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Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.

 2015-­‐2016  

SISON V. PEOPLE
Background  of  the  Case:    
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2.
3.

4.

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6.

7.

This  incident  happened  after  the  EDSA  Revolution.  
This  was  the  time  when  the  newly-­‐installed  
government  of  President  Corazon  C.  Aquino  was  
being  openly  challenged  in  rallies,  demonstrations  
and  other  public  fora  by  "Marcos  loyalists".  Tension  
and  animosity  between  the  two  (2)  groups  
sometimes  broke  into  violence.  On  July  27,  1986,  it  
resulted  in  the  murder  of  Stephen  Salcedo,  a  known  
"Coryista."  
A   rally   without   permit   was   conducted   by   the   Marcos  
loyalists   at   the   Luneta.     Because   of   lack   of   proper  
warrant,  they  were  dispersed  by  the  police.  
At   about   4:00   p.m.,   a   small   group   of   loyalists  
converged   at   the   Chinese   Garden,   Phase   III   of   the  
Luneta.   There,   they   saw   Annie   Ferrer,   a   popular  
movie   starlet   and   supporter   of   President   Marcos,  
jogging   around   the   fountain.   They   approached   her  
and  informed  her  of  their  dispersal  and  Annie  Ferrer  
angrily  ordered  them  "Gulpihin  ninyo  and  mga  Cory  
hecklers!"    She  was  later  on  captured  by  the  police.    
As   an   act   of   vengeance,   Marcos   loyalists   were   then  
attacking   persons   in   yellow,   the   color   of   the  
"Coryistas."    
A   man   wearing   a   yellow   t-­‐shirt   being   chased   by   a  
group   of   persons   shouting   "Iyan,   habulin   iyan.   Cory  
iyan!"   The   man   in   the   yellow   t-­‐shirt  was   Salcedo   and  
his   pursuers   appeared   to   be   Marcos   loyalists.   They  
caught   Salcedo   and   boxed   and   kicked   and   mauled  
him.    
Salcedo   died   of   "hemorrhage,   intracranial  
traumatic."  
Eleven  persons  identified  as  Marcos  loyalists  
charging  them  with  the  murder  of  Salcedo.  
 
***  
The   prosecution   presented   twelve   witnesses.     In  
support   of   their   testimonies,   the   prosecution  
likewise  presented  documentary  evidence  consisting  
of   newspaper   accounts   of   the   incident   and   various  
photographs  taken  during  the  mauling.  

 
8.

9.

Some   of   the   accused   were   acquitted,   some   were  
convicted.     They   then   appealed   all   the   way   up   to   the  
Supreme  Court.  
 
***  
Appellants  also  contend  that  although  the  appellate  
court  correctly  disregarded  Exhibits  "D,"  "G,"  and  
"P,"  it  erroneously  gave  evidentiary  weight  to  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

Exhibits  "O,"  "V,"  "V-­‐1"  to  "V-­‐48,"  "W,"  "W-­‐1"  to  "W-­‐
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13."    The  objection  of  Atty.  Lazaro,  one  of  the  
accused,  to  the  admissibility  of  the  photographs  is  
anchored  on  the  fact  that  the  person  who  took  the  
same  was  not  presented  to  identify  them.  
10. Exhibits  "V,"  "V-­‐1"  to  "V-­‐48"  are  photographs  taken  
of  the  victim  as  he  was  being  mauled  at  the  Luneta  
—  starting  from  a  grassy  portion  to  the  pavement  at  
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the  Rizal  Monument  and  along  Roxas  Boulevard,    
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—  as  he  was  being  chased  by  his  assailants    and  as  
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he  sat  pleading  with  his  assailants.    Exhibits  "W",  
"W-­‐1"  to  "W-­‐13"  are  photographs  of  Salcedo  and  the  
mauling  published  in  local  newspapers  and  
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magazines  such  as  the  Philippine  Star,    Mr.  and  Ms.  
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Magazine,    Philippine  Daily  Inquirer,    and  the  
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Malaya.    The  admissibility  of  these  photographs  is  
being  questioned  by  appellants  for  lack  of  proper  
identification  by  the  person  or  persons  who  took  
the  same.  
HELD:    
11. The  rule  in  this  jurisdiction  is  that  photographs,  
when  presented  in  evidence,  must  be  identified  by  
the  photographer  as  to  its  production  and  testified  
as  to  the  circumstances  under  which  they  were  
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produced.    The  value  of  this  kind  of  evidence  lies  in  
its  being  a  correct  representation  or  reproduction  of  
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the  original,    and  its  admissibility  is  determined  by  
its  accuracy  in  portraying  the  scene  at  the  time  of  
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the  crime.      
12. The  photographer,  however,  is  not  the  only  witness  
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who  can  identify  the  pictures  he  has  taken.    The  
correctness  of  the  photograph  as  a  faithful  
representation  of  the  object  portrayed  can  be  
proved  prima  facie,  either  by:  
1.  the  testimony  of  the  person  who  made  it  or    
2. by  other  competent  witnesses,    
after  which  the  court  can  admit  it  subject  to  
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impeachment  as  to  its  accuracy.    Photographs,  
therefore,  can  be  identified  by  the  photographer  or  
by  any  other  competent  witness  who  can  testify  to  
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its  exactness  and  accuracy.  
13. The   accused,   although   initially   had   objected   the  
offer  of  the  photographs  in  evidence,  did  not  object  
the   subsequent   use   by   the   prosecution   of   the  
photographs  during  the  cross-­‐examination  of  all  the  
accused  who  took  the  witness  stand  of  the  case  on  
the   subsequent   hearings.     In   fact,   some   of   the  
accused   used   the   photographs   to   show   their  
alleged   non-­‐participation   in   the   crime   because   they  
were   not   there   inside   the   photographs.     This  
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Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  
utilisation   is   an   admission   of   the   exactness   and  
accuracy  thereof.  
This  court  notes  that  when  the  prosecution  
offered  the  photographs  as  part  of  its  evidence,  
appellants,  through  counsel  Atty.  Alfredo  Lazaro,  Jr.  
objected  to  their  admissibility  for  lack  of  proper  
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identification.    However,  when  the  accused  
presented  their  evidence,  Atty.  Winlove  Dumayas,  
counsel  for  accused  Joselito  Tamayo  and  Gerry  Neri  
used  Exhibits  "V",  "V-­‐1"  to  "V-­‐48"  to  prove  that  his  
clients  were  not  in  any  of  the  pictures  and  therefore  
could  not  have  participated  in  the  mauling  of  the  
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victim.    The  photographs  were  adopted  by  
appellant  Joselito  Tamayo  and  accused  Gerry  Neri  as  
part  of  the  defense  exhibits.  And  at  this  hearing,  
Atty.  Dumayas  represented  all  the  other  accused  per  
understanding  with  their  respective  counsels,  
including  Atty.  Lazaro,  who  were  absent.  At  
subsequent  hearings,  the  prosecution  used  the  
photographs  to  cross-­‐examine  all  the  accused  who  
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took  the  witness  stand.    No  objection  was  made  by  
counsel  for  any  of  the  accused,  not  until  Atty.  Lazaro  
appeared  at  the  third  hearing  and  interposed  a  
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continuing  objection  to  their  admissibility.    
We  rule  that  the  use  of  these  photographs  by  some  
of  the  accused  to  show  their  alleged  non-­‐
participation  in  the  crime  is  an  admission  of  the  
exactness  and  accuracy  thereof.  That  the  
photographs  are  faithful  representations  of  the  
mauling  incident  was  affirmed  when  appellants  
Richard  de  los  Santos,  Nilo  Pacadar  and  Joel  Tan  
identified  themselves  therein  and  gave  reasons  for  
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their  presence  thereat.    
 
14. The   absence   of   the   two   appellants,   Sison   and  
Tamayo,   does   not   necessarily   follow   their   lack   of  
participation.     Photographs   only   capture   segments  
of   the   entire   crime.     They   still   can   be   positively  
identified  by  testimonies  of  witnesses.  
An  analysis  of  the  photographs  vis-­‐a-­‐vis  the  
accused's  testimonies  reveal  that  only  three  of  the  
appellants,  namely,  Richard  de  los  Santos,  Nilo  
Pacadar  and  Joel  Tan  could  be  readily  seen  in  various  
belligerent  poses  lunging  or  hovering  behind  or  over  
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the  victim.    Appellant  Romeo  Sison  appears  only  
once  and  he,  although  afflicted  with  hernia  is  shown  
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merely  running  after  the    victim.   Appellant  Joselito  
Tamayo  was  not  identified  in  any  of  the  pictures.    
The  absence  of  the  two  appellants  in  the  
photographs  does  not  exculpate  them.  The  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

photographs  did  not  capture  the  entire  sequence  of  
the  killing  of  Salcedo  but  only  segments  thereof.  
While  the  pictures  did  not  record  Sison  and  Tamayo  
hitting  Salcedo,  they  were  unequivocally  identified  
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by  Sumilang  and  Banculo. Appellants'  denials  and  
alibis  cannot  overcome  their  eyeball  identification.  

STATE V. TATUM
 

Tousin,   of   Pasco,   received   monthly   welfare   checks  
from   the   state   of   Washington.   In   February,   1960,   Tousin   did  
not  receive  his  check  because  the  February  check  for  $28.90  
was   endorsed   and   cashed   at   Sherman's   Food   Store   in   Pasco  
by  someone  other  than  the  payee,  Tousin.  
Upon   investigation,   an   employee   of   the   store,  
Caroline   Pentecost,   testified   that,   although   she   could   not  
specifically   recall   the   above-­‐mentioned   transaction,   the  
initials  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  check  were  hers.  She  also  
testified   that   whenever   a   check   was   presented   to   her   for  
payment   at   the   store,   the   store   manager   had   instructed   her  
to  initial  it  and  then  insert  it  into  a  "Regiscope"  machine.  This  
machine  is  designed  to  simultaneously  photograph,  through  
two   separate   lenses,   both   the   check   and   the   person   facing  
the  machine.  
When  it  was  discovered  that  the  endorsement  of  the  
payee   was   a   forgery,   the   Regiscope   film   of   the   transaction  
was   sent   to   the   Regiscope   distributor   in   Portland   to   be  
developed.  The  processed  film  shows  both  the  check  and  the  
person   of   appellant   (from   his   waist   up)   with   the   food   store   in  
the   background.   Upon   the   trial,   both   the   negative   and   the  
print  therefrom  were  admitted  in  evidence.  
Tatum  objects  to  the  admission.  
Issue:  Were  the  Regiscope  films  (the  negative  and  the  print)  
authenticated   sufficiently   to   warrant   their   admission   into  
evidence?  
HELD:    YES  
1.

Quantum   of   Authentication   is   only   that   some  
witnesses,   although   not   necessarily   the  
photographer,   are   able   to   give   some   indication   of  
when,   where,   and   under   what   circumstances   the  
photograph  was  taken.  
 
What   quantum   of   authentication   do   courts   require  
before  a  photograph  may  be  admissible  in  evidence?  
It   is   simply   this-­‐-­‐that   some   witness   (not   necessarily  
the  photographer)  be  able  to  give  some  indication  as  
to  when,  where,  and  under  what  circumstances  the  
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Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  
photograph   was   taken,   and   that   the   photograph  
accurately   portray   the   subject   or   subjects   illustrated.  
The  photograph  need  only  be  sufficiently  accurate  to  
be  helpful  to  the  court  and  the  jury.  
Witness   Pentecost   testified   that   she  
recognized   the   background   shown   in   the   picture   as  
that  of  the  food  store,  and,  as  mentioned  previously,  
she   also   testified   as   to   the   store's   standard  
procedure   of   "regiscoping"   each   individual   who  
cashed  a  check  at  the  store.    
Phillip   Dale   testified   at   length   concerning  
the  Regiscope  process.  
 The   testimony   of   these   two   witnesses  
taken   together   amounted   to   a   sufficient  
authentication   to   warrant   the   admission   of   the  
photograph   (both   the   print   and   the   negative)   into  
evidence.  
2.

Attacking   the   inaccuracy   of   the   contents   of   the  
paragraph   attacks   the   weight,   rather   than   the  
admissibility,  of  evidence.  
 
The   authentication   supplied   by   the   testimony  
summarized   above,   of   course,   did   not   preclude  
appellant   from   attempting   to   prove   that   the  
individual   portrayed   was   someone   other   than  
appellant,   that   the   photograph   was   inaccurate   in  
one   or   more   respects,   the   appellant   was   somewhere  
else   at   the   moment   the   photograph   was   taken,   or  
any  other  such  defense.  But  these  arguments  go  to  
the   weight   rather   than   to   the   admissibility   of   the  
exhibits   in   question.   In   our   opinion,   the   Regiscope  
exhibits,   coupled   with   the   other   evidence   produced  
by  the  state,  sufficed  to  establish  a  prima  facie  case  
of  first  degree  forgery.  

PEOPLE V. CARPO
 

One  evening,  Carpo  with  Warlito  Ibao  and  his  sons  Oscar  and  
Roche   all   went   to   the   house   of   Dulay.     Oscar   hurled   grenades  
inside   the   house   of   Dulay.     Seconds   later,   a   loud   explosion  
occurred,   killing   the   Dulay   family   members   except   Noemi  
Dulay.     The   witness   herein,   Mr.   Ruben   Meriales,   witnessed  
the  incident.      

did.     He   identified   the   four   aforementioned   suspects   as   the  
perpetrators   of   the   offense.     They   were   charged   and  
convicted   with   the   complex   crime   of   multiple   murder   with  
attempted  murder  by  the  lower  courts.  
Forthwith,   the   case   was   elevated   to   this   Court   for  
automatic  review.  After  the  filing  of  briefs,  the  accused  filed  
an   Addendum   to   Appellant's   Brief   urging   that   the   favorable  
results   of   their   lie   detector   tests   with   the   NBI   be   admitted  
into  the  records.  
 
Accused’s  Alibis:  
Jaime   testified   that   Ruben   implicated   him   because  
the   latter   was   angry   at   him.   He   alleged   that   as   a   matter   of  
fact,  on  10  December  1996  while  he  was  incarcerated  at  the  
Balungao  District  Jail,  Ruben  supposedly  visited  him  asking  his  
forgiveness  for  having  named  him  as  one  of  the  perpetrators  
of  the  crime.    
 
Warlito,   Oscar   and   Roche   Ibao   testified   that   on   the  
night  of  the  explosion  their  family  was  having  a  farewell  party  
for   the   family's   only   girl   Maribel   Ibao   who   was   leaving   for  
Hongkong.  
 
Issue:   whether   or   not   the   favorable   results   of   the   lie   detector  
tests   with   the   NBI   be   cogent   enough   to   acquit   them,  
overturning  Ruben’s  testimony  against  them.  
 
HELD:  No.  
A   lie   detector   test   is   based   on   the   theory   that   an   individual  
will   undergo   physiological   changes,   capable   of   being  
monitored   by   sensors   attached   to   his   body,   when   he   is   not  
telling   the   truth.   The   Court   does   not   put   credit   and   faith   on  
the   result   of   a   lie   detector   test   inasmuch   as   it   has   not   been  
accepted  by  the  scientific  community  as  an  accurate  means  of  
ascertaining  truth  or  deception  
The   explosion   by   means   of   a   hand   grenade   on   the  
night  of  25  August  1996  resulting  in  the  death  of  Florentino,  
Norwela   and   Nissan   Dulay   and   in   the   wounding   of   Noemi  
Dulay   is   an   admitted   fact.   The   identity   of   the   perpetrators,   as  
tenaciously   questioned   by   the   accused,   depends   upon   the  
credibility  of  Ruben  Meriales.  

TIJING V. CA
 

1.

 
Investigation  coursed  through.    Fearful  however  that  
the  culprits  would  return,  Ruben  Meriales  refused  to  give  any  
statement   but   intimated   to   Police   Officer   Guillermo   Osio   that  
he   would   go   to   the   police   station   after   the   burial,   which   he  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

2.

This  is  a  story  of  a  mother,  Bienvenida  Tijing,  and  her  
employer,  Angelita  Diamante.    
Bienvenida  use  to  do  laundry  works  for  Angelita  until  
this   unfortunate   day   happened.   One   day,   Angelita  
went   to   the   house   of   Bienvenida   to   ask   her   to   do  
some  works  for  her  but  since  Bienvenida  was  already  
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  10. All   these   considered.  the  attending  physician  or  midwife  in   attendance  at  birth  should  cause  the  registration  of   such   birth.   we   have   now   the   facility   and   expertise   in   using   DNA   test   19   for   identification   and   parentage   testing.  there  is  evidence  that  Angelita  could  no  longer   bear  children.  20  Of  course.   she   offered   no   evidence  she  gave  birth  to  a  child  between  1978  to   1988  or  for  a  period  of  ten  years.   four   months   after   the   alleged   birth   of   the   child.   1974.   The   University   of   the   Philippines   Natural   Science   Research   Institute   (UP-­‐NSRI)   DNA   Analysis   Laboratory   has   now   the   capability   to   conduct   DNA   typing   using   short   tandem   repeat   (STR)   analysis.   the   trial   court   observed   several   times   that   when   the   child   and   Bienvenida   were   both   in   court.  1989.   Fortunately.   eyebrows  and  head  shapes.  being   a   novel   scientific   technique.   Jr. A   final   note.   Bienvenida   told   Angelita   to   just   wait   for   her   at   the   house   until   she   returned   and   for   the   meantime. 7.   the   husband   of   Bienvenida   learned   through   a   tabloid   about   the   death   of   the   live-­‐in   partner   of   Angelita.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  From  her  very  lips.   The   writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  proper  to  regain  custody  of   said  child.   Assuming   she   had   that   ligation   removed   in   1978.  The  certificate  must  be  filed  with  the  local  civil   registrar   within   thirty   days   after   the   birth.   4-­‐year   old   boy   Eduardo   but   who   is   now   named   John   Thomas.   she   presented   clinical   records   consisting   of   a   log   book. Fifth. 4.   Tomas   Lopez   and   his   legal   wife.   in   Hagonoy.   we   are   constrained   to   rule   that   subject   minor   is   indeed   the   son   of   petitioners.   Under  the  law.  the  trial  court's  conclusion  should   be  given  high  respect.  How  did  the  SC  resolve  the  issue  on  the   identity  of  the  child?     Ruling:   5.   one   copy   from   the   mother   and   the   other   from   the   father.     Then.   she   underwent   ligation  at  the  Martinez  Hospital  in  1970.   Benjamin   Lopez   declared   in   court   that   his   brother.  before  she   lived   with   Tomas   Lopez   without   the   benefit   of   marriage   in   1974.  Resemblance  between  a   minor   and   his   alleged   parent   is   competent   and   material   evidence   to   establish   parentage.  as   the   appropriate   case   comes.   we   find   unusual   the   fact   that   the   birth   certificate   of   John   Thomas   Lopez   was   filed   by   Tomas   Lopez  instead  of  the  midwife  and  on  August  4.  she  admitted  that   after   the   birth   of   her   second   child.   The  crucial  issue  in  this  case  is  on  the  identity  of  the   boy-­‐-­‐whether   Eduardo   Tijing.   18   Needless  to  stress.   log   book   or   discharge   order  from  the  clinic  were  ever  submitted. Fourth.   17   This   false   entry   puts   to   doubt   the   other   data   in   said   birth   certificate.   For   it   was   said. on   her   way   to   the   market.  22  Though  it  is  not  necessary  in   4   .   eyes.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     8. John   Thomas   Lopez   is   actually   the   missing   son   of   Bienvenida  based  on  the  evidence  presented.   which  is  false  because  even  private  respondent  had   admitted   she   is   a   "common-­‐law   wife".   So   when   Angelita   refused   to   return   the   child/boy   to   Bienvenida.   16   Significantly.  Bienvenida  went  to  the  wake.   Bulacan.   Parentage   will   still   be   resolved   using   conventional  methods  unless  we  adopt  the  modern   and   scientific   ways   available.   is   the   same   boy   named   John   Thomas   and  claimed  by  Angelita  as  her  own  son.  So  the  issue   in  is  identity.  it  having  had  the  opportunity   to   observe   the   physical   appearances   of   the   minor   and  petitioner  concerned.  Moreover. Third.   First.   The   analysis   is   based   on   the   fact   that   the   DNA   of   a   child/person   has   two   (2)   copies.   Ernesto  Tijing  (4  months  old).   No   clinical   records.   was   sterile   because   of   the   accident  and  that  Tomas  admitted  to  him  that  John   Thomas  Lopez  was  only  an  adopted  son.   they   also   bore  no  offspring.   at   her   clinic.   12.   Four   years   after.   to   watch   over   her   son.   Though   Tomas   Lopez   had   lived   with   private   respondent   for   fourteen   years..   Unlike   private   respondent.   there   is   strong   evidence   which   directly   proves   that   Tomas   Lopez   is   no   longer   capable   of   siring   a   son.   Only   in   default   of   the   physician   or   midwife.   the   use   of   DNA   test   as   evidence  is  still  open  to  challenge.  cTECHI   11.  The  midwife  who   allegedly   delivered   the   child   was   not   presented   in   court.   the   latter  together  with  her  husband  where  constrained   to   file   a   case   for   HABEAS   CORPUS   against   Angelita.   that   courts   should   apply   the   results   of   science   when   competently   obtained   in   aid  of  situations  presented.  2015-­‐2016   3.   the   alleged   father   and   child   are   analyzed  to  establish  parentage.   9.  Servacio.   she   saw   her   son.   the   two   had   strong   similarities   in   their   faces.  since  to  reject  said  result   is  to  deny  progress.   discharge   order  and  the  signatures  of  petitioners.   the   birth   certificate   of   the   child   stated   Tomas   Lopez   and   private   respondent   were   legally   married   on   October   31.   Tomas.   she   was   surprised   that   Angelita  and  Bienvenida’s  son  were  gone  and  so  she   went   to   the   house   of   Angelita   and   makes   a   run   around   until   she   learned   that   Angelita   moved   to   another   unknown   address.   Rheland  S.   can   the   parent   register   the   birth   of   his   child.   Second.   The   DNA   from   the   mother.  and  it  was  stated  that  the  remains  of   Tomas   is   in   a   certain   place   in   Cavite   and   so   out   of   that  information.   Lourdes   Vasquez   testified   that   she   assisted   in   Bienvenida's   giving   birth   to   Edgardo   Tijing. 6.     When   Bienvenida   returned.   as   she   claimed.   had   no   children   after   almost   fifteen   years   together.   named  Tomas.Y.   courts   should   not   hesitate   to   rule   on   the   admissibility   of   DNA   evidence.  21  Eventually.   as   claimed   by   Bienvenida.   Maria   Rapatan   Lopez.

  is   about   four   to   five   meters   away   from   Daisy's  house.   where   accused-­‐appellant   was   also   staying.  2015-­‐2016   this  case  to  resort  to  DNA  testing.   This   was   reiterated   in   the  subsequent  case  of  PP  v.  Ma.   Ma.   Daisy  came  back  with  accused-­‐appellant.  so  that  Aimee  Vallejo.  At  about  7:00   o'clock   that   evening.   otherwise.   The   findings   of   the   trial   court   was   upheld   by   the   SC.  testified  that   she   sent   her   9-­‐year   old   daughter   Daisy   Diolola   to   their   neighbor's   house   in   Pilapil.  Ma.   So   the   result   of   the   DNA   test   was   officially   accepted/admitted   by   the   court   and   in   fact   taken   into   consideration   in   this   case   in   the   resolution   of   the   issue   of   identity   in   the   case.   Now   you   will   note   in   this   case   that   the   SC   used   the   traditional  or  conventional  method.  in  the  cases  of  PP  v.     o Now   in   ruling   that   Vallejo   is   indeed   the   party   responsible   despite   the   absence   of   direct   evidence.   As   in   most   rape   cases.   Ma.   until   the   early   morning   of   the   following   5   . 3.  But.   Nida   woke   up   at   about   5:30   o'clock   after   an   afternoon   nap.     Ø The   SC   resorted   to   the   conventional   method   of   resolving  the  issue  of  identity  and  that  is  why  there   is   a   simple   physical   comparison.     The  victim's  mother.     The   inspiration   in   Tijing   v.   who   told   her   that   Daisy   had   gone   to   her   classmate's   house  to  borrow  a  book.   Vallejo.   Ø The   case   involves   a   prosecution   for   rape   with   homicide.   Ligtong   I.   Nida   went   back   to   her   neighbor's   house.   Nida   that   Daisy   was   not   there   and   that   Aimee   was   not   able   to   help  Daisy  with  her  lessons  because  Aimee  was  not   feeling   well   as   she   had   her   menstrual   period.   Ma.   An   hour   later. VALLEJO Background  of  the  Case:   1.  but  it  was  in  this   case   that   the   SC   for   the   first   time   recognize   the   evidentiary   value   of   DNA   evidence.   the   SC   took   note   that   after   the   result   of   the   DNA   test   conducted. 2.  Nida  saw  her  daughter  go  to  the   house   of   her   tutor.   CA   did   not   die   in   vain   because  years  after.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   recognized   and   applied   DNA   evidence   in   a   resolution   of   an   actual  case.   the   evidence   against   Vallejo   were   all   circumstantial.   could   help   Daisy   with   her   lessons.   she   was   told   that   Daisy   had   not   been   there.   but   that   Daisy   later   left   with   accused-­‐ appellant.   She   was   wearing   pink   short   pants   and   a   white   sleeveless   shirt.  the  sister  of  accused-­‐ appellant.   so   it   was   necessary   to   establish  the  identity  of  the  assailant  or  the   convict.   Ma.  courts  will  be   constrained   to   resort   to   the   conventional   method.   Cavite.   Nida   that   Daisy   was   playing   in   front   of   her   house   that   afternoon   and   even   watched   television   in   her   house.   same   face.  when  Ma.   a   Saturday.   Aimee's   house.   Daisy's   tutor. The   case   involves   a   prosecution   for   rape   with   homicide.  similar  cases  in  the  future.   Jessiemin   Mataverde   also   told   Ma.  She  started  looking  for   her  daughter  and  proceeded  to  the  house  of  Aimee.  Yatar.  but  she  was  not  there.   the   SC   in   effect   even  holds  courts  for  future  cases  to  resort  to  DNA   testing   and   hold   on   to   their   rule   on   admissibility   and  consider  DNA  results  in  the  resolution  of  cases   especially   on   the   issues   of   paternity   and   filiation   issues.  Vallejo  the   SC   for   the   first   time   officially   accepted.  Servacio.   Daisy   and   accused-­‐appellant   went   back   to   the   latter's   house.   Nida   and   her   brother   and   sister   searched   for   Daisy   the   whole   evening   of   June   10.   she   noticed   that  Daisy  was  not  yet  home.   When   Ma.   same   eyebrow   and   same   shape   of   their   heads.   and   there   saw   accusedappellant.   1999.  in  future  it  would   be   useful   to   all   concerned   in   the   prompt   resolution   of  parentage  and  identity  issues.   So   when   the   trial   court   resolved   in   favor   of   Bienvenida.   Rosario.  They  were   looking   for   a   book   which   accused-­‐appellant   could   copy   to   make   a   drawing   or   a   poster   that   Daisy   would  submit  to  her  teacher.   Aimee's   mother   told   Ma.  Nida  Diolola.  Nida  went   there.  After  finding  the  book.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     PEOPLE V.   it   was   established   in   the   DNA   test   that   the   vaginal   swabs   taken   from   the   victim   showed   the   DNA   profile   of   Rheland  S.   Nida   went   to   the   dike   and   was   told   that   they   saw   Daisy   playing   at   about   3:30   o'clock   in   the   afternoon.   SC   said   TO   DENY   ACCEPTANCE   OF   THE   SCIENTIFIC   METHOD   OF   DNA   IS   TO   DENY   PRACTICE.  either.   Nida   looked   for   Daisy   in   her   brother's   and   sister's   houses.   So   the   trial   court   made   a   conclusion   that   the   boy   might   be   the   son   that   Bienvenida   claimed   to   be   Eduardo   Tijing.Y.   one   of   the   evidence/factual   circumstances   the   trial   court   cited   in   its   decision-­‐-­‐   was   the   trial   court’s   observation   that   the   boy   and   Bienvenida   showed   strong   facial   similarities.

    The   results   of   the   examinations   conducted   by   Pet   Byron   Buan   showed   accusedappellant   to   belong   to   Group   "O".Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   the   evidence   against   an   accused   is   more   often   than   not   circumstantial.  Leyva  informed  him  of   his   constitutional   rights.   makes   the   prosecution   of   the   offense   particularly  difficult  since  the  victim  could  no  longer   testify   against   the   perpetrator.   Accused-­‐appellant   claimed   that.   considering   that   these   specimens   were   already   soaked   in   smirchy   waters   before  they  were  submitted  to  the  laboratory.  at  about  10:00  o'clock  in  the   morning  of  June  11.   this   was   because  the  police  had  maltreated  him.   1999.   but   their   search   proved  fruitless.   12.   Leyva   asked   him   whether   he   wanted   him   to   be   his   counsel.   22   13.   Atty.  (2)   one   (1)   violet   no.   so   it   was   necessary   to   establish  the  identity  of  the  assailant  or  the  convict.   13   athletic   basketball   shirt.  Lupo  Leyva  went  to  see  him  in  the   investigation   room   of   the   police   station   and   told   him   that   they   would   help   him   if   he   told   the   truth.   although   he   admitted   to   Mayor   Abutan   and   Atty.     Ruling  of  the  Court:   11.   Nida   saw   her   daughter.   with   patches   "Grizzlies"  in  front  and  "SAMARTINO"  at  the  back.   When  accused-­‐appellant  was  brought  before  Inquest   Prosecutor  Elpidia  J.   (4)   one   (1)   "cut"   pink   short   pants   with   reddish   brown   stains.   Decision  of  the  Lower  Courts:   8.   (5)   one   (1)   "cut"   dirty   white   small   panty   with   reddish   brown   stains.   The   body   was   already   in   the   barangay   hall   when   Ma.   Accused-­‐appellant   confirmed   that   Mayor   Renato   Abutan  and  Atty.   Arguments  of  Accused  on  Appeal:   9.   the   evidence   against   Vallejo   were   all   circumstantial.  she  was  informed  that  the   dead   body   of   her   daughter   was   found   tied   to   the   root   of   an   aroma   tree   by   the   river   after   the   "compuerta"   by   a   certain   Freddie   Quinto.   b) the   facts   from   which   the   inferences   are   derived  are  proven.  Servacio.   21 In   rape   with   homicide. He  was  charged  guilty  of  Rape  with  Homicide. 6.  1999.  Then.  and   c) the   combination   of   all   6   .   Daisy   was   wearing   her   pink   short   pants  with  her  sleeveless  shirt  tied  around  her  neck.   An   accused   can   be   convicted   even   if   no   eyewitness   is   available.Y.   provided   sufficient   circumstantial   evidence   is   presented   by   the   prosecution  to  prove  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that     the   accused   committed   the   crime.  Itoc  at  around  noon  of  July  13.   June   11.  and  accused-­‐appellant  said  he  answered  in   Rheland  S.   Buan   observed   that   accused-­‐appellant   was   remorseful   and   was   crying   when   he   made   the   confession  in  the  presence  of  SPO1  Amoranto  at  the   NBI  laboratory.   were   all   positive   for   the   presence   of   human   blood   showing  the  reactions  of  Group  "A".   section   4   of   the   Revised   Rules   on   Evidence. First.   9   athletic   basketball   short   pants.   circumstantial   evidence   is   sufficient   to   sustain  a  conviction  if:   a) there  is  more  than  one  circumstance.    The  appeal   should  be  denied.  accused-­‐appellant  had  with  him   a   handwritten   confession   which   he   had   executed   inside  his  cell  at  the  Municipal  Jail  of  Rosario.   Resort   to   circumstantial   evidence   is   inevitable   and   to   demand   direct  evidence  proving  the  modality  of  the  offense   and  the  identity  of  the  perpetrator  is  unreasonable.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     the  affirmative.   The   following   specimens:   (1)   one   (1)   white   no. The   Accused   also   challenges   the   DNA   analysis   conducted   by   NBI   Forensic   Chemist   Aida   Viloria-­‐ Magsipoc. day.   a   Sunday. We  affirm  the  conviction  of  the  accused. Under   Rule   133.   This   is   because   the   nature  of  the  crime.   10. 5.  He  said  Atty.   Leyva   the   commission   of   the   crime.   As   in   most   rape   cases.   1999  in  Cavite  City.   Mr.   He   argues   that   the   prosecution   failed   to   show  that  all  the  samples  submitted  for  DNA  testing   were   not   contaminated.  where  only  the  victim  and  the   rapist   would   have   been   present   at   the   time   of   its   commission.  he  had  a  conversation  with  accused-­‐ appellant   during   which   the   latter   admitted   that   he   had  raped  and  later  killed  the  victim  by  strangulation   and   stated   that   he   was   willing   to   accept   the   punishment   that   would   be   meted   out   on   him   because   of   the   grievous   offense   he   had   committed. THE   TRIAL   COURT   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN   CONVICTING   THE   ACCUSEDAPPELLANT   OF   RAPE   WITH   HOMICIDE   DESPITE   THE   INSUFFICIENCY   AND   WEAKNESS   OF   THE   CIRCUMSTANTIAL   EVIDENCE   OF   THE   PROSECUTION.   Pet   Byron   Buan   (the   one   who   conducted   the   examinations)   also   testified   that   before   he   took   the   blood  samples.   (3)   one   (1)   white   small   "Hello   Kitty"   T-­‐shirt   with   reddish   brown   stains. 7.  2015-­‐2016   4.

  she   was   told   by   accused-­‐appellant  that  Daisy   had   gone   to   her   classmate   Rosario's   house. The   victim   went   to   Aimee   Vallejo's   house.   3. Accused-­‐appellant  has  blood   type  "O.   accused-­‐ appellant   and   Daisy   went   together   to   the   latter's   house   to   get   a   book   from   which   the   former   could   copy   Daisy's   school   project.   The   fishing   boat   which   accused-­‐appellant   used   as   a   bomber   (a   boat   for   catching   Rheland  S.   10.   After   getting   the   book.   at   1:00   o'clock   in   the   afternoon   of   July   10.  2015-­‐2016   circumstances   is   such   as   to   produce   conviction   beyond   reasonable  doubt.   the   spouses   Iluminado  and  Charito  Yepes   saw   accused-­‐appellant   coming   out   of   the   "compuerta.   Accusedappellant   thereafter   arrived   and   whispered   something   to   Daisy."   11. The   clothes   which   accused-­‐ appellant   wore   the   day   before   were   bloodstained."   9. Daisy's   body   was   found   tied   to  an  aroma  tree  at  the  part   of   the   river   near   the   "compuerta.   15. During   the   initial   investigation.   The   information   proved   to   be   false.   He   kept   looking   around   and   did   not   even   greet   them   as   was   his   custom  to  do  so.   basketball   shorts.  for  tutoring."   At   about   4:30   o'clock   in   the   afternoon.   where   accusedappellant   was   residing.   The   bloodstains   on   accused-­‐ appellant's   clothes   and   on   Daisy's   clothes   were   found   positive   of   human   blood   type  "A. A  little  before  5:00  o'clock  in   the   afternoon.  although  his   face   and   hair   were   not. 4.   Daisy   then   went   to   the   house   of   Jessiemin   Mataverde   where   she   watched   television.   According   to   these   witnesses.   they   proceeded   to   accused-­‐ appellant's  residence.Y. 5. From   accused-­‐appellant's   house. The   vaginal   swabs   from   Daisy's   body   contained   her   DNA   profile   as   well   as   that   of  accused-­‐appellant.   and  t-­‐shirt  wet.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     fish   with   dynamite)   was   docked  by  the  seashore.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A."     14.   the   following   circumstantial   evidence   establish   beyond   reasonable   doubt   the   guilt  of  accused-­‐appellant:   1.   2.   he   looked   pale.   1999. On   the   challenge   against   the   DNA   test   results.   7."   with   his   clothes.   accused-­‐ appellant   had   scratches   on   his   feet   similar   to   those   caused   by   the   thorns   of   an   aroma  tree.   and   the   latter   went   with   him   towards  the  "compuerta.   6.   we   find  the  argument  as  to  be  without  merit. In   the   case   at   bar.   and   troubled   (balisa).   7   .   8. By   5:30   o'clock   in   the   afternoon."   12. At   around   2:00   o'clock   in   the   afternoon.   Nida   Diolola   looked   for   her   daughter.   uneasy.  Servacio.   Jessiemin   Mataverde   also   saw   accused-­‐appellant   buying   a   Marlboro   cigarette   from   a   store.   Jessiemen   also   noticed   that   accused-­‐ appellant's  clothes  were  wet   but  not  his  face  nor  his  hair.   as   Ma.

  the   samples   are   found   to   be   Rheland  S.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   This   is   the   evidence   sample.  34   In   assessing   the   probative   value   of   DNA   evidence. In   the   case   at   bar.   35   because.   each   person's   DNA   profile   is   distinct  and  unique.   how   they   were   handled.   This   might   occur   for   a   variety   of   reasons   including   degradation.   Sir.  2015-­‐2016   16.  32 The  test  may   yield  three  possible  results:   1) 2) 3) The   samples   are   different   and   therefore   must   have   originated   from   different   sources   (exclusion).   the   bloodstains   taken   from   the   clothing  of  the  victim  and  of  accused-­‐appellant.   whether   the   proper   standards   and   procedures   were   followed   in   conducting   the   tests.  29   When   a   crime   is   committed.  Except   for   identical   twins.   Various   parts   of   the   analysis  might  then  be   repeated   with   the   same   or   a   different   sample.   whether   the   samples   have   similar   DNA   types   (inconclusive).   33 In   such   a   case.   based   on   the   results   of   the   test.  30   The  purpose  of  DNA  testing  is  to  ascertain   whether  an  association  exists  between  the  evidence     sample   and   the   reference   sample.  courts  should  consider.   This   means   that   the   hair   did  not  contain  any  root.   Vertido.   the   smears   geared   negative   results   and   the   swabs   gave   positive  results.   I   already   informed   Dr.  Sir.   And   so   upon   examination.   the   procedure   followed   in   analyzing   the   samples.   as   Ms.   Vertido   about   it   and   he   confirmed   the   state   of   the   specimen.   the   analyst   proceeds   to   determine   the   statistical   significance   of   the   similarity.  or   The   samples   are   similar.   the   smear   on   the   slide   was   very.   Viloria-­‐Magsipoc  explained:   A:  Because  when  we  received  the   vaginal  smears  submitted   by   Dr.   why   did   they   show  negative  results  for   DNA?   A:  The  hair  samples  were  cut  hair.   material   is   collected   from   the   scene   of   the   crime   or   from   the   victim's   body   for   the   suspect's   DNA.   the   possibility   of   contamination   of   the   samples.   or   failure   of   some   aspect   of   the   protocol.   17.   This   conclusion   is   absolute   and   requires   no   further   analysis   or   discussion.   31 The   samples   collected   are   subjected   to   various   chemical     processes  to  establish  their  profile.   and   the   qualification  of  the  analyst  who  conducted  the  tests.   contamination.   very   dry   and   could   have   chipped   off.   7.   the   following   data:   how   the   samples   were   collected.   And   I   told   him  that  may  be  it  would   be   the   swab   that   could   help   us   in   this   case.  among   others   things.  the   smears  taken  from  the  victim  as  well  as  the  strands   of  hair  and  nails  taken  from  her  tested  negative  for   the   presence   of   human   DNA. DNA   is   an   organic   substance   found   in   a   person's   cells  which  contains  his  or  her  genetic  code.   the   hair  and  nails  taken  from   the   victim.  therefore.   It  is  not  possible  to  be   sure.  and  could  have   originated   from   the   same   source     (inclusion).  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     similar.  Servacio.   to   obtain   a   more   conclusive   result.Y.   The   evidence   sample   is   then   matched  with  the  reference  sample  taken  from  the   suspect  and  the  victim.   Q:   How   about   specimen   no.   So  any  hair  that  is  above   the  skin  or  the  epidermis   of   one's   skin   would   give   negative   results   as   the   8   .

In   January   1990.   while   on   her   way   to   her   grandmother's   home.   When   facts   or   UMANITO   dressed   up   and   threatened   circumstances   which   are   proved   are   not   only   [AAA]   while   poking   the   knife   at   her   neck.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  But  the  vaginal  swabs  taken  from  the   could   not   shout   because   she   was   afraid.   while   the   evidence  in  its  effect  upon  the  court.  it  is  the  inadequacy  of  the  specimens   first   undressed   her   [AAA]   and   himself   with   submitted   for   examination. It  was  around  9:00  o'clock  in  the  evening  of   July   15.   established  in  the  DNA  test  that  the  vaginal   After  hearing  private  complainant  [AAA]'s  story.  her   mother  brought  her  to  the  police  station   swabs   taken   from   the   victim   showed   the   hair   shaft   is   negative   for   DNA.   negates   AAA's   claim   that   he   was   the   one   who   raped   her   but   rather   supports   his   assertion   that   the   sexual   congress   AAA   engaged   in   was   with   another   man.   1989.  Sir.   Yatar.   She   recounted   that   accused-­‐ appellant   UMANITO   waited   for   her   by   the   creek.   we   hold   that   the   totality   of   the   set   the   knife   down.   And   then   the   nails   did   not   contain   any   subcutaneous   cells   that   would   be   amenable   for   DNA  analysis  also.  nBuilding   ot  the  inadequacy   f  the  examination  or Economics   inside   othe   premises   of   the   Daramuangan   Elementary     A:    Yes.   accused-­‐appellant   Evidence   is   weighed   not   counted.   direct  evidence.   appellant   insists.   bench.   to   his   holding  her  breasts  and  stomach.   Upon   analysis   by   the   experts.   private   complainant   [AAA].   which   knife   menacingly   on   his   left   hand.  Sir.  Servacio.  [sic]  1989.  and  to  his   pulling   her   by   the   arm   to   be   dragged   to   the     Q:  So  it's  the  inadequacy  of  the  specimens  that  were  the  reason  for  Home   this  negative   result.   evidence   points   to   no   other   conclusion   than   that   inserting   his   penis   into   her   [AAA's]   vagina   accused-­‐appellant   is   guilty   of   the   crime   charged.   PEOPLE V.   Private   accounted   for   the   negative   results   of   their   complainant   [AAA]   recounted   that   she   examination."   School   where   accused-­‐appellant   UMANITO   Thus.  2015-­‐2016   learned   the   name   of   accused-­‐appellant   UMANITO.   DNA   profile   of   Vallejo.Y.   18.   they   showed   appellant   UMANITO   laid   her   down   on   a   the  DNA  profile  of  accused-­‐appellant. In   conclusion.   It   was   only   later   when   she   Rheland  S.   6   months   after   the   incident.     noticed   the   prominence   on   [AAA]'s   stomach.   Accused-­‐ its   weight   and   probative   force.   This   aspect.   then   mounted   her.     Argument  of  the  Accused-­‐appelant:   4.   and   then   with   a   knife   pointed   at   [AAA]'s   left   side   of   the   [sic]   abdomen.   private   7 Ø Now   in   ruling   that   Vallejo   is   indeed   the   complainant   [AAA's]   mother.  SHCaDA     2.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira       Decision  of  the  Lower  Courts:   3. The  accused  was  proven  guilty  of  Rape. Appellant  asserts  that  the  court  a  quo  erred  in  giving   full   faith   and   credence   to   the   testimony   of   the   complaining   witness   and   in   not   acquitting   him   on   reasonable   doubt.   He   avers   that   apparently   AAA   filed   the   complaint   against   him   only   upon   the   prodding   of   her   mother.   when   private     complainant   [AAA]   6 was   accosted   by   a   young   male.   consistent   with   the   guilt   of   the   accused   but   also   not   to   report   the   incident   to   the   police   or   inconsistent   with   his   innocence.   her   real   lover   who   was   married   to   another  woman.   It   was   only   then   party   responsible   despite   the   absence   of   when   the   victim.   and   not   the   possibility   his   right   hand   while   he   still   clutched   the   that   the   samples   had   been   contaminated.   So   the   result   of   the   DNA   test   was   officially   accepted/admitted   by   the   court   and   in   fact   taken   into   consideration   in   this   case   in   the   resolution   of  the  issue  of  identity  in  the  case.   house   and   she   noticed   that   it   was   already     around   1:00   o'clock   in   the   morning   when     she  reached  there.   it   was   the  details  of  what  had  happened  in  July.  This  was   reiterated   in   the   subsequent   case   of   PP   v.   and   shortly   thereafter.   4   meters   long   and   24   inches   wide.  the  SC  took  note  that  after   divulged  to  her  mother  the  alleged  rape  and  told  her   the   result   of   the   DNA   test   conducted.   9   .   [BBB]. UMANITO Background  of  the  Case:   1.  37  This  is  how   victim  [AAA]  went  on  to  her  grandmother's   it  is  in  this  case.   in   else   he   said   he   would   kill   her.   victim   yielded   positive   for   the   presence   of   human   She   further   recounted   that   accused-­‐ DNA.   he   forced   her   to   give   in   to   his   kisses.   may   surpass   direct   appellant   UMANITO   then   left.   such   evidence.

  This   involves   a   petition   for   compulsory   recognition   of   paternity.999%-­‐   the   SC   said   that   this   is   just   a   disputable   presumption   of   paternity   sufficient   if   allowed   to   stand   uncontroverted.     If   the   value   of   probability   is   99. YATAR 19. 9.  That  sealed  the  fate  of  Umanito.   in   the   case   of   Yatar.  was  sired  by  the  accused.   So   again.   we   are   directing   appellant.   motu  proprio  to  order  a  DNA  testing.     Ø The  court  said  the  accused  was  established   beyond   reasonable   doubt   to   be   the   party   responsible.   the   courts  are  authorized.  subject  to  guidelines  prescribed  herein.  taking   cue   from   the   result   of   the   DNA   test   showing   the   substantial   match   between   the   samples   taken   from   the  victim  and  the  samples  taken  from  the  accused.   the   SC   officially   recognized   and   ruled   on   the   admissibility   of   DNA   evidence   and   in   fact   considered   the   DNA   results   in   the   resolution  of  the  case.   is   material   to   the   fair   and   correct   adjudication   of   the   instant   appeal.  On  appeal  the  SC  directed  the  conduct  of   DNA   test   and   remanded   the   case   to   the   trial   court   for   the   conduct  of  the  DNA  test  to  determine  if  the  child.  or  at  least  least  weigh  heavily  in  the  ultimate   decision   in   this   case.   In   his   defense.  filed  before  the  trial  court  a   petition   for   compulsory   recognition.   the   SC   in   Herrerra   v.g.   If   he   is   not.     HERRERA V.   Alba   reaffirmed   recognition   DNA   evidence   in   its   admissibility   and   probative   value   in   our   jurisdiction.   the   putative   father.  2015-­‐2016   Issue  presented  before  us:   5.  Again.   The   rulings   in   these   cases   eventually   culminated   in   the   promulgation   of   our   own   rule   on   DNA   which   took   effect   10   .   True   enough.  the  SC  cited  cases  in  the  past  on   the   previous   case   of   Vallejo   and   Yatar. this   Court   is   called   upon   to   determine   whether   the   prosecution   has   successfully   met   the   level   of   proof   needed  to  find  appellant  guilty  of  the  crime  of  rape     Ruling  of  the  Court:   6. 3.   In   the   absence   of   contrary   evidence   the   putative  father  is  presumed  to  be  the  father.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     sexual   relation   and   therefore   he   could   not   be   the   father   of   the   child.     This  case  involves  a  crime  of  rape  which  resulted  in   the  birth  of  a  child.   it   can   now   be   determined   with   reasonable  certainty  whether  appellant  is  the  father   of   AAA's   child.   his   acquittal   may   be   ordained. A  party  was  so  minded  to  challenge  the  admissibility   of   the   DNA   test   results.   which   may   be   accomplished   through   DNA   testing.   the   DNA   yielded   positive   result   -­‐ 99.     Ø In  this  case.   With  the  advance  in  genetics  and  the  availability  of   new   technology.   impossibility   of   sexual   intercourse).   this   may   cast   the   shadow   of   reasonable   doubt   and   allow   his   acquittal   on   this   basis.   AAA   and   AAA's   child   to   submit     themselves   to   deoxyribonucleic   acid   (DNA)   testing under   the   aegis   of   the   New   Rule   on   DNA   Evidence     23 (the   Rules). o The  prosecution  met  the  burden  of  proof.Y.   support   and   damages  against  petitioner.   Respondent   filed   a   motion   to   direct   the   taking   of   DNA  paternity  testing  to  abbreviate  the  proceedings. This  case  involves  rape  with  homicide.   PEOPLE V.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Thus.  This  is  the  fact  that   AAA   bore   a   child   as   a   result   of   the   purported   rape.   which   took   effect   on   15   October   2007.   Umanito   himself   failed   to   controvert   the   presumption   and   as   a   matter   of   fact   he   even   moved   for   the   withdrawal  his  appeal. 2.   represented   by  his  mother  Armi  Alba.  Servacio.   It   is   obvious   to   the   Court   that   the   determination   of   whether   appellant   is   the   father   of   AAA's   child.  after  due  hearing  and  notice.       The   SC   said   if   the   result   would   be   negative   then   that   would   create   reasonable   doubt   as   to   the   guilt   of   Umanito   because   the   defense   of   Umanito   was   that   there   was   no   Rheland  S. 8. 7.   A   happenstance   may   provide   the   definitive   key   to   the  absolution  of  the  appellant.   opposed   the   conduct   of   a   DNA   test   on   the   ground   that   DNA   results   has   not   yet   gained   acceptance   or   has   a   doubtful  admissibility  in  our  jurisdiction.  But  this   admits   of   controverting   evidence   like   proof   allowed   under   the   Family   Code   (e.   Then   thirteen-­‐ year-­‐old   Rosendo   Alba   ("respondent").     We   have   pronounced   that   if   it   can   be   conclusively   determined   that   the   accused   did   not   sire   the   alleged   victim's   child.   Under   Section   4   of   the   Rules.9%   or   higher   –   the   positive   result   is   a   disputable   presumption   of   paternity. ALBA   Background  of  the  Case:   1.  which  was   the  alleged  result  of  the  rape.

  Resemblance   is   a   trial   technique   unique   to   a   paternity   proceeding.   which   match   the   paternal   types   in   the   child.  Petitioner.   11.   as   of   this   date.   although   likeness   is   a   function   of   heredity.   Comparing   next   the   DNA   profiles  of  the  mother  and  child.Y.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.9%  as  a  minimum  value  of  the   Probability  of  Paternity  ("W")  prior  to  a  paternity   inclusion.  19 This  kind  of  evidence  appeals  to   the  emotions  of  the  trier  of  fact.   Ruling  of  the  Lower  Court:   4. We  also  repeat  the  trial  court's  explanation  of  DNA   analysis  used  in  paternity  cases:   In   [a]   paternity   test.  18   9.   The   putative   father   may   show   incapability   of   sexual   relations   with   the   mother.   If   the   man's   DNA   types   do   not   match   that   of   the   child.  52     13.     Ruling  of  the  Court:   7. The   RTC   granted   respondent's   motion   to   conduct   DNA  paternity  testing  on  petitioner.   He   denied   ever   having   sexual   relations   with   Armi   Alba   and   stated   that   respondent   is   Armi   Alba's   child   with   another   man.  following  the  highest  standard  adopted  in   an   American   jurisdiction:   trial   courts   should   require  at  least  99.   how   they   were   handled.  the   procedure   followed   in   analyzing   the   samples.   and   the   qualification   of   the   analyst   who   conducted   the   tests.   denied   Armi   Alba's   assertion.   We   reiterate   our   statement  in  Vallejo  [THE  VALLEJO  STANDARDS]:   In   assessing   the   probative   value   of   DNA   evidence.   If   the   DNA   types   match.   the   trial   court   encountered   three   of   the   four   aspects.   A   complete   match   between   the   DNA   profile   of   the   child   and   the   DNA   profile   of   the   putative   father   does   not   necessarily   establish   paternity.   among  other  things.  courts  should  consider.   the   man   is   excluded   as   the   father.   respondent's   mother.  The  alleged  father's  profile   is   then   examined   to   ascertain   whether   he   has   the   DNA   types   in   his   profile.   Rheland  S.  the  following   data:   how   the   samples   were   collected. It   is   not   enough   to   state   that   the   child's   DNA   profile   matches   that   of   the   putative   father.     Issue  presented  before  us:   6. Finally.  16   The  putative  father  may  also  show  that  the  mother   had   sexual   relations   with   other   men   at   the   time   of   conception.   2007.   Petitioner   asks   for   the   conditions   under   which   DNA   technology   may   be   integrated   into   our   judicial   system   and   the   prerequisites   for   the   admissibility  of  DNA  test  results  in  a  paternity  suit.   However.   Armi   Alba   countered   petitioner's   denial   by   submitting   pictures   of   respondent   and   petitioner   side   by   side.   17 The  child's  legitimacy  may  be  impugned  only  under   the  strict  standards  provided  by  law.   put   forward   a   prima   facie   case   when   she   asserted   that   petitioner   is   respondent's   biological   father.   she   offered   corroborative   proof  in  the  form  of  letters  and  pictures.  respondent  and   Armi  Alba.  Servacio.   Aware   that   her   assertion   is   not   enough   to   convince   the   trial   court.   the   forensic   scientist   looks   at   a   number   of   these   variable   regions   in  an  individual  to  produce  a  DNA   profile.   CA  affirmed  the  RTC  decision  upon  appeal.   physical   resemblance   between   the   putative   father  and  child  may  be  offered  as  part  of  evidence   of   paternity.  it   is   possible   to   determine   which   half   of   the   child's   DNA   was   inherited   from   the   mother.  2015-­‐2016   on   October   15.   to   show   how   much   they   resemble  each  other.    There  are  two  affirmative  defenses  available  to  the   putative   father.   therefore. The  petition  has  no  merit.   W   is   a   numerical   estimate   for   the   likelihood   of   paternity   of   a   putative   father   compared   to   the   probability   of   a   random   match   11   . Despite   our   relatively   liberal   rules   on   admissibility. 5.   we   now  have  as  part  of  our  Rules  of  Court.   10.   because  of  either  physical  absence  or  impotency.   then   he   is   not   excluded  as  the  father.  Rule   on  DNA  evidence.   The   other   half   must   have   been   inherited   from   the   biological   father.   So. In   the   present   case.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     trial  courts  should  be  cautious  in  giving  credence  to   DNA   analysis   as   evidence.   there   is   no   mathematical   formula   that   could   quantify   how   much   a   child   must   or   must   not   look   like   his     biological  father.   on   the   other   hand.   whether   the   proper   standards   and   procedures   were   followed   in   conducting   the   tests. 8.   the   possibility   of   contamination  of  the  samples.   51   12.   A   child   born   to   a   husband   and   wife     during   a   valid   marriage   is   presumed   legitimate. Petitioner  raises  the  issue  of  whether  a  DNA  test  is  a   valid  probative  tool  in  this  jurisdiction  to  determine   filiation.   For   this   reason.   Armi   Alba.

affirmative   defenses.     b.   there   was   no   allegation   that   he   was   treated   as   the   child   of   respondent   by   the   latter   or   his   family.   petitioner.   such   as   the   Philippine   population   database.   Jesse   U. presumption   of   legitimacy.     He   argued   that   DNA   testing   cannot   be   had   on   the   basis   of   a   mere   allegation   pointing   to   respondent   as   petitioner's   father.   An   appropriate   reference   population   database.   allowing   compulsory   DNA   testing.   at   Belen's   workplace.     The   court   opined   that   petitioner   must   first   establish   these   four   procedural   aspects   before   he   can   present   evidence   of   paternity   and   filiation.       LUCAS V.  his   mother.   However.   The   court   opined   that.   which   may   include   incriminating   acts   or   scientific   evidence   like   blood  group  test  and  DNA  test  results.  It  noted  that  the   new   Rule   on   DNA   Evidence   allows   the   conduct   of  DNA  testing.   migrated   to   Manila   from   Davao   and   stayed   with   a   certain   "Ate   Belen   (Belen)"   who   worked   in   a   prominent   nightspot   in   Manila.     c.   Lucas.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     6.   Elsie   got   acquainted   with   respondent.   Attached   to   the   petition   were   the   following:   (a)   petitioner's   certificate   of   live   birth.   Respondent   allegedly   extended   financial   support   to   Elsie   and   petitioner   for   a   period   of   about   two   years.   Jesus   S.     9.   Elsie   made   several   attempts   to   introduce   petitioner   to  respondent. (note:  still  a  hearing)   The   respondent   opposed   the   hearing   for   the   petition   for   recognition.   is   required   to   compute  for  W.   the   accuracy   of   W   estimates   is   higher   when   the   putative   father.  1969. On   motion   for   reconsideration. 3. physical   resemblance   between   the   putative   father   and  the  child.   Elsie   would   oftentimes   accompany   Belen   to   work.   and   that   jurisprudence   is   still   unsettled   on   the   acceptability  of  DNA  evidence.   having   failed   to   establish   a   prima  facie  case. a   prima   facie   case. The   court   observed   that   the   petition   did   not   show   that   these   procedural   aspects   were   present.  2015-­‐2016   of   two   unrelated   individuals. The   RTC   dismissed   Jesse’s   petition   for   DNA   testing  to  establish  paternity  and  filiation.  sometime  in  1967.     The   court   also   dismissed   Jesus’   arguments   that   there   is   no   basis   for   the   taking   of   DNA   test.   (b)   the   certificate   of   live   birth   was   not   signed   by   respondent. 2.   and   an   intimate   relationship   developed   between   the   two.   mother   and   child   are   subjected   to   DNA   analysis   compared   to   those   conducted  between  the  putative  father  and  child   alone.Y.   When   the   relationship   of   Elsie   and   respondent   ended.  but  all  attempts  were  in  vain. LUCAS Background  of  the  Case:   1.   The   RTC   scheduled   a   hearing   for   the   petition   Rheland  S.  whether  at  the  court's  instance   12   .  W  will  never  equal  to  100%.   On   one   occasion.   (b)   petitioner's  baptismal  certificate  among  others.  and     d.     Decision  of  the  Lower  Courts:   7.9%.   then   there   is   refutable     presumption   of   paternity.   the   RTC   reversed   its   previous   decision.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Lucas. 4.   and   (c)   although   petitioner   used   the   surname   of   respondent.  petitioner  was   baptized   at   San   Isidro   Parish. It   held   that   there   are   four   significant   procedural   aspects   of   a   traditional   paternity   action  which  the  parties  have  to  face:     a.   Elsie   eventually  got  pregnant.    Jesse  was  then  born.   and   petitioner's   statement   as   to   what   his   mother   told   him   about   his   father   was   clearly   hearsay.  Servacio.   Elsie   Uy   (Elsie). On   July   26.   While   petitioner   was   growing   up.   Taft   Avenue.  the   results   of   the   DNA   analysis   should   be   considered   as   corroborative   evidence.  On  August  1. 5.  Due  to  the  probabilistic  nature  of   paternity  inclusions.  If  the  value  of  W  is  less  than  99.   The  name  of  petitioner's  father  was  not  stated   in   petitioner's   certificate   of   live   birth.   Petitioner   failed   to   establish   a   prima   facie   case   considering   that   (a)   his   mother   did   not   personally   declare   that   she   had   sexual   relations   with   respondent.   10.   If   the   value   of   W   is   99.   Elsie   refused   to   accept   respondent's   offer   of   support  and  decided  to  raise  petitioner  on  her   own.   jurisprudence   is   still   unsettled   on   the   acceptability   of   DNA   evidence.       8.   filed   a   Petition   to   Establish   Illegitimat   Filiation   (with   Motion   for   the   Submission   of   Parties   to   DNA  Testing)   Petitioner  narrated  that.   Pasay   City.9%   or   higher.   Moreover.   However.   2007. DNA  analysis  that  excludes  the  putative  father  from   paternity   should   be   conclusive   proof   of   non-­‐ paternity.   Elsie   later   on   told   petitioner   that   his   father   is   respondent.   55 This   refutable   presumption  of  paternity  should  be  subjected  to  the   Vallejo  standards.  54   14.  respondent  had  no  obligation   to  present  any  affirmative  defenses.

  HCSEIT   (c) The   DNA   testing   uses   a   scientifically   valid  technique.   been   presented   by   petitioner.   In   fact.Y.  when  only  the   petition  to  establish  filiation  has  been  filed.  More  essentially.   In   light   of   this   observation. Section   4   of   the   Rule   on   DNA   Evidence   merely   Rheland  S.   (d) The   DNA   testing   has   the   scientific   potential  to  produce   new   information   that   is   relevant   to   the   proper   resolution   of   the   case.  A  party  is  confronted  by   these   so-­‐called   procedural   aspects   during   trial.   which  the  court  may   consider   as   potentially   affecting   the   accuracy   or   integrity   of   the   DNA   13   . The   CA   reversed   the   order   of   the   RTC.   at   any   time.   (b) The   biological   sample:   (i)   was   not   previously   subjected   to   the   type   of   DNA   testing   now   requested. The  petition  must  be  granted.  Servacio.   order   a   DNA   testing.   the   latter   has   just   set   the   said  case  for  hearing.     It   dismissed  the  special  proceedings  case.   Application   for   DNA   Testing   Order.   We.  Alba  34  that  there   are   four   significant   procedural   aspects   in   a   traditional  paternity  case  which  parties  have  to   face   has   been   widely   misunderstood   and   misapplied  in  this  case.   It   noted   that   petitioner   failed   to   show   that   the   four   significant   procedural   aspects   of   a   traditional   paternity   action   had   been   met. Clearly   then.   11.   The   CA   further   held   that   a   DNA   testing   should   not   be   allowed   when   the   petitioner   has   failed   to   establish   a   prima   facie   case     Ruling:   12.   A   prima   facie   case   is   built   by   a   party's   evidence   and   not   by   mere   allegations   in   the   initiatory   pleading   (thus   a   hearing  is  required  to  be  made  first)   14. The  statement  in  Herrera  v.   —   The   appropriate   court   may.   we   find   that   there   is   a   need   to   supplement   the   Rule   on   DNA   Evidence   to   aid   the  courts  in  resolving  motions  for  DNA  testing   order.   They   are   matters   of   evidence   that   cannot   be   determined   at   this   initial  stage  of  the  proceedings.   the   CA's   view   that   it   would   be   dangerous   to   allow   a   DNA   testing   without   corroborative  proof  is  well  taken  and  deserves   the   Court's   attention.   address   the   question   of   whether   a   prima   facie   showing   is   necessary   before  a  court  can  issue  a  DNA  testing  order   16.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   13.  The   CA's   observation   that   petitioner   failed   to   establish   a   prima   facie   case   —   the   first   procedural   aspect   in   a   paternity   case   —   is   therefore   misplaced.  and   (e) The   existence   of   other   factors.   as   yet.  it  is  premature  to   discuss   whether.   it   was   also   not   the   opportune   time   to   discuss   the   lack   of   a   prima   facie   case   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   the   motion   for   DNA   testing   since   no   evidence   has.  2015-­‐2016   or  upon  application  of  any  person  who  has  legal   interest  in  the  matter  in  litigation.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     provides   for   conditions   that   are   aimed   to   safeguard   the   accuracy   and   integrity   of   the   DNA  testing.   Such   order   shall   issue   after   due   hearing   and   notice   to   the   parties   upon  a  showing  of  the  following:   (a) A   biological   sample   exists   that   is   relevant  to  the  case. At   any   rate.   either   motu   proprio   or   on   application   of   any   person  who  has  a  legal  interest  in  the   matter   in   litigation.   thus.    The  CA   remarked   that   petitioner   filed   the   petition   to   establish   illegitimate   filiation.   if   any.   particularly   in   paternity   and   other   filiation   cases.   or   (ii)   was   previously   subjected   to   DNA   testing.   specifically   seeking   a   DNA   testing   order   to   abbreviate   the   proceedings.   a   DNA   testing   order   is   warranted   considering   that  no  such  order  has  yet  been  issued  by  the   trial   court.  Section  4  states:   SEC.   under   the   circumstances.   when   the   parties   have   presented   their   respective   evidence.   15.   4.   but   the   results   may   require   confirmation   for   good   reasons.

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  
testing.  
This   Rule   shall   not   preclude   a   DNA  
testing,   without   need   of   a   prior   court  
order,   at   the   behest   of   any   party,  
including   law   enforcement   agencies,  
before   a   suit   or   proceeding   is  
commenced.  
17. This   does   not   mean,   however,   that   a   DNA  
testing  order  will  be  issued  as  a  matter  of  right  
if,   during   the   hearing,   the   said   conditions   are  
established.  
18. In   some   states,   to   warrant   the   issuance   of   the  
DNA   testing   order,   there   must   be   a   show   cause  
hearing   wherein   the   applicant   must   first  
present   sufficient   evidence   to   establish   a   prima  
facie   case   or   a   reasonable   possibility   of  
paternity  or  "good  cause"  for  the  holding  of  the  
test.     A   court   order   for   blood   testing   is  
considered   a   "search,"   which,   under   their  
Constitutions   (as   in   ours),   must   be   preceded   by  
a   finding   of   probable   cause   in   order   to   be   valid.  
Hence,   the   requirement   of   a   prima   facie   case,  
or   reasonable   possibility,   was   imposed   in   civil  
actions   as   a   counterpart   of   a   finding   of  
probable  cause.  
19. The   same   condition   precedent   should   be  
applied   in   our   jurisdiction   to   protect   the  
putative   father   from   mere   harassment   suits.  
Thus,  during  the  hearing  on  the  motion  for  DNA  
testing,  the  petitioner  must  present  prima  facie  
evidence  or  establish  a  reasonable  possibility  of  
paternity.  
20. Notwithstanding   these,   it   should   be   stressed  
that   the   issuance   of   a   DNA   testing   order  
remains   discretionary   upon   the   court.   The  
court   may,   for   example,   consider   whether  
there  is  absolute  necessity  for  the  DNA  testing.  
If   there   is   already   preponderance   of   evidence  
to   establish   paternity   and   the   DNA   test   result  
would  only  be  corroborative,  the  court  may,  in  
its  discretion,  disallow  a  DNA  testing.  
 
The  SC  enunciated  a  sort  of  supplement  to  DNA  testing,  
by  way  of  jurisprudence  and  this  supplement  only  applies  to  
cases   involving   paternity   and   filiation.   SC   said   that   in   cases  
involving   paternity   and   filiation,   it   is   not   enough   that   the  
conditions  of  section  4  on  the  rule  on  DNA  evidence  are  met.  
But   just   as   important   as   it   is   necessary   for   the   applicant   to  
ESTABLISH   PRIMA   FACIE   EVIDENCE   or   INTRODUCE   PRIMA  
FACIE   EVIDENCE   OF   PATERNITY   or   REASONABLE   POSSIBILITY  
OF   PATERNITY;   this   is   provided   as   a   supplement   based   on  
jurisprudence  of  the  case  of  Lucas  v.  Lucas:  
 
20. FACTS:  Jessie  Lucas  claims  to  be  the  illegitimate  son  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

of   Jesus   Lucas,   he   filed   a   petition   for   compulsory  
recognition   of   filiation   and   this   petition   is   with  
motion   to   submit   the   parties   for   DNA   testing.   The  
defendant,   the   putative   father,   moved   for   the  
dismissal   of   the   action   or   denial   of   the   motion   for  
DNA  testing  on  the  ground  that  the  petitioner  failed  
to   establish   prima   facie   case   of   paternity;   such  
argument   was   upheld   by   CA   and   so   the   CA   denied  
the  motion  for  DNA  testing,  and  dismissed  the  entire  
petition   for   the   petitioner   failed   to   establish   prima  
facie   case   of   paternity   or   reasonable   possibility   of  
paternity.  The  reasoning  of  the  CA  was  that,  it  would  
be  terribly  dangerous  to  allow  DNA  testing  by  mere  
application   of   any   party,   allowing   it   as   a   matter   of  
right,   would   result   to   that   DNA   testing   becoming   a  
tool   for   harassment   or   extortion   that   may   be   taken  
advantage   by   some   unscrupulous   individuals   who  
prey   on   people   who   have   no   stomach   for   public  
scandal   thus,   they   are   constrained   to   settle   cases   for  
he   has   no   stomach   for   public   scandal.   So   CA   states  
that   there   should   be   some   safeguard   for   the   benefit  
of   the   innocent   alleged   putative   fathers   to   shield  
them  from  harassment  paternity  suits.    
 
Ø SC  thus  said,  there  is  a  need  to  supplement  
the   existing   rule   on   DNA   evidence,   so   now  
the  rule  is;    
DNA  TESTING  IS  ALLOWED,  provided  that:  
1.
2.

The  conditions  set  forth  under  section  4  on  
DNA  testing  are  met;  and    
There   is   prima   facie   evidence   of   paternity  
or  reasonable  possibility  of  paternity.  

Before  a  DNA  testing  could  be  conducted,  based  on  
American  jurisprudence,  the  conduct  of  DNA  testing  is  akin  to  
a   search   which   intrudes   ones   privacy.   Thus,   as   a   search,  
there  is  a  need  to  establish  as  a   condition  sine  qua  non  the  
existence   of   Probable   Cause.   As   a   counterpart   of   Probable  
Cause,   the   SC   said   that   prima   facie   evidence   is   needed   as   a  
condition   precedent   to   the   conduct   of   a   DNA   testing   to  
safeguard  interest  of  the  putative  fathers.  
 
IN   RE:   THE   WRIT   OF   HABEAS   CORPUS   FOR   REYNALDO   DE  
VILLA    
(TN:  this  case  was  decided  prior  to  the  effectivity  of  Rules  on  
DNA  evidence)  
De   Villa   was   convicted   of   rape   of  
14  

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  
his   niece   resulting   in   the   birth   of   a   child.  
While   on   appeal   one   of   the   children   of   De  
villa   took   it   upon   himself   to   resort   to   DNA  
testing   it   just   so   happened   that   one   of   the  
grandchildren  of  the  accused  (De  Villa)  was  
the   classmate   of   the   child,   allegedly   to   be  
the  child  of  De  Villa  as  a  result  of  the  rape,  
upon   instruction   of   one   of   the   sons   of   De  
Villa   the   grandchild   asked   the   child   to   spit  
on   the   cup   and   submitted   the   samples   to  
the   DNA   Laboratory   for   examination.   The  
result   is   negative   and   thus   the   child   could  
not  have  been  the  child  of  De  Villa.    
Ø

Ø

But  the  SC  ruled  against  de  villa  on  
the   grounds   that   the   remedy   of  
Habeas   corpus   is   a   procedural  
misstep   -­‐   not   allowed-­‐   the   SC  
enumerated   the   grounds   for  
Habeas  Corpus  which  DNA  result  is  
not   one   of   them   and   the   SC  
disagreed   with   the   defense   that  
the   result   of   DNA   test   could   not   be  
considered   as   a   newly   discovered  
evidence  because  the  failure  of  the  
defense   to   avail   of   the   DNA  
evidence   was   through   the   fault   of  
the   counsel   whose   negligence   is  
binding  upon  the  client.    
The   SC   made   a   definitive   ruling  
that   a   petition   for   Habeas   Corpus  
is   NOT   a   proper   remedy   to   get   a  
reversal   of   judgment   of   conviction  
on   the   basis   of   the   result   of   the  
DNA  test.    

TN:  With  the  promulgation  of  the  Rules  on  
DNA   Evidence   the   ruling   of   De   villa   is   no   longer  
controlling.  The  rule  now  specifically  provides  that  a  
petition  for  Habeas  corpus  is  the  remedy  if  DNA  test  
result   shows   that   the   accused   could   not   have  
committed  the  crime,  the  petition  for  Habeas  Corpus  
can   be   filed   in   the   court   of   origin,   Court   of   Appeals  
or   even   in   the   Supreme   Court.   In   which   case   this  
court  may  reverse  the  judgment  of  conviction,  it  may  
declare   the   accused   acquitted   or   modify   the  
judgment   and   order   the   release   of   the   convict.   So  
Habeas  Corpus  is  now  the  remedy  prescribed  under  
the  Rules  on  DNA  evidence.  
TN  also  of  the  ruling  declared  by  the  court  
in  the  case  of  De  Villa  where  it  said  that  the  fact  of  
the  result  of  the  DNA  test  yielded  negative  this  does  
not   necessarily   absolve   the   accused   because   the  
pregnancy  of  the  victim  is  not  one  of  the  elements  of  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

the   crime   of   rape.   So   long   the   crime   of   rape   is  
proven   by   other   evidence/s   the   negative   result   of  
the   DNA   testing   is   not   enough   to   overturn   the  
conviction.  
Sir’s   Observation:   This   is   contrary   to   the  
ruling  declared  by  the  court  in  case  of  Pp  v  Umanito  
where  it  held  that  the  negative  result  could  very  well  
establish   reasonable   doubt   especially   if   the   defense  
of   the   accused   is   consistent   with   the   DNA   result,   like  
when  the  defense  of  the  accused  that  there  was  no  
sexual   relation   or   the   child   was   fathered   by   a   man  
other  than  the  accused.  Except  if  the  defense  of  the  
accused  that  the  sexual  intercourse  is  consensual.  If  
the  prosecution  theorizes  that  as  a  result  of  the  rape  
a   child   was   born,   DNA   testing   is   relevant.   Forget  
about  DeVilla  because  it  was  overtaken  by  the  case  
of  Pp  v  Umanito  and  Rules  on  DNA  evidence.  
 

PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ
 

Accused  was  charged  with  illegal  possession  and  sale  of  illegal  
drugs.      
A   confidential   informant   arrived   at   around   4:30   noon   and  
reported   that   there   is   a   person   who   has   been   selling   shabu.  
An   entrapment   team   was   formed   consisting   of   himself   as  
poseur   buyer,   SPO1   Brigido   An,   PO3   Virgilio   Bernardo,   PO2  
Manny  Paulilis  and  PO1  Cecil  Collado.  
 
