Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ID No.
Saiful Islam
Jinnat Jahan
Nazma Akter
Md. Al Mahmud Kabir
Ankhirunnesa Monnu
Nahida Sultana
M150203730
M150203740
M150203713
M150203733
M150203707
M150203741
Department of Finance
MBA(Eve) Program,6th Batch (Sec-A)
Jagannath University, Dhaka
Table of Contents
Abstract......................................................................................................................................4
Introduction................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Objective of the study......................................................................................................5
Primary Objective..............................................................................................................5
Secondary Objective..........................................................................................................5
1.3Scope of the study.............................................................................................................5
Literature Review.......................................................................................................................5
2.1 Meaning & importance of Corporate Governance...........................................................6
2.2 History of Corporate Governance....................................................................................7
2.3 Parties to corporate governance.......................................................................................8
2.4 Principles..........................................................................................................................8
2.5 Systemic problems of corporate governance...................................................................9
2.6 Mechanisms and controls.................................................................................................9
Internal corporate governance controls..............................................................................9
External corporate governance controls...........................................................................10
Methodology of the Study........................................................................................................10
Data Analysis & Findings of the Study....................................................................................11
4.1 Overveiw of Corporate Governance on Food & Beverage Industries...........................12
4.1.1 Gemini Sea Food Ltd..............................................................................................12
4.1.2 Rangpur Dairy & Food Products Ltd......................................................................12
4.1.3 Fu-Wang Foods Ltd.................................................................................................12
4.1.4 Rahima Foods Ltd...................................................................................................13
4.1.5 Olympic Food Ltd...................................................................................................13
4.1.6 Apex Food Ltd.........................................................................................................13
4.2 Corporate Governance Disclosure.................................................................................14
4.2.1 Gemini Sea Food Ltd..............................................................................................14
4.2.2 Rangpur Dairy & Food Products Ltd......................................................................15
4.2.3 Fu-Wang Foods Ltd.................................................................................................15
4.2.4 Rahima Foods Ltd...................................................................................................15
4.2.5 Olympic Food Ltd...................................................................................................15
4.1.6 Apex Food Ltd.........................................................................................................18
Conclusion................................................................................................................................28
References................................................................................................................................29
5
Abstract
Keywords: ( Accountability,Fairness,Transparency,Independent,Openness,Intigrity,Govenance )
SUBMITTED TO
Secondary Objective
To see the Corporate Governance guidelines of Bangladesh
To see the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practice by the listed companies.
To see the risk-return features of security stocks and their relationship with Corporate
Governance practices.
To see the Corporate Governance practices of other countries.
Literature Review
term strategic goals to satisfy shareholders, creditors, employees, customers and suppliers, and
complying with the legal and regulatory requirements, apart from meeting environmental and local
community needs. Report of SEBI committee (India) on Corporate Governance defines corporate
governance as the acceptance by management of the inalienable rights of shareholders as the true
owners of the corporation and of their own role as trustees on behalf of the shareholders. It is about
commitment to values, about ethical business conduct and about making a distinction between
personal & corporate funds in the management of a company. The definition is drawn from the
Gandhian principle of trusteeship and the Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution. Corporate
Governance is viewed as ethics and a moral duty.
In the 19th century, state corporation laws enhanced the rights of corporate boards to govern
without unanimous consent of shareholders in exchange for statutory benefits like appraisal rights, to
make corporate governance more efficient. Since that time, and because most large publicly traded
corporations in the US are incorporated under corporate administration friendly Delaware law, and
because the USs wealth has been increasingly securitized into various corporate entities and
institutions, the rights of individual owners and shareholders have become increasingly derivative and
dissipated. The concerns of shareholders over administration pay and stock losses periodically has
led to more frequent calls for corporate governance reforms. In the 20th century in the immediate
aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 legal scholars such as Adolf Augustus Berle, Edwin Dodd,
and Gardiner C. Means pondered on the changing role of the modern corporation in society. Berle
and Means monograph The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932, Macmillan) continues
to have a profound influence on the conception of corporate governance in scholarly debates today.
