particularly

the US simply will not make up its


mind whether to contain or engage China, even though the writing is on the wall and the
challenges posed by China's rise are palpable. In other words, the US remains unsure about how to
manage China as a rising power. Its policies seem to have vacillated between
constraining, containing, engaging, enmeshing and hedging against China's rise, as the
moment of great strategic uncertainty lingers on. James Steinberg's (2009) call that
by the United States. Yet, Will Hutton (2007) contends,

China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the
expense of security and well-being of others, reflects not only the deep-seated mutual strategic mistrust between
China and the US, but it is also indicative of the ongoing frustration on the part of the US in trying to read China's

Looming large on the


horizon is a profound unease about China as a rising power. The China
anxiety noted above has morphed into such questions as does the future belong to China?
(Zakaria, 2005); what does China think? (Leonard, 2008); what will China want? (Legro, 2007);
real strategic intentions (Foot, 2009; Lampton, 2010; Lieberthal and Wang, 2012).

what China wants: bargaining with Beijing (Nathan, 2011); will China's rise lead to war? (Glaser, 2011); and will
China's rise lead to a new normative order? (Kinzelbach, 2012). That these questions are being asked and debated

They testify to deeper anxieties which are


discernible but rarely talked about explicitly and which ul timately concern China's
pathways to power. That is, given the apparent contradictions in the Chinese political economy, how has
both in academia and foreign policy circles is revealing.

China managed to rise so rapidly? How could we have got China so wrong in the recent past? These questions take
us beyond concerns expressed about an indeterminate transition of power, strategic uncertainties and the impact of
the rise of China on the future world order. It suggests that prior to being a problem, the rise of China is first and
foremost a puzzle. If we adopt a twenty-year perspective, it is humbling to observe how seriously we have

Put differently, China's political change, economic transformation and


strategic policies since 1990 seem to have defied most anticipations, projections
and predictions by economists, political scientists and international relations
specialists, whether from the political right or the political left, be they realist, liberal
or constructivist. China, in other words, keeps surprising us all .
misjudged China.

2. Their use of a traditional IR perspective props up a UScentric approach to knowledge production that ensures China
remains academically isolated, discrete, controllable, and
difference. This is inseparable from the militaristic objective
that views China as a threat or an opportunity to be exploited.
Chow 6 (Rey is a cultural critic, specializing in 20th-century Chinese fiction and
film and postcolonial theory. Educated in Hong Kong and the United States, she has
taught at several major American universities, including Brown University, 2006,
The Age of the World Target Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative
Work, Duke University Press DURHAM AND LONDON 2006) FB
under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and
documentation, the "scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge
during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the
institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic
conception of the world as target.52 In other words, despite the claims about the
apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities
undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training,
historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully
inscribed in the politics and ideology of war . To that extent, the disciplining, research,
and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a
strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data
Often

analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war-if, for
instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military
codes53-is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to "know" the other cultures ?

Can
"knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the
violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined
to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As
long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit
of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the
omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign "self"/"eye" -the "I" -that
is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that a
target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the
bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States , and as
long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the
present, such

study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of

virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs , with the
United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always
viewed as the military and information target fields . In this manner, events whose historicity
does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber-such as the Chinese reactions to the war from
a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter-will never receive the

"Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and


however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing
of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has
been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object" -and
by "the problem of the vanishing object." As Harootunian goes on to argue, for all its
attention that is due to them.

investment in the study of other languages and other cultures, area studies missed the opportunity, so aptly
provided by Said's criticism of Orientalism, to become the site where a genuinely alternative form of knowledge
production might have been possible_ Although, as Harootunian writes, "Said's book represented an important
intellectual challenge to the mission of area studies which, if accepted, would have reshaped area studies and freed
it from its own reliance on the Cold War and the necessities of the national security state,"56 the challenge was too
fundamentally disruptive to the administrative and instrumentalist agendas so firmly routinized in area studies to
be accepted by its practitioners. As a result, Said's attempt to link an incipient neocolonial discourse to the history
of area studies was almost immediately belittled, dismissed, and ignored, and his critique, for all its relevance to
area studies' future orientation, simply "migrated to English studies to transform the study of literature into a fullscale preoccupation with identity and its construction."57 A long-term outcome of all this, Harootunian suggests,
has been the consolidation of a type of postcolonial studies that, instead of fully developing the comparative,
interdisciplinary, and multicultural potential that is embedded theoretically in area studies, tends to specialize in
the deconstruction of the nature of language, in the amalgamation of poststructuralist theory largely with AngloAmerican literary studies, and in the investigation mostly of former British colonial cultures rather than a substantial
range of colonial and semicolonial histories from different parts of the world.58 On its part, having voluntarily failed
to heed Said's call, area studies can only remain "locked in its own enclaves ofknowledge"59 based on the
reproduction of institutional and organizational structures with claims to normativity, while being defensively
guarded against the innovations of poststructuralist theory that have radicalized North American humanistic and