The   team   was   dispatched.     The   money   was   marked  
with  Sevilla’s  initials  “LS.”    Sevilla  offered  to  buy  shabu  from  
the   accused   as   pampapayat   for   the   marked   money   of  
P100.00,   which   the   latter   did   furnish   him   a   pack   of   shabu.    
Upon   giving   the   shabu,   Sevilla   made   the   warning   and   the  
team  busted  in,  capturing  the  accused.  
 
On   the   procedures   that   was   observed   by   the   police  
during   the   taking,   the   accused   was   brought   to   the   police  
station  and  the  bag  of  shabu  was  in  Sevilla’s  possession.    He  
simply   marked   the   shabu   with   his   initials   (and   to   make  
matters  worse,  he  marked  it  not  at  the  site  of  the  crime  but  
only  later  at  the  police  station)  and  turned  them  over  to  the  
Desk  officer  of  the  police  station.  
Accused   now   appeals   the   decisions   of   the   lower   courts  
convicting  him  of  the  charges  of  selling  illegal  drugs.  
Issue:   are   the   procedural   requirements   by   the   Illegal   Drugs  
Act  violated  by  the  police?  
HELD:  Yes.    By  such  violation,  the  accused  is  hereby  acquitted.  
Non-­‐observance  of  the  requirements  of  Section  21,  
15  

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  

paragraph  1  of  Article  II  of  Republic  Act  No.  9165  

and   photograph   the   same   in   the  
presence  of  the  accused  or  the  person/s  
from   whom   such   items   were  
confiscated   and/or   seized,   or   his/her  
representative  
or  
counsel,  
a  
representative   from   the   media   and   the  
Department   of   Justice   (DOJ),   and   any  
elected   public   official   who   shall   be  
required   to   sign   the   copies   of   the  
inventory  and  be  given  a  copy  thereof:  .  
.   .   Provided,   further   that   non-­‐
compliance   with   these   requirements  
under  justifiable  grounds,  as  long  as  the  
integrity   and   the   evidentiary   value   of  
the  seized  items  are  properly  preserved  
by  the  apprehending  officer/team,  shall  
not   render   void   and   invalid   such  
seizures  of  and  custody  over  said  items.  
[Emphasis  supplied]  

A   buy-­‐bust   operation   is   a   form   of   entrapment  
employed   by   peace   officers   to   apprehend   prohibited   drug  
law  violators  in  the  act  of  committing  a  drug-­‐related  offense.  
Because   of   the   built-­‐in   danger   for   abuse   that   a   buy-­‐bust  
operation   carries,   it   is   governed   by   specific   procedures   on  
the   seizure   and   custody   of   drugs,   separately   from   the  
general   law   procedures   geared   to   ensure   that   the   rights   of  
people   under   criminal   investigation   and   of   the   accused  
facing  a  criminal  charge  are  safeguarded.  We  expressed  this  
concern  in  People  v.  Tan,  when  we  recognized  that  "by  the  
very   nature   of   anti-­‐narcotic   operations,   the   need   for  
entrapment   procedures,   the   use   of   shady   characters   as  
informants,   the   ease   with   which   sticks   of   marijuana   or  
grams   of   heroin   can   be   planted   in   the   pockets   or   hands   of  
unsuspecting   provincial   hicks   [planting   of   evidence],   and  
the   secrecy   that   inevitably   shrouds   all   drug   deals,   the  
possibility   of   abuse   is   great.   Thus,   the   courts   have   been  
exhorted   to   be   extra   vigilant   in   trying   drug   cases   lest   an  
innocent   person   is   made   to   suffer   the   unusually   severe  
penalties  for  drug  offenses."  IATSHE  
The  required  procedure  on  the  seizure  and  custody  
of  drugs  is  embodied  in  Section  21,  paragraph  1,  Article  II  of  
R.A.  No.  9165,  which  states:  
1)

The   apprehending   team   having  
initial   custody   and   control   of   the  
drugs   shall,   immediately   after  
seizure   and   confiscation,   physically  
inventory   and   photograph   the  
same  in  the  presence  of:  
a.  the   accused   or   the   person/s  
from   whom   such   items   were  
confiscated   and/or   seized,   or  
his/her   representative   or  
counsel,    
b. a   representative   from   the  
media    
c. and   the   Department   of   Justice  
(DOJ),    
d. and   any   elected   public   official  
who   shall   be   required   to   sign  
the  copies  of  the  inventory  and  
be   given   a   copy   thereof.  
[Emphasis  ours]  

This  is  implemented  by  Section  21  (a),  Article  II  of  
the  Implementing  Rules  and  Regulations  of  R.A.  No.  9165,  
which  reads:  
(a)   The   apprehending   officer/team  
having  initial  custody  and  control  of  the  
drugs   shall,   immediately   after   seizure  
and   confiscation,   physically   inventory  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

The   records   of   the   present   case   are   bereft   of   evidence  
showing   that   the   buy-­‐bust   team   followed   the   outlined  
procedure   despite   its   mandatory   terms,   as   indicated   by   the  
use  of  "shall"  in  its  directives.  
The  deficiency  is  patent  from  the  following  exchanges  at  the  
trial:  
A:  We  turn  [sic]  him  over  to  the  Desk  Officer.  
 

Q:  

 

A:  

 What  did  you  turn  over?  

 The  accused  and  the  evidences

Q:   Before   you   turn   over   that   plastic  
sachet   Mr.   Witness,   what   did  
you  put  there?  
 

A:  

 I  put  my  initial  and  initial  of  the  accused.  

Other   than   the   markings   that   SPO2   Sevilla   alleged,  
it   is   clear   that   no   physical   inventory   and   no   photograph   of  
the  seized  items  were  taken  in  the  presence  of  the  accused  
or   his   counsel,   a   representative   from   the   media   and   the  
Department   of   Justice   (DOJ),   and   an   elective   official.   Based  
on   the   above   testimony,   SPO2   Sevilla   —   the   prosecution's  
lone   witness   —   also   did   not   mark   the   plastic   sachet   of   shabu  
immediately  upon  seizure;  it  was  only  marked  upon  arrival  at  
the  police  station.  Thus,  other  than  the  stipulation  regarding  
the   handling   and   results   of   the   specimen   at   the   forensic  
laboratory,   SPO2   Sevilla's   testimony   and   the   evidence   he  
identified   constitute   the   totality   of   the   evidence   for   the  
prosecution  on  the  handling  of  the  allegedly  seized  items.  
16  

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   however.   Likewise.  For  this  reason.   1.   9165   is   not   necessarily   fatal   to   the   prosecution's   case.   Series   of   2002   30   which   implements   R.  and   how   the   latter   handled   these   materials.   coupled   with   the   presentation   in   court   of   evidence   of   corpus   delicti   —   the   body  of  the  crime  whose  core  is  the  confiscated  illicit  drug.     Implicit   in   all   these   is   the   need   for   proof   that   the   transaction   or   sale   actually   took   place.   must   be   recognized   and   explained   in   terms   of   their   justifiable   grounds   and   the   integrity   and   evidentiary   value   of   the   evidence  seized  must  be  shown  to  have  been  preserved.   No   reference   was   ever   made   to   the   person   who   submitted   the   seized   specimen   to   the   PNP   Crime   Laboratory   for   examination.   such   as   narcotics   in   a   trial   of   drug   case.  9165.E.   must   account   for   the   custody   of   the   evidence   from   the   moment   in   which   it   reaches   his   custody   until   the   Rheland  S.   the  date  and  time  when  such  transfer  of   custody   were   made   in   the   course   of   safekeeping   and   use   in   court   as   evidence.   Significantly.  In  a  long  line  of  cases.   Such  is  evident  in  the  following  testimony:   Q:   By   the   way   Mr.     Black's   Law   Dictionary   explains   chain   of   custody   in   this  wise:   In   evidence.  No.   26   Proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt   demands   that   unwavering   exactitude   be   observed   in   establishing   the   corpus   delicti:   every   fact   necessary   to   constitute   the   crime   must   be   established.  the   elements   necessary   in   every   prosecution   for   the   illegal   sale   of  shabu  are:     (1)   the   identity   of   the   buyer   and   the   seller.   the   one   who   offers   real   evidence.A.     The  "chain  of  custody"  over  the  confiscated  items  was  not   proven   Under  Section  5.   People   32   is   particularly   instructive   on   how   we   expect   the   chain   of   custody   or   "movement"   of   the   seized   evidence   to   be   maintained   and   why  this  must  be  shown  by  evidence:   17   .  9165  defines  "chain  of  custody"  as  follows:   "Chain   of   Custody"   means   the   duly   recorded   authorized   movements   and   custody   of   seized   drugs   or   controlled   chemicals   or   plant   sources   of   dangerous   drugs   or   laboratory   equipment   of   each   stage.  and  the  final  disposition.  Servacio.   The   chain   of   custody   requirement   performs   this   function   in   buy-­‐bust   operations   as   it   ensures   that   doubts   concerning   the   identity   of   the   evidence   are   removed.  9165  may  not  always   be  possible  under  field  conditions.   this   was   the   only   testimony   in   the   case   that   touched   on   the   chain   of   custody   of   the   seized   evidence.  No.   the   object  and  the  consideration.  we  have  considered  it  fatal   for   the   prosecution   to   fail   to   prove   that   the   specimen   submitted   for   laboratory   examination   was   the   same   one   allegedly  seized  from  the  accused.   Likewise.   police   procedures   in   the   handling  of  confiscated  evidence  may  still  have  some  lapses.   Thus.   No.   353   Mass.  the  media  or  an  elected  official   alone  can  be  problematic.   shall  not  render  void  and  invalid  such  seizures  of  and  custody   over   said   items".  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     moment   in   which   it   is   offered   in   evidence.   It   failed   to   disclose   the   identities   of   the   desk   officer   and   the   investigator  to  whom  the  custody  of  the  drugs  was  given.  and   (2)   the   delivery   of   the   thing   sold   and   the   payment   therefor.   No.  the  police  operates  under   varied   conditions.   White.A.   did   you   happen   to   know   where   the   investigator  brought  the  plastic  sachet?     A:  I  gave  that  plastic  sachet  first  to  the  table  of  the   Desk   Officer   and   the   Desk   Officer   gave   it   to   the   investigator.   many   of   them   far   from   ideal.  2015-­‐2016   We   recognize   that   the   strict   compliance   with   the   requirements  of  Section  21  of  R.   and   cannot   at  all  times  attend  to  all  the  niceties  of  the  procedures  in  the   handling   of   confiscated   evidence.Y.  Article  II  25  of  R.   Section   1   (b)   of   Dangerous   Drugs   Board   Regulation   No.  as  long  as   the   integrity   and   the   evidentiary   value   of   the   seized   items   are   properly   preserved   by   the   apprehending   officer/team.   Such  record  of  movements  and  custody   of   seized   item   shall   include   the   identity   and   signature   of   the   person   who   held   temporary   custody   of   the   seized   item.   232   N.   409.   Com.   These   lapses.   Witness   after   you   turned   over   to   the   investigator   the   plastic   sachet.2d  335.A.   as   in   the   present   case.   V.  the  last  sentence   of   the   implementing   rules   provides   that   "non-­‐compliance   with  these  requirements  under  justifiable  grounds.   no   one   testified   on   how   the   specimen   was   handled   after   the   chemical  analysis  by  the  forensic  chemist.  and  such  evidence  goes  to  the   weight   not   to   admissibility   of   evidence.   The   participation   of   a   representative  from  the  DOJ.A.   non-­‐compliance   with   the   strict   directive   of   Section   21   of   R.   The   recent   case   of   Lopez   v.   from   the   time   of   seizure/confiscation   to   receipt   in   the   forensic   laboratory   to   safekeeping   to   presentation   in   court   for   destruction.

  That   the   prosecution   offered   in   evidence   the   request  for  laboratory  examination   (Exh.Y.   These   witnesses   would   then   describe   the   precautions   taken   to   ensure   that   there   had   been   no   change  in  the  condition  of  the  item  and   no  opportunity  for  someone  not  in  the   chain  to  have  possession  of  the  same.   where   it   was   and   what   happened   to   it   while   in   the   witness'   possession.  or     when   its   condition   at   the   time   of   testing   or   trial   is   critical.  or     when  a  witness  has  failed  to  observe  its  uniqueness   in   case   the   evidence   is   susceptible   to   alteration.   All   that   these   exhibits   proved   were   the   existence   and   authenticity   of   the   request   for   laboratory   examination   and   the   results   of   this   examination.  from  the  moment  the   item   was   picked   up   to   the   time   it   is   offered   into   evidence.   In   other   words.   "A").   further   that   non-­‐compliance   with   these   requirements   under   justifiable   grounds.   the   initial   laboratory   report   (Exh.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  an   unbroken   chain   of   custody   becomes   indispensable   and   essential  when:     1.   Provided.   as   long   as   the   integrity   and   the   evidentiary   value   of   the  seized  items  are  properly  preserved   by  the  apprehending  officer/team.   Evidently.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     beyond  reasonable  doubt  the  indispensable  element  of   corpus  delicti  of  the  crime.  D366-­‐03  (Exh.   the   chain   of   custody   rule   requires   that   the  admission  of  an  exhibit  be  preceded   by   evidence   sufficient   to   support   a   finding   that   the   matter   in   question   is   what   the   proponent   claims   it   to   be.   On   the   other   hand.   While   testimony   about   a   perfect   chain   is   not   always   the   standard  because  it  is  almost  always  impossible  to  obtain.   the   physical  inventory  and  photograph  must  be  conducted  in  the   place   where   the   search   warrant   was   served.   tampering.   .   the   venues   of   the   physical   inventory   and   photography   of   the   seized   items   differ   and   depend   on   whether  the  seizure  was  made  by  virtue  of  a  search  warrant   or   through   a   warrantless   seizure   such   as   a   buy-­‐bust   operation.  No."   the   second   sentence   makes   a   distinction   between   warrantless   seizures   and   seizures   by   virtue   of   a   warrant.  shall   not   render   void   and   invalid   such   seizures  of  and  custody  over  said  items.   .  immediately  after  seizure  and   confiscation.  "C").  physically  inventory  and  photograph  the  same.  to  which   the  defense  did  not  object. 3.   alteration   or   tampering   —  without  regard  to  whether  the  same  is  advertent   or  otherwise  not  —  dictates  the  level  of  strictness  in   the  application  of  the  chain  of  custody  rule.   the   condition   in   which  it  was  received  and  the  condition   in   which   it   was   delivered   to   the   next   link   in   the   chain.   It   would   include   testimony   about   every   link  in  the  chain.   the   exhibit's   level   of   susceptibility   to   fungibility.     Physical   inventory   and   photograph   requirement   under   Section  21   vis-­‐a-­‐vis  "marking"  of  seized  evidence   While   the   first   sentence   of   Section   21   (a)   of   the   Implementing  Rules  and  Regulations  of  R.   in   such   a   way   that   every   person   who   touched   the   exhibit   would   describe   how   and   from   whom   it   was   received.   the   prosecution   has   not   proven   Rheland  S. the   item   of   real   evidence   is   not   distinctive   and   is   not   really  identifiable.   [Emphasis  supplied]   Thus.  2015-­‐2016   As   a   method   of   authenticating   evidence.  Servacio.   Provided.   whichever   is   practicable.   thus:  ASHaTc   (a)   .   contamination   and   even   substitution   and   exchange.   18   .   In   seizures   covered   by   search   warrants.   whichever   is   practicable.   not  the  required  chain  of  custody  from  the  time  of  seizure  of   the   evidence.   that   the   physical   inventory   and   photograph   shall  be  conducted     st (1  priority)   at   the   place   where   the   search   warrant   is  served.   and  final  Chemistry  Report  No. 4.  has  no  bearing  on  the  question  of   whether   the   specimen   submitted   for   chemical   analysis   and   subsequently   presented   in   court   was   the   same   as   that   seized   from   the   appellant.  9165  states   that   "the   apprehending   officer/team   having   initial   custody   and  control  of  the  drugs  shall.   in   case   of   warrantless   seizures. 2.A.   "B").   the   physical   inventory   and   photograph   shall   be   conducted   at   the   nearest   police   station   or   office   of   the   apprehending   officer/team.   in   case   of   warrantless   seizures   such   as   a   buy-­‐bust   operation.  or     nd (2   priority   –   only   in   cases   of   warrantless  seizures)   at   the   nearest   police   station   or   at   the   nearest   office   of   the   apprehending   officer/team.

  or   of   any   elected   public   official.     Issue:   In   this   appeal.   9165   when   the   dangerous   drugs   are   missing   but   also   when   there   are   substantial   gaps   in   the   chain   of   custody   of   the   seized   dangerous   drugs   that   raise   doubts   about   the   authenticity   of   the   evidence   presented  in  court. The   State   did   not   satisfactorily   explain   substantial   lapses  committed  by  the  buy-­‐bust  team  in  the  chain   of   custody. Here.   Consistency   with   the   "chain   of   custody"   rule   requires   that   the   "marking"   of   the   seized  items  —  to  truly  ensure  that  they  are  the  same  items   that   enter   the   chain   and   are   eventually   the   ones   offered   in   evidence   —   should   be   done   (1)   in   the   presence   of   the   apprehended   violator   (2)   immediately   upon   confiscation.  known  under  RA  No.   as   well   as   during   the   physical   inventory   and   photographing   of   the   contraband.   Thereafter.   13   the   dangerous   drugs   are   themselves   the   corpus   delicti.   and   of   protecting   as   well  the  apprehending  officers  from  harassment  suits  based   on   planting   of   evidence   under   Section   29   36   and   on   allegations  of  robbery  or  theft.   PEOPLE V.    Accused  is  hereby  acquitted.   I.   Hence.   the   guilt   of   the   accused   for   the   crime   charged   was   not   established   beyond   reasonable  doubt   The  presentation  of  the  dangerous  drugs  as  evidence  in  court   is   material   if   not   indispensable   in   every   prosecution   for   the   illegal   sale   of   dangerous   drugs.   Such   presence   was   precisely   necessary   to   insulate   the   apprehension   and   incrimination   proceedings   from   any   taint   of   illegitimacy   or   irregularity.   Diocena)   shabu   for   a   marked   money   of   P500.   hence.   Diocena   marked   the   first   two   'LEM-­‐1'   and   'LEM2'while  the  one  taken  after  the  frisk  he  marked  'LEM-­‐3'   Accused  was  convicted  by  the  lower  courts.   nothing   prevents   the   apprehending   officer/team   from   immediately   conducting   the   physical   inventory   and   photography   of   the   items   at   the   place   where   they   were   seized.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     11  of  RA  No.  hence:  HITAEC   To   discharge   its   duty   of   establishing   the   guilt   of   the   accused   beyond   reasonable   doubt.     After   frisking   him.  9165  as  the  chain   of   custody.   the   accused   presents   the   lone   issue   of   whether   the   CA   erred   in   finding   him   guilty   beyond   reasonable   doubt   of   the   violations   of   Section   5   and   Section   Rheland  S.  2015-­‐2016   however.   What   Section   21   of   R.00   which   occurred   when   the   police   organized   a   buy-­‐bust   operation.   as   it   is   more   in   keeping   with   the   law's   intent   of   preserving  their  integrity  and  evidentiary  value.   performs   the   function   of   ensuring   that   unnecessary   doubts   concerning   the   identity   of   the   evidence   are   removed.   If   the   physical   inventory   and   photograph   are   made   at   the   nearest   police   station   or   office   as   allowed   by   the   rules.   the   State   did   not   show   the   presence   during   the   seizure   and   confiscation   of   the   contraband.   of   the   representatives  from  the  media  or   the   Department   of   Justice.  9165.  37   For  greater  specificity.  the  Prosecution  does   not   comply   with   the   indispensable   requirement   of   proving  the  violation  of  Section  5  of  Republic  Act  No.   That   proof   is   vital   to   a   judgment   of   conviction.   this   is   in   keeping   with   the   desired   level   of   integrity   that   the   handling   process   requires.  the  apprehended  violator  or  counsel   must   be   present.  On  the  other  hand.Y.   9165   and   its   implementing   rule   do   not   expressly   specify   is   the   matter   of   "marking"   of   the   seized   items   in   warrantless   seizures   to   ensure   that   the   evidence   seized   upon   apprehension   is   the   same   evidence   subjected   to   inventory   and   photography   when   these   activities   are   undertaken   at   the   police   station   rather   than   at   the   place   of   arrest.  "marking"  means  the  placing   by   the   apprehending   officer   or   the   poseur-­‐buyer   of   his/her   initials   and   signature   on   the   item/s   seized.A.   Catalan. MENDOZA   Accused  was  charged  of  selling  to  a  poseur  buyer  (PO1  Arnel   D.   Again.   38   the   inventory   and   photography   of   the   seized   items   must   be   made   in   accordance   with   Sec.   therefore.  it  did.   2   of   Board   Resolution   No.  this  appeal  was  made.  This   rigorous  requirement.   The   evidence   bag   or   container   shall   accordingly   be   signed   by   the  handling  officer  and  turned  over  to  the  next  officer  in  the   chain  of  custody.  Servacio.   As   such.   the   Prosecution   must   prove   the   corpus   delicti.   This  step  initiates  the  process  of  protecting  innocent  persons   from   dubious   and   concocted   searches.       • It   is   notable   that   PO1   Diocena.     An   examination   of   the   records   reveals   that   the   buy-­‐bust   team  did  not  observe  the  statutory  procedures  on  preserving   the  chain  of  custody.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   they   recovered   another   sachet   of   shabu   from   him.   Series   of   2002.   No.     1.   the   seized   items   shall   be   placed   in   an   envelope   or  an  evidence  bag  unless  the  type  and  quantity  of  the  seized   items  require  a  different  type  of  handling  and/or  container.   the   identity   of   the   dangerous   drugs   should   be   established   beyond   doubt   by   showing  that  the  dangerous  drugs  offered  in  court  were  the   same  substances  bought  during  the  buy-­‐bust  operation.  39  but   in  every  case.   1.   although   19   .   12   As   the   Court   has   expounded   i   n   People   v.   HELD:  YES.

  that   the   buy-­‐bust   team.   7   The   items   recovered   inside   appellant's   house   were   one   (1)   big   heat-­‐sealed   transparent   plastic   pack   with   white   crystalline   substance   believed   to   be   shabu. ALCUIZAR Appellant   was   charged   with   violation   of   Sections   5   (illegal   sale).   if   he   had   made   his   marking   in   the   presence   of   the   accused   himself   or   of   his   representative.   or   any   elected   public  official   • In   all.   It   puzzles   the   Court.   2007.   three   (3)   disposable   lighters.   therefore.   two   (2)   packs   containing   thirteen   (13)   decks   each   of   suspected   shabu.  had   conducted   the   physical   inventory   of   the   confiscated   items.   it   became  doubtful  whether   any   shabu   had   been   seized   from   the   accused   at  all.  or  any  member  thereof.  Both  parties  thus  agreed  to  dispense  with   the  testimony  of  the  forensic  chemist   The  lone  witness  for  the  prosecution.   contrary   to   the   claim   of   P/Insp.   authenticity   and   truthfulness   of   the   Forensic   Chemistry  Report.  a  tin  foil  with  traces  of  shabu  residue.   and   August   28.  and  in  the   presence   of   a   representative   from   the   media   or   the   Department   of   Justice.  they   first   conducted   a   buy-­‐bust   operation   in   Sitio   Awayan.   that   the   buy-­‐ bust   team   did   not   prudently   follow   the   procedures   outlined   in   Section   21   (1).   the   defense   admitted   the   genuineness.   who   were  all  assigned  at  the  Municipality  of  Carcar  Police  Station   in   Cebu   City.Y.   when   the   test   buy   was   conducted.   • Without   the   inventory   having  been  made  by  the   Rheland  S.   despite   their   being   experienced   policemen   who  knew  the  significance   of   the   procedures   in   the   preservation   of   the   chain   of  custody   Secondly.   as   the   following   excerpts   from   his   testimony   indicate. specifically   recalling   having   marked   the   confiscated   sachets   of   shabu   with   the   initials   of   the   accused   immediately   after   the   seizure.  6  Upon  the  consummation  of  the  sale.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     III.  Servacio.  E   20   .  a  tooter.  SPO1  Meliton   Agadier  (SPO1  Agadier).   The   State   did   not   explain   this   lapse.   PO3   Rolando   Gantuangco   (PO3   Gantuangco).   And.  testified  on  the  following  facts:   SPO1   Agadier.   thirdly.   6   (maintaining   a   drug   den).  2015-­‐2016   II.  20  it  still  behooved  him  to   justify  why  the  photographs  of  the   seized   shabu   was   not   taken   immediately  upon  the  seizure.  and   at   the   place   of   seizure.   The   subject  of  the  operation  is  appellant.   secured   a   search   warrant   5   from   the   court   to   search  the  house  of  appellant  on  the  suspicion  that  the  latter   is  selling  and  in  possession  of  shabu.   the   records   nowhere   indicated. seizing   lawmen.   We   know   this   because   the   State's   formal   offer   of   evidence   did   not   include   such  inventory.   supra.   did   not   state.   SPO1   Roland   Navales   (SPO1   Navales).   the   buy-­‐bust   team   had   about   48   days   —   the   period   intervening   between   July   10.   Lim.  when  the  crimes   charged   were   committed   —   within   which   to   have   the   media   and   the   Department   of   Justice   be   represented   during   the   buy-­‐bust   operation.   as   well   as   to   invite   an   elected   public   official   of   the   place   of   operation   to   witness   the   operation.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  SPO1  Agadier  and  his  team  went  back  to  the  house   of   appellant   to   conduct   a   search.   although   PO1   Diocena   asserted   that   photographs   of   the   confiscated   items   and   the   marked   money   were   taken   at   the   police   station.  and   an  improvised  lamp.   SPO1   Agadier   was   standing   in   a   store   across   the   house  of  appellant.   The   pictorial   evidence   of   the   latter   kind   would   have   more   firmly   established   the   identity   of   the   seized   shabu   for   purposes   of   preserving  the  chain  of  custody.   After   effecting   the   arrest.  On  15  June  2003.     PEREZ V.  He  witnessed  the  poseur  buyer  hand  the   marked   money   to   appellant   in   exchange   for   one   deck   of   shabu.  SPO1  Agadier   immediately   pursued   appellant.   11   (illegal   possession)   and   12  (illegal  possession  of  dangerous  drug  paraphernalia   During   the   pre-­‐trial   conference.  2007.   who   ran   to   his   parents'   house   where   he   was   eventually   caught.

  They   were   given   sufficient   time   and   opportunity   to   prepare   for   its   implementation.   SPO1   Navales   turned  them  over  to  SPO1   Agadier   for   marking.   SPO1  Agadier  narrated  that  a  certain  photographer   took   pictures   of   the   items   seized   from   the   house   of   appellant.   Article   II   of   the   Implementing   Rules   and   Regulations   of   Republic   Act   No.   D-­‐983-­‐03   was   issued   confirming   that   the   specimen   submitted  are  positive  for  shabu.   This   omission   alone   is   not   necessarily   fatal   to   the   cause  of  the  prosecution.   Controlled   receipt   which   affects   the   integrity   of   the   corpus   delicti   in   general.  The  trial  court  relied  on  the  presumption  that   when   prohibited   drugs   are   found   in   a   house   or   building   belonging   to   and   occupied   by   a   particular   person.   and   several   photographers   were   present   during   the   implementation   of   the   search   warrant.  It  provides:  HcDaAI   Laboratory   Equipment.  Thus.   seized   and/or   surrendered.   9165   that   non-­‐compliance   with   the   prescribed   procedures   does   not   necessarily   result   in   the   conclusion   that   the   identity   of   the   seized   drugs   has   been   compromised  so  that  an  acquittal  should  follow  as  long  as  the   prosecution   can   demonstrate   that   the   integrity   and   evidentiary   value   of   the   evidence   seized   have   been   preserved.   plant   sources   of   dangerous   drugs.     Appellant   also   points   out   the   failure   of   the   police   officers  to  give  or  leave  a  copy  of  the  inventory  receipt  upon   the   accused   or   any   of   his   family   members   pursuant   to   Section  21  of  Republic  Act  No.  Seized.   —   The   PDEA   shall   take   charge   and   have   custody   of   all   dangerous   drugs.   immediately   after   seizure   and   confiscation.   appellant   contends.   This   omission.   for   proper   disposition  in  the  following  manner:   1.   barangay   tanod.   this   contemplates   a   case   of   warrantless   searches   and   seizures.  and/or   the   nagging   doubt   created   in   our   mind   with   respect   to   the   Surrendered   Dangerous   Drugs.  the  police  officers  failed   to   provide   appellant   a   copy   of   the   inventory   receipt.  Servacio.   controlled   precursors   and   essential   chemicals.   renders   the   chain  of  custody  dubious.   as   well   as   instruments/paraphernalia   and/or   laboratory   equipment   so   confiscated.   who   then   delivered  the  items  and  the  request  to  the  Philippine  National   Police  (PNP)  Crime  Laboratory.   Upon   reaching   the   police   station.   But   it   was   provided   further   under   Section   21   (a).   and   any   elected  public  official  who  shall   be   required   to   sign   the   copies   of  the  inventory  and  be  given  a   copy  thereof.  Thus.   Rheland  S.   physically   inventory   and   photograph   the   same   in   the   presence   of   the   accused   or   the   person/s   from   whom   such   items   were   confiscated   and/or   seized.  the  requirement  of  taking  a  photograph  was   not  clearly  proven.  2015-­‐2016   SPO1   Agadier   related   that   appellant.   and   two   (2)   photographers   were   asked   to   sign   the   receipt.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.   The   trial   court   held   that   the   prosecution   has   clearly   proven   that   appellant   was   guilty   of   illegal   possession   of   dangerous  drugs  since  the  plastic  packs  of  shabu  were  found   inside  his  room.   The   seized   items   were   initially   in   the   custody   of   SPO1   Navales.  10  Forensic  Chemistry  Report   No.   Instruments/Paraphernalia   and/or   He  testified:     Section  21.  failure  to  comply  with  the  marking  of   evidence   immediately   after   confiscation   constitutes   a   first   gap  in  the  chain  of  custody.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     21   .  9165  relating  to  custody  and  disposition  of   confiscated  or  seized  dangerous  drugs  accounts  for  a  crucial   link  in  the  chain  of  custody  rule.   one   barangay   captain.  However.   The   apprehending   team   having   initial   custody   and   control   of   the   drugs   shall.   9   A   receipt   of   the   seized   items   was   prepared   and   the   barangay   captain.  the  photograph/s  do  not  appear  on  the   records   nor   were   they   offered   by   the   prosecution   as   evidence.   SPO1   Agadier   admitted   that   he   only   marked   the   seized   items   at   the   police   station.  while  it  was   prepared  and  appeared  on  records.   the   police   officers   were   able   to   secure   a   search   warrant   prior   to   their   operation.  9165.   or   his/her   representative   or   counsel.   o   n   e   barangay   tanod.   Appellant  construed  this  omission  as  fatal.   24   In   this   case.  However.  SPO1   Agadier   prepared   the   request   for   laboratory   examination   before   turning   them   over   back   to   SPO1   Navales.   Precursors   and   Essential   Chemicals.   SPO1   Agadier   did   not   offer   an   explanation   or   a   justification   on   why   he   did   not   immediately   mark   the   plastic   packs   of   shabu   seized   inside   appellant's   house   notwithstanding   that   an   inventory  receipt  was  even  prepared  while  the  police  officers   were   still   inside   the   house   of   appellant.   such   person  is  in  possession  of  such  drugs  in  violation  of  the  law.  this  Court  cannot  ignore    Custody  and  Disposition   of  Confiscated.   Appellant   cites   the   failure   of   the   police   officer   to   mark   the   evidence   immediately   after   purportedly   taking   it   from   him.   a   representative   from   the  media  and  the  Department   of   Justice   (DOJ).   appellant's   sister-­‐in-­‐law.   Adherence   to   the   guidelines   under   Section   21   of   Republic  Act  No.  Anent  the  inventory  receipt.   Plant   barangay   tanod's   testimony   pertaining   to   the   inventory   Sources   of   Dangerous   Drugs.   While   the   rule   allows   marking   of   evidence   to   be   done   in   the   nearest   police   station.

  PO2   Llantino   turned   over   the   A:    No.   And   when   they   reached   appellant's   house.  when  you   testimony.   we   were   not   told   by   the   policemen   but   we   were   told   to   At   around   3:00   o'clock   in   the   afternoon   of   21   sign  before  we  left.   A:    We  were  there  but  we  arrived  the   late  atlleged   han  the   policemen.   they   just   asked   us   to   peso  bill  was  used  for  the  operation.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     22   .   did   they   of  the  drugs  from  the  residence  of  appellant  up  to  the  time  it   recover   shabu   in   that   house   of   was   submitted   to   the   crime   laboratory   constitute   a   huge   and   Alberto  Alcuizar. RIVERA table?   Again  this  is  a  buy-­‐bust  operation.  Servacio.   Mr.     shabu.             sign.   Witness.  25   Carcar  implemented  the  search     Note   from   the   testimony   of   the   barangay   tanod   warrant   against   him   for   that   he   and   the   barangay   captain   arrived   later   than   the   violation   of   RA   9165.   the   barangay   tanod   did   not   witness   how   the   arrived   what   did   you   observe   police   officers   conducted   their   search   and   how   they   were   there   at   the   place   of   Alberto   able   to   discover   the   packets   of   shabu   inside   appellant's   Alcuizar.  to   Confidential   A:   He   told   us   that   the   document   we   PO2   Allan   Llantino   of   the   District   Drug   Enforcement   Unit.   confiscated   plastic   sachet   containing   the   white   crystalline   Q:  You  only  assumed  that  what  was  put   substance   to   the   investigator   who   put   his   markings   "BB"   on   the   table   colored   white   is   (meaning  buy-­‐bust)  and  made  a  laboratory  request.  2015-­‐2016   Q:   On   June   15.   October  2002.   Caloocan   City   that   we   were   there   and   assist   the   one   alias   'Boy'   was   selling   shabu.  Witness.  Mr.  find  no  cogent  reason  to  warrant  the  acquittal   A:    I  only  believe  that  it  was  the  shabu.  sir.  if  you  remember?   house.  however.   Q:  You  were  only  told  by  the  police  that   there  was  shabu  on  top  of  the   PEOPLE V.  a  confidential  informer  personally  appeared  at   Q:    What  is  the  affixing  of  signature  stheir   tands  police   for  according   the  police?  information   was   relayed   to   station.       Accused   and   the   confiscated   drug   was   brought   to   the   Q:    They  never  told  you  that  they  were  Caloocan   able  to  recover   shabu?   Police   Station.   I   do   not   know   relayed   to   the   Chief   of   the   Station   Police.  Witnes?   We.   while   you   were   there   as     Rheland  S.   As   can   be   gleaned   from   his   Q:  Nevertheless.   who   immediately   ordered   PO2   Llantino   to  organize  a  team  to  conduct  a  buy-­‐bust  operation.   you   only   of  the  trial  and  appellate  courts.   Larangay.   vague   recollection   of   SPO1   Agadier   concerning   the   custody   Q:   How   about   the   policemen.  One  marked  one  hundred   A:  They   did   not   also   tell   us.   Q:    What  happened  next  after  you  were  given  flashlights  to  look   Verily.   of   accusedappellant   in   this   case   and   reversal   of   the   findings   Q:   Nevertheless.   A:   No.   Q:    It  was  only  the  policemen  who   pointed   you   the   shabu   on   top   PO2   Llantino   was   designated   as   poseur-­‐buyer   while   the   rest   of  the  table?   of  the  team  served  as  his  back-­‐up.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   signed   was   to   attest   only   that   Northern   Police   District   Office.  Witness?   significant   gap   in   the   chain   of   custody   which   substantially   A:   When   we   arrived   the   alleged   shabu   affects  the  identity  of  the  corpus  delicti.   we   were   told   to   assist   them   in   This  second  gap  in  the  chain  of  custody  was  evident   looking  for  shabu.  the  failure  of  the  police  officers  to  mark  the   for  shabu?  DAEaTS   dangerous   drugs   immediately   after   their   seizure   and   the   A:    I  was  continuously  looking  but  I  did  not  find  any.   Orante.     were   already   on   top   of   the     table.  Mr.Y.   Said   information   was   then   apprehension.   you   thought   all   the   appellant  for  the  illegal  sale  of  shabu.  which  he     did   without   hesitation.   no   other   signatories   A:   When   we   arrived   there   we   were   in   the   receipt   were   presented   by   the   prosecution   to   provided   with   flashlights   and   authenticate  the  document.   Reynaldo   B.   Aside   from   the   barangay   tanod.  The  case  records  support  the   went   there   not   to   the   fact   as   conclusion  that  prosecution  was  able  to  discharge  its  burden   of   establishing   with   moral   certainty   the   presence   of   all   the   witness   to   the   recovery   of   elements   necessary   for   the   conviction   of   herein   accused-­‐ shabu.   the   Anti-­‐ police   officers.   in  SPO1  Agadier's  statements.   2003.   Superintendent   that  it  refers  to  the  shabu.   Drugs  Law?   confiscated   shabu  were  already  on  top  of  a  table.   He  was  merely  asked  to  sign  the  inventory  receipt.  Mr.   could   you   please   witness   wherein   the   policemen   tell  us  whether  you  were  there   went  there?   when   the   police   officers   of     A:    That  is  right.

:   (a)  The  apprehending  team  having  initial   custody   and   control   of   the   drugs   shall.   if   any.   40   Be   that   as   it   may.    dangerous  drugs  is  outlined  in  Section   21. GARCIA Buy  Bust  operation  of  marijuana.   The   dangerous   drug   itself   constitutes   the   very   corpus   delicti   of   the   crime   and   the   fact   of   its   existence   is   vital   to   a   judgment   of   conviction.   Indeed.   coupled   with   the   presentation   in   court   of   the   prohibited   or   regulated   drug   or   the   corpus   delicti  as  evidence.   what   determines   if   there   was   a   sale   of   dangerous   drugs   is   proof   of   the   concurrence   of   all   the   elements  of  the  offense.   immediately   after   seizure   and   confiscation.  and   (3) the   delivery   of   the   thing   sold   and   the   payment   therefor.     What   is   material   is   proof   that   the   transaction   or   sale   actually   took   place.  2015-­‐2016   In   prosecutions   for   illegal   sale   of   prohibited   or   dangerous   drugs.   paragraph   1.   is   NOT   fatal   and   does   not   automatically   render   accused-­‐appellant's   arrest   illegal   or   the   items   seized/confiscated   from   him   inadmissible.  Servacio.  and  the  consideration.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     The   failure   of   the   prosecution   to   show   that   the   police   officers   conducted   the   required   physical   inventory   and   photograph   of   the   evidence   confiscated   pursuant   to   said   guidelines.   physically   inventory   and   photograph   the   same   in   the   presence  of  the  accused  or  the   person/s   from   whom   such   items   were   confiscated   and/or   seized.     Moreover.   the   implementing   rules   offer   some   flexibility   when   a   proviso   added   that   'noncompliance   with   these   requirements   under   justifiable   grounds.  Conviction  is  proper  if  the  following   elements  concur:   counsel.  9165.  Article  II   of   the   Implementing   Rules   and   Regulations   of   Republic   Act   No.   The   existence   of   the   dangerous   drug   is   a   condition   sine   qua   non   for   conviction   for   the   illegal   sale   of   dangerous   drugs.  CTEDSI   The  same  is  implemented  by  Section  21  (a).   further.   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be   required   to   sign   the   copies   of   the   inventory   and   be   given   a   copy   thereof.   or   his/her   representative   or   Rheland  S.   as   long   as   the   integrity   and   the   evidentiary  value  of  the  seized  items  are  properly  preserved   by  the  apprehending  officer/team.   immediately   after   seizure   and   confiscation.   that   non-­‐ compliance   with   these   requirements   under   justifiable   grounds.   or   his/her   representative   or   counsel.   This   Court   can   no   longer   find   out   what   justifiable   reasons   existed.  shall   not   render   void   and   invalid   such   seizures   of   and   custody   over   said   items.   Garcia   and   the   others   arrived   at   the   area   of   operation   for   the   23   .  as  the  same  would  be   utilized  in  the  determination  of  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the   accused.   physically   inventory   and   photograph  the  same  in  the  presence  of   the  accused  or  the  person/s  from  whom   such   items   were   confiscated   and/or   seized.  shall  not  render  void  and   invalid   such   seizures   of   and   custody   over   said   items'.   and   any   elected   public   official   who  shall  be  required  to  sign  the  copies   of   the   inventory   and   be   given   a   copy   thereof:   Provided.Y.   (Emphasis  ours.   9165   which   stipulates:   (1)  The  apprehending  team  having  initial   custody   and   control   of   the   drugs   shall.   as   long   as   the   integrity   and   the   evidentiary   value   of   the  seized  items  are  properly  preserved   by   the   apprehending  officer/team.   a   representative   from   the   media   and   the   Department   of   Justice   (DOJ).   Del   Monte   41   that   what   is   of   utmost   importance   is   the   preservation   of   the   integrity   and   evidentiary  value  of  the  seized  items.   The   chain   of   custody   requirement   performs   the   function   of   ensuring  that  the  integrity  and  evidentiary  value  of  the  seized   items  are  preserved.   Article   II   of   Republic   Act   No.   this   Court   has   explained   in   People   v.   The   same   provision   clearly   states   as   well.   42   Thus.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  viz.   a   representative   from   the   media   and   the   Department   of   Justice   (DOJ).   the   chain   of   custody   is   unbroken   and   thus   the   integrity   and   evidentiary   value   of   the   seized   items   have  been  preserved.   since   the   defense   did   not   raise   this   issue   during   trial.)  IcDHaT   (1) the  identity  of  the  buyer  and  the  seller.   it   is   essential   that   the   identity  of  the  prohibited  drug  be  established  beyond  doubt.   that   it   must   still   be   shown  that  there  exists  justifiable  grounds  and  proof  that  the   integrity  and   evidentiary  value  of  the  evidence  have  been  preserved.     (2) the  object.  so  much  so  that  unnecessary  doubts  as   to  the  identity  of  the  evidence  are  removed     PEOPLE V.

  he  stated  that:   The   first   procedural   safeguard   that   the   police   failed   to  observe  (and  which  both  the  RTC  and  the  CA  failed  to  take   into  account)  is  that  provided  under  paragraph  1.   or   his/her   representative   or   counsel.  that:   (a)   The   apprehending   office/team   having  initial  custody  and  control  of  the   drugs   shall.   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be   required   to   sign   the   copies   of   the   inventory   and   be   given   a   copy   thereof:   Provided.  No.  .  RP-­‐1.]   A:   I   turned   it   over   to   our   investigator   and   then   he   placed   markings   on  the  wrapper.   The   Implementing   Rules   and   Regulations   of   R.   they   tested  positive  for  marijuana   The   lower   courts   convicted   him   of   illegal   possession   of   prohibited  drugs.   .   further   that   non-­‐compliance   with   these   requirements   under   justifiable   grounds.00  bills  earlier  given  for  him   to   use   as   buy-­‐bust   money   .   9165   further   elaborate   on   the   legal   requirement   by   providing.  sir.   No.   who   then   placed   markings   on   the   wrapper.   whose   serial   numbers   were   listed  in  the  dispatch  order  .   8   The   seized   items   were   thereafter   sent   to   the   PNP   Crime   Laboratory   for   examination.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  This  provision  states:   Q:   So   what   happened   to   the   pack   of   marijuana   that   you   were   able   to  buy  from  the  accused?   1)    The  apprehending  team  having  initial  custody   and  control  of  the  drugs  shall.  .   as   long   as   the   integrity   and   the   evidentiary   value   of   the  seized  items  are  properly  preserved   by  the  apprehending  officer/team.  Servacio.   .A.  among  others.  R.    immediately     after     seizure     and     confiscation.  9165  or  the  chain  of   custody  rule  on  seized  drugs.   [Emphasis  supplied.   a   representative   from  the  media  and  the  Department  of  Justice   (DOJ).  No.   as   agreed   upon   between   the   confidential   informer   and   the   accused.  shall   not   render   void   and   invalid   such   seizures  of  and  custody  over  said  items.   physically   inventory   Rheland  S.00.   Garcia   verified   the   contents   thereof   and   thereafter   gave   the   P200.   Is   this   the  marking  that  you  placed?     A:    Yes.  2015-­‐2016   accused   to   arrive   on   board   a   red   scooter.  under  its  Section  21  (a).  He  (PO1  Garcia)  turned   over   the   seized   items   to   the   investigator.  and  any  elected  public  official  who  shall   be  required  to  sign  the  copies  of  the  inventory   and   be   given   a   copy   thereof.   [ISSUE]  Ruiz  Garcia  argues.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     xxx  xxx  xxx   Q:   I   am   handing   to   you   now   the   improvise   [sic]   wrapper.   Article  II  of  R.   the   prosecution   failed   to   show   that   the   police   complied   with   paragraph   1.   they   brought   Ruiz   to  the  DEU  7  office  for  investigation.Y.   a   representative   from   the   media   and   the   Department   of   Justice   (DOJ).   He   also   arrested   the   accused   whom   he   told   of   his   rights   and   brought   him   to   a   lyingin  clinic  and  then  to  the  police  headquarters   and   photograph   the   same   in   the   presence  of  the  accused  or  the  person/s   from   whom   such   items   were   confiscated   and/or   seized.   physically   inventory   and   photograph   the   same   in   the   presence   of   the   accused   or   the   person/s   from   whom   such   items   were   confiscated   and/or   seized.  9165.   or   his/her   representative   or   counsel.  Section  21.   The   procedural   lapse   is   plainly   evident   from   the   testimony   of   PO1  Garcia.  consisting  of  two  P100.   The   accused   in   turn   gave   Garcia   the   marijuana   wrapped   in   a   yellow   page   of   the   PLDT   directory.A.00   worth   of   marijuana.A.   immediately   after   seizure   and   confiscation.   Garcia   told   the   accused   that   he   will   buy   P200.]   According   to   PO1   Garcia.  Garcia  then  gave  the  signal  to   his   companions   for   them   to   approach.   Section   21.   HELD:  Ruiz  is  acquitted  from  the  charge.   [Emphasis   supplied.   The   records   utterly   fail   to   show   that   the   buy-­‐bust   team   complied   with   these   procedures   despite   their   mandatory   nature   as   indicated   by   the   use   of   "shall"   in   the   directives   of   the   law   and   its   implementing   rules.   Article   II   of   R.   9165.   after   the   arrest.  ITcCSA   Testifying  on  the  handling  of  the  seized  marijuana.   and   with   the   chain   of   evidence   requirement   of  this  Act.   xxx  xxx  xxx   Q:   What   happened   after   you   have   seized   the   item   from   the   accused   or   after   you   have   recovered  this  and  placing  [sic]   markings?   A:    It   was   sent   to   the   PNP   Crime   24   .   Specifically.   No.  that:  (f)  there  was   no  compliance  with  Section  21.A.

    Pp vs Casimiro   FACTS:     On   August   16.   from   the   time   of   seizure/confiscation   to   receipt   in   the   forensic   laboratory   to   safekeeping   to   presentation   in   court   for   destruction.   (c)    The  subsequent  links  in  the  chain  of  custody   The  evidence  on  record  relating  to  the  subsequent   links  in  the  chain  of  custody  —  from  the  police  inspector  to   the  PNP  Crime  Laboratory  —  did  not  identify  the  person  who   submitted  the  seized  marijuana  to  the  PNP  Crime  Laboratory   for   examination.   walked   into   the   office   of   Police   Chief   Inspector   Benson   Dagiw-­‐a   Leleng   at   the   14th   Regional   Narcotics   Office.A.   Although   a   reading   of   the   Memorandum   dated   February   28.   no   mention  whatsoever  was  made  on  whether   the  marking  had  been  done  in  the  presence   of  Ruiz  or  his  representatives.   Only   PO1   Garcia  testified  to  this  link.  accused-­‐appellant  herein.   The   records   utterly   fail   to   show   that   the   buy-­‐bust   team   complied   with   these   procedures   despite   their   mandatory   nature   as   indicated   by   the   use   of   "shall"   in   the   directives   of   the  law  and  its  implementing  rules.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  and  the  final  disposition.   no   mention   was   made   that   any   representative   from   the   media   and   the   Department   of   Justice.   As   proof.  2015-­‐2016   Laboratory   for   examination.   while   there   was   marking   made.  Sections  3  46  and  6  47  (paragraph  8)   of   Dangerous   Drugs   Board   Regulation   No.     Also.Y.   Series   of   2003   48   require   laboratory   personnel   to   document   the   chain   of   custody  each  time  a  specimen  is  handled  or  transferred  until   the  specimen  is  disposed.  At  the  same   time.  was  engaged  in   the   distribution   or   sale   of   marijuana.   Rose   told   the  police  officers  to  wait  and  accused-­‐appellant  would  call   them  up  on  that  day.  Accused-­‐appellant.   DPS   Compound   in   Baguio   City.   The   available   records   in   the   case   fail   to   show   compliance   with  this  regulation.   this   piece   of   evidence   does   not   establish   the   latter's   identity   as   the   police   inspector   to   whom   PO1   Garcia   turned   over   the   marijuana.  Nonetheless.  prepared  the  request   for   the   laboratory   examination   of   the   seized   marijuana   to   the   PNP   Crime   Laboratory.  In  the  interim.  DTEHIA   (b)   Thus.   In  this  regard.   a   civilian   informer.   "Chain   of   Custody"   means   the   duly   recorded   authorized   movements   and   custody   of   seized   drugs   or   controlled   chemicals   or   plant   sources   of   dangerous   drugs   or   laboratory   equipment   of   each   stage.   Whether   it   was   the   Police   Inspector   Chief   SDEU  is  not  clear  from  the  evidence  that  only  shows  that  he   signed   the   request   for   the   laboratory   examination   of   the   seized  marijuana  to  the  PNP  Crime  Laboratory.  did  not   call  up.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira      The  second  link  in  the  chain  of  custody   The   second   link   in   the   chain   of   custody   of   the   seized   marijuana   is   from   PO1   Garcia   to   the   police   investigator.  however.  as  Police  Inspector  Chief  SDEU.  he  only  marked  it  at  the  police  station  when  he  turned   it  over  to  the  investigator.   No.  and     no   photograph   of   the   seized   items   was   taken  in  the  presence  of  the  accused  under   the   circumstances   required   by   R.   (a)    The  first  crucial  link  in  the  chain  of  custody   The   first   crucial   link   was   from   the   time   the   marijuana   was   seized   by   PO1   Garcia   to   its   delivery   to   the   police   investigator   at   the   police   headquarters.   other   than   the   markings   made   by   PO1   Garcia   and   the   police  investigator  (whose  identity  was  not  disclosed).   1999.  From  his  own  testimony.   2.     Also.   She   informed   Chief   Inspector   Leleng   and   PO3   Juan   Piggangay   that   a   certain   Albert  Casimiro.   Such  record  of  movements  and  custody   of   seized   item   shall   include   the   identity   and   signature   of   the   person   who   held   temporary   custody   of   the   seized   item.   named   Rose.  23   laboratory   crime   scene   to   the   lying-­‐in   center.   or   any   elected   official   had   been   present   during   this   inventory.   and   from   the   lying-­‐in   center  to  the  police  station.   9165  and  its  implementing  rules.  he  and  the  rest  of   the   buy-­‐bust   team   had   taken   Ruiz   to   a   lying-­‐in   clinic   for   medical   examination.   The   identity   of   this   police   investigator   to   whom   the  custody  of  the  seized  marijuana  was  turned  over  was  not   disclosed.   The   evidence   does   not   show   who   was   in   possession   of   the   marijuana   during   the   ride   from   the   Rheland  S.   and   who   subsequently   made   the   corresponding   markings   on   the   seized  items.  he  did   not  mark  the  seized  marijuana  after  it  was  handed  to  him  by   Ruiz.   2003   shows   that   a   certain   Ferdinand   Lavadia   Balgoa.  The  board  regulation  also  requires   the  identification  of  the  individuals  participating  in  the  chain.  after  it  was  chemically   analyzed   pending   its   presentation   in   court.   the  date  and  time  when  such  transfer  of   custody   were   made   in   the   course   of   safekeeping   and   used   in   court   as   evidence.   25   .   the   identity   of   the   person   who   had   the   custody   and   safekeeping  of  the  seized  marijuana.   or   that   any   of   these   people   had   been   required   to   sign   the   copies   of   the   inventory.  Servacio.   was   also   not   disclosed.  Police  Chief  Inspector  Leleng  formed   a  buy-­‐bust  team.     Ø Ø Ø Ø no  physical  inventory  was  ever  made  in  the   presence  of  the  accused.

    In   this   case.   The   policemen   prepared   a   booking   sheet   and   arrest   report.   August   17.     Third.   Rose   could   simply   introduce   PO2   Supa   as   the   one   who  wanted  to  buy  marijuana  as  if  the  latter  were  buying   something   not   prohibited   or   illegal.   The   discrepancy   in   the   testimony   of   these   two   police   officers   casts   additional   doubt   on   the   identity   of   the   prohibited  drug  which  constitutes  the  corpus  delicti.   Rose   again   told   the   Narcotics   agents   to   wait   for   a   call   from   accused-­‐ appellant.00   with   him   and   asked   for   the   marijuana.     First.     this   Court   ruled   that   the   failure  to  prove  that  the  specimen  of  marijuana  examined   by   the   forensic   chemist   was   that   seized   from   the   accused   was  fatal  to  the  prosecution's  case.     On   August   18.   After   arresting   accused-­‐appellant.   these   transactions   are   usually   done   face   to   face.   the   bag   that   he   saw   accused-­‐appellant   give   PO2   Supa   was   colored   gray   or   blue.   He   testified   that   he   no   longer   gave   the   marked   money   to   accused-­‐appellant   because   he   placed   the   latter   under   arrest.   The   narcotics   field   test.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     appellant   admitted   that   he   delivered   a   prohibited   drug   to   another.   PO2   Supa   said   he   wanted   to   buy   one   kilogram   of   marijuana   and   accused-­‐ appellant  said  it  would  cost  P1.  however.   SPO2   Madlon..   was   likewise  not  conducted  at  the  scene  of  the  crime.     26   .   he   found   that   it   was   accused-­‐   appellant   who   was   calling.   the   same   color   as   that   of   the   bag   sent   to   the   PNP   Crime   Laboratory   Service   for   laboratory   examination.   the   policemen   took  him  to  the  14th  Narcom  Office.   The   dried   leaves   were   then   examined  by  the  PNP  Crime  Laboratory  Service.   Dismuke.  After  determining  from   its   appearance   and   smell   that   the   object   inside   was   marijuana.   accused-­‐appellant  arrived.  that  the  bag  of  marijuana  which  accused-­‐ appellant  was  carrying  in  the  grocery  was  colored  brown.  2015-­‐2016   The   following   day.  SPO2  Madlon  and   PO3   Piggangay   waited   secretly   inside   the   Post   Office   building.   While   drugs   may   indeed   be   sold   to   police   officers.     RULING:     Yes.   which   initially   identified   the   seized   item   as   marijuana.   They   also   prepared  a  "receipt  of  property  seized.     ISSUE:   WON   the   evidence   against   the   accused   is   insufficient  to  prove  his  guilt  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  It  is   inadmissible   in   evidence.   while   the   back-­‐up   team   ran   from   across   the   streets.   reciting   to   him   his   rights.   the   following   day.   the   receipt   states   that   a   brick   of   dried   marijuana   leaves   was   delivered   by   the   suspect  to  a  poseur  buyer  and  signed  by  accused-­‐appellant   Albert  Casimiro  as  "  suspect/  owner.   An   uncounseled   statement   is   presumed   by   the   Constitution   to   be   psychologically   coerced.   True   enough.   he   could   not   have   been   so   careless   as   to   call   the   telephone   number   of   the   14th   Regional   Narcotics   Office   and   offer   marijuana   to   the   policemen   there.m.Y.  "  In  effect.   Accused-­‐   appellant   gave   the   poseur-­‐buyer   a   paper   bag.   affidavits."     Accused-­‐appellant   signed   the   receipt   without   the   assistance   of   counsel.   It   is   improbable   that   a   drug   dealer  would  discuss  the  details  of  an  illegal  sale  over  the   telephone  with  someone  he  has  never  seen  before.   Nor   is   there   other   credible   evidence   against   accused-­‐appellant.  the  suspect  needs  the   guiding  hand  of  counsel.m.   1999.   the   telephone   rang.   PO2   Supa   stated.   the   prosecution   failed   to   prove   the   crucial   first   link   in   the   chain   of   custody.     In   People   v.     The   trial   court   rendered   a   decision   finding   accused-­‐appellant  guilty  of  the  crime  charged.   which   is   an   offense   under   the   law.  SPO2   Madlon.   and   PO3   Piggangay   admitted   they   did   not   write   their   initials   on   the   brick   of   marijuana   immediately   after   allegedly   seizing   it   from   accused-­‐appellant  outside  the  grocery  store  but  only  did  so   in   their   headquarters.   it   cannot   be   accepted  as  proof  that  marijuana  was  seized  from  him.   and   PO3   Piggangay   wrote   their   initials   on   the   brick   of   marijuana   before   giving   it   to   the   evidence   custodian.   PO2   Supa  and  Rose  went  to  the  grocery  store.   around   12   meters   across   the   street.     According   to   PO3   Piggangay.500.   where   they   could   see   PO2   Supa   and   Rose.  where  PO2  Supa.  Cordillera   Administrative  Region.   Nor   can   we   believe   that   when   accused-­‐appellant   finally   showed   up   at   the   appointed   place.00.   Rose   introduced   on   the   telephone   PO2   Supa   to   accused-­‐   appellant   as   someone   who   wanted   to   buy   marijuana..   Having   been   made   without   the   assistance   of   counsel.   The   prosecution   witnesses   PO2   Supa.   1999.   at   around   4:00   p.   at   around   1:00   p.   which   contained   an   object   wrapped  in  plastic  and  newspaper.     PO2   Supa   said   he   had   P1.  There  is  thus  reasonable  doubt  as  to   whether   the   item   allegedly   seized   from   accused-­‐appellant   is   the   same   brick   of   marijuana   marked   by   the   policemen   in   their   headquarters   and   given   by   them   to   the   crime   laboratory  for  examination.  an  essential  requirement  in  a   drug-­‐  related  case.  but  only   at  the  narcotics  office.m..  accused  -­‐   Rheland  S.   and   a   request   for   the   laboratory   examination   of   the   confiscated   marijuana.     Second.   At   around   1:30   p.   The   prosecution   failed   to   establish   the   identity   of   the   prohibited   drug   which   constitutes   the   corpus  delicti  of  the  offense.   Accused-­‐appellant   allegedly   agreed   to   meet   PO2   Supa   at   around   1:00   p.500.  PO2  Supa  gave  a  signal  for  the  back-­‐up  team  to   make   an   arrest   by   combing   his   hair.   When   PO2   Supa   answered   the   telephone.   With   respect   to   the   receipt   of   property   seized   from   accused-­‐appellant.   As   he   points   out.  Servacio.   Swept   into   an   unfamiliar   environment   and   surrounded   by   intimidating   figures   typical   of   the   atmosphere  of  a  police  interrogation.m.

 are  admissible  as  part  of  the  res   gestae.   through   its   authorized   agent.  Statements   then.  The  excitement  had  not  as  yet  died  down.   Cuento.   the   defendant.     For.   If   it   were   really   true   that  no  such  entry  was  made.   Carrascoso   and   pacified   Mr.   issued   to   plaintiff   a   'first   class'   round   trip   airplane   ticket   from   Manila   to   Rome.   who.   the   duplicates   to   the   customers.     On   March   28.  the  deposition  of  the  purser   could  have  cleared  up  the  matter.     Petitioner   assails   respondent   court's   award   of   moral   damages   and   that   the   decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals  fails  to  make  a  finding  of  bad  faith.  the  plaintiff.  and   according  to  said  witness  the  original  invoices  were  sent  to   the   Manila   office   of   the   company.  they  grow  "out  of  the  nervous  excitement  and   mental   and   physical   condition   of   the   declarant".   It  thus  escapes  the  operation  of  the  hearsay  rule.  Cuento.   From   Manila   to   Bangkok.   Cebu  City.   and   that   the   captain   refused   to   intervene"   is   predicated   upon   evidence   [Carrascoso's   testimony  above]  which  is  incompetent.   1958.Y.  many  of   the   Filipino   passengers   got   nervous   in   the   tourist   class.   two   carbons   were   used   between   the   three   sheets.  a  commotion   ensued.   refused.   And.   and   related   to   the   circumstances   of   the   ouster   incident.   when  they  found  out  that  Mr.   the  Manager  alleged.   Carrascoso   to   give   his   seat   to   the   'white   man.  1958.  in  this  environment.   so  that  the  duplicates  and  the  triplicates  were  filled  out  by   the   used   of   the   carbons   in   the   course   of   the   preparation   27   .   there   was   a   'white   man'.   Its   trustworthiness   has   been   guaranteed.  according  to  said  Ernesto  G.   corroborated  by  the  corresponding  entry  made  by  the   purser  of  the  plane  in  his  NOTEBOOK   ISSUE:   incompetent   WON   Carrascoso’s   testimony   Rheland  S.  Carrascoso  was  having  a  hot   discussion   with   the   white   man   [manager].  therefore.     Air france vs carascoso   FACTS:   Plaintiff.   no   such   distributions   of   such   relief   and   supplies   as   valued  and  supposedly  purchased  by  said  Pacita  Madrigal   Gonzalez   in   the   public   and   official   documents   had   ever   been  made.   Witness   further   explained   that   in   preparing   receipts   for   sales.   and   was   transferred   to   the   tourist   class   not   only   without   his   consent   but   against   his   will.   Magallanes   corner   Jakosalem.   so   that   the   triplicate   copies   remained   in   the   booklet.  2015-­‐2016     We   do   not   think   so.   It   would   have   been   an   easy   matter   for   petitioner   to   have   contradicted   Carrascoso's   testimony.     In   order   to   prove   the   charge   of   falsification.   the   entry   was   made   outside   the   Philippines.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     RULING:   was   When   the   dialogue   happened.   in   the   words   of   the   witness   Ernesto   G.   by   an   employee   of   petitioner.  the  Manager  of  the   defendant   airline   forced   plaintiff   to   vacate   the   'first   class'   seat   that   he   was   occupying   because.  as  was  to   be   expected.  Servacio.     We.     PP vs Tan FACTS:   Respondents   Pacita   Madrigal-­‐Gonzales   and   others   are   charged   with   the   crime   of   falsification   of   public   documents.  and.   Testimony   of   the   entry   does  not  come  within  the  proscription  of  the  best  evidence   rule.   and   told   defendant's   Manager   that   his  seat  would  be  taken  over  his  dead  body.   the   prosecution   presented   to   a   witness   a   booklet   of   receipts   of   the   Metro   Drug   Corporation..   has   been   sufficiently   established   by   plaintiff   in   his   testimony   before   the   court.  hold  that  the  transcribed  testimony   of  Carrascoso  is  admissible  in  evidence.   by   having   made   it   appear   that   certain   relief   supplies   and/or   merchandise   were   purchased   by   Pacita   Madrigal-­‐Gonzales  for  distribution  to  calamity  indigents  or   sufferers.   the   impact   of   the   startling   occurrence   was   still   fresh   and   continued   to   be   felt.  but  at  Bangkok.   when   in   fact   and   in   truth.   in   such   quantities   and   at   such   prices   and   from   such   business   establishments   or   persons   as   are   made   to   appear   in   the   said   public   documents.   they   came   all   across   to   Mr.   The   utterance  of  the  purser  regarding  his  entry  in  the  notebook   was   spontaneous.   The   subject   of   inquiry   is   not   the   entry.  a  civil  engineer.  Such  testimony  is  admissible.  had  a  'better  right  to  the  seat.   Philippine   Air   Lines.   in   their   capacities   as   public   officials   and   employees.  The  booklet  contained  the  triplicate  copies.  the  Court  of  Appeals   declared:   "That  the  plaintiff  was  forced  out  of  his  seat  in  the   first   class   compartment   of   the   plane   belonging   to   the   defendant  AirFrance  while   at   Bangkok.  It  forms   part  of  the  res  gestae.   and   plaintiff   reluctantly   gave  his  'first  class'  seat  in  the  plane.  When   asked  to  vacate  his  'first  class'  seat.   but   the   ouster   incident.   plaintiff   traveled  in  'first  class'.   the   original.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Inc.     At   all   events.   the   duplicate   and   the   triplicate.   Air   France.  was  a  member  of  a  group   of   48   Filipino   pilgrims   that   left   Manila   for   Lourdes   on   March  30.     Petitioner  charges  that  the  finding  of  the  Court  of   Appeals   that   the   purser   made   an   entry   in   his   notebooks   reading   "First   class   passenger   was   forced   to   go   to   the   tourist   class   against   his   will.   On  the  question  of  bad  faith.

    After   the   cross-­‐examination   of   the   last   witness.   and   Singayan   was   to   pose   as   the   buyer.   Herino   de   la   Cruz.  B  i  e  n  v  e  n  i  d  o  M  .   the  prosecution  again  went  back  to  the  identification  of  the   triplicate  invoice.m.  such  signature  being  thus  reproduced   by   the   same   stroke   of   the   pen   which   made   the   surface   or   exposed   impression.00   and   two   P5.   all   are   duplicate   originals.  appellant  erroneously  thinks  that  said   28   .     The   team   then   moved   in   and   arrested   Tandoy.   The  marijuana  was  offered  as  an  exhibit.  Jr.   Rule   123   of   the   Rules   of   Court.  and  these  have  been  held  to  be  as  much   primary  evidence  as  the  originals.   Duplicate   originals.   Manalastas   and   Candolesas   made   a   body   search   of   the   accused-­‐appellant   and   took   from   him   the   marked   money.   ISSUE:   WON   the   best   evidence   rule   should   apply   in  the  presentation  of  a  Xerox  copy  of  the  marked  P10  bill   RULING:   Apparently.   gusto   mo   bang   umiskor?"   Singayan   said   yes.  100.     PP vs Tandoy FACTS:   On  May  27.   chemical   and   chromotographic   examination  was  performed  on  the  confiscated  marijuana.   Makati.   of   the   Makati   Police   Station   dispatched   Pfc.  including  the  signature  of   the   party   to   be   charged   thereby.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.     The   target   area   was   a   store   along   the   said   street.   the   best   evidence   rule   is   that   rule   which   requires   the   highest   grade   of   evidence   obtainable   to   prove   a   disputed   fact   p.   The   other   members   of   the   team   strategically   positioned   themselves.   Barangay   Singkamas.     Microscopic.   Luisito   de   la   Cruz.  however.   all   of   the   sheets   so   written   on   are   regarded  as  duplicate  originals  and  either  of  them  may  be   introduced  in  evidence  as  such  without  accounting  for  the   nonproduction  of  the  others.   616.Y.   which   requires   the   production   of   the   originals.  Soon.   who   said   without   preamble:   "Pare.  1986.  Carbon  copies.     ISSUE:   WON   the   carbon   copy   of   the   invoice   is   admissible   RULING:   The   admissibility   of   duplicates   or   triplicates   has   long  been  a  settled  question  and  we  need  not  elaborate  on   the   reasons   for   the   rule.   and   the   same   does   not   require   an   accounting   for   the   non-­‐production   of   the   original.   This   matter   has   received   consideration   from   the   foremost   commentator   on   the   Rules  of  Court  thus:     "When  carbon  sheets  are  inserted  between  two  or   more   sheets   of   writing   paper   so   that   the   writing   of   a   contract  upon  the  outside  sheet.  t  h  e  n  p  r  e  s  i  d  i   n  g  i  n  t  h  e  c  o  u  r  t  b  e  l  o  w  .   386.   being   carbon   copy   of   the   original   and   bearing   as   it   does   the   signature   of   the   appellant.   and   any   one   of   them   may   be   introduced   in   evidence   without   accounting   for  the  nonproduction  of  the  other.  Salido.  without  accounting   first   for   the   loss   of   the   originals   is   incorrect   and   must   be   reversed.00   bills  marked  ANU  (meaning  Anti-­‐Narcotics  Unit).   duplicate   are   produced.'     The   said   confession   Exhibit   B.  when  made  at   the  same  time  and  on  the  same  machine  as  the  original.     We   find   that   the   ruling   of   the   court   below   to   the   effect   that   the   triplicates   formed   by   the   used   of   carbon   papers  are  not  admissible  in  evidence.  as  follows:     "SEC.   is   admissible   in   evidence   and   possess   all   the   probative   value   of   the   original.   H  o  n  .  2015-­‐2016   and   signing   of   the   originals.  at  about  3:30  p.   .   .   Nicanor   Candolesas.   Estanislao   Dalumpines.   concurrently   with   the   original.  interrupted  the  proceeding   holding   that   the   triplicates   are   not   admissible   unless   it   is   first   proven   that   the   originals   were   lost   and   can   not   be   produced.     The  accused-­‐appellant  chose  to  remain  silent  after   having  been  informed  of  his  constitutional  rights.   He   stood   alone   near   the   store   waiting   for   any   pusher   to   approach.  Lt.   Singayan.     Two   principal   authors   on   the   law   on   evidence   have  sustained  the  theory  of  the  admissibility  of  duplicate   originals.     "SEC.   produces   facsimile   upon   the  sheets  beneath.   as   by   placing   carbon   Rheland  S.  are   duplicate  originals.  One  of   them   was   the   accused-­‐appellant.   The   witness   giving   the   testimony  was  the  salesman  who  issued  the  triplicates.   —   Where   letters   are   produced   by   mechanical   means   and.   A   "duplicate   sales   slip   has   been  held  to  be  primary  evidence"   SEC.   .  the  special  prosecutor  claimed  that  the  evidence  of   the  prosecution  the  originals  on  account  of  their  loss.  It  was  at  this  stage  that  the  judge  below   told   the   prosecution   that   the   law   applicable   is   Section   46.   In   response   to   the   above   ruling..   as  well  as  eight  more  rolls/foils  of  marijuana  and  crushed   leaves.  Servacio.   The   exchange   was   made   then   and   there   —   two   rolls/pieces   of   marijuana   for   one   P10.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     paper  between  sheets  of  writing  on  the  exposed  surface  at   the   same   time.  Ta  n  .   Antonio   Manalastas   and   Virgilio   Padua   to   conduct   a   buy-­‐ bust   operation   at   Solchuaga   St.   and   Detectives   Pablo   R.   420.  three  men  approached  Singayan.

  unloading   and   deliveries   of   cargoes"   and   that   the   compensation   for   such   services   would   be   paid   "by   the   owners   and   consignees   of   the  cargoes"  as  "has  been  the  practice  in  the  port  of  Iligan   City"     The   union   found   out   later   that   stipulation   was   oppressive   and   that   the   company   was   unduly   favored   by   that  arrangement.   J)   upon   instruction   of   the   head   office.   Demetrio   S.   the   work   of   the   union   consisted  of  arrastre  and  stevedoring  services.  J.  the  best  evidence   rule  does  not  apply  and  testimonial  evidence  is  admissible.000.Y.     Plaintiff  company's  evidence.   Exhibits  B.     Compania Maritima vs Allied Free Workers Union   FACTS:   On   August   11.245.  show  the  following  alleged  damages  in  the   aggregate  amount  of  P349.  does  not  reach  the  sum  of  P450.   2.   the   failure   to   produce   the   marked   money   itself   would   not   constitute  a  fatal  omission.   the   original  writings  need  not  be  produced.  1954.   like   a   xerox   copy   thereof.000   on   the   basis   of   the   auditor's   reports.     ISSUES:  WON  the  report  of  the  accountants  were   admissible   RULING:   The   best   evidence   on   the   cost   of   the   said   equipment   would   have   been   the   sales   invoices   instead   of   the   oral   testimony   of   Teves.     The   best   evidence   rule   applies   only   when   the   contents  of  the  document  are  the  subject  of  inquiry.  2015-­‐2016   marked  money  is  an  ordinary  document  falling  under  Sec.   1954  Teves  hired  auditors  to  ascertain  the  losses  suffered   by   the   company   during   the   period   from   January   1   to   September  11.     The   trial   court   awarded   actual   damages   amounting   to   P450.   the   issue   of   whether   the   company   should   pay   for   the   stevedoring   service   became   a   sore   point   of   contention  between  the  parties.   or   exists.     The   union   agreed   to   the   stipulation   that   the   company   would   not   be   liable   for   the   payment   of   the   services   of   the   union   "for   the   loading.37.  The  damages  shown  in  the  accountants'   reports  and  in  the  statement  made  by  the  company's  chief   clerk   (who   did   not   testify)   amount   to   P349.  Where   the  issue  is  only  as  to  whether  or  not  such  document  was   actually   executed.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.     Moreover.  C  and  D  are  not  auditors'  reports.  Teves.     Under   the   contract.   other   substitutionary   evidence.000.   The   contract   was   terminated   in  order  to  avoid  further  losses  to  the  company  caused  by   the  union's  inefficient  service     Since  the  aforesaid  marked  money  was  presented   by   the   prosecution   solely   for   the   purpose   of   establishing   its   existence   and   not   its   contents.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     The   trial   court   did   not   bother   to   make   a   breakdown   of   the   alleged   damages   totalling   P450.   It   did   not   carefully   examine   the   said   exhibits.     On  the  basis  of  the  reports  of  the  two  accountants.245.   Contrary   to   the   trial   court's   impression.   1952   the   Compañia   Maritima   and   the   Allied   Free   Workers   Union   entered   into   a   written   contract   whereby   the   union   agreed   to   perform   arrastre   and   stevedoring   work   for   the   company's   vessels   at   Iligan   City.   the   presentation   at   the   trial   of   the   "buy-­‐bust  money"  w  as  not  indispensable  to  the  conviction   of  the  accused-­‐appellant  because  the  sale  of  the  marijuana   had   been   adequately   proved   by   the   testimony   of   the   police   officers.   He   did   not   produce   the   sales   invoices.     Rheland  S.  testified  that  on   August   24.  Servacio.   is   therefore   admissible   without  the  need  of  accounting  for  the  original.   the   damages   claimed   by   the   company.   The   reports   of   the   two   hired   accountants.   So   long   as   the   marijuana   actually   sold   by   the   accused-­‐appellant   had   been   submitted   as   an   exhibit.     That   rule   cannot   be   applied   in   this   case   because   29   .  Siojo.   or   in   the   circumstances   relevant  to  or  surrounding  its  execution.     The   company   supposedly   suffered   losses   as   a   result  of  the  union's  inefficient  service  since  September  1.   1954   he   terminated   the   arrastre   and   stevedoring   contract   with   the   union   (Exh.000  fixed   by  the  trial  court.   Rule   130   of   the   Revised   Rules   of   Court   which   excludes   the   introduction   of   secondary   evidence   except   in   the   five   (5)  instances  mentioned  therein.p   Thus.   or   much  less  than  P450.   Jayme   and  M.  —  Jose  C.     The  company  argues  that  the  accountants'  reports   are  admissible  in  evidence  because  of  the  rule  that  "when   the   original   consists   of   numerous   accounts   or   other   documents   which   cannot   be   examined   in   court   without   great   loss   of   time   and   the   fact   sought   to   be   established   from   them   is   only   the   general   result   of   the   whole".   Exhibits   A   to   I.  the   company's  branch  manager  at  Iligan  City.   as   a   matter   of   simple  addition.     It   was   stipulated   that   the   company   could   revoke   the  contract  before  the  expiration  of  the  term  if  the  union   failed  to  render  proper  service.37.