From the Chicago school of economics, Ronald Coases The Nature of the Firm (1937) introduced
the notion of transaction costs into the understanding of why firms are founded and how they
continue to behave. Fifty years later, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensens The Separation of
Ownership and Control (1983, Journal of Law and Economics) firmly established agency theory as a
way of understanding corporate governance: the firm is seen as a series of contracts. Agency
theorys dominance was highlighted in a 1989 article by Kathleen Eisenhardt (Agency theory: an
assessment and review, Academy of Management Review). US expansion after World War
II through the emergence of multinational corporations saw the establishment of the managerial
class. Accordingly, the following Harvard Business School management professors published
influential monographs studying their prominence: Myles Mace (entrepreneurship), Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr. (business history), Jay Lorsch (organizational behavior) and Elizabeth MacIver
(organizational behavior). According to Lorsch and MacIver many large corporations have dominant
control over business affairs without sufficient accountability or monitoring by their board of directors.
Since the late 1970s, corporate governance has been the subject of significant debate in the U.S.
and around the globe. Bold, broad efforts to reform corporate governance have been driven, in part,
by the needs and desires of shareowners to exercise their rights of corporate ownership and to
increase the value of their shares and, therefore, wealth. Over the past three decades, corporate
directors duties have expanded greatly beyond their traditional legal responsibility of duty of loyalty to
the corporation and its shareowners. In the first half of the 1990s, the issue of corporate governance
in the U.S. received considerable press attention due to the wave of CEO dismissals
(e.g.: IBM, Kodak, Honeywell) by their boards. The California Public Employees Retirement System
(CalPERS) led a wave of institutional shareholder activism (something only very rarely seen before),
as a way of ensuring that corporate value would not be destroyed by the now traditionally cozy
relationships between the CEO and the board of directors (e.g., by the unrestrained issuance of stock
options, not infrequently back dated). In 1997, the East Asian Financial Crisis saw the economies
of Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and The Philippines severely affected by the exit of
foreign capital after property assets collapsed. The lack of corporate governance mechanisms in
these countries highlighted the weaknesses of the institutions in their economies. In the early 2000s,
the massive bankruptcies (and criminal malfeasance) of Enron and WorldCom, as well as lesser
corporate
debacles,
such
as Adelphia
Communications, AOL, Arthur
Andersen, Global
Crossing, Tyco, led to increased shareholder and governmental interest in corporate governance.
Parties involved in corporate governance include the regulatory body (e.g. the Chief Executive Officer,
the board of directors, management and shareholders). Other stakeholders who take part include
suppliers, employees, creditors, customers and the community at large. In corporations, the
shareholder delegates decision rights to the manager to act in the principals best interests. This
separation of ownership from control implies a loss of effective control by shareholders over managerial
decisions. Partly as a result of this separation between the two parties, a system of corporate
governance controls is implemented to assist in aligning the incentives of managers with those of
shareholders. With the significant increase in equity holdings of investors, there has been an
opportunity for a reversal of the separation of ownership and control problems because ownership is
not so diffuse. A board of directors often plays a key role in corporate governance. It is their
responsibility to endorse the organizations strategy, develop directional policy, appoint, supervise and
remunerate senior executives and to ensure accountability of the organization to its owners and
authorities. The Company Secretary, known as a Corporate Secretary in the US and often referred to
as a Chartered Secretary if qualified by the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and
Administrators (ICSA), is a high ranking professional who is trained to uphold the highest standards of
corporate governance, effective operations, compliance and administration. All parties to corporate
governance have an interest, whether direct or indirect, in the effective performance of the
organization. Directors, workers and management receive salaries, benefits and reputation, while
shareholders receive capital return. Customers receive goods and services; suppliers receive
compensation for their goods or services. In return these individuals provide value in the form of
natural, human, social and other forms of capital. A key factor is an individuals decision to participate in
an organization e.g. through providing financial capital and trust that they will receive a fair share of the
organizational returns. If some parties are receiving more than their fair return then participants may
choose to not continue participating leading to organizational collapse.