the truth of the continual


targeting of the world as the fundamental form of knowledge production
is xenophobia, the inability to handle the otherness of the other beyond the
orbit that is the bomber's own visual path . For the xenophobe, every effort needs to be
made to sustain and secure this orbit-that is, by keeping the place of the other-astarget always filled. With the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the
United States must hence seek other substitutes for war. As has often been pointed out,
drugs, poverty, and illegal immigrants have since become the new targets, which occupy together
with Moslems, Arabs, and communists (that is, Cuba, North Korea, and mainland China)-the status of
that ultimate danger to be "deterred" at all costs . Even so, xenophobia can backfire. When
anxiety about the United States' loss of control over its target fields-and by implication its own
boundaries -becomes overwhelming, bombing takes as its target the United States itself. This is so
because, we remember, bombing the other has , as a rule, been held as the most effective means to end
the war, the violence to stop violence , and, most important, the method to affirm moral
righteousness. Why, then, when the United States is perceived to be threatened and weakened by
social scientific learning since the 1970s. As I have already suggested,

incompetent leadership, should bombing not be the technique of choice for correcting the United States itself? And
so, in spite of all the suspicions of racist conspiracy quickly raised about "foreigners "

in the bombing of the


federal office building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, U.S. militiamen were arrested in
the case. Spurred by a supremacist determination to set things right, the targeting of "others" turned
into the targeting of innocent American men, women, and children, with a violence
that erupted from within the heart of the country. The worst domestic terrorist incident in U.S.
history,60 the bombing in Oklahoma City took place with the force of an emblem: the vicious circle of
the-world-as-target had returned to its point of origin.

c. Impact: Anxiety produces a will to control and calculate, but


existing forms of knowledge will fail. Continuing the
domination epistemologies of IR will result in war,
environmental destruction, and the loss of value to life.
Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at
UNSW, Sydney, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Theory and
Event, 10.2, Muse)
My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war,

war is not an enduring historical or


feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather
the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and
community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation.
militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that
anthropological

Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will
save us.

The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual
and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for,
to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that
the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply
endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of
revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a
more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's
argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political

the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of


weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of
thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and
existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism,
repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic
exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular
choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative,
'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful
enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and
cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities , their actions become
inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we
existence and security -- is a view that

give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent

creates both
discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and
material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses
and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however
ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly,
or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It

tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible
conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships

institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the
instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are
and national security

certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

d. Our alternative is to forget IR, forget China, and forget the


1ac. Refusing to represent China for policy purposes and
forgetting the knowledge produced by the aff opens up new
modes of thinking and helps intellectuals resist domination.
Bleiker 97 (Roland Bleiker is a reader in peace studies and political theory at the
University of Queensland. From 1986 to 1988 he served as chief of office for the
Swiss delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Panmunjom.
March 1997. Forget IR Theory. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644880?seq=1&cid=pdfreference#page_scan_tab_contents) IS
To forget orthodox IR theory is not to ignore the IR practices that have framed our
realities. Countless events of the past, such as the Holocaust, cannot and should not
be simply chased out of our colllective memory. Nor is it to turn a blind eye toward
the violent nature that characterizes present world politics. Forgetting is not only
a negative process, a neglecting and overlooking, but also a necessary
part of our existence, something we often do without being aware of it.
Jeanette Winterson: They say that every snowflake is different. If that were true, how could we go on? How could we

How could we ever recover from the wonder of it? By forgetting. We


cannot keep in mind too many things. There is only the present and nothing to remember. The
task, then, becomes one of turning forgetting from a selective, arbitrary,
and unconscious constitution of things past into an active, conscious, and
more inclusive process. Instead of perpetuating IR nostalgia, seeking
comfort and security in the familiar interpretation of long-gone epochs,
even if they are characterized by violence and insecurity, conscious
forgetting opens up possibilities for a dialogical understanding of our
present and past. It refuses to tie future possibilities to established forms of life.
Rather than further entrenching current IR security dilemmas by engaging with the
orthodox discourse that continuously gives meaning to them, forgetting tries to
escape the vicious circle by which these social practices serve to legitimize and
objectivize the very discourses that have given rise to them . Forgetting becomes
an instrument of dialogue and inclusion; it reorients our memories,
becomes active by turning into forge(t) and for(to)get. From this vantage point,
forgetting is a process or remembering, or, seen from Milan Kundera's reversed
perspective, "remembering is a form of forgetting." I will draw primarily upon the work of
ever get up and off our knees?

Friedrich Nietzsche to explore the process of forgetting orthodox IR theory. This is not to essentialize Nietzsche or
render him heroic but to employ his work as a steppingstone, a source to provoke thought before it, too, has to be

The process of forgetting, for Nietzsche, is a


process of healing: Only now do I believe you healed: for healed is who forgot.
forgotten in order not to turn into a new orthodoxy.