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  

the   voluminous   character   of   the   records,   on   which   the  
accountants'  reports  were  based,  was  not  duly  established.  

It  is  also  a  requisite  for  the  application  of  the  rule  
that  the  records  and  accounts  should  be  made  accessible  to  
the   adverse   party   so   that   the   correctness   of   the   summary  
may  be  tested  on  cross-­‐examination.  
What  applies  to  this  case  is  the  general  rule  "that  
an  audit  made  by,  or  the  testimony  of,  a  private  auditor,  is  
inadmissible   in   evidence   as   proof   of   the   original   records,  
books  of  accounts,  reports  or  the  like"    
That   general   rule   cannot   be   relaxed   in   this   case  
because   the   company   failed   to   make   a   preliminary  
showing   as   to   the   difficulty   or   impossibility   attending   the  
production   of   the   records   in   court   and   their   examination  
and  analysis  as  evidence  by  the  court    
A   close   scrutiny   of   the   accountants'   reports  
reveals  their  lack  of  probative  value.    
Jayme   used   the   pronouns   "we"   and   "our"   and  
made   reference   to   the   examination   made   by   the   "auditors"  
and  his  accounting  office.  He  did  not  disclose  the  names  of  
other   "auditors"   who   assisted   him   in   making   the  
examination  of  the  company's  records.    
He   gave   the   impression   that   he   was   an  
independent   accountant   hired   by   the   company.   The   truth  
is   that   Jayme   was   a   "personal   friend"   of   Teves,   the  
company's   branch   manager   at   Iligan   City.   Teves   was   the  
company's  principal  witness  in  this  case.    
He   suppressed   that   fact   in   his   report   of  
examination.   Apparently,   the   practice   of   accounting   was  
his   sideline   or   he   practiced   accounting   and,   as   the   saying  
goes,   he   moonlighted   as   the   company's   branch   manager.  
Obviously,   Jayme   would   be   biased   for   the   company.   He  
violated   a   rule   of   the   accountants'   code   of   ethics   by   not  
disclosing   in   his   report   of   examination   that   he   was   an  
employee  of  the  company.  
Photostatic   copies   of   some   manifests   and   bills   of  
lading  proving  that  the  company  was  not  able  to  collect  the  
stipulated   freight   on   the   alleged   shutout   cargoes   should  
have  been  presented  in  evidence  as  supporting  papers  for  
Jayme's  report.  No  such  exhibits  were  presented.    
Damages  computed  by  Salvador  M.  Magante.  —    
The   trial   court   erred   in   allowing   the   damages  
totalling  P82,680.12  because  Magante's  statement,  Exhibit  
B,   is   hearsay.   Magante   should   have   been   presented   as   a  
witness.    
More  appropriate  still,  the  documents  and  records  
on   which   the   statement   was   based   should   have   been  
presented   as   evidence   or   at   least   brought   to   the   court   for  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

examination  by  the  union's  counsel  and  its  accountant.    
Lost   freight   revenue   and   operating   expenses   for  
the   forklifts.   —   The   said   damages   were   computed   in   the  
reports  of  Miguel  J.  Siojo,  an  accountant  who,  for  two  days  
and   nights,   March   8   to   10,   1960,   or   shortly   before   and  
during  the  trial,  allegedly  examined  the  company's  record  
at  Iligan  City,  such  as  its  cash  book,  cash  vouchers,  reports  
to   the   head   office,   shipping   manifests,   and   liquidation  
reports.   Those   records   were   not   produced   in   court.   Their  
non-­‐production   was   not   explained.   If   the   accountant   was  
able   to   summarize   the   contents   of   those   records   in   two  
days,   they   could   not   have   been   very   voluminous.   They  
should  have  been  offered  in  evidence.    
To   avoid   fraud   or   fabrication,   the   documents  
evidencing   the   alleged   expenses   should   have   been  
presented   in   evidence.   Siojo's   reports   were   not   the   best  
evidence  on  the  said  operating  expenses.    

Consolidated Bank vs Del Monte
 

FACTS:  
On   13   June   1984,   petitioner   filed   before   the   RTC  
of   Manila   a   complaint   for   recovery   of   sum   of   money  
against  respondents,  impleading  the  spouse  of  respondent  
Narciso   O.   Morales.   Petitioner,   a   domestic   banking   and  
trust  corporation,  alleges  therein  that  on  23  April  1982,  it  
extended   in   favor   of   respondents   a   loan   in   the   amount   of  
One   Million   Pesos   (P1,000,000.00)   as   evidenced   by   a  
promissory   note   executed   by   respondents   on   the   same  
date.   Under   the   promissory   note,   respondents   Del   Monte  
Motor   Works,   I   nc.   (respondent   corporation)   and   Morales  
bound   themselves   jointly   and   severally   to   pay   petitioner  
the   full   amount   of   the   loan   through   twenty-­‐five   monthly  
installments   of   P40,000.00   a   month   with   interest   pegged  
at  23%  per  annum.    
As   respondents   defaulted   on   their   monthly  
installments,   the   full   amount   of   the   loan   became   due   and  
demandable  pursuant  to  the  terms  of  the  promissory  note.    
Petitioner   attached   to   its   complaint   as   Annexes  
"A,"   "B,"   and   "C,"   respectively,   a   photocopy   of   the  
promissory   note   supposedly   executed   by   respondents,   a  
copy   of   the   demand   letter   it   sent   respondents   dated   20  
January   1983,   and   statement   of   account   pertaining   to  
respondents'  loan.    
During   the   trial   on   the   merits   of   this   case,  
petitioner   presented   as   its   sole   witness,   Liberato   A.  
Lavarino   (Lavarino),   then   the   manager   of   its   Collection  
Department.    
Lavarino  also  identified  the  following  exhibits  for  
petitioner:   photocopy   of   the   duplicate   original   of   the  
promissory  note  attached  to  the  complaint  as  Exhibit  "A;"  
30  

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petitioner's   20   January   1983   demand   letter   marked   as  
Exhibit   "B;"   Tolentino's   letter   to   petitioner   dated   10  
February   1983   and   marked   as   Exhibit   "C;"   and   the   09  
March   1984   statement   of   account   sent   to   respondents  
marked  as  Exhibit  "D.    

On  26  September  1985,  petitioner  made  its  formal  
offer  of  evidence.  However,  as  the  original  copy  of  Exhibit  
"A"  could  no  longer  be  found,  petitioner  instead  sought  the  
admission  of  the  duplicate  original  of  the  promissory  note  
which  was  identified  and  marked  as  Exhibit  "E."    
Respondent   corporation   claims   that   Exhibit   "E"  
should   not   have   been   admitted   as   it   was   immaterial,  
irrelevant,   was   not   properly   identified   and   hearsay  
evidence.    
On   26   December   1985,   respondents   separately  
filed   their   motions   to   dismiss   on   the   similar   ground   that  
with   the   exclusion   of   Exhibits   "A"   and   "E,"   petitioner   no  
longer   possessed   any   proof   of   respondents'   alleged  
indebtedness.    
The   courts   below   ruled   in   favor   of   respondents  
and  dismissed  the  case.  
ISSUE:  WON  the  courts  below  erred  in  ruling  that  
the  respondents  were  able  to  specifically  deny  under  oath  
the  allegations  in  petitioner’s  complaint.  
RULING:  
In  this  case,  both  the  court  a  quo  and  the  Court  of  
Appeals   erred   in   ruling   that   respondents   were   able   to  
specifically   deny   the   allegations   in   petitioner's   complaint  
in   the   manner   specifically   required   by   the   rules.   In   effect,  
respondents  had,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  admitted  the  
genuineness   and   due   execution   of   the   subject   promissory  
note  and  recognized  their  obligation  to  petitioner.    
The   appellate   court   likewise   sustained   the   ruling  
of   the   trial   court   that   the   "best   evidence   rule   or   primary  
evidence  must  be  applied  as  the  purpose  of  the  proof  is  to  
establish   the   terms   of   the   writing   —   meaning   the   alleged  
promissory   note   as   it   is   the   basis   of   the   recovery   of   the  
money   allegedly   loaned   to   the   defendants   (respondents  
herein)."    
The   "best   evidence   rule"   is   encapsulated   in   Rule  
130,   Section   3,   of   the   Revised   Rules   of   Civil   Procedure  
which  provides:    
Sec.   3.   Original   document   must   be   produced;  
exceptions.  —  When  the  subject  of  inquiry  is  the  contents  
of  a  document,  no  evidence  shall  be  admissible  other  than  
the  original  document  itself,  except  in  the  following  cases:    
(a)  When  the  original  has  been  lost  or  destroyed,  
or   cannot   be   produced   in   court,   without   bad   faith   on   the  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

part  of  the  offeror;    
(b)   When   the   original   is   in   the   custody   or   under  
the   control   of   the   party   against   whom   the   evidence   is  
offered,   and   the   latter   fails   to   produce   it   after   reasonable  
notice;    
(  c  )  W  h  e  n  t  h  e  o  r  ig  in  a  l  c  o  n  s  is  t  s  o  f  n  u  m  e  
r  o  u  s  a  c  c  o  u  n  t  s  o  r  o  t  h  e  r  documents  which  cannot  be  
examined   in   court   without   great   loss   of   time   and   the   fact  
sought   to   be   established   from   them   is   only   the   general  
result  of  the  whole;  and    
(d)   When   the   original   is   a   public   record   in   the  
custody  of  a  public  officer  or  is  recorded  in  a  public  office.    
The   "best   evidence   rule,"   according   to   Professor  
Thayer,  first  appeared  in  the  year  1699-­‐1700  when  in  one  
case  involving  a  goldsmith,  Holt,  C.  J.,  was  quoted  as  stating  
that   they   should   take   into   consideration   the   usages   of  
trade  and  that  "the  best  proof  that  the  nature  of  the  thing  
will  afford  is  only  required."    
According  to  McCormick,  an  authority  on  the  rules  
of   evidence,   "the   only   actual   rule   that   the   'best   evidence'  
phrase  denotes  today  is  the  rule  requiring  the  production  
of  the  original  writing"  the  rationale  being:    
(1)   that   precision   in   presenting   to   the   court   the  
exact   words   of   the   writing   is   of   more   than   average  
importance,   particularly   as   respects   operative   or  
dispositive  instruments,  such  as  deeds,  wills  and  contracts,  
since   a   slight   variation   in   words   may   mean   a   great  
difference  in  rights,  (2)  that  there  is  a  substantial  hazard  of  
inaccuracy   in   the   human   process   of   making   a   copy   by  
handwriting   or   typewriting,   and   (3)   as   respects   oral  
testimony  purporting  to  give  from  memory  the  terms  of  a  
writing,  there  is  a  special  risk  of  error,  greater  than  in  the  
case  of  attempts  at  describing  other  situations  generally.  In  
the   light   of   these   dangers   of   mistransmission,  
accompanying  the  use  of  written  copies  or  of  recollection,  
largely   avoided   through   proving   the   terms   by   presenting  
the  writing  itself,  the  preference  for  the  original  writing  is  
justified.    
Bearing   in   mind   that   the   risk   of   mistransmission  
of   the   contents   of   a   writing   is   the   justification   for   the   "best  
evidence   rule,"   we   declare   that   this   rule   finds   no  
application   to   this   case.   It   should   be   noted   that  
respondents   never   disputed   the   terms   and   conditions   of  
the   promissory   note   thus   leaving   us   to   conclude   that   as   far  
as   the   parties   herein   are   concerned,   the   wording   or  
content  of  said  note  is  clear  enough  and  leaves  no  room  for  
disagreement.   In   their   responsive   pleadings,   respondents'  
principal   defense   rests   on   the   alleged   lack   of   consideration  
of   the   promissory   note.   In   addition,   respondent   Morales  
also   claims   that   he   did   not   sign   the   note   in   his   personal  
capacity.   These   contentions   clearly   do   not   question   the  
"precise   wording"   of   the   promissory   note   which   should  
have   paved   the   way   for   the   application   of   the   "best  
31  

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evidence  rule."  It  was,  therefore,  an  error  for  the  Court  of  
Appeals   to   sustain   the   decision   of   the   trial   court   on   this  
point.    

Besides,   the   "best   evidence   rule"   as   stated   in   our  
Revised   Rules   of   Civil   Procedure   is   not   absolute.   As   quoted  
earlier,  the  rule  accepts  of  exceptions  one  of  which  is  when  
the   original   of   the   subject   document   is   in   the   possession   of  
the   adverse   party.   As   pointed   out   by   petitioner   in   its  
motion  to  inhibit,  had  it  been  given  the  opportunity  by  the  
court  a  quo,  it  would  have  sufficiently  established  that  the  
original   of   Exhibit   "A"   was   in   the   possession   of  
respondents  which  would  have  called  into  application  one  
of  the  exceptions  to  the  "best  evidence  rule."    
Significantly,   and   as   discussed   earlier,  
respondents   failed   to   deny   specifically   the   execution   of   the  
promissory   note.   This   being   the   case,   there   was   no   need  
for   petitioner   to   present   the   original   of   the   promissory  
note   in   question.   Their   judicial   admission   with   respect   to  
the   genuineness   and   execution   of   the   promissory   note  
sufficiently   established   their   liability   to   petitioner  
regardless   of   the   fact   that   petitioner   failed   to   present   the  
original  of  said  note.    

Arceo vs PP
 

FACTS:  
On   March   14,   1991,   [petitioner],   obtained   a   loan  
from   private   complainant   Josefino   Cenizal   []   in   the   amount  
of   P100,000.00.   Several   weeks   thereafter,   [petitioner]  
obtained   an   additional   loan   of   P50,000.00   from   [Cenizal].  
[Petitioner]   then   issued   in   favor   of   Cenizal,   Bank   of   the  
Philippine   Islands   [(BPI)]   Check   No.   163255,   postdated  
August  4,  1991,  for  P150,000.00,  at  Cenizal's  house  located  
at   70   Panay   Avenue,   Quezon   City.   When   August   4,   1991  
came,   [Cenizal]   did   not   deposit   the   check   immediately  
because   [petitioner]   promised   []   that   he   would   replace   the  
check   with   cash.   Such   promise   was   made   verbally   seven  
(7)  times.  When  his  patience  ran  out,  [Cenizal]  brought  the  
check   to   the   bank   for   encashment.   The   head   office   of   the  
Bank   of   the   Philippine   Islands   through   a   letter   dated  
December   5,   1991,   informed   [Cenizal]   that   the   check  
bounced  because  of  insufficient  funds.    
Thereafter,   [Cenizal]   went   to   the   house   of  
[petitioner]  to  inform  him  of  the  dishonor  of  the  check  but  
[Cenizal]  found  out  that  [petitioner]  had  left  the  place.  So,  
[Cenizal]   referred   the   matter   to   a   lawyer   who   wrote   a  
letter  giving  [petitioner]  three  days  from  receipt  thereof  to  
pay   the   amount   of   the   check.   [Petitioner]   still   failed   to  
make   good   the   amount   of   the   check.   As   a   consequence,  
[Cenizal]   executed   on   January   20,   1992   before   the   office   of  
the   City   Prosecutor   of   Quezon   City   his   affidavit   and  
submitted   documents   in   support   of   his   complaint   for  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

[e]stafa  and  [v]iolation  of  [BP  22]  against  [petitioner].    
The   check   in   question   and   the   return   slip   were  
however   lost   by   [Cenizal]   as   a   result   of   a   fire   that   occurred  
near   his   residence   on   September   16,   1992.   [Cenizal]  
executed   an   Affidavit   of   Loss   regarding   the   loss   of   the  
check  in  question  and  the  return  slip.    
Petitioner   claims   that   the   trial   and   appellate  
courts   erred   in   convicting   him   despite   the   failure   of   the  
prosecution   to   present   the   dishonored   check   during   the  
trial.    
ISSUE:   WON   the   failure   to   present   the   dishonored  
bill  was  fatal  to  the  case  of  the  prosecution  
RULING:  
Petitioner's   insistence   on   the   presentation   of   the  
check   in   evidence   as   a   condition   sine   qua   non   for  
conviction  under  BP  22  is  wrong.    
Petitioner   anchors   his   argument   on   Rule   130,  
Section   3,   of   the   Rules   of   Court,   otherwise   known   as   the  
best   evidence   rule.   However,   the   rule   applies   only   where  
the   content   of   the   document   is   the   subject   of   the   inquiry.  
Where   the   issue   is   the   execution   or   existence   of   the  
document  or  the  circumstances  surrounding  its  execution,  
the   best   evidence   rule   does   not   apply   and   testimonial  
evidence  is  admissible.    
The  gravamen  of  the  offense  is  the  act  of  drawing  
and   issuing   a   worthless   check.   Hence,   the   subject   of   the  
inquiry  is  the  fact  of  issuance  or  execution  of  the  check,  not  
its  content.  THCSEA    
Here,  the  due  execution  and  existence  of  the  check  
were   sufficiently   established.   Cenizal   testified   that   he  
presented   the   originals   of   the   check,   the   return   slip   and  
other   pertinent   documents   before   the   Office   of   the   City  
Prosecutor   of   Quezon   City   when   he   executed   his  
complaint-­‐affidavit   during   the   preliminary   investigation.  
The   City   Prosecutor   found   a   prima   facie   case   against  
petitioner   for   violation   of   BP   22   and   filed   the  
corresponding   information   based   on   the   documents.  
Although   the   check   and   the   return   slip   were   among   the  
documents   lost   by   Cenizal   in   a   fire   that   occurred   near   his  
residence   on   September   16,   1992,   he   was   nevertheless  
able   to   adequately   establish   the   due   execution,   existence  
and  loss  of  the  check  and  the  return  slip  in  an  affidavit  of  
loss  as  well  as  in  his  testimony  during  the  trial  of  the  case.    
Moreover,   petitioner   himself   admitted   that   he  
issued   the   check.   He   never   denied   that   the   check   was  
presented   for   payment   to   the   drawee   bank   and   was  
dishonored   for   having   been   drawn   against   insufficient  
funds.    

32  

  petitioners   merely   insist   that   the   photocopy   is   inadmissible   as   a   result   of   respondent's   failure   to   present   the  original.   In   their   Answer.     Petitioners.   the   CA   proclaimed   that   the   document   resides   in   the   record.   in   their   Petition   and   Reply.   or   revenue   stamp.     The   CA   held   that   petitioners   failed   to   deny   specifically  under  oath  the  genuineness  and  due  execution   of   the   Acknowledgment.   identification  and  offer  by  the  respondent.   Elena   Santos.   Though   respondent   now   claims   that   she   had   lost   the   original.   and   respondent's   testimony   was   merely   hearsay   and  uncorroborated.456.   identified   and   formally   off   ered   in   evidence  by  the  party  proponent.00.  both  the  original  and  a  photocopy  thereof   are   authenticated.   Respondent's   cause   of   action   is   based   on   a   document   entitled   "Acknowledgment"   apparently   executed  by  hand  by  petitioner  Fernando.   and   the   presentation   of   a   mere   photocopy   thereof   at   said   hearing.000.   consequently.  2)  there  was  thus   no  need  to  present  the  original  thereof.   .   On   November   21.Y.   which   remained   unpaid   despite  written  demand.   Rheland  S.  2015-­‐2016   Sps Santos vs Alcazar   FACTS:   In   February   2001.   the   alleged   deliveries   of   paint   and   construction   materials   were   not   covered   by   delivery   receipts.  Hence.   the   same   having   been   made   part   of   the   record   of   the   case   when   respondent's   evidence   was   first   presented   ex   parte.   or   that   it   was   unauthorized   .   petitioners   sought   the   dismissal   of  the  Complaint     On   November   8.   The   effect  of  this  is  that  the  genuineness  and  due  execution  of   the   Acknowledgment   is   deemed   admitted..   Petitioners   argued   that   the   Acknowledgment   —   respondent's   Exhibit   "A"   which   was   presented   in   court   —   was   not   an   original   copy   and   thus   inadmissible.   to   collect   the   value   of   paint   and   construction   materials   obtained   by   the   latter   from   LCC   amounting   to   P1.   does   not   materially   affect   the   outcome   of   the   case.   there   is   no   harm  if  in  a  case.   the   33   .   This   would   explain   then   why   respondent   cannot   find   it   in   her   possession."     "There   is   no   need   for   proof   of   execution   and   authenticity   with   respect   to   documents   the   genuineness   and   due   execution   of   which   are   admitted   by   the   adverse   party.   an   acknowledgment.     More   to   the   point   is   the   fact   that   petitioners   failed   to   deny   specifically   under   oath   the   genuineness   and   due   execution   of   the   Acknowledgment   in   their   Answer.   "By   the   admission   of   the   genuineness   and   due   execution   [of   such   document]   is   meant   that   the   party   whose   signature   it   bears   admits   that   he   signed   it   or   that   it   was   signed   by   another  for  him  with  his  authority.   are   cut   off   by   the   admission   of   its   genuineness  and  due  execution.   they   argue   that   the   photocopy   presented   and   offered   in   evidence   is   inadmissible   and   could   not   be   the   basis   for   arriving   at   a   finding   of   liability   on   their   part.   the   original   exists   and   was   made   part  of  the  records  of  the  case  when  respondent's  evidence   was   first   taken.   respondent   Lolita   Alcazar.   ..   .   assert   that   during   the   proceedings   below.   or   that   the   party   charged  signed  the  instrument  in  some  other  capacity  than   that  alleged  in  the  pleading  setting  it  out  .   such   as   a   seal.   For   this   reason.     Petitioners   filed   a   Demurrer   to   Evidence.  ."   With   the   consequent   admission   engendered   by   petitioners'   failure   to   properly   deny   the   Acknowledgment   in   their   Answer.   she   made   a   formal   offer   of   her   evidence  and  rested  her  case.   2005.  or  that  it  was   never   delivered   .   petitioners'   receipt   of   the   written   demand   was   not   proved.  .  which  they  nevertheless  admit  to  exist  and  is   found  and  included  in  the  record  of  the  case.   that   the   document   was  delivered.     ISSUE:  WON  presentation  of  a  mere  photocopy  of   the  Acknowledgment  materially  affects  the  outcome  of  the   case.   coupled   with   its   proper   authentication.   it   evidently   appears   that   there   is   no   question   raised   on   the   authenticity   and   contents   of   the  photocopy  that  was  presented  and  identified  in  court.   .   instituted   through   her   attorney-­‐in-­‐fact   Delfin   Chua   a   Complaint   for   sum   of   money   against   the   petitioners.   which  it  lacks.   respondent   presented   her   evidence   and   testified   in   court   as   the   lone   witness.  Servacio.  that  at  the  time  it  was   signed  it  was  in  words  and  figures  exactly  as  set  out  in  the   pleading   of   the   party   relying   upon   it.   spouses   Fernando   and   Ma.   it   is   with   the   court   as   an   exhibit.     While   it   is   a   basic   rule   of   evidence   that   the   original   copy   prevails   over   a   mere   photocopy.   proprietor   of   Legazpi   Color   Center   (LCC).Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  and  that  any  formal  requisites  required  by   law.   which   respondent   opposed.  are  waived  by  him.  not  to  mention   petitioners'   admissions   in   paragraphs   4   to   6   of   their   Answer   that   they   are   indeed   indebted   to   respondent..  .   2005.   Besides.   only   a   photocopy   of   the   Acknow   ledgment   w   as   presented   and   identified   by   respondent   even   as   the   original   was   not   lost.  such  defenses  as   that  the  signature  is  a  forgery  ..   It   was   a   mere   procedural   inadvertence  that  could  have  been  cured  and  did  not  affect   petitioners'   cause   in   any   manner.  and  3)  petitioners'   liability  was  sufficiently  established.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     RULING:   Respondent's   failure   to   present   the   original   copy   of   the   Acknowledgment   during   the   taking   of   her   testimony   for   the   second   time.     .   As   conceded   by   them   and   as   held   by   the   CA.   1)   its   genuineness   and  due  execution  are  deemed  admitted.   pursuant  to  the  best  evidence  rule.

  the   trial   court   ruled  that  Exhibit  "A"  was  inadmissible  in  evidence     ISSUE:   WON   the   photocopy   is   admissible   in   evidence  and  bears  probative  value.   the   notary  public  who  notarized  the  deed  of  sale.  but  even  to  cross-­‐examine  the  notary  public.   34   .   the   same   division   of   the   CA   made   a   complete   turnaround   from   its   original   pronouncement   in   CA-­‐G.   while   they   admit   petitioners'   possession   of   the   land. vs.   much   to   their   dismay   and   surprise.   FACTS:   On   November   20.   and   there   is   no   need   to   present   receipts   and   other   documents   to   prove   the   claimed   indebtedness. both surnamed MADRID.   the   Madrids   denied   having   Rheland  S.   1986.   The   admission   of   liability   resulting   from   petitioners'   admission   of   indebtedness   in   their   Answer   and   other   pleadings.Y.   regarding   its   execution. PACIFICO MARQUEZ.   continuous   and   open   possession   of   the   property.     However.  records  show  that  none   of   these   five   copies   was   even   presented   during   the   trial. petitioners.  they  assert  that  this  possession  is  in  defiance  of  their   repeated   demands   that   the   former   relinquish   the   same.   Consequently.     During   the   trial.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     executed   the   said   deed   of   sale   and   assuming   that   said   document   exists.  as  a  document  evidencing  the  loan  agreement   they  had  entered  into.   sometime   in   October   1986.     Notwithstanding   this   procedural   lapse.  Servacio.   CV   No.   when   Atty.   just   as   an   ordinary   acknowledgment   receipt.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   RULING:   To   begin   with.   Meanwhile.   is   "valid   and   binding   between   the   parties   who   executed  it.   the   same   is   fictitious   and   falsified.   physical.  Indeed.   all   duplicates   and/or   counterparts  must  be  accounted  for. FILOMENO and GREGORIO.  the  same  becomes  primary  evidence. respondents.   Forthwith.   CV   No.   petitioners   filed   an   action   for   reconveyance   with   damages   against   private   respondents  involving  a  parcel  of  land."   the   contents   were   based   on   an   alleged   carbon   original   which   petitioners'   predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest   presented   to   him.   private   respondents   managed   to   obtain   a   Torrens   Title   over  the  said  land. COURT OF APPEALS.   Madrid   brothers.   they   were   constrained   to   offer.   Tabangay.   Its   tendency   to   convince   and   persuade   must   be   considered   for   admissibility   of   evidence   should   not  be  confused  with  its  probative  value.  is  interposed  by  the  defendant.   as   Exhibit   "A.   in   disposing   of   the   case.   Tabangay   typed   Exhibit   "A.   upon   private   respondents'   failure   to   object   to   Exhibit   "A"   when   it  was  presented.     These   petitioners  failed  to  do.   as   well   as   their   waiver   of   their   right   to   present   evidence   —   all   these   did   away   with   the   necessity   of   producing   receipts   and   statements   of   account   which   would  otherwise  be  required  under  normal  circumstances.   Hence.R.   In   their   complaint.   However.R.   we   agree   with   the   Court   of   Appeals   that   its   probative   value   must   still   meet   the   various   tests   by   which   its   reliability   is   to   be   determined.  1959.   A   cursory   glance   will   immediately   reveal   that   it   was   unsigned   by   any   of   the   parties   and   undated   as   to   when   it   was   executed.  and   since   then   they   have   been   in   actual."  The  absence  of  rebutting  evidence   occasioned  by  petitioners'  w  aiver  of  their  right  to  present   evidence   renders   the   Acknowledgment   as   the   best   evidence   of   the   transactions   between   the   parties   and   the   consequential  indebtedness  incurred.00  in  a  deed  of  sale  executed  on  May  18."       As   for   petitioners'   claim   that   in   CA-­‐G.   the   Court   finds   no   irregularity   in   this.   petitioners   were   unable   to   present   the   original   deed   of   sale   since   it   was   lost.  Moreover.     On   the   other   hand.  To   be   sure.   even   if   Exhibit   "A"   is   admitted   in   evidence.   their   failure   to   specifically   deny  under  oath  the  genuineness  and  due  execution  of  the   Acknowledgment.  the  effect  of   the  admission  is  such  that  "a  prima  facie  case  is  made  for   the   plaintiff   which   dispenses   with   the   necessity   of   evidence  on  his  part  and  entitles  him  to  a  judgment  on  the   pleadings   unless   a   special   defense   of   new   matter.   not   only  to  object.   Moreover.   87935.   when   Exhibit   "A"   was   presented   private   respondents   failed.   Worse.   Atty.  2015-­‐2016   Court   believes   that   judgment   may   be   had   solely   on   the   document.   Atty.000.   The   Acknowledgment.   it   is   imperative   that   all   the   originals   must   be   accounted   for   before   secondary   evidence   can   be   presented.   Sevillano   Tabangay."  a  photo  copy  of  the  purported  original  carbon  copy  of   the  deed  of  sale  in  an  effort  to  prove  the  transaction.     Exhibit   "A"   was   merely   a   photocopy   lifted   from   the   carbon   copy   of   the   alleged   deed   of   sale.   71187   —   thus   doing   away   with   the   requirement   of   presenting   receipts   and   statements   of   account   which   it   originally   required   in   the   latter   case.   such   as   payment.  testified  that   the   document   has   about   five   (5)   copies.   petitioners   assert   that   the   subject   land   was   bought   by   their   predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest   from   the   private   respondents.  and  no  excuse  for  the   non-­‐   production   of   the   original   document   itself   can   be   regarded  as  established  until  all  its  parts  are  unavailable.   Pacifico   Marquez   contends   that   he   is   an   innocent   purchaser   for   value   of   the   property   having   bought  the  same  from  the  Madrid  brothers  in  1976.     It  is  a  well-­‐settled  principle  that  before  secondary   evidence   can   be   presented.   Petitioners'   explanation   that   these   copies   were   lost   or   could   not   be   found   in   the   National   Archives   was   not   even   supported  by  any  certification  from  the  said  office.   for   P4.   HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA CRUZ.

  It   was   also   established   that   somewhere   in   the   testimony.     Petitioners   are   hereby   declared   as   the   legal   owners  of  the  subject  land.   the   transcript   of   the   stenographic   notes   taken   during   the   testimony   of   Mr.   The   construction   of   various   infrastructure   on  the  land  —  rice  mill.   Meyers   is   as   to   what   exactly   was   the   testimony   of   Lamarre  during  the  senate  investigation.     In   the  prosecution  for  subornation  of  perjury.   Meyers   was   a   government   official   connected   with   the   department   of   defense   of   the   US.  pavements   and  other  buildings  —  w  as  undoubtedly  a  clear  exercise  of   ownership  which  the  Madrids  could  not  ignore.   Mr.   he   claimed   that   Mr.   it   does   not   mean   that   the   transcript   is   the   only  evidence  of  that  fact.   Lamarre   pleaded   guilty  to  the  charges  but  he  confessed  that  before  he  gave   his   prejurious   testimony   before   the   Senate   Investigation   Hearing.   after   the   war   and   wanting   to   investigate   reports   of   corruption   perpetrated   by   officers   of   department   of   defense.  the  land   was   enclosed.   Lamarre   given   during   the   senate   investigation   hearing.  Furthermore.   But   since  this  issue  was  raised  in  the  dissenting  opinion  of  the   decision.  during  all  this  time.  While  the   exact   testimony   of   Mr.  2015-­‐2016   without   bothering   to   check   his   own   files   to   verify   the   correctness   of   the   contents   of   the   document   he   was   copying.   So   the   crucial   issue   in   the   subornation   of   perjury   charges   of   Mr.  storage  house.   it   is   necessary   to   establish   that   someone   made   a   statement   under   oath   during   the   senate   investigation.   Subsequently.       SEILER vs LUCASFILM   FACTS:   35   .   Meyers   instructed   him   to   lie   under   oath.  To  prove  this  fact.   Meyers   who   was   accused   of   maintaining   financial   interest   in   a   certain   business   entity   which   conducted   substantial   business   transactions   with   the   government.  The  fact  of  the  exact  testimony  of   Mr.   he  also  made  a  contradictory  claim  that  indeed  Mr.  it  is  necessary   to   establish   that   someone   committed   perjury   and   in   the   determination   of   whether   that   someone   committed   perjury.   the   US   Senate   conducted  an  investigation.   three   counts   of   subornation   of   perjury   were   filed   against   Mr.   Lamarre  were  also  presented  in  court.   In   other   words.  One  of  those  investigated  was   Mr.   During   the   arraignment.   Meyers.  not   one  of  them  protested.   Three   counts   against   Meyers.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  Y  testify  during   the   hearing.   In   this   case.  garage.   the   SC   was   constrained   to   address   the   issue   of   whether   or   not   it   was   proper   of   the   court   to   admit   the   testimony   of   the   special   counsel   considering   that   the   transcript   of   stenographic   notes   was   available   in   the   light   of  the  best  evidence  rule.   the   special   counsel.     The  records  show  that  the  disputed  property  has   been  in  the  possession  of  the  petitioners  since  1959.     To   m   a   k   e   m   a   t   t   e   r   s   w   o   r   s   e   .   It   was   alleged   that   this   corporation   cornered   substantial   transactions   with   the   government.   he   was   charged   with   three   counts   of   perjury   for   falsely   denying   that  Mr.   Lamarre.       FACTS:   This   involved   criminal   prosecution   for   subornation   of   perjury.   Lamarre   who   was   the   president   of   Aviation   Electric   Corporation.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     In   this   case.   Now.   t   h   e   r   e   c   o   r   d   i   s   b  e  r  e  f  t  o  f  a  n  y  documentary  evidence  that  the  Madrids   sent  a  written  demand  to  the  petitioners  ordering  them  to   vacate  the  land.  Oddly.   Lamarre   could   also   be   proved   by   the   transcript.   Because   of   the   allegedly   perjurious   testimony   of   Mr.   Tabangay's   failure   to   determine   the   accuracy   of   the   carbon   copy   requested   by   the   petitioners'   predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest   renders   Exhibit   "A"  unreliable.   was   engaged   in   the   business   of   manufacturing   airplane   parts   and   accessories.   thus   signifying   petitioners'   exclusive   claim   of   ownership.   On   the   basis   of   this   info.  Meyer  had  no   financial   interest   or   has   no   connection   to   Aviation   Electric.   Atty.     MEYERS v US had   financial   interest   in   the   corporation   or   otherwise   has   substantial   interest   in   the   corporation.  Meyers  had  interest  in  the  company  when  in  truth   and   if   fact   Mr.Y.   During   his   testimony   before   the   Senate   Committee.   The   purpose   of   the   testimony   of   the   special   counsel   is   to   prove   the   exact   testimony   of   Mr.     However.   Lamarre   can   be   proved   either   by   the   transcript   or   someone   who   heard   him   testify.   The   accused   never   raised   the   issue   as   to   the   admissibility   of   the   testimony   of   the   special   counsel.   the   US   SC   had   the   occasion   to   rule   that   the   best   evidence   rule   applies   only   to   a   situation   where   the   subject   of   the   inquiry   is   the   contents   of   the   document   which   is   not   the   case   here.   This   corporation.   the   one   who   examined   Mr   Y   as   witness  to  testify  as  to  what  exactly  did  Mr.   Aviation   Electric   Corporation.   despite   our   prescinding   discussion.   One  of  the  witnesses  and  also  accused  in  the  case  was  Mr.  Servacio.  Meyer   Rheland  S.  Their  failure  to  raise  a  restraining  arm  or  a   shout   of   dissent   to   the   petitioners'   possession   of   the   subject   land   in   a   span   of   almost   thirty   30   years   is   simply   contrary  to  their  claim  of  ownership.  They   have  since  been  introducing  several  improvements  on  the   land  which  certainly  could  not  have  escaped  the  attention   of  the  Madrids.   all   is  not  lost  for  the  petitioner.   the   prosecution   presented   the   special   counsel   who   presided   the   hearing.   He   was   not   presented   to   prove   the   contents  of  the  transcript  of  stenographic  notes.  he  testified  under  oath  that  Mr.   Meyers   has   financial   interest   in   the   corporation.

 their  copyright  ability  attests  to  that.   recordings.   engineering   drawings.   and   Valentina   Clave.  they  had  continued  the  possession  of   the   property   as   heirs.   they   prayed   that   the   entry   be   cancelled.   Sr.   and   that   the   entry   had   been  maliciously  done  by  Prodon  because  the  deed  of  sale   with   right   to   repurchase   covering   the   property   did   not   exist.   Seiler's   argument   would   have   us   restrict   the   definitions   of   Rule   1001(1)   to   "words"   and   "numbers"  but  ignore  "or  their  equivalent.   the   custodian   of   the   records   of   the   property   attested   that   the   copy   of   the   deed   of   sale   with   right   to   repurchase   could   not   be   found   in   the   files   of   the   Register  of  Deeds  of  Manila.  and  that  Prodon  be  adjudged  liable  for  damages.   In   short.   The   rule   excludes   any   evidence   other   than   the   original   writing   to   prove   the   contents   thereof.   its   contents   could   nevertheless   be   proved   by   secondary  evidence  in  accordance  with  Section  5.   FACTS:   In   their   complaint   for   quieting   of   title   and   damages   against   Margarita   Prodon.   just   as   the   law   of   contract   protects   through   its   multifarious   principles   the   meeting   of   minds   evidenced   in   the   contract.   accused   Lucasfilm   (defendant)   of   copyright   infringement   with   regard   to   machines   called   Imperial   Walkers   depicted   in   The   Empire   Strikes   Back. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S.   84797. MAXIMO ALVAREZ.  the  late  spouses   Maximo   S.  Rule  130   of   the   Rules   of   Court. REPRESENTED BY REV.   ISSUE:     whether   the   pre-­‐requisites   for   the   admission  of  secondary  evidence  had  been  complied  with.   in   that   it   is   artwork   rather   than   "writings.     During   trial..   It   found   that   Seiler   had   lost   or   destroyed   the   original   drawings   of   the   Striders   in   bad   faith   and   under   the   best   evidence   rule.   depositing   with   the   Copyright   Office   “reconstructions”  of  the  originals  as  they  as  had  appeared   in   1976   and   1977. petitioners.   Neither   party   has   cited   us   to   cases   which  discuss  the  applicability  of  the  rule  to  drawings.   The  district  court  granted  summary  judgment  to  Lucasfilm.   or   photographs.   unless   the   offeror   proves:   (a)   the   existence  or  due  execution  of  the  original.   RULING:   The  Best  Evidence  Rule  stipulates  that  in  proving   the   terms   of   a   written   document   the   original   of   the   document   must   be   produced   in   court.   run   counter   to   the   rule's   preoccupation   with  the  centrality  of  the  written  word  in  the  world  of  legal   relations.   84797   on   file   with   the   Register   of   Deeds   of   Manila   was   intact.   blueprints.  (b)  the  loss  and   36   .   We   would   be   inconsistent  to  apply  the  rule  to  artwork  which  is  literary   or   photographic   but   not   to   artwork   of   other   forms.  that  upon   their  parents'  deaths.Y.   defamation.   and   a   photograph  whose  contents  are  sought  to  be  proved.   as   Seiler   argues.     Trial   Court   ruled   in   favor   of   it   opined   that   although  the  deed  itself  could  not  be  presented  as  evidence   in   court.   that   they   could   not   locate   the   owner's   duplicate   copy   of   TCT   No.   3   the   respondents   averred  as  the  plaintiffs  that  their  parents.  as  in   copyright.   paying   the   real   property   taxes   due   thereon.   It   found   that   the   defendant   had   established  the  execution  and  existence  of  the  deed.   The   copyright   laws   give   legal   protection   to   the   objective   manifestations   of   an   artist's   ideas.   Lucasfilm   argued   that   Seiler   did   not   obtain   his   copyright   until   after   The   Empire   Strikes   Back   was   released   and   there   is   no   evidence   that   Seiler   created   the   Garthian   Striders   prior   to   The   Empire   Strikes   Back. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira       HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON.   The   district   court   held   an   evidentiary   hearing   on   the   admissibility   of   the   “reconstructions”   of   the   Striders.   were   the   registered   owners   of   that   parcel   of   land   covered   by   Transfer   Certificate   of   Title   (TCT)   No.   Rheland  S.   Consequently.   so   Seiler's   drawings   are   objective   manifestations   of   the   creative   mind.  2015-­‐2016    Lee   Seiler   (plaintiff).  Servacio. respondents.   Seiler   obtained   a   copyright   on   the   Garthian   Striders.  Seiler's  "reconstructions"  are  "writings"  that  affect  legal   relations.   but   the   original   copy   of   TCT   No."   He   contends   that   the   rule   both   historically   and   currently   embraces   only   words   or   numbers.   84797   of   the   Register  of  Deeds  of  Manila.   To   recognize   Seiler's   works   as   writings   does   not.   A   creative   literary   work.   Seiler  appealed.   the   reconstructions   were   not   admissible.  that  their  parents  had  been  in   possession  of  the  property  during  their  lifetime.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   architectural   designs   may   all   lack   words   or   numbers   yet   still   be   capable   of   copyright   and   susceptible   to   fraudulent   alteration.   Furthermore.   Comparing   Seiler's   drawings   with   Lucas'   drawings   is   no   different   in   principle  than  evaluating  a  contract  and  the  intent  behind   it.   a   graphic   designer. JR. vs.   Seiler   claimed   that   Imperial   Walkers   were   copied   from   science   fiction   creatures   he   created   and   published   in   1976   and   1977   called   Garthian   Striders."  We  will  not  do   so  in  the  circumstances  of  this  case.   In   1981.   upon   proof   of   its   execution   or   existence   and   of   the   cause   of   its   unavailability   being   without   bad   faith.   Alvarez.     RULING:    Seiler  argues  that  the  best  evidence  rule  does  not   apply   to   his   work.   Just   as   a   contract   objectively   manifests   the   subjective   intent   of   the   makers.   which   is   artwork.   that   the   original   copy   contained   an   entry   stating   that   the   property   had   been   sold   to   defendant   Prodon   subject   to   the   right   of   repurchase.   are   both   covered   by   the   best   evidence   rule.   or   invasion   of   privacy.

  the   rule  protects  against  misleading  inferences  resulting  from   the   intentional   or   unintentional   introduction   of   selected   portions  of  a  larger  set  of  writings.  The  RTC  then  sustained  the  objection.   and   (c)   as   respects   oral  testimony  purporting  to  give  from  memory  the  terms   of  a  writing. FELIPE DE VERA.   Since   then   and   up   to   the   present. LUIS DE VERA.  1956.     On  February  13.   It   is   not   denied   that   this   action   does   not   involve   the   terms   or   contents   of   the   deed   of   sale   with   right   to   repurchase.   At   that   point   began   the   diversion   of   the   focus   in   the   case.   Verily.   It   should   have   simply   addressed   and   determined   whether   or   not   the   "existence"   and   "execution"   of   the   deed   as  the  facts  in  issue  had  been  proved  by  preponderance  of   evidence.   as   pre-­‐requisites   for   the   presentation   of   Rheland  S.   for   Prodon   who   had   the   burden   to   prove   the   existence   and   due   execution   of   the   deed   of   sale   with   right   to   repurchase.   Luis.  2015-­‐2016   destruction   of   the   original.   the   CA   did   not   have   to   address   and   determine   whether   the   existence.   The   rule   further   acts   as   an   insurance   against   fraud.   considering   that   (a)   the   precision   in   presenting  to  the  court  the  exact  words  of  the  writing  is  of   more   than   average   importance.  greater  than  in   the   case   of   attempts   at   describing   other   situations   generally.  Servacio.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Leonardo  Bordador.   such   as   the   existence.     This   case   involves   an   action   for   quieting   of   title.   married   to   respondent   Mariano   Aguilar.   had   been   established   by   Prodon's   evidence.     This  was  because  the  deed.   the   Notarial   Register   of   Notary   Eliseo   Razon. AGUILAR. vs.   duly   executed   by   the   late  Maximo  Alvarez.     The   foregoing   notwithstanding.Y.   the   Aguilars  have  been  paying  taxes  on  the  land.   or   the   reason   for   its   non-­‐ production  in  court.   Marcosa   Bernabe   owned   the   disputed  parcel  of  land.     Indeed.  would  have  sufficed  even  without  first  proving  the   loss  or  unavailability  of  the  original  of  the  deed.   which  Prodon  challenged  head  on.     Considering   that   the   Best   Evidence   Rule   was   not   applicable  because  the  terms  of  the  deed  of  sale  with  right   to   repurchase   were   not   the   issue.     Best  Evidence  Rule  applies  only  when  the  terms  of   a   writing   are   in   issue.   In   such   a   case.   however. FACTS:   Petitioners   Basilio. respondents.   In   her   lifetime.   1960.  the  Best     Evidence   Rule   cannot   be   invoked. SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V.   all   surnamed   de   Vera   and   respondent   Leona.   Leonardo   Bordador   and   in   turn   Marcosa   Bernabe   sold   the   same   to   them   as   evidenced   by   a   deed   of   absolute   sale   dated   February  11.   wills   and   contracts.  had  really  existed.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     secondary   evidence.   good   trial   tactics   still   required   Prodon   to   establish   and   explain   the   loss   of   the  original  of  the  deed  of  sale  with  right  to  repurchase  to   establish   the   genuineness   and   due   execution   of   the   deed.  and  seeks  to  substitute  inferior   evidence   in   its   place.  like  the  testimonies  of  Prodon   and   Jose   Camilon.     The  primary  purpose  of  the  Best  Evidence  Rule  is   to  ensure  that  the  exact  contents  of  a  writing  are  brought   before   the   court.   without   reference   to   its  terms.     In   the   course   of   the   trial.   Felipe.  When  the  mortgage  had  matured.  (b)  there  is  a  substantial   hazard   of   inaccuracy   in   the   human   process   of   making   a   copy   by   handwriting   or   typewriting.  not  its  terms.   was   the   foundation   of   her   defense   in   this   action   for   quieting  of  title.  the  respondents  registered   the   deed   with   the   Registry   of   Deeds   of   Bulacan   resulting   in   the   cancellation   of   the   tax   declaration   in   the   name   of   Marcosa  Bernabe  and  the  issuance  of  another  in  the  name   of   the   Aguilars.   When   the   evidence   sought   to   be   introduced   concerns   external   facts..   a   question   was   propounded   to   Prodon   as   to   who   had   signed   or   executed   the   deed.   particularly   as   respects   operative   or   dispositive   instruments.   are   the   children   and  heirs  of  the  late  Marcosa  Bernabe  who  died  on  May  10.   and   the   question   was   objected   to   based   on   the   Best  Evidence  Rule..  1956.   the   presumption   naturally   arises   that   the   better   evidence   is   withheld   for   fraudulent   purposes   that   its   production   would   expose   and   defeat. petitioners.  although  a  collateral  document.   Eustaquia   and   Maria.   such   as   deeds.  Sr.  was  whether  or  not  the   deed   of   sale   with   right   to   repurchase.   execution   or   delivery   of   the   writing.   and   the   Primary   Entry   Book   of   the   Register   of   Deeds.   The   RTC   should   have   outrightly   overruled   the   objection   because  the  fact  sought  to  be  established  by  the  requested   testimony  was  the  execution  of  the  deed.  there  is  a  special  risk  of  error.  and  (c)  the  absence  of  bad  faith  on  the   part   of   the   offeror   to   which   the   unavailability   of   the   original  can  be  attributed.   secondary   evidence   may   be   admitted   even   without   accounting  for  the  original.   The   principal  issue  raised  by  the  respondents  as  the  plaintiffs.       BASILIO DE VERA.   execution.   The   disputed   property   was   mortgaged   by   respondents   Basilio   and   Felipe   de   Vera   to   a   certain   Atty. et al.   and   loss.   Lastly.   because   a   slight   variation   in   words   may   mean  a  great  difference  in  rights.     37   .  the   respondents   redeemed   the   property   from   Atty.   if   a   party   is   in   the   possession   of   the   best   evidence  and  withholds  it.   the   presentation   of   evidence   other   than  the  original  document. HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented by GLICERIA PAPAFRANCISCO.

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  or  by  any  person  who  was  present  and  saw   Rheland  S.     Secondary   evidence   is   admissible   when   the   original   documents   were   actually   lost   or   destroyed.   The   destruction   of   the   instrument   may   be   proved   by   any   person   knowing   the   fact.   The   petitioners   also   claimed   that   the   respondents   had   resold   the   property   to   Marcosa   Bernabe   on  April  28.  as  amended.  Emiliano  Ibasco.  or  who  has  made  any  other   investigation   which   is   sufficient   to   satisfy   the   court   that   the  instrument  is  indeed  lost.  notary   public   who   notarized   the   document   testified   that   the   alleged  deed  of  sale  has  about  four  or  five  original  copies.  it  must  next  be  proved  that  said  document  has   been   lost   or   destroyed.   Records   show   that   petitioners   merely   accounted   for   three   out   of   four   or   five   original   copies.   The   correct   order   of   proof   is   as   follows:   Existence.   retained   by   the   opponent  or  by  a  third  person  or  the  like).  respondent  Mariano  Aguilar  was   issued   a   free   patent   to   the   land   on   the   basis   of   which   Original   Certificate   of   Title   No.   or   by   any   one   who   had   made.   The   loss   may   be   shown   by   any   person   who   knew   the   fact   of   its   loss.   they   were   co-­‐owners   of   the   property   and   demanded   partition   thereof   on   threats   that   the   respondents   would   be   charged   with   perjury   and/or   falsification.   This. vs.   The   sufficiency   of   proof   offered   as   a   predicate   for   the   admission   of   an   alleged   lost   deed   lies   within   the   judicial   discretion  of  the  trial  court  under  all  the  circumstances  of   the  particular  case.     it   executed   or   who.   the   trial   court   admitted.   Exhibit   A   purporting   to   be   a   xeroxed   copy   of   an   alleged   deed  of  sale  executed  on  April  28.   lost. petitioner.   It   failed   to   look  into  the  facts  and  circumstances  surrounding  the  loss   or  destruction  of  the  original  copies  of  the  alleged  deed  of   sale.   petitioners   failed   to   do.   FACTS:   Nelson   Santos   (Santos)   applied   for   a   license   with   the   National   Food   Authority   (NFA)   to   engage   in   the   business   of   storing   not   more   than   30.     In   establishing   the   execution   of   a   document   the   same   may   be   established   by   the   person   or   persons   who   executed  it.000.  or  a  bond  signed  by  a   duly   authorized   bonding   company.  by  the  person  before  whom  its  execution  was   acknowledged.   contents   although   this   order   may  be  changed  if  necessary  in  the  discretion  of  the  court.   a   sufficient   examination   in   the   place   or   places   where   the   document   or   papers   of   similar   character   are   usually   kept   by   the   person   in   whose   custody   the   document   lost   was.   no   excuse   for   non-­‐production   of   the   writing   itself   can   be   regarded   as   established   until   it   appears   that   all   of   its   parts   are   unavailable   (i.   Under   Act   No.   Hence.     RULING:     We  rule  in  the  negative..e.   since   all   the   duplicates  or  multiplicates  are  parts  of  the  writing  itself  to   be   proved.   execution   loss.Y.     On   September   1. ANTONIO LAGMAN.   For.   in   the   judgment   of   the   court.  Servacio.  P-­‐1356     In   ruling   in   favor   of   the   respondents.  2     A  reading  of  the  decision  of  the  trial  court  shows   that  it  merely  ruled  on  the  existence  and  due  execution  of   the   alleged   deed   of   sale   dated   April   28.       COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION.   transferring   and   conveying   unto   Marcosa   Bernabe   the  disputed  parcel  of  land     ISSUE:   whether   or   not   the   petitioners   have   satisfactorily   proven   the   loss   of   the   original   deed   of   sale   so   as  to  allow  the  presentation  of  the  xerox  copy  of  the  same.   after   its   execution.   or   by   a   person   to   whom   the   parties   to   the   instrument   had   previously   confessed   the   execution  thereof.   Camiling.   3893   or   the   General  Bonded  Warehouse  Act.   the   respondents   wrote   to   the   respondents   claiming   that   as   children   of   Marcosa   Bernabe.   over   the   objection   of   the   respondents.000   sacks   of   palay   valued   at   P5.   all   duplicates   or   counterparts   must   be   accounted   for   before   using   copies.  2015-­‐2016   On  July  20.   and  has  been  unable  to  find  it.   the   proponent   must   establish   the   former   existence   of   the   instrument.   saw   it   and   recognized   the   signatures.     After  the  due  execution  of  the  document  has  been   established.   But   prior   to   the   introduction   of   such   secondary   evidence.   1980.     38   .  1959.     In  the  case  at  bar.  the  existence  of  an  alleged  sale   of   a   parcel   of   land   was   proved   by   the   presentation   of   a   xeroxed  copy  of  the  alleged  deed  of  absolute  sale.     In  the  case  at  bar.   the   amount   of   which   shall   be   fixed   by   the   NFA   Administrator   at   not   less   than   thirty-­‐three   and   one   third   percent   (33   1/3%)   of   the   market   value   of   the   maximum   quantity   of   rice   to   be   received.   Tarlac.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     However.  Jr.  Atty.250.   all   originals   must   be   accounted   for   before   secondary   evidence   can   be   given   of   any   one.   1959.   P-­‐1356   (M)   was   issued   in   his  name.00   in   his   warehouse   at   Barangay   Malacampa.  1959  by  the  respondents   selling.     Petitioners  filed  a  suit  for  reconveyance  of  the  lot   covered  by  Original  Certificate  of  Title  No.  the  approval   for   said   license   was   conditioned   upon   posting   of   a   cash   bond.  1977. respondent.  a  bond  secured  by  real  estate.

 2015-­‐2016   Accordingly.   may   be   cancelled   only   by   the   obligee.   03515   (1990   Bond)   which   was   also   valid   for   one   year   and   that   no   Indemnity   Agreement   was   executed   for   the  purpose.  is   not   admissible   unless   it   is   shown   that   the   original   is   unavailable.     Santos   then   secured   a   loan   using   his   warehouse   receipts   as   collateral.   the   third   is   with   Country   Bankers   and   the   fourth   was   in   his   possession.   Antonio   Lagman  (Lagman).   03304   for   P1.  Third.   by   the   Insurance  Commissioner.  there  can  be  no  novation  to  speak  of.   However.  Lagman  presented  a  mere  photocopy  of  the   1990  Bond.   Lagman   mentioned   during   the   direct   examination   that   there   are   actually   four   (4)   duplicate   originals   of   the   1990   Bond:   the   first   is   kept   by   the  NFA.  and  by  the  court.750.  We  rule  as  inadmissible  such  copy.     Lagman's   insistence   on   novation   depends   on   the   validity.  We   see  the  point.825.       ISSUE:   WON   the   presentation   of   a   photocopy   of   the   alleged   1990   bond   is   admissible   in   evidence   to   prove   the  alleged  novation  of  the  contract   RULING:   The   provision   in   the   bonds   is   but   in   compliance   with   the   second   paragraph   of   Section   177   of   the   Insurance   Code.     A  photocopy.  and  contents.   Rhosemelita   Reguine   (Reguine)  and  Lagman.   he   did   not   explain   why   severance   of   ties   is   by   itself  reason  enough  for  the  non-­‐availability  of  his  copy  of   the   bond   considering   that.     39   .   A   party   must   first   present   to   the   court  proof  of  loss  or  other  satisfactory  explanation  for  the   non-­‐production   of   the   original   instrument.   which   is   the   NFA.   as   in   this   case   where   there   is   no   fixed   expiration   date.     Country   Bankers   questions   the   existence   of   a   third   bond.   Santos   defaulted   in   his   payment.00   on   13   December   1989   (1989   Bonds)   through   its   agent.  A   photocopy   may   not   be   used   without   accounting   for   the   other  originals.   Second.   as   evidenced   by   receipts.     The   clear   import   of   these   provisions   is   that   the   surety   bonds   in   question   cannot   be   unilaterally   cancelled   Rheland  S.   Lagman   alleged   that   the   1989   Bonds   were   valid   only   for   1   year   from   the   date   of   their   issuance.  destroyed.   the   1990   Bond.     Before   a   party   is   allowed   to   adduce   secondary   evidence   to   prove   the   contents   of   the   original.   the   issuance   of   the   1990   Bond   was   not   approved   and  processed  by  Country  Bankers.  Country   Bankers  was  compelled  to  pay  P1.  as  co-­‐  signors.       In   the   case   at   bar.37.   nay.   Country   Bankers   Insurance   Corporation   (Country   Bankers)   issued   Warehouse   Bond   No.  cancels.  through   the   NFA   was   t   h   e   o   b   l   i   g   e   e   .     Under   the   best   evidence   rule.   the   original   document  must  be  produced  whenever  its  contents  are  the   subject  of  inquiry.   Clearly.  Neither  did  Lagman   explain  why  he  failed  to  secure  the  original  from  any  of  the   three   other   custodians   he   mentioned   in   his   testimony.  that   on  5  November  1990.   corresponding   Indemnity   Agreements   6   were   executed   by   Santos.  Santos  was  the  bond  principal.   and  (3)  on  the  part  of  the  offeror.   (2)   the   loss   and   destruction   of   the  original  or  the  reason  for  its  non-­‐  production  in  court.Y.749.00   on   5   November   1989   and   Warehouse   Bond   No.166.   In   his   Answer.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.     Consequently.  Lagman   was  the  surety  and  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines.  or  cannot  be  produced  in   court  before  secondary  evidence  can  be  given  of  any  one.  Country  Bankers  understandably  impugns  both.  the  NFA  as  bond   obligee   was   not   in   possession   of   the   1990   Bond.  Servacio.   Country   Bankers   stresses   that   the   cancellation   of   the   1989   Bonds   requires  the  participation  of  the  bond  obligee.   Lagman   failed   to  produce  the  original  of  the  1990  Bond  and  no  basis  has   been   laid   for   the   presentation   of   secondary   evidence.925.  being  a  mere  secondary  evidence.   02355   5   for   P749.   the   offeror   must   prove   the   following:   (1)   the   existence   or   due   execution   of   the   original.   8   When   the   loan   matured.   which   allegedly   cancelled   the   1989   Bonds   on   the   following   grounds:   First.   as   bond   principal.   which   specifies   that   a   continuing   bond.   Lagman   merely   presented   a   photocopy.  Lagman  himself  is  a  bondsman.   it   must   appear   that   all   of   them  have  been  lost.   The   sacks   of   palay   covered   by   the   warehouse   receipts   were   no   longer   found   in   the   bonded  warehouse.   as   it   appears   from   the   1989   Bonds.  and  that  the  1990  Bond  supersedes.   He   admitted   that   he   kept   a   copy   of   the  1990  Bond  but  he  could  no  longer  produce  it  because   he   had   already   severed   his   ties   with   Country   Bankers.  the  absence  of  bad  faith   to   which   the   unavailability   of   the   original   can   be   attributed.     Despite   knowledge   of   the   existence   and   whereabouts   of   these   duplicate   originals.  he  was  merely  contented  with  producing   its   photocopy.  execution.  Country  Bankers  issued  Warehouse   Bond   No.   When   more   than   one   original   copy   exists.   While  he  apparently  was  able  to  find  the  original  with  the   NFA  Loan  Officer.   Lagman   failed   to   exert   diligent   efforts  to  produce  the  original.   that   the   bonds   were   never  renewed  and  revived  by  payment  of  premiums.   together   with   Ban   Lee   Lim   Santos   (Ban   Lee   Lim).     Having   discounted   the   existence   and/or   validity   of  the  1990  Bond.   existence   of   the   allegedly   novating   1990   Bond.  loss.  the  second  is  with  the  Loan  Officer  of  the  NFA  in   Tarlac.  By  virtue  of  the  surety  bonds.   The   correct   order   of   proof   is   as   follows:   existence.   I   n   consideration   of   these   issuanes.   and  renders  no  force  and  effect  the  1989  Bonds.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     by  Lagman.   Country   Bankers   filed   a   complaint   for  a  sum  of  money.

 Rufino  L.   the   conditions   sine   qua   non   for   the   presentation   and   reception   of   the   photocopies   of   the   original   document   as   secondary   evidence   have   been   met.   the   trial   court   correctly   allowed   the   presentation  of  the  photocopied  documents  in  question  as   secondary  evidence.   for   Progress   Billing   Nos.501.   what   the   Court   said   in   Magdayao   v.  without  bad  faith  on   the  part  of  the  offeror.  1993.   BF   claimed   having   been   misled   into   working   continuously   on   the   project   by   ESHRI   which   gave   the   assurance   about   the   Progress   Payment   Certificates   already   being  processed.   (2)   there   is   proof   of   the   cause   of   the  original  document's  unavailability.   In   this   regard.  and  (3)  the  offeror   is   in   good   faith.  Rule  130.  Servacio.  (2)   a   request   was   made   on   ESHRI   to   produce   the   documents.   6   of   Rule  130.   —   If   the   document   is   in   the   custody   or   under   control   of   the   adverse   party.   exceptions.   and   necessarily   the   trial   court.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     SEC.  except  in  the  following  cases:     a) When   the   original   has   been   lost   or   destroyed.  Rufo  B.  which  reads:     SEC.   ESHRI. BF Corporation   FACTS:     Both   petitions   stemmed   from   a   construction   contract   denominated   as   Agreement   for   the   Execution   of   Builder's   Work   for   the   EDSA   Shangri-­‐la   Hotel   Project   4   that   ESHRI   and   BF   executed   for   the   construction   of   the   EDSA  Shangri-­‐la  Hotel  starting  May  1.   however.   no   evidence   shall   be   admissible   other   than   the   original   document  itself.   and   the   latter   fails   to   produce   it   after   reasonable   notice.   to   wit:   (1)   the   existence   of   the  original  documents  which  ESHRI  had  possession  of.   6.   3   (b)   of   Rule   130.   While   perhaps   not   on   all   fours   because   it   involved   a   check.  —  When  the     subject   of   inquiry   is   the   contents   of   a   document.   but   also   when   it   is   in   the   custody   or   under   the   control   of   the   adverse   party.   did   not   prepare   the   Progress   Payment   Certificates.  Samaniego.     From  May  1.     In   our   view.    Under   this   arrangement.  1991  to  June  30.   Clearly.  1992.  on  July  26.   3.   however.   40   .  1991.Y.  1  to  13.  as  a  general  proposition.   14   to   19   and   the   complementing  Project  Manager's  Instructions  (PMIs)  and   the  Work  Variation  Orders  (WVOs).     RTC   and   CA   ruled   in   favor   of   BF   ordering   the   ESHRI.     ISSUE:   Petitioners   fault   the   CA.   certain   explanations   must   be   given   before   a   party   can   resort   to   secondary  evidence.  Based  on  Progress  Billing  Nos.   secondary   evidence   may   be   presented  as  in  the  case  of  loss.  before  the  RTC  a  suit  for   a  sum  of  money  and  damages.     Ruling:     The  only  actual  rule  that  the  term  "best  evidence"   denotes  is  the  rule  requiring  that  the  original  of  a  writing   must.   A   party   may   present   secondary   evidence   of   the   contents   of   a   writing   not   only   when   the   original   is   lost   or   destroyed.   BF   shall   submit   a   monthly   progress   billing   to   ESHRI   which   would   then   re-­‐ measure   the   work   accomplished   and   prepare   a   Progress   Payment  Certificate  for  that  month's  progress  billing.   (Emphasis   added.834.   Secondary   evidence   of   the   contents   of   a   written   instrument  or  document  refers  to  evidence  other  than  the   original   instrument   or   document   itself.  Colayco.   he   must   have   reasonable   notice   to   produce   it.  Kuok  Khoon   Chen.   In   either   instance.   If   after   such   notice   and   after   satisfactory   proof   of   its   existence.   let   alone   remit   payment   for   the   inclusive   periods   covered.  ESHRI   paid  BF  PhP86.S     b) When   the   original   is   in   the   custody   or   under   the   control   of   the   party   against   whom   the   evidence   is   offered.  be  produced  and  secondary   evidence   of   its   contents   is   not   admissible   except   where   the   original  cannot  be  had.   When   original   document   is   in   adverse   party's   custody   or   control.   These   are:   (1)   there   is   proof   of   the   original   document's   execution   or   existence.   did   not   re-­‐   measure   the   work   done.  BF  filed.   and   Kuok   Khoon   Tsen   to   pay   jointly   and   severally   respondent   BF   Corporation   (BF)   a   sum   of   money   with   interests  and  damages.   (3)   ESHRI   was   afforded   sufficient   time   to   produce   them.  Section  3  of  the  Rules  of   Court  enunciates  the  best  evidence  rule:   Rheland  S.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   or   cannot  be  produced  in  court.   on   the   matter   of   the   admission   in   evidence   of   the   photocopies   of   Progress   Billing   Nos.     After  several  futile  attempts  to  collect  the  unpaid   billings.   14   to   19.   and  (4)  ESHRI  was  not  inclined  to  produce  them.   the   circumstances   obtaining   in   this   case   fall   under   the   exception   under   Sec.   he   fails   to   produce   the   document.   Original   document   must   be   produced.     Four   factual   premises   are   readily   deducible   from   the   above   stenographic   notes.     According   to   BF.)     Complementing   the   above   provision   is   Sec.  2015-­‐2016   EDSA Shangri-la Hotel v.05.  BF  submitted   a   total   of   19   progress   billings   following   the   procedure   agreed  upon.   In   other   words.

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  that  he  fails  or  refuses  to  produce  the  same  in  court   and   that   the   offeror   offers   satisfactory   proof   of   its   existence.  thus:     .   .   To   warrant   the   admissibility   of   secondary   evidence  when  the  original  of  a  writing  is  in  the  custody  or   control   of   the   adverse   party.   Section   6   of   Rule   130   provides  that  the  adverse  party  must  be  given  reasonable   notice.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     41   .  2015-­‐2016   People  is  very  much  apt.  Servacio.     -­‐-­‐xxx-­‐-­‐   When   such   party   has   the   original   of   the   writing  and  does  not  voluntarily  offer  to  produce  it  or   refuses   to   produce   it.       Rheland  S.   .   secondary   evidence   may   be   admitted.

  which  NPC  failed  to  do  in  this   case.  to  consider   a   document   as   electronic   document.  This  is   the  ruling  in  the  case  of  NPC  vs  Codilla:       NPC  VS  CODILLA   v This  case  involves  an  action  filed  by   NPC  arising  from  an  incident  where  a   foreign  vessel  rammed  into  one  of   NPC’s  barges.  it  should  be  treated   as  an  ordinary  paper-­‐based   document. CODILLA For  purposes  of  the  Best  Evidence  rule.     On   20   April   1996.  but  NPC   formally  offered  in  evidence  only  the   photocopies  of  their  documentary   exhibits.  This  was  objected  to  by  the   defendant  under  the  BER.  In   this  case.       Ø The  SC  held  that  by  its   definition.  filed  a  formal  offer  of  evidence  before  the  lower   court   on   2   February   2004   consisting   of   Exhibits   "A"   to   "V"   together   with   the   sub-­‐marked   portions   thereof.   for   the   alleged   damages  caused  on  petitioner's  power  barges..   Inc.  stored.  By  no  stretch   of  the  imagination  can  a   person’s  signature  affixed   manually  in  the  photocopies   be  considered  as  information   ELECTRONICALLY  received.   petitioner   filed   an   Amended   Complaint   dated   8   July   1996   impleading   herein   private   respondent   Wallem   Shipping.  it  cannot  be   considered  as  an  electronic  document..   Thereafter.  private  respondents  Bangpai  Shipping  Co.   the   original   electronic   document   must   also  be  presented.     Ø The  processes  mentioned  here  must  be  free   from  any  manual  intervention.  the  contents  must   be  processed  electronically.   Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  and   Wallem   Shipping.   a   vessel   of   foreign   registry   owned   and   operated   by   private   respondent   Bangpai   Shipping.   ALL   the   PROCESSES   must  be  ELECTRONIC.  On   appeal.  The  moment   manual  intervention  supervenes.  the  document  in   question  appears  to  have  been   manually  signed.   Thus.   Inc.  NPC  argued  that  under  the   Rules  on  Electronic  Evidence.     If   the   contents   of   the   electronic   document   is   the   subject   of   an   inquiry.   Ø If  it  is  manually  signed.  asked  the  SC  that   they  be  allowed  this  time  to   present  the  original.   filed   their   respective   objections   to   petitioner's  formal  offer  of  evidence.   on   26   April   1996.   Ø SC  even  went  on  to  castigate   NPC  because  what  happened   there  was  that  NPC  in  their   last  ditch  effort  to  present  the   original.   allegedly   bumped   and   damaged   petitioner's  Power  Barge  209  which  was  then  moored  at  the   Cebu   International   Port.   Consequently.   42   .     Petitioner.Y.   Co.   as   additional   defendant.   processed.   M/V   Dibena   Win.  During  the  trial.  Servacio.   all  are  considered  originals.  The  court   gave  NPC  time  to  produce  the  original   but  NPC  did  not  bother  to  care.  The   lower  court  ruled  against  NPC.   recorded.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     electronic.  The  presence  of  the   MANUAL  signature  as  PART  of   the  CONTENTS  of  these   documents  disqualifies  the   document  from  being   Rheland  S.  retrieved  or   produced..  NPC   presented  various  documents.  SC  said   that  NPC  was  given  ample   opportunity    to  present  the   original  but  NPC  was  bull-­‐ headed  so  it  is  already  late  in   the  day  for  NPC  to  submit  the   original.   a  photocopy  can  only  be   allowed  as  secondary  if  the   original  is  accounted  for.  Not  being   electronic.  transmitted.  2015-­‐2016   NPC V.   petitioner   filed   before   the   Cebu   RTC   a   complaint   for   damages   against   private   respondent   Bangpai   Shipping   Co.  there  is   no  more  original  or  copies  to  speak  of.   after   adducing   evidence   during   the   trial   of  the  case.   contending   that  the  latter  is  a  ship  agent  of  Bangpai  Shipping  Co.  and  under  the  BER.   cannot  be  considered   electronic  document.