2.4 Principles
Key elements of good corporate governance principles include honesty, trust and integrity, openness,
performance orientation, responsibility and accountability, mutual respect, and commitment to the
organization. Of importance is how directors and management develop a model of governance that
aligns the values of the corporate participants and then evaluate this model periodically for its
effectiveness. In particular, senior executives should conduct themselves honestly and ethically,
especially concerning actual or apparent conflicts of interest, and disclosure in financial reports.
Commonly accepted principles of corporate governance include:
Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: Organizations should respect the rights of
shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those rights. They can help shareholders exercise
10
their rights by effectively communicating information that is understandable and accessible and
encouraging shareholders to participate in general meetings.
Interests of other stakeholders: Organizations should recognize that they have legal and other
obligations to all legitimate stakeholders.
Role and responsibilities of the board: The board needs a range of skills and understanding to
be able to deal with various business issues and have the ability to review and challenge
management performance. It needs to be of sufficient size and have an appropriate level of
commitment to fulfill its responsibilities and duties. There are issues about the appropriate mix of
executive and non-executive directors.
Integrity and ethical behavior: Ethical and responsible decision making is not only important for
public relations, but it is also a necessary element in risk management and avoiding lawsuits.
Organizations should develop a code of conduct for their directors and executives that promotes
ethical and responsible decision making. It is important to understand, though, that reliance by a
company on the integrity and ethics of individuals is bound to eventual failure. Because of this,
many organizations establish Compliance and Ethics Programs to minimize the risk that the firm
steps outside of ethical and legal boundaries.
Disclosure and transparency: Organizations should clarify and make publicly known the roles
and responsibilities of board and management to provide shareholders with a level of
accountability. They should also implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard the
integrity of the companys financial reporting. Disclosure of material matters concerning the
organization should be timely and balanced to ensure that all investors have access to clear,
factual information. Issues involving corporate governance principles include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
Demand for information: A barrier to shareholders using good information is the cost of processing
it, especially to a small shareholder. The traditional answer to this problem is the efficient market
hypothesis (in finance, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are
efficient), which suggests that the small shareholder will free ride on the judgments of larger
professional investors.
Monitoring costs: In order to influence the directors, the shareholders must combine with others to
form a significant voting group which can pose a real threat of carrying resolutions or appointing
directors at a general meeting.
Supply of accounting information: Financial accounts form a crucial link in enabling providers of
finance to monitor directors. Imperfections in the financial reporting process will cause
imperfections in the effectiveness of corporate governance. This should, ideally, be corrected by the
working of the external auditing process.
11
Internal corporate governance controls monitor activities and then take corrective action to accomplish
organizational goals. Examples include:
Monitoring by the board of directors: The board of directors, with its legal authority to hire, fire
and compensate top management, safeguards invested capital. Regular board meetings allow
potential problems to be identified, discussed and avoided. Whilst non-executive directors are
thought to be more independent, they may not always result in more effective corporate
governance and may not increase performance.[5] Different board structures are optimal for different
firms. Moreover, the ability of the board to monitor the firms executives is a function of its access to
information. Executive directors possess superior knowledge of the decision-making process and
therefore evaluate top management on the basis of the quality of its decisions that lead to financial
performance outcomes, ex ante. It could be argued, therefore, that executive directors look beyond
the financial criteria.
Internal control procedures and internal auditors: Internal control procedures are policies
implemented by an entitys board of directors, audit committee, management, and other personnel
to provide reasonable assurance of the entity achieving its objectives related to reliable financial
reporting, operating efficiency, and compliance with laws and regulations. Internal auditors are
personnel within an organization who test the design and implementation of the entitys internal
control procedures and the reliability of its financial reporting.
Balance of power: The simplest balance of power is very common; require that the President be a
different person from the Treasurer. This application of separation of power is further developed in
companies where separate divisions check and balance each others actions. One group may
propose company-wide administrative changes, another group review and can veto the changes,
and a third group check that the interests of people (customers, shareholders, employees) outside
the three groups are being met.
Remuneration: Performance-based remuneration is designed to relate some proportion of salary
to individual performance. It may be in the form of cash or non-cash payments such
as shares and share options, superannuationor other benefits. Such incentive schemes, however,
are reactive in the sense that they provide no mechanism for preventing mistakes or opportunistic
behavior, and can elicit myopic behavior.