Nietzsche ended up with this position by dealing with a set of methodological dilemmas similar to those I am trying

The need to forget emerges from recognizing the problematic


links that are commonly drawn between cause and effect . Such a duality, Nietzsche claims,
probably never existed. We merely establish arbitrary links between things that we
consider important, isolate a couple of pieces out of a continuum of complex and
inter- twined events. This is why it is futile to search for a causal origin in
this web of human life and to think we could somehow ground a better
world on this form of flawed insight. "How foolish it would be," Nietzsche claims, "to
to address in this article.

suppose that one only needs to point out this origin and this misty shroud of
delusion in order to destroy the world that counts for real, so-called "reality ."
Nietzsche's skepticism toward grounding critique in an investigation of the origins of things is important. It is one of
the reasons why some consider his work as the conceptual turning point from modernity to postmodernity.
Nietzsche's own words may explain best the importance of forgetting for a critique of orthodox IR: Why is it that this

when
investigators of knowledge sought out the origin of things they always believed they
would discover something of incalculable significance for all later action and
judgment, that they always presupposed, indeed, that the salvation of man must
depend on insight into the origins of things , but. . . The more insight we possess into
an origin the less significant does the origin appear: while what is nearest to us,
what is around us and in us, gradually begins to display colors and beauties and
enigmas and riches of significance of which earlier mankind had not an inkling . By
thought comes back to me again and again and in ever more varied colours? - that formerly,

observing why Nietzsche ended up with this position, I will explore the "riches of significance" that could emerge
once we liberate IR theory from the compulsion to link the search for peace with exploring the origins of present

I will then retrace Nietzsche's next step, an engagement with


what he calls "active forgetfulness," a way of thinking that enables "a tabula rasa of
the consciousness," makes room for new things, new thoughts, new possibilities . My
approach to forgetting IR theory will revolve primarily around issues of
language: how they constrain and enable, how they are part of a
discursive form of domination and, at the same time, offer powerful
opportunities to think and act beyond the narrow confines of our present
world. In that sense, my article deals with methodological concerns - with what conventionally is considered form
dilemmas in world politics.

rather than substance. Yet, the manner in which we approach, think, conceptualize, and formulate IR has a
significant impact on how it is practiced.

Language frames politics. Form turns into substance.

Framework:
we arent promoting fiat so to specifically implement a
theoretical affirmative. This is about having an affirmative
that follows the resolution to allow in depth clash, fiat is a
mechanism that comes with the resolution, not what we are
specifically promoting.

Util Good Morality


Utilitarianism is the only moral framework and alternatives are
contradictory
Nye, 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Nuclear Ethics pg.
18-19)
The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34

Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where a n
army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a
wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When
you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to

and tells you that


if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other . Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try
any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the
consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral
integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value
and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us
would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent
life collapse before the consequentialist burden ? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000
peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of
10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become
prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle

the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives

Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse


or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences ? Do
of countless others?

absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right
though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century,

Now that it may be


literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be selfcontradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age
than ever before.
and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then.

Util Good Best for Policy Making


The impossibility to attain knowledge of every outcome or
abuse leaves utilitarianism as the only option for most rational
decision-making
Goodin 95 Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social
Sciences at the Australian National University (Robert E., Cambridge University
Press, Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy pg 63)
My larger argument turns on the proposition that th ere

is something special about the situation of


public officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible for them (or, more precisely, makes
them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding

their
situations that makes it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt
a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first the argument from necessity. Public
officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very
with that larger argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and

special sort at that. All choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But

private individuals will usually have more complete information on


the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that
alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, at
relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on
individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and
aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of
their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy
makers to use the utilitarian calculus if they want to use it at all to choose general rules of
in the nature of things,

conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each

they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given


individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates
and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.
alternative possible general rule. But

Not knowing conditions for each individual or ramifications


forces us to adopt utilitarianism. Policy makers must use in
their decision making
Goodin 95 Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social
Sciences at the Australian National University (Robert E., Cambridge University
Press, Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy pg 63)
Furthermore, the argument from necessity would continue,

the instruments available to public

policy-makers are relatively blunt. They can influence general tendencies, making rather more people
behave in certain sorts of ways rather more often. But perfect compliance is unrealistic. And (building on the

not knowing particular circumstances of particular individuals, rules and


regulations must necessarily be relatively general in form. They must treat more
people more nearly alike than ideally they should, had we perfect information. The
combined effect of these two factors is to preclude public policy-makers from finetuning policies very well at all. They must, of necessity, deal with people in
aggregate, imposing upon them rules that are general in form. Nothing in any of
previous point)

this necessarily forces them to be utilitarian in their public policy-making, of course.


What it does do, however, is force them- if they are inclined to be utilitarian at allaway from direct (act) utilitarianism. The circumstances surrounding the selection
and implementation of public policies simply do not permit the more precise
calculations required by any decision rule more tailored to peculiarities of
individuals or situations.