  "K".   "Q"   and   its   sub-­‐markings.   Troyo.  with  "RECEIVED"  stamped   thereon.   with   "RECEIVED"   stamped   thereon.   the   Xerox   copies   do   not   constitute   the   electronic   evidence   defined   in   Section   1   of   Rule   2   of   the   Rules   on   Electronic   Evidence   as   follows:   "(h)   "Electronic   document"   refers   to   information   or   the   representation   of   information.   retrieved   or   produced   electronically.   "J"   and   its   sub-­‐markings.  Rule  2  of  the  Rules   on   Electronic   Evidence   is   not   limited   to   information   that   is   received.   "K".   "P"   and   its   sub-­‐markings.   together   with   a   handwritten  date.   transmitted.   and   "R"   are  hereby  DENIED  admission  and  excluded  from  the  records.   by   which   a   right   is   established   or   an   obligation   extinguished..  or  by  which  a  fact   may   be   proved   and   affirmed.   figures.   stored.   The  Xerox  or  photocopies  offered  should.  "M"  and  its  submarkings.   described   or   however   represented.   the   photocopies   it   presented   as   documentary   evidence   actually   constitute   electronic   evidence   based   on   its   own   premise   that   an   "electronic   document"  as  defined  under  Section  1  (h).   2.   "E".   petitioner   maintains   that   an   "electronic   document"   can   also   refer   to   other   modes   of   written   expression   that   is   produced   electronically.   "H"   and   its   sub-­‐markings.   "J".   data.   processed.  "N"  and  its  sub-­‐markings.   readable   by   sight   or   other   means   which   accurately   reflects   the   electronic   data   message   or   electronic   document.   the   required   Affidavit   to   prove   the   admissibility   and   Rheland  S.   "E".   plaintiff's   Exhibits   "A".   which   is   received.   "C".   together   with   a   handwritten   notation   of   the   43   .   Enriquez.   "R"   and  "S"  and  its  sub-­‐markings.  According  to  the  court  a  quo:   The   record   shows   that   the   plaintiff   has   been   given   every   opportunity   to   present   the   originals   of   the   Xerox   or   photocopies   of   the   documents   it   offered.   recorded.  Rex  Malaluan   and  Virgilio  Asprer. Exhibit   "D"   is   a   photocopy   of   a   letter   manually   signed   by   a   certain   Nestor   G.   symbols   or   other   models   of   written   expression.   It   includes   digitally   signed   documents   and   any   printout.   Rule   5.  2015-­‐2016   On   16   November   2004.   "L".   much   less   presented   in  evidence.   "H"   and   its   sub-­‐markings.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   For   the   purpose   of   these   Rules.   "D".   Rule   9.  The  plaintiff  attempted  to  justify  the  admission   of   the   photocopies   by   contending   that   "the   photocopies   offered   are   equivalent   to   the   original   of   the   document"   on   the  basis  of  the  Electronic  Evidence   But   as   rightly   pointed   out   in   defendant   Wallem's   Reply   to   the   Comment   of   Plaintiff.   "D".   Ibid)   was   not   executed.   as   included   in   the   section's   catch-­‐all   proviso:   "any   print-­‐out   or   output.   "O".   recorded.   such   as   photocopies.     WHEREFORE.     [ISSUE]   The   focal   point   of   this   entire   controversy   is   petitioner's   obstinate   contention   that   the   photocopies   it   offered   as   formal   evidence   before   the   trial   court   are   the   functional  equivalent  of  their  original  based  on  its  inimitable   interpretation  of  the  Rules  on  Electronic  Evidence.  "N"  and  its  sub-­‐markings.   1.   It   never   produced   the  originals.   "C".   be  stricken  off  the  record.  Servacio.   "P"   and   its   sub-­‐markings.   "I".  such  electronic   evidence   must   be   authenticated   (Sections   1   and   2.   "Q"   and   its   submarkings.   Rather.  contrary  to  the  rulings  of  both  the  trial   court   and   the   appellate   court.   Rules   on   Electronic   Evidence).   the   term   "electronic   document"   may   be   used   interchangeably   with  "electronic  data  message". Exhibit   "C"   is   a   photocopy   of   a   list   of   estimated   cost   of   damages   of   petitioner's   power   barges   207   and   209   prepared  by  Hopewell  Mobile   Power   Systems   Corporation   and   manually   signed  by  Messrs.   and   its   sub-­‐markings.   retrieved   or   produced   electronically.   retrieved   or   produced   electronically.   recorded.   HELD:   1.   public   respondent   judge   issued   the   assailed   order   denying   the   admission   and   excluding   from   the   records   petitioner's   Exhibits   "A".   aITECD   The   information   in   those   Xerox   or   photocopies   was   not   received.  "O".  Moreover.   Petitioner  insists  that.   Jr.   which   the   plaintiff   failed   to   do.  "L".   readable  by  sight  or  other  means".   "I".  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     evidentiary   weight   of   the   alleged   electronic   evidence   (Sec.Y.  therefore.  "M"  and  its  sub-­‐markings. Exhibit   "A"   is   a   photocopy   of   a   letter   manually   signed   by   a   certain   Jose   C.  cTECIA   3.   Finally.

  which   is   received.   Jr.   manually   signed   by   Jaime   S. Exhibit   "E"   is   a   photocopy   of   a   Standard   Marine   Protest   Form  which  was  filled  up  and   accomplished   by   Rex   Joel   C.   14.   Malaluan.  The   sub-­‐markings   contain   manual   signatures   and/or   handwritten   notations.   Nestor   G.   processed.   Portions   of   the   Jurat   were   handwritten.   Malaluan   and   Bautista   and   by   the   Notary   Public.  or  by  which  a  fact   may   be   proved   and   affirmed.   with   "RECEIVED"   stamped   thereon.   with   a   handwritten   notation   when   it   was   received   by   the   party.   manually   signed   by   Mr. Exhibit   "O"   is   the   same   photocopied   document   marked  as  Annex  C.   4.   Enriquez.   6..  2015-­‐2016   date  it  was  received.   Ofelia   Polo-­‐De   Los   Reyes.   and   manually   signed   by   the   Notary   Public.   with   other   handwritten  notations. Exhibit  "M"  is  a  photocopy  of   the   Notice   of   Termination   with   attachments   addressed   to   Rex   Joel   C.   Enriquez.   together   with   other  handwritten  notations.   Jr.   and   other   handwritten  notations.   10.   Exhibit  "L"  is  a  photocopy  of  a   portion   of   the   electricity   supply   and   operation   and   maintenance   agreement   Rheland  S.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   signed   manually   by   Atty.   Nestor   G.Y.   recorded.   8.   retrieved   or   produced   electronically.   Nestor   G.   13.  Patino. Exhibit   "Q"   is   a   photocopy   of   a   letter   manually   signed   by   Virgilio   Asprer   and   by   a   Notary   Public. Exhibit  "J"  is  a  photocopy  of  a   letter   containing   the   breakdown  of  the   cost   estimate.   44   .   together   with   a   handwritten   notation   of   the   date  it  was  received.   described   or   however   represented.   with   a   handwritten   notation   of   the   date   it   was   received.   Malaluan  in  his  own   handwriting   and   signed   by   him.   On   the   other   hand.   Jr.   Patinio.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     between   petitioner   and   Hopewell.   Exhibit   "H"   is   a   photocopy   of   a   letter   manually   signed   by   Mr. Exhibit   "P"   is   a   photocopy   of   an   incident   report   manually   signed   by   Messrs.   Enriquez. 5.   figures.   data.   together   with   a   handwritten   notation   of   the   date   it   was   received.   an   "electronic   document"   refers   to   information   or   the   representation   of   information. Exhibit   "I"   is   a   photocopy   of   a   computation   of   the   estimated   energy   loss   allegedly   suffered   by   petitioner   which   was   manually   signed   by   Mr.  Servacio.   11.   containing   handwritten   notations   and   every   page   containing   three   unidentified   manually   placed   signatures.   with   "RECEIVED"   stamped   thereon. Exhibit   "N"   is   a   photocopy   of   a   letter   of   termination   with   attachments   addressed   to   Virgilio   Asprer   and   manually   signed  by  Jaime  S. 9..   symbols   or   other   models   of   written   expression.   The   sub-­‐markings   also   contain   manual   signatures   and/or   handwritten  notations.   EACIaT   12.   STECDc   7.   by   which   a   right   is   established  or  an  obligation  extinguished. Exhibit   "K"   is   a   photocopy   of   the   Subpoena   Duces   Tecum   Ad   Testificandum   written   using   a   manual   typewriter.   transmitted.   stored.

  Original   writing   must  be  produced.   such   as   the   signatures   of   the   persons   who  purportedly  signed  the  documents.     MCC  Industrial  Sales  vs.  we  find  no  error  in  the  Order  of  the  court  a  quo   denying   admissibility   of   the   photocopies   offered   by   petitioner  as  documentary  evidence.   destroyed.  exceptions.   processed.   13  However.   Rule   130   of  the  Rules  of  Court:   "SECTION   2.   Moreover.  the  information   contained   in   an   electronic   document   is   received.   or   cannot   be   produced  in  court.     MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES V.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  Over  the  years.  may  be  recorded  or   produced  electronically.   A   perusal   of   the   information   contained   in   the   photocopies  submitted  by  petitioner  will  reveal  that  not  all  of   the   contents   therein.   other   than   the   original   writing   itself.   upon   proof   of   its   execution   or   existence   and   the   cause   of   its   unavailability   without   bad   faith   on   his   part.  an  international  trader.   it   failed   to   establish   that   such   offer   was   made   in   accordance   with   the   exceptions   as   enumerated   under   the   abovequoted   rule.  By  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  can   a   person's   signature   affixed   manually   be   considered   as   information   electronically   received.  except  in  the  following  cases:   (a) (b) When   the   original   has   been   lost.  One  of  the  suppliers  of  its   products  is  Ssanyong.   and   the   latter   fails   to   produce   it   after  reasonable  notice.  sourced  their  products  from   manufacturers  abroad.  —  There   can   be   no   evidence   of   a   writing   the   contents   of   which   is   the   subject   of   inquiry.  Ssanyong  Corp.  Servacio.  in  the  case  at  bar.  the  invoices  detailing  the   specifications."  ADHCSE   When   the   original   document   has   been   lost   or   destroyed.  then   45   .   if   not   preposterous.   may   prove   its   contents   by   a   copy.   recorded.   transmitted.  interpretation  of  the  law.   (c) When  the  original  is  a  record  or   other   document   in   the   custody   of  a  public  officer.   Ssanyong  also.   When   the   original   is   in   the   possession   of   the   party   against   whom   the   evidence   is   offered.  clearly.   processed.   v MCC  Industrial  Sales  is  a  domestic  corporation   engaged  in  the  business  of  importing  and  selling   stainless  steel  bars.  though  petitioner  insisted  in   offering   the   photocopies   as   documentary   evidence.  it  is  consequential  that  the  same  may   not   be   considered   as   the   functional   equivalent   of   their   original  as  decreed  in  the  law.   and   (c)   it   must   be   shown   that   a   diligent   and   bona   fide   but   unsuccessful   search   has   been   made   for   the   document   in   the   proper   place   or   places.  And  if  MCC  Sales  approves  it.   (d) When   the   original   has   been   recorded  in  an  existing  record  a   certified  copy  of  which  is  made   evidence  by  law.   or   cannot   be   produced   in   court.   (e) When   the   original   consists   of   numerous   accounts   or   other   Rheland  S.  Having  thus  declared   that   the   offered   photocopies   are   not   tantamount   to   electronic  documents.   as   mandated   under   Section   2. SSANGYONG CORPORATION   “FACSIMILE  COPY”   What  about  a  FACSIMILE  COPY?     Facsimile  copies  are  considered  electronic  subject  to   the   qualification   provided   for   under   the   case   of   MCC   Industrial  Sales  vs.  Ssanyong  Corporation.   or   by   a   recital   of   its   contents   in   some   authentic  document.   recorded.   stored.   retrieved   or   produced.   what   differentiates   an   electronic   document   from   a   paper-­‐based   document   is   the   manner   by   which  the  information  is  processed.   Accordingly.  they  entered   into  various  transactions  and  their  practice  was  for   Ssanyong  to  send  by  fax.  or  by  the  testimony  of  witnesses  in  the     order   stated.  2015-­‐2016   However.   stored.   then   these   photocopies  are  electronic  documents  as  defined  in  the  Rules   on   Electronic   Evidence   is   obviously   an   erroneous.  design.   transmitted.   Hence.   retrieved   or   produced   electronically.   11 The   offeror   of   secondary   evidence   is   burdened   to   prove   the   predicates   thereof:   (a)   the   loss   or   destruction   of   the   original   without   bad   faith   on   the   part   of   the   proponent/offeror   which   can   be   shown   by   circumstantial   evidence   of   routine   practices   of   destruction   of   documents.Y.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     documents   which   cannot   be   examined   in   court   without   great   loss   of   time   and   the   fact   sought   to   be   established   from   them   is   only   the   general   result   of  the  whole.     12 (b)  the  proponent  must  prove  by  a  fair  preponderance  of   evidence   as   to   raise   a   reasonable   inference   of   the   loss   or   destruction   of   the   original   copy.   the   argument   of   petitioner   that   since   these   paper   printouts   were   produced   through   an   electronic   process.  qualities  and  quantities  of  the   products  ordered.   the   offeror.

  32 Later.  on  June  22.  MCC  failed  to   30 open  a  letter  of  credit.  2000.  another  US$20/MT  discount  on  the  price  of   the  stainless  steel  ordered.  Ssangyong   received.  sent  a   letter.  related  interests  and  charges.  by  way  of  a   fax  transmittal.  through  its  Manila   Office.  June  29.  inclusive  of  warehouse   31 expenses.  Ssangyong   offered  to  negotiate  with  its  steel  manufacturer.   Because  MCC  could  open  only  a  partial  letter  of   credit.     On  April  13.  Ssangyong  forwarded  to  MCC  Pro   12 Forma  Invoice  No.  2000.  because  of   the  delay  of  the  shipment  of  the  items.  2000.  2015-­‐2016   v v v v v v their  officer  would  affix  his  signature  to  indicate   conformity  to  the  invoices.  As  stated  in  the  pro   forma  invoice.  that  it  was   Rheland  S.  to  the  Treasury  Group  of   Sanyo  Seiki  that  it  was  looking  forward  to  receiving   22 the  L/C  details  and  a  cable  copy  thereof  that  day.  One  of  these  transactions  bugged  down   for  failure  of  MCC  Sales  to  open  the  required  letter   of  credit  but  in  the  meantime.  ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐1  and   33 ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐2  dated  August  16.  Servacio.860.  in  South  Korea  and  paid  the   same  in  full.  requesting   that  it  be  informed  of  the  date  when  the  L/C  would   be  opened.  that  it  was  ready  to  ship  193.  2000.  to  confirm  MCC's  and   Sanyo  Seiki's  order  of  220  metric  tons  (MT)  of  hot   rolled  stainless  steel  under  a  preferential  rate  of   US$1.  both  dated  April  17.  Ssangyong  sent  another  facsimile  letter  to   MCC  stating  that  its  principal  in  Korea  was  already   25 in  a  difficult  situation  because  of  the  failure  of   Sanyo  Seiki  and  MCC  to  open  the  L/C's.  Ssanyong  was  forced  to  go  to  court  to   collect  damages  arising  from  the  alleged  breach  of   contract.  Ssangyong  replied.   The  following  day.  a  letter  addressed  to  Gregory  Chan.  Ssangyong  Manila   Office  informed  Sanyo  Seiki.18.  thru  Chan.  on  behalf  of  the   corporations.  Ssangyong  placed  the  order   with  its  steel  manufacturer.   Ssangyong  sent  a  separate  letter  of  the  same  date  to   Sanyo  Seiki  requesting  for  the  opening  of  the  L/C   covering  payment  of  the  first  100MT  not  later  than   23 June  28.  This  was  intimated  in   28 Ssangyong's  June  30.   Ssangyong  reiterated  its  request  for  the  facilitation   21 of  the  L/C's  opening.  2000  letter  to  MCC.   POSCO.  through  its  Manila  Office.   Following  their  usual  practice.  ST2-­‐POSTSO401  containing  the   terms  and  conditions  of  the  transaction.   On  the  same  date.  As  can  be  gleaned   46   .  Pro  Forma  Invoice  Nos.00  per  MT.  another  follow-­‐up  letter  for  the  opening  of   the  L/C  was  sent  by  Ssangyong  to  MCC.  requesting   an  extension  of  time  to  open  the  L/C  because   MCC's  credit  line  with  the  bank  had  been  fully   availed  of  in  connection  with  another  transaction.  MCC   10 Manager  [also  the  President  of  Sanyo  Seiki   Stainless  Steel  Corporation].  the  first  100MT  on  that  day   and  the  second  100MT  not  later  than  June  27.  in  that  the  quantity  was  now   officially  100MT  per  invoice  and  the  price  was   reduced  to  US$1.  Ssangyong  Manila  Office  sent.  a  letter  signed  by  Chan.  incurred   some  cost  for  storage  of  the  items.  by   9 fax.  payment  for  the  ordered  steel   products  would  be  made  through  an  irrevocable   14 letter  of  credit  (L/C)  at  sight  in  favor  of  Ssangyong.   since  its  Steel  Team  2  in  Korea  was  having  problems   27 and  Ssangyong  was  incurring  warehousing  costs.  on  June  26.     On  April  17.  Then  Ssanyong.  by  fax.  assented  and  affixed  his  signature  on   11 the  conforme  portion  of  the  letter.  2000.  Ssanyong  already   ordered  the  products  from  its   suppliers/manufacturers.Y.  and  that  the  goods  were  to  be   shipped  in  two  tranches.  2000.  MCC  sent   back  by  fax  to  Ssangyong  the  invoice  bearing  the   13 conformity  signature  of  Chan.   On  June  20.  by  fax.  2000.   To  maintain  their  good  business  relationship  and  to   support  MCC  in  its  financial  predicament.  On  June   28.  2000  were   issued  by  Ssangyong  and  sent  via  fax  to  MCC.  2000.  through  counsel.   In  the  meantime.  Ssangyong   would  be  compelled  to  cancel  the  contract  and  hold   MCC  liable  for  damages  for  breach  thereof   amounting  to  US$96.  because  of  its  confirmed   transaction  with  MCC.   Two  days  later.860.  the  order  for  220MT  of  steel  was  split  into   16 two.00/MT  for  the  200MT   stainless  steel.  on  August   15.  Chan  affixed  his  signature  on  the  fax   transmittal  and  returned  the  same.  MCC  Sales  would  open  a   letter  credit  before  the  items  are  shipped  to  the   Philippines.  Chan.700.132.  On  July  6.  despite  Ssangyong's  letters.  to   20 Ssangyong.  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐1   and  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐2).  one  for  110MT  covered  by  Pro  Forma  Invoice   17 No.  informed  Sanyo  Seiki  and  Chan.00  per  MT.  wrote  Sanyo   Seiki  that  if  the  L/C's  were  not  opened.  Similar  letters  were  transmitted  by   24 Ssangyong  Manila  Office  on  June  27.  It   requested  that  the  opening  of  the  L/C  be   19 facilitated.  preferably  at  the  earliest  possible  time.  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐1  and  another  for  110MT   18 covered  by  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐2.597MT   of  stainless  steel  from  Korea  to  the  Philippines.  2000.  delivery  of  the  goods   was  to  be  made  after  the  L/C  had  been  opened.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     v v v v able  to  secure  a  US$30/MT  price  adjustment  on  the   contracted  price  of  US$1.  Ssangyong.   However.  2000.  2000.   2000.  The   invoices  slightly  varied  the  terms  of  the  earlier  pro   forma  invoices  (ST2-­‐POSTSO401.  Ssangyong.   29 2000.  Consequently.   26 and  MCC  was  waiting  for  an  additional  credit  line.   Ssangyong  later.  So  to  cut  the  long   story  short.  Pohang  Iron  and  Steel   15 Corporation  (POSCO).

 on  September  11.  MCC  finally  opened  an  L/C  with   PCIBank  for  US$170.  2000.  photocopies  of  the   facsimile  copies  are  now  considered  as   functional  equivalents  of  the  originals.  the  photocopy   may  be  considered  a  functional  equivalent   of  the  original.00  for  the   remaining  100MT  of  steel  under  Pro  Forma  Invoice   Nos.  8792.  2000   invoices  submitted  to  the  court.  In  its   39 complaint.99  (representing  cost   difference.  but  in  order  to  resolve  the   issue  whether  the  photocopy  of  a  facsimile   copy  are  admissible  under  the  BER.  2000)  and  other  damages   for  breach.   Respondent  further  claims  that  the   47   .  and  demanding  payment  of   US$97.  Ssangyong  alleged  that  defendants   breached  their  contract  when  they  refused  to  open   the  L/C  in  the  amount  of  US$170.     Ø Ssanyong  argued  that  under  the  new  rules   of  electronic  evidence.  interests  and  charges.00  with  a   warning  that.700).  on  August  23.  Not  the  original   but  the  photocopy  of  the  facsimile  copy.   MCC  then  faxed  to  Ssangyong  a  letter  dated  August   22.  2000.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  respondent  posits  that.  and  that  MCC  lost  a  lot  of  money  due   36 to  a  recent  strike.  the  court  denied   the  demurrer.00/MT   (from  1.  2015-­‐2016   v v v v v v v from  the  photocopies  of  the  said  August  16.066.   37 2000.  requesting  for  a  price   adjustment  of  the  order  stated  in  Pro  Forma  Invoice   No.  2000  signed  by  Chan.   Ssangyong  rejected  the  request.  interests  and   charges  as  of  August  15.  2001.000.     After  Ssangyong  rested  its  case.     On  August  17.  in  the  first   place.  Servacio.  Chan  failed  to  reply.  No.  Ssangyong  through  counsel  wrote  a   letter  to  MCC.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     v During  the  trial  and  in  order  to  prove  the  existence   of  the  contract.  2000.   otherwise  known  as  the  Electronic  Commerce  Act  of   2000.A.     Critical  issue:  Whether  the  print-­‐out  and/or  photocopies  of   facsimile  transmissions  are  electronic  evidence  and   admissible  as  such.  defendants  filed  a   40 Demurrer  to  Evidence  alleging  that  Ssangyong   failed  to  present  the  original  copies  of  the  pro  forma   invoices  on  which  the  civil  action  was  based.       Ø What  we  have  here  are  photocopies  of  the   facsimile  copies.   Exasperated.  we  need   to  determine  first  whether.000.  Ssanyong  presented  a  photocopy  of   the  facsimile  copy  of  the  invoices.  considering  that  the  prevailing   price  of  steel  at  that  time  was  US$1.  if  the  said  L/C  was  not  opened  by  MCC   on  August  26.)  No.  Sanyo  Seiki  and  Gregory  Chan   before  the  Regional  Trial  Court  of  Makati  City.   because  the  law  merely  admits  as  the  best   evidence  the  original  fax  transmittal   Ø On  the  other  hand.  a  facsimile  copy  is  an  electronic   document  because  if  it  is.   from  a  reading  of  the  law  and  the  Rules  on   Electronic  Evidence.  sent  a  demand  letter  to  Chan  for  the  opening   of  the  second  and  last  L/C  of  US$170.00  covering  payment  for   100MT  of  stainless  steel  coil  under  Pro  Forma   34 Invoice  No.  therefore.     In  an  Order  dated  April  24.  The  goods  covered   by  the  said  invoice  were  then  shipped  to  and   35 received  by  MCC.  a  civil   action  for  damages  due  to  breach  of  contract  against   defendants  MCC.   Ssangyong  then  filed.Y.  the  original  facsimile   transmittal  of  the  pro  forma  invoice  is   admissible  in  evidence  since  it  is  an   electronic  document  and.  8792.  2002  Order  and  their  admissibility   finds  support  in  Republic  Act  (R.         v The  CA  affirmed  the  RTC’s  decision.  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐1  and  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐2.  ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐2.A.  declaring  that   the  invoices  were  admissible  in  evidence  although   they  were  mere  facsimile  printouts  of  MCC’s  steel   orders.37  representing  losses.317.  warehousing   38 expenses.  Ssangyong  would  be   constrained  to  cancel  the  contract  and  hold  MCC   liable  for  US$64.     Rheland  S.  ruling  that  the  documentary  evidence   presented  had  already  been  admitted  in  the   41 December  16.000.  on  November  16.  they  both  bear  the   conformity  signature  of  MCC  Manager  Chan.   v Arguments:   Ø Petitioner  contends  that  the  photocopies  of   the  pro  forma  invoices  presented  by   respondent  Ssangyong  to  prove  the   perfection  of  their  supposed  contract  of   sale  are  inadmissible  in  evidence  and  do  not   fall  within  the  ambit  of  R.  and.   v The  issue  on  the  admissibility  of  the  photocopy  of   the  facsimile  copy  of  the  invoices  subject  of  the  case   was  brought  to  the  fore  because  it  was  objected  to   under  the  BER.  2003.  the   best  evidence  under  the  law  and  the  Rules.  warehousing  expenses.500.  canceling  the   sales  contract  under  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐1  /ST2-­‐ POSTS0401-­‐2.  ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐1.

 5.A.  No.  described  or   however  represented.  figures.  electronic  data   interchange  (EDI).  figures.  received  or   stored  by  electronic.  sent.  but  not  limited  to.  Throughout  these  Rules.  as  follows:   xxx   (e)  "Electronic  Data  Message"  refers  to   information  generated.  Definition  of  Terms.  considers  an  electronic  data  message   or  an  electronic  document  as  the  functional  equivalent  of  a   65 written  document  for  evidentiary  purposes.   telex  or  telecopy.  otherwise  known  as  the  Electronic   Commerce  Act  of  2000.  "Electronic  Data  Message"  refers  to   information  generated.  retrieved  or   produced  electronically.  symbols  or  other   modes  of  written  expression.  by  which  a  right  is   established  or  an  obligation  extinguished.  An  electronic  document  is  also  the  equivalent  of   an  original  document  under  the  Best  Evidence  Rule.  2015-­‐2016   photocopies  of  these  fax  transmittals   (specifically  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐1  and  ST2-­‐ POSTS0401-­‐2)  are  admissible  under  the   Rules  on  Evidence  because  the  respondent   sufficiently  explained  the  non-­‐production  of   the  original  fax  transmittals.  electronic  data  interchange  (EDI).  received  or   stored  by  electronic.     64 R.  to  be  admissible  in  evidence  as  an  electronic  data   message  or  to  be  considered  as  the  functional  equivalent  of   an  original  document  under  the  Best  Evidence  Rule. Facsimiles  of  documents  originally  in  paper  are   excluded  in  the  ECA.  defines  the  terms  as:   Sec.  For  the   purposes  of  this  Act.   A.  Definition  of  Terms."     The  Electronic  Commerce  Act  of  2000  defines  electronic  data   message  and  electronic  document  as  follows:   Sec.   or  by  which  a  fact  may  be  proved  and   affirmed.  electronic  mail.  the  following  terms   Rheland  S.  telegram.  Servacio.  6.   The  Implementing  Rules  and  Regulations  (IRR)  of  R.  optical  or  similar   means.  telex  or  telecopy"  in  the  UNCITRAL   Model  Law  was  deliberately  deleted  in  both   Canadian  and  Philippine  ECA.  by  which  a  right  is   established  or  an  obligation  extinguished.  8792.  data.  optical  or  similar   means.  2000  by  the  then   Secretaries  of  the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry.  stored.Y.    However.  electronic   mail.  which  is  received.   Thus.   xxx   f.   69 8792.  MCC  is  still  bound  to  pay  Sssangyong   because  preponderance  of  evidence  submitted  by  Ssangyong   other  than  the  two  purchase  invoices  established  the   existence  of  the  valid  contract  of  sale  and  the  alleged  breach   committed  by  MCC.  which  was  signed  on  July  13.   the  term  "electronic  data  message"  shall  be   equivalent  to  and  be  used  interchangeably   with  "electronic  document.    The  phrase  "but  not  limited   to.  in  the  same  way  as  they  are   excluded  in  the  Uniform  Electronic  Commerce  Act   of  Canada  which  Senator  Santiago  had  used  to   define  what  is  included  and  excluded  in  the  scope   of  the  Philippine  ECA.  and  is  authenticated  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the   67 said  Rules.  if  it  is  a   printout  or  output  readable  by  sight  or  other  means.  the   Department  of  Budget  and  Management."   x  x  x  x   (h)  "Electronic  Document"  refers  to   information  or  the  representation  of   information.  and  then  Governor   of  the  Bangko  Sentral  ng  Pilipinas.  telegram.  the   writing  must  foremost  be  an  "electronic  data  message"  or  an   "electronic  document.  recorded.  processed.A.   HELD:  The  documents  in  question  are  inadmissible  in   evidence.   or  by  which  a  fact  may  be  proved  and   48   .Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  data.  described  or   however  represented.  the   following  terms  are  defined.  For  the   purposes  of  this  Act  and  these  Rules.  sent.  "Electronic  Document"  refers  to   information  or  the  representation  of   information.  shown   68 to  reflect  the  data  accurately.  No.   transmitted.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     are  defined.  symbols  or  other   modes  of  written  expression.  The  Rules  on   66 Electronic  Evidence  regards  an  electronic  document  as   admissible  in  evidence  if  it  complies  with  the  rules  on   admissibility  prescribed  by  the  Rules  of  Court  and  related   laws.  as  follows:   xxx   c.

 electronic  mail.  telegram.   the  interpretation  of  this  Act  shall  give  due   regard  to  its  international  origin  and  the   need  to  promote  uniformity  in  its   application  and  the  observance  of  good   faith  in  international  trade  relations.  by  which  a  right  is   established  or  an  obligation  extinguished.  retrieved  or   produced  electronically.   electronic  data  interchange  (EDI)."   The  phrase  "but  not  limited  to.   49   .   or  by  which  a  fact  may  be  proved  and   affirmed.  Magsaysay.  Section  37  of  the  Electronic  Commerce  Act  of   2000  provides  that   Unless  otherwise  expressly  provided  for."   Rheland  S.  electronic  data  interchange   (EDI).  data."   However.  processed.  the  term  "electronic  document"  shall   be  equivalent  to  and  be  used   interchangeably  with  "electronic  data   message.  8792  were  taken.  the  "international  origin"  mentioned  in  this   section  can  only  refer  to  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law.   telex  or  telecopy.A.  Jr.  as  follows:   x  x  x  x   (g)  "Electronic  data  message"  refers  to   information  generated.  but  not  limited  to.  retrieved  or   produced  electronically.  the   principal  author  of  Senate  Bill  1902  (the  predecessor  of  R.  the  drafters  of  the  IRR   reinstated  it.  The   generally  accepted  principles  of   international  law  and  convention  on   electronic  commerce  shall  likewise  be   considered..  the  term   "electronic  document"  may  be  used   interchangeably  with  "electronic  data   message.  and  the   UNCITRAL's  definition  of  "data  message":     "Data  message"  means  information   generated.  Congress  deleted  the  phrase.  which  is  received.   electronic  data  interchange  (EDI).  processed.   transmitted.  described  or   however  represented.  The  expanded  definition  of   an  "electronic  data  message"  under  the  IRR.  which  is  received."   Interestingly.  optical  or  similar  means   including.  when  Senator  Ramon  B.  received  or  stored  by   electronic.  further  supports  this  theory   considering  that  the  enumeration  "xxx  [is]  not  limited  to.  recorded.  –  For   purposes  of  these  Rules.  electronic  mail.  stored.  at  first  glance.  telegram.  Servacio.  telegram.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Given  these  definitions.  optical  or  similar   means.  telex  or  telecopy"  in  the  IRR's   definition  of  "electronic  data  message"  is  copied  from  the   Model  Law  on  Electronic  Commerce  adopted  by  the  United   Nations  Commission  on  International  Trade  Law   70 (UNCITRAL).   convey  the  impression  that  facsimile  transmissions  are   electronic  data  messages  or  electronic  documents  because   they  are  sent  by  electronic  means.   76 telex  or  telecopy."  and  replaced  the  term  "data  message"  (as   found  in  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  )  with  "electronic  data   message.  While  Congress  deleted  this  phrase  in   the  Electronic  Commerce  Act  of  2000.  the  following   terms  are  defined.  sent.  For   purposes  of  these  Rules.  recorded.   The  Rules  on  Electronic  Evidence  promulgated  by  this  Court   defines  the  said  terms  in  the  following  manner:   SECTION  1.  from  which  majority  of  the  provisions  of  R.  consistent  with   the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law.  figures.   is  substantially  the  same  as  the  IRR's  characterization  of  an   "electronic  data  message.   Obviously.  The  deletion  by  Congress  of  the  said  phrase  is   significant  and  pivotal.  It  includes  digitally   signed  documents  and  print-­‐out  or  output.  electronic  data   interchange  (EDI).  2015-­‐2016   affirmed.A.Y.   (h)  "Electronic  document"  refers  to   information  or  the  representation  of   information.   its  IRR  and  the  Rules  on  Electronic  Evidence.  Throughout  these   Rules.  "but  not  limited  to.   transmitted.  electronic  mail."  And  to  telecopy  is  to  send  a  document   75 from  one  place  to  another  via  a  fax  machine.  Definition  of  Terms.  received  or   stored  by  electronic.  sent.     As  further  guide  for  the  Court  in  its  task  of  statutory   construction.   telex  or  telecopy.  stored.  electronic  mail.   readable  by  sight  or  other  means.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  we  go  back  to  the  original  question:   Is  an  original  printout  of  a  facsimile  transmission  an  electronic   data  message  or  electronic  document?     The  definitions  under  the  Electronic  Commerce  Act  of  2000.  telegram.  symbols  or  other   modes  of  written  expression.  which   accurately  reflects  the  electronic  data   message  or  electronic  document.   71 No.

 not  all  data  recorded  or  stored  in   Rheland  S.  the  exchange  followed:   Senator  Santiago:  "ELECTRONIC  RECORD"   MEANS  DATA  THAT  IS  RECORDED  OR   STORED  ON  ANY  MEDIUM  IN  OR  BY  A   COMPUTER  SYSTEM  OR  OTHER  SIMILAR   DEVICE.  he  proposed   to  adopt  the  term  "data  message"  as  formulated  and  defined   79 in  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law.  The  record  is  the  data.  to   which  we  have  no  objection.  the  lady   Senator  accepted  that  we  use  the  term   "Data  Message"  rather  than  "ELECTRONIC   RECORD"  in  being  consistent  with  the   UNCITRAL  term  of  "Data  Message.   Furthermore.  however.   In  short.  Though  when  the   video  is  transferred  to  a  website.  2015-­‐2016   No.  It  would  also  not  apply  to   regular  digital  telephone  conversations   since  the  information  is  not  recorded.  8792).  the  term  evolved  into  "electronic   data  message.   amending  the  term  of  the  definition  of   "Data  Message"  on  page  2A.  Then  we  are.   The  explanation  for  this  term  and  its   definition  is  as  follows:  The  term   "ELECTRONIC  RECORD"  fixes  the  scope  of   our  bill.  printouts  that  are  used  only  as   paper  records  and  whose  computer  origin  is   never  again  called  on  are  treated  as  paper   records.  it  would   not  apply  to  telexes  or  faxes.  The  term  I  would  like  to   insert  is  ELECTRONIC  DATA  MESSAGE  in  lieu   of  "ELECTRONIC  RECORD.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     digital  form  is  covered.  conveyed  a  different   meaning   In  the  Legislative  proceedings  in  drafting   this  law.  In  that  case.  it  would  be   covered  because  of  the  involvement  of  the   computer.   Although  things  that  are  not  recorded  or   preserved  by  or  in  a  computer  system  are   omitted  from  this  bill.  A  computer  or  a   similar  device  has  to  be  involved  in  its   creation  or  storage.  PRINTOUT  OR  OTHER  OUTPUT  OF   THAT  DATA.   Paper  records  that  are  produced  directly  by   a  computer  system  such  as  printouts  are   themselves  electronic  records  being  just  the   means  of  intelligible  display  of  the  contents   of  the  record."  will  this  affect  her   accepting  of  the  use  of  "Data  Message"   instead  of  "ELECTRONIC  RECORD"?     Senator  Santiago.  for   example.  telegram.  The  term  "similar   device"  does  not  extend  to  all  devices  that   create  or  store  data  in  digital  form.  in  effect.  IT  INCLUDES  A   DISPLAY."  So  with   the  new  amendment  of  defining   "ELECTRONIC  RECORD.  line  31.  it  will  not.  if  my   memory  does  not  fail  me.  President.  During  the  period  of   amendments.  The  record   may  be  on  any  medium.  This   provision  focuses  on  replacing  the  search  for   originality  proving  the  reliability  of  systems   instead  of  that  of  individual  records  and   using  standards  to  show  systems  reliability.  Thank  you   for  reminding  me.  these  may  well  be   admissible  under  other  rules  of  law.  sponsored  the  bill  on  second  reading.  telex  or   telecopy"  in  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  was  deleted.   except  for  the  aforesaid  deleted  phrase.  the  term  "electronic  data  message.  but  the  original  printout   would  be  subject  to  the  rules  of  admissibility   of  this  bill."  though   maintaining  its  description  under  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law.  video   records  are  not  covered.  Likewise.  Music  recorded  by  a  computer   system  on  a  compact  disc  would  be  covered.  except   computer-­‐generated  faxes.  electronic  mail.  It   would  apply  to  voice  mail  since  the   information  has  been  recorded  in  or  by  a   device  similar  to  a  computer.  earlier.  unlike  the   United  Nations  model  law  on  electronic   commerce.   x  x  x  x   50   .  Servacio.   Senator  Magsaysay.  No.  electronic   data  interchange  (EDI).  Mr.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  It  is  electronic   because  it  is  recorded  or  stored  in  or  by  a   computer  system  or  a  similar  device."  and  the  phrase  "but  not  limited  to.  Photocopies  of  the  printout   would  be  paper  record  subject  to  the  usual   rules  about  copies.  to  data  on  magnetic  strips  on   cards  or  in  Smart  cards.  the  reliability  of  the   computer  system  that  produces  the  record   is  irrelevant  to  its  reliability.  As  drafted."   Senator  Magsaysay.Y.   The  amendment  is  intended  to  apply.   However.  THAT  CAN  BE  READ  OR  PERCEIVED   BY  A  PERSON  OR  A  COMPUTER  SYSTEM  OR   OTHER  SIMILAR  DEVICE.

 technically.  electronic  data  interchange  (EDI).  It  is  not  the  functional   equivalent  of  an  original  under  the  Best  Evidence  Rule  and  is   not  admissible  as  electronic  evidence."  which.  In  the  present  case."  without  considering  the   intention  of  Congress  when  the  latter  deleted  the  phrase  "but   not  limited  to.  It  may.   electronic  mail.  consonant  with  the   term  "electronic  record"  in  the  law  of  Canada."  This  term  then.  electronic  data  interchange  (EDI).  unlike  the  United  Nations  model  law  on   electronic  commerce."  it  intended  the  same   meaning  as  the  term  "electronic  record"  in  the  Canada  law."  Noteworthy  is   that  the  Uniform  Law  Conference  of  Canada.  telex  and  telecopy  (except  computer-­‐generated   faxes.     x  x  x  A  facsimile  is  not  a  genuine  and   authentic  pleading.  a  facsimile  transmission  cannot  be   considered  as  electronic  evidence.  which  is  a  newer  development  as  compared  to  the   ordinary  fax  machine  to  fax  machine  transmission).  telex  or  telecopy.     Facsimile  transmissions  are  not.  conclude  that  the  terms  "electronic  data   message"  and  "electronic  document.  including  the  amendment  on  the  effect   of  error  or  change.  President.  I  will  provide  the   language  of  the  amendment  together  with   the  explanation  supporting  that   amendment  to  the  distinguished  sponsor   and  then  he  can  feel  free  to  take  it  up  in  any   session  without  any  further  intervention.   in  a  virtual  or  paperless  environment."  has   assumed  a  different  context.  Mr."  In  explaining  the  term  "electronic   record"  patterned  after  the  E-­‐Commerce  Law  of  Canada.  sent  through  a  phone  line."     Clearly  then.  That  is  correct."  and  cannot  be   considered  as  electronic  evidence  by  the  Court.  an  exact   Rheland  S.   Senator  Defensor-­‐Santiago  had  in  mind  the  term  "electronic   data  message.  at  best.  Ineluctably.  It  accounts  for   the  addition  of  the  word  "electronic"  and  the  deletion  of  the   phrase  "but  not  limited  to.  except  computer-­‐ generated  faxes.  therefore.  telegram.   This  construction  of  the  term  "electronic  data  message."   which  excludes  telexes  or  faxes.  as  all  direct  printouts  of  the  virtual   reality  are  the  same.  "paperless.  Accordingly.  and  are  considered  as   89 originals.  In  fact.  electronic   mail.  telex  or  telecopy.  These  two   copies  are  distinct  from  each  other.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     copy  preserving  all  the  marks  of  an  original.  in  a  manner  strikingly  similar  to  Sen.  Servacio.  and  re-­‐printed  at  the   receiving  end.  the  law's  definition  of  "electronic  data   message.   Since  a  facsimile  transmission  is  not  an  "electronic  data   message"  or  an  "electronic  document.  it  excluded  the  early  forms  of  technology.  Mr.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Is  that  not  right?   80 Senator  Santiago.  It  is.  the   deliberations  of  the  Legislature  are  replete  with  discussions   on  paperless  and  digital  transactions.   President.  Pro  Forma   Invoice  Nos.  in  this  sense.  when  it   defined  the  term  "electronic  data  message.  there  is  no  way  of   determining  on  its  face  whether  the   facsimile  pleading  is  genuine  and  authentic   and  was  originally  signed  by  the  party  and   his  counsel.  explains  the   term  "electronic  record.  is  in  harmony  with  the  Electronic  Commerce  Law's   focus  on  "paperless"  communications  and  the  "functional   82 equivalent  approach"  that  it  espouses."  as  drafted  in  the  Uniform  Electronic   Evidence  Act.  as  aforesaid.  in  all  respects.  telegram.  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐1  and  ST2-­‐POSTS0401-­‐2   51   .Y."  it  was  consonant  with  the   explanation  of  Senator  Miriam  Defensor-­‐Santiago  that  it   would  not  apply  "to  telexes  or  faxes.  there   exists  an  original  paper-­‐based  information  or  data  that  is   scanned.  this  time.  like   telegraph.  Santiago's   explanation  during  the  Senate  deliberations:   There  is  no  question  then  that  when  Congress  formulated  the   term  "electronic  data  message.  in  an  ordinary  facsimile  transmission.   Accordingly.  Be  it  noted  that  in  enacting  the  Electronic   Commerce  Act  of  2000.  While  Congress  anticipated  future  developments  in   90 communications  and  computer  technology  when  it  drafted   the  law.  I  have   proposed  all  the  amendments  that  I  desire   to.  when  the  Senate  consequently  voted  to  adopt  the  term   "electronic  data  message.  which  have  an  original  paper-­‐based  copy  as   sent  and  a  paper-­‐based  facsimile  copy  as  received.  be  a  sham   87 pleading.  is  interchangeable  with   "electronic  document.  and  have  different  legal   effects.  Before  we  end.   Thus.  Further.  there  is  no   original  copy  to  speak  of."  but   verily  are  paper-­‐based.   Without  the  original.   Senator  Magsaysay.  2015-­‐2016   Senator  Santiago.  with  greater   reason  is  a  photocopy  of  such  a  fax  transmission  not   electronic  evidence.  while  maintaining  part  of  the   UNCITRAL  Model  Law's  terminology  of  "data  message."  as  defined  under  the   Electronic  Commerce  Act  of  2000.  Congress  intended  virtual  or   paperless  writings  to  be  the  functional  equivalent  and  to  have   88 the  same  legal  function  as  paper-­‐based  documents.  except  computer-­‐generated   faxes.  I  understand  from  the  proponent   of  these  amendments  that  these  are  based   on  the  Canadian  E-­‐commerce  Law  of  1998."  could  not  have  included  facsimile   transmissions.  do  not  include  a  facsimile   transmission."   We.  in  fact.  the  IRR  went  beyond  the  parameters  of  the  law   when  it  adopted  verbatim  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law's   definition  of  "data  message.  therefore.

  petitioner  MCC  does  not  assail  the  admissibility  of  this   document  in  the  instant  petition.  on  the  other  hand.  why  would  petitioner  open  an  L/C  for  the  second  half   of  the  transaction  if  there  was  no  first  half  to  speak  of?     The  logical  chain  of  events.  these  invoices  slightly  varied  the  terms  of   the  earlier  invoices  such  that  the  quantity  was  now  officially   100MT  per  invoice  and  the  price  reduced  to  US$1.000.  not  all  facsimile  copies  are  not   electronic  because  in  this  case.  It  also  introduced  in  evidence  a  variety  of  other   documents.   It  is  observed.  both  Pro  Forma   Invoices  bear  the  same  date  and  details.  that  it  was  the  first  of   two  (2)  pro  forma  invoices  covering  the   subject  contract  between  plaintiff  and  the   defendants.  along  with  the  other  unchallenged   documentary  evidence  of  respondent  Ssangyong.  scanned.  and  likewise  did  not  sufficiently  prove  the  loss  or   destruction  of  the  originals.   however.  which   likewise  bears  the  signature  of  Gregory   Chan.  as  enumerated  above.  Servacio.  where  the   information  originated  from  an   ordinary  paper-­‐based  document   fed  into  the  machine.  which  was  certified  by  PCIBank  as  a  true  copy  of   105 its  original.  subject  of  the  case.  on  the  other   hand.  ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐1  and  ST2-­‐ POSTS080-­‐2).  the  existence  of  the  sales  contract  was   still  proven  in  preponderance  of  other  evidence   presented  by  Ssangyong.   Observably  further.Y.  that  is.   which  logically  mean  that  they  both  apply   106 to  one  and  the  same  transaction.  contrary   to  the  position  of  both  the  trial  and  the  appellate  courts.   failed  to  account  for  the  notation  "2/2"  in   its  Pro  Forma  Invoice  (Exhibit  "1-­‐A").00  per   MT.  Thus.  Exhibits  E  and  F  cannot  be   admitted  in  evidence  and  accorded  probative  weight.  in  the  amount  of   US$170.  and  which  bears  the   signature  of  Gregory  Chan.     Pro  Forma  Invoice  No.  Notable  among  them  are  Pro   Forma  Invoice  Nos.  As   already  mentioned.  Plaintiff.  2015-­‐2016   (Exhibits  "E"  and  "F").  "1-­‐A"  to  "1-­‐R")  referring  to  Pro   Forma  Invoice  for  Contract  No.  is  not  open   to  question.  ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐1  (Exhibit  "X").860.700.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Indeed.00  per  MT.  Its  admissibility.  Issues   not  raised  on  appeal  are  deemed  abandoned.   (Exhibits  "1".  it  was.  we  find  that  respondent  failed  to  prove   the  existence  of  the  original  fax  transmissions  of  Exhibits  E   and  F.  petitioner  MCC  which  introduced   this  document  in  evidence.  in  fact.  SC   distinguished  TWO  KINDS  OF  FACSIMILE   PROCESSES/MACHINES:     a) Traditional  or  ordinary.  presented  Pro  Forma  Invoice   referring  to  Contract  No.  is  a  mere  photocopy  of  its  original.00.  Defendants.   preponderate  in  favor  of  the  claim  that  a  contract  of  sale  was   perfected  by  the  parties.   These  invoices  (ST2-­‐POSTS0401.   As  to  Pro  Forma  Invoice  No.   in  the  amount  of  US$170.  which  are  mere  photocopies  of  the   original  fax  transmittals.   b) Computer-­‐generated  fax  machine:   machine   where   the   original   information/data   is   electronically   generated.000.     Ø SC:  The  facsimile  copies.   Given  these  norms.   B.     This  Court  also  finds  merit  in  the  following  observations  of   the  trial  court:   Defendants  presented  Letter  of  Credit   Rheland  S.00.   ST2POSTS080-­‐2.  ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐1  and  ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐2   which  were  issued  by  Ssangyong  and  sent  via  fax  to  MCC.  Petitioner  MCC  paid  for  the  order   stated  in  this  invoice.  This  initial  contract  was  perfected.  ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐1.  2000  invoices   submitted  to  the  court  bear  the  conformity  signature  of  MCC   Manager  Chan.  Plaintiff  accounted  for  the   notation  "1/2"  on  the  right  upper  portion  of   the  Invoice.  ST2-­‐POSTS080-­‐2  (Exhibits  "1-­‐A"   and  "2-­‐C"). However.  therefore.   sent  through  the  telephone  line   and  reprinted  at  the  receiving  end.  does  not  originate  from   a   paper-­‐based   document   but   already  electronic  then  sent  to  the   52   .  as  gleaned  from  the  evidence  of   both  parties.  General   Manager  of  MCC.  together  with  the   testimonies  of  its  witnesses.  however.  that  respondent  Ssangyong  did  not   rely  merely  on  Exhibits  E  and  F  to  prove  the  perfected   contract.  But  then  again.  MCC.  are  not  electronic  evidence.  Verily.  Although  the   SC  said.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   are  not  electronic  evidence.  evidence  not   objected  to  is  deemed  admitted  and  may  be  validly   104 considered  by  the  court  in  arriving  at  its  judgment.  The  copies  of  the  said  August  16.  started  with  the  petitioner  and  the  respondent   agreeing  on  the  sale  and  purchase  of  220MT  of  stainless  steel   at  US$1.

  Executive  Assistant  II  of  the  Acting  Division  Clerk  of  Court  of   the   Fifteenth   (15th)   Division.  in  August  of  2004.   thus   complainant   was   not   reinstated  to  his  former  job  pending  adjudication  of  the  case.  73460  entitled  "PAGCOR  vs.  Servacio.   SP  No.  telegraph"   was  deleted/not  adopted  in  our  own   definition  of  Electronic  Evidence.000.000.R.  But  they  made  it  easier  for   the  court  to  confirm  or  to  find  them  guilty  because   of  their  admission.  It  should  be  treated   similarly  in  all  respects.   The   CSC   ordered   complainant's   reinstatement   but   a   writ   of   preliminary   injunction   and   a   temporary   restraining   order   was   issued   by   the   CA   in   favor   of   PAGCOR.   SC   said.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A."     Complainant's   case   referred   to   above   had   been   pending   with   the   CA   for   more   than   two   years.  Zaldy  Nuez.   24   The   crew   of   the   TV   program   53   .   which   were   scanned   and   then.   complainant   thought   that   respondent   would   be   able   to   advise  him  on  how  to  achieve  an  early  resolution  of  his  case..       The   simplest   way   if   you   happen   to   defend   someone   who   is   charged   with   any   wrongdoing   and   the   evidence   against   your   client   consists   of   electronic   like   email.  It  would  have  been  difficult   without  the  admission.   During   their   first   telephone   conversation  17   and   thereafter   through   a   series   of   messages   they   exchanged   via   SMS.   respondent   allegedly   told   complainant   that   a   favorable  and  speedy  decision  of  his  case  was  attainable  but   the   person   who   was   to   draft   the   decision   was   in   return   asking  for  One  Million  Pesos  (P1..   15   Complainant   filed   an   illegal   dismissal   case   against   PAGCOR   before   the   Civil   Service   Commission   (CSC).   This   is   an   administrative   case   for   Dishonesty   and   Grave   Misconduct   3   against   Elvira   Cruz-­‐Apao   (Respondent).   the   facsimile   copies   in   question   as   received   originated   from   an   ordinary   paper-­‐based   document   (the   invoices).  complainant   sought   the   assistance   of   respondent   sometime   in   July   2004   after   learning   of   the   latter's   employment   with   the   CA   from   her   sister.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     One   is   the   parties   to   the   communication.   CA-­‐G.00).  he  sought  the  assistance   of   Imbestigador.     v In  the  case  of  NUEZ  VS.  2015-­‐2016   Ø Ø other   end   through   the   telephone   line  resulting  in  a  facsimile  copy     The  ordinary.  cannot  be  considered  electronic.   Rheland  S.   16  Desiring  an  expeditious  decision  of  his  case.  19   Complainant   then   asked   for   time   to   determine   whether   or   not   to   pay   the   money   in   exchange   for   the   decision.  telecopy".   It   would   only   be   easy   for   the   offended   party   to   call   witnesses   when   the   account   used  is  known  to  many.00)  from  Zaldy  Nuez  (Complainant)   in   exchange   for   a   speedy   and   favorable   decision   of   the   latter's   pending   case   in   the   CA.  libel)   IN   AUTHENTICATING   1 PARTIES  TO  THE  COMMUNICATION   1                                                                                                      This  is  not  a  “kulang”  list  as  per  Sir’s  discussion.  let  the  other  party  prove   it.   The   complaint   arose   out   of   respondent's   solicitation   of   One   Million  Pesos  (P1.000.  Allegedly.   DISCUSSION:   FIRST   REASON:   In   this   case   however.Y.  telex.   B.   This   is   contrary   to   the   obvious   purpose   of   the   rules   which   is   to   promote   a   paperless   environment.  So  deny. The  obvious  purpose  of  the  framers  in   enacting  the  Electronic  commerce  act  and   then  the  electronic  evidence  rule  is  to   promote  a  paperless  writing  as  the   functional  equivalent  of  an  ordinary  paper-­‐ based  document.   Magdalena   David.     NUEZ V.  After  “parties  to  the   communication”. The  Model  Law  mentioned  a  list  of   electronic  processes  which  include   "telegram.  it  started  with  an   information/data   originated   from   an   ordinary   paper-­‐based   document   and   ended   up   with   an   ordinary   paper-­‐based   facsimile   copy   as   received.    What  started  out  as  ordinary  will  result  to  an   ordinary  document  in  this  context.  APAO.   There   is   difficulty   in   identifying   the   sender   or   receiver   such   as   when   the  other  party  uses  an  alias/other  name  or  when  the  other   end   denies   ownership   of   the   account.000.   However.  We  are  not  aware  of  any   other  enumeration  about  this  is  in  the  past  transcripts.   sent   through   the   telephone   line   and   reprinted  at  the  other  end. CRUZ-APAO BASIC   FACTS   TO   ESTABLISH   ELECTRONIC  EVIDENCE  (ex.  traditional  type  of  facsimile  machine   which  originated  from  an  ordinary  paper-­‐based   document  resulting  in  a  facsimile  copy  also  in  a   paper-­‐based  form.  telex.   4   more   particularly.  In  other  words.   facebook  and  so  on  is  to  deny  authorship  which  is  the  safest   defense.     SC   said   if   the   source   of   the   data/information   is   purely   electronic   (like   in   the   case   of   a   computer-­‐generated   fax   machine)   the   resulting   facsimile   copy   will   be   considered   as   electronic   because   it   did   not   start   with   a   paper-­‐based   document.  he  proceeded  to  Parol  Evidence.  SC  noted  that   the  last  phrase  "Telecopy.  Instead.  the  respondents   there  admitted  that  the  text  messages  originated   from  there  cellphone.   Court   of   Appeals   (CA).     SC  cited  TWO  JUSTIFICATIONS:     A.   18   complainant   informed   respondent  of  the  particulars  of  his  pending  case.   a   week   after   their   first   telephone   conversation.

000.   respondent   refused   to   entertain   the   offer.   28   the   place   where   the   entrapment  operation  was  later  conducted.000.000.  36   Complainant   brought   along   copies   of   the   documents   pertinent   to   his   case   during   the   first   meeting.000.   35   However.   accompanied   complainant   and   posed   as   his   sister-­‐in-­‐law.000.00)   was   still   standing.   "Ephemeral   electronic   communications   shall   be   proven  by  the  testimony  of  a  person  who  was  a  party  to  the   same   or   who   has   personal   knowledge   thereof   .000.   The   text   messages   were   properly   admitted   by   the   Committee  since  the  same  are  now  covered  by  Section  1(k).300.   text   messages  .000.       MALIKSI V.   29   During   the   meeting.   On   24   September   2004.  and  other  electronic  forms   of   communication   the   evidence   of   which  is  not  recorded  or  retained.00)   after   the   decision   had   come   out.00)   was   corroborated   by   the   testimony   of   a   disinterested   witness.   the   plan   for   the   entrapment   operation   was   formulated   by   Imbestigador   in   cooperation  with  the  PAOCC.   the   reporter   of   Imbestigador   who   was   present   when   the   parties   met   in   person.   only   Eight   Hundred   Thousand   Pesos   (P800.   After   reading   through   them.   complainant   and   respondent  met  for  the  first  time  in  person  at  the  2nd  Floor   of   Jollibee.00)  will  be  paid  once  the   decision   had   been   released.  2015-­‐2016   accompanied   him   to   PAOCCF-­‐SPG   where   he   lodged   a   complaint   against   respondent   for   extortion.00)   in   exchange   for   a   favorable  decision  of  the  former's  pending  case  with  the  CA.  68  We  have   no   doubt   as   to   the   probative   value   of   the   text   messages   as   evidence   in   determining   the   guilt   or   lack   thereof   of   respondent  in  this  case.   30   Respondent   also   explained   that   the   amount   of   One   Million   Pesos   (P1.   Times   Plaza   Bldg."   In   this   case.00).Y.000.   "Ah.000..   Siringan.   This   was   confirmed   by   the   latter   together   with   the   assurance   that   it   would   take   about   a   month   for   the   decision   to   come   out.  Servacio.   .   she   claimed   that   it   will   go   to   a   male   researcher   whose   name  she  refused  to  divulge.000.   .  The  researcher  was  allegedly  a   lawyer  in  the  CA  Fifth  (5th)  Division  where  complainant  case   was   pending.00)  was  because  on   a   previous   occasion.00)  was  paid  by  the  client  despite  the  fact  that  the   amount   had   been   pegged   at   One   Million   Three   Hundred   Thousand   Pesos   (P1.   Respondent   herself   admitted   that   the   cellphone   number   reflected   in   complainant's   cellphone   from  which  the  messages  originated  was  hers.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     lunchtime  on  28  September  2004  and  it  was  understood  that   the   money   would   be   handed   over   by   complainant   to   respondent   then. COMELEC During   the   2010   Elections.   the   candidate   who  garnered  the  second  highest  number  of  votes.000.00).   25   Thereafter.   a   researcher   of   Imbestigador.000.  67  It  is  also  well  to   remember   that   in   administrative   cases.   he   communicated   with   respondent   again   to   verify   if   the   latter   was   still   asking   for   the   money   26   and   to   set   up   a   meeting   with   her."  37  The  parties  set  the  next  meeting  date  at   Rheland  S.000.  33   Complainant   tried   once   again   to   bargain   for   a   lower   amount  during  the  meeting  but  respondent  asserted  that  the   amount   was   fixed.  Patricia  Siringan   (Siringan).   She   even   explained   that   this   was   their   second   transaction   and   the   reason   why   the   amount   was   closed  at  One  Million  Pesos  (P1.   complainant   clarified   from   respondent   that   if   he   gave   the   amount   of   One   Million   Pesos   (P1.   Complainant's   testimony   as   to   the   discussion   between  him  and  respondent  on  the  latter's  demand  for  One   Million   Pesos   (P1.   .000.   Rule  2  of  the  Rules  on  Electronic  Evidence  65  which  provides:   "Ephemeral   electronic   communication   refers   to   telephone   conversations.   complainant   who   was   the   recipient   of   said   messages   and   therefore   had   personal   knowledge   thereof   testified   on   their   contents   and   import.   respondent   allegedly   uttered.00)   guaranteed   a   favorable   decision   only   in   the   CA  but  did  not  extend  to  the  Supreme  Court  should  the  case   be  appealed  later.   32   She   also   claimed   that   she   will   not   get   any   part  of  the  money  unless  the  researcher  decides  to  give  her   some.  Rule  11  of  the  Rules  on  Electronic   Evidence.   Cavite  alleging  that  there  were  irregularities  in  the  counting   54   ."   Under  Section  2.     And   in   that   next   meeting.  .  31   When  respondent  was  asked  where  the  money  will   go.000.000.  panalo  ka.   he   was   entrapped  by  police  officers.   Cavite.  .00)   while   the   balance   of   Three   Hundred   Thousand  Pesos  (P300.   any   doubt   respondent   may   have   had   as   to   the   admissibility   of   the   text   messages   had   been   laid   to   rest   when   she   and   her   counsel   signed   and   attested   to   the   veracity   of   the   text   messages  between  her  and  complainant.   27   Upon   learning   that   respondent's   offer   of   a   favorable   decision   in   exchange   for   One   Million   Pesos   (P1.   Maliksi.  brought   an  election  protest  in  the  Regional  Trial  Court  (RTC)  in  Imus.   Complainant  was  able  to  prove  by  his  testimony  in   conjunction   with   the   text   messages   from   respondent   duly   presented   before   the   Committee   that   the   latter   asked   for   One   Million   Pesos   (P1.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   she   and   the   researcher   having   learned   their   lesson   from   their   previous   experience   for   as   then.   the   client   no   longer   paid   the   balance   of   Five   Hundred   Thousand   Pesos   (P500.   Siringan   was   privy   to   the   parties'   actual   conversation   since   she   accompanied   complainant   on   both   meetings   held   on  24  and  28  of  September  2004  at  Jollibee.000.   34   Complainant   then   proposed   that   he   pay   a   down   payment   of   Seven   Hundred   Thousand   Pesos   (P700.   the   Municipal   Board   of   Canvassers   proclaimed   Saquilayan   the   winner   for   the   position   of   Mayor   of   Imus.   technical   rules   of   procedure  and  evidence  are  not  strictly  applied.  66  Moreover.   he   would   get   a   favorable   decision.

 2013.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   and   that   the   First   Division's   finding   that   the   ballots   and   the   ballot   boxes   had   been   tampered   had   been   fully   established   by   the   large   number   of   cases   of   double-­‐shading   discovered   during   the   Rheland  S.  AND  FOR  THE  FIRST   TIME  ON  APPEAL.   2012.  2   Maliksi   then   came   to   the   Court   via   petition   for   certiorari.   The   Court   concluded   that   Maliksi   had   not   been   denied   due   process   because:   (a)   he   had   received   notices   of   the   decryption.   In   resolving   the   appeal.  2015-­‐2016   of   votes   in   209   clustered   precincts.   and   Maliksi   was   then   installed  as  Mayor.   the   RTC   held  a  revision  of  the  votes.   and   to   the   use   of   the   printouts   of   the   ballot  images  in  the  recount  proceedings  conducted  by  the   First  Division.   reiterating   his   objections   to   the   decryption.   the   COMELEC   En   Banc   resolved  to  deny  Maliksi's  motion  for  reconsideration.   He   argued  that  the  resort  to  the  printouts  of  the  ballot  images.  and  examination  of  the  ballot  images  by   the   First   Division   —   referring   to   the   orders   of   the   First   Division   directing   Saquilayan   to   post   and   augment   the   cash   deposits  for  the  decryption  and  printing  of  the  ballot  images.   and   examination   of   the   ballot   images   without   prior   notice   to   him.  Maliksi  raises  the  following  argument:   I.  by   a  vote  of  8-­‐7.   THIS   HONORABLE  SUPREME  COURT  EN  BANC   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN   DISMISSING   THE   INSTANT  PETITION  DESPITE  A  CLEAR   VIOLATION   OF   PETITIONER'S   CONSTITUTIONAL   RIGHT   TO   DUE   PROCESS   OF   LAW   CONSIDERING   THAT   DECRYPTION.   and   (b)   he   had   been   able   to   raise   his   objections   to   the   decryption  in  his  motion  for  reconsideration.   In  the  decision  promulgated  on  March  12.  based  on  the  results  of  the   revision.   On   September   14.   which   were   secondary   evidence.  Thus.   WITH   ALL   DUE   RESPECT.Y.   decided   to   recount   the   ballots  through  the  use  of  the  printouts  of  the  ballot  images   from  the  CF  cards.  dismissed  Maliksi's  petition  for  certiorari.   II.   without   giving   notice   to   the   parties.   2012  for  Saquilayan  to  augment  his  cash  deposit.  WERE  DONE   INCONSPICUOUSLY   UPON   A   MOTU   PROPRIO  DIRECTIVE  OF  THE  COMELEC   FIRST  DIVISION  SANS  ANY  NOTICE  TO   THE  PETITIONER.   revision   In   his   Extremely   Urgent   Motion   for   Reconsideration.   printing.   the   First   Division   issued   a   resolution   nullifying   the   RTC's   decision   and   declaring   Saquilayan  as  the  duly  elected  Mayor.   Subsequently.   AND   THAT   BALLOT   IMAGES   CAN   BE   RESORTED  TO  ONLY  IF  THE  OFFICIAL   BALLOTS  ARE  LOST  OR  THEIR  INTEGRITY   WAS  COMPROMISED  AS   DETERMINED   BY   THE   RECOUNT/REVISION   COMMITTEE.  1   Maliksi   filed   a   motion   for   reconsideration.  Servacio.  declared  Maliksi  as  the  duly  elected  Mayor  of  Imus   commanding  Saquilayan  to  cease  and  desist  from  performing   the   functions   of   said   office.   the   COMELEC   First   Division.   Later.   the   RTC   granted   Maliksi's   motion   for   execution   pending   appeal.   but   considered   original   documents   with   the   same   evidentiary   value   as   the   official   ballots   under   the   Rule   on   Electronic   Evidence.   Saquilayan   appealed   to   the   COMELEC.  CIRCUMSTANCES   WHICH   ARE   WANTING   IN   THIS   CASE.   it   issued   another   order   dated   April   17.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira       WITH   ALL   DUE   RESPECT.  it  issued  an  order  dated  March  28.  WHICH  IS  THE  BASIS  FOR  THE   ASSAILED   14   SEPTEMBER   2012   RESOLUTION  OF  THE  PUBLIC   RESPONDENT.   alleging   that   he   had   been   denied   his   right   to   due   process   because   he   had   not   been   notified   of   the   decryption   proceedings.   2012.   AND  IN  FACT  THE  INTEGRITY  OF  THE   BALLOT  BOXES  AND  ITS  CONTENTS  WAS   PRESERVED  AND  THE  ISSUE  OF   TAMPERING     WAS     ONLY     BELATEDLY     55   .   2012   requiring   Saquilayan   to   deposit   the   amount   necessary   to  defray  the  expenses  for  the  decryption  and  printing  of  the   ballot   images.  THaDEA   On   August   15.  and.  printing.   WHICH   IN   TURN   AFFIRMED  THE  15  AUGUST  2012   RESOLUTION   OF   THE   COMELEC   FIRST   DIVISION.  The  Court  then   pronounced  that  the  First  Division  did  not  abuse  its  discretion   in   deciding   to   use   the   ballot   images   instead   of   the   paper   ballots.   PRINTING   AND   EXAMINATION   OF   THE   DIGITAL   IMAGES   OF   THE   BALLOTS.   In   the   meanwhile.   had   been   unwarranted   because  there  was  no  proof  that  the  integrity  of  the  paper   ballots  had  not  been  preserved.   explaining   that   the   printouts   of   the   ballot   images   were   not   secondary   images.  the  Court.   THIS   HONORABLE  SUPREME  COURT  EN  BANC   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN   UPHOLDING   THE   COMELEC  FIRST  DIVISION'S  RULING   TO   DISPENSE   WITH   THE   PHYSICAL   BALLOTS  AND  RESORT  TO  THEIR   DIGITAL   IMAGES   NOTWITHSTANDING   THE  FACT  THAT  THE  BALLOTS  ARE   THE   BEST   AND   MOST   CONCLUSIVE   EVIDENCE   OF   THE   VOTERS'   WILL.

  EaHATD   signs   of   tampering   of   the   ballots   are   present.   6   In   Vinzons-­‐Chato   v.   through   its   chairman.   the   printing   of   the   image   of   the   ballots   of   the   subject  precinct  stored  in  the  CF  card   used  in  the  May  10.  it  shall  proceed  to   instruct   the   printing   of   the   picture   image  of  the  ballots  stored  in  the  data   storage   device   for   the   precinct.  9369.  and  the  Electoral  Tribunals  to  quickly   and   unilaterally   resort   to   the   printouts   of   the   picture   images   of   the   ballots   in   the   proceedings   had   before   them   without   notice   to   the   parties.  are  likewise   'official  ballots'  that  faithfully  capture  in  electronic  form  the   votes  cast  by  the  voter.  to  wit:   xxx  xxx  xxx   (g)         Only   when   the   Recount   Committee.  or  are  wet  and  otherwise  in  such  a  condition  that   (the  ballots)  cannot  be  recounted"  before  the  printing  of  the   image  of  the  ballots  should  be  made.   Despite   the   equal   probative   weight  accorded  to  the  official  ballots  and  the  printouts  of   their  picture  images.  the  printouts  thereof  are  the  functional   equivalent  of  the  paper  ballots  filled  out  by  the  voters  and.   (Emphases  supplied.   as   when   proof   of   tampering   or   substitution  exists.     I.   the   picture   images   of   the   ballots   are   to   be   used   only   when   it   is   first   shown   that   the   official   ballots   are   lost   or   their   integrity   has   been   compromised.  when  either  is  presented  as  evidence.  Servacio.   provides:   xxx  xxx  xxx   (m) In   the   event   that   the   revision   committee   determines   that   the   integrity  of  the  ballots  and  the  ballot   box   have   not   been   preserved.   thus.  one   is  not  considered  as  weightier  than  the  other.)  TADaES   That  the  two  documents  —  the  official  ballot  and   its   picture   image   —   are   considered   "original   documents"   simply  means  that  both  of  them  are  given  equal  probative   weight."   xxx  xxx  xxx   (l) In   the   event   the   Recount   Committee   determines   that   the   integrity   of   the   ballots   has   been   violated   or   has   not   been   preserved.   7   the   Court   held   that   "the   picture   images   of   the   ballots.   9164.   aScITE   For   instance.   Printing   of   the   ballot   images   shall   proceed   only   upon   prior   authentication   and   certification   by   a   duly   authorized   personnel   of   the   Election   Records   and   Statistics   Department   (ERSD)   that   the   data   or   the   images   to   be   printed   are   genuine   and   not   substitutes.Y.   2010   Elections).   the   aforesaid   Section   6.  8804  (In   Re:  Comelec  Rules  of  Procedure  on  Disputes  in  An  Automated   Election   System   in   Connection   with   the   May   10.  In  short.   But   this   juridical   reality   does   not   authorize   the   courts.   No.   as   amended   by   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   the   Recount   Committee   shall  follow  paragraph  (l)  of  this  rule.  the  “Rules  for  the  Revision  of  Ballots”   adopted   for   their   respective   proceedings   still   consider   the   official   ballots   to   be   the   primary   or   best   evidence   of   the   voters'   will.  Rule  10  (Conduct  of  Revision)  of  the  2010   Rules   of   Procedure   for   Municipal   Election   Contests.   HRET.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     xxx xxx  xxx   Section  6.  As  such.  wet  or  are  otherwise  in   such   a   condition   that   it   could   not   be   recounted.   determines   that   the   integrity   of   the   ballots  has  been  preserved  or  that  no   Rheland  S.   In   case   there   are   signs   that   the   ballots   contained   therein   are   tampered.  2010  elections  in   the   presence   of   the   parties.   or   are   wet   and   otherwise   in   such   a   condition   that   it   cannot   be   recounted.   Due  process  requirements   The   picture   images   of   the   ballots   are   electronic   documents   that   are   regarded   as   the   equivalents   of   the   original   official   ballots   themselves.  as  defined  by  Section  2  (3)  of  R.   will   the   recount   proceed.   may   be   used   for   purposes   of   revision   of   votes   in   an   electoral  protest.   In   that   regard.   the   Chairman   of   the   Committee   shall   request   from   the   Election   Records   and   Statistics   Department   (ERSD).  as  scanned  and  recorded  by  the  PCOS.A.   Rule   15   of   COMELEC  Resolution  No.  the  COMELEC.   itself  requires  that  "the  Recount  Committee  determines  that   the  integrity  of  the  ballots  has  been  violated  or  has  not  been   preserved.   compromised.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   which   governs   the   proceedings   in   the   Regional   Trial   Courts   exercising   original   jurisdiction   over   election   protests.  2015-­‐2016   RESPONDENT   AFTER   THE   REVISION   RESULTS   SHOWED   THAT   HE   LOST.   The   court   shall   provide   a   non-­‐partisan   56   .

  (Emphases   supplied.   2010   elections   was   not   preserved.   the   House   of   Representative   Electoral   Tribunal's   Guidelines   on   the   Revision   of   Ballots   requires   a   preliminary   hearing   to   be   held   for   the   purpose   of   determining   whether   the   integrity   of   the   ballots   and   ballot   boxes  used  in  the  May  10.  that  the  integrity  of  the   ballots   and   ballot   boxes   used   in   the   May   10.   as   the   Tribunal   may   determine.   it   shall   proceed   to   instruct   the   printing   of   the   picture   image   of   the   ballots   of   the   subject   precinct   stored   in   the   data   storage   device   for   the   same   precinct.   Only   after   this   determination  can  the  printed  picture   image   be   used   for   the   recount.   the   parties   are   immediately   made   aware   of   such   determination.   2011.   The   Tribunal   may   avail   itself   of   the   assistance   of   the   COMELEC   for   the   service   of   a   non-­‐partisan   technical   person   who   shall   conduct   the   necessary   authentication   process   to   ensure   that   the   data   or   images   stored   are   genuine   and   not   merely   substitutes.   as   when   there   is   proof   of   tampering   or   substitution.  2015-­‐2016   technical   person   who   shall   conduct   the   necessary   authentication   process   to   ensure   that   the   data   or   image   stored   is   genuine   and   not   a   substitute.)   xxx  xxx   A   similar   procedure   is   found   in   the   2010   Rules   of   the  Presidential  Electoral  Tribunal.  —   The   revision   of   votes   shall   be   done   through   the   use   of   appropriate   PCOS   machines   or   manually   and   visually.   It   is   only   upon   such   determination   that   the   printed   picture   image   can   be   used   for   the   revision   of   votes.  HDAECI   HERE   THOUGH.   (Emphases  supplied.   it   was   not   the   Revision/Recount   57   .     There   is   a   good   reason   for   thus   fixing   where  and  by  whom  the  decryption  and  the  printing   should  be  conducted:   It   is   during   the   revision   or   recount   conducted   by   the   Revision/Recount   Committee   when   the   parties   are   allowed   to   be   represented.  Servacio.  the  Tribunal   shall   direct   the   printing   of   the   picture   images   of   the   ballots   of   the   subject   precinct   stored   in   the   data   storage   device   for   the   same   precinct.  —   Rheland  S.  2010  elections  was  not  preserved.  to  wit:   HDITCS   Section  10.   Emphases  supplied.   Moreover.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     xxx  xxx  xxx   All   the   foregoing   rules   on   revision   of   ballots   stipulate   that   the   printing   of   the   picture   images   of   the   ballots   may   be   resorted   to   only   after   the   proper   “Revision/Recount   Committee”   has   first   determined   that   the   integrity   of   the   ballots   and   the   ballot   boxes   was   not   preserved.   with   their   representatives  witnessing  the  proceedings   and   timely   raising   their   objections   in   the   course   of   the   proceedings.Y.   as   when   there   is   proof   of   tampering  or  substitutions.   The   foregoing   rules   further   require   that   the   decryption   of   the   images   stored   in   the   CF   cards   and   the   printing   of   the   decrypted   images   take   place   during   the   revision  or  recount  proceedings.)  HTcDEa   xxx xxx  xxx  xxx   (d)     When   it   has   been   shown.  to  wit:   Rule  43.   as  when  there  is  proof  of  tampering  or  substitutions.     Conduct  of  the  revision.   whenever   the   Revision/Recount   Committee   makes   any   determination   that   the   ballots   have   been   tampered   and   have   become   unreliable.   in   a   preliminary   hearing   set   by   the   parties   or   by  the  Tribunal.   and   according  to  the  following  procedures:   xxx  xxx  xxx   (q)     In   the   event   that   the   RC   determines   that   the   integrity   of   the   ballots   and   the   ballot   box   was   not   preserved.   It   is   only   upon   such   determination   that   the   printed   picture   image   can   be   used   for   the   revision.     Revision  of  Ballots.)   xxx  xxx  xxx   Also.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   (As   amended   per   Resolution   of   February   10.   The   Tribunal   shall   provide   a   non-­‐partisan   technical   person   who   shall   conduct   the   necessary   authentication   process   to   ensure   that   the   data   or   image   stored   is   genuine   and   not   a   substitute.