12
takeovers
13
Corporate governance principles and codes have been developed in different countries
and issued from stock exchanges, corporations, institutional investors, or associations
(institutes) of directors and managers with the support of governments and international
organizations. As a rule, compliance with these governance recommendations is not
mandated by law, although the codes linked to stock exchange listing requirements may
have a coercive effect. There has been some work done in the area of corporate governance by
the , Apex Food Ltd, Fu-Wang Foods Ltd, Olympic Food Ltd, Gemini Sea Food Ltd,
National Feed Mills Ltd, Rangpur Dairy & Food Products Ltd in Bangladesh, but overall
there is a lack of material on corporate governance issues in Bangladesh. The brief summaries of
the major articles and studies relating to CG are presented here The summaries explain the
authors major points that relate to corporate governance.
4.1 Overveiw of Corporate Governance on Food & Beverage Industries
Rangpur Dairy & Food Products Limited, commonly known as RD Milk, was incorporated in
Bangladesh on March 6, 2004 with registration no- C-52012(2307)/2004, as a Private Limited
Company under The Companies Act 1994. It has started commercial operation on 14th April, 2007
by establishing its factory at Salaipur, Baldipur, Rangpur on 935 decimal land owned by the
Company. The location of the factory is on the Dhaka-Rangpur Highway and 15 KM to the Rangpur
Municipality. The company was established under the EEF assistance of Bangladesh Bank and
project loan from NCC bank. Presently authorized capital of the Company is BDT 1,000 Million and
paid up capital stands at BDT 236.586 Million. The Company introduced Aseptic Pouch Packaging
for the first time in Bangladesh in manufacturing and marketing of fresh milk, flavored milk and
other by-products by using UHT technology. In 2008 it introduced candy production under the same
brand name. Its annual milk processing capacity is 21.90 million liters under two shifts of operation
at processing stage. The brand name of the products are RD Milk.
4.1.3 Fu-Wang Foods Ltd
Fu-Wang is much closed to the taste and food habit of generations. Accordingly to
research and development of products from state of art laboratory. Every developed
14
product from Fu-Wang foods is well accepted from each every valued customers group.
Due to much acceptance of Fu-Wang products many of the food producers taking the
scope of duplicating our products, packing shapes etc. Thank our valued customers for
their valued supports to choice the right product from the crowed of products in
shops/market. Remember nationwide growth of Fu-Wang Foods network & supply chain
only due to our customers. Presently we are having 350 dealers, more than dozens of
chain shops, eight numbers of branches & residential offices to serve you. More than 200
products option to your wide variety choice. 24 hour supervision of foreign technician for
producing quality, imported Taiwan, Italian machinery, good quality raw materials,
Business line
Authorized Capital
Paid-up Capital
Number of Employees
1620
The company is engaged in the production of refined oils and fats. The registered business
office of the company is located in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The company offers a wide range of
products such as cooking oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, edible vegetable oil, as well as corn
oil, and other related products. This producer of refined oils and fats is active and
operational in Bangladesh. Business SummaryThe Company is engaged in food
manfacturing. Description and history The Company is engaged in food manfacturing &
incorporated in 1900 & quoted in dhaka stock exchange in 1997.
4.1.5 Olympic Food Ltd
Olympic Food Ltd is the largest Food Beverage Company in Private Sector in Bangladesh. It
provides special services to the customers through its own network all over the country. This
company has been playing a vital role in socio-economic, industrial and agricultural development as
well as in the overall economic development of the country. During the last 5 years the growth rate of
Olympic Food Ltd earnings is more than 8% on average. The cash dividend to Tk. 3.00 per share
(30%) this year from Tk. 2.00 per share (20%) last year. We believe that this is in the best
interest of the company and shareholders, as it provides shareholders with access to current
income. The company is now in a position to responsibly distribute healthy dividends to
shareholders without any risk to its capital base.
15
Gemini sea food limited believes in the continued improvement of corporate governance. The Board
of Directors and the Management Team of Gemini Sea Food Limited is commited to maintaining
effective Corporate Governance through a culture of accountability and transparency.