  The   COMELEC   was   merely   content  with  listing  the  guidelines  that  the  First  Division  had   followed  in  the  appreciation  of  the  ballots  and  the  results  of   the   recount.   including   the   required   authentication   and   certification   that   the   images   to   be   printed   are   genuine.   The   ordinary   scanning   procedure   is   that   there   is   a   paper-­‐based   document.   for   only   by   their   participation   would   the  COMELEC's  proceedings  attain  credibility  as  to  the  result.     CHATO  VS.   you   scan   it. CHATO QUESTION:   if   the   data   or   information   originated   from   an   ordinary   paper-­‐based   document   and   subsequently   Rheland  S.   mechanical   or   chemical   processes   for   purposes   of   reproduction.   In   this   regard.     But   this   question   has   already   been   answered   in   the   many   cases   involving   election   protest:   Mayor   Maliksi   and   Liwayway   Vinzons-­‐ Chato.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   but   the   First   Division   in   the   exercise   of   its   appellate  jurisdiction.  Servacio.   There   is   parallelism   here   with   facsimile   transmission  as  what  happened  in  the  case  of  Ssanyong.   ordinary   paper-­‐based   document.   there   was   vagueness   as   to   what   rule   had   been   followed   in   the   decryption   and   printing   proceeding.  Initial  tally  showed  that   Chato  was  actually  ahead  in  the  counting.   what   will   become   of   the   resulting   copy?   I’m   referring   to   the   process   of   SCANNING.   the   resolution   of   the   First   Division   to  that  effect  was  unusually  mute  about  the  factual  bases  for   the   finding   of   ballot   box   tampering.   We   should   not   ignore   that   the   parties'   participation   during   the   revision   and   recount   proceedings   would   not   benefit   only   the   parties.     PEOPLE V.   Clearly.   and   did   not   also   particularize  how  and  why  the  First  Division  was  concluding   that   the   integrity   of   the   ballots   had   been   compromised.   and   venue   of   the   decryption   and   recount   proceedings.   Maliksi   was   not   immediately   made   aware   of   that   crucial  finding  because  the  First  Division  did  not  even  issue   any   written   resolution   stating   its   reasons   for   ordering   the   printing   of   the   picture   images.  The  other  candidate   moved  that  the  picture  images  stored  in  the   PCOS  be  printed  and  should  be  used  as   basis  for  the  recount.  feed  it  to  the  machine  and  then  a  digital  image  of   the   paper-­‐based   document   will   be   created   in   the   process.   All   that   the   First   Division   declared   as   justification   was   a   simple   generalization   of   the   same   being   apparent   from   the   allegations   of   ballot   and   ballot   box   tampering   and   upon   inspection  of  the  ballot  boxes   Moreover.  whereby  the  First  Division  nullified  the   decision   of   the   RTC   and   declared   Saquilayan   as   the   duly   elected   Mayor.   Even   so.   In   short.   she  filed  an  election  protest.  but  she   lost  in  the  elections.  Chato  was  able  to  establish  a   pattern  of  fraud.   All   these   cases   involved   the   admissibility   of   picture   images   of   ballots   created   through   the   process   of   scanning   using   PCOS   machine   (Precinct   Count  Optical  Scanner).   the   COMELEC   was   less   than   candid.   which   is   the   same   as   a   facsimile   transmission   copy   cannot   be   considered   electronic  because   it   started  with  an  ordinary  paper-­‐based  document.Y.   The  parties'  presence  would  have  ensured  that  the  requisite   procedures   have   been   followed.   date.   For   example.  The  other   candidate  noticed  that  the  result  of  the   initial  recount.  But  typical  of  a  Filipino   politician  who  would  either  proclaim  victory   or  decry  being  a  victim  of  electoral  fraud.  an  argument  can  be  made  that   the   resulting   printout.  it  would  appear   that  the  resulting  copy  will  not  be  considered  electronic.  the  parties  should  have  been  given  a   formal  notice  thereof.   So  the  other  party  moved  that  the  recount   should  not  be  based  on  the  actual  ballots   but  on  the  picture  images  of  the  ballots   stored  in  the  PCOS.   The   parties   were   formally   notified   that   the   First   Division   had   found   that   the   ballots   had   been   tampered   only   when   they   received   the   resolution   of  August  15.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     subjected   to   electronic.   but   also   demands   an   opportunity   to   be   present   at   such   proceedings   or   to   be   represented   therein.   and   was   even   cavalier   in   its   conduct   of   the   decryption   and   printing   of   the   picture   images   of   the   ballots   and   the   recount   proceedings.  HRET   v Liwayway  Vinzons-­‐Chato  ran  for   representative  of  Camarines  Norte.   You   will   then   have   another   paper-­‐based   copy   resulting   from   the   scanning.   Judging  it  in  the  light  of  the  Ssanyong  ruling.  2012.  So  to   be  consistent  with  Ssanyong.  an  initial   recount  of  votes  was  conducted.   the   First   Division   had   no   intention   of   giving   the   parties   the   opportunity  to  witness  its  proceedings.       v The  issue  there  is  whether  or  not  the   printout  of  the  picture  images  of  the  ballots   can  be  considered  as  official  ballots  and   therefore  can  be  used  in  the  recount  of  the   votes  without  accounting  for  the  actual   58   .  2015-­‐2016   Committee   or   the   RTC   exercising   original   jurisdiction   over   the   protest   that   made   the   finding   that   the   ballots   had   been   tampered.   The   orders   did   not   state   the   time.   but   was   as   vital   and   significant   for   the   COMELEC   as   well.   Maliksi   correctly   contends   that   the   orders   of   the   First   Division  simply  required  Saquilayan  to  post  and  augment  his   cash   deposit.   and   recount   proceedings   to   the   parties.   and   then   a   digital   image   is   created   and   you   print   it   out.   printing.  due  process  of  law  does  not  only  require   notice   of   the   decryption.

.  in   these  cases.   Taking   cue   from   this   omission/deletion.  Because  the  origin  of   the  picture  messages  were  paper-­‐based   ballots.   Rule   4).  SCANNING  –  Electronic  (Election  cases)   Rheland  S.   SECOND   REASON   Advanced   by   the   Supreme   Court.   Liwayway  Vinzons-­‐Chato  (Chato)  renewed  her  bid  in   the   May   10.   SC   said  that  “telecopy”  there  refers  to  facsimile  transmission.   you   print   it   out   and   you   have   a   printout   of   an   electronic   document   which   is   considered   by   section   1   as   a   functional   equivalent   of   the   original?   In   other   words.   composed   of   the   seven   (7)   Municipalities   of   Daet.   SC  concluded  that  the  intention  of  the  congress  was  really  to   exclude   them   from   being   considered   as   Electronic   Data.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     59   .       So  the  RULE  NOW  is:     ü ü If  the  resulting  copy  as  received  originated  from  an   ordinary  paper-­‐based  document  and  scanned  and   sent  thru  the  use  of  ordinary  facsimile  machine.   Because   there   really   is   parallelism   between   facsimile   process  and  scanning.  they  are   considered  as  equivalent  of  the   original  and  considered  official   ballots.  the  origins  of   which  are  paper-­‐based  ballots   which  are  not  electronic  and  yet.   the   PRINTOUT   of   the   EMAIL   is   SUBJECTED   TO   SOME   MECHANICAL.   the   printout   is   in   turn   reproduced   into   many   copies  thru  the  processes  mentioned  in  sec.  the   controlling  doctrine  is  that  of  SSANYONG.   2010   elections   as   representative   of   the   Second   Legislative   District   of   Camarines   Norte.   Our  definition  on  Electronic  data  message.   1.   they   are   Electronic   Document   in   the   first   place.  Rule  4)   ex.  the   picture  images  of  the  paper-­‐based   ballots  as  scanned  and  stored  and   printed  out  are  functional   equivalents  of  the  paper-­‐based   ballots.  T:  Ssangyong  is  a  special  case.   What   happens   now   when   you   received   an   email.     Ø SC:  Under  the  rules  on  electronic   evidence  and  even  in  the  rules   promulgated  by  the  COMELEC.     Because  notwithstanding  the  parallelism.  therefore   cannot  be  considered  as  ELECTRONIC.2)”.  2.   She   lost   to   Elmer   E.  SC  in  other   cases  said  that  a  copy/document  resulting  from  a   2 scanning  process  is  considered  as  ELECTRONIC.   telegraph"  was  deleted/not  adopted  in  our  own  definition  of   Electronic   Evidence.  In  fact.  telecopy".   He   printed   a   hard   copy   of   his   Kamasutra   out   of   the   soft   copy   from   his   computer.  CHEMICAL  REPRODUCTION?(sec.  Servacio.  The  first   reason   advanced   by   the   SC   in   ruling   that   the   facsimile   transmission   copy   is   not   an   electronic.(Sec.   and   photocopied   it   many   times.  so  long  as  the   copies   accurately   reflect   the   data   or   information.   ELECTRONIC.1.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Talisay.   Panotes   (Panotes)   2                                                                                                      So.Y.   Mercedes.   these   copies   can   be   considered   as   functional   equivalent   of   the   original.  remember:  ORDINARY  FACSIMILE  (Traditional)  –  NOT  electronic   (Ssanyong).   The   Electronic   Data   message   here   is   "as   something   that   is   processed   electronically".   Erojo   is   a   writer.   Vinzons.   Again.  I  have  a  feeling   that   these   photocopies   are   really   functional   equivalent   of   original.  telex.     SC   noted   that   the   last   phrase   "Telecopy.   So  again.   The   SOFT   COPY   WAS   PRINTED   out   and   under   sec..  facsimile  transmission   presupposes  a  scanning  process.   Mr.   But   that   can   be   an   inaccurate   proposition   because   it   can   be   argued   that   the   HARD   COPY   is   NOT   REALLY   PAPER-­‐BASED   because  the  SAID  HARD  COPY  is  an  ELECTRONIC  DOCUMENT   IN   THE   FIRST   PLACE(sec.  So  therefore.   The   Model   Law   mentioned   a   list   of   electronic   processes   which   include   "telegram.   wrote   a   masterpiece   on   Kamasutra.   with   a   total   of   205   clustered   precincts.   they   are   functional   equivalent  of  the  original     You  might  say  that  the  hard  copy  is  a  PAPER-­‐BASED.2.  SC  said  that  printouts   of  the  picture  images  created   through  the  scanning  of  the  paper-­‐ based  ballots  are  electronic   evidence.  if  a  printout  like  these  NOTES  your  printout   generated   from   your   computer   which   is   electronically   produced.   telex.     So  this  debunks  any  argument  which  will  be   based  on  the  ruling  in  the  case  of  Ssanyong.   the   HARD   COPY   from   SOFT   copy   is   ALREADY  AN  ELECTRONIC  DOCUMENT!     Atty.  But  this  rule   should  again  only  refer  to  FACSIMILE.   San   Vicente.   and   San   Lorenzo.   These   PHOTOCOPIES   can   be   argued   as   functional   equivalent   of   the   original   because   they   are   a   “counterpart   produced   by   the   same   impression   or   same   matrix   or   by   mechanical   or   chemical   reproduction.   Basud.  our  own  EER  and   Electronic   Commerce   Act   are   patterned   from   the   MODEL   LAW   adopted   by   the   UN   Commission   of   International   Trade   Law   (UNCITRAL).   So.  2015-­‐2016   paper-­‐based  ballots.   Ø TN:  Print-­‐out  resulted  from  a   scanning  process.  the  one  filled-­‐up  by  the  voters  at   the  precinct  level.

  Inner  condition:   a.  or  a  plurality  of  3.   and   therefore   the   HRET   should   use   instead   the   printed   picture   images   of   the   ballots  scanned  thru  the  PCOS  machine.   c.   this   tape   seal   was   broken/cut/sliced.  Panotes  prayed   that   a   preliminary   hearing   be   set   in   order   to  determine   first   the  integrity  of  the  ballots  and  the  ballot  boxes  used  in  the   elections.   2010.so   the   election   documents   —   e.  2015-­‐2016   who   was   proclaimed   the   winner   on   May   12.   which   he   alleged   are   not.   On  March  24.   Basud   and   Mercedes.   2011.   d.885  votes   On   May   24.  Servacio.   showed   a   substantial   discrepancy   between   the   votes  of  the  parties  per  physical  count  vis-­‐a-­‐vis  their  votes   per   election   returns   in   the   following   precincts   of   the   Municipalities  of  Basud  and  Daet.   c.   b.   the   upper   portion   of   the   lock   Rheland  S.   Vinzons.Y.   assailing  the  results  in  all  the  160  clustered  precincts  in  four   (4)   municipalities.   namely:   Daet.   which   means  that  the  lock   had  been  previously   tampered  with. The   ballots   were   unnecessarily   folded   and/or   crumpled   inthe   clustered   precincts   where   the   votes   of   (Panotes)   were   60   .   minutes   of   voting..  2011.g.   ballots.707   votes   as   against   Chato's   47.   Panotes’   motion   was   prompted   by   certain   irregularities   8   in   the   condition   of   the   ballot   boxes   subject   of  the  revision.  which  Panotes  described  as  follows:   Outer  condition:   a.   b. Some   of   the   Minutes   of   Voting   and   Election   Returns   were   MISSING   and   only   the   ballots   were   found   inside   the   ballot  box.  conducted  on  March   21-­‐24.822   votes. Some   of   the   self-­‐locking   security   seal   was   not   properlyattached.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     disconnected   from   its   body.     st 1  –  Results  of  the  initial  revision  of  ballots   The  initial  revision  of  ballots.   10-­‐040.   which   means   that   the   ballot   boxes   had   been   opened   prior   to   the   initial   revision.g. In  some  ballot   boxes. The   contents   of   the   ballot   box   —   e.  ballots  and  the   documents   —   were   in   total   disarray.  should  it  be  shown  during   such   hearing   that   the   ballots   and   ballot   boxes   were   not   preserved.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A. In   the   municipalities   where   Petitioner   (Panotes)   was   ableto   seal   the   ballot   boxes   with   packing   tape.  He  further  urged  that.  5  No  counter-­‐protest  was  interposed  by  Panotes.   2010   having   garnered   a   total   of   51.   which  means  that  it   was  tampered  with.     nd 2  –  Panotes  prays  that  the  integrity  of  the  ballots  be  first   determined.   Chato   filed   an   electoral   protest   before   the   House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal   (HRET). The   top   cover   of   the   ballot   box   is   loose   and   can   be   lifted..   which   was   docketed   as   HRET   Case   No.   when   the   key   was   inserted   intothe   padlock.  as  a  response.   election   returns   —   can  be  taken  out.   the   HRET   should   direct   the   printing   of   the   picture   images   of   the   ballots   of   the   questioned   precincts   stored  in  the  data  storage  device  for  said  precincts.

  On   June   8.   Should   he   then   decide   to   use  the  decrypted  and  copied  ballot  images.  that  the  integrity  of   the   ballots   and   ballot   boxes   used   in   the   May   10.   The   Tribunal   shall   provide   a   nonpartisan   technical   person   who   shall   conduct   the   necessary   authentication   process   to   ensure   that   the   data   or   image   stored   is   genuine   and   not   a   substitute.  although  the   actual   ballots   used   in   the   May   10.)   lack   of   legal   basis   to   copy   them   and   2.   Moreover.   —   An   electronic   document   shall   be   regarded   as   the   equivalent   of   an   original   document   under   the   Best   Evidence   Rule   if   it   is   a   printout   or   output   readable  by  sight  or  other  means.   Chato.   in   a   preliminary   hearing   set   by   the   parties   or  by  the  Tribunal.   With  respect  to  the  allegation  that  certain  defective   CF  cards  were  replaced.   Marie   Grace   T.   the   HRET   issued   the   assailed   Resolution  18  No.  11-­‐321  denying  Chato's  Urgent  Motion  to   Prohibit   the   Use   by   Protestee   of   the   Decrypted   and   Copied   Ballot   Images   in   the   Instant   Case   on   the   ground   that   she   failed  to  show  proof  that  the  CF  cards  used  in  the  twenty  (20)   precincts   in   the   Municipalities   of   Basud   and   Daet   with   substantial   variances   were   not   preserved   or   were   violated.   11-­‐208.   citing   Rule   4   of   the   Rules   on   Electronic   Evidence.   moved   11   for   the   cancellation   of   the   decryption   and   copying   of   ballot   images   arguing   inter   alia  that  there  was  no  legal  basis  therefor  and  that  the  HRET   had  not  issued  any  guidelines  governing  the  exercise  thereof.   2010   elections   are   the   best  evidence  of  the  will  of  the  voters.   acting   through   Atty.     rd 3  –  HRET  directed  the  copying  of  the  picture  image  files  of   ballots   (that   it   is   to   be   counted   in   printed   form   was   not   mentioned)   Consequently.   since   Atty.Y.   it   remained   unclear   whether   the   replacement   was   done   before   or   after   the   elections.   in   its   Resolution   9   No.  the  picture  images  of   the   ballots   are   regarded   as   the   equivalent   of   the   original.   (as   amended   per   Resolution   Rheland  S.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     of  February  10.   as   when   there   is   proof   of   tampering   or   substitutions.  2011).  2015-­‐2016   substantially   reduced.  the  HRET  declared  that.   which   reads:   Sec.   and   which   precincts   were   involved.  10       th 4  –  Chato  opposes  the  copying  of  the  ballot  images  for  1.   Cortez   was   not   presented   in   court   to   clarify   the   matter   of   the   alleged   replacement   of   CF   cards.  Panotes  argued  15  that  it  was  during   the  election  day.  which  reads:   (d)     When   it   has   been   shown.  which  could  not  be   done   until   each   and   every   clustered   precinct   was   duly   accounted  for.  For  this  reason.   Chato   alleged   that   the   ballot   images   were  taken  from  polluted  Compact  Flash  (CF)  cards.   It   is   only   upon   such   determination   that   the   printed   picture   image   can   be   used   for   the   revision.  shown   61   .  that  the  CF  cards  were  found   to   be   not   working   so   they   had   to   be   re-­‐configured.  May  10.   Chato   then   filed   an   Urgent   Motion   to   Prohibit   the   Use  by  Protestee  of  the  Decrypted  and  Copied  Ballot  Images   in   the   Instant   Case   12   reiterating   the   lack   of   legal   basis   for   the  decryption  and  copying  of  ballot  images  inasmuch  as  no   preliminary   hearing   had   been   conducted   showing   that   the   integrity   of   the   ballots   and   ballot   boxes   was   not   preserved.     th 5  -­‐  Decision  of  the  HRET:  Chato’s  Motion  is  denied.   Consequently.   the  canvassing  before  the  Provincial  Board  of  Canvassers  was   halted   in   order   to   wait   for   the   transmission   of   the   results   from  the  Municipal  Board  of  Canvassers.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  cHAaEC   Significantly.   The   Tribunal   stressed   that.   the   voting   in   some   precincts   in   the   Municipalities   of   Labo.   however.   cSHATC   Notwithstanding.   which   was   scheduled   to   commence  on  April  25.   the   HRET   directed   the   copying   of   the   picture   image   files   of   ballots   relative   to   the   protest.    There   is  clear  legal  basis  because  the  picture  images  are   equivalent  of  the  original  actual  ballots  scanned.     Original   of   an   electronic   document.   stressed   in   his   Opposition   14   to   the   foregoing   motion   that   the   decryption   and   copying   of   the   ballot   images   was   at   the   behest   of   the   HRET   itself.   2011.  2010.   2011   the   copying   of   the   picture   image   files   of   ballots   and   election   returns   in   13   election   protests   pending   before   it.   who   formally   requested   on   February   10.   2010   elections   was   not   preserved.   Javier-­‐Ibay.   the   testimonies   of   the  witnesses  that  were  actually  presented  were  found  to  be   irrelevant  and  immaterial.   She   cited   Section   10   (d)   of   the   HRET   Guidelines   on   the   Revision  of  Ballots.     Panotes.   on   the   other   hand.   Vinzons   and   Basud   started   late.  2011  and  everyday  thereafter  until   completion.  there  is  nothing   in  the  HRET  rules  that  prohibit  the  same.   the   Tribunal   shall   direct   the   printing   of   the   picture   images   of   the   ballots   of   the   subject   precinct   stored   in   the   data   storage   device   for   the   same   precinct.   but   the  voting  period  was  extended  accordingly.   Moreover.   1.  Servacio.)   the   Compact   Flash   (CF)  cards  used  to  store  the  ballot  images  were  polluted.   the   decryption   and   copying   proceeded  as  scheduled.

 15.   since   the   automated   election   system   (AES)   used   during   the   May   10.A.   Chato   filed   a   Motion   for   Reconsideration.  No.   No.     Official  Ballot.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   storage   and   distribution   of   official  ballots.   Accredited   political   parties   and   deputized   citizen's   arms   of   the   Commission  shall  assign  watchers  in  the   printing.  —  .  Servacio.   2011.   11-­‐ 487   (DATED   15   SEPTEMBER   2011)   —   DESPITE   THE   FACT   THAT   UNDER   REPUBLIC  ACT  NO.  the  Tribunal  has  to   rely   on   what   is   reflected   in   the   election   returns   and/or   statement   of   votes   by   precinct   the   same   being   the   best   evidence   of   the   results   of   the   election  in  said  precincts  in  lieu  of  the   altered  ballots.   2010   elections   was   paper-­‐based.   The   HRET   categorically  held  that:   .   cannot   be   relied   upon.  11-­‐321  dated   June  8.   copies   or   duplicates   shall   not   be   admissible   to   the  same  extent  as  the  original  if:   (a) a   genuine   question   is   raised   as   to   the  authenticity  of  the  original.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     HELD:   (DATED   08   JUNE   2011)   REGARDED   THE   PICTURE   IMAGES   OF   THE   BALLOTS  AS  THE  EQUIVALENT  OF  THE   ORIGINAL.   or   by   chemical   reproduction.  2015-­‐2016   to  reflect  the  data  accurately.Y.  or   (b) in   the   circumstances   it   would   be   unjust  or  inequitable  to  admit  thecopy  in   lieu  of  the  original.   She   maintains   that.   Notwithstanding   the   foregoing.   The  crucial  issue  posed  by  Chato  is  whether  or  not  the  picture   images   of   the   ballots   may   be   considered   as   the   "official   ballots"  or  the  equivalent  of  the  original  paper  ballots  which   the   voters   filled   out.   2.  which  reads  in   part  as  follows:   Sec.  9369  THE  PICTURE   IMAGES   OF   THE   BALLOTS   ARE   NOT   THE   "OFFICIAL   BALLOTS"   SINCE   THE   AUTOMATED  ELECTION  SYSTEM  (AES)   USED   DURING   THE   MAY   2010   ELECTIONS  WAS  PAPER  BASED.   2011.   as   they   do   not   reflect   the   true   will   of   the   electorate.   IN  RESOLUTION  NO.   which   yielded   reversal   of   votes.   Her   petition   is   anchored   on   the  following  grounds:  THE  HON.   or   from   the   same   matrix.A.   AND   USED   THE   PICTURE   IMAGES   OF   THE   BALLOTS   IN   ITS   SUBSEQUENT   RESOLUTION   NO.   .   Chato   claims   that   the   HRET   committed   grave   abuse   of   discretion   amounting   to   lack   or   excess  of  jurisdiction  in  issuing  Resolution  No.   The  Issues   In   this   petition   for   certiorari   and   prohibition   with   prayer   for   a   temporary   restraining   order   and/or   writ   of   prohibitory   injunction.   31   the   "official   ballot"   is   only   the   paper   ballot  that  was  printed  by  the  National  Printing  Office  and/or   the   Bangko   Sentral   ng   Pilipinas   pursuant   to   Section   15   of   R.  as  amended  by  R.   11-­‐487   dated   September   15.   xxx  xxx  xxx   Section   2   (3)   of   R.   the   official   ballots   shall   be   printed   by   the   National   Printing   Office   and/or  the  Bangko  Sentral  ng  Pilipinas  at   the   price   comparable   with   that   of   private   printers   under   proper   security   measures   which   the   Commission   shall   adopt.A.   19   which   was   denied   in   the   Resolution   20   No.     Copies   as   equivalent   of   the   originals.  The  Commission  may  contact  the   services   of   private   printers   upon   certification   by   the   National   Printing   Office/Bangko  Sentral  ng  Pilipinas  that  it   cannot   meet   the   printing   requirements.   (T)he   votes   determined   after   the   revision   in   the   20   precincts   in   Basud   and   Daet.  Hence.   .  PUBLIC  RESPONDENT  HRET   Rheland  S.   or   by   mechanical   or   electronic   rerecording.   Chato’s  petition  must  be  dismissed.   9369   defines   "official   62   .   such   copies   or   duplicates   shall   be   regarded   as   the   equivalent   of   the  original.  or  is  a   counterpart   produced   by   the   same   impression   as   the   original.  .   xxx  xxx  xxx   With   respect   to   a   paper-­‐based   election   system.  11-­‐321   Sec.   or   by   other   equivalent   techniques   which   accurately   reproduces   the   original.  —  When  a  document  is  in  two   or  more  copies  executed  at  or  about  the   same  time  with  identical  contents.  2011  and  Resolution  No.  11-­‐487  dated   September   15.   Aggrieved.   No.  9369.  .   8436.

  are   likewise   "official   ballots"   that  faithfully  captures  in  electronic  form  the  votes  cast  by   the   voter.  tabulates.  36  As   established   during   the   required   demo   tests.   No.  consolidates/canvasses  and   transmits   electronically   the   results   of   the   vote   count."   EDHCSI   An   automated   election   system.A.   which   specifies   how   the   message   is   to   be   encoded.   11.   11-­‐321.   that   the   integrity   of   any   of   the   Compact   Flash   (CF)   Cards   used   in   the   May   10.   2010   elections   was   not   preserved   or   the   same   was   violated.   the   possibility   of   tampering   or   substitution   of   the   CF   cards   did   not   escape   the   HRET.   however.   records.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     encryption   key.  Each  voter  was  then  required  to   personally   feed   his   ballot   into   the   Precinct   Count   Optical   Scan   (PCOS)   machine   which   scanned   both   sides   of   the   ballots  simultaneously.  The  Tribunal  shall  provide   a   non-­‐partisan   technical   person   who   shall   conduct   the   necessary   authentication   process   to   ensure   that   the  data  or  image  stored  is  genuine  and   not  a  substitute.   as   when   there   is   proof   of   tampering   or   substitution.  This  is  usually  done  with  the  use  of  an   Rheland  S.  40   However."  34   As   earlier   stated.   should   not   be   able   to   determine   anything   about   the   original   message.Y.   records   and   counts  votes.   and   transmission   of   election   result.   2011.  35  meaning.   the  protestant.   Accordingly.   canvassing.   Any   adversary   that   can   see   the   ciphertext."   33   On   the   other   hand.   An   authorized   party.   direct   recording   electronic   election   system   "uses   electronic   ballots.  37   We   agree.   is   a   system   using   appropriate   technology   which   has   been   demonstrated   in   the   voting.   the   May   10.   the   message   or   information   (referred   to   as   plaintext)   is   encrypted   using   an   encryption   algorithm.   that   adversaries   do   not   have  access  to.   38   "Encryption   is   the   process   of   encoding   messages   (or   information)   in   such   a   way   that   eavesdroppers   or   hackers   cannot   read   it.  votes  by  means  of  a  ballot  display  provided   with   mechanical   or   electro-­‐optical   component   that   can   be   activated   by   the   voter.  whether   printed   OR   generated   by   the   technology   applied.   A   paper-­‐based   election   system.  to  present  testimonial  and/or  documentary   evidence   to   show   proof   that   the   integrity   of   the   CF   cards   used   in   the   May   10.   counting.   tapes   ostensibly   containing   a   63   .   or   AES.   in   the   assailed   Resolution   No.   the   Tribunal.   In   an   encryption   scheme.       Printing   of   the   picture   images   of   the   ballots   in   lieu   of   photocopying.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  thus.   and   directed   Chato.   however.   9369.   As   such.  in  just  one  pass.   the   HRET   set   the   instant   case   for   preliminary   hearing   on   May   27.   in   lieu   of   photocopying   of   ballots   upon   any   motion   of   any   of   the   parties.   2010   elections.   which   provided   in   its   Guidelines   on   the   Revision  of  Ballots  that:   Sec."  39   Despite   this   security   feature.   —   Unless   it   has   been   shown.   The   testimonies   of   the   witnesses   she   presented   were   declared   irrelevant   and   immaterial   as   they   did   not   refer   to   the   CF   cards  used  in  the  20  precincts  in  the  Municipalities  of  Basud   and  Daet  with  substantial  variances.  Servacio.   processes   data   by   means   of   computer   programs.   the   HRET   found   Chato's   evidence   insufficient.   but   that   authorized   parties   can.  J  p:   More   than   three   years   ago.   consolidating.   with   both   the   HRET   and   Panotes   that   the   picture   images   of   the   ballots.   such   as   the   one   adopted   during   the   May   10.   2010   elections   used   a   paper-­‐based   technology   that   allowed   voters   to   fill   out   an   official  paper  ballot  by  shading  the  oval  opposite  the  names   of  their  chosen  candidates.   when   decrypted   for   verification.   and   (2)   direct   recording   electronic   election   system.   that   faithfully   captures   or   represents   the   votes   cast   by   a   voter   recorded  or  to  be  recorded  in  electronic  form.   32   There  are  two  types  of  AES  identified  under  R.  No.   as   scanned   and   recorded   by   the   PCOS.   is   the   type   of   AES   that   "use   paper   ballots.   2010   elections   was   not   preserved   or   was  violated.   record   voting   data   and   ballot   images.   therefore.   and   transmits   voting   results   electronically.A.   and   other   electoral   process.   as   defined   by   Section   2   (3)   of   R.   that   usually   requires   a   secret   decryption   key.   in   a   preliminary   hearing   set   by   the   parties   or   motu   propio. HRET   NACHURA.   is   able   to   decode   the   ciphertext   using   a   decryption   algorithm.   the   system   captured   the   images   of   the   ballots   in   encrypted   format   which.  may  be   used   for   purposes   of   revision   of   votes   in   an   electoral   protest.   shall   direct   the   printing   of   the   picture   image   of   the   ballots   of   the   subject   precinct   stored  in  the  data  storage  device  for  the   same  precinct.  2015-­‐2016   ballot"  where  AES  is  utilized  as  the  "paper  ballot.   were   found   to   be   digitized  representations  of  the  ballots  cast.  the  printouts  thereof  are  the  functional  equivalent  of   the  paper  ballots  filled  out  by  the  voters  and.   turning   it   into   an   unreadable  ciphertext.   9369:   (1)   paper-­‐based   election   system.  CHaDIT   It   bears   stressing   that   the   digital   images   of   the   ballots   captured   by   the   PCOS   machine   are   stored   in   an   encrypted   format   in   the   CF   cards.       GARCILLANO V.

  No.   the   Court   grants   the   same.  170338.   they   decided   to   prepare   committee   reports   based   on   the   said  recordings  and  the  testimonies  of  the  resource  persons.   purchase   and   use   of   wiretapping   equipment   and   to   prohibit   the   Armed   Forces   of   the   Philippines   (AFP)   from   performing  electoral  duties.   The   Senate   cannot   be   allowed   to   continue   with   the   conduct   of   the   questioned   legislative   inquiry   without   duly   published   rules   of   procedure.   Article   VI   of   the   1987   Constitution   explicitly   provides  that  "[t]he  Senate  or  the  House  of  Representatives.  He  prayed  that  the  respondent   House   Committees   be   restrained   from   using   these   tape   recordings   of   the   "illegally   obtained"   wiretapped   conversations   in   their   committee   reports   and   for   any   other   purpose.  170338.   allegedly   contained   the   President's   instructions   to   COMELEC   Commissioner   Virgilio   Garcillano   to   manipulate   in   her   favor   results   of   the   2004   presidential   elections.   No.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     64   .   who   had   previously   filed   two   bills   6   seeking   to   regulate   the   sale.   Senator   Panfilo   Lacson  roused  the  slumbering  issue  with  a  privilege  speech.  and   grants  the  second.  179275.   Rheland  S.   2007."  44  EScaIT   On   September   6.   On   motion   of   Senator   Francis   Pangilinan.  170338  and  179275.  Servacio.   10   docketed   as   G.A.   not   even   a   constructive   one.Y.   Garcillano   (Garcillano)   filed   with   this   Court   a   Petition   for   Prohibition   and   Injunction.  14  2007.  179275  admit  in  their  pleadings   and   even   on   oral   argument   that   the   Senate   Rules   of   Procedure   Governing   Inquiries   in   Aid   of   Legislation   had   been   published   in   newspapers   of   general   circulation   only   in   1995   After   more   than   two   years   of   quiescence.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   in   clear   derogation   of   the   constitutional  requirement.   On   November   20.  the  House  discussion  and   debates  on  the  "Garci  tapes"  abruptly  stopped.   He   further   implored   that   the   said   recordings   and   any  reference  thereto  be  ordered  stricken  off  the  records  of   the  inquiry.  2015-­‐2016   wiretapped   conversation   purportedly   between   the   President   of   the   Philippines   and   a   high-­‐ranking   official   of   the   Commission   on   Elections   (COMELEC)   surfaced.   the   respondent   House   Committees   decided   to   suspend   the   hearings   indefinitely.   petitioners   Santiago   Ranada   and   Oswaldo   Agcaoili."   The   requisite   of   publication   of   the   rules   is   intended  to  satisfy  the  basic  requirements  of  due  process.  No.   As   to   the   petition   in   G.   43   What   constitutes   publication   is   set   forth   in   Article   2   of   the   Civil   Code.R.  G.   His   speech   sought   an   inquiry   into   the   perceived   willingness   of   telecommunications   providers   to   participate   in   nefarious   wiretapping  activities.R.   seeking   to   bar   the   Senate   from   conducting   its   scheduled   legislative   inquiry.   The   tapes.  and     the   second   seeks   to   prohibit   and   stop   the   conduct   of   the   Senate   inquiry   on   the   wiretapped   conversation.   179275.   179275.R.  Nos.   3   Alarmed   by   these   developments.  they  have  different  objectives  —     the   first   is   poised   at   preventing   the   playing   of   the   tapes  in  the  House  and  their  subsequent  inclusion  in   the  committee  reports.   or  any  of  its  respective  committees  may  conduct  inquiries  in   aid  of  legislation  in  accordance  with  its  duly  published  rules   of   procedure.   which   provides   that   "[l]aws   shall   take   effect   after   15   days   following   the   completion   of   their   publication   either   in   the  Official  Gazette.  No.  12  17  13  and  October  1.  42   Publication   is   indeed   imperative.   petitioner   Virgilio   O.R.   HELD:   The  Court  dismisses  the  first  petition.   notoriously   referred   to   as   the   "Hello   Garci"   tapes.   Investigations   and   inquiries   within   both   chambers   of   the   Congress  were  made  and  conducted.  No.   Nevertheless.   No.  5   Without  reaching  its  denouement.   retired   justices   of   the   Court   of   Appeals.  11   As   the   Court   did   not   issue   an   injunctive   writ.  19   It  may  be  noted  that  while  both  petitions  involve  the  "Hello   Garci"  recordings.   2007.  G.   with   Prayer   for   Temporary   Restraining   Order   and/or   Writ   of   Preliminary   Injunction   4   docketed  as  G.   They   argued   in   the   main   that   the   intended   legislative   inquiry   violates   R.   2005.   the   Court   resolved   to   consolidate   G.   Senator   Lacson's   speech   was   referred   to   the   Senate   Committee   on   National   Defense   and   Security.     Writ   of   Preliminary   Injunction.   "The   Lighthouse   that   Brought   Darkness".   for   it   will   be   the   height   of   injustice   to   punish   or   otherwise   burden   a   citizen   for   the   transgression   of   a   law   or   rule   of   which   he   had   no   notice   whatsoever.   chaired   by   Senator   Rodolfo   Biazon.  Article  III  of  the  Constitution.   These   recordings   were   to   become   the   subject   of   heated   legislative   hearings   conducted   separately   by   committees   of   both   Houses   of   Congress.R.  and  the  respondent  House  Committees  directed   to   desist   from   further   using   the   recordings   in   any   of   the   House  proceedings.   the   Senate   proceeded  with  its  public  hearings  on  the  "Hello  Garci"  tapes   on  September  7.   filed  before  this  Court  a  Petition  for  Prohibition  with  Prayer   for   the   Issuance   of   a   Temporary   Restraining   Order   and/or   The  respondents  in  G.R.R.  7   Section   21.  No.   On   August   3.   4200   and   Section  3.  or  in  a  newspaper  of  general  circulation   in  the  Philippines.

  in   his   Dissenting   and   Concurring   Opinion.   of   the   Senate   of   a   particular   Congress   are   considered   terminated   upon   the   expiration   of   that   Congress  and  it  is  merely  optional  on  the   Senate   of   the   succeeding   Congress   to   65   .   this   Court   sees   fit   to   issue   a   clarification.e.  46  we  said:   Fourth.  we  find  merit  in  the  argument  of   the   OSG   that   respondent   Committees   likewise  violated  Section  21  of  Article  VI   of   the   Constitution.   leaving   less   than   a   majority   of   Senators   to   continue   into   the   next   Congress.  2015-­‐2016   and   in   2006.   like   the   1935   Constitution.  The  present  Senate  has   twenty-­‐four   members.   no   effort   was   undertaken   for   the   publication   of   these   rules   when   they   first  opened  their  session.   i.  the  Senate  under  the  1987   Constitution   is   not   a   continuing   body   because   less   than   majority   of   the   Senators   continue   into   the   next   Congress.   all   pending   matters   and   proceedings.   the   term   of   twelve   Senators   expires   every   three   years..   reinforces   this   ruling   with   the   following   rationalization:  CcSEIH   The   present   Senate   under   the   1987   Constitution   is   no   longer   a   continuing   legislative  body.   123.   the   composition   of   the   Senate   also   changes   by   the   end   of   each   term.   requiring   that   the   inquiry   be   in   accordance   with   the   "duly   published   rules   of   procedure".   however.   the   Court   had   occasion   to   rule   on   this   very   same   question.   Not   having   published   its   Rules   of   Procedure.   Certainly.   procedurally  infirm.   twelve   of   whom   are  elected  every  three  years  for  a  term   of   six   years   each.  but  may  be  taken  by   the   succeeding   Congress   as   if   present  for  the  first  time.   Senate   Committee   on   Accountability   of   Public  Officers  and  Investigations.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     majority  of  Senators  to   "constitute   a   quorum   to   do   business".   Since   Senatorial   elections   are   held   every   three   (3)   years   for   one-­‐half   of   the   Senate's   membership.  Servacio.   the   subject   hearings   in   aid   of   legislation   conducted   by   the   14th   Senate.   are   therefore.   Justice   Antonio   T.  Nazareno.   of   which   the   term   of   half   of   its   members   commenced   on   June   30.   2007.  However.   Unfinished   business   at   the   end   of   the   session   shall   be   taken   up   at   the   next   session   in  the  same  status.   as   it   is   not   dissolved   as   an   entity   with   each   national   election   or   change   in   the   composition   of   its  members.   Thus.   Applying   the   same   reasoning   in   Arnault   v.:   On   the   nature   of   the   Senate   as   a   "continuing   body".   We   quote  the  OSG's  explanation:   The   phrase   "duly   published   rules   of   procedure"   requires   the   Senate   of   every   Congress   to   publish   its   rules   of   procedure   governing   inquiries   in   aid   of   legislation   because   every   Senate   is   distinct   from   the   one   before   it   or   after   it.   The   Rules   of   the   Senate   itself   confirms   this   when   it   states:   RULE  XLIV   UNFINISHED  BUSINESS   SEC.   Undeniably   from   the   foregoing.   47   The   subject   was   explained   with   greater   lucidity   in   our   Resolution   48   (On   the   Motion   for   Reconsideration)   in   the   same  case.   there   is   no   debate   that   the   Senate   as   an   institution   is   "continuing".   Recently.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  viz.   Each   Senate   may   thus   enact   a   different   set   of   rules   as   it   may   deem   fit.Y.   unpassed   bills   and   even   legislative   investigations.  in  the  conduct  of   its   day-­‐to-­‐day   business   the   Senate   of   each   Congress   acts   separately   and   independently   of   the   Senate   of   the   Congress   before   it.   The   consequence   is   that   the   Rules  of  Procedure  must  be  republished   by   the   Senate   after   every   expiry   of   the   term  of  twelve  Senators.   Carpio.   In   Neri   v.   requires   a   Rheland  S.   45   With   respect   to   the   present   Senate   of   the   14th   Congress.   All   pending   matters   and   proceedings   shall   terminate   upon  the  expiration  of  one  (1)   Congress.   The   1987   Constitution.

    The  language  of  Section  21.  could  not.  2008  issues  of  Manila  Bulletin   and   Malaya.   that   the  Senate  or  its  committees  may  conduct  inquiries  in  aid  of   legislation   only   in   accordance   with   duly   published   rules   of   procedure. plaintiff -appellant.   the   respondent   Senate   Committees.   and   accessible   to   the   public   at   the   Senate's   internet   web  page.  but  as  if  presented  for   the  first  time.  in  violation  of  the  Constitution.A.   FACTS:     The  basis  of  this  action  is  a  written  contract  which   66   .   The   absence   of   any   amendment   to  the  rules  cannot  justify  the  Senate's  defiance  of  the  clear   and   unambiguous   language   of   Section   21.  51  In  other  words.   While   we   take   judicial   notice   of   this   fact.   The  constitutional  mandate  to  publish  the  said  rules  prevails   over   any   custom.   It   is   incumbent   upon   the   Senate   to   publish   the   rules   for   its   legislative   inquiries   in   each   Congress   or   otherwise   make   the   published   rules   clearly   state   that   the   same   shall   be   effective   in   subsequent   Congresses   or   until   they   are   amended   or   repealed   to   sufficiently  put  public  on  notice.   to   support   their   claim   of   valid   publication   through   the   internet   is   all   the   more   incorrect.   the   recent  publication  does  not  cure  the  infirmity  of  the  inquiry   sought   to   be   prohibited   by   the   instant   petitions.   A   person   who   violates  the  Rules  of  Procedure  could  be   arrested  and  detained  by  the  Senate.  2015-­‐2016   take   up   such   unfinished   matters.   Respondents   justify   their   non-­‐observance   of   the   constitutionally   mandated   publication   by   arguing   that   the   rules   have   never   been   amended   since   1995   and.   Tuvera   ruling   which   requires   publication  either  in  the  Official  Gazette   or   in   a   newspaper   of   general   circulation.  they  are  published  in  booklet  form  available  to  anyone   for   free. BASILIO GONZALEZ.   If   it   was   the   intention   of   the   Senate   for   its   present   rules   on   legislative   inquiries   to   be   effective   even   in   the   next   Congress.   Given   this   discussion.   Article   VI   of   the   Constitution.  use  its   unpublished   rules   in   the   legislative   inquiry   subject   of   these   consolidated   cases.   The   organic   law   instructs.   practice   or   tradition   followed   by   the   Senate.   Publication   in   accordance   with   Tañada   is   mandatory   to   comply   with   the   due   process   requirement   because   the   Rules   of   Procedure   put   a   person's   liberty   at   risk.   the   legislative   investigation  subject  thereof  still  could  not  be  undertaken  by   the   respondent   Senate   Committees.  Servacio.  rules  and  regulations.   Insofar   as   the   consolidated   cases   are   concerned.   The   conduct   of   inquiries   in   aid   of   legislation  by  the  Senate  has  to  be  deferred  until  it  shall  have   caused  the  publication  of  the  rules.     Very   recently.   R.   because   no   published   rules  governed  it.   therefore.   precluding   any   other   form   of   publication.  49  HIESTA   The   Court   does   not   agree.       CASES  39-­‐46   YU TEK & CO.   No. vs.Y.   without   more.A.  52  It  does  not  make  the  internet  a   medium  for  publishing  laws.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  8792.  in  clear  contravention  of  the  Constitution.   is   not   sufficient   under   the   Tañada   v. defendantappellant.   The   invocation   by   the   respondents   of   the   provisions   of   R.  Article  VI  of   the   Constitution   requiring   that   the   inquiry  be  conducted  in  accordance  with   the   duly   published   rules   of   procedure   is   categorical.   the   Senate   caused   the   publication   of   the   Senate   Rules   of   Procedure   Governing   Inquiries   in   Aid   of   Legislation  in  the  October  31.   Justice   Carpio's   response   to   the   same   argument   raised   by   the  respondents  is  illuminating:   The   publication   of   the   Rules   of   Procedure  in  the  website  of  the  Senate.   or   in   pamphlet   form   available   at   the   Senate..   it   could   have   easily   adopted   the   same   language   it   had   used   in   its   main  rules  regarding  effectivity.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     newspapers   of   general   circulation".   The   Rules   of   Procedure   even   provide   that  the  rules  "shall  take  effect  seven  (7)   days   after   publication   in   two   (2)   Rheland  S.   8792   considers   an   electronic   data   message   or   an   electronic   document   as   the   functional   equivalent   of   a   written   document  only  for  evidentiary  purposes.  because  it  can  do  so  only   "in  accordance  with  its  duly  published  rules  of  procedure".   and   does   not   make   any   distinction   whether   or   not   these   rules   have   undergone   amendments   or   revision.   not   in   the  same  status.   despite   that.   the   law   merely   recognizes   the   admissibility   in   evidence   (for   their   being   the   original)   of   electronic   data   messages   and/or   electronic  documents.  50  otherwise  known  as  the  Electronic  Commerce   Act   of   2000.

  Basilio   Gonzalez   obligates   himself   to   deliver   to   the   said   Messrs.  but  he  did  not  limit  his  obligation  to  his  own  crop   of   sugar..   Parties   are   presumed   to   have  reduced  to  writing  all  the  essential  conditions  of  their   contract.   The   contract   placed   no   restriction   upon   the   defendant   in   the   matter   of   obtaining   the   sugar.   600   piculs   of   sugar   of   the   first   and   second   grade.   The   defendant   undertook   to   deliver   a   specified   quantity   of   sugar   within   a   specified   time.   Our   conclusion   is   that   the   condition   which   the   defendant   seeks   to   add   to   the   contract   by   parol   evidence   cannot   be   considered.   Baluyut   failed   to  redeem  the  subject  property  within  the  period  required   by   law   prompting   Eulogio   Poblete   to   execute   an   Affidavit   of  Consolidation  of  Title.   the  loan  shall  mature  in  one  month.  and  ending  on  the  31st  day  of  March   of  the  same  year.  Yu  Tek  &  Co.  by   way   of   a   real   estate   mortgage   contract.   it   is   sought   to   show   that   the   sugar  was  to  be  obtained  exclusively  from  the  crop  raised   by  the  defendant.   in   Eveland   vs.   There   is   not   the  slightest  intimation  in  the  contract  that  the  sugar  was   to   be   raised   by   the   defendant. petitioner..  Subsequently.  1912.  Yu   Tek  &  Co.   However.   Baluyut   signed.  To  secure  the  payment   of  her  obligation.   509)   a   contract  of  employment  provided  that  the  plaintiff  should   receive   from   the   defendant   a   stipulated   salary   and   expenses   The   defendant   sought   to   interpose   as   a   defense   to  recovery  that  the  payment  of  the  salary  was  contingent   upon  the  plaintiff's  employment  redounding  to  the  benefit   Rheland  S.  43445  was   issued  in  the  name  of  Eulogio  and  the  heirs  of  Salud.   FACTS:   On   July   20.   before   Eulogio   and   the   heirs   of   Salud   could   take   possession   of   the   property. vs.000.   Baluyut   filed   an   action  for  annulment  of  mortgage.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Yu   Tek   &   Co.  1912.  There  is  no  clause  in  the  written  contract   which   even   remotely   suggests   such   a   condition.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     of   the   defendant   company.   The   contract   contained   no   such   condition  and  the  court  declined  to  receive  parol  evidence   thereof.  As  evidence  of  her   indebtedness.   That   Mr.  she  conveyed  to  the  Poblete  spouses.200   by   way   of   indemnity   for  loss  and  damages.   Eastern   Mining   Co.   It   may   be   true   that   defendant   owned   a   plantation   and   expected   to   raise   the   sugar   himself.   Gaspar.  extrajudicial  foreclosure   67   .  That  in  case  the  said  Mr.   Rep.   and   that   in   consideration  of  said  sum  he  obligates  himself  to  deliver  to   the   said   Yu   Tek   &   Co.  who   in   the   meantime.   the   mortgaged   property   was   sold   on   auction   by   the   Provincial   Sheriff   of   Rizal   to   the   Poblete   spouses   who   were   the   highest   bidders."     Plaintiff  alleges  that  the  court  erred  in  refusing  to   permit   parol   evidence   showing   that   the   parties   intended   that  the  sugar  was  to  be  secured  from  the  crop  which  the   defendant   raised   on   his   plantation.     However. THE HON.   a   promissory   note  for  the  amount  borrowed.   The   Poblete   spouses   subsequently   decided   to   extrajudicially   foreclose   the   real   estate   mortgage.   Basilio   Gonzalez   hereby   acknowledges   receipt   of   the   sum   of   P3.   (14   Phil.  the  600  piculs  of  sugar   within   the   period   of   three   months.     GUILLERMINA BALUYUT .   and   that   he   was   unable   to  fulfill  the  contract  by  reason  of  the  almost  total  failure  of   his  crop.   He   was   equally   at   liberty   to   purchase   it   on   the   market   or   raise   it   himself.     "2...  Under  the  promissory  note.   of   this   city   the   said   600   piculs   of   sugar   at   any   place   within   the   said  municipality  of  Santa  Rosa  which  the  said  Messrs.   the   P3.  2015-­‐2016   contains  the  following  provisions:   "1.  While  parol  evidence  is  admissible  in  a  variety  of   ways  to  explain  the  meaning  of  written  contracts.  it  cannot   serve   the   purpose   of   incorporating   into   the   contract   additional   contemporaneous   conditions   which   are   not   mentioned  at  all  in  the  writing.  unless  there  has  been  fraud   or   mistake.   on   even   date.   Basilio   Gonzalez   will   then   be   obligated   to   return   to   Messrs.   a   house   and   lot   she   owns.  TCT  No.   (Pastor   vs. EULOGIO POBLETE.   On   August   27.Y. SALUD POBLETE and respondents.   1981.000   received   and   also   the   sum   of   P1.  or  a  representative  of  the  same  may  designate.   2   Phil.   within   the   period   of   three   months.   Guillermina   Baluyut   (Baluyut).   Rep.00.   Baluyut   remained   in   possession   of   the   subject   property   and   refused   to   vacate   the   same.     ISSUE:   WON   court   erred   in   refusing   to   permit   parole  evidence   RULING:   This   case   appears   to   be   one   to   which   the   rule   which  excludes  parol  evidence  to  add  to  or  vary  the  terms   of   a   written   contract   is   decidedly   applicable.   1982.   this   contract   will   be   rescinded   and   the   said   Mr.   That   the   said   Mr. COURT of APPEALS .   Yu   Tek   &   Co.   Hence.   592.   died.   herein   petitioner.   as   evidenced   by   a   Certificate   of   Sale   issued   pursuant   thereto.   Yu   Tek   &   Co.   according   to   the   result   of   the   polarization.  Basilio  Gonzales  does   not  deliver  to  Messrs.     In   the   case   at   bar.     "3.000   Philippine   currency   from   Messrs.   In   an   early   case   this   court   declined   to   allow   parol   evidence   showing   that   a   party   to   a   written   contract   was  to  become  a  partner  in  a  firm  instead  of  a  creditor  of   the   firm.   loaned   from   the   spouses   Eulogio   and   Salud  Poblete  the  sum  of  P850.   The   rights   of   the   parties   must   be   determined  by  the  writing  itself.)   Again.   beginning   on   the   1st   day  of  January.  Servacio.   referred   to   in   the   second   paragraph   of   this   document.   Eulogio   and   the   heirs   of   Salud   filed   a   Petition   for   the   issuance   of   a   writ   of   possession   with   the   RTC  of  Pasig.

    c)   The   sum   of   P3.     In   the   instant   case.   Mendoza.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.000.000.   they   entered   again   on   a   verbal   agreement   whereby   plaintiff   Conrado   Salonga   and   defendant   Lucio   Cruz   had   agreed   that   defendant   Lucio   Cruz   will   sublease   and  had  in  fact  subleased  the  fishpond  of  Nemesio  Yabut  to   the   herein   plaintiff   for   the   amount   of   P28.   it   cannot   serve   the   purpose   of   incorporating   into   the   contract   additional   contemporaneous   conditions   which   are   not   mentioned   at   all   in   writing.   through   their   respective   counsel.  G).     LUCIO R.      ISSUE:   WON   the   testimony   of   Atty.   Edwina   Mendoza   that   the   maturity   of   the   loan   which   petitioner   incurred   is   one   year.     The   private   respondent   Conrado   Salonga   filed   a   complaint   for   collection   and   damages   against   petitioner   Lucio  Cruz.   unless   there   has   been   fraud   or   mistake.     6)   That   sometime   on   June   15.  is  acceptable  proof  of  the   existence  of  collateral  agreements  which  were  entered  into   by  the  parties  who  executed  the  Promissory  Note  and  the   Real   Estate   Mortgage   prior.  1982.   petitioner   failed   to   present   clear   and   convincing   evidence   to   prove   her   allegation   that   the   real   agreement   of   the   parties   is   for   the   loan   to   mature   in   one   year.   1982.00   on   September   4.   In   fact   there  was  not  even  any  allegation  in  the  Complaint  and  in   the   Memorandum   filed   by   petitioner   with   the   trial   court   to   the   effect   that   there   has   been   fraud   or   mistake   as   to   the   date  of  the  loan's  maturity  as  contained  in  the  Promissory   Note  of  July  20.  Mr. COURT OF APPEALS AND CONRADO Q.     7)   That   defendant   Lucio   Cruz   in   compliance   with   their   verbal   sublease   agreement   had   received   from   the   plaintiff  Conrado  Salonga  the  following  sums  of  money:     a)  P8.Y.   took   back   the   subject   matter   of   this   case   from   the   defendant   Lucio  Cruz.  (Exh.   Trial  court  dismissed  Baluyut’s  complaint.     b)   The   sum   of   P500.  2015-­‐2016   and  sale  of  the  subject  property.   However.   1982.   petitioner  herself  never  claimed  that  the  loan  shall  mature   in   one   year   despite   being   questioned   regarding   its   maturity.   Mendoza   is   admissible  to  prove  the  real  maturity  date  of  the  PN   RULING:     Petitioner   makes   much   of   the   testimony   of   Atty.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     1)   That   plaintiff   Conrado   Salonga   entered   into   a   contract   of   what   is   commonly   called   as   'pakyawan'   with   defendant   Lucio   Cruz   on   the   fishes   contained   in   a   fishpond   which   defendant   Lucio   Cruz   was   taking   care   of   as   lessee   from  the  owner  Mr. SALONGA.00  in  order  that  Lucio  Cruz  could   meet   his   obligation   with   the   owner   of   the   fishpond   in   question.   as   evidenced  by  Annex  "C"  of  the  complaint  (Exh.   who   is   the   owner   of   the   fishpond."   plaintiff   Conrado   Salonga   was   able   to   harvest   the   fishes   contained   in   the   fishpond   administered   by   Lucio   Cruz   in   August  1982.   agreed   on   the   following  stipulation  of  facts:     Petitioner   contends   that   herein   private   respondents'  witness. vs.   as   evidenced   by   a   receipt   dated   May   4.00   for   a   period  of  one  year  beginning  August  15.  1982  as  evidenced  by   Annex  "B"  of  the  Complaint.   FACTS:   Rheland  S.   he   requested   plaintiff   Conrado   Salonga   to   advance   the   money   of   not   only   P28. respondents.000.  and     68   .00   on   September   19.     Moreover.   1983.00  as  requested  by   defendant   Lucio   Cruz   was   in   fact   delivered   by   plaintiff   Conrado   Salonga   duly   received   by   the   defendant   Lucio   Cruz.000.   during   her   cross-­‐examination.   no   other   evidence   was   presented   to   prove   that   the   real   date   of   maturity   of   the   loan   is   one   year.     3)  That  the  amount  of  P35.  a  certain  Atty.   that   the   maturity  of  the  loan  is  one  year.   evidence   of   a   prior   or   contemporaneous   verbal   agreement   is   generally   not   admissible   to   vary.000.  as  well  as  cancellation  of   the   title   issued   in   the   name   of   Eulogio   and   the   heirs   of   Salud. petitioner.  Servacio.     2)  That  because  of  the  necessity.000.   contemporaneous   and   subsequent  to  the  execution  of  these  documents.     5)   Immediately   thereafter   the   aforesaid   harvest   thereon.   While   parol   evidence   is   admissible   to   explain   the   meaning   of   written   contracts.  is  a   competent   witness   and   that   her   testimony.  Nemesio  Yabut.  Nemesio  Yabut.  1981.   during   the   pre-­‐trial   conference.   Mayor   Nemesio   Yabut.  Edwina  Mendoza. CRUZ.00  but  P35.  E).  with  a  verbal  contract   for  the  sum  of  P28.   duly   signed  by  defendant  Lucio  Cruz     4)   That   pursuant   to   said   contract   of   "pakyaw.   In   sum.   1982   as  evidenced  by  Annex  "D"  of  the  complaint  (Exh.   Plaintiff   and   defendant.  F).000.   contradict   or   defeat   the   operation   of   a   valid   contract.  defendant  Lucio   Cruz   at   that   time   needed   money.   aside   from   the   testimony   of   Atty.00  on  August  15.  plus  damages.00  sometime  in  May  1982.

 The  petitioner  denied  having  received  another   amount   of   P28.00   (Exh.00  (Exh.00   and   of   the  date  when  the  said  amount  was  received.000.   0   0   a   s   consideration   of   the   "pakyaw"   contract   does   not   make   it   part   of   the   terms   of   their   agreement.  Section  7.  Servacio.Y.     The  rule.   Exhibit   D   does   not   even   mention   the   transaction   that   gave   rise   to   its   issuance.   he   also   delivered   to   the   petitioner   P28.   1982.   no   evidence   of   the   terms   of   the   agreement  other  than  the  contents  of  the  writing.000.  except  in   the  following  cases:     Rheland  S.   0   0   0   .   the   petitioner   testified   that   he   entered  into  a  "pakyaw"  and  sublease  agreement  with  the   private   respondent   for   a   consideration   of   P28.00.00   on   September   30.750.   A   writing  of  this  nature.00.   1982.   P3.000   for   each   transaction.   He   contended  that  the  instrument  dated  May  14.  H).     Even  if  it  were  assumed  that  Exhibits  D  and  I  are   covered   by   the   parol   evidence   rule.  7.  P8.   and   therefore.   1982.     For   his   part.   decision   of   the   trial   court   was   reversed   and   ordered  petitioner  to  pay  the  respondent.   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court   and   thereby   in   making   a   conclusion   that   the   transaction   effected  between  the  private  respondent  and  petitioner  is   one  of  contract  of  loan  and  not  a  contract  of  lease.   At   most.   but   Exhibit  D  does  not  contain  such  an  agreement.  1982  (Exh.00. ISSUE:  WON  the  Court  of  Appeals  gravely  erred  in   disregarding   parol   evidence   to   Exhibits   "D"   and   "I"   despite   the   fact   that   these   documents   fall   under   the   exceptions   provided   for   in   Sec.00.  P3.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   there   can   be.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     a)  When  a  mistake  or  imperfection  of  the  writing   or   its   failure   to   express   the   true   intent   and   agreement   of   the  parties.00   were   not   payments   for   the   "pakyaw"   and   sublease   agreement   but   for   loans   extended   by  Salonga  to  Cruz.000   covered   full   payment  of  their  "pakyaw"  agreement  while  the  remaining   P7.  The  former  may  be  varied  by   parol   evidence   but   not   the   latter.   Exhibit   D   can   only   be   considered   a   casual   memorandum  of  a  transaction  between  the  parties  and  an   acknowledgment   of   the   receipt   of   money   executed   by   the   petitioner   for   the   private   respondent's   satisfaction.000.  The  term  "agreement"  includes  wills.  This  was  evidenced  by  a  receipt  dated  May  14.   It   is   not   and   could   have   not   been   intended   by   the   parties   to   be   the   sole   memorial   of   their   agreement.     The   reason   for   the   rule   is   the   presumption   that   when  the  parties  have  reduced  their  agreement  to  writing   they   have   made   such   writing   the   only   repository   and   memorial   of   the   truth.  it  also  found  that   the  amounts  of  P35.   P28.  1982.000   from   Salonga   on   May   14.000.   G)   and   P3.   the   private   respondent   claimed   that   aside  from  the  amounts  of  P35.   P500.000.  H)  mentioned  in  the  partial  stipulation  of   facts.  I  t  s  r  e  f  e  r  e  n  ce  t  o  t   h   e   a   m   o   u   n   t   o   f   P   2   8   .00   (Exh.   As   a   matter   of   fact.00.  D).00   as   advance   for   the  sublease.   P3.  It  is  only  a   receipt   attesting   to   the   fact   that   on   May   4.000   of   which   was   payment   for   the   "pakyaw"   and   the   excess   of   P7.     b)   When   there   is   an   intrinsic   ambiguity   in   the   writing.  Evidence  of  Written  Agreements.  or  the  validity  of  the  agreement  is  put  in  issue   by  the  pleadings.000.  I)   was   executed   to   evidence   their   "pakyaw"   agreement   and   to   fix   its   duration.000.000.   1982   as  Annex  "E"  of  the  complaint  (Exh.     Trial   court   ruled   in   favor   of   the   petitioner.   betw   een   the   parties   and   their   successors   in   interest.  it   is   to   be   considered   as   containing   all   such   terms.000.000.   P28.000   but   the   receipt   of   which   had   been   lost   and  denied  being  indebted  to  the  petitioner  for  P4.000.  is  not  applicable  in  the  case  at   bar.000.000   he   received   from   the   private   respondent   on   May   4.00   (Exh.00.  as  Wigmore  observed  is  not  covered   by  the  parol  evidence  rule.  particularly  with  respect  to   the   petitioner's   receipt   of   the   amount   of   P28.   receipt   of   P35.   The   rule   is   that   objections   to   evidence   must   be   made   as   soon   as   the   grounds   therefor   become   69   .   F).   Out   of   the   P35.   between   the   parties   and   their   successors   in   interest.   5   Section   7   of   Rule   130   clearly   refers   to   the   terms   of   an   agreement   and   provides   that   "there   can   be.     A   distinction   should   be   made   between   a   statement   of   fact   expressed   in   the   instrument   and   the   terms  of  the  contractual  act."     The   statement   in   Exhibit   I   of   the   petitioner's   receipt  of  the  P28.   and   whatever   is   not   found   in   the   writing   must   be   understood   to   have   been   waived   or   abandoned.   which   constituted   the   consideration   for   their   "pakyaw"   agreement.000  for   the  lease  of  other  portions  of  the  fishpond.00  (Exh.     At   the   trial.  however.  P500.   Salonga   also   claimed   that   he   had   paid   Cruz   the   amount   of   P4.00  is  just  a  statement  of  fact.  —  When   the  terms  of  an  agreement  have  been  reduced  to  writing.   no   evidence   of   the   terms   of   the   agreement  other  than  the  contents  of  the  writing.   Parol   evidence   may   therefore   be   introduced  to  explain  Exhibit  I.750.     RULING:   Sec.  The  record  shows  that  no   objection   was   made   by   the   private   respondent   when   the   petitioner   introduced   evidence   to   explain   the   circumstances   behind   the   execution   and   issuance   of   the   said   instruments.750.000.00   and   P4.000  constituted  the  advance  payment  for  their  sublease   agreement.   the   petitioner   received   from   the   private   respondent   the   amount   of   P35.   E).  Rule  130  is  predicated  on  the  existence  of  a   document   embodying   the   terms   of   an   agreement.   its   application   by   the   Court  of  Appeals  was  improper.   He   was   corroborated   by   Sonny   Viray.  P8.   1982  marked  as  Exhibit  I.   7.  It  is  a   mere   acknowledgment   of   the   distinct   act   of   payment   made   b  y  t  h  e  p  r  i  v  a  t  e  r  e  s  p  o  n  d  e  n  t  .  2015-­‐2016   d)   The   sum   of   P3.   who  testified  that  it  was  he  who  prepared  the  May  4.   on   appeal.

 that  these  12  hectares  were  transferred  by  her   parents   in   her   (witness)   name.   The   rule   is   not   applicable   where   the   controversy   is   between   one   of   the   parties   to   the   document   and   third   persons.   containing   an   area   of   36   hectares.  however.   The   Court   of   Appeals   should  have  considered  the  partial  stipulation  of  facts  and   the   testimonies   of   the   witnesses   which   sought   to   explain   the  circumstances  surrounding  the  execution  of  Exhibits  D   and  I  and  their  relation  to  one  another.   and   refused   to   surrender   the   possession   of   the   same   despite   demands   made   by   the   petitioner.  he  is  deemed  to   have  waived  the  benefit  of  the  parol  evidence  rule.000.   The   dispute  over  what  was  actually  sold  is  between  petitioner   and  the  private  respondents.   parol  evidence  cannot  be  received  to  contradict  or  vary  its   terms.   The   deed   of   sale   was   executed   by   Leoncia   Lasangue   in   favor   of   Victoria   Lechugas.   owned   a   parcel   of   land   in   Lambunao.  5456  OF  LAMBUNAO  CADASTRE.   1950.   leaving   only   some   twelve   hectares   out   of   the   original  36.  the  court  ruled:     Defendants.   plaintiff's   vendor   in   exhibit   A.   Emeterio   Lasangue.     As   explained   by   a   leading   commentator   on   our   Rules  of  Court.     In  Horn  v.   1982   by   the   petitioner   was   in   the   nature   of   a   loan   accommodation.     VICTORIA LECHUGAS.   She   alleges   that   this   lot   was   sold   to   her   by   one   Leonora  Lasangue. COURT OF APPEALS.  it  was  shown  that  what  she   really   intended   to   sell   and   to   be   the   subject   of   Exhibit   A   was  Lot  No.     ".   The   petitioner  denies  that  Leoncia  Lasangue  sold  Lot  No.  not  bound  by   it. CARMELITO LOZA.  2015-­‐2016   reasonably   apparent. respondents.   being   the   only   child   and   heir.   where   at   least   one   of   the   parties  to  the  suit  is  not  party  or  a  privy  of  a  party  to  the   written   instrument   in   question   and   does   not   base   a   claim   on   the   instrument   or   assert   a   right   originating   in   the   instrument  or  the  relation  established  thereby. DAVID LOZA. petitioner.  and   it  is  relaxed  where  either  one  of  the  parties  between  whom   the  question  arises  is  a  stranger  to  the  written  agreement.     ISSUE:   WON   the   defendant   court   erred   in   admitting   the   parol   evidence   OVER   THE   OBJECTION   OF   THE   PETITIONER   IN   ORDER   TO   VARY   THE   SUBJECT   MATTER   OF   THE   DEED   OF   DEFINITE   SALE   (EXHIBIT   A)   ALTHO   THE   LAND   THEREIN   IS   DESCRIBED   AND   DELIMITED  BY  METES  AND  BOUNDS  AND  IDENTIFIED  AS   LOT  NO.   that   as   between   parties   to   a   written   agreement. SALVADOR LOZA.   or   their   privies.  1941.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     70   .  of  course.  and  described  in  paragraph   2  of  plaintiff's  complaint.  In  the  case  at  bar.     For   failure   of   the   private   respondent   to   object   to   the  evidence  introduced  by  the  petitioner.   In   the   case   of   testimonial   evidence. vs.  and   may   not   properly   be   invoked   by   either   party   to   the   litigation   against   the   other.  5522   to   her."     Leoncia   Lasangue. HON.  Servacio.   the   petitioner.   The   complaint   was  dismissed.   FACTS:   The  petitioner  filed  a  complaint  for  forcible  entry   with   damages   against   the   private  respondents.     RULING:   The   appellate   court   acted   correctly   in   upholding   the   trial   court's   action   in   admitting   the   testimony   of   Leoncia   Lasangue.   is   different   from   the   land  now  subject  of  this  action. MARINA LOZA.  2)   dated  March  17.Y.     We  find  that  it  was  error  for  the  Court  of  Appeals   to   disregard   the   parol   evidence   introduced   by   the   petitioner   and   to   conclude   that   the   amount   of   P35.   maintain   that   the   land  which  plaintiff  bought  from  Leoncia  Lasangue  in  1950   as   evidenced   by   the   deed   exhibit   A.   that   on   December   8.  who.   that   said   Emeterio   Lasangue   sold   a   slice   of   4   hectares   of   this   property  to  Hugo  Loza.  that  other  sales  were  made  to  other   persons. AMPARO LOZA.     The  case  was  dismissed.   on   the   other   hand.  was  never  presented  as   witness   in   any   of   the   proceedings   below   by   herein   petitioner.  through  the   testimony  of  Leoncia  Lasangue.   She   alleged   that  they  appropriated  the  produce  thereof  for  themselves.  5522  but  not  being  able  to  read  and  write  and   fully   relying   on   the   good   faith   of   her   first   cousin.   the   objection   must   be   made   when   the   objectionable   question   is   asked   or   after   the   answer   is   given   if   the   objectionable  features  become  apparent  only  by  reason  of   such  answer.   she   (Leoncia   Lasangue)   sold   six   hectares   of   her   inherited   property   to   Victoria   The   petitioner's   reliance   on   the   parol   evidence   rule   is   misplaced.   .  .   she   just   placed   her   thumbmark   on   a   piece   of   Rheland  S.00   received   on   May   4.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   The   petitioner   claims   that   Leoncia   Lasangue   was   the   vendor   of   the   disputed   land. ISIDRO LOZA.  .   and   the   rule   excluding   extrinsic   evidence   in   the   construction  of  writings  is  inapplicable  in  such  cases.W. ERLINDA LOZA and ALEJANDRA LOZA.       Lechugas  under  a  public  instrument  (exhibit  A)  which  was   prepared   at   the   instance   of   Victoria   Lechugas   and   thumbmarked  by  herself  (the  vendor).   and  does  not  claim  under  or  through  one  who  is  party  to  it.  evidenced  by  a  deed  of  sale  (Exh.   .   Iloilo.  the  parol  evidence  rule  does  not  apply.  Hansen  (57  N.  315).   In  such  case  the  rule  is  binding  upon  neither.   and   the   rule   therefore   applies.  Strangers  to  a  contract  are.   testifying   for   defendants   declared   that   during   his   lifetime   her   father.

  9. JOSERINO.     Consequently. JOSEFINA YAP. MARIA YAP DETUYA.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   cannot   sue   for   the   enforcement   of   the   supposed   obligations  arising  from  said  contracts.   by   virtue   of   a   contract   of   lease   in   their   favor.     The   Pacres   siblings   executed   a   Confirmation   of   Rheland  S.     Petitioners'   only   piece   of   evidence   to   prove   the   alleged   oral   partition   was   the   joint   affidavit   (entitled   "Confirmation   of   Oral   Partition/Settlement   of   Estate").   Hilario   Ramirez. LELISA.   even  though  they  were  not  written  in  the  Deeds  of  Sale.  9  from  petitioners'  four  siblings."     Rodrigo. and LOURDES a l l s u r n a m e d PA C R E S .   Under   this   Rule. ELENA. namely BAUDILLO YGOÑA YAP.   not   being   parties   to   the   contracts   of   sale   between   Ygoña   and   the   petitioners'   siblings.  Servacio.     Four   of   the   Pacres   siblings     (namely.     ISSUE:   Whether   petitioners   were   able   to   prove   the   existence   of   the   alleged   oral   agreements   such   as   the   partition   and   the   additional   obligations   of   surveying   and   titling     RULING:   Both   the   trial   and   appellate   courts   dismissed   petitioners'   complaint   on   the   ground   that   they   had   failed   to  prove  the  existence  of  an  oral  partition.  and  to  pay  for  all  their  past  and  present  estate  and   realty   taxes. DE PACRES.   In   1983.   Mario   (petitioners'   predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest)   and   Veñaranda   (herein   petitioner).   9   including   the   shares   of   the   petitioners   (the   non-­‐selling   siblings). EGYPTIANA YAP BANZON.Y.   Mario   claimed   sole   ownership   of   the   lot   occupied   by   Ramirez/Vicentuan   by   virtue   of   the   oral   partition.   petitioners.   The  total  area  sold  to  Ygoña  was  493  square  meters.     While   petitioners   claim   that   there   was   an   oral   stipulation.  Simplicia  and  Margarita)  sold  their  shares  in  the   ancestral  home  and  the  lot  on  which  it  stood  to  Ramirez.  2015-­‐2016   paper   which   petitioner   told   her   was   the   document   evidencing  the  sale  of  land.   FACTS:     The   lot   originally   belonged   to   Pastor   Pacres   (Pastor)   who   left   it   intestate   to   his   heirs   Margarita.   under   Article   1311   of   the   Civil   Code.   there   can   be   no   other   conclusion  but  that  Lasangue  did  not  intend  to  sell.   71   .     and   Simplicia     sold   their   remaining  shares  in  Lot  No.  she  also  bound  herself  to   survey   Lot   No.  as  she   could   not   have   sold.   He   argued   that   Ramirez/Vicentuan   should   pay   rentals   to   him   for   occupying   the   front   lot   and   should   transfer  to  the  rear  of  Lot  No. respondents.   free   of   cost.   to   deliver   to   petitioners. HEIRS of CECILIA YGOÑA.   Margarita   also   sold   her   share   to   Ygoña.   Petitioners   admitted   that   at   the   time   of   Pastor's   death   in   1962. petitioners.     and   beside   it   stood   Rodrigo's   hut   (also   fronting   the   provincial   highway).   it   cannot   be   proven   under   the   Parol   Evidence   Rule.   Petitioners   did   not   adequately   explain   why   the  affidavit  was  executed  only  in  1993.   the   titles   corresponding   to   their   definite  shares   in   Lot   No.   petitioners'   predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest.   45   According   to   petitioners.   Francisco.   Rodrigo.  The  deed  of  sale  described  the   disputed  lot  instead.   Francisco.     The   deeds   of   sale   described   the   subjects   thereof   as   "part   and   portion   of   the   300   square   meters   actually   in   possession   and   enjoyment   by   vendee   and   her   spouse.     Petitioners   allege   that   when   Ygoña   bought   portions  of  Lot  No.   a   piece   of   land   already   sold   by   her   father  to  the  predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest  of  the  respondents.  contracts  take  effect  only  between  the  parties.   his   heirs   were   already   occupying   definite   portions   of   Lot   No.     HEIRS OF MARIO PACRES.     Francisco.   it   is   considered   as   containing   all   the   terms   agreed   upon   and   there   can   be.  aside   from  paying  the  purchase  price.  their   assigns   and   heirs   (subject   to   exceptions   not   applicable   here).   to   the   effect   that   such   an   oral   partition   had   previously   been   agreed   upon. namely: VALENTINA Vda.   Ygoña   agreed   to   these  undertakings  as  additional  consideration  for  the  sale.     Mario.   The   front   portion   along   the   provincial   highway   was   occupied   by   the   co-­‐owned   Pacres   ancestral   home.   Mario's   house   stood   at   the  back  of  the  ancestral  house.  9  where  the  lots  of  Ramirez's   vendors  are  located.  several  years  after   respondents   Ygoña   and   Ramirez   took   possession   of   the   front  portions  of  Lot  No.  9. vs.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Oral  Partition/Settlement  of  Estate  of  Pastor  Pacres.   Rodrigo.   Simplicia.     In   the   first   place.DEABABA. a n d V E Ñ A R A NDAVda. LEOVIGILDO.   "[w]hen   the   terms   of   an   agreement   have   been   reduced   to   writing.     From   the   foregoing.  9. and VICENTE YAP and HILARIO RAMIREZ.   filed   an   ejectment   suit   against   Ramirez'   successor-­‐in-­‐interest   Vicentuan.  9  to  respondent  Cecilia  Ygoña   (Ygoña).

000   cubic   meters   of   aggregates   from   Lucia.  .     Moreover.     c) The  validity  of  the  written  agreement.   Toledo   City[.   1994."   Conversely.   even   assuming   that   the   alleged   oral   undertakings   invoked   by   petitioners   may   be   deemed   stipulations   pour   autrui.  a  beneficiary  of  a  stipulation  pour  autrui  is  required   to   communicate   his   acceptance   to   the   obligor   before   its   revocation.  a  party  may  present  evidence  to  modify.   Kimwa   hauled   10.   "   A   beneficiary   of   a   stipulation   pour   autrui   obviously   bases   his   claim   on   the   contract.   much   less   proved.     In   their   Complaint.   by   petitioners.   a   person   who   claims   to   be   the   beneficiary   of   an   alleged   stipulation   pour   autrui   in   a   contract  (such  as  petitioners)  may  be  considered  a  party  to   that  contract.   Kimwa  stopped  hauling  aggregates.  or     d) The   existence   of   other   terms   agreed   to   by   the   parties   or   their   successors   in   interest   after   the   execution  of  the  written  agreement.   explain  or  add  to  the  terms  of  written  agreement  if  he  puts   in  issue  in  his  pleading:     a) An  intrinsic  ambiguity.   Kimwa   allegedly   asked   that   it   be   "assured"   of   40.     The   Parol   Evidence   Rule   applies   to   "the   parties   and   their   successors   in   interest.  1995  was  never  set  as  a   deadline.   no   evidence   of   such   terms   other   than  the  contents  of  the  written  agreement.     b) The   failure   of   the   written   agreement   to   express   the   true   intent   and   agreement   of   the   parties   thereto.     However.   no   evidence   of   such   terms   other   than   the   contents   of   the   written   agreement.   Kimwa   violated   the   Agreement.  it  insisted  that   Spouses   Paras   were   barred   from   introducing   evidence   which  would  show  that  the  parties  had  agreed  differently.     Rheland  S.   it   has   no   application  to  a  stranger  to  a  contract.  the  rule  on   admissibility   of   documentary   evidence   when   the   terms   of   an  agreement  have  been  reduced  into  writing:     Section   9."     While   the   Rule   admits   of   exception.   Lucia   and   Kimwa   entered   into   a   contract   denominated   "Agreement   for   Supply   of   Aggregates"  (Agreement).Y.   Spouses   Paras   alleged   that   sometime   in   December   1994.  For  purposes  of  the   Parol   Evidence   Rule.   —   When   the   terms   of   an   agreement   have   been   reduced   to   writing.  .  mistake  or  imperfection  in   the  written  agreement.   however.  Cebu.  2015-­‐2016   between   the   parties   and   their   successors   in   interest.  Servacio.     In   its   Answer.   Lucia.000   cubic   meters   of  aggregates  from  petitioner  Lucia  Paras.   filed   the  Complaint   for  breach  of  contract  with  damages  that  is   now  subject  of  this  Petition.   Lucia   was   approached   by   Kimwa  expressing  its  interest  to  purchase  gravel  and  sand   from   her.   because   they   are   barred   from   proving   them   by   oral  evidence  under  the  Parol  Evidence  Rule.   Thus.   He   therefore   cannot   claim   to   be   a   stranger   to   the   contract   and   resist   the   application   of   the   Parol  Evidence  Rule.000   cubic   meters   of   aggregates.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   to   preclude   the   application   of   Parol   Evidence   Rule.000   cubic   meters   represented   only   an   upper   limit   or   the  maximum  quantity  that  it  could  haul.   Bonifacio.   Sometime   after   this.     72   .   RULING:   Respondent  Kimwa  is  liable  for  failing  to  haul  the   remainder  of  the  quantity  which  it  was  obliged  to  acquire   from  petitioner  Lucia  Paras.   It   argued   that   the   controversial   quantity   of   40.   Section   9   of   the   Revised   Rules   on   Evidence  provides  for  the  Parol  Evidence  Rule.   still   petitioners'   claim   cannot   prosper."     On   December   6.]"   9   Kimwa   is   a   "construction   firm   that   sells   concrete   aggregates  to  contractors  and  haulers  in  .     Rule   130.000   cubic   meters   was   a   maximum  limit  and  that  May  15.   between   the   parties   and   their   successors   in   interest.  It  has  been  held  that  a  third  party  who  avails   himself   of   a   stipulation   pour   autrui   under   a   contract   becomes   a   party   to   that   contract.000  cubic  meters  worth  of  aggregates.   Kimwa   alleged   that   it   never   committed   to   obtain   40.  it  is  considered  as  containing  all  the  terms  agreed   upon   and   there   can   be.     Claiming   that   in   so   doing.   joined   by   her   husband.   no   such   exception   was   pleaded.     ISSUE:   Whether   respondent   Kimwa   Construction   and   Development   Corporation   is   liable   to   petitioners   Spouses   Paras   for   (admittedly)   failing   to   haul   30.     Pursuant   to   the   Agreement.   This   is   why   under   Article   1311.  Invoking  the  Parol  Evidence  Rule.   it   must   be   shown   that   "at   least   one   of   the   parties  to  the  suit  is  not  party  or  a  privy  of  a  party  to  the   written   instrument   in   question   and   does   not   base   a   claim   on   the   instrument   or   assert   a   right   originating   in   the   instrument   or   the   relation   established   thereby.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Kimwa   asserted   that   the   Agreement   articulated   the   parties'   true   intent   that   40.     Paras vs Kimwa Consrtuction   FACTS:     Lucia   Paras   (Lucia)   was   a   "concessionaire   of   a   sand   and   gravel   permit   at   Kabulihan.   Evidence   of   written   agreements.

    Contrary   to   the   Court   of   Appeal's   conclusion.   In   choosing   to   reduce   their   agreement   into   writing.   as   well   as   the   Agreement's   failure   to   express   the  true  intent  of  the  parties.  2015-­‐2016   The  term  "agreement"  includes  wills.   petitioners   Spouses   Paras   pleaded   in   the   Complaint   they   filed   before   the   trial   court   a   mistake   or   imperfection   in   the   Agreement.   donated   100   square   meters   thereof   to   the   Barangay  San  Miguel  Water  System  Association.   "forbids   any   addition   to.   which   is   owned   by   Dalisay.   even   technical   —   language   as   are   appropriate   to   their   context.   Sr.   the   terms   of   a   written   agreement   by   testimony   or   other   evidence   purporting   to   show  that  different  terms  were  agreed  upon  by  the  parties.   is   merely   a   general   rule.   From   an   evidentiary  standpoint.  this  is  also  because  "oral  testimony   .. De Dalisay   FACTS:   Desiderio   Dalisay."     This.   Sr.  also  responded  to  petitioners  Spouses   Paras'  pleading  of  these  issues.   on   6   December   1994   or   thereabouts"     was   founded   on   the   Rheland  S.   Mellonida   (Mellonida)     Patricia.  Jr.   It   is   true   that   petitioners   Spouses   Paras'   Complaint   does   not   specifically   state   words   and   phrases   such  as  "mistake.   that   the   existence   of   any   of   the   four   (4)   exceptions   has   been   put   in   issue   in   a   party's  pleading  or  has  not  been  objected  to  by  the  adverse   party.   or   subsequent   extraneous   terms   averred   by   the   party   seeking   to   introduce  parol  evidence.  explain   or  add  to  the  terms  of  the  agreement[.   varying  the  purport  of  the  written  contract.  respondent  Kimwa.  Servacio."     This   rule   is   animated   by   a   perceived   wisdom   in   deferring   to   the   contracting   parties'   articulated   intent.  That  is.)   bought   from   Juan  Abrea  and  R  i  c  a  r  t  e  A  g  u  d  o  n  g  t  w  o  p  a  r  c  e  l  s  o  f  l   a  n  d.   employing   specific   —   frequently.  Further.   RULING:   Petitioners'   contention   that   the   Deeds   of   Sale   indicating   the   name   of   Dalisay.   lest   such   hauling   be   rendered   impossible   by   the   rechanneling   of   petitioner   Lucia   Paras'   permitted   area.   In   fine.  initiated   with  the  RTC  a  Complaint  for  Annulment  of  Deeds  of  Sale   and   Reconveyance   with   prayer   for   Preliminary   Injunction   and   Temporary   Restraining   Order.   Inc.   Patricia.   The   rule   excluding   extrinsic   73   .   reduction   to   written   form.   .   Likewise.  an  exceptional   case  allowing  admission  of  parol  evidence.   Sr.   regardless   of   the   formalities   observed.  it  must  be  relevant.  coming  from  a  party  who  has  an  interest  in  the  outcome   of   the   case.   and   second.   Sr.   (Dalisay.   729-­‐A   to   petitioner   Silvano   B.   Dalisay.  thus."  or  "failure  to  express  the   true   intent   of   the   parties.  for  herself  and  in  her  capacity  as  special   administratrix  of  the  testate  estate  of  Dalisay.   Jr.   Petitioner.   or   contradiction   of.   it   is   evident   that   the   crux   of   petitioners   Spouses   Paras'   Complaint   is   their   assertion   that   the   Agreement   "entered   into   .   the   parcels   of   land   were   leased  by  Dalisay.   In   1981.   This   assertion   is   the   very   foundation   of   petitioners'  having  come  to  court  for  relief.   Jr.   two   (2)   things   must   be   established   for   parol   evidence   to   be   admitted:   first.  tending  to  "induce  belief  in   [the]   existence"   44   of   the   flaw.   Provided   that   a   party   puts   in   issue   in   its   pleading   any   of   the   four   (4)   items   enumerated   in   the   second   paragraph   of   Rule   130.     Gaje vs Vda.   it   is   equally   imperative  that  the  parol  evidence  sought  to  be  introduced   points  to  the  conclusion  proposed  by  the  party  presenting   it."   Nevertheless.   having   been   appointed   as   administratrix.     The  Deeds  of  Sale  indicated  the  name  of  Desiderio   Dalisay.  "a  party  may  present  evidence  to  modify.)   as   vendee   per   instructions   of   Dalisay.   1995.   .   (Dalisay.   through  its  Answer.Y.   sold   Lot   No.     The  courts  a  quo  ruled  in  favor  of  the  respondent.  .   true   intent.   Spoken   words   could   be   notoriously   unreliable   unlike   a   written  contract  which  speaks  of  a  uniform  language.   as   vendee   is   the   best   evidence   to   prove   his   ownership   of   the   parcels   of   land   does   not   hold   water.   Jr.   on   even   date.   Gaje   (Gaje).   ISSUE:   WON  the  CA  gravely  erred  in  affirming  in  toto  the   ruling   of   the   trial   court   stating   that   the   parcel   of   land   belonged  to  Dalisay  Sr.   is   not   as   reliable   as   written   or   documentary   evidence.   depending   exclusively   on   human   memory."  "imperfection.  TIADCc     In   sum.     Per   this   rule.  to  Davao  Premier  Fruits  Corporation.   Section  9.   maintained  possession  of  the  two  parcels  of  land  from  the   date  of  sale  in  1973  until  his  death  in  1989.  Sr.  to  be   used   as   a   site   for   the   installation   of   the   water   pump   and   reservoir  of  the  said  water  system.]"     Apart   from   pleading   these   exceptions.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     parties'   supposed   understanding   that   the   quantity   of   aggregates  allotted  in  favor  of  respondent  Kimwa  must  be   hauled   by   May   15.   they   are   deemed   to   have   done   so   meticulously   and   carefully.  They  became   part   of   the   landholdings   of   Desidal   Fruits.   is   not   party   to   the   Deeds   of   Sale.   729-­‐F   to   Emilio   C.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Jr.   the   Complaint   prayed   for   the   declaration   of   nullity   of   the   Deeds   of   Sale   executed  by  Dalisay.  in  favor  of  Gaje  and  Mellonida.   the   former   sold   Lot   No.   Sr.  Sr.   however.   for   expediency   and   convenience.  Inc.   In   the   case   at   bar.  This  is.  .   that   the   parol   evidence   sought   to   be   presented   serves   to   form   the   basis   of   the   conclusion   proposed  by  the  presenting  party.     Petitioner   Dalisay.

  he   did   not   further   insist   upon   the   incorporation   of   said   agreement   into   this   document.   In   course   of   the   negotiations   an   obstacle   was   encountered   in   the   fact   that   the   lease   of   Zacarias   Robles   still   had   over   two   years   to   run.   Felix   Robles.   1918.   which   was   the   original   term.   and   the   children   of   a   deceased   daughter.   by   Severiano   Lizarraga  to  the  plaintiff.   the   widow   of   Dalisay.  2015-­‐2016   evidence  in  the  construction  of  writings  is  inapplicable  in  a   case   where   one   of   the   parties   to   the   case   is   a   stranger   to   the   contract.000.   Shortly   thereafter   Zacarias   Robles.   Magdalena   Robles.   at   the   same   time  calling  the  attention  of  the  plaintiff  to  the  fact  that  the   plaintiff   was   already   debtor   to   the   house   of   Lizarraga   Hermanos   in   the   amount   of   P49.   the   defendant   undertook   to   pay   for   the   improvements   which   the   plaintiff   had   placed   on   the   hacienda  and  take  over  at  a  fair  valuation   The   plaintiff   introduced   in   evidence   a   letter   (Exhibit   D).Y.   74   .   Purificacion   Robles.   for   which   the   firm   had   no   security.  parents   of  the  present  plaintiff.   believing   that   the   agreement   with   respect   to   compensation   would   be   carried   out   in   good   faith.  Upon  the  death  of   Zacarias  Robles.   written   on   March   1.   and   he   says   that   upon   his   calling   attention   to   this.   in   part.   FACTS:   This   action   was   instituted   in   the   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Occidental   Negros   by   Zacarias   Robles   against   Lizarraga   Hermanos.   thus.   a   mercantile   partnership   organized   under  the  laws  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  in  which  reference  is  made  to  an   appraisal  and  liquidation.   It   was   stipulated   that   any   permanent  improvements  necessary  to  the  cultivation  and   exploitation  of  the  hacienda  should  be  made  at  the  expense   of   the   lessee   without   right   to   indemnity   at   the   end   of   the   term.  except  in  fixing   the   date   when   the   lease   should   end.  for  the  purpose  of   recovering   compensation   for   improvements   made   by   the   plaintiff   upon   the   hacienda   "Nahalinan"   and   the   value   of   implements   and   farming   equipment   supplied   to   the   hacienda  by  the  plaintiff.   and   terminating   at   the   end   of   the   milling   season   in   May.   and   share   in   the  estate  of  their  deceased  mother.   instead   of   in   May.   is   a   stranger   to   the   said   Deeds   of   Sale.  she   leased   the   hacienda   to   the   plain-­‐   tiff.  1918.  several  years  ago. defendant-appellant.  as  well  as  damages  for  breach  of   contract.  Zacarias  Robles.  he  saw  that  in  the  sixth  paragraph  it  was   declared  that  the  plaintiff's  lease  should  subsist  only  until   June   30.  leaving  as  heirs  Zacarias  Robles   (the   plaintiff).   and   can   be   deemed   competent  to  defeat  the  deed.   in   consideration   of   the   shortening   of   the   period   of   the   lease   by   nearly   two   years.   and   Evarista   Robles   acquired   by   purchase   the   shares   of   their   coheirs   in   the   entire   inheritance.  sr.   1915. vs.   Sr.   Nor   was   the   supposed   agreement  otherwise  reduced  to  writing.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   1917."   nor   as   including   any   of   his   rights   in   or   to   the   property   conveyed   other   than   those   which   he   possessed   in   the   character   of   heir. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS.     No   reference   is   made   in   this   conveyance   to   the   surrender  of  the  plaintiff's  rights  as  lessee.   Patricia.   Zacarias   Robles.  and  at  this  juncture  Lizarraga  Hermanos  came   forward  with  a  proposal  to  buy  from  these  three  all  of  the   property  belonging  to  the  Robles  estate.   the   hacienda   "Nahalinan.  his  widow  Anastacia   de  la  Rama  was  appointed  administratrix  of  his  estate.     Three   years   before   the   lease   was   to   expire..   Upon   this   manifestation   the   plaintiff   subsided.   the   representative   of   the   defendant   explained   that   this   was   unnecessary   in   view   of   the   confidence   existing   between   the   parties.     It  will  be  noted  that  the  three  grantors  in  the  deed   conveyed   only   their   several   rights. plaintiffappellee.   What  was  conveyed  by  the  plaintiff  is  not  defined   as   being.   nor   is   anything   said   concerning   the   improvements   or   the   property   of   a   personal   nature   which   the   plaintiff   had   placed   on   the   hacienda.   and.     Hacienda   "Nahalinan. The   plaintiff   says   that.   Evarista   Robles.   while   at   the   same   time   the   promise   of   the   defendant   to   compensate   for   him   for   the   improvements   and  to  purchase  the  existing  crop.   It   was   accordingly   proposed  that  he  should  surrender  the  last  two  years  of  his   lease   and   permit   Lizarraga   Hermanos   to   take   possession   as  purchaser  in  June.   Jose   Robles.   The   plaintiff   agreed   to   the   proposal   that   the   Rheland  S.     ZACARIAS ROBLES.   when   the   instrument   was   presented  to  him.  Servacio.   1920.  This  letter  is  relied  upon  by  the   plaintiff   as   constituting   written   evidence   of   the   agreement.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     defendant  would  pay  him  the  value  of  all  betterments  that   he  had  made  on  the  hacienda  and  furthermore  to  purchase   from   him   all   that   belonged   to   him   personally   on   the   hacienda   in   consideration   for   his   surrender   of   the   unexpired  term  of  the  lease  and  subsequently  executed  an   instrument  of  conveyance.   Jose   Robles..  together  with  the  cattle   and   other   things.   1920."   belonged   originally   to   the   spouses  Zacarias  Robles  and  Anastacia  de  la  Rama.   the   trial   court   properly   admitted   extrinsic   evidence   adduced   by   respondent   against   its   efficacy.   for   the  period  of  six  years  beginning  at  the  end  of  the  milling   season   in   May.   Anastacia  de  la  Rama  died.   was   wanting.     RULING:   We   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   preponderance   of   the  evidence  supports  the  contention  of  the  plaintiff  —  and   the   finding   of   the   trial   court   —   to   the   effect   that.   interest.

   FACTS:   Petitioners  Wilfredo  and  Angela  Amoncio  entered   into   a   contract   of   lease   with   a   certain   Ernesto   Garcia.     RTC   gave   credence   to   respondent's   version   and   dismissed   petitioners'   case   for   lack   of   factual   and   legal   basis.   he   and   petitioner   Wilfredo   Amoncio   agreed   to   construct   five   commercial   buildings   on   petitioners'   property.   and   a   vendor   of   realty   may   show   by   parol   evidence   that   crops   growing   on   the   land   were   reserved.   Shortly   thereafter.   However.  According  to  petitioners.  But   we   believe   that   the   contract   is   otherwise   proved   by   oral   testimony.   and   a   written   contract   were   really   necessary.  m.  According   to   him. petitioners.   Nothing   is   said   concerning   the   rights   in   the   hacienda   which   the   plaintiff   had   acquired   by   lease   or   concerning  the  things  that  he  had  placed  thereon  by  way  of   improvement   or   had   acquired   by   purchase.  in  the  absence  of   accident.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     or  inducement. vs.   petitioners   likewise   contended   the   trial   court   disregarded   the   parol   evidence   rule   which   disallowed  the  court  from  looking  into  any  other  evidence   relating  to  the  agreement  of  the  parties  outside  the  written   75   ."     It   has   accordingly   been   held   that.  They  also  agreed  that   he  was  to  finance  the  construction  and  petitioners  were  to   pay  him  for  the  two  buildings  assigned  to  them.  2015-­‐2016   but   it   seems   to   us   so   vague   that.     There   is   no   rule   of   evidence   of   wider   application   than   that   which   declares   extrinsic   evidence   inadmissible   either  to  contradict  or  vary  the  terms  of  a  written  contract.     On   appeal.   and   all   the   authorities   are   agreed   that   proof   is   admissible   of   any   collateral.   notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  deals  with  related  matters.   if   it   stood   alone.Y.  stayed  on  until   June  8.  One  of  the  buildings  was  to  go  to  Garcia.     The   execution   of   a   contract   in   writing   is   deemed   to   supersede   all   oral   negotiations   or   stipulations   concerning   its   terms   and   the   subject-­‐matter   which   preceded  the  execution  of  the  instrument.   regardless   of   whether   or   not   the   written   agree-­‐   ment   contains   any   reference   to   such   collateral   agreement.   and   it   is   a   collateral   to   the   written   contract.     Petitioners  filed  in  the  RTC  of  Quezon  City  a  case   for   recovery   of   possession   of   real   property   against   respondent.  fraud  or  mistake  of  fact     But   it   is   recognized   that   this   rule   is   to   be   taken   with   proper   qualifications.   m.  Servacio.   Petitioners  entered  into  another  contract  of  lease.  petitioners  claimed  they  discovered  respondent   putting  up  improvements  on  another  120  sq.  portion  of   their   property   which   was   never   leased   to   him   nor   to   Garcia.   Respondent   added   he   was   to   pay   the   rentals   for   five   years   and   surrender   the   buildings   (on   his   leased   portion)   to   petitioners   after   the   lapse   of   said   period.   "The   rule   excluding   parol   evidence   to   vary   or   contradict  a  writing  does  not  extend  so  far  as  to  preclude   the   admission   of   extrinsic   evidence   to   show   prior   or   contemporaneous  collateral  parol  agreements  between  the   parties.   in   June   2000.   portion  of  the  same  property.  respondent  stopped   paying   his   monthly   rentals   in   December   1999.  2000.   They   added   he   had   also   occupied   Garcia's   portion   immediately  after  the  latter  left.  In  the  case  before  us  the  written  contract  is   complete   in   itself.   the   lessee   may   prove   an   independent  verbal  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  landlord   to   put   the   leased   premises   in   a   safe   condition.   the   oral   agreement   is   also   complete   in   itself.  The  rule  that  a   preliminary   or   contemporaneous   oral   agreement   is   not   admissible  to  vary  a  written  contract  appears  to  have  more   particular   reference   to   the   obligation   expressed   in   the   written   agreement.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.     In   this   connection   stress   is   placed   upon   the   fact   that  there  is  no  allegation  in  the  complaint  that  the  written   contract  fails  to  express  the  agreement  of  the  parties.   parol   agreement   that   is   not   inconsistent   with   the   terms   of   the   written  contract.   and   whether   the   action  is  at  law  or  in  equity.   and   the   rule   has   never   been   interpreted  as  being  applicable  to  matters  of  consideration   Rheland  S.     Cases  47-­‐52   SPOUSES WILFREDO and ANGELA AMONCIO.   though   no   such   reservation  was  made  in  the  deed  of  conveyance     In   the   case   before   us   the   deed   of   conveyance   purports  to  transfer  to  the  defendant  only  such  interests  in   certain   properties   as   had   come   to   the   conveyors   by   inheritance.  though  it  may  relate  to  the  same  subject-­‐ matter.   in   case   of   a   w   ritten   contract   of   lease. AARON GO BENEDICTO.  Respondent.   he   vacated   the   premises   after   he   and  petitioners  could  no  longer  settle  things  amicably.  on  the  other  hand.  this  time   with   respondent   Aaron   Go   Benedicto   over   a   240   sq.   and   evidence   of   such   verbal   contract   is   admissible  under  the  doctrine  above  stated.   The   verbal   contract   which   the   plaintiff   has   established   in   this   case   is   therefore   clearly   independent   of   the   main   contract   of   conveyance.     Garcia   pre-­‐terminated   his   contract   with   petitioners.   it   could   not   be   taken  as  sufficient  proof  of  the  agreement  in  question.  two  to   petitioners  and  the  last  two  to  him.     respondent   denied   petitioners'   accusations   and   alleged  that  it  was  them  who  owed  him  money.   but   such   evidence   may   be   received. respondent.

  a   party   may   present   evidence   to   modify.]   But   it   is   evident   that   [petitioners]   have   chosen   to   adopt   inconsistent   positions  which.  Garcia  at  the  cost  of  P300.   .   or   the   parties   fail   to   agree   on   the   terms   of   the   contract.   or   where   the   document   is   manifestly   incomplete   as   the   parties   do   not   intend   to   exhibit   the   whole   agreement   but  only  to  define  some  of  its  terms.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  EDATSC     The  term  "agreement"  shall  include  wills.  by  applicable  jurisprudence.   .  2015-­‐2016   contract   between   them.   It   also   covers  cases  where  the  parties  commit  a  mutual  mistake  of   fact.   [Respondent]   testified   that   two   units   thereof   were   intended   for   [petitioners].   imperfection  in  the  written  agreement.   We   agree   with   the   trial   court:   IADaSE     .  Said  the  Court  in  this  regard:   The  doctrine  of  estoppel  prohibits  a  party   from  assuming  inconsistent  position  based  on  the   principle   of   election.       The   present   case   does   not   appear   to   fall   under   any   of   the   given   exceptions.   Thus.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     the  contract  is  so  obscure  that  the  contractual  intention  of   the  parties  cannot  be  understood  by  mere  inspection  of  the   instrument.   explain   or   add   to   the   terms   of   the   written  agreement  if  he  puts  in  issue  in  his  pleading:   (a)   An   intrinsic   ambiguity.   the   Court   cannot   be   unmindful   of   [petitioner   Wilfredo   Amoncio's   denial   by   any   knowledge   of   the   whole   construction   undertaken   by   herein   [respondent.  .   undertook   the   construction   subject   hereof.000.   In   this   case.   .  And  we  find  it   difficult   to   ignore   them.   a   party   to   a   contract   may   prove   the   existence   of   any   separate   oral   agreement   as   to  any  matter  which  is  not  inconsistent  with  its  terms.     .  it  is  considered  as  containing  all  the  terms  agreed   upon   and   there   can   be.   .   indeed.  .     The   fourth   exception   involves   a   situation   where   the  due  execution  of  the  contract  or  document  is  in  issue.   [T]hat   [respondent].  Section  9  of  the  Rules  of  Court  provides:     Section   9.     (c)  The  validity  of  the  written  agreement.   mistake   or   (b)   The   failure   of   the   written   agreement   to   express   the   true   intent   and   agreement   of   the   parties   thereto.   The  wordings  are  so  defective  that  what  the  author  of  the   document   intended   to   say   cannot   be   deciphered.   is   not   disputed   by   [petitioners].   no   evidence   of   such   terms   other   than   the   contents  of  the  written  agreement.00  per  unit  or   for  a  total  budget  of  P1.   However.   and   precludes   him   from   repudiating   an   obligation   voluntarily   assumed   after   having   accepted   benefits   therefrom.   the   rule   is   not   absolute   and   admits  of  exceptions:     xxx   xxx   xxx  However.  ITHADC     xxx   xxx   xxx  The   so-­‐called   "parol   evidence"   forbids   any  addition  to  or  contradiction  of  the  terms     of   a   written   instrument   by   testimony   purporting   to   show   that.  .   Under   the   aforecited   rule.   extrinsic   proof   of   its   subject   matter.   the   court  believes  that  the  document  does  not  convey  entirely   the  whole  of  the  parties'  transaction.   the   parol   evidence   rule   does   not   apply   where   the   purpose   of   introducing   the   evidence   is   to   show   the   invalidity   of   the   contract.   RULING:   Rule  130.   Evidence   of   written   agreements.  or     (d)  The  existence  of  other  terms  agreed  to  by  the   parties  or  their  successors  in  interest  after  the  execution  of   the  written  agreement.   at   or   before   the   signing   of   the   document.   —   When   the   terms   of   the   agreement   have   been   reduced   in   writing.5  million.     Under   the   third   exception.   other   terms   were   orally   agreed   on   by   the   parties.   between   the   parties   and   their   successors.  .  This   may   be   done   if.     Evidence   further   disclosed   that   the   [b]uilding  [p]ermit  issued  therefor  by  the  Building   Official  bore  the  signature  of  [petitioner]  Wilfredo   Amoncio  .   CA   affirmed   the   RTC's   decision   and  dismissed  petitioners'  appeal.  Servacio.   another   two   units   for   him   and   one   for  .  [are]   barred.   To   countenance   such   repudiation   would   be   contrary   to   equity   and   would   put   a   premium   on   fraud   and   76   .     The  first  exception  applies  when  the  ambiguity  or   uncertainty  is  readily  apparent  from  reading  the  contract.     ISSUE:   WON   CA   gravely   erred   in   ruling   that   petitioners  waived  their  right  to  respondent's  assertion  of   facts  that  were  not  embodied  in  the  lease  contract.   This   includes   cases   where   a   party   alleges   that   no   written   contract   ever   existed.   there   are   tell-­‐tale   signs   that   petitioners   and   respondent   had   other   agreements   aside   from  those  established  by  the  lease  contract.   or   there   is   no   consideration   for   such   agreement.Y.   from   the   circumstances   of   the   case.   of   the   relation   of   the   parties   and   of   the   circumstances   surrounding   them   when   they   entered   into   the   contract   may  be  received  as  evidence.   However.   the   terms   of   the   written   contract   are   conclusive   upon   the   parties   and   evidence   aliunde   is   inadmissible   to   vary   an   enforceable   agreement   embodied   in   the   document.   The   second   exception   includes   instances   where   Rheland  S.

  where   the   qualifying   phrases   "working   capacity"   and   "producing   capacity"   are   specifically"  mentioned.   and   also   used   figuratively.  Under  the  first  view.   En   el   vaso   se   debe   atender   la   disposicion   y   capacidad.   only   did   so   in  express  connection  with  the  name  and  description  of  the   machine   as   illustrated   in   the   catalogue.  and  these  describe  a  capacity  of  6.   of   Manila.     Moreover.     Appellant   would   require   that   all   the   terms   of   the   contract   be   given   effect   with   special   emphasis   upon   the   phrase  "de  un  grado  de  96-­‐97  Gay  Lussac.  petitioners  also  failed  to  make  a  timely   objection   against   respondent's   assertion   of   their   prior   agreement   on   the   construction   of   the   buildings.   etc.   to   the   surrounding   circumstances.   action   for   damages   for   breach  of  contract  was  begun     It  is  around  the  first  clause  of  the  contract  (Exhibit   D)  that  all  the  argument  centers. defendant-appellee.  or  to   which   it   relates.  Wilson  &  Co.  we  can  go.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     word   "capacity"   may   have   different   meanings   unless   restricted   in   terminology.000  and  P40.   but   on   the   contrary   only   something  over  480  liters  a  day  or  rectified  alcohol  of  the   required  grade.  .  while   mentioning  a  capacity  of  6.   The   agent   of   Wilson   &   Co.  that  a  machine  capable  of  producing   6.  .000  liters  of   jus  (ferment).  and  chapter  X   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure.   Stone   ([1891]   140   U.   the   Rheland  S.  Wilson  &  co.   or   to   explain   an   intrinsic   ambiguity.   through   its   manager   Carlos   Palanca.000   liters   of   alcohol   a   day.  book  IV  of  the  Civil  Code.   In   order   to   reach   a   proper   conclusion   as   to   the   meaning   of   clause   one   of   the   contract.   647).   FACTS:   Song   Fo   &   Co..   squarely   contradicted  this  on  the  stand  and  said  that  Palanca  asked   him  to  get  a  price  on  an  apparatus  to  treat  6.  como   el   de   una   vasija.   did   not   produce   6.   Five   months   after   the   machine   was   installed.   nevertheless   "does   not   exclude   other   evidence   of   the   circumstances  under  which  the  agreement  was  made. plaintiffappellant.   petitioners   waived  the  protection  of  the  parol  evidence  rule.   to   evidence  of  the  circumstances  under  which  the  agreement   was  made.000   liters   of   raw   material   a   day.  and   now   the   successor   of   the   company.   vs.   London.   we   approach   the   subject  from  two  directions.     We   think.   entered   into   a   contract   with   Fred   Wilson   &   Co..   the   ship's   capacity   is   1.000  liters.  Section   285   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure   to   contain   all   the   terms.   Where   a   party   entitled   to   the   benefit   of   the   parol   evidence   rule   allows  such  evidence  to  be  received  without  objection.   Schon   &   Co...  we  take   up  the  meaning  of  the  words  themselves.  he   cannot.  2015-­‐2016   misrepresentation  .   that   the   rectifying   machine   had   been   examined   by   a   number   of   competent   persons   who   stated   that  the  machine  was  not  capable  of  producing  the  amount   of  alcohol  stipulated  in  the  contract.     ISSUE:   Lalis   sila   kay   ingon   ang   plaintiff   the   apparatus   can’t   “produce”   6.  Servacio."   The   ordinary   meaning   of   the   Spanish   equivalent   "capacidad"   as   disclosed  by  the  Spanish  dictionaries  is  "ambito  que  tiene   alguna  cosa  y  es  suficiente  para  contener  en  si  otra..  with  plans  and  specifications  of  the  distilling   apparatus..   as   the   keg   has   a   capacity   of   10   gallons.   carrying   power   or   space.   arca.   RULING:   In   connection   with   the   distilling   of   liquor.   1913.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.000   liters   a   day.   said   of   that   within   which   any   solid   or   fluid   may   be   placed.  Under  the  second   believing  that  it  is  necessary  to  explain  intrinsic  ambiguity   in  the  contract.000   liters   of   alcohol   per   24   hour  work.  it  was  stated  during  the  trial.000.   with   the   description   in   the   maker's   catalogue.   we   find  the  following:  Wilson  &  Co.000   tons. vs.   that   it   can   be   laid   down   as   a   premise   for   further   discussion   that   there   is   intrinsic   ambiguity  in  the  contract  which  needs  explanation.000   liters   or   rectified   alcohol   every   24   hours   from   nipa   ferment  would  cost  between  P35.   especially   section   285.   however.  in  their  offer  to  Song  Fo  &   Co.000  liters  per  day.   is   disclosed   by   the   decision   of   the   United   States   Supreme   Court   in   Chicago   Distilling   Co.  respondent  on  the  other  hand  said  that.     CARLOS PALANCA.   while   mentioning   capacity.   by   failing   to   object   to   respondent's   testimony   in   the   trial   court.   after   the   trial   has   closed   and   the   case   has   been   decided   against   him.  Getting  no  satisfaction   from   the   reply   of   Wilson   &   Co.'s  order  to  manufacturer.   that   he   need   a   machine   that   would   produce   at   least   6.  finally.  And.   cubic   extent.   James   F.   Palanca   wrote   Wilson   &   Co.   in   question   77   ."   Both   definitions   denote   that   which  anything  can  receive  or  contain.   on   June   9.  the  manager  of  Song  Fo  &  Co.   ordered   the   apparatus   of   Turner.  while  it   could   treat   6.   They   furnished   Song  Fo  &  Co.000   liters   per   day   and   produces  an  alcohol  grade  96-­‐97  Gay  Lussac.     We  believe  in  the  first  place. FRED WILSON & CO.   Hence.  and  it   has  not  been  denied.  The  ordinary  meaning  of  the  word   is  defined  in  the  English  Dictionaries  as  "ability  to  receive   or   contain.  that  it  is  undeniable   from  the  evidence.  for  the  purchase  of  a  distilling  apparatus.  does  so  again   in   connection.     Carlos  Palanca..  as  we  are  permitted  to  do  under   chapter  IV  title  II."   Turning.   Loader.Y..   therefore.  it  has   complied   with   the   terms   of   the   agreement   because   the   apparatus   has   the   “capacity”   of   6.  that  the  apparatus  in  question.   invoke   the   rule   in   order   to   secure   a   reversal   of   the   judgment.   testified   that   he   told   the   agents   of   Wilson   &   Co.   S.     We   are   accordingly   constrained   to   hold   that   the   proper   construction   of   clause   1   of   the   contract.

  plaintiffs   entered   into   a   contract   of   conditional   sale   with   one   Pedro   del   Rosario   covering   a   parcel   of   land   in   Quezon   City   described   in   Transfer   Certificate   of   Title   No.00   per   square   meter   on   condition  that  she  will  assume  the  payment  of  P50.00   was   advanced   by   defendant   as   her   contribution   to   the   construction   of   the   roads   which   plaintiffs   assumed   to   undertake   "in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the   City   Ordinance   of   Quezon   City.00  per  square  meter.056.   Ramos. ET AL.00   per   square   meter.  such  commitment  was  not   included   in   the   contract   because   the   ordinance   aforesaid   was  already  deemed  to  be  part  of  the  contract.000.000.  together  with  defendant  Socorro   A.   all   the   improvements   introduced   by   him   would  automatically  become  part  of  the  property  without   any  right  on  his  part  to  reimbursement  and  the  conditional   sale  would  be  rescinded.   To   guarantee   the   performance   of   the   conditions   stipulated   therein   a   performance   bond   in   the   amount   of   P100.000   liters   every   24   hours   of   work   and   of   producing   alcohol   of   a   grade  96-­‐97  Gay  Lussac.   type   C   (Agricola).Y.   and   in   order   to   avoid   court   litigation. SOCORRO A.   were   to   furnish   Song   Fo   &   Co.  1956  with  the  condition  that.   plaintiffs   allowed   defendant   to   buy   20   of   the   lots   herein   involved   at   the   rate   of   P16.   1956.   11483   which   has   a   total   area   of   77.   He   undertook   to   pay   for   the   subdivision   survey.     Unable  to  pay  the  consideration  of  P600.   as   claimed   by   defendant.  upon  his  failure  to  pay  said   price   when   due. RAMOS.  and  the  income  tax  plaintiffs  may  be  required  to   pay   arising   from   the   transaction.     Plaintiffs.00   appearing   in   the   deed   of   sale.  Servacio.   is   that   Wilson   &   Co. plaintiffs-appellants.   To   release   the   performance   bond   and   to   enable   defendant   to   pay   some   of   the   lots   for   her   own   purposes.00   was   executed   by   Pedro   del   Rosario.   FACTS:   The   evidence   of   record   discloses   the   following   facts:   On   November   6.000..  that  when  the  sale  in  question  was  being   negotiated   the   construction   of   roads   in   the   prospective   subdivision   must   have   been   uppermost   in   the   mind   of   defendant  for  her  purpose  in  purchasing  the  property  was   to   develop   it   into   a   subdivision.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     undertake   to   construct   the   roads   that   may   be   required   in   the   subdivision   subject   of   the   sale   on   or   before   January.000.   as   the   court  a  quo  did.   capable   of   receiving   or   treating   6.   the   whole   obligation   became   due   and   demandable   thus   giving   plaintiffs   the   right   to   foreclose   the   mortgage   in   accordance   with  law.   in   consideration   of   which   Del   Rosario   was   allowed   to   buy   the   property   for   P600.772   square   meters   in   consideration   of   a   purchase   price   of   P10.   a   distilling   apparatus.   the   construction   of   roads.   entered   into   a   contract   of   rescission   on   November   24.00.   on   the   other   hand.   the   installation   of   light   and  water.   Del   Rosario   was   given   possession  of  the  land  for  development  as  a  subdivision  at   his   expense.   and   that.     It  is  argued  that  the  court  a  quo  erred  in  allowing   the   presentation   of   parole   evidence   to   prove   that   a   78   .   upon   the   suggestion  of  plaintiffs'  counsel. defendant-appellee.   That   such   requirement   was  uppermost  in  the  mind  of  defendant  is  proven  by  the   execution   by   the   plaintiffs   of   the   so   called   "Explanation"   (Exhibit  3)  on  the  very  day  the  deed  of  sale  was  executed   wherein   it   was   stated   that   the   sum   of   P50.  2015-­‐2016   in   connection   with   the   conduct   of   the   parties   and   surrounding   circumstances.   as   described   on   page   30   of   the   maker's   catalogue.   And   so   it   is   correct   to   presume.000.       ISSUES:   WON   the   action   for   foreclosure   of   mortgage  filed  by  the  petitioner  was  premature   RULING:   We  find  no  error  in  the  conclusion  reached  by  the   court  a  quo  for  indeed  that  is  the  condition  to  be  expected   by   a   person   who   desires   to   purchase   a   big   parcel   of   land   for   purposes   of   subdivision.00  within  a  period  of  two  years  from  November   6.     Defendant   contends   that   the   contract   of   sale   Exhibit   A   does   not   express   the   true   agreement   of   the   parties  because  certain  important  conditions  agreed  upon   were   not   included   therein   by   plaintiffs'   counsel   among   which  is  the  promise  assumed  by  plaintiffs  that  they  would   Rheland  S.   RODRlGO ENRIQUEZ.   plaintiffs  and  Del  Rosario.   This   situation   led  to  the  execution  of  the  contract  of  sale  Exhibit  A  subject   of  the  present  foreclosure  proceedings.   In   a   subdivision   the   main   improvement   to   be   undertaken   before   it   could   be   sold   to   the   public   is   feeder   roads   as   otherwise   it   would   be   inaccessible   and   valueless   and   would   offer   no   attraction   to   the   buying   public.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.00   should   be   deducted   from   the   purchase   price   of   P235.   and   this   is   a   clear   indication   that   the   real   purchase   price   is   only   P185.   1959.00   as   her   share   in   the   construction   of   roads   and   other   improvements   required   in   the   subdivision.   that   said   condition   was   not   placed   in   the   contract   because   plaintiffs'   counsel   said   that   it   was   a   superfluity   inasmuch   as   there   was   then   in   Quezon   City   an   ordinance   which   requires   the   construction   of   roads   in   a   subdivision   before   the   lots   therein   could   be   sold.   dispute   the   above   contention  arguing  that  there  was  no  such  oral  agreement   or   understanding   because   all   that   was   agreed   upon   between  the  parties  was  already  expressed  and  included  in   the  contract  of  sale  Exhibit  A  executed  between  the  parties   and   since   defendant   failed   to   pay   the   balance   of   her   obligation   within   the   period   stipulated.   who   turned   out   to   be   a   partner   of   the   latter."   It   is   to   be   noted   that   said   document  specifically  states  that  the  amount  of  P50.   which   would   approximately   be   the   price   of   the   entire   area   of   the   land   at   the  rate  of  P16. vs.000.000.00  as   agreed   upon.   1958.

 regardless  of  whether  or  not  the   written   agreement   contains   reference   to   such   collateral   79   ..   admitted   the   execution   of   the   two   promissory   notes. defendants-appellees.   but   contended   that   the   same   had   been   novated   by   a   subsequent   agreement   contained   in   a   letter   (Exh.   does   not   extend   so   far   as   to   preclude   the   admission   of   extrinsic   evidence.   Manager.  which.   Board   of   Liquidators   of   the   LASADECO.   with   the   understanding   that   upon   non-­‐payment   of   the   substantial   amount.   but   such   evidence  may  be  received.   and   since   the   complaint   was   filed   on   February   20.   to   coincide   with   their   ramie   harvest   "provided   that   they   will   make   a   substantial   down   payment   immediately.   was   one   of   the   exceptions   to   the   parol   evidence   rule.   contained  in  Exhibit  L.  Guinto  and  Kintanar.  Legal  Officer   Rheland  S.     ISSUE:   WON   the   court   a   quo   erred   in   excluding   parol   evidence.).   upon   the   objection   of   the   counsel   for   defendants.   in   their   Answer.   but   contended   that   the   same   did   not   express   the   true   intent   and   agreement   of   the   parties.   there  is  nothing  to  which  to  apply  the  excluding  rule.   giving   the   defendant   Salud   C. GARCIA.   it   follows   that   their  action  is  premature  as  found  by  the  court  a  quo.  in  the  pleadings.  the  same  may  be  the   subject   of   parole   evidence   (Idem.   The   defendants.   they   claimed   that   the   action   was   premature   and   prayed   that   the   complaint   be   dismissed.  such   may   be   established   by   parol   evidence.   FACTS:   This  is  an  action  for  specific  performance  filed  by   the  petitioner  for  the  unpaid  balance  from  the  purchase  of   tractors  by  the  latter  from  the  former.   The   fact   that   such   failure   has   been   put   in   issue   in   this   case   is   patent   in   the   answer   wherein   defendant   has   specifically   pleaded   that   the   contract   of   sale   in   question   does   not   express   the   true   intent  of  the  parties  with  regard  to  the  construction  of  the   roads.  within  which  the  Garcia  spouses  pay  their  account.   The   plaintiff   in   the   reply   and   answer   to   the   counterclaim.   showing   that   they   were   indebted   to   said   plaintiff.   the   defendant   admitted   all   the   documentary   evidence   adduced   by   the   plaintiffs.   tending   to   prove   the   true   intention   and   agreement   of   the   parties   and   the   existence   of   a   condition   precedent.   RULING:   The   parol   evidence   consisted   of   the   testimony   of   Attys.   knowing   that   the   subject-­‐matter   treated   therein.   to   testify   on   the   true   agreement  and  the  intention  of  the  parties  at  the  time  the   letter   (Exh.  The  rule   excluding   parol   evidence   to   vary   or   contradict   a   writing.Y.   de   Garcia   an   extension   up   to   May   31.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     of   the   Board   of   Liquidators.     At   the   trial.   was   the   condition   to   be   complied   with   or   the   consideration   given   for   the   extension   of  time.  This  rule.   L)   sent   by   Filomeno   C.  2015-­‐2016   contemporaneous   oral   agreement   was   also   reached   between   the   parties   relative   to   the   construction   of   the   roads   for   the   same   is   in   violation   of   our   rule   which   provides   that   when   the   terms   of   an   agreement   had   been   reduced   to   writing   it   is   to   be   considered   as   containing   all   that  has  been  agreed  upon  and  that  no  evidence  other  than   the   terms   thereof   can   be   admitted   between   the   parties   (Section  22. and/or SALUD GARCIA and VICENTE B.  Guinto.  Garcia  to  give  the  defendants   an   extension   of   time   to   pay   their   accounts.   ruled   out   said   testimony   and   prevented   the   introduction   of   evidence   under   the   parol   evidence  rule.   The  subject  of  agreement  alluded  to  in  the  second   paragraph   of   the   above   letter. vs .   admitted   the   due   execution   and   genuineness   of   the   letter   marked   Exhibit   L.   Atty.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  The  lower  court  dismissed  the  case.   That  there  was  such  condition  precedent  is  manifested  by   the  second  paragraph  of  the  letter  Exhibit  L.   thereby   placing   the   fact   in   issue.  Rule  123).  could  become  effective.     It   appearing   that   plaintiffs   have   failed   to   comply   with   the   condition   precedent   relative   to   the   construction   of   the   roads   in   the   subdivision   in   question. GARCIA PLANTATION CO.   for  the  simple  reason  that  there  is  no  contract  in  existence.  only  holds  true   if   there   is   no   allegation   that   the   agreement   does   not   express   the   true   intent   of   the   parties.  stating   that  the  action  was  premature.  It  should  not  have  improvidently   and   hastily   excluded   said   parol   evidence.   1957.  for  that  reason  is  a  condition  precedent.   was   drafted   and   prepared. INC.   L   for   the   defendants).   This   is   not   varying   the   terms   of   the   written   contract   by   extrinsic   agreement.   Kintanar.   within   which   to   pay   the   account.   the   lower   court..  Servacio.  ".   The   lower   court   should   have   admitted   the   parol   evidence   sought   to   be   introduced   to   prove   the   failure   of   the   document   in   question   to   express   the   true   intent   and   agreement  of  the  parties.  Lucido  A.  to  the  effect  that  in  view  of  the   plea  of  defendant  Vicente  B.   to   show   prior   or   contemporaneous   collateral   parol   agreements   between   the   parties.   before   the   extension   granted   the   defendants.   1957.   when   the  plaintiff  presented  Atty.  pre-­‐requisite  to  liability".  .  however.   When   the   operation   of   the   contract   is   made   to   depend   upon   the   occurrence   of   an   event. plaintiff-appellant.   If   there   is   and   this   claim  is  put  in  issue  in  the  pleadings.     LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION .   This   rule   does   not   prevent   the   introduction   of   extrinsic   evidence   to   show   that   a   supposed   contract   never   became   effective   by   reason   of   the   failure   of   some   collateral   condition  or  stipulation.  the  extension  shall  be  deemed  as  not  granted  and   the   LASADECO   shall   feel   free   to   seek   redress   in   court".   However.  .   1957.   Kintanar   gave   the   defendants   up   to   May   31.

  The   relationship   started   to   turn   sour   when   the   first   check   bounced.   in   favor   of   another   foreign   entity.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  Servacio.   may   admit   evidence   of   surrounding   circumstances.   FACTS:    Defendant-­‐appellant   Seaoil   purchased   one   unit   of   LC   Excavator.  the  said  plaintiff  would  have  been  able  to   show   that   because   the   defendants   had   failed   to   pay   a   substantial   down   payment.  .376.Y.   Seaoil  refused  to  pay  the  remaining  balance.   particularly   that   the   written   agreement   failed   to   express   the   true   intent   and   agreement   of   the   parties.   However.  ownership  thereof  was  to  remain  with  Autocorp   until   the   obligation   is   fully   settled.   It   was   downhill   from   thereon.  owed  money  to  Focus.   It   claims   that  Seaoil  and  Autocorp  were  only  utilized  as  conduits  to   settle   the   obligation   of   one   foreign   entity   named   Uniline   Asia   (herein   referred   to   as   Uniline).   Seaoil's   contractor.   However.     Although   parol   evidence   is   admissible   to   explain   80   .   Incorporated   (Focus  for  short).   Unsubstantiated   testimony.   Despite   repeated   demands.   from   plaintiff-­‐appellee   Autocorp.  and   although   a   document   is   usually   to   be   interpreted   in   the   precise  terms  in  which  it  is  couched.   Autocorp   refused   to   accept   the   checks   because   they   were   not   under   Seaoil's   name. vs.   petitioner   only   had   its   bare   testimony   to   back   up   the   alleged   arrangement   with   Rodriguez.  This  was  to  be  paid  by  checks  issued  by   Seaoil   but   which   in   turn   were   to   be   funded   by   checks   issued  by  Uniline.   on   the   other   hand.  in  the  exercise   of   sound   discretion.   Yu.  2015-­‐2016   agreement. respondents.   Section   9   of   the   Revised   Rules   on   Evidence  embodies  the  parol  evidence  rule.   Had   the   trial   court   permitted.   1957.  .   However.   Uniline   instead   agreed   to   convey   the   excavator  to  Focus.   offered   as   proof   of   verbal   agreements   which   tends   to   vary   the   terms   of   a   written   agreement.  in  the  second  paragraph  of  letter  Exhibit  L.   1957.   Hence.   Seaoil.   This  argument  is  untenable.   three   months   before   the   deadline   of   the   extension   on   May   31.   On   the   other   hand.   However.  Autocorp  filed   a   complaint   for   recovery   of   personal   property   with   damages  and  replevin.   in   order   to   arrive   at   the   true   intention   of   the  parties.   as   it   should.  or   contradiction   of.   never   became   effective   and   the   extension   should   be   considered   as   not   having   been   given   at   all.     ISSUE:   SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION.   on   behalf   of   Seaoil.   it   was   agreed   that   despite   delivery   of   the   excavator.  Paul  Rodriguez  (Rodriguez  for  brevity)  is   a   stockholder   and   director   of   Autocorp.   Focus   Point   International.   the   terms   of   a   written   agreement   by   testimony   or   other   evidence   purporting   to   show   that   different   terms   were   agreed   upon   by   the   parties.   issued   12   postdated   checks.     This   principle   notwithstanding.     In  the  case  at  bar.   signed   and   issued   12   postdated   checks   for   P259.   Romeo   Valera.   So   that.     It   held   that   the   transaction   between   Yu   and   Rodriguez   was   merely   verbal.     In  short.   there   would   be   no   premature   institution   of   the   case.   the   remaining   10   checks   were   not   honored   by   the  bank  since  Seaoil  requested  that  payment  be  stopped.  erred  in  dismissing  the  case.   petitioner   would   have   the   Court   rule   that   this   case   falls   within   the   exceptions.  reference  is  made  of  a  previous   agreement.   is   inadmissible  under  the  parol  evidence  rule.   the   agreement   was   breached   and   the   contract   contained   in   Exhibit   "L". AUTOCORP GROUP and PAUL Y.  Seaoil  claims  that  the  real  transaction  is   that  Uniline.   although   the   complaint   was   filed   on   February   20.   the   plaintiff  to  prove  the  condition  precedent  to  the  extension   of  the  payment.   varying   the  purport  of  the  written  contract.     Rule   130.   it   was   remedied   when   Seaoil   replaced   it   with   a   good   check.  In   lieu   of   payment.   alleges   that   the   transaction   is   not   as   simple   as   described   above.     owner   of   Uniline.   This   cannot   alter   the   sales   contract   between   Seaoil   and   Autocorp   as   this   will   run   counter   to   the   parol   evidence   rule   which   prohibits   the   introduction   of   oral   and   parol   evidence   to   modify   the   terms  of  the  contract. petitioner. RODRIGUEZ.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Whether   or   not   the   Court   of   Appeals   erred   in   partially   applying   the   parol   evidence   rule   to   prove   only   some  terms  contained  in  one  portion  of  the  document  but   disregarded   the   rule   with   respect   to   another   but   substantial   portion   or   entry   also   contained   in   the   same   document  which  should  have  proven  the  true  nature  of  the   transaction  involved.     RTC  and  CA  ruled  in  favor  of  respondents  and  that   the  transaction  between  Autocorp  and  Seaoil  was  a  simple   contract  of  sale  payable  in  installments.     RULING:   Petitioner   does   not   question   the   validity   of   the   vehicle  sales  invoice  but  merely  argues  that  the  same  does   not   reflect   the   true   agreement   of   the   parties.  .  Courts.62   each   with   Autocorp   as   payee.   He   is   also   the   Rheland  S.   therefore.   The   lower   court.  through  Rodriguez.   The  parol  evidence  rule  forbids  any  addition  to.   Furthermore.   Yu   is   the   president   and   stockholder   of   Seaoil   and   is   at   the   same   time   owner   of   Focus.

  which   are  the  properties  in  dispute  in  this  case.   but   to   Alfonso   and.     ISSUE:   Whether   the   Court   of   Appeals   is   correct   in   ruling   that  the  Deed  of  Absolute  Sale  of  25  October  1969  is  void   for   being   absolutely   fictitious   and   in   relation   therewith.   they   obtained   a   copy   of   the   Deed   of   Sale   executed   on   October   25.   Partition.   Merlinda.   Prudencia.   which   included   all   the   lands   that   were   covered   by   the   four   (4)   deeds   of   sale  that  were  previously  executed  by  Alfonso  for  taxation   purposes.   Accordingly.   Alfonso   executed   four   (4)   Deeds   of   Sale   covering   several   parcels   of   land   in   favor   of   Policronio.  Alfonso  and  four  of  his   children.   Prudencia.  as  soon  as  the   81   .   to   the   administrators   of   his   estate."     Heirs of Ureta v.   Policronio.   Vicente.   it   cannot   serve   the   purpose   of   incorporating   into   the   contract   additional   contemporaneous   conditions   which   are   not   mentioned   at   all   in   the   writing   unless   there   has   been   fraud   or   mistake.   met   at   the   house   of   Liberato.   Inocensio.  is   not   as  reliable  as  written  or  documentary  evidence.   and   Damages  against  the  Heirs  of  Alfonso.   1995.   Hence.   The   exception   obtains   only   where   "the   written   contract   is   so   ambiguous   or   obscure   in   terms   that   the   contractual   intention   of   the   parties   cannot   be   understood   from   a   mere   reading   of   the   instrument.  namely.   The   children   of   Policronio   (Heirs   of   Policronio). Heirs of Ureta   FACTS:     Alfonso  Ureta(Alfonso)  begot  14  children.   In   such   a   case.   Policronio's   eldest   son.   Narciso.   Policronio  died  on  November  22.  After  their  father's  death.   These   tenants   never   turned   over   the   produce   of   the   lands   to   Policronio   or   any   of   his   heirs.   Valeriana   Dela  Cruz.   possess   and   enjoy   the   Rheland  S.  1969  by  Alfonso  in  favor  of  Policronio.   They   are  written  memorials  of  the  details  of  the  consummation   of   contracts.   their   father   should   make   it   appear   that   he   had   sold   some   of   his   lands   to   his   children.   who   was   then   a   municipal   judge.   Francisco.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  The  RTC's  assessment  of  the  credibility  of  her   testimony   was   accorded   respect.   was   found   by   the   CA   to   be   unrebutted.   Liberato.   suggested   that   in   order   to   reduce   the   inheritance   taxes.  2015-­‐2016   the   meaning   of   a   contract.   but   vital   pieces   of   evidence   of   commercial   transactions.     The   objection   against   the   admission   of   any   evidence  must  be  made  at  the  proper  time.   Policronio.     Believing   that   the   six   parcels   of   land   belonged   to   their   late   father.   Commercial   documents   or   papers   are   those   used   by   merchants   or   businessmen   to   promote   or   facilitate  trade  or  credit  transactions.   Liberato.   Roque.   Annulment   of   Documents.   The   CA   affirmed   the   finding   of   the   RTC   that   the   Deed   of   Sale   was   void.   Liberato.   petitioner's   contention   that   the   document   falls   within   the   exception   to   the   parol   evidence   rule   is   untenable.   It   found   the   Deed   of   Sale   to   be   absolutely   simulated   as   the   parties   did   not   intend   to   be   legally  bound  by  it.   and   the   intention   of   the   parties   was   given   the   primary   consideration   in   determining  the  true  nature  of  the  contract.   and   Andres.  Servacio.   the   Heirs   of   Policronio   sought   to   amicably   settle   the   matter   with   the   Heirs   of   Alfonso.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     lands  and  their  produce.  These  documents  are   not   mere   scraps   of   paper   bereft   of   probative   value.   Wenefreda.   in   favor   of   Policronio.   may   parol   evidence   be   entertained   to   thwart   its   binding   effect  after  the  parties  have  both  died.   Francisco.   covered   six   parcels   of   land.   The  Deed  of  Sale  executed  on  October  25.   neither   Policronio   nor   his   heirs   ever   took   possession   of   the   subject   lands.  Except  for  the  said   portion   of   parcel   5.     Sometime  in  October  1969.  depending  exclusively  on  human  memory.   Earnest  efforts  proving  futile.  of   the   relations   of   the   parties   to   each   other.   and   as   such.   Prudencia.   Alfonso's   heirs   executed   a   Deed   of   Extra-­‐Judicial   Partition.   Recovery   of   Possession.   Benedicto.   extrinsic  evidence  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  contract.     The   testimony   of   Amparo   Castillo.  1969.   representing   the   Heirs   of   Policronio.   Adela.   signed   the   Deed   of   Extra-­‐Judicial   Partition  in  behalf  of  his  co-­‐heirs.   coming   from   a   party   who   has   an   interest   in   the   outcome   of   the  case.   the   rest   of   the   parcels   transferred   to   Policronio   were   tenanted   by   the   Fernandez   Family.   and   of   the   facts   and   circumstances   surrounding   them   when   they   entered   into   the   contract   may   be   received   to   enable   the   court   to   make  a  proper  interpretation  of  the  instrument.  contradict  or  defeat  the   operation  of  a  valid  contract.   later.  1974.     Alfonso   continued   to   own.   Evidence   of   a   prior   or   contemporaneous   verbal   agreement   is  generally  not  admissible  to  vary.Y.   RULING:   The  Court  finds  no  cogent  reason  to  deviate  from   the  finding  of  the  CA  that  the  Deed  of  Sale  is  null  and  void   for  being  absolutely  simulated.   On   June   15.   and   Francisco.   and   his   common-­‐law   wife.   excluded   from   the   Deed   of   Extra-­‐Judicial   Partition.   the  Heirs  of  Policronio  found  tax  declarations  in  his  name   covering   the   six   parcels   of   land.   are   opposed   to   the   rest   of   Alfonso's   children  and  their  descendants  (Heirs  of  Alfonso).   namely.  the  Heirs  of  Policronio  filed  a   Complaint   for   Declaration   of   Ownership.     The   Vehicle   Sales   Invoice   is   the   best   evidence   of   the   transaction.   Jorge.   Conrado.   as   to   the   circumstances   surrounding   the   actual   arrangement   and   agreement   between   the   parties   prior   to   the   execution   of   the   four   (4)   Deeds   of   Sale.     Except   for   a   portion   of   parcel   5.   Oral   testimony   on   the   alleged   conditions.

  The   parol   evidence   rule   excluding   evidence   aliunde.  Even  granting  that  they  did  not  object   to  her  testimony  during  trial.   Failure   to   invoke   results   to   waiver.  It  has  to  be  invoked   by   the   parties   and   must   be   invoked   seasonably.   Heirs   of   Policronio   contended   that   the   rule   on   hearsay   was   violated   when   the   testimony   of   Amparo   Castillo  was  given  weight  in  proving  that  the  subject  lands   were  only  sold  for  taxation  purposes  as  she  was  a  person   alien  to  the  contract.         IV.   It   was  alleged  that  the  Deed  of  Sale  was  only  made  to  lessen   the  payment  of  estate  and  inheritance  taxes  and  not  meant   to   transfer   ownership.     the   testimony   of   Amparo   Castillo.   still  cannot  apply  because  the  present  case  falls  under  two   exceptions  to  the  rule.   there   were   other   prevailing   circumstances  which  corroborate     Paragraphs   (b)   and   (c).   the   Heirs   of   Alfonso   are   not   precluded   from   presenting   evidence   to   modify.   respectively.   explain   or   add  to  the  terms  of  the  written  agreement.   It   is.  such  as  when  a  contract  may  be  void  for  lack  of   consideration.   thus.   In   this   case.   and   to   timely   object   to   the   testimony   of   Amparo   Castillo.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     It   has   indeed   been   held   that   hearsay   evidence   whether   objected   to   or   not   cannot   be   given   credence   for   having   no   probative   value.  Second.     Granting   that   the   Heirs   of   Policronio   timely   objected   to   the   testimony   of   Amparo   Castillo.   thus.   there   were   other   pieces   of   evidence   presented   or   there   were   other  circumstances  prevailing  to  support  the  fact  in  issue.  all  the   properties   subject   therein   were   included   in   the   Deed   of   Extra-­‐Judicial   Partition   of   the   estate   of   Alfonso.   however.   → Involves   a   series   of   commercial   transactions.     n   the   case   at   bench.  and  once  the  intent  is  clear.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   in   addition   to   the   failure   to   object   to   the   admissibility   of   the   subject   evidence.   obtained   a   credit   line   with   Manila   Banking   Corp.     v WILLEX  VS  CA     → Parties  in  this  case:   → Inter-­‐Resin  =  principal  debtor   → Manila  Bank  =  lending  bank   → IUCP  (later  Atrium  Capital  Corp)  =  surety  with  Inter-­‐ Resin  for  the  Manila  Bank  Loan  under  a  “Continuing   Surety  Agreement”   → Willex  =  guarantor  of  Inter-­‐Resin  to  pay  IUCP  for  the   money   Inter-­‐resin   had   obtained   by   virtue   of   IUCP’s   undertaking   of   being   a   surety   under   a   “Continuing   Guaranty”  agreement.   In   this   case.  it   now  prevails  over  what  appears  on  the  Deed  of  Sale.  In  the   case   of   testimonial   evidence.   To   facilitate   the   credit.  it  will  be  understood  to  have  been  waived.   Policronio   never   informed   his   children  of  the  sale.  they  argued  that  it  should  not   have   been   appreciated   by   the   CA   because   it   had   no   Rheland  S.   and   Valeriana   on   the   same   day   as   that   of   Policronio's  were  all  presented  in  evidence.  Servacio.   never   demanded   or   received   the   produce   thereof.   Considering   that   the   Deed   of   Sale   has   been   shown   to   be   void   for   being   absolutely   simulated   and   for   lack   of   consideration.   Manila   Banking   demanded   for   a   surety   agreement   and   to   put   up   82   .   and   if   not   so  made.  the  applicability  of  the  parol  evidence  rule   requires   that   the   case   be   between   parties   and   their   successors-­‐in-­‐interest.   both   the   Heirs   of   Alfonso   and   the   Heirs   of   Policronio   are   successors-­‐in-­‐ interest   of   the   parties   to   the   Deed   of   Sale   as   they   claim   rights   under   Alfonso   and   Policronio.   never   exercised   acts   of   ownership   over   the   subject   properties   (as   he   never   demanded   or   took   possession   of   them.   not   applicable   in   a   proceeding  where  the  validity  of  such  agreement  is  the  fact   in  dispute.  2015-­‐2016   grounds   therefor   become   reasonably   apparent.   during   his   lifetime.Y.   deemed   to   have   waived  the  benefit  of  the  parol  evidence  rule.   The   operation   of   the   parol   evidence   rule   requires   the   existence   of   a   valid   written   agreement.   the   objection   must   be   made   when   the   objectionable   question   is   asked   or   after   the   answer   is   given   if   the   objectionable   features   become   apparent   only   by   reason   of   such   answer.   Prudencia.   First.   Third.  WAIVER   → PER  is  not  a  self-­‐executing  rule.     probative  value  whatsoever.   has   been   relaxed   in   cases   where.   the   Heirs  of  Policronio  failed  to  timely  object  to  the  testimony   of   Amparo   Castillo   and   they   are.   however.   The   exception   in   paragraph   (b)   is   allowed  to  enable  the  court  to  ascertain  the  true  intent  of   the  parties.   As   the   true   intent  of  the  parties  was  duly  proven  in  the  present  case.   Parol   evidence   becomes  admissible.     Indeed.   and   was   precisely   one   of   the   issues   submitted   to   the   RTC   for   resolution.   and   never   paid   real   estate   taxes   thereon).   Risen   Corp.  it  shall  prevail  over   what   the   document   appears   to   be   on   its   face.   Policronio.   the   other   Deeds   of   Sale   which   were   executed   in   favor   of   Liberato. The  failure  of  the  Deed  of  Sale  to  express  the  true   intent  and  agreement  of  the  parties  was  clearly  put  in  issue   in   the   Answer   of   the   Heirs   of   Alfonso   to   the   Complaint.   Section   9   of   Rule   30   of   the   Rules  of  Court  are  applicable  in  the  case  at bench.     As  the  Heirs  of  Policronio  failed  to  controvert  the   evidence   presented.     The   validity   of   the   Deed   of   Sale   was   also   put   in   issue   in   the   Answer.   This   principle.   Fourth.   their   argument  would  still  fail.   both   the   RTC   and   the   CA   correctly   accorded  probative  weight  to  her  testimony.

    Willex  is  a  guarantor.  at  the  hearing  of  the  case  on   September   16.   In   turn.   called   on   the  guaranty  agreement."   It   has   been   held   that   explanatory   evidence   may   be   received   to  show  the  circumstances  under  which  a  document  has  been   made  and  to  what  debt  it  relates.   1982.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A."   For   its   part   Interbank   adduced   evidence   to   show   that   the   "Continuing  Guaranty"  had  been  made  to  guarantee  payment   of   amounts   made   by   it   to   Manilabank   and   not   of   any   sums   given   by   it   as   loan   to   Inter-­‐Resin   Industrial.  Willex  Plastic  waived  the  protection  of  the  parol   evidence  rule.   Willex   Plastic   cannot   now   claim   that   its   liability   is   limited   to   any   amount   which   Interbank.   Willex   Plastic   argues   that   under   the   "Continuing   Guaranty. Marriage  (Spousal  Immunity)   § Neither   the   H   nor   the   W   may   testify   for   or   against   the   other   without   the   consent   of   the   affected  SPS.   To   facilitate   the   surety.   Willex   Plastic.Y.   when   Inter-­‐Resin   Industrial   paid   P687.   not   for   sums   paid   by   the   latter   to   Manilabank   for   the   account   of   Inter-­‐Resin   Industrial   Issue:       whether  under  the  "Continuing  Guaranty"  signed  on  April  2.   representing   their   indebtedness   to   the   plaintiff.00   to   the   plaintiff.  the  trial  court  rendered  judgment.   1979   petitioner   Willex   Plastic   may   be   held   jointly   and   severally  liable  with  Inter-­‐Resin  Industrial  for  the  amount  by   Interbank  to  Manilabank.   1986.  Willex  failed  to  object  to  the  oral  testimony  tending  to   prove  the  actual  intention  of  the  parties.  2015-­‐2016   → → → → some   collateral   so   Risen   had   a   continuing   surety   agreement   with   Investment   Underwriting   Corp.     Interbank's   witness   testified   under   cross-­‐examination   by   counsel   for   Willex   Plastic   that   Willex   "guaranteed   the   exposure/of   whatever   exposure   of   ACP   [Atrium   Capital]   will   later   be   made   because  of  the  guarantee  to  Manila  Banking  Corporation.   Risen   together   with   Willex   executed   a   guaranty   agreement   in   favour   of   Investment  Underwriting.  alleged:   5.  Risen  and  Willex  refused  to   pay.  EXC:   83   .  Willex  Plastic's  counsel  replied  in  the  negative  and   manifested   that   "the   plaintiff   in   this   case   [Interbank]   is   the   guarantor   and   my   client   [Willex   Plastic]   only   signed   as   a   guarantor  to  the  guarantee.  4     At   all   events.   It   did   not   guaranty   payment   for   obligations  Risen  incurred  against  another  party."  its  liability  is  for  sums  obtained  by  Resin   Industrial   from   Interbank.     HELD:   SC   disagreed   and   ruled   that   PER   can   be   waived   by   failing   to   object.   when   asked   by   the   trial   judge   whether   Willex   Plastic   had   not   filed   a   crossclaim   against   Inter-­‐Resin   Industrial.   Investment   Underwriting.  1988.   the   plaintiff   required   defendant   IRIC   [Inter-­‐Resin   Industrial]   to   execute   a   chattel   mortgage   in   its   favor   and   a   Continuing   Guaranty   which   was   signed   by   the   other   defendant  WPIC  [Willex  Plastic].   ordering   Inter-­‐Resin   Industrial   and   Willex   Plastic   jointly   and   severally   to   pay   to   Interbank   the   following  amounts:   P3.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Interbank's  predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest  Atrium  Capital.   What   Willex   Plastic   has   overlooked   is   the   fact   that   evidence  aliunde  was  introduced  in  the  trial  court  to  explain   that  it  was  actually  to  secure  payment  to  Interbank  (formerly   IUCP)   of   amounts   paid   by   the   latter   to   Manilabank   that   the   "Continuing  Guaranty"  was  executed.   Inter-­‐Resin   Industrial   admitted   this   allegation   (stipulation  5)   On   the   other   hand.   with   interest   of   17%   per   annum   from   August   11.   In   denying   liability   to   Interbank   for   the   amount.500.   Rheland  S.780.646.   while   denying   the   allegation  in  question.   In   its   answer.  Risen  contended  that  it  already  paid.  Willex  also   said   that   it   only   guaranteed   payment   for   whatever   obligation   Risen   may   have   against   Investment   Underwriting."  But.   by   failing   to   object   to   the   parol   evidence   presented.61.   as   creditor.   might   give   directly   to   Inter-­‐Resin   Industrial   as   debtor   because. RAMIREZ 1.     Risen   failed   to   pay   so   Investment   Underwriting   had   to   pay.   to   secure   the   guarantee   made   by   plaintiff   of   the   credit   accommodation   granted   to   defendant   IRIC   [Inter-­‐Resin   Industrial]   by   Manilabank.   until   full   payment  of  the  said  amount.  Servacio.  In  its  complaint  below.   On  April  5.  merely  did  so  "for  lack  of  knowledge  or   information  of  the  same.   ALVAREZ V.