Board of Directors
The Board of Directors comprises of 5 members including one Independent Directors.
Audit Committee
The audit committee was established as a sub committee of the Board and has jurisdiction
over Gemini Sea food limited. The Audit Committee assists the Board.
Purchase Committee
A purchase committee is functioning with a group of executives ,headed by the senior most
executive to examine the purchase proposal of goods.
Management Committee
The day to day management of the company is entrusted with the Chief Executive Officer
and the management committee.The Management Committee serves the interest of the company and
presently the committee achieves a sustainable growth.
16
17
18
1. To set the goals for the company, formulate policies and guidelines and to lead
the key organs in the company achieve those goals.
2. To represent to the Board various plans, programs, strategies and to arrange
required fnance for the company from proper sources for implementation of
various plans.
3. To ensure that proper recruitment takes place through effective human
resource planning to represent the company and to lead them achieve result
4. To maintain congenial working environment, disciplined behaviour and team
spirit in the organization.
5. To maintain effective two ways communication skill from and to the company.
6. To effectively control the costs, reduce wastage and improve effciency at all
levels to fulfll the objectives of the company.
7. To promote and maintain management succession and management
development plans.
8. To identify various risk factors for the company and develop strategy to
overcome those risks.
9. To ensure that performance is consistent and is recognized
C) Compliance in respect of appointment of Independent Director
The Board of Directors of Olympic Industries Limited consists of 6 Sponsors
Directors and following 2 Independent Directors:
1. Mr. Sharif M. Afzal Hossain : He was frst appointed on October 23, 2010 for
3 years term. Upon expiry of his term on October 22, 2013, he was
reappointed for one more term of 3 years which will expire on October
22,2016. His frst appointment as well as re-appointment was duly
approved by the shareholders of the company. The brief resume of Mr.
Sharif M. Afzal Hossain is provided in the annual report. He does not hold
any share in the company.
2. Ms. Noorbanu Virji : She has been inducted in the Board of Olympic
Industries Limited on September 25, 2014. Her brief resume is also
provided in the annual report. The term of Ms. Noorbanu Virji will be for 3
years which will expire on September 24, 2017. He appointment was
approved by the shareholders in 35th annual general meeting held on
December 24, 2014. She holds 56,906 share in the company
D) Remuneration to Directors including Independent Directors
The aforesaid remuneration paid to the Directors were approved by the
shareholders of the company as shown below:
31st AGM held on 30.12.2010 : Remuneration of Managing Director
32nd AGM held on 29.12.2011 : Remuneration of Chairman
34th AGM held on 26.12.2013 : Remuneration of Mr. Sharif M. Afzal Hossain,
Independent Director
The fees for attending each meeting of the Board is Tk.750.00 for each Director
and is contained in Article 111 of the Articles of Association of the company.
E) Disclosure of related party transactions
The company in its normal course of business carried out a number of
transactions which comes under the defnition of related party transaction. The
said transactions comprising the names of related parties, nature of transactions,
opening balances, debits and credits during the period under report and the
closing balances at the end of fnancial year have been provided under Notes
32.00 of the audited fnancial statements.
19
Title
Compliance
Status
1.1
Complied
1.2 (i)
1.2 (ii)a)
1.2 (ii)b)
1.2 (ii)c)
1.2 (ii)d)
1.2 (ii)e)
1.2 (ii)f)
1.2 (ii)g)
1.2 (ii)h)
1.2 (ii)i)
1.2 (iii)
1.2 (iv)
1.2 (v)
1.2 (vi)
1.3
1.3 (i)
1.3 (ii)
Independent Directors
Independent Director: At
least 1/5th
(We have four Directors and
One
Independent Director)
Less than 1% Shares
Not a Sponsor of The
Company
Does not have other
relationship
Not a Member, Director or
Officer of any
Stock Exchange.
Not a Shareholder, Director
or Officer of
any Stock Exchange or an
intermediary
of the capital market.
Not a Partner or an
Executive or was
not a partner or an
Executive during the
preceding 3 (Three) years of
the
concerned Companys
statutory audit
firm.