  But   this   must   be   revisited   to   be   in   line   with   recent   case   where   SC   held   that   a   void   marriage   is   presumed  valid  unless  declared  void  by   the  court.   SC  said  the  purpose  of  this  rule  is   to   preserve   marital   relations.   Arson   was   filed   against   him   and   during   the   trial   the   principal   witness   was   his   wife   who   claimed   that   she   saw   her   husband   set   the   house   on   fire.     The   issue   for   our   resolution   is   whether   Esperanza   Alvarez   can   testify   against   her   husband   in   Criminal   Case   No.   neither   the   husband   nor   the   wife   may   testify   for   or   against   the   other   without   the   consent   of   the   affected   spouse.       It   should   be   stressed   that   as   shown   by   the   records.   this   prohibition   rule   will   not   apply.   they   were   separated   de   facto   almost   six   months   before   the   incident.   Witness   Spouse   can   be   or   cannot   be   a   party   to   the   case.   The   policy   of   the   law   is   to   guard   the   security   and   confidences  of  private  life.   Prevent   Perjury:   love   can   move   mountains   so   if   a   spouse   can   take   one   bullet   for   the   other   s/he   might   lie   for   the   other.   the   relationship   between   petitioner   and   his   wife   was   already   strained.   except   in   a   civil   case   by   one   against   the   other.   or   in   a   criminal   case   for   a   crime   committed   by   one   against   the   Rheland  S.   Criminal   casefor   crimes   committed   by   one   against   the   other   or   against   the   direct   ascendants   or   descendants  of  the  other   Purpose:   A.   If   one   were   to   testify   for   or   against   the   other.   Where   there   is   want   of   domestic   tranquility   there   is   danger   of   punishing   one   spouse   through   the   hostile   testimony   of   the  other.  and   4.   there   is   no   basis   to   apply   the   disqualification   rule.   84   .Y.   This  Rule  does  not  apply:  When  the  reason  for   the  rule  does  not  exist     Alvarez   vs   Ramirez:   Alvarez   was   married   to   sister   of   Ramirez."   The   reasons   given   for   the   1.   2.   he   followed   his   wife   who   was   then   staying   with   her   sister.   marital   disqualification   is   intended  to  preserve  marital  relations  and   promote  domestic  peace  and  harmony   B.   Six   months   before   the   incident   in   question   they   separated  de  facto.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     rule  are:   § other   or   the   latter's   direct   descendants   or   ascendants.   19933-­‐MN.  must  be  a  party  to  the  case.   The   reason   for   the   rule   does   not   exist   anymore.   There   is   identity   of   interests   between   husband   and   wife.   C.  even  at   the   risk   of   an   occasional   failure   of   justice.     REQUISITES   A.  2015-­‐2016   § § A.   Alvarez   moved   for   her   disqualification   b/c   the   marriage  was  then  still  subsisting.  Servacio.  This  disqualification  rule  exist  so  long  as   the  marriage  subsist.   prior   to   the   commission   of   the   offense.   but   the   OTHER   spouse  for  whom  or  against  whom  the   testimony   of   the   witness   spouse   is   offered.   Indeed.   Disqualification   by   reason   of   marriage.   and   to   prevent   domestic   disunion  and  unhappiness.   there   is   consequent   danger   of   perjury.   and   set   the   house   on   fire.   3.  Alvarez  could  not  move   on.   Valid   Marriage:   what   happens   in   void   marriage?  The  popular  opinion  is  that  if   the   marriage   is   void.   the   evidence   and   facts   presented   reveal   that   the   preservation   of   the   marriage   between   petitioner   and   Esperanza   is   no   longer   an   interest  the  State  aims  to  protect.   22.   In   fact.  Civil  case  between  each  other   B.   B.   Section   22.   Rule   130   of   the   Revised   Rules   of   Court   provides:   "Sec.   —   During   their   marriage.

      GUERRERO   VS   ST.   the   other   children   having  been  assigned  other  lots.     Accordingly.   The   sale   was   evidenced   by   a   deed   of   sale   executed   by   sister   in   favor   of   Manuel.   The   arrangement   between   brother   and   sister   was   that   Cristina   Guerrero   could   continue   in   the   cultivation   of   the   land   and   enjoyment   of   the   owner's   share   in   the   produce   for   as   long   as   she   needed   the   property. ST.   4.   Isidoro   Guerrero   verbally  willed  and  ordained  that  the  questioned  lot   be   assigned   and   adjudicated   to   Andres   Guerrero   as   his   share   in   the   inheritance.   and   all   surnamed   Guerrero.   Defendants   sought   to   disqualify   witnesses   under   dead  man’s  statute  since  Andres  was  already  dead. CLAIRE’S REALTY REQUISITES  FOR  DEAD  MAN’S  STATUTE  TO  APPLY:   1) The   defendant   in   the   case   where   dead   man   statute   is   invoked   must   be   sued   in   his/her   representative   capacity:   either   as   executor.   with   an   area   of   42.   Dominador   Ramirez   continued   his   tenancy   until   shortly   before   the  death  of  Andres  Guerrero.     Before   his   demise.   who   earned   a   50%   share   in   the   net   produce.     Shortly  after  the  beginning  of  the  Japanese   occupation.   4752.  Servacio.   Andres   Guerrero   entrusted   the   land   to   his   sister.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Panay   Ramos   predeceased  Isidoro  Guerrero.   the   other   50%   being   retained   by   Andres   Guerrero   who   defrayed   the   cultivation   expenses   and   real  estate  taxes  on  the  property.  more  or  less.  1957.  Andres  Guerrero  physically  possessed  the   lot   and   cultivated   it   through   his   tenant   Dominador   Ramirez.299   square  meters.   Cadastre   No.   Sometime   during   the   latter   part   of   1971   certain   people   who   introduced   themselves   as   agents   or   buyers   of   the   land   approached   some   of   the   plaintiffs   in   order   to   85   .     1.   and   allowed   her   to   have   the   property   cultivated   and   to   retain   the   owner's   share   in   the   harvests.   Rizal.   Heirs   of   andres   were   shocked   when   they   were   told   by   manuel   (another   heir)   that   he   already   owned   the   property.   they   filed   a   case   for   recovery   of   property.   Aurelio.   When   heirs   of   andres   learned   of   transactions.   Segunda   Laquindanum.   and   entrusted   possession   to   his   sister   Christina.   Manuel  sold  to  relatives.  and  eventually  sold  it  to  st.   Only   plaintiff.   THE   DEFENDANT   IN   THE   CASE   WHERE   DEAD   MAN   STATUTE   IS   INVOKED   MUST   BE   SUED   IN   HIS/HER   REPRESENTATIVE   CAPACITY:   EITHER   AS   EXECUTOR.   but   was   still   possessed   by   his   sister   Christina.     2) Applies   only   in   a   situation   where   the   suit   involves  a  claim/demand  upon  the  estate  of  the   deceased/person  of  unsound  mind   3) Not   all   witnesses   are   disqualified   under   DMS.   before   his   death   he   conveyed   ownership   of   his   property   to   son   Andres   who   took   possession  of  his  property  after  death  of  her  father.   When   Andres   died.   his   assignor.     Sometime   in   July   1943.   Juliana.   and   their   children.   The   complaints   further   alleged   that   as   early   as  December  10.   administrator.   Jose   and   Cristina.   Claire.   the   property   transferred   to   his   children.  or  an  heir  or  representative  of  the   deceased.   ADMINISTRATOR.     Rheland  S.   Case   No.   who   are   the   petitioners   in   this   case.  2015-­‐2016   § Different   in   Privileged   Communication   Rule   between   SPS   because   the   H   nor   the   W   cannot   disclose   any   information   s/he   may   have   obtained   during   the   existence   of   the   marriage   even  if  the  marriage  is  dissolved.   Cristina   Guerrero   continued   as   trustee   of   the   deceased  Andres  Guerrero.   Leona.   Andres   Guerrero   died   survived   by   his   widow.   which   is   a   parcel   of   land   located   at   San   Dionisio.   That   their   deed  of  sale  is  void  since  sister  of  andres  was  not  the   owner  of  the  property.     The   spouses   had   six   children.     GUERRERO V.   or   person   in   whose   behalf   the   suit   is   prosecuted   are   disqualified   from  being  witnesses  under  DMS.   Parañaque.   CLAIRE:   A   land   was   owned   by   father.Y.  OR  AN  HEIR  OR  REPRESENTATIVE  OF  THE   DECEASED.  the  land  was  surveyed  by  the   Bureau   of   Lands   for   and   in   the   name   of   Andres   Guerrero   as   Lot   No.  Alleged  that  sister  of  Andres   only   executed   REM   in   contemplation   of   a   loan.   229   of   the   Parañaque   Cadastre.   upon   the   death   of   Isidoro   Guerrero.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     __________________________________________________ _____________________________________     Isidoro   >   Andres   >   [entrusted   to   Cristina]   >   Heirs   of   Andres   -­‐   -­‐   -­‐  Manuel  >  Nieces  and  Nephews  of  Manuel  (?)  [basta  they  are   the   children   of   Felicisimo   Guerrero   who   helped   Manuel   file   an   application   for   registration   of   land   with   the   RTC.   claiming   the   property   belonged   to   their   father.]   >   St   Claire   -­‐ Manuel   is   a   cousin   of   the   Heirs  of  Andres   __________________________________________________ ______________________________________     The   spouses   Isidoro   Guerrero   and   Panay   Ramos   were   the   absolute   owners   of   the   disputed   property.   named   Andres.   Cristina   Guerrero.

  cannot   testify   as   to   any   matter   of   fact   occurring   before   the   death   of   such   deceased  person  or  before  such  became  of   unsound  mind.   accompanied   by   Felicisimo   Guerrero.   constituting   themselves   as   partners.   that   in   1963.   Rule   130.  4591  to   the   applicant.   there   was  filed  with  the  Register  of  Deeds  of  Rizal  a  "Deed   of   Absolute   Sale"   purportedly   executed   by   Manuel   Guerrero  in  favor  of  the  defendants  Guerreros.     Plaintiffs   (the   heirs   of   Andres   Guerrero)   made   inquiries   and   discovered   the   following:   that   Manuel   Guerrero   was   able   to   have   the   lot   titled   in   his   name   on   the   basis   of   a   'Deed   of   Sale   of   Land'   dated   April   24.   through   her   children.   4591   in   fraud   of   the   plaintiffs.   1971.  Said   plaintiffs   were   informed   that   the   land   was   titled   in   the  name  of  their  cousin.     Issue:   The   first   question   of   importance   that   engages  the  attention  of  this  Court  is  whether  or  not   the   witnesses   Laura   Cervantes   and   Jose   Cervantes   were   correctly   disqualified   from   testifying   in   the   case  and  their  testimonies  excluded  on  the  basis  of   Section  20(a).   and   that   Felicisimo   Guerrero   asked   Laura   Cervantes   to   sign   a   piece   of   paper   to   attest   to   the   fact   that   a   certain   amount   of   money   had  been  borrowed  from  Manuel  Guerrero.   340842  in  the  name  of  said  realty  company.   Jose   Cervantes   as   well   as   other   witnesses   similarly   situated.   —   The   following   persons   cannot   testify   as   to   matters   in   which   they   are   interested.  1971.00./   upon   a   claim   or   demand   against  the  estate  of  such  deceased  person   or   against   such   person   of   unsound   mind.   among   others.   After   Laura   Cervantes   had   thus   testified.   that   Cristina   Guerrero   was   not   the   owner   of   the   land   at   the   time   she   purportedly   sold   it.  simulated  and  falsified  for   the   reason.   Manuel   Guerrero.   Rule  130.   Laura   Cervantes   stated  that  the  land  was  lent  by  Andres  Guerrero  to   Cristina   Guerrero.  that   the   Register   of   Deeds   gave   due   course   to   the   registration  of  that  deed.  and  that  her  mother  could  walk   only   inside   their   house   in   Parañaque.   that   on   September  28.   had   been  sick  for  a  long  time  before  she  died  at  the  age   of  80  years  in  1948.   and   summed   up   the   loans   he   had   extended   to   Cristina   Guerrero   in   the   total   amount   of   P1.   among   others.   are   disqualified   to   testify  in  the  case."   The   trial   court   having   ruled   that   the   witness   "may   answer".   Resuming   her   testimony.   and   that.   and   ineffective   against   the   plaintiffs   for   the   reason.   father   of   the   defendants   Guerreros.   the   Deed   of   Sale   in   favor   of   Manuel   Guerrero  was  fraudulent.   1973.  or  persons  in  whose  behalf  a  case   is   prosecuted.  that  on  the  same  day  that   the   deed   of   sale   was   registered.   that   Manuel   Guerrero   loaned   money  to  Cristina  Guerrero  for  quite  some  time.   Cristina   Guerrero.   According   to   the   original   and   amended   complaints.   defendants'   counsel   registered   a   continuing   objection.   Disqualification   by   reason   of   interest   or   relationship.  LexLib   On   October   24.   The   court   allowed   the   witness   to   continue   her   testimony   subject  to  such  objection.   the   defendants   Guerreros   caused   to   be   notarized   an   "Articles   of   Partnership"   of   St.  Servacio.  Manuel   Guerrero   went   to   their   house.   that   the   Deeds   of   Sale   to   the   defendants   Guerreros   and   St.   Clare's   Realty   Company.   assisted   by   Felicisimo   Guerrero.  Rule  130.  The  motion  was   opposed   by   the   plaintiffs.   On   November   16.   Ltd.   1973.   of   the   Rules   of   Court.  of  the  New  Rules  of  Court."   86   .   directly  or  indirectly  as  herein  enumerated:   (a)   Parties   or   assignors   of   parties   to  a  case.Y.   that   despite   oppositors'  appeal  to  a  higher  court.   and   the   transfer   certificates   of   title   in   their   favor   are   fraudulent   and   simulated.   Ltd.   that   on   September   14.   filed   an   application   for   registration   of   land   with   the   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Rizal.   or   against   a   person   of   unsound   mind.   Ltd.   /against   an   executor   or   administrator   or   other   representative   of   a   deceased   person.   20(a).   that   by   virtue   thereof.  which   provides  as  follows:   "Section   20.   the   defendants   Guerreros   filed   a   written   motion   to   disqualify   Laura   Cervantes  as  a  witness  on  the  basis  of  Section  20(a).   1948   purportedly   executed   by   Cristina   Guerrero..900.  the  defendants  Guerreros  sold   the  disputed  lot  in  a  "Deed  of  Absolute  Sale"  to  the   St.   Laura   Cervantes   testified   that   her   mother.   1973.   that   Manuel   Guerrero   obtained   OCT   No.   Rheland  S.  2015-­‐2016   secure  their  consent  to  the  sale  of  the  property.  Manuel  Guerrero.   the   court   ruled   that   Manuel   Guerrero   owned   the   lot.   that   at   the   time   of   execution   of   the   Deeds   of   Sale.   Clare's   Realty   Company.   the   Register   of   Deeds   issued   TCT   No.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A..  of  the  Rules  of  Court.   Cristina   Guerrero   could   ask   money   from   Manuel   Guerrero   because   of   the   land   that   Andres   Guerrero  had  lent  to  her.  the  Register  of   Deeds  issued  Original  Certificate  of  Title  No.   that   notwithstanding   the   opposition   of   the   heirs   of   Cristina   Guerrero.  that   shortly  after  the  death  of  Cristina  Guerrero.   the  trial  court  granted  the  motion  and  declared  that   Laura   Cervantes.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     counsel   for   the   defendants   Guerreros   objected   to   the  line  of  questioning  on  the  ground  that  the  said   witness   was   testifying   "on   matters   which   are   prohibited   under   Sec.   Clare's   Realty   Company.   that   the   money   spent   for   the   illness   of   her   mother   came   from   Manuel   Guerrero.   the   defendants   Guerreros   knew   that   the   property   belonged   to   Andres  Guerrero   On   October   19.

   The   wife   of   Abraham   was   a   witness   to   the   execution   thereof.   pending   before   the   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Quezon   City."  (Moran.   The   defendants   Guerreros   are   not   the   executors   or   administrators   or   representatives   of   such  deceased.   Vda.  therefore.  and   2.   but   Andres   Guerrero.  1970  ed.  like  the  executor  or  administrator.  persons  in  whose   behalf   a   case   is   prosecuted.   and   no   others.   de   Abraham  together  with  her  sons.   Q-­‐285   for   the   settlement   of   the   intestate   estate   of   Juan   Ysmael.   the   inapplicability   of   the   dead  man's  rule.   only   parties  plaintiff  or  their  assignors.   not   the   personal   rights   of   such   representative. 3.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.)     IOW.   filed   a   pleading   entitled   "Reclamacion"   demanding   payment   of   the   amount   represented  by  the  note.   that   is.   the   SC   said   that   Dead   Man   Statute   does   not   apply.   The   lot   is   not   a   part   of   the   estate   of   Manuel   Guerrero.  Servacio.       I.   Ysmael.  the  present  case  is  not  a  claim  or  demand   against   the   estate   of   the   deceased   Manuel   Guerrero.   are   sued   in   their   representative.  169-­‐171.   not   Rheland  S.   are   not  included  in  the  prohibition.Y.   it   may   be   said   that   incompetency   to   testify   established   in   the   provision   above   quoted.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira       Background  of  the  Case:   1.   And   that   is   emphasized   by   the   law   by   using   the   words   'against   the   estate   of   such   deceased   persons'.   in   the   amount   of   P12.   the   claimants   reproduced   their   "Reclamacion"  before  the  lower  court  and  the  same   87   . personal.   nor   persons   in   whose   behalf   a   case   is   prosecuted.   that   Cristina   Guerrero   did   not   really   sell   but   merely   mortgaged   the   property   to   Manuel  Guerrero.  The  law  uses  the  word  'against  an   executor   or   administrator   or   other   representative   of   a   deceased   person.     Upon   the   facts   and   under   the   law.   "Following   this   rule   of   construction.   who   owned   the   disputed   land   at   the   time   of   its   alleged   sale   to   Manuel   Guerrero."   They  are  mere  witnesses  by  whose  testimonies  the   plaintiffs   aimed   to   establish   that   it   was   not   Cristina   Guerrero.   irrespective   of   their   spirit.  5.   must   be   applied   strictly   in   accordance   with   their   express   wording.  166.'   It   should   be   noted   that   after   the   mention   of   an   executor   or   administrator   the   words   or   other   representative   follows.   a   demand   was   made   for   the   payment  thereof  but  the  note  remained  unpaid."   (Moran.  it  is  only  his   rights   that   are   to   be   asserted   and   defendant   in   the   litigation   by   the   person   representing   him.  Comments   on  the  Rules  of  Court.   As   soon   as   Priscilla   Recto-­‐Kasten   was   appointed   administratrix.   which   means   that   the   word   'representative'   includes   only   those   who. 2.   which   convey   the   idea   of   an   estate   actually   owned   by   the   deceased   at   the   time   the   case   was   brought  and  that.       Upon   maturity.)   nor   "persons   in   whose   behalf   a   case   is   prosecuted.   Florencia   Q.   1954.)   neither   are   they   assignors   of   the   parties   3.  Alfonso  and  Jesus.)     II.       On   November   13.500.)  not  parties  in  the  present  case.   Mere   witnesses   who   are   neither   parties   plaintiff.  2015-­‐2016     HELD:  Laura  and  Jose  Cervantes  must  be  allowed  to  testify.   all   surnamed   Abraham. 4.   affects   only   the   persons   therein   mentioned.   since   the   defendant   must   be   acting   in   a   representative   capacity   of   the   estate   of   the   deceased.   nor   their   assignors. RECTO-KASTEN Parties  to  the  case:   Ysmael  –  debtor  whose  estate  now  is  being  subjected  to  the   payment  of  the  loan  from  Abraham   Abraham  –  creditor   Florencia  Vda  de  Abraham  –  wife  of  the  creditor   Recto-­‐Kasten  –  administratrix     Moreover.  p.  Vol.  pp.   Defendants   were   all   sued   in   their   personal  capacities     ABRAHAM V.   in   Special   Proceedings   No. Juan   C.. The   plain   truth   is   that   Laura   Cervantes   and   Jose   Cervantes  are  1.   "It   has   been   held   that   statutes   providing   that   a   party   in   interest   is   incompetent   to   testify   where   the   adverse   party   is   dead   or   insane.   Hence.   capacity.00   in   Japanese   currency   notes.   this   Court   is   fully   persuaded  that  the  affirmative  rulings  of  both  the  trial  court   and  the  Court  of  Appeals  were  made  in  error.   obtained   a   loan   from   Alfonso   Abraham   Sr.   ibid.   and   executed   a   promissory   note  in  favor  of  the  latter  promising  to  pay  the  loan   within  90  days  with  interest  at  the  rate  of  10%.  They  are  being  sued  as  claimants  of   ownership   in   their   individual   capacities   of   the   disputed   lot.

 see  par.  Servacio.   and   after   he   has   put   the   opposite   party   to   the   expense.   133. The   decision   of   the   RTC   must   be   upheld.  1)   11.   de   Abraham   invoking   the   provisions   of  Section  26  (c).   upon   a   3                                                                                                     claim   or   demand   against   the   estate  of  such  deceased  person  or   against   such   person   of   unsound   mind.   whether   the   same   is   already   barred   by   prescription   and   laches.   Having   made   his   selection   of   one   of   two   courses   which   he   may   pursue.   we   will   only   touch   on   the   first   issue)     Ruling  of  the  Supreme  Court:   9.)  if  the   answer   is   in   the   affirmative.   prejudices   and   predilection"   of   the   witness.   12.   RULES   OF   COURT. Furthermore.     The   decision  of  the  CA  should  consequently  be  reversed.     The  issue  presented  before  us:   8.   Cas.  Rule  123  of  the  Rules  of  Court.   876.   or   against   a   person   of   unsound   mind.     13.)   whether   or   not   petitioners   have  established  a  just  and  valid  claim  and  b.   Rheland  S.Y. The   lower   court   ruled   that   the   claimants   have   established   a   valid   claim   against   the   estate   of   Ysmael.   to   change   his   position   and   make   another   and   different   selection. was  finally  set  for  hearing.   465)".   89   VT.    Further.   the   wife   of   Abraham   was   able   to   extensively   describe  the  due  execution  of  the  instrument  during   the   hearing   (it   is   to   be   noted   that   the   wife   of   Abraham   was   a   witness   to   the   execution   of   the   instrument.   .   Jacobs."     However.     There.   after   the   claimant   had   testified.   he   lengthily   cross-­‐examined   her   on   the   very   matters   against  which  he  interposed  a  general  objection.   .   he   has   no   light.  During  the  hearings.   and   has   consumed   the   time   of   the   courts  in  a  trial  of  the  case   in   accordance   with   the   course   selected.  the  decision  of  the  lower  court  was  reversed   on  the  grounds  of  prescription.   497.     In   this   connection.  Rule  123  of  the  Rules  of   Court  provides:   "(c)   Parties   or   assignors   of  parties  to  a  case.   it   has  been  said:   ".   cannot   testify   as   to   any   matter   of   fact   occurring   before   the   death   of   such   deceased   person   or   before   such   person   became  of  unsound  mind.  or  persons  in   whose  behalf  a  case  is  prosecuted.   citing   the   case   of   Comstock's   Adm'r   vs.   (for   the   sake   of   Evidence.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.    Because  the  first  production  of  their  Reclamacion  was  not   acted  upon  due  to  absence  of  an  administrator.   there   was   a   waiver   of   the   prohibition   when   the   counsel   for   the   administratrix   extensively   cross-­‐examined   the   witness   on   the   very   matters   subject   of   the   prohibition.   1913A.  2015-­‐2016   3 5.     However.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     88   .  the   counsel   for   the   administratrix   interposed   a   general   and   continuing   objection   to   the   testimony   of   Florencia   Vda.   Such   course   would  be  unfair  both  to  the   opposite   party   and   to   the   court   and   should   not   be   countenanced   in   any   court   of   justice.   this   description   was   more   vividly   given   by   the   said   witness   not   in   answer  to  the  questions  propounded  by  her  lawyer   but   on   cross-­‐examination   of   counsel   for   the   administratrix.   (IV   Francisco.   it   is   difficult   to   believe   that   the   counsel's   lengthy   cross-­‐examination   on   the   prohibited   matters   was   merely   for   the   purpose   of   establishing   the   "motive.   Ann.   94   A. The   main   issue   is   a.     Decision  of  the  lower  courts:   6. The   record   shows   that   petitioners   have   established   the   due   execution   and   genuineness   of   the   promissory   note   and   that   respondents   failed   to   present  any  evidence  to  destroy  the  same.   after   he   discovers   that   the   course   selected   is   not   to   his   advantage.  estoppel.   The   administratrix   appealed   to   the   Court   of   Appeals.       It   was   for   this   reason   that   the   trial   judge   eventually   overruled   the   counsel's   previous   general   and   continuing   objection   and  admitted  the  testimony  of  the  witness. It  is  true  that  Section  26  (c).   10.   877. Much   to   the   surprise   of   the   Court.  and  laches.   against   an   executor   administrator   or   other   representative   of   a   deceased   person.   The   reason   for   the   rule   apparently   is   that   a   litigant   cannot   be   permitted   to   speculate   as   to  what  his  examination  of   a   witness   may   bring   forth. 7.

 3   9. Private   respondent   Vicente   thereafter   advised   TABACALERA   to   debit   from   his   account   the   amount   of   P13.627   square   meters.   or   in   consideration   of   the   guaranty   undertaken   by   private  respondent  Vicente.   4   and   13   of   the   Hacienda   Dulce   Nombre   de   Maria   were   thereafter   registered   in   the   name   of   Villanueva   under   TCT   No..   11.   later   transferred   to   the   Philippine   National   Bank   on   December   16.   4   and   13   of   Hacienda   Dulce   Nombre   de   Maria.     However.  Servacio.   314   of   the   Cadastral   Survey   of   Bais   with   an   area   of   468. The   three   (3)   haciendas   known   as   San   Sebastian.460.   3. 3.00.   1955.  as  the  amount  of   P12.  1950.   the   rent   thereof   to   be   deducted   from   the   money   advanced   by   private   respondent   (the   amount   of   12.   private   respondent   Gaspar   Vicente   stood   as   guarantor   for   Villegas   in   favor   of   TABACALERA.  were  originally   owned   by   the   Compañia   General   de   Tabacos   de   Filipinas  [TABACALERA].   the   late   Praxedes   T.    Again  counsel  manifested  that  if  the  note  was   indeed   a   genuine   document.  The  fields  were   likewise   mortgaged   by   Villanueva   to   the   Rehabilitation   Finance   Corporation   (RFC). TABACALERA   executed   a   formal   deed   of   sale   covering   the   three   haciendas   in   favor   of   Villanueva.   1950.s.Y.  However.   This   agreement   was   reduced   to   writing   and  signed  by  petitioner  Genaro  Goñi  as  attorney-­‐in-­‐ fact  of  Villanueva   6.460.n.   The   guarantee   was   embodied   in   a   document  denominated  as  "Escritura  de  Traspaso  de   Cuenta.     8. On   June   17.00.   7.     However.24   had   already   been   debited   from   private   respondent's   account. It   is   alleged   by   petitioners   that   subsequent   to   the   execution  of  the  contract/promise  to  sell.   3.  Negros  Oriental.     Either   because   the   amount   realized   from   the   transaction  between  Villanueva  and  Villegas  still  fell   short   of   the   purchase   price   of   the   three   haciendas.   Villanueva.   the   same   had   been   fully   paid   already.  Villanueva  contracted  or   promised  to  sell  to  the  latter  fields  nos.00   as   payment   for   the   balance   of   the   purchase   price.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Fields   Nos.  Villanueva   was   able   to   raise   funds   by   selling   a   property   in   Ayungon. 4.   (t.   covering   Lot   No.807.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     P13.   only   the   latter   amount   was   debited   from   private   respondent's   account.  1950  the  sugar  quota  of  the  land.   T-­‐4780   of   the   Register  of  Deeds  of  Negros  Oriental.     Intestate   proceedings   were   then   instituted   before   the   CFI   (now   RTC).   Field   no.460.   4   and   13   were   delivered   to   private   respondent   Vicente   after   the   1949-­‐1950   milling  season  in  January  and  February.   Sometime   in   1949.     Among   the   properties   included   in   the   inventory   submitted   to   the   court   were   fields   nos.  as  he  did  not  have  sufficient  funds  to  pay   the   price.   but   as   no   receipt   evidencing   such   payment   was   presented   in   court.  4  and  13   of  Hacienda  Dulce  Nombre  de  Maria  for  the  sum  of   Rheland  S. Meanwhile.   predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest   of   petitioners.     Allegedly  because  TABACALERA  did  not  agree  to  the   transaction   between   Villanueva   and   Villegas   being   without   a   guaranty. It   is   indeed   unfortunate   that   counsel   for   the   administratrix  did  not  choose  to  present  evidence  to   destroy   the   alleged   genuineness   of   the   promissory   note.807.   He   thus   went   to   private   respondent  Vicente  for  the  purpose  of  rescinding  the   contract/promise  to  sell.   10.   Fields   nos.   GONI V.  2015-­‐2016   14.   Villanueva   executed   a   "Documento   de   la   Venta   Definitiva"   in   favor   of   Joaquin   Villegas.   85).   and  13  of  Hacienda  Dulce)   5.   (Hacienda   Sarria).   for   a   total   indebtedness   of   P334.   counsel   did  not  present  any  proof  to  support  this  contention.   p.   who   was   later   substituted   by   Joaquin  Villegas.   The   difference   was   supposedly   paid   by   private   respondent   to   Villanueva.   13   with   an   area   of   1   hectare. CA Parties  to  the  Case:   Background  of  the  Case:   1.   44   ares   and   95   centares   89   .  offered  to  sell  Hacienda  Sarria  to  one   Santiago   Villegas.   Sarria   and   Dulce   Nombre   de   Maria   situated   in   the   Municipality  of  Bais. Villlanueva   later   on   died.   as   only   the   amount   of   P12.24   was   actually   needed   to   complete   the   purchase   price.400.   Negros   Oriental.   A   supplemental   instrument   was   later   executed   by   Villanueva   in   favor   of   Villegas   to   include   in   the   sale   of  June  17.   However.   more   or   less. 2.  3.   it   was   agreed   that   lots   4   and   13   of   the   Hacienda   Dulce   Nombre   de   Maria   would   merely  be  leased  to  private  respondent  Vicente  for  a   period   of   five   (5)   years.   negotiated   with   TABACALERA   for   the   purchase   of   said   haciendas.24)   and   any   balance   owing   to   Villanueva   would   be   delivered   by   Vicente   together   with   the   lots   at   the   end   of   the   stipulated  period  of  lease."     Villegas   <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<   >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  Tabacalera   (where  Villanueva        got  money  in  advance   |      for  Hacienda  Sarria)                    Vicente             Hacienda  Sarria  Sale)   Villanueva   |   |          (Guarantor   for                (Offeree   for   Fields   3.   Villanueva   with   the   consent   of   TABACALERA.   this   fact   was   disputed  by  petitioners.   4.

  commonly   known   as   the   Survivorship   Disqualification   Rule   or   Dead   Man   Statute.   basing   his   entitlement   thereto  on  the  contract/promise  to  sell  executed  by   the  late  Praxedes  Villanueva  in  his  favor   On   October   25.   although   instituted   against   the   heirs   of   Praxedes   Villanueva   after   the   estate   of   the   latter   had   been   distributed   to   them. 14.   4   and   13.   on   the   costs   of   production   and  produce  of  the  three  fields  in  question.   The   reason   is   that   the   defendants-­‐heirs   are   properly   the   "representatives"   of  the  deceased.  The  case   thereafter  proceeded  to  trial.   and   1   hectare.     Decision  of  the  lower  courts:   16.   as   herein   enumerated:   "(a)   Parties   or   assignors   of   parties   to   a   case.   which   constitutes   a   claim   or   demand   upon  his  estate  in  violation  of  rule  130.   4.   21.  with  areas  of  3  hectares.  Servacio. 15.  20.  upon   a  claim  or  demand  against  the  estate  of   such   deceased   person   or   against   such   person   of   unsound   mind.    Vicente  is  ordered  to  return   the   possession   of   the   fields   to   petitioners   as   the   heirs  of  Villanueva.   and   13.  Sec. was   listed   as   Lot   no.   257   of  the  inventory.   a   clerk  of  TABACALERA  Agency.   as   defendant   in   Civil   Case   No.   directly   or   indirectly.   himself.   the   lower   courts’   decision   must   be   reversed  and  set  aside. The   case   at   bar.     The   decision   of   the   RTC   was   affirmed   by   the   CA   with   slight   modification  as  to  damages.  —  The   following   persons   cannot   testify   as   to   matters   in   which   they   are   interested."   20.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Vicente's   testimony.   Disqualification   by   reason  of  interest  or  relationship.     Issues  presented  before  us:   17.  private  respondent   Vicente  instituted  an  action  for  recovery  of  property   and  damages  before  the  then  Court  of  First  Instance   of   Negros   Oriental   against   petitioner   Goñi   in   his   capacity   as   administrator   of   the   intestate   estate   of   Praxedes  Villanueva.   2990.   were   included   in   Lot   no.   and   Epifanio   Equio.Y.     However.  par   (a)?     Ruling  of  the  Supreme  Court:   18.   against   an   executor   or   administrator   or   other   representative   of   a   deceased   person.   among   others. The   decisions   of   the   lower   courts   must   be   affirmed   insofar   as   the   admissibility   of   the   testimony   of   Vicente  is  concerned.  2015-­‐2016   12.   or   against  a  person  of  unsound  mind.   as   to   the   issue   of   novation  and  the  consequent  ownership  of  the  fields   in   question.   respectively.   as   well   as   the   surrender   thereof   on   June  20.   The   parties   entered   into   a   stipulation   of   facts.   petitioner   Goñi. Under   ordinary   circumstances. 13.   Vicente  sought  to  recover  field  no.   while   fields  nos.  not  only  because  they  succeeded  to   the  decedent's  right  by  descent  or  operation  of  law.  the  end  of  the  fifth  crop-­‐year.   19.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   3.    We  find  that  neither  the  trial   nor   appellate   court   erred   in   ruling   for   the   admissibility   in   evidence   of   private   respondent   Rheland  S. The   trial   court   ordered   the   defendants-­‐heirs   to   deliver   to   Vicente   field   no.   in   order   to   remove   from   the   surviving   party   the   temptation   to   falsehood   and   the   possibility   of   fictitious   claims   against  the  deceased.   private   respondent   Vicente  8  would  be  disqualified  by  reason  of  interest   from   testifying   as   to   any   matter   of   fact   occurring   before   the   death   of   Praxedes   T.   723   of   the   inventory.  3  of  the  Hacienda   Dulce   Nombre   de   Maria.   or   persons   in   whose   behalf   a   case   is   prosecuted.   1954.  Plaintiff  presented  two   (2)   witnesses:   then   party-­‐plaintiff   Gaspar   Vicente.   remains   within   the   ambit   of   the   protection.   9   It   is   designed   to   close   the   lips   of   the   party   plaintiff   when   death   has   closed   the   lips   of   the   party   defendant. The   object   and   purpose   of   the   rule   is   to   guard   against   the   temptation   to   give   false   testimony   in   regard  to  the  transaction  in  question  on  the  part  of   the  surviving  party  and  further  to  put  the  two  parties   to   a   suit   upon   terms   of   equality   in   regard   to   the   opportunity   of   giving   testimony.  75  ares   and   60   centares.   Villanueva. Petitioners   (the   heirs   of   Villanueva)   presents   this   question   of   law   on   evidence   among   others   upon   appeal  by  certiorari:  May  respondent  Gaspar  Vicente   testify  on  matters  of  fact  occurring  before  the  death   of   Villanueva.   agreeing.   cannot   testify   as  to  any  matter  of  fact  occurring  before   the   death   of   such   deceased   person   or   before   such   person   became   of   unsound   mind.   filed   an   answer   with   counterclaim  for  accounting  of  the  produce  of  fields   nos.  1955.   who   over   the   objection   of   therein   defendants   testified   on   facts   occurring   before   the   death   of   Praxedes   Villanueva.   which   provides  as  follows:   "Section   20.   On   the   day   before   the   intestate   proceedings   were   ordered   closed   and   the   estate   of   the   late   Praxedes   Villanueva  delivered  to  his  heirs.   to   execute   a   formal   deed   of   sale   over   fields   3.   69   ares   and   80   centares.   but  more  importantly  because  they  are  so  placed  in   litigation   that   they   are   called   on   to   defend   which   90   .  3  and  4.   such   disqualification   being   anchored   on   Section   20(a)   of   Rule   130.

  but   by   the   estate   or   representatives   of  the  estate/deceased  person.   however. 25.   under   a   great   majority   of   statutes.   the   adverse   party   is   competent   to   testify   to   transactions   or   communications   with   the   deceased   or   incompetent  person  which  were  made  with  an  agent   of   such   person   in   cases   in   which   the   agent   is   still   alive  and  competent  to  testify.  for  the  reason  that  petitioner  Goñi  could  and   did   not   negate   the   binding   effect   of   the   contract/promise  to  sell.   Insofar   as   the   counterclaim   is   concerned.  if  living.   the   estate   is   the   complaining   party   and   the   complainant   is   the   defending  party.   The   estate   of   Villanueva   cannot   invoke   DMS   in   disqualifying   Gaspar   Vicente   from   testifying.   When   represented   by   an   attorney-­‐in-­‐fact.  he  did  it  as   a   party-­‐plaintiff   insofar   as   the   complaint   is   concerned   and   as   a   party-­‐defendant   insofar   as   the   counterclaim   is   concerned.   said   action   not   having   been   brought   against. they  have  obtained  from  the  deceased  and  make  the   defense   which   the   deceased   might   have   made   if   living.  DMS  does  not  apply  if  the  estate  of  the  deceased   interposes  a  counterclaim  against  the  complainant   Rheland  S.     The   properties  must  be  returned  to  them.  But  the  testimony  of   the   adverse   party   must   be   confined   to   those   transactions   or   communications   which   were   had   with   the   agent.   it   is   established   that   the   transaction   was   entered   into   by   Villanueva   through   Gunye   as   agent   who   can   very   well   protect   the   interest  of  Villanueva   When  Gaspar  Vicente  testified.   it   follows   that   they   are   entitled   to   a   favorable   decision   on   their   counterclaim.   He   testifies   as   a   plaintiff   in   the   complaint   and   at   the   same   time.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   Likewise.  Servacio.   he   was   not   disqualified   from   testifying   as   to   matters   of   fact   occurring   before   the   death   of   Praxedes   Villanueva.   where   one   of   the   parties   no   longer   has   the   opportunity  to  either  confirm  or  rebut  the  testimony   of  the  other  because  death  has  permanently  sealed   the  former's  lips.     1.Y.   it  was  in  a  dual  capacity  as  plaintiff  in  the  action  for   recovery   of   property   and   as   defendant   in   the   counterclaim  for  accounting  and  surrender  of  fields   nos.   he   testifies   as   a   defendant   in   the   counterclaim."     It   must   further   be   observed   that   petitioners   presented  a  counterclaim  against  private  respondent   Vicente.   He   was   privy   to   the   circumstances   surrounding   the   execution   of   such   contract   and   therefore   could   either   confirm   or   deny   any   allegations  made  by  private  respondent  Vicente  with   respect   to   said   contract.   the   rice   fields   in   haciendas   where  Villanueva  sold  to  Vicente  was  included  in  the   estate   - Vicente   filed   case   to   claim   ownership   over   these   rice   fields  claiming  that  these  were  sold  by  Villanueva  to   him   - Testimony   of   Vicente   was   objected   to   under   DMS   by   Gunye  (administrator  of  Villanueva)   - Held:   rejected   by   SC   on   the   ground   that   while   Villanueva   is   dead.   as   defendant   in   the   counterclaim.   Vicente   is   also   testifying   on   his   counterclaim   and   the   counterclaim   is   in   the   nature   of  complaint.   Evidently.   On   the   second   issue.   4   and   13.   13   The   contract/promise   to   sell   under   consideration   was   signed   by   petitioner   Goñi   as   attorney-­‐in-­‐fact   (apoderado)   of   Praxedes   Villanueva.   petitioners.   he   is   testifying   in   a   dual   capacity. 24.   DMS   cannot   be   used   in   a   transaction   entered   into   with   the   deceased   represented   by   an   agent   and   the   agent  was  still  alive   One   of   the   purposes   of   DMS   is   to   level   the   playing   field   where   one   party   is   already   dead.  2015-­‐2016   22.     2.   the   surviving   party   should   also   be   disqualified   from   telling   their  story.   "A   waiver   occurs   when   plaintiff's   deposition   is   taken   by   the   representative   of   the   estate   or   when   counsel   for   the   representative   cross-­‐examined   the   plaintiff   as   to   matters   occurring   during  deceased's  lifetime.  CA   - 3  haciendas  owned  by  a  corporation  Tabacalera   sold   to   a   certain   Villanueva   who   didn’t   have   enough   funds  to  buy  the  haciendas   - Tabacalera   wanted   someone   to   stand   as   guarantor   of   villegas   where   petitioner   (Gaspar   Vicente)   came   into  the  picture  as  agent  of  Villanueva   - proceeds  of  sale  was  not  enough  to  cover  purchase   price  of  the  haciendas   - when   Villanueva   died.     CASE:  GUNYE  V.   having   clearly   and   sufficiently   shown   that   the   contract/promise   to   sell   was   subsequently   novated   into   a   verbal   lease   agreement.   The   inequality   or   injustice   sought   to   be   avoided   by   Section   20(a)   of   Rule   130. 23.   the   91   .  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     The   complainant   may   then   testify   on   any   fact   occurring   before   the   death   of   the   decedent   without   violating  the  DMS.   Such   protection.   or   to   establish   a   claim   which   deceased   might   have  been  interested  to  establish.  This  is  so  because  when  a  complainant   testifies   in   the   case.  When  Vicente  thus  took  the  witness  stand.   was   effectively   waived   when  counsel  for  petitioners  cross-­‐examined  private   respondent   Vicente.  does  not  actually  exist  in  the  case   at  bar.

  FACTS:   92   .   then   the   presumption   of   the   Civil   Code.  when  she  presented  a  motion  for  a  revision   of  certain  decrees.   . defendantappellee.     The   law   twice   makes   use   of   the   word   "against. vs.   Agent   Gunye   is   still   alive   who   is   in   a   position   to   rebut   or   controvert  whatever  Vicente  may  testify.  the  action  is  one  by  the   administratrix  to  enforce  a  demand  "by"  the  estate.   that   is. administratrix.  It  appears  that  shortly  before   the  death  of  Marcelino  Tongco.   it   would. administratorappellee.   ISSUE:     WON   the   ruling   of   the   trial   judge   in   both   the   Rheland  S.   the   widow   began   action   on   April  28.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     cadastral   case   and   property   case   to   the   effect   that   the   widow  was  compentent  to  testify  was  proper.   The   administratrix   of   the   estate   began   action   against   Anastacia   Vianzon   for   the   recovery   of   specified   property   and   for   damages.     CASE:  GUNYE  V.  In  the  first  case  at  bar.  1926.  Servacio. plaintiff -appellant.. LICHAUCO ."   Counsel   is   eminently   correct  in  emphasizing  that  the  object  and  purpose  of  this   statute   is   to   guard   against   the   temptation   to   give   false   testimony   in   regard   to   the   transaction   in   question   on   the   part  of  the  surviving  party.  nor  were  they  brought  upon  claims  "against"   the  estate. FACTS:   Marcelino   Tongco   and   contracted  marriage  on  July  5. claimant-appellant.Y.   .   Administratrix’s   motion   for   reconsideration   was   denied. deceased.  however.   arises.  he  had  presented  claims  in   a  cadastral  case  in  which  he  had  asked  for  titles  to  certain   properties   in   the   name   of   the   conjugal   partnership   consisting  of  himself  and  his  wife.   unless  we  are  forced  to  disregard  her  testimony. represented by JOSEFA TONGCO.   must   be   adhere   to   the   findings  and  rulings  of  the  trial  judge.. vs.     Counsel  for  the  appellant.     Anastacia   Vianzon   Marcelino   Tongco   died   leaving   Vianzon   a   widow.   RULING:   We   still   think   that   the   widow   has   proved   in   a   decisive   and   conclusive   manner   that   the   property   in   question   belonged   exclusively   to   her.   fortified   by   the   unassailable   character   of   Torrens   titles.  neglected  the   equally  important  rule  that  the  law  was  designed  to  aid  in   arriving  at  the  truth  and  was  not  designed  to  suppress  the   truth. GULF & PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA.  asserts  that  if   the   testimony   of   the   widow   be   discarded.  however. MARCIAL P.   .   .   this   transaction   was   entered   into   by   Villanueva  through  his  agent  Gunye  who  was  still  alive.   upon   a   claim   or   demand   against   the   estate   of   such   deceased   person   .   which   means   that   the   entire   fabric   of   appellee's   case   is   punctured.   was   named   administratrix  of  the  estate.   against   an   executor   or   administrator   or   other   representative   of   a   deceased   person.  and  that  corresponding   decrees   for   these   lots   were   issued   in   the   name   of   the   conjugal  partnership  not  long  after  his  death."   The  actions  were  not  brought  "against"  the  administratrix   of  the  estate.   The   court   dismissed   the   case.     The   result.  CA     While   Villanueva   is   already   dead.   no   longer   around   to   refute   the   testimony   of   Vicente   regarding   the   transaction.  Counsel  relies  on  that  portion  of  section  383  of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure   as   provides   that   "Partied   or   assignors  of  parties  to  an  action  or  proceeding.  an  appeal  was  filed.   therefore.   cannot  testify  as  to  any  matter  of  fact  occurring  before  the   death   of   such   deceased   person   .     Decision   was   rendered   by   the   Judge   of   first   instance  annulled  and  set  aside  certain  certificates  of  title   and   ordered   in   lieu   thereof   new   decrees  and   certificates   of   title   be   issued   as   the   exclusive   property   of   Anastacia   Vianzon.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   The   niece   of   the   deceased.   . ANASTACIA VIANZON.     In   the   cadastral   case.   the   same   analogy   holds   true   for   the   claim  was  presented  in  cadastral  proceedings  where  in  one   sense  there  is  no  plaintiff  and  there  is  no  defendant.  He  has.   Josefa   Tongco.  or  persons   in   whose   behalf   an   action   or   proceeding   is   prosecuted.   Intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco.     Testate estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS.   . ATLANTIC.  In  the   second   case   at   bar.   Hence.   as   it   should   be.     We   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   witness   was   competent.   .  2015-­‐2016   evil   or   purpose   of   the   DMS   is   not   present   because   the   attorney-­‐in-­‐fact   or   agent   who   is   still   alive   may   always   rebut   or   controvert   whatever   the   surviving   party   testifies.

  Fitzsimmons.     The   evidence   for   the   administrator   against   this   claim  of  P63.   supra.  Enos.   it   will   be   observed.500  returnable  to  the  estate..   67   Pac..   Henry   J.  section  26(c).   no   obligation   whatsoever   in   favor   of   the   Atlantic.   that   our   statute   does   not   exclude   from   testifying   a   stockholder   of   a   corporation.  Said  company  filed  a  claim  against  the  estate   of   Richard   T.  2015-­‐2016     This   is   a   case   for   a   claim   against   the   estate   of   Fitzsimmons   filed   by   Atlantic.   Code.   Enos.   .   in   addition   thereto.   Appellant   cites   section   14.   Code   Proc.   Merriman   vs."     Inasmuch  as  section  26(c)  of  Rule  123  disqualifies   93   .   the   same   tribunal.  may  either  reacquire  the   said   545   shares   of   stock   by   returning   to   his   estate   the   amount  applied  thereon.   interpreting  said  article  1880.   75   Pac.  167.  Fitzsimmons  was  the  president  and  one   of   the   largest   stockholders   of   said   company   when   the   Pacific   war   broke   out.   55.   A   corporation   may   be   conceded   to   be   a   person.   was   P174.656   in   favor   of   the   Philippine   Bank   of   Commerce.   Gulf   &   Pacific   Company   of   Manila.   at   the   rate   of   P450   a   share.  vice-­‐president-­‐treasurer   and   president.   167..500  had  been  credited  in  his   favor   on   account   of   the   purchase   price   of   the   said   545   shares   of   stock   out   of   bonuses   and   dividends   to   which   he   was   entitled   from   the   company.  the  company.   The   provision   applies   only   to   parties   or   assignors   of   parties.   135   Cal.   for   interest   no   longer   disqualifies   under   our   law.   52.     In   the   same   claim   the   company   offered   to   reacquire  the  545  shares  sold  to  the  deceased  Fitzsimmons   upon   return   to   his   estate   of   the   amount   of   P64..   The  court  said:     -­‐-­‐-­‐xxx-­‐-­‐-­‐   "Our   own   statute..   1941.67   from   the   amount   of   P64.   Marcial   P.  at  its  option.'   It   is   concluded.   under   Rule  123.   141   Cal.   He   held   1.   Plainly   the   law   disqualifies   only   'parties   or   assignors   of   parties.  Richard  T.   which   it   is   claimed   he   was.   1879.   Civ.   whether   he   be   but   a   stockholder."     In   a   later   case.   sections   1879.250.   respectively.'   and   does   not   apply   to   persons   who   are   merely   employed   by   such   parties   or   assignors  of  parties.   Civ.   Under   his   agreements   with  the  company  dated  April  4  and  July  12.   and   Haslam   was   neither   the   one   nor   the   other.500   paid   thereon.   and   claims   that.   Lichauco   explaining   the   circumstances   under   which   said   document   was   prepared   and   signed   by   the   deceased   Fitzsimmons.  Servacio.868..  In  1941  the  sum  of  P64.   respectively.   they   being   not   only   large   stockholders   and   members   of   the   board   of   directors   but   also   vice-­‐president-­‐   treasurer   and   president.   of  the  claimant  company.   in   passing   upon   the   competency   of   a   vice-­‐president   and   principal  stockholder  of  a  corporation  to  testify.     Claimant   also   called   as   witnesses   Mr.   It   neither   disqualifies   parties   to   a   contract   nor   persons   in   interest.   that   fact   would   make   no   difference.   and   thus  it  is  that  in  City  Savings  Bank  vs.   to   the   effect   that   the   word   'person'   includes   a   corporation.  reaffirmed   its   ruling   in   City   Savings   Bank   vs.  as  the  corporation  can  only  speak  through  its  officers.   but   the   concession   does   not   help  appellant.   1943.   the   section   must   be   held   to   apply   to   all   who   are   officially   related   to   the   corporation.  or  issue  in  favor  of  his  estate  the   corresponding   number   of   the   company's   shares   of   stock   equivalent  to  the  amount  paid  thereon  at  P450  a  share.   to   testify   on   the   status   of   the   personal   account   of   the   deceased   Fitzsimmons   with   the   company   as   of   December.   1880).  said:     ".082.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     ISSUE:     Whether   or   not   the   officers   of   a   corporation   which   is   a   party   to   an   action   against   an   executor   or   administrator   of   a   deceased   person   are   disqualified   from   testifying   as   to   any   matter   of   fact   occurring   before   the   death   of   such   deceased   person.  and  asked  the  court  to  authorize  the  setoff  of  the   amount   of   its   claim   of   P63.  52.   180.   567.   but   upon   objection   of   the   administrator   the   trial   court  refused  to  admit  their  testimony  on  that  point  on  the   ground   that   said   witnesses   were   incompetent   under   section   26(c)   of   Rule   123.   Belden  and  Mr.   after   examining   decisions   of   other   state   supreme   courts   in   relation   to   their   respective   statutes   on   the   same   subject.   is   broader   than   any   of   these.  1939.000   shares   of   stock.  should   he  die  without  having  fully  paid  for  the  said  545  shares  of   stock.   it   being   said:   'To   hold   that   the   statute   disqualifies   all   persons   from   testifying   who   are   officers   or   stockholders   of   a  corporation  would  be  equivalent  to  materially  amending   the   statute   by   judicial   interpretation.700.   the   Supreme   Court   of   California.   If   he   was   a   stockholder.   In   other   words.   of   which   545   shares   had   not   been   fully   paid   for.   Fitzsimmons   died   and   special   proceeding  was  subsequently  instituted  for  the  settlement   of  his  estate.426   in   favor   of   the   Peoples   Bank   and   Trust   Company   and   another   of   P8.   To   hold   that   the   statute   disqualifies   all   persons   from   testifying  who  are  officers  or  stockholders  of  a  corporation   would   be   equivalent   to   materially   amending   the   statute   by   judicial   interpretation.Y.  135  Cal.   of   the   claimant   company.000  consisted  of  Exhibit  1  and  the  testimony   of   Mr.     Rheland  S.   .  of  the  Rules  of  Court     RULING:   In   the   case   of   City   Savings   Bank   vs.   but   only   parties   to   the   action   (Code   Civil   Procedure.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   According   to   Exhibit   1   the   gross   value   of   the   assets   of   the   conjugal   partnership   between   the   deceased   Fitzsimmons   and   his   wife   Miguela   Malayto   as   of   November.   These   obligations  consisted  of  only  two  items  —  one  of  P21.  Samuel  Garmezy.   Enos.   181-­‐   182.   Gulf   &   Pacific   Company   of   Manila   was   listed  in  said  inventory  Exhibit  1.   Wickersman.   he   be   a   director  or  officer  thereof.   therefore.  it  has  been  held  that  one  who  is  cashier  and  at   the  same  time  a  stockholder  of  a  bank  was  not  disqualified.   sec.   and   the   total   amount   of   the   obligations   was   P30.   but   for   which   he   had   executed   promissory   notes   in   favor   of   the   company   aggregating   P245.   67  Pac.   or   whether.

    In  the  instant  case.  Servacio.   against   an   executor   or   administrator   or   other   representative   of   a   deceased   person.   and   that   the   Rheland  S..  Belden  and  Garmezy.   74306   is   the   owner  of  the  said  shares  of  stock.  .   Razon.   cannot   testify   as   to   any   matter   of   fact   accruing   before   the   death   of   such   deceased   person   or   before   such   person   became  of  unsound  mind.  properties   of  defendants  having  possession  of  shares  of  stock  and  for   receivership  of  the  properties  of  defendant  corporation  .  for  a  writ  of  preliminary  attachment  v.500   shares  of  stock  in  E.  Disqualification  by  reason  of  interest  or   relationship.     It   results   that   the   trial   court   erred   in   not   admitting  the  testimony  of  Messrs.  According  to  him.  Chuidian  in  the   books  of  the  corporation.R.  74315  is  the  owner  of  the  shares  of  stock.   thus   unjustly   subjecting   their   properties   or   rights   to   false   or   unscrupulous   claims   or   demands.  .   reversed   the   trial   court's   decision   and   ruled   that   Juan   T.   many   would   be   tempted   to   falsely   impute   statements   to   deceased   persons   as   the   latter   can   no   longer   deny   or   refute   them.  Razon.   Chuidian   in   G.   Chuidian. in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T.  the  testimony  excluded  by  the   appellate  court  is  that  of  the  defendant  (petitioner  herein)   to   the   effect   that   the   late   Juan   Chuidian.  as  to  any   matter  of  fact  occurring  before  the  death  of  such  deceased   person.   (the   father   of   private  respondent  Vicente  Chuidian.  Inc.  with  a  prayer  for  an  order  to   restrain   the   defendants   from   disposing   of   the   said   shares   of  stock.  we  are  constrained  to   hold   that   the   officers   and/or   stockholders   of   a   corporation   are   not   disqualified   from   testifying.  Razon.   declared   that   Enrique   Razon. respondents.   delimits   the   prohibition   it   contemplates   in   that   it   is   applicable   to   a   case   against   the   administrator   or   its   representative   of   an   estate   upon   a   claim  against  the  estate  of  the  deceased  person.  allegedly  owned  by   94   .  Inc.R.  Razon  Inc.   or   persons   in   whose   behalf   a   case   is   prosecuted.   upon   a   claim   or   demand   against   the   estate   of   such   deceased  person  or  against  such  person  of  unsound  mind.  xxxxxxxx   The  purpose  of  the  rule  has  been  explained  by  this   Court  in  this  wise:     "The  reason  for  the  rule  is  that  if  persons  having  a   claim   against   the   estate   of   the   deceased   or   his   properties   were   allowed   to   testify   as   to   the   supposed   statements   made   by   him   (deceased   person).   the   private  respondent.  —  The  following  persons  cannot  testify  as  to   matters  in  which  they  are  interested  directly  or  indirectly.'     The   rule. CHUIDIAN.   however.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  covered  by  a  certificate  of   stock  registered  under  the  name  of  Juan  T.   The   purpose   of   the   law   is  to  'guard  against  the  temptation  to  give  false  testimony   in  regard  to  the  transaction  in  question  on  the  part  of  the   surviving  party.   Moreover.   are   actually   owned   by   the   defendant   unless   the   deceased   Juan   Chuidian   opted   to   pay   the   same   which   never   happened.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     petitioner   was   subjected   to   a   rigid   cross   examination   regarding  such  testimony.  20.   the   petitioner   in   G.   Chuidian  in  the  E.Y.   the   deceased   father   of   petitioner   Vicente   B.     Regional   Trial   Court   of   Manila.     ISSUE:   WON   “dead   man’s   statute   is   applicable   in   the   instant  case   RULING:   Section   20   (a)   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court   (Section  23  of  the  Revised  Rules  on  Evidence)  states:     "SEC.   Vicente   B. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B."  (Italics  supplied).   or   against   a   person   of   unsound   mind.   as  herein  enumerated.  the  administrator  of   the   estate   of   Juan   Chuidian)   and   the   defendant   agreed   in   the   lifetime   of   Juan   Chuidian   that   the   1.   FACTS:   Main   issue   in   the   case   is   the   ownership   of   1.   No. vs.  the  "dead  man's  statute"   rule   is   not   applicable   to   the   instant   case.5000   shares   of   stock   in   E. CHUIDIAN.  2015-­‐2016   only  parties  or  assignors  of  parties.  as  plaintiff  in  the  case  did  not  object  to   his   oral   testimony   regarding   the   oral   agreement   between   him   and   the   deceased   Juan   T.       ENRIQUE RAZON.     Court   of   Appeals.   however.     Petitioner   Enrique   Razon   assails   the   appellate   court's   decision   on   its   alleged   misapplication   of   the   dead   man's   statute   rule   under   Section   20   (a)   Rule   130   of   the   Rules  of  Court.     In   his   complaint.   Chuidian   prayed   that   defendants   be   ordered   to   deliver   certificates   of   stocks   representing   the   share   holdings   of   the   deceased   Juan   T.   The   case   was   filed   by   the   administrator   of   the   estate   of   the   late   Juan   Chuidian   to   recover  shares  of  stock  in  E.   for   or   against   the   corporation   which   is   a   party   to   an   action   upon   a   claim   or   demand  against  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person.   No.   Chidian   that   the   ownership   of  the  shares  of  stock  was  actually  vested  in  the  petitioner   unless   the   deceased   opted   to   pay   the   same. petitioner.     (a)   Parties   or   assignors   of   parties   to   a   case.   Inc.

which the committee deemed insufficient and disapproved their claims.   the   private   respondent   is   deemed  to  have  waived  the  rule." and.200. and having no knowledge of the supposed management of their rights in the "Tren de Aguadas. vs. and the plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7. VIUDA DE GOITIA.  Servacio. 1927.00. By order of the court dated June 16.   the   records   show   that   the   private   respondent   never   objected   to   the   testimony   of   the   petitioner   as   regards   the   true   nature   of   his   transaction   with   the   late   elder   Chuidian.   LEONOR MENDEZONA. more particularly. widow of Juan Bautista Goitia. plaintiffappellee. Benigno Goitia. owns 180 shares worth P18. filed separate claims with the committee of claims and appraisal against the intestate estate of Benigno Goitia y Lazaga. Leonor Mendezona and Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal. that some time before his death.  Hence. Benigno Goitia failed to remit to them the dividends Rheland  S.     Furthermore.   The   petitioner's   testimony   was   subject   to   cross-­‐examination   by   the   private   respondents'  counsel. not having seen nor received any money of the plaintiff's 95   .  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     upon their shares in the 'Tren de Aguadas'. which he remitted to them every year. in July. and P36 upon Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal's stock.  Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court. furthermore.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A. Defendant answered the amended complaints. ENCARNACION C.   that   the   testimony   of   the   petitioner   is   not   within   the   prohibition   of   the   rule.  granting  that  the  petitioner's   testimony  is  within  the  prohibition  of  Section  20  (a). pleading in special defense. defendant-appellant. at that time the manager of the aforesaid copartnership.   The   case   was   not   filedagainst   the   administrator   of   the   estate. collected the dividends for the plaintiffs.Y. Benigno Goitia. Both claimants appealed from the report of the committee.     It   is   clear.   FACTS:   Benigno Goitia was the representative and attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff s in the joint-account partnership known as the 'Tren de Aguadas' which the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona.   therefore. the amount P90 as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor Mendezona's shares. who was no longer the manger of the said business. these claims were heard by the committee. that from 1915 until his death in August.   nor  was  it  filed  upon  claims  against  the  estate. 1926.  Chuidian. The claimants presented their evidence. that not having intervened in any of the transactions of Benigno Goitia y Lazaga as attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs. 1926. administratrix of the estate of Benigno Goitia.  2015-­‐2016   the  late  Juan  T. received as attorney-infact of both plaintiffs.

Spain. she is not in a position to render an account of any sort to the plaintiffs. ISSUE: WON the appellees were competent to testify RULING: Counsel for the appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions. When these depositions were read in court. invoking section 383. of the Code of Civil Procedure. the law seals those of the other. since 1915. to pay the costs of both instances. and he did not suggest any other interrogatory in addition to the questions of the committee. 7.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.140 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint. They testify. No.Y.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     admission. The underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate from fictitious claims." would be to exclude all possibility of a claim 96   . We are of the opinion that the claimants' denial that a certain fact occurred before the death of their attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia does not come within the legal prohibitions. The lower court ordered the defendant. The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the estate of a decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before the death of the deceased. But this protection should not be treated as an absolute bar or prohibition from the filing of just claims against the decedent's estate.  2015-­‐2016   from said business. denying any such liquidation.  Servacio. Her objection referred mainly to the questions on whether the deceased has rendered an accounting for the appellee from 1915 onwards. To apply to them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties. either own personal capacity or as judicial administratrix of Benigno Goitia's intestate estate. It is to be noted that deponents deny having received from the deceased Benigno Goitia any money on account of profits on their shares. to pay plaintiff Leonor Mendezona the sum of P13.256 likewise with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint. and to pay the plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre P5. Defendant questions the admission of the appelle’s deposition made before the American consul at Bilbao. as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased Benigno Goitia. the defendant objected to their Rheland  S. and moreover.

 1924. The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took place before their representative's death. but on the contrary denied that a liquidation had been made or any money remitted on account of their shares in the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim.   The   defendant.   Sityar.   the   victim   of   the   murder   was   the   physician   who   performed   surgical   operation   upon   the   defendant’s   wife. FAUSTO V. It was incumbent upon the appellant to prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition was true. defendantappellant. either by bringing into court the books which attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep.   attacked   the   deceased   with   a   fan-­‐knife   and   stabbed  him  twice.  that  of  March  20.   After   her   release   from   the   hospital   she   was   required   to   go   several   times   to   the   clinic   of   Doctor   Sityar   On   these   occasions   she   was   accompanied   by   her   husband. as was the decedent's usual practice according to Exhibit I.   FACTS:     Dr.   The   defendant   states   that   on   one   of  the  visits.   On   one   of   these   occasions   he   was   asked   by   an   employee  of  the  office.   According   to   the   evidence   of   the   prosecution.   inflicted   another   wound   upon   him   and  as  a  consequence  of  the  three  wounds  he  died  within  a   few   minutes.   and   that   while   the   defendant   was   absent   on   this   errand   Doctor   Sityar   outraged   the   wife.   While   in   the   hospital  he  received  a  letter  (Exhibit  5)  from  Doctor  Sityar   asking  for  the  immediate  settlement  of  the  account  for  the   professional  services  rendered  his  wife.Y.   the   defendant  then.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   the   defendant.   The   defendant   made   his   escape   but   surrendered   himself   to   the   Constabulary   at   Malolos. or by other similar evidence.  2015-­‐2016   against the testamentary estate.  and  where  he  was   under   the   care   of   two   other   physicians. 1926.  if  he  had  come   to  settle  his  account. or by introducing copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them. who succeeded Benigno Goitia in the administration of said partnership.  Doctor  Sityar  sent  him   out   on   an   errand   to   buy   some   medicine.   entered   the   Philippine   General   Hospital   where  he  remained  until  May  18. vs. and P36 for Valentina Izaguirre.  The  deceased  made  an  effort  to  escape   but  the  defendant  pursued  him  and  overtaking  him  in  the   hall   outside   the   office. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. to the effect that the deceased plaintiffs as dividends on their shares for the months of May and June.   suffering   from   some   stomach   trouble.   Bulacan. which agrees with the statement of Ruperto Santos.  the  nurse  Cabanera. The appellant admits having found a book of accounts kept by the decedent showing an item of P90 for the account of Leonor Mendezona and another of P36 for the account of Valentina Izaguirre. or P90 for Leonor Rheland  S.  Servacio.     The  defendant  admits  that  he  killed  the  deceased   but  maintains  that  he  did  so  in  self-­‐defense. We do not believe that this was the legislator's intention.  in  the  evening  of  the  following  day.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Mendezona.  1924. amounts which had not been remitted by the deceased to the plaintiffs.     97   .     In  the  afternoon  of  May  26th  the  defendant  again   went   to   the   office   of   the   deceased   and   found   him   there   alone.     Shortly   after   his   release   from   the   hospital   the   defendant   sought   an   interview   with   Doctor   Sityar   and   went   to   the   latter's   office   several   times   without   finding   him   in. CARLOS.  to  which  the  defendant  answered  that   he  did  not  believe  he  owed  the  doctor  anything. plaintiff-appellee.  without  any  preliminary  quarrel  between   the   two.

    During   the   course   of   these   proceedings.   This   fining   can   only   be   sustained   by   taking   into   consideration   Exhibit   L.   Whereupon.   It   is   dated   two   days   before   the   commission  of  the  crime  and  shows  that  the  writer  feared   that   the   defendant   contemplated   resorting   to   physical   violence  in  dealing  with  the  deceased. THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY.       Rheland  S.   there   is   in   our   opinion   not   sufficient   evidence   in   the   record   to   show   that   the   crime   was  premeditated. defendants-appellees. vs.  2015-­‐2016   The   court   below   found   that   the   crime   was   committed   with   premeditation   and   therefore   constituted   murder.   however.   the   plaintiff's  attorney  surrendered  the  policies  of  insurance  to   the  administrator  of  the  estate.   That   cannot   apply   where   the   statement   is   contained  in  an  unanswered  letter.   but   such   is   not   the   case   here.  if  he  had  any  objection   to   his   attorney's   testifying   concerning   the   surrender   of   the   policies.   If   the   defendant   either   by   answer   or   otherwise   had   indicated   his   assent   to   the   statements   contained  in  the  letter  it  might  also  have  been  admissible.  The  attorney   was   then   called   for   that   purpose.   The   letter   was   written  by  the  wife  of  the  defendant  and  if  she  had  testified   at   the   trial   the   letter   might   have   been   admissible   to   impeach   her   testimony.     The   plaintiff   now   brings   this   action.     If   Exhibit   L   is   excluded.  Counsel.  who  compromised  with  the   insurance  company  for  one-­‐half  their  face  value.   be   excluded   for   reasons   not   because   in   the   briefs.     98   .   Testimony   of   that   character   is   admissible   on   the   ground   that  it  relates  to  a  conversation  in  which  both   spouses   took   part   and   on   the   further   ground   that   where   the   defendant   has   the   opportunity   to   answer   a   statement   made   to   him   by   his   spouse   and   fails   to   do   so.  Servacio.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A. Counsel   for   the   defendant   argues   vigorously   that   the   letter   was   a   privileged   communication   and   therefore   not  admissible  in  evidence.   his   silence   implies   assent. plaintiff-appellant.     The   question   is   radically   diff   erent   from   that   of   the   admissibility   of   testimony   of   a   third   party   as   to   a   conversation   between   a   husband   and   wife   overheard   by   the   witness.  on   this  appeal.  It  appears  that  the  father  of  the  plaintiff  died  in  1897.   ISSUE:   WON  the  letter  written  by  the  wife  is  admissible   RULING:   The   letter   Exhibit   L   must.   In   this   respect   there   can   be   no   difference   between   an   ordinary   communication  and  one  originally  privileged. LIMITED.   The   plaintiff   was   asked.   the   fact   that   he   had   the   letter   in  his  possession  is  no  indication  of  acquiescence  or  assent   on   his   part.   maintaining   that  the  policies  and  goods  insured  belong  to  him  and  not   to   the   estate   of   his   deceased   father   and   alleges   that   he   is   not   bound   by   the   compromise   effected   by   the   administrator  of  his  father's  estate.   counsel   for   the   plaintiff   formally   withdrew   the   waiver   previously   given  by  the  plaintiff  and  objected  to  the  testimony  of  the   attorney  on  the  ground  that  it  was  privileged.     The  plaintiff  seeks  to  recover  the  face  value  of  two   insurance  policies  upon  a  stock  of  dry  goods  destroyed  by   fire.Y.     UY CHICO.  while  on  the  witness  stand.   at   which   time   he   was   conducting   a   business   under   his   own   name..   and   for   that   purpose   introduced   evidence   showing   that   the   plaintiff's   attorney   had   surrendered   the   policies   to   the   administrator   with   the   understanding   that   such   a   compromise   was   to   be   effected.  to  which  he  replied  in  the  negative. ET AL.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira       FACTS:     At   the   time   of   the   fire   "Uy   Layco"   was   heavily   indebted   and   subsequent   thereto   the   creditors   petitioned   for  the  appointment  of  an  administrator  of  the  estate  of  the   plaintiff's  father.000.   but   she   was   not   put   on   the   witness-­‐stand  and  the  letter  was  therefore  not  offered  for   the   purpose.     The  defendant  insurance  company  sought  to  show   that   the   plaintiff   had   agreed   to   the   compromise   settlement   of   the   policies.   a   letter   written   to   the   defendant   by   his   wife   and   seized   by   the   police   in   searching   his   effects   on   the   day   of   his   arrest.     The   letter   in   question   was   obtained   through   a   search  for  which  no  warrant  appears  to  have  been  issued.  base  their  argument  on  the  proposition  that  a   waiver   of   the   client's   privilege   may   be   withdrawn   at   any   time  before  acted  upon     ISSUE:   WON  the  testimony  was  privileged   RULING:   It   will   be   noted   that   the   evidence   in   question   concerned   the   dealings   of   the   plaintiff's   attorney   with   a   third  person.  Uy  Layco.  or  P6.   The   letter   is   therefore   nothing   but   pure   hearsay   and   its   admission   in   evidence   violates   the   constitutional   right   of   the   defendant   in   a   criminal   case   to   be   confronted   with   the   witnesses   for   the   prosecution   and   have   the   opportunity   to   cross-­‐examine   them.

 the  court  has  a  right  to  know  that  the  client   whose   privileged   information   is   sought   to   be   protected   is   flesh  and  blood.  on  his  client's   authority.   be   classified   in   a   legal   sense   as   a   privileged   communication   between   the   attorney   and   his   client.   is   a   communication  between  the  client  and  a  third  person.     "The  proposition  advanced  by  the  respondent  and   adopted  by  the  trial  court.   As   members   of   the   ACCRA   Law   Firm.  ACCRA  lawyers  acted  as  nominees-­‐ stockholders   of   the   said   corporations   involved   in   sequestration  proceedings.   i.   as   his   agent.   As   a   matter   of   public   policy..  with  the  correlative  and  incidental  services   where   its   members   acted   as   incorporators.   stock   certificates   endorsed   in   blank   representing   the   shares   registered   in   the   client's   name.   A   perilous   facility  of  fraud  and  wrong.   and   that   when   he   informed   the   plaintiff   of   the  surrender  of  the  policies  for  that  purpose  the  plaintiff   made   no   objection   whatever.   Under   this   premise.  would  result.   by   any   reasoning   whatever.     These   ACCRA   lawyers   were   impleaded   for   purposes  of  revealing  the  name  of  their  client.   the   organization   and   acquisition   of   business   associations   and/or   organizations.  Servacio.   or   simply.   Having   agreed   to   the   compromise..  The  third  party  may   well   rely   on   the   assurance   of   a   reputable   lawyer   that   he   has  authority  in  fact.   which   included.   as   stockholders.  the   members   of   the   law   firm   acquire   information   relative   to   the  assets  of  clients  as  well  as  their  personal  and  business   circumstances.  and   that  the  attorney  simply  occupies  the  role  of  intermediary   or  agent.     First.  after  fully  authorizing   his   attorney.   in   the   performance   of   these  services.   due   process   considerations   require   that   99   .  that  one.e.  In  the  course  of  their  dealings  with  their  clients.   It   is   plain   that   such   a   communication.     Second.  though  such  assurance  be  given  only   by  implication  from  the  doing  of  the  act  itself.   and   after   such   authority   has   been   executed   and  relied  on.   the   privilege   generally   pertains   to   the   subject  matter  of  the  relationship.  The  attorney  who.   pledges   his   reputation   and  integrity  that  he  binds  his  client.   The   evidence   is   sufficient   to   show   that   the   plaintiff   acquiesced   in   the   compromise   settlement   of   the   policies.   it   cannot.   to   enter   into   contract   with   a   third   party.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     defendants.   as   one   of   the   principal   Rheland  S.   Among   the   defendants   named   in   the   case   are   herein   petitioners  who  all  were  then  partners  of  the  ACCRA  Law   Firm.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  2015-­‐2016   It   is   evident   that   a   communication   made   by   a   client   to   his   attorney   for   the   express   purpose   of   its   being   communicated  to  a  third  person  is  essentially  inconsistent   with   the   confidential   relation.   the  general  rule  in  our  jurisdiction  as  well  as  in  the  United   States   is   that   a   lawyer   may   not   invoke   the   privilege   and   refuse  to  divulge  the  name  or  identity  of  his  client.   after   reaching   the   party   for   whom   it   was   intended   at   least.     RULING:   Court  ruled  in  the  affirmative.   When   the   attorney   has   faithfully   carried   out   his   instructions   by   delivering   the   communication   to   the   third   person   for   whom   it   was   intended   and   the   latter   acts   upon   it.   contracts   in   his   behalf.  the  members  of  the  law  firm  delivered  to  its   client   documents   which   substantiate   the   client's   equity   holdings.   is   most   startling.  and  in  keeping   with  the  office  practice.   which  includes  shares  of  stocks  in  the  named  corporations.  the  privilege  begins  to  exist  only  after  the   attorney-­‐client   relationship   has   been   established.   petitioners   and   private   respondent   Raul   Roco   admit   that   they   assisted   in   the   organization   and   acquisition   of   the   companies  included  in  Civil  Case  No.   and   a   blank   deed   of   trust   or   assignment   covering   said   shares.   for   the   recovery   of   alleged   ill-­‐gotten   wealth.   The   reasons   advanced   for   the   general   rule   are   well  established.  may  effectively  nullify  his  own  and  his  duly   authorized   agent's   act   by   closing   the   attorney's   mouth   as   to   the   giving   of   such   authority.Y.           Regala vs Sandiganbayan   FACTS:     The   matters   raised   herein   are   an   offshoot   of   the   institution   of   the   Complaint   on   July   31.   1987   before   the   Sandiganbayan  by  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines.   ACCRA   Law   Firm   performed   legal   services   for   its   clients.     It   is   manifest   that   the   objection   to   the   testimony   of  the  plaintiff's  attorney  as  to  his  authority  to  compromise   was   properly   overruled.   he   cannot   now   disavow   it   and   maintain   an   action  for  the  recovery  of  their  face  value.  through   the  Presidential  Commission  on  Good  Government  against   Eduardo   M.   ISSUE:  WON  under   the  peculiar  facts  of  this  case.   among   others.   Jr.  he  understood  that  there  was  a  compromise   to   be   effected.   The   attorney-­‐client   privilege   does   not   attach   until   there   is   a   client     Third.  0033.     Finally.   a   client's   identity   should   not   be   shrouded   in   mystery.   Cojuangco.   The   testimony   was   to   the   effect   that   when   the   attorney   delivered   the   policies   to   the   administrator.   the   attorney-­‐client   privilege   includes   the   identity   of   the   client(s).   More   specifically.  both  upon  the  attorney  and  the   third  party.