Not an Independent Director
more than
three listed Companies.
Not Convicted by a court of
competent
jurisdiction as a defaulter in
payment of
any loan to a Bank or a
Non-Bank
Financial Institution (NBFI)
Not convicted for a Criminal
offence
Appointment by the Board
and
approved in AGM.
Post can not remain vacant
more than
90 days
Lay down a code of conduct
and annual
compliance.
Tenure of the Independent
Director.
Qualification of
Independent Director (ID)
Independent Director shall
be
knowledgeable
Should be a Corporate
Leader/Business
Leader
20
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
1.3 (iii)
1.4
1.5
1.5 (i)
1.5 (ii)
1.5 (iii)
1.5 (iv)
1.5 (v)
1.5 (vi)
1.5 (vii)
1.5 (viii)
1.5 (ix)
21
Not Applicable
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Not applicable
Complied
Not applicable
Not applicable
Complied
1.5 (x)
1.5 (xi)
1.5 (xii)
1.5 (xiii)
1.5 (xiv)
1.5 (xv)
1.5 (xvi)
1.5 (xvii)
Remuneration to directors
including
independent directors.
The financial statements
prepared by
the management of the issuer
company
present fairly its state of affairs,
the
result of its operations, cash
flows and
changes in equity
Proper books of account of the
issuer
company have been
maintained.
Appropriate accounting policies
have
been consistently applied in
preparation
of the financial statements and
that the
accounting estimates are based
on
reasonable and prudent
judgment
IAS/BAS/IFRS/BFRS, as
applicable in
Bangladesh, have been
followed in
preparation of the financial
statements
and any departure there-from
has been
adequately disclosed.
The system of internal control is
sound
in design and has been
effectively
implemented and monitored
There are no significant doubts
upon
the issuer company's ability to
continue
as a going concern. If the issuer
company is not considered to
be a
going concern, the fact along
with
reasons thereof should be
disclosed.
Significant deviations from the
last
years operating results of the
issuer
company shall be highlighted
and the
reasons thereof should be
explained.
22
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
1.5 (xviii)
1.5 (xix)
1.5 (xx)
1.5 (xxi)a)
1.5 (xxi)b)
1.5 (xxi)c)
1.5 (xxi)d)
1.5 (xxii)a)
1.5 (xxii)b)
1.5 (xxii)c)
2.1
2.2
23
Complied
Not applicable
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
1.5 (xxi)c)
Complied
1.5 (xxi)d)
Complied
1.5 (xxii)a)
Complied
1.5 (xxii)b)
Complied
1.5 (xxii)c)
Complied
2.1
Complied
2.2
3 (i)
3 (ii)
1.5 (xxi)c)
3 (iii)
3.1
3.1(i)
3.1(ii)
3.1(iii)
3.1(iv)
3.1(v)
3.1(vi)
24
Complied
3 (i)
Complied
3 (ii)
Complied
1.5 (xxi)c)
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Not applicable
Complied
Complied
3.2
3.2(i)
3 (iii)
3.2(ii)
3.3
3.3(i)
3.3(ii)
3.3(iii)
3.3(iv)
3.3(v)
3.3(vi)
3.3(vii)
3.3(viii)
3.3(ix)
Committee
meeting shall not constitute
without at
least 1(one) independent
director
Chairman of the Audit
Committee
The Board of Directors shall
select 1
(one) member of the Audit
Committee
to be Chairman of the Audit
Committee,
who shall be an independent
director.
The Audit Committee shall be
responsible to the Board of
Directors.
The duties of the Audit
Committee shall
be clearly set forth in writing.
Chairman of the audit
committee shall
remain present in the Annual
General
Meeting (AGM).
Role of Audit Committee
Oversee the financial reporting
process
Monitor choice of accounting
policies
and principles.
Monitor Internal Control Risk
management process.
Oversee hiring and
performance of
external auditors
Review along with the
management, the
annual financial statements
before
submission to the board for
approval.
Review along with the
management, the
quarterly and half yearly
financial
statements before submission
to the
board for approval.
Review the adequacy of
internal audit
function.
Review statement of significant
related
party transactions submitted by
the
management
Review Management Letters/
25
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
3.3(x)
3.4
3.4.1(i)
3.4.1(ii)a)
3.4.1(ii)b)
3.4.1(ii)c)
3.4.1(ii)d)
3.4.2
3.5
4
4 (i)
4 (ii)
Letter of
Internal Control weakness
issued by
Statutory auditors.
When money is raised through
Initial
Public Offering (IPO)/Repeat
Public
Offering (RPO)/Rights Issue the
company shall disclose to the
Audit
Committee, on a quarterly basis
and
annual basis.
Reporting of the Audit
Committee
The Audit Committee shall
report on its
activities to the Board of
Directors
26
Not applicable
Complied
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Complied
Complied
4 (iii)
4 (iv)
4 (v)
4 (vi)
4 (vii)
4 (viii)
4 (ix)
5 (i)
5 (ii)
5 (iii)
5 (iv)
27
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
5 (v)
6.(i)
6 (i)a)
6 (i)b)
6 (ii)
7
7 (i)
the affairs
of the subsidiary company
also.
The Audit Committee of the
holding
company shall also review the
financial
statements, in particular the
investments made by the
subsidiary
company.
DUTIES OF CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO)
AND CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER (CFO):
They have reviewed financial
statements for the year and
that to the
best of their knowledge and
belief:
These statements do not
contain any
materially untrue statement or
omit any
material fact or contain
statements that
might be misleading;
These statements together
present a
true and fair view of the
companys
affairs and are in compliance
with
existing accounting standards
and
applicable laws.
There are, to the best of
knowledge and
belief, no transactions entered
into by
the company during the year
which are
fraudulent, illegal or violation of
the
companys code of conduct.
REPORTING AND
COMPLIANCE OF
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:
The company shall obtain a
certificate
from a Professional
Accountant/
Secretary (Chartered
Accountant/Cost
& Management
Accountant/Chartered
Secretary) regarding
compliance of
28
Not applicable
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
7(ii)
29
conditions of Corporate
Governance
Guidelines.
The directors of the company
shall
state, in accordance with the
Annexure
attached, in the directors'
report
regarding compliance
Conclusion
At present the need for strengthening the corporate governance in Bangladesh arises with
a global demand for a sound and transparent corporate world system. Corporate
governance was viewed as the total system or control mechanisms, external or internal,
that provided an effective means of good corporate behavioral process. This process
ensures accountability of those who matter most in the process and maximizes the value
for the shareholders in a fully transparent manner. Failure in institutions, legal enforcement
and market behavior resulted in weak corporate governance in Bangladesh. A large number
of companies listed in the stock exchange in Bangladesh pay inadequate attention to follow
the rules of businesses and full disclosure of information and demonstrate lack of
corporate norms and responsibility. But this is hopeful that there is no serious scandal in
respect of corporate governance in Bangladesh. It is seen that in many areas, system did
not provide adequate incentives and motivations in terms of legal, institutional or economic,
for the shareholders to encourage and enforce good corporate governance. As a result,
they added, there were hardly any rewards for the companies that instituted good corporate
governance practices and no penalties for failing to do so. Dhaka Stock Exchange is going
to incorporate corporate governance principles in the list of the stock exchange to ensure a
competitive atmosphere in the capital market. However, the Securities and Exchange
Commission notified certain further conditions for the public listed companies with any stock
exchange in Bangladesh, on mandatory basis, in order to improve corporate governance in
the interest of investors and the capital market.To conclude, government cannot legislate
the personal integrity of key players and no amount of legislation can substitute trust, faith
and confidence necessary for good corporate governance practice. But as the lead
regulatory body overseeing corporate accounting and reporting, the SEC has a critical role
to ensure that public company boards are properly structured and organized and have the
resources to accomplish the objectives of adding value to shareholders, minimize risk of
30
key shareholders and hold management responsible for corporate results. Ruthless
monitoring of compliance and severe punishment of transgressors can ensure good
corporate governance. But Bangladesh has to wait a lot to ensure enforcement of any
corrective measures properly.
31
References
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