    Apart  from  these  principal  exceptions.  there  exist   other   situations   which   could   qualify   as   exceptions   to   the   general  rule.  therefore.   Terminal   Cab   Corporation.   The   key   lies   in   the   three   specific   conditions   laid   down  by  the  PCGG  which  constitutes  petitioners'  ticket  to   non-­‐prosecution  should  they  accede  thereto:     (a)  the  disclosure  of  the  identity  of  its  clients.   as   a   general   rule.   the   claim   should   be   rejected   by   the   insurer   and   action   or   suit   should   not   be   commenced   within   three   months   after   such   rejection.     ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY.   Inc.  2015-­‐2016   the   opposing   party   should.  the  general   rule  is  however  qualified  by  some  important  exceptions..   that  the  company  rejected  the  claim  on  April  15.  the   peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   Neugass   v.  Servacio.  For  instance..   In   the  answer  of  the  Orient  Insurance  Company.  "A  party  suing  or  sued  is  entitled  to  know  who   his  opponent  is.  interposed  in   the   civil   case   mentioned.   since   such   revelation   would   otherwise  result  in  disclosure  of  the  entire  transaction. REVILLA.   Petitioners..   the   identity   of   the   client   has   been   held   to   be   privileged.  it  constituted   an   integral   part   of   their   duties   as   lawyers.  clearly  reveal  that   the   instant   case   falls   under   at   least   two   exceptions   to   the   general   rule.     For   example.   which   is   privileged   information.   is   plaintiff   in   a   civil   action   instituted   for   the   purpose   of   recovering   upon   two   fire   insurance   policies   issued   by   the   Orient   Insurance   Company. FACTS:   The   object   of   the   petition   is   to   obtain   an   order   requiring  the  respondent  judge  to  permit  the  attorney  for   the   petitioner   to   examine   a   letter   (Exhibits   49   and   49-­‐A)   part  of  which  has  been  read  into  the  record  in  the  course  of   the   examination   of   one   of   the   witnesses   testifying   for   the   plaintiff   in   the   case   of   Teal   Motor   Co.     1.   have   a   legitimate   fear   that   identifying   their   clients  would  implicate  them  in  the  very  activity  for  which   legal   advice   had   been   sought.  More  important.   vs. Judge of First Instance of Manila.  his  identity  is  privileged. P.   1929.  1929. 3.   Inc. INC.   by   no   less   than   the   PCGG   itself.   which   was   more   than   three   100   .   prompted   the   New   York   Supreme   Court   to   allow   a   lawyer's   claim   to   the  effect  that  he  could  not  reveal  the  name  of  his   client  because  this  would  expose  the  latter  to  civil   litigation.   The   circumstances   involving   the   engagement   of   lawyers  in  the  case  at  bench. Client   identity   is   privileged   where   a   strong   probability   exists   that   revealing   the   client's   name   would  implicate  that  client  in  the  very  activity  for   which  he  sought  the  lawyer's  advice.   Summarizing   these   exceptions.  that   notice  of  such  rejection  was  given  to  the  plaintiff  by  letter   on   the   same   day..     (b)   submission   of   documents   substantiating   the   lawyer-­‐client  relationship.   the   content   of   any   client   communication  to  a  lawyer  lies  within  the  privilege  if  it  is   relevant   to   the   subject   matter   of   the   legal   problem   on   which   the   client   seeks   legal   assistance.     There   is   no   question   that   the   preparation   of   the   aforestated  documents  was  part  and  parcel  of  petitioners'   legal  service  to  their  clients. 2.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     established   in   the   case   at   bar."  He  cannot  be  obliged  to  grope  in  the  dark   against  unknown  forces.   and   that   suit   was   not   instituted   on   the   policy   until   August   3.   as   stated   earlier.e.   because   the   privilege. and TEAL MOTOR CO.   the   alleged   accumulation   of  ill-­‐gotten  wealth  in  the  aforementioned  corporations.   disclosure   of   the   alleged   client's   name   would   lead   to   establish   said   client's   connection   with   the   very   fact   in   issue   of   the   case.Y.   the   client's  name  is  privileged.   Where   disclosure   would   open   the   client   to   civil   liability.     Notwithstanding  these  considerations. vs.   know   his   adversary.     The  link  between  the  alleged  criminal  offense  and   the   legal   advice   or   legal   service   sought   was   duly   Rheland  S.   therefore.   by   revealing   the  client's  name.   First. E.   Moreover.   information   relating   to   the   identity   of   a   client   may   fall   within   the   ambit   of   the   privilege   when   the   client's   name   itself   has   an   independent  significance.  and     (c)   the   submission   of   the   deeds   of   assignment   petitioners  executed  in  favor  of  their  clients  covering  their   respective  shareholdings...   in   case   of   loss. respondents.  the  said  name  would  furnish  the   only   link   that   would   form   the   chain   of   testimony   necessary   to   convict   an   individual   of   a   crime.   Orient   Insurance  Company     Teal   Motor   Co.     Where   the   government's   lawyers   have   no   case   against   an   attorney's   client   unless.   where   the   nature   of   the   attorney-­‐client   relationship   has   been   previously   disclosed   and   it   is   the   identity   which   is   intended   to   be   confidential.   In   one   of   the   clauses   of   the   policies   sued   upon   is   a   stipulation   to   the   effect   that   all   benefit   under   the   policy   would   be   forfeited   if.   by   way   of   defense.   i.  such  that  disclosure  would  then   reveal  client  confidences.   it   is   alleged.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A. petitioner.   protects   the   subject   matter   or   the   substance   (without   which  there  would  be  no  attorney-­‐client  relationship).

.   and   the   jurisprudence   on   the   subject   does  not  recognize  any  exception..   or   retaining   of   the   services   of   plaintiff's   attorneys   in   connection   with   said   cases.   The   incorporation   of   this   excerpt   from   the   letter   was   a   necessary   support   of   the   oral   statement   which   the   witness   had   made.  2015-­‐2016   months  after  the  rejection  of  the  claim.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     record   was   either   proof   of   the   defendant.   and   there   can   be   no   question   that.   Privilege  primarily  refers  to  communications  from  client  to   attorney.   whether   he   had   any   objection.   the   witness   produced   the   letter   and   the   part   of   it   already   quoted   was   read   into   the   record.  Bachrach.   With   respect   to   this   point   it   is   difficult   to   see   how   a   contract   for   fees   could   be   considered   privileged.     The  witness  E.   that   his   answer   should   be   stricken   out.   conversation."  it  being  a  well-­‐known  rule  of  law  that  a  witness   cannot   be   permitted   to   give   oral   testimony   as   to   the   contents   of   a   paper   writing   which   can   be   produced   in   court.."     It  was  stated  by  the  attorney  for  the  plaintiff  that   only   a   part   of   the   letter   had   anything   to   do   with   the   urging   of  the  presentation  of  the  complaints  in  the  cases  to  which   the   witness   had   testified.   because  they  related  to  the  terms  of  employment  between   attorney   and   client..  Inc.   if   your   Honor   please.  Servacio.   in   conformity   with   the   rule   that   when   part   of   a   document   is   offered   in   evidence.   even   supposing   that   the   matter   contained   in   the   letter   and   withheld   from   the   inspection   of   the   adversary   was   originally   of   a   privileged   nature.   Of   course   contracts   between   attorneys   and   clients   are   inherently   personal   and   private   matters.   and   the   respondent   judge   was   in   error   in   refusing   to   permit   the   inspection   of   the   letter   by   said   attorney.   in   accordance   with   the   express   provision   of   section  283  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.  but  not   privileged.   and   that   the   other   part   of   the   letter   referred   to   the   contract   of   fees.   but   they   are   a   constant   subject   of   litigation.   and   when   the   fact  was  revealed  that  the  communication  had  been  made   by   letter.   and   if   this   basis   for   such   statement   had   not   been   laid   by   the   incorporation   of   the   excerpt   into   the   record.     The   respondent   judge   appears   to   have   considered   that   the   excerpt   from   the   letter   thus   incorporated   in   the   Rheland  S.  president  of  the  Teal   Motor   Co.   and   if   not.  in  opposing  the  introduction  of  other  portions  of   the   letter   in   proof.   Inc.   the   oral   statement  of  the  witness  concerning  the  tenor  of  the  letter   should   properly   have   been   stricken   out.   The   excerpt   in   question   must   therefore   be   considered   as   proof   submitted   by   the   plaintiff.   The   attorney   for   the   defendant   thereupon   insisted   before   the   court  that.   or   that   at   least   the   legal   responsibility   for   the   incorporation   of   said   excerpt  into  the  record  was  attributable  to  the  defendant.  the  other  part  of   the   letter   being   a   communication   between   a   client   and   attorney.   "between   the   attorney   and   ourselves.   the   attorney   for   the   defendant   requested   that   the   witness   be   required   to   produce   the   letter   in   court.   or   writing   admissible   when   part   has   been   given   in   evidence   by   one   party.       101   .  and  its  attorneys.   its   production   having   been   demanded   by   defendant's   counsel.     FACTS:   WON   the   presentation   of   the   part   of   the   letter   constitutes  a  waiver  to  present  the  the  whole   RULNG:   A  witness  for  the  plaintiff  made  an  oral  statement   as   to   the   substance   of   part   of   a   letter   which   had   been   received   by   the   plaintiff   from   its   attorney.   and   the  attorney  observed  that  he  would  have  no  objection  to   the   disclosing   of   that   part   of   the   letter   which   referred   exactly   to   the   point   of   the   urging   of   the   filing   of   the   complaints.   an   idea   which   of   course   includes   communications   from   attorney   to   client   relative   to   privileged  matters.Y.  the   whole   of   the   letter   could   properly   be   examined   by   the   other   party..  The  provision  in  section  283  of  the  Code   of   Civil   Procedure   making   the   whole   of   a   declaration.   the   privilege   was   waived   by   the   introduction   in   evidence   of   part  of  the  letter.   But   instead   of   withdrawing  the  oral  statement  of  the  witness  concerning   the   nature   of   the   written   communication.   the   entire   document   should   be   exhibited.  and  he  added:  "Unfortunately.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  a  matter.   while   being   examined   in   chief   by   the   attorneys   for   the   plaintiff.   the   entire   document   must   be   presented.   and   speaking   of   the   circumstances   surrounding   the   institution   of   the   action.."   meaning   between  the  Teal  Motor  Co.  inasmuch  as  all  the  letter  refers  to  the  case  then   in   court.     But.   or   to   the   fee   to   be   paid   to   the   attorney.   We   are   unable   to   accept   this   view.  under  certain  circumstances.   and   contracts   relating   to   fees   are   essentially   not   of   a   privileged   nature.   that   the   other   parts   were   privileged.  entirely  distinct   from   the   urging   of   the   presentation   of   the   cases.  certainly  be.   said   that   he   had   reported   certain   conversations   to   plaintiff's   attorneys.   He   was   asked   by   the   counsel   for   the   defendant   to   produce   the   other   part   of   the   letter   referred   to.   Inc.   I   don't   think.     The   court   thereupon   inquired   of   the   attorney   for   the   Teal   Motor   Co.   but   the   witness   refused   stating   that   it   contained   private   matter.   it   can   be   disclosed  without  the  consent  of  both.   part   of   the   letter  having  been  introduced  in  behalf  of  the  plaintiff.  so  the  attorney  suggested.   makes   no   exception   as   to   privileged   matter.  M.   Irrelevant   it  might.     We  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  attorney  for   the   defendant   in   the   court   below   was   entitled   to   examine   the   whole   of   the   letter   with   a   view   to   the   introduction   in   evidence   of   such   parts   thereof   as   may   be   relevant   to   the   case   on   trial.     It   was   stated   in   court   by   the   attorney   for   the   plaintiff.   This   in   legal   effect   was   a   demand   for   the   production   of   "the   best   evidence.

  People  v. 7.   another   case   was   filed   in   court   against   Peredes   for   violation   of   the   provisions   of   the   anti-­‐graph   and   corrupt   practices  act.   His   application   was   approved   and.  it  must  be  for:   • • A  legitimate  purpose.   Pls-­‐67   of   the   Rosario   Public   Land   Subdivision   Survey.  as  the  facts  thereof  and  the  actuations  of  both   respondents   therein   constitute   an   exception   to   the   rule.   who   was   formerly   the   provincial   attorney.     • The   case   that   involves   a   prominent   politician   in   Mindanao. SANDIGANBAYAN Background  of  this  case:   1.   pursuant   to   a   free   patent   granted   to   him.   After.At   the   time   when   the   information   was   learned   in   confidence  by  the  lawyer.   For   THE  INFORMATION  RELAYED  BY  THE  CLIENT  TO  THE   Rheland  S. The   decision   of   the   Sandiganbayan   must   be   reversed   and  set  aside.   Respondent   Sansaet   was   a   practicing   attorney   who   served   as   counsel   for   Paredes  in  several  instances  pertinent  to  the  criminal   charges  involved  in  the  present  recourse. Petitioner   seeks   the   annulment   of   the   resolution   of   the   Sandiganbayan   which   denied   petitioner's   motion   for   the   discharge   of   respondent   Generoso   S.  and  congressman.   is   barred   by   the   attorney-­‐client   privilege.  same  act  or   omission.   Pertinently.   respondent   Sansaet   served  as  counsel  of  Paredes  in  that  civil  case.   and   is   at   present   a   Congressman.   Because   of   this.   as   proposed   state   witness.   The   attorney-­‐client   privilege   cannot   apply   in   these   cases.   •   Ruling  of  the  Court:   6.   someone   filed   a   case   of   perjury   against   Paredes   which   was   then   dismissed.  a  special  law.     During  his  stint.  Agusan  del  Sur.     Reckoning   point   to   be   considered   as   communication  in  relation  to  a  PAST  CRIME:   .     Fast-­‐forward.   then   Governor   of   the   same   province. The   principal   issues   on   which   the   resolution   of   the   petition  at  bar  actually  turns  are  therefore     a.     • The   legal   profession   is   intended   for   a   lawful   or   legitimate  purpose.   he   is   eligible   for   discharge   to   testify  as  a  particeps  criminis.     By  way  of  defense.   San   Francisco-­‐Bunawan-­‐Rosario   in   Agusan   del   Sur.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     102   .   LAWYER   OR   THE   ADVICE   OF   THE   LAWYER   GIVEN   TO   THE   CLIENT   IN   THE   COURSE   OF   OR   IN   THE   VIEW   OF   PROFESSIONAL   EMPLOYMENT   RESPECTING   A   PAST   CRIME/ACT     Meaning.  and   Related   to   a   past   crime-­‐–NOT   an   ongoing   or   future   crime.   The   trial   court   rendered  judgment  3  nullifying  said  patent  and  title   after   finding   that   respondent   Paredes   had   obtained   the   same   through   fraudulent   misrepresentations   in   his   application. 2.   the   Director   of   Lands   filed   an   action  2  for  the  cancellation  of  respondent  Paredes'   patent  and  certificate  of  title  since  the  land  had  been   designated   and   reserved   as   a   school   site   in   the   aforementioned   subdivision   survey.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A. 3.   The   Bureau   of   lands   even   move   for   cancellation   of   the   title   on   the   ground   of   misrepresentation.  2015-­‐2016   PEOPLE V.   3097-­‐A.  and     b.  Paredes  contended  that   the   second   complaint   filed   in   court   arose   from  the  same  incident  subject.   in   1985. (1)   whether   or   not   the   projected   testimony   of   respondent   Sansaet.   an   original   certificate   of   title   was   issued   in   his   favor   for   that   lot   which   is   situated   in   the   poblacion   of   San   Francisco. (2)   whether   or   not.   Paredes.   someone   came   forward   and   accused  Paredes  of  committing  fraud  in  his   application   for   titling.  Sandiganbayan     • •   Issues  presented  before  us:   5.  Paredes  was  able  to  acquire   a   free   patent   over   a   vast   tract   of   land   in   Mindanao. 4.  Servacio.   as   a   consequence   thereof.   Sansaet   to  be  utilized  as  a  witness     Respondent   Honrada   was   the   Clerk   of   Court   and   Acting   Stenographer   of   the   First   Municipal   Circuit   Trial   Court.   However.Y.   They   alleged   that   double   jeopardy   has   already   attached.   of   the   earlier   perjury   case   which   was   already   dismissed.   Respondent   Paredes   was   successively   the   Provincial   Attorney   of   Agusan   del   Sur.   The   information   regarding   an   ongoing   or   future   crime  are  not  covered  by  the  privilege  on  two  grounds:   • No   longer   in   the   course/   with   the   view   of   professional   employment   because   the   employment   there   must   be   in   the   course   of/   with   the   view   of   a   lawful  employment.   Respondent   Paredes   applied   for   a   free   patent   over   Lot   No.   then   governor.

    On   appeal.   into   the   substance   of   the   conversation   during  the  first  meeting.   It   is   beyond   dispute   that   the   attorney-­‐client   privilege   does   not   extend   to   communications   regarding   an   103   .   He   was   suggested   by   the   prosecution   to   be   a   state   witness   against   Paredes   but   the   Sandiganbayan   denied   the   motion   on   the   ground   of   client-­‐lawyer   privilege   since   lawyer   could   not   testify   against  his  own  client.   Here.       clients…   3. A   communication   divulged   to   "strangers"   or   outsiders   can   scarcely   be   considered   a   confidential   communication   between   attorney   and   client.   to   give   testimony   regarding   allegedly   privileged   conversations   between   appellant's   attorney   and   his   Rheland  S.   Held:   SC   said   that   there   is   no   privileged   communication   rule   to   talk   about.   Atty..   several   of   the   codefendants   were   present.   the   privilege   applies   only   if   the   information   was   relayed   by   the   client   to   the   lawyer   respecting   a   past   crime.     Unfortunately.   Marchand   subsequently   pled   guilty   on   Count   I   of   the   indictment  and  testified  at  trial  for  the  Government.  Estrumsa.       US v.     6.C. Appellant.   Prior   to   entering   her   plea. Brenda   Marchand   was   charged   as   a   codefendant   with   the   crimes   for   which   appellant   was   convicted.   appellant   contends   her   conviction   should   be   reversed   because   the   district   court   permitted   a   Government   witness.     On   each   of   these   occasions.   were   not   clients  of  Mr.   that   the   communication   was   considered   confidential   despite   the   presence   of   a   stranger). The  decisions  of  the  lower  courts  must  be  affirmed.   The   conversations   in   question  dealt  with  plans  to  commit  perjury  so  as  to   hide   the   criminal   activity   of   appellant   and   others.     5.   and   it   is   unclear   whether   all   the   other   persons  in  these  meetings  were  Estrumsa's  clients.  Servacio.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Ruling  of  the  Court:   8.   1 Estrumsa. On  redirect.     4.   Therefore.   The   principal   issue   in   this   regard   is   whether   the   statements   in   attorney   Estrumsa's   office   were   2 protected   by   the   attorney-­‐client   privilege.   9.   this   communication   is   not   protected   by   the  attorney-­‐client  privilege.   the   testimony   was   nonetheless   admissible.  was  convicted  after  a   trial   by   jury   on   all   three   counts   of   an   indictment   charging   her   with   conspiracy   to   possess   with   intent   to   distribute   approximately   four   kilograms   of   cocaine.   and   the   substantive   charges   of   possession   with   intent   to   distribute   and   distribution   of   the   cocaine. Gordon-Nikkar   Background  of  the  Case:   1.  at  Mr.  another  case  was  filed   against   the   three   for   falsification   of   judicial   records.  2015-­‐2016   • • • double   jeopardy   to   attach:   there   must   be   arraignment   and   the   case   was   dismissed   without  the  consent  of  the  accused. 2.   the   second   conversation   was   the   subject   of   thorough   cross-­‐examination   by   Estrumsa.  agreed  to   give   perjured   cover-­‐up   testimony   at   trial   to   the   effect  that  none  of  them  had  possessed  the  cocaine. Marchand   testified   that   at   this   meeting   the   participants.     The   lawyer   then   offered   to   testify   against   his   client.S.     There   were   at   least   five   persons   present   at   Estrumsa's   office   on   this   occasion.  Estrumsa's  suggestion.   and   perhaps   others.     To   support   such   defense   the   accused   presented   court   records   and   transcripts   as   proof   that   he   was   arraigned   in   the   perjury   case.   but  instead  merely  happened  to  be  at  a  party  where   the  cocaine  was  discovered.     10.  §§  841(a)  (1).  SC   also   said   that   the   communication   referred   in   the   rule   does   not   only   cover   oral   or   written   communication   but   even  PHYSICAL  ACTS.Y. But   even   if   it   appeared   that   the   communication   in   question   were   otherwise   privileged   (i.   It   was   done   in   conspiracy   with   the   lawyer   of   Paredes   and   clerk   of   court   where   the   perjury   case   was   filed.  over  defense   objection.  846.     The  Issue  presented  before  this  Court:   7.  Ana  Gordon-­‐Nikkar.   e.  not  when  the  lawyer  was  made  to  testify.   the   information   was   given   in   contemplation   of   a   future  crime.   such   documents   were   discovered   to   be   falsified.   Brenda   Marchand.     SC  said  reckoning  point  is  when  communication   was  given.   The   second   conversation   involved   Estrumsa's   alleged   recommendation   that   Marchand   leave   the   country   and  go  to  Venezuela.  Because  of  this.  the  Government  inquired.   Marchand   had   two   meetings   in   the   office   of   appellant's   attorney.  21  U.   It   must   be   noted   however   that   Marchand   was   not   a   client   of   Estrumsa.   at   least   one   of   the   persons.   Brenda   Marchand.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A. Of   the   two   conversations   related   by   Marchand.

 It  would  be   a   perversion   of   the   privilege   to   extend   it   so   as   to   protect  communications  designed  to  frustrate  justice   by   committing   other   crimes   to   conceal   past   misdeeds.   Mr.   In   pursuit   of   their   common   defnese.   The   lawyer   may   not   be   examined   without   the   consent   of   the   client   on   any   information   that   the   lawyer   obtain   or   may   have   obtained   from   the   client   as   well   as   any   advice   that   the   lawyer   may   give   to   the   client   in   the   course     of   or  with  the  view  to  professional  employment.   This   includes   the   scenario   where   the   client   relayed   information  to  the  lawyer  or  the  lawyer  gives  an  advice  to  the   client   with   the   view   for   professional   employment.   Any   information   that   one   party   may   relay   to   the   lawyer   of   another  party  with  respect  to  matters  of  common  interest  or   joint  defense  is  still  covered  by  the  privilege  even  absent  the   client-­‐lawyer  relationship  between  them.  the  privilege/rule  still   applies—Principle   of   Common   Defense   or   Joint   Interest.  without  the   consent  of  the  client  and  his  employer.  —  The  following  persons  cannot  testify  as  to   matters  learned  in  confidence  in  the  following  cases:   XXX   (b)  An  attorney  cannot.  Disqualification  by  reason  of  privileged   communication.   Benton.  or  his  advice  given  thereon  in   the  course  of.   hoping   that   mcpartlin   could   provide   significant   information   that   can   be   used   to   destroy   testimony   of   Benton-­‐-­‐divulged   information   beneficial   to   ingram.  or  clerk  be  examined.  Ingram  Corporation.     To   the   best   interest   of   mcpartlin   and   ingram.   the   objective   being.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     • This  involves  a  criminal  prosecution  for  conspiracy  to   commit   fraud   against   the   government   of   US   and   obstruction   of   justice.   the   lawyer   of   ingram   engaged   services   of   investigator   who   interviewed   mcpartlin.  This  is  the  doctrine   enunciated  in  the  case  of  US  v.   they   came  up  with  a  common  defense  against  Benton-­‐-­‐to   their   mutual   interest   to   destroy   the   testimony   of   Benton.   What   is   important  is  that  it  is  a  communication  between  a  client  and   a  lawyer.   one   of   those   is   congressman   Mcpartlin  by  certain  private  individuals.  nor  can  an  attorney's  secretary.  McPartlin:       PURPOSE:   To  encourage  free  flow  of  information  between  the   lawyer   and   the   client.Y.  or  with  a  view  to.   preliminary   to   the   actual   perfection   of   the   contract.   Benton   was   part   of   the   series   of   negotiation  where  the  conspiracy  took  place.   where   lawyer   of   104   .     An   exception   to   the   rule   is:   even   if   the   communication   is   made   not   between   a   client   to   a   lawyer   or   made  between  a  lawyer  to  a  non-­‐client.   WHO  OWNS  THE  PRIVILEDGE?   The  interest  sought  to  be  protected  is  the  interest  of   the  client.     11.  the  privilege  belongs  to  the  CLIENT.     The  star  witness  for  the  prosecution  was  the  former   VP   of   the   contractor   of   a   private   corporation. 2.  LAWYER-­‐CLIENT  PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATION   RULE  130. There  must  be  a  Client-­‐Lawyer  Relationship   The  information  relayed  by  the  client  to  the  lawyer   or  the  advice  of  the  lawyer  given  to  the  client  in  the   course   of   or   in   the   view   of   professional   employment  respecting  a  PAST  CRIME/ACT     Advice   or   information   given   must   be   given   in   confidence     THERE  MUST  BE  A  CLIENT-­‐LAWYER  RELATIONSHIP   Rheland  S.     2.  Therefore.   to   enable   the   lawyer  to  effectively  perform  his  official  function  as  counsel.   by   virtue   of   the   phrase—“with   the   view   for   professional  employment”.   meaning.  2015-­‐2016   intended  crime. The  policy  underlying  the  attorney-­‐client  privilege  is   to  promote  the  administration  of  justice.     Facts:   • And   what   better   way   to   achieve   this   purpose   than   assuring   that   whatever   information.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  without  the  consent  of  his   client.  professional   employment.  be  examined  as  to  any  communication  made   by  the  client  to  him.     TN:   not   only   the   information   given   during   the   lawyer-­‐client  relationship  but  any  information  that  the  client   may   relay   to   the   lawyer   or   any   advice   that   the   lawyer   may   give   to   the   client   even   before   the   relationship   is   formalized   is   covered.  This  involves   a   government   contract   for   sludge   hauling   project   with  a  private  corporation. 3.  concerning   any  fact  the  knowledge  of  which  has  been  acquired   in  such  capacity.   In   the   course   of   these   negotiations   and   series   of   meetings.   Benton   claim   that   he   keep   a   diary   of   all   the   meetings   specifying   the   details   which   includes   incriminating   information-­‐-­‐   the   conspiracy   between     mcpartlin  and  ingram  corporation.   however   incriminating.   stenographer.  Section  24.   Filed   against   some   government   officials.   Mr.  Servacio.   given   by   the   client   to   the   lawyer   is   protected   by   the   rule   on   confidentiality.   • • REQUISITES:   1.

 on  which  we  alternatively  base   our  ruling  on  this  point.  Benton  kept  diaries.  2015-­‐2016   • ingram  tried  to  introduce  this  information.   SC   called   this   as   the   Common   Defense   or   Joint  Interest  Privilege.13   56   The  exclusion  of  the  McPartlin  statements   would  not  be  reversible  error  even  if  he  had   not  been  entitled  to  claim  the  privilege.  and  Frederick   Ingram  and  McPartlin  cooperated  in  that   effort.Y.  where  it   not   for   this   common   purpose.  of  the  attorney-­‐client  privilege.   When   a   client   communicates   with   the   lawyer   of   the   other   party   pursuant   to   a   common   defense.  naming  the  persons  involved   and  often  recording  the  substance  of  the   conversations.  as  it  was  to  the  other   Rheland  S.   53   No.  or   appointment  calendars.   but   when   there   is   no   client-­‐lawyer   relationship  between  the  accused  and  the  lawyer  of  the  other   accused   who   hired   the   services   of   the   investigator   who   interviewed   the   accused   it   is   obvious   that   the   interview   was   contracted   pursuant   to   a   matter   of   common   defense-­‐-­‐to   discredit  the  testimony  of  Mr.  This  US  case  has  persuasive  effect  in  our   jurisdiction.   the   interview   would   not   have   been   conducted.  In  the  second  of  these   interviews  McPartlin  made  certain   statements.  Servacio.  In  a  brief  supporting  a  pretrial   "Motion  for  Additional  Time  to  Conduct   Document  Analysis.   105   .   under   lawyer/client   privileged  communication.  Since   Benton's  diaries  corroborated  so  much  of   his  testimony.  The  McPartlin  Statements  and  the   Attorney-­‐Client  Privilege  Among  Co-­‐ defendants  and  Their  Counsel   51   Throughout  the  period  covered  by  the   indictment.  We   are  satisfied  from  our  examination  of  the   transcript  of  the  In  camera  hearing.  SC  said  that  any  communication  that   one   party   disclose   to   another   party   on   matters   of   common   interests   covered/protected   by   the   client-­‐lawyer   privilege   communication  rule.  and   because  the  government's  case  hinged   largely  on  Benton's  testimony.  after  an  In  camera  hearing.  in  part.     Issue  presented  before  the  Court:   Ø Can  a  defendant  offer  testimonial  evidence  made  to   his  lawyer  by  his  co-­‐defendant  pursuant  to  a  joint  or   common  defense?     Held:     defendants."  Ingram's  counsel   stated.  even  though  Ingram's  defense   was  based.   Mcpartlin   objected   to   this.     The   privilege   still   covers   instances   where   the   common/joint   defense   exists.   As   in   this   case.  Benton  and  his  diary.  which   was  sealed  and  made  a  part  of  the  record   on  appeal.  it  was  imperative  from  the   standpoint  of  all  defendants  that  an  effort   be  made  to  discredit  them.  when  Ingram   offered  evidence  of  these  statements.   sustained  the  objection  on  this  and  another   ground.   Inter  alia.  The  Benton  diaries  figured   prominently  in  the  government's  case.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Such  an  effort  was  made.  At  trial.   because  Ingram's  account  of  events  in  issue   differed  materially  from  Benton's.  in  which  he  made   notes  concerning  meetings  and  telephone   conversations.  on  the  argument  that  he   had  made  the  payments  in  response  to  the   threats  Benton  had  reported  to  him.  with  reference  to  contemplated   tests  on  the  Benton  diaries.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   and  the  court.  which  Ingram  argues  tend  to   support  his  defense.   52   Destroying  Benton's  credibility  was   important  to  Ingram.   50   1.   McPartlin's  counsel  objected  on  the  ground.  the  lawyer  of  the  other  party  is  deemed  the  lawyer   of  the  other.14  We  do  not  disclose  the   contents  of  the  statements  because  they   remain  protected  by  the  attorney-­‐client   privilege.   55   An  investigator  acting  for  Frederick  Ingram's   counsel  twice  interviewed  McPartlin  with   the  consent  of  the  latter's  counsel12  for  the   purpose  of  determining  whether  there  was   a  basis  for  challenging  the  truth  of  some  of   the  diary  entries.  for   they  corroborated  much  of  his  testimony.  that  the  statements  merely   corroborated  facts  which  were  admitted  in   evidence  and  which  the  jury  obviously   found  to  be  true.

 The  cases  do  not  establish  such   a  limitation.   Cooperation  between  defendants  in  such   circumstances  is  often  not  only  in  their   own  best  interests  but  serves  to  expedite   the  trial  or.  42  Wash.   The  privilege  protects  pooling  of   information  for  any  defense  purpose   common  to  the  participating  defendants."   8  Colum.  2   N.  in  its   revision  of  the  Federal  Rules  of  Evidence.  Chahoon  v.L.  (Emphasis  supplied  and  citations   omitted.  from  the   evidence  adduced  at  the  hearing  held   pursuant  to  Rule  404(a).Evid.  Emmanuel.Y.  That  finding  is   not  clearly  erroneous.2d  799.   See  State  v..  The   Advisory  Committee's  Note  to  proposed   Rule  503(b)  makes  it  clear  that  the  joint-­‐ interest  privilege  is  not  limited  to  situations   in  which  the  positions  of  the  parties  are   compatible  in  all  respects:   60   The  third  type  of  communication  occurs  in   the  "joint  defense"  or  "pooled  information"   situation.  .  Note.  2  J.   259  P.)  822   (1871).  are  a  useful  guide  to  the   federal  courts  in  their  development  of  a   common  law  of  evidence.2d  413  (1942).  381.  Rule  503(b)(3)  of  the  proposed   Federal  Rules  of  Evidence.  Weinstein.Prob.15  and  there  is  no  reason  to   impose  it.R.2d  845.  the  judge  found.  &  Soc.   Commonwealth.   deleted  the  detailed  privilege  rules  and  left   the  subject  of  privilege  in  federal  question   cases  to  "be  governed  by  the  principles  of   common  law  as  they  may  be  interpreted  by   the  courts  of  the  United  States.   Rheland  S.  (21  Gratt.  8   Colum.   Hunydee  v."  63   Yale  L.Supp.  Ingram   acknowledges  that  communications  by  a   client  to  his  own  lawyer  remain  privileged   when  the  lawyer  subsequently  shares  them   with  co-­‐defendants  for  purposes  of  a   common  defense.   "Waiver  of  Attorney-­‐Client  Privilege  on   Inter-­‐Attorney  Exchange  of  Information.Y.5.   Uninhibited  communication  among  joint   parties  and  their  counsel  about  matters  of   common  concern  is  often  important  to  the   protection  of  their  interests.  1030  (1954).J.   406  F.  Therefore.  Matter  of  Grand  Jury  Subpoena.   58   In  the  case  at  bar.  &  Soc.)  Although  the  Congress.  854-­‐855  (1953).  has  been  recognized  in  cases   spanning  more  than  a  century.  .  The  rule  does  not  apply  to   situations  where  there  is  No  common   interest  to  be  promoted  by  a  joint   consultation.  the  recommendations  of  the   Advisory  Committee.  Servacio.  at  503-­‐6  to   503-­‐7.  2015-­‐2016   57   McPartlin  was  entitled  to  the  protection  of   the  attorney-­‐client  privilege.  a  project   in  which  Ingram  and  McPartlin  and  their   attorneys  were  jointly  engaged  for  the   benefit  of  both  defendants.   61   Quoted  in  2  J.  355  F.  Weinstein.  United  States.  v.  Fed.R.  Note.1975).  501   Fed.  as  in  the  case  at  bar.Prob.  1965).J.  547.  waiver  is   not  to  be  inferred  from  the  disclosure  in   confidence  to  a  co-­‐party's  attorney  for  a   common  purpose.  Supra.   United  States.J.  at  501-­‐20.  the  trial   106   .  330  F.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     59   Ingram  argues  that  the  co-­‐defendants'   defenses  must  be  in  all  respects  compatible   if  the  joint-­‐defense  privilege  is  to  be   applicable.Evid.  that   McPartlin  had  made  the  statements  to  the   investigator  in  confidence.  Supra.N.  They   were  made  in  connection  with  the  project   of  attempting  to  discredit  Benton.  as  approved  by   the  Supreme  Court.2d  183  (9th   Cir.   Supra.  approved  by  the   Supreme  Court.  The  common-­‐defense   rule.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  where  different  lawyers  represent   clients  who  have  Some  interests  in   common.  Schmitt  v.  211  Minn.  at  179-­‐180."  R.  In   criminal  cases  it  can  be  necessary  to  a  fair   opportunity  to  defend.  62  Va.  179  (1972).  which  is  not  as  narrow  as  Ingram   contends.  Emery.   Weinstein.2d  347  (1964)."  See  2  J.L.  .  and  the  parties  meet  on  a   purely  adversary  basis.  as  a   preliminary  question  of  fact.4  to  501-­‐20.  because  his   statements  were  made  in  confidence  to  an   attorney  for  a  co-­‐defendant  for  a  common   purpose  related  to  both  defenses..  387-­‐389  (S.  Note.  In  this   instance  we  follow  the  recommendation.  "The  Attorney-­‐ Client  Privilege  in  Multiple  Party  Situations.  Evidence  503-­‐52  (1977).D.W.  Continental  Oil  Co.  stated  that  the   privilege  applies  to  communications  by  a   client  "to  a  lawyer  representing  another  in   a  matter  of  common  interest.

 as  Ingram  contends. 3.  United  States  v.2d  918.   denied   the  motion  and  allowed  the  witness  to  testify. 7."   Trial   on   the   merits   ensued.2d  275  (1971).  Kovel.  The  court  went  on  to  state.  2015-­‐2016   preparation.   United  States.  United  States   v.2d  1076.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     8. 2.).Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   however.  Cf.   1961)  (client's  communications  to  an   accountant  employed  by  his  attorney).   and  during  cross-­‐examination  McPartlin   passed  Ingram's  attorney  a  note  containing   information  for  use  in  the  cross-­‐ examination.     Private   respondent's   counsel   announced   that   he   would   present   as   his   next   witness  the  Chief  of  the  Female  Services  of  the   National   Mental   Hospital.   Petitioner's   counsel   filed   an   urgent   omnibus   motion   to   quash   the   subpoena   ad   testificandum   and   suspend   the   proceedings   pending  resolution  of  the  motion.16   62   8  8  Wigmore.4  (9th   Cir.   during   and   after   the   marriage  and  until  the  present.     NELLY LIM V.  1961).  in  effect. 6.  supra.  404  U. Petitioner   and   private   respondent   are   lawfully   married  to  each  other.     The   trial   court.  958.   Acampado   would   be   presented  as  an  expert  witness  and  would  not   testify   on   any   information   acquired   while   attending   to   the   petitioner   in   a   professional   capacity.  When  the  Ingram  and   McPartlin  camps  decided  to  join  in  an   attempt  to  discredit  Benton. 5. 64   Inasmuch  as  McPartlin  was  entitled  to   assert  the  privilege  whether  Ingram  was   tried  jointly  or  separately.  The  attorney  who  thus   undertakes  to  serve  his  client's  co-­‐ defendant  for  a  limited  purpose  becomes   the  co-­‐defendant's  attorney  for  that   purpose.  to  Ingram's  attorney   rather  than  his  own.   supra.Y. 4.  because   no  joint  defense  or  common  interest  was   alleged.  In  Friedman   the  court  held  its  decision  in  Hunydee  v.  that  even  if  Hunydee   was  applicable.  there  was  no  privilege  since   "the  facts  of  the  conversation  negate   confidentiality.  Evidence  §  2301  at  583   (McNaughton  rev.  296  F.  1085  n."  445  F.   Movant   argued   that   having   seen   and   examined   the   petitioner   in   a   professional   capacity.S.   Dr.4.   326.   Acampado   is   barred   from   testifying   under   the   rule   on   the   confidentiality   of   a   physician-­‐patient   relationship.   Said   counsel   forthwith   orally   applied   for  the  issuance  of  a  subpoena  ad  testificandum   requiring  Dr.  is  not  to  the  contrary.  Acampado  to  testify.Ed.  the  attorney   for  each  represented  both  for  purposes  of   that  joint  effort.     Petitioner's  counsel  opposed  the  motion  on  the   ground  that  the  testimony  sought  to  be  elicited   from   the   witness   is   privileged   since   the   latter   had   examined   the   petitioner   in   a   professional   capacity  and  had  diagnosed  her  to  be  suffering   from  schizophrenia.  in  the   footnote  relied  upon.   63   Nor  was  it.   statements  even  if  those  statements  had   not  been  merely  cumulative.  Servacio.Supp.   Lydia   Acampado.  30  L. CA   Background  of  the  Case:   1.  relied  on  by   Ingram.  at  391.  921-­‐922  (2d  Cir.  inapplicable.  445  F.   Dr.  406  F.2d  at  1085  n.  Cert.     Counsel   for   private   respondent   contended.   Private   respondent   presented  three  (3)  witnesses  before  taking  the   witness   stand   himself   to   testify   on   his   own   behalf.   Friedman.   per   respondent   Judge.  Acampado  thus  took  the  witness  stand.   private   respondent   filed   with   Branch   53   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   of   Pangasinan   a   petition  for  annulment  of  such  marriage  on  the   ground   that   petitioner   has   been   allegedly   suffering   from   a   mental   illness   called   schizophrenia   "before.  fatal  to  the   privilege  that  McPartlin  made  the   statement.  denied.  The  relationship  was  no   different  than  it  would  have  been  if  during   the  trial  the  Ingram  and  McPartlin  attorneys   had  decided  that  Ingram's  attorney  would   cross-­‐examine  Benton  on  behalf  of  both.   the   court   heard   this   urgent   motion.  was   qualified   by   counsel   for   private   respondent   as   107   .Ct.   that   Dr.  92  S.   Before   Dr.  A  claim  of  privilege  was  upheld  in   circumstances  such  as  these  where   communications  were  made  directly  to  the   attorney  for  another  party  in  In  the  Matter   of  Grand  Jury  Subpoena  Duces  Tecum.   a   Doctor   of   Medicine   who   specializes   in   Psychiatry.   Dr.  no  prejudice   would  have  resulted  from  the  joint  trial  by   reason  of  the  exclusion  of  the  McPartlin   Rheland  S.   Acampado   took   the   witness   stand   on   25   January   1989.

  these   changes   affected   the   meaning   of   the  provision."  and  (b)  substitution  of  the  word   reputation  for  the  word  character.  Rule  130  of  the  1964  Revised  Rules  of  Court   with   two   (2)   modifications.   There   is   a   distinction   between   these   two   concepts.  2015-­‐2016   an   expert   witness   and   was   asked   hypothetical   questions  related  to  her  field  of  expertise.   The   former   signifies   reality   and   the   latter   merely   what   is   accepted   to   be   reality   at   108   .  Section   21."   9   Verily. Said   Section   21   in   turn   is   a   reproduction   of   paragraph  (f).  With  the  advent  of  the   Revised   Rules   on   Evidence   on   1   July   1989.   A   physician   is   not   disqualified   to   testify   as   an   expert   concerning  a  patient's  ailment.   it   was   imperative   that   the   information   would   blacken  such  character.   without   the   consent   of   the   patient.Y.  Section  26.     "SECTION   24.  Servacio.   Disqualification   by   reason   of   privileged   communication.  She   neither   revealed   the   illness   she   examined   and   treated   the   petitioner   for   nor   disclosed   the   results   of   her   examination   and   the   medicines   she  had  prescribed.   The   facts   and   conditions   alleged   in   the   hypothetical   problem   did   not   refer   and   (sic)   had   no   bearing   to   (sic)   whatever   information   or   findings  the  doctor  obtained  from  attending   the   (sic)   patient.     15.    The  CA  ruled:   “Given   a   set   of   facts   and   asked   a   hypothetical   question. Under  the  1940  Rules  of  Court.  it  was  sufficient   if   the   information   would   tend   to   blacken   the   character   of   the   patient.  Rule  123  of  the  1940   Rules   of   Court   with   a   modification   consisting   in   the  change  of  the  phrase  "which  would  tend  to   blacken"   in   the   latter   to   "would   blacken. This  is  a  reproduction  of  paragraph  (c).   surgery   or   obstetrics   cannot   in   a   civil   case.   provided   the   physician   does   not   give   testimony   tending   to   disclose   confidential   information   related   to   him   in   his  professional  capacity  while  attending  to   the  patient.   12.   the   rule   was   relaxed   once   more   by   the   substitution   of   the   word   character   with   the   word   reputation.   7.   436.  and  'reputation'  is  what  he  is  supposed  to  be   in   what   people   say   he   is.   namely:   (a)   the   inclusion   of   the   phrase   "advice   or   treatment   given  by  him.   a   stricter   requirement   was   imposed.   (Butler   vs.   Role.   Rule   130   of   the   Revised   Rules   of   Evidence)   exist   in   the   case   at   bar.     It   was   denied   again   by   the   CA   upon   appeal   due   to   failure  in  establishing  the  confidential  nature  of   the  testimony  given.   Dr.   Expert   testimony   of   a   physician   based   on   hypothetical   question   (sic)   as   to   cause   of   illness   of   a   person   whom   he   has   attended   is   not   privileged.  Section  24  of   the  Revised  Rules  on  Evidence  which  reads:   Rheland  S.  when  he  can   disregard   knowledge   acquired   in   attending   such   patient   and   make   answer   solely   on   facts   related   in   (sic)   the   hypothetical   question.   "'Character'   is   what   a   man   is.   and   'reputation'   on   attributes  which  others  believe  one  to  possess.   be   examined   as   to   any   advice   or   treatment   given   by   him   or   any   information   which   he   may   have   acquired   in   attending  such  patient  in   a   professional   capacity.   'Character'   depends   on   attributes   possessed. The   petitioner   appeals   before   the   Court   to   reverse  the  decisions  of  the  lower  courts  in  not   finding   that   all   the   essential   elements   of   the   rule   on   physician-­‐patient   privileged   communication   under   Section   21.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     (c)   A   person   authorized   to   practice   medicine.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A. The   RTC   denied   the   omnibus   motion.   1926).   —   The   following   persons   cannot   testify   as   to   matters   learned   in   confidence  in  the  following  cases:   xxx  xxx  xxx   Rulings  of  the  Lower  Courts:     9. The  law  in  point  is  paragraph  (c)."   13.     14.”     The  Issue  presented  before  the  Court:   10.   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court   (Section   24.   which   information   was   necessary   to   enable   him   to   act   in   that   capacity.   Supreme   Court   of   Arizona   Jan.   Acampado   rendered   an   opinion   regarding   the   history   and   behaviour   of   the   fictitious   character   in   the   hypothetical   problem. The  petition  must  be  denied.   and  which  would  blacken   the   reputation   of   the   patient.   242   Pac.   In   the   1964   Rules   of   Court.     Ruling  of  the  Court:   11.

  then   the   father   and   after   having   the  history.  the  following  requisites  must  concur:   1) the  privilege  is  claimed  in  a  civil  case.   Acampado's   answers   to   the   questions   propounded   to   her   relating   to   the   hypothetical   problem   were   influenced   by   the   information   obtained   from   the   petitioner.   Otherwise   stated.  if  disclosed."   16.   as   well.  interview  and   treatment  of  the  petitioner.   3) The   relation   must   be   one   which   in   the   opinion   of   the   community   ought   to   be   sedulously  fostered   4) The   injury   that   would   inure   to   Rheland  S.   thus:       Q     I   am   asking   you.   As   correctly   held   by   the   Court   of   Appeals.  the  facts   and   conditions   alleged   in   the   hypothetical   problem   did   not   refer   to   and   had   no   bearing   on   whatever   information   or   findings   the   doctor   obtained   while   attending   to   the   patient. Firstly.   17.  2015-­‐2016   present.  Nelly.  it  is  quite  clear  from  Dr.  I  interviewed   the  patient.Y.  It  is  to  be  emphasized   that  "it  is  the  tenor  only  of  the  communication   that   is   privileged.   2) the  person  against  whom  the   privilege   is   claimed   is   one   duly   authorized   to   practice   medicine.   only   disclosures   which   would   have  been  made  to  the  physician  to  enable  him   "safely  and  efficaciously  to  treat  his  patient"  are   covered  by  the  privilege.   surgery   or   obstetrics.   The   mere   fact   of   making   a   communication.   As   an   expert   witness. The  physician  may  be  considered  to  be  acting  in   his   professional   capacity   when   he   attends   to   the  patient  for  curative."  15   19.  and   5) the   information   was   confidential.   There   is. These   requisites   conform   with   the   four   (4)   fundamental   conditions   necessary   for   the   establishment   of   a   privilege   against   the   disclosure  of  certain  communications.   21.   are  therefore  not  privileged  from  disclosure. This   rule   on   the   physician-­‐patient   privilege   is   intended   to   facilitate   and   make   safe   full   and   confidential   disclosure   by   the   patient   to   the   physician   of   all   facts.  preventive.  so   long   as   the   subject   communicated   is   not   stated.   and  be  enabled  safely  and  efficaciously  to  treat   his  patient.  or  palliative   treatment.   There   is   authority   to   the   effect   that   information  elicited  during  consultation  with  a   physician   in   the   presence   of   third   parties   removes   such   information   from   the   mantle   of   the  privilege:   "Some   courts   have   held   that  the  casual  presence  of  a  third   109   .   3) such   person   acquired   the   information   while   he   was   attending   to   the   patient   in   his   professional  capacity.   to   the   end   that   the   physician   may   form   a   correct   opinion.   2) This   element   of   confidentiality   must   be   essential   to   the   full   and   satisfactory   maintenance   of   the   relation   between   the   parties."   20.   her   expert   opinion   excluded   whatever   information   or   knowledge   she   had   about   the   petitioner   which   was   acquired   by   reason   of   the   physician-­‐patient   relationship   existing   between   them.   circumstances   and   symptoms.   no   showing   that   Dr.   Said   interviews   were   always   conducted   in   the   presence   of   a   third   party.   whom   did  you  interview?   A   I   interviewed   the   husband   first.  Servacio.  and.   would  blacken  the  reputation   (formerly   character)   of   the   patient.   untrammeled   by   apprehension   of   their   subsequent   and   enforced   disclosure   and   publication   on   the   witness   stand.  to  wit:   1."  14   18. The   communications   must   originate  in  a  confidence  that   they  will  not  be  disclosed.   4) the   information   was   necessary   to   enable   him   to   act  in  that  capacity.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     the   relation   by   the   disclosure   of   the   communications   must   be   greater   than   the   benefit   thereby  gained  for  the  correct   disposal  of  litigation. In   order   that   the   privilege   may   be   successfully   claimed.  moreover.   Thus.   doctor.  11  It  rests  in  public  policy  and  is  for   the  general  interest  of  the  community.  Acampado's   testimony   that   the   petitioner   was   never   interviewed   alone.  she  did  not  disclose  anything  obtained   in  the  course  of  her  examination.   as   well   as   the   date   of   a   consultation   and   the   number   of   consultations. Secondly.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   her   testimony   before   the   trial   court  cannot  then  be  excluded.

  who   was   once   confined   in   the   hospital   for   drug   rehabilitation.   Relate  this  ruling  to  Rule  28   Mode   of   discovery   called   mental   and   physical   examination   The   court.   upon   motion   of   adverse   party.   except   for   the   petitioner's   sweeping   claim   —   that   "(T)he   information   given   by   Dr.   nothing   specific   or   concrete   was   offered   to   show   that   indeed.   irreparable   injury   to   the   name   and   reputation   of   petitioner   and   her   family."   22   —   which   is   based   on   a   wrong   premise.     was   objected   under   physician-­‐patient   privilege   rule.   For   example:   Autopsy   is   neither   preventive   nor   curative. “professional  employment”   2.   When   a   physician   attends   to   a   patient.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     What   is   prohibited   by   the   rule   is   the   disclosure   of   specific   information.  the  party  subjected  to  the   physical   examination   is   deemed   to   have   waived   any   confidential   information   relating   to   any   other   examination   conducted  relating  to  the  same  mental  condition.  36—the  husband  is  mentally  deficient  due   to   his   incessant   alcoholism   and   excessive   drug   use.  So  the  physician  may   disclose   that   indeed   a   certain   patient   is   under   my   care   or   under  my  medical  treatment.       INFORMATION  MUST  BE  GIVEN  IN  CONFIDENCE   If  the  advice  is  given  in  the  presence  of  a  third  party. Thirdly.  These  medical  reports  serve   as  repository  of  all  the  findings/diagnosis/treatment   administered   by   the   physician   to   the   patient.  Ca   SC:   what   is   prohibited   by   the   rule   is   the   disclosure   of   the   specific   information—the   treatment   given   or   procedure   administered.   the   diagnosis.     SC  SAID:   ANY   INFORMATION/TREATMENT/ADVICE   GIVEN   SHOULD   BE   MADE   IN   THE   COURSE   OF   A   PROFESSIONAL   EMPLOYMENT   1.  not  the  records.   CASE:   Chan   V.   It   Rheland  S.   the   former   would   obviously   put   into   writing  his/her  findings/diagnosis/treatment  into  the   latter’s  medical  record.   3—   the   effect   is   when   a   party   examined   request   for   the   copy   of   the   result   of   the   report   of   the   examination  caused  to  be  conducted  by  the  adverse  party/at   the  instance  of  the  adverse  party.   Acampado   brings   disgrace   and   invite   (sic)   reproach   to   petitioner   by   falsely   making   it   appear   in   the   eyes   of   the   trial   court   and   the   public   that   the   latter   was   suffering   from   a   mental   disturbance   called   schizophrenia   —   which   caused.  this  is  a  good  case)   A   wife   filed   a   case   for   nullity   of   marriage   under  art.  he  cannot  anymore  object  to   the   disclosure   of   the   results   of   the   other   examinations   because   he   has   deemed   to   have   waived   his   right   to   the   confidential   nature   of   his   other   reports   related   to   the   same   mental   condition   subject   of   the   examination   contemplated   in   rule  28.   4   in   relation   to   Sec.   Acampado   would   blacken   the   former's   "character"   (or   "reputation").   CASE:  Lim  V.   To   prove   such.   SURGERY.   producing   this   medical   record   in   court   is   not   different   from   the   physician   testifying   therefore.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.  CA   The  wife  objected  to  the  production  of  her   medical   record   based   on   the   interview   conducted   by   her  psychiatrist.   Sec.   OR   110   .  Servacio.     CASE:  Lim  V.   So.   it   is   not   covered.   covered  by  the  privilege.   Dr.   not   exclusively   in   the   presence   of   the   patient.  So.   not   the   fact   of   consultation.   the   information   obtained   from   Dr.Y.   and   continues   to   cause.  2015-­‐2016   person   destroys   the   confidential   nature   of   the   communication   between   doctor   and   patient   and   thus   destroys   the   privilege   and   that   under   such   circumstances   the   doctor  may  testify.   Acampado   never   disclosed   any   information   obtained   from   the   petitioner   regarding  the  latter's  ailment  and  the  treatment   recommended  therefor.   Even   if   the   disclosure   is   of   specific   information   regarding  the  treatment  of  the  advice. Interpreted   as   PREVENTIVE   OR   CURATIVE   TREATMENT.   The  wife  argued  that  the  privilege  will  not  apply—  it   only  applies  when  then  the  physician  is  examined  or   the  testimony  of  the  physician.   it   is   only   a   fact   finding   procedure-­‐-­‐not  covered.  if  there   is  other  examination  conducted.   the   information   relayed   by   the   patient   to   the   physician   but   NOT  THE  FACT  OF  CONSULTATION.   SC   disagrees.   may   order   the   submission   to   physical   examination   of   a   party.   the   wife   move   for   the   issuance   of   subpoena   duces   tecum   for   the   submission   of   the   medical   records   of   the   husband.”   22.     MAY   ONLY   BE   INVOKED   AGAINST   A   PERSON   AUTHORIZED   TO   PRACTICE   MEDICINE.   Chan   (if   mockbar   examiner   is   updated.   Physician  may  not  be  EXAMINED   covers   not   only   the   testimony   of   the   physician—when  the  physician  is  called  to  be  examined.  it  will  not   be   covered   by   the   privilege   if   it   is   established   that  during  the  interview  the  patient  was  always   accompanied  by  third  party.

 private  respondent  submits  that  privileged   communication   may   be   waived   by   the   person   entitled   thereto.  par.   .   Paz   Fernandez   were   married   at   the   Saint   Vincent   de   Paul   Church   in   San   Marcelino.   Paz   on   the   ground   of   "incapacitas   assumendi   onera   conjugalia  due  to  lack  of  due  discretion  existent  at   the   time   of   the   wedding   and   thereafter.   Edgar   Krohn.     She  argues  that  since  Sec.   Jr.     Their   blessings   notwithstanding.  2015-­‐2016   OBSTETRICS   TN:   the   communication   must   be   between   the   physician   and   the   patient   and   if   such   communication   was   made   with   the   presence   of   a   third   party.  This   was   objected   to   on   the   ground   that   it   violated   the   rule   on   privileged   communication   between   physician  and  patient..   not   the   physician  who  prepared  the  report.   In   1973.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     8) 9) The   trial   court   resolves   to   overrule   the   objection   because  the  psychiatric  report  is  very  material  and   relevant  to  the  issue  of  the  case.   Jr.   however   contends   that   "the   rules   are   very   explicit:   the   prohibition   applies   only   to   a   physician.  Paz  before  the   trial   court."   On   23   October   1990.   and   this   petitioner   expressly   did   when   she   gave   her   unconditional   consent   to   the   use  of  the  psychiatric  evaluation  report  when  it  was   presented   to   the   Tribunal   Metropolitanum   Matrimoniale   which   took   it   into   account   among   others   in   deciding   the   case   and   declaring   their   marriage   null   and   void.  security  and   confidence   to   the   relation   of   physician   and   his   patient.   Jr.   the   relationship   between   the   couple   developed   into   a   stormy   one.   the   legal   prohibition   to   testify   is   not   applicable   to   the   case   at   bar   where   the   person   sought   to   be   barred   from   testifying   on   the   privileged   communication   is   the   husband   and   not   the   physician   of   the   petitioner.   The   union   produced   three   children.   The   effort   however   proved   futile.  24.   In   1975.       The  CA  affirmed  the  RTC  and  denied  the  appeal.   he   cited   the   Confidential   Psychiatric   Evaluation   Report   which   Ma.   Paz   merely   denied   in   her   Answer   as   "either   unfounded  or  irrelevant.   Edgar   filed   a   petition   for   the   annulment  of  his  marriage  with  Ma.   Edgar   was   able   to   secure   a   copy   of   the   confidential  psychiatric  report  on  Ma.  Rule  130.   Paz  underwent  psychological  testing  purportedly  in   an   effort   to   ease   the   marital   strain.   Thus   ..   according   to   him.  Servacio.   it   ceases   to   be   confidential  or  privileged."       11) She   further   argues   that   to   allow   her   husband   to   testify   on   the   contents   of   the   psychiatric   evaluation   report   "will   set   a   very   bad   and   dangerous   precedent   because   it   abets   circumvention   of   the   rule's  intent  in  preserving  the  sanctity.Y.   In   1971.   Manila.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A."   At   the   hearing   on   8   May   1991.   findings   or   evaluation   prepared   by   a   physician   which   the   latter   has   acquired   as   a   result   of   his   confidential   and   privileged   relation   with  a  patient.   Cornelio   Banaag.   November   1978..   3   In   his   petition.   "WITH   MORE   REASON   should   a   third   person   (like   respondent-­‐husband   in   this   particular   instance)   be   PROHIBITED   from   testifying   on   privileged   matters   between  a  physician  and  patient  or  from  submitting   any   medical   report. CA Facts:   1) A  confidential  psychiatric  evaluation  report  is  being   presented   in   evidence   before   the   trial   court   in   a   petition   for   annulment   of   marriage   grounded   on   psychological  incapacity.   Edgar   took   the   witness  stand  and  tried  to  testify  on  the  contents  of   the  Confidential  Psychiatric  Evaluation  Report.   .   presenting   the   report   among   others.   and   Ma."   16   In   fact.  of   the   Rules   of   Court   prohibits   a   physician   from   testifying   on   matters   which   he   may   have   acquired   in  attending  to  a  patient  in  a  professional  capacity."     The  issue  presented  before  us:   111   ."     Arguments  of  the  Respondent  on  Appeal:   12) Private   respondent   Edgar   Krohn.   2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7)   Decision  of  the  Lower  Courts:   Rheland  S.   he   obtained   a   decree   ("Conclusion")   from   the   Tribunal   Metropolitanum   Matrimoniale   in   Manila   nullifying   his   church   marriage   with   Ma."     On   10   July   1979.     Arguments  of  the  Petitioner  on  Appeal:   10) Petitioner  now  seeks  to  enjoin  the  presentation  and   disclosure  of  the  contents  of  the  psychiatric  report.   the   decree   was   confirmed   and   pronounced  "Final  and  Definite.   they   finally   separated  in  fact.   13) Besides.  (c).   and   Baltazar  Reyes.   On   14   June   1964.   .   the   Rules   sanction   his   testimony   considering   that   a   husband   may   testify   against   his   wife   in   a   civil   case  filed  by  one  against  the  other.   Private   respondent   further   argues   that   petitioner   also   gave   her   implied   consent  when  she  failed  to  specifically  object  to  the   admissibility  of  the  report  in  her  Answer  where  she   merely   described   the   evaluation   report   as   "either   unfounded  or  irrelevant.     KROHN V.  Paz  prepared   and   signed   by   Drs.     The  witness  testifying  on  the  report  is  the  husband   who   initiated   the   annulment   proceedings.   Ma.

 or  barely  38  days  from  the   effectivity   of   her   health   insurance.   if   disclosed.   BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE V.   She   paid   these   amounts   in   full   on  October  17.   For   the   period   October   16.   And   that   I   should   not   release   any   medical   information   concerning   her   neurologic   status   to   anyone   without   her   approval.     Rheland  S.  2002."   18) In   the   instant   case.   respondent   Danilo   Olivares.   2003.   (b)   the   person   against   whom   the   privilege   is   claimed   is   one   duly   authorized   to   practice   medicine. 3.  Inc.   2003.   she  requested  from  the  representative  of  petitioner   at  Medical  City  a  letter  of  authorization  in  order  to   settle   her   medical   bills.   Consequently.   2002   to   October   15.   he   invoked  the  rule  on  privileged  communications  but   never  questioned  the  testimony  as  hearsay.   2002.   consequently.   Olivares   applied   for   a   health   care   program   with   petitioner   Blue   Cross   Health   Care.   the   person   against   whom   the   privilege   is   claimed   is   not   one   duly   authorized   to   practice   medicine.   in   failing   to   object   to   the   testimony   on   the   ground   that   it   was   hearsay.Y.  It  was  a   fatal   mistake.   she   and   her   husband. 4.   2003.   surgery   or   obstetrics.  On  December  5.   she   also   availed   of   the   additional   service   of   limitless   consultations   for   an   additional   amount   of   P1.   Neither   can   his   testimony   be   considered   a   circumvention   of   the   prohibition   because   his   testimony   cannot   have   the   force   and   effect   of   the   testimony   of   the   physician   who   examined  the  patient  and  executed  the  report.117.   They   thereafter  filed  a  complaint  for  collection  of  sum  of   money  against  petitioner  in  the  MeTC  on  January  8.  2002.   is   not   doubted.   she   underwent   several   laboratory   tests..   Indeed.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     112   .   6   she   paid   the   amount   of   P11.   (e)   the   information   was   confidential   and.   For   the   same   period.   [Respondent]   Neomi   T.  2002.   That  she  no  longer  has  any  relationship  with   [petitioner].   (c)   such   person   acquired   the   information   while   he   was   attending  to  the  patient  in  his  professional  capacity.  she  demanded  that   petitioner  pay  her  medical  bill.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   In   a   letter   to   petitioner   dated   February   14.   In   his   Manifestation   before   the   trial   court   dated   10   May   1991.     2.   8   informed   her   that   she   could   be   discharged  from  the  hospital.   as   well   as   the   reasons   therefor.   11   In   its   answer   dated   January   24.   were   constrained   to   settle   the   bill.   would   blacken   the   reputation  (formerly  character)  of  the  patient.   Dr. OLIVARES Background  of  the  Case:   1.  Saniel  stated  that:   This   is   in   response   to   your   letter   dated   February   13.   Olivares   called   by   phone   on   January   29.   (d)  the  information  was  necessary  to  enable  him  to   act   in   that   capacity.20.   On  November  30.217.  Court  of  Appeals  clearly  lays  down   the   requisites   in   order   that   the   privilege   may   be   successfully  invoked:  (a)  the  privilege  is  claimed  in  a   civil   cases.   Plainly   and   clearly.  She  incurred  hospital   expenses   amounting   to   P34.   and. 5.   surgery   obstetrics.  a  health  maintenance  firm.  When  petitioner  still   refused.   During   her   confinement.   Dr.   For.   her   attending   physician.   In   the   health   care   agreement.   He   is   simply   the   patient's   husband   who   wishes   to   testify   on   a   document   executed   by   medical   practitioners.   the   evidence   offered   may   be   admitted.   petitioner   maintained   that   it   had   not   yet   denied   respondents'   claim   as   it   was   still   awaiting   Dr.   2002.  2015-­‐2016   14) The  issue  is  whether  the  objection  on  the  ground  of   privileged   communication   between   a   psychiatrist   and   a   patient   should   be   sustained   as   to   exclude   the   testimony  of  the  husband  about  the  contents  of  the   psychiatric  report  from  evidence.   Edmundo   Saniel.   2003.   2003.  2002.   this   does   not   fall   within   the   claimed   prohibition.   ailments   due   to   "pre-­‐existing   conditions"   were   excluded  from  the  coverage.   17) Petitioner's   discourse   while   exhaustive   is   however   misplaced.   On   December   2.   statutes   making   communications   between   physician   and   patient   privileged  are  intended  to  inspire  confidence  in  the   patient  and  encourage  him  to  make  a  full  disclosure   to  his  physician  of  his  symptoms  and  condition.   16) The   treatise   presented   by   petitioner   on   the   privileged   nature   of   the   communication   between   physician   and   patient.   But   petitioner   refused   to   issue   the   letter   and   suspended   payment   pending   the   submission   of   a   certification   from   her   attending   physician   that   the   stroke   she   suffered   was   not   caused  by  a  pre-­‐existing  condition.   She   stated   that   she   is   invoking   patient-­‐physician   confidentiality.   counsel   waived   his   right   to   make   such   objection   and.   Saniel's  report.  Servacio.   2003.   respondent   Neomi   suffered   a   stroke   and   was   admitted   at   the   Medical   City   which   was   one   of   the   hospitals   accredited   by   petitioner.  Lim  v.   19) Counsel  for  petitioner  indulged  heavily  in  objecting   to   the   testimony   of   private   respondent   on   the   ground   that   it   was   privileged.   The  Ruling  of  the  Court:   15) The  appeal  should  be  denied.     She   was   discharged   from   the   hospital   on   December   3. Respondent   Neomi   T.000.  The  application  was  approved   on   October   22.

The   MeTC   denied   Olivares’   complaint   for   lack   of   cause   of   action.   Section   3   (e).     CHAN V.   she   had  convinced  him  to  undergo  hospital  confinement   for  detoxification  and  rehabilitation.  limitations  of  liability   on   the   part   of   the   insurer   or   health   care   provider   must   be   construed   in   such   a   way   as   to   preclude   it   from   evading   its   obligations.     6) Here.   It   is   an   established   rule   in   insurance   contracts   that   when   their   terms   contain   limitations   on   liability.   it   contends   that   the   presumption   that   evidence   willfully   suppressed   would   be   adverse   if   produced   should   apply  in  its  favor.   14.   7) Furthermore. The  CA  affirmed  the  decision  of  the  RTC.   9.   but   may   be   contradicted   and   overcome  by  other  evidence:   xxx  xxx  xxx       (e)   That   evidence   willfully   suppressed  would  be  adverse  if  produced     5) However.  (b)   the   suppression   was   not   willful.   Hence. Olivares  counter  that  the  burden  was  on  petitioner   to   prove   that   Neomi's   (the   wife)   stroke   was   excluded   from   the   coverage   of   their   agreement   because   it   was   due   to   a   pre-­‐existing   condition.   CA.     7.  Saniel's  report  was  justified.   Disputable   —   The   Rheland  S. The   issue   is   whether   Blue   Cross   was   able   to   prove   that   respondent   Neomi's   stroke   was   caused   by   a   pre-­‐existing   condition   and   therefore   was   excluded   from  the  coverage  of  the  health  care  agreement.   this   presumption   does   not   apply   if   (a)   the  evidence  is  at  the  disposal  of  both  parties.     The   RTC   held   that   it   was   the   burden   of   Blue   Cross     to   prove   that   the   stroke   of   respondent  Neomi  was  excluded  from  the  coverage   of   the   health   care   program   for   being   caused   by   a   preexisting   condition. Petitioner   never   presented   any   evidence   to   prove   that   respondent   Neomi's   stroke   was   due   to   a   pre-­‐ existing   condition.   Saniel's   report   would   be   adverse   to   Neomi.   During   the   PRE-­‐TRIAL   CONFERENCE. CHAN Background  of  the  case:   1.  The   113   .  Saniel's  report  to  bail  it  out.  respondents'  refusal  to  present  or  allow  the   presentation  of  Dr.   presumptions.   it   should   have   made   its   own   assessment   of   whether   respondent   Neomi   had   a   pre-­‐existing   condition   when   it   failed   to   obtain   the   attending   physician's   report.  It   was  privileged  communication  between  physician   and  patient.   It   was   not   able   to   discharge   that  burden.   v.     The  Ruling  of  the  Court:   12.        It   ordered   Blue   Cross   to   pay   the   medical   bill   among   other   damages."   Since  petitioner  had  the  burden  of  proving  exception   to   liability.   It   failed  to  prove  this.   Decision  of  the  Lower  Courts:   8.  Saniel. In   Philamcare   Health   Systems.   they   should   be   scrutinized   by   the   courts   with   "extreme   jealousy"   and   "care"   and   with   a   "jaundiced   eye.   This   doctrine   is   equally   applicable  to  health  care  agreements.   Indeed.   Inc.   13.   Rule   131   of   the   Rules   of   Court  states:   Sec.   Josielene   pre-­‐ marked   the   Philhealth   Claim   Form   that   Johnny   attached  to  his  answer  as  proof  that  he  was  forcibly   confined  at  the  rehabilitation  unit  of  a  hospital. 3.  Servacio.   Accordingly. On  appeal.  2015-­‐2016   Arguments  of  the  Parties:   6.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   they   should   be   construed   strictly   against   the   insurer.   we   ruled   that   a   health   care   agreement   is   in   the   nature   of   a   non-­‐life   insurance.   It   merely   speculated   that   Dr. The  petition  must  be  denied.  The  mere  reliance  on   a   disputable   presumption   does   not   meet   the   strict   standard   required   under   our   jurisprudence   [insofar   as  insurance  contracts  are  concerned]. Blue   Cross   argues   that   respondents   prevented   Dr.  as  already  stated.   3.Y.     The  Issues  presented  before  us:   11.   (c)   it   is   merely   corroborative   or   cumulative   and   (d)   the   suppression  is  an  exercise  of  a  privilege.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     following   presumptions   are   satisfactory   if   uncontradicted.   10.  the  RTC  reversed  the  MeTC’s  ruling.   The   wife   (Josie)   filed   before   the   RTC   a   petition   for   the   declaration   of   nullity   of   marriage   to   her   husband   Johnny  on  the  ground  that  he  failed  to  care  for  and   support  his  family  and  that  a  psychiatrist  diagnosed   him   as   mentally   deficient   due   to   incessant   drinking   and   excessive   use   of   prohibited   drugs.   based   on   her   invocation   of   the   doctor-­‐patient   privilege.     It   held   that   the   best   person   to   determine  whether  the  stroke  she  suffered  was  not   caused   by   “pre-­‐existing   conditions”   is   her   attending   physician  Dr.   This  was  a  disputable  presumption  at  best.   It   could   not   just   passively   wait   for   Dr.   Saniel   from   submitting   his   report   regarding   the   medical   condition   of   Neomi. 2.   These   are   contracts   of   adhesion   the   terms   of   which   must   be   interpreted   and   enforced   stringently   against   the   insurer   which   prepared   the   contract. This   case   is   about   the   propriety   of   issuing   a   subpoena   duces   tecum   for   the   production   and   submission   in   court   of   the   respondent   husband's   hospital  record  in  a  case  for  declaration  of  nullity  of   marriage   where   one   of   the   issues   is   his   mental   fitness  as  a  husband.

  2006   Josielene   filed   with   the   RTC   a   request   for   the   issuance   of   a   subpoena   duces   tecum   addressed   to   Medical   City   (the   rehabilitation   center).  2015-­‐2016   4.   would   be   at   the   time   they   are   offered.   Josielene's   request   for   subpoena   duces   tecum   is   premature.  He   attached   the   Philhealth   form   to   his   answer   for   the   limited   purpose   of   showing   his   alleged   forcible   confinement.   but   also   affidavits.   the   case   is   still   in   the   PRE-­‐TRIAL   stage.   and  may  prescribe  such  terms  and   conditions   as   are   just.   covering   Johnny's   medical   records   when   he   was   there   confined.   Rule   27   of  the  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  provides:     SEC.   It   is  when  those  records  are  produced  for  examination   at   the   trial.   Here.   papers.   photographs.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     must   be   made   immediately   after   the   offer  is  made.   the   court   in   which  an  action  is  pending  may  (a)   order   any   party   to   produce   and   permit   the   inspection   and   copying   or   photographing.   —   Objection   to   evidence   offered   orally   Rheland  S.   Rule   132.     Decisions  of  the  Lower  Courts:   6.   letters.   Section   1.   The   prohibition   covers   not   only   testimonies.   objects   or   tangible   things.   Section   36.  given  that   the  time  to  object  to  the  admission  of  evidence.   surveying.   which   constitute   or   contain   evidence   material   to   any   matter   involved   in   the   action   and   which   are   in   his   possession.   nd 13.Y.   measuring. Since   the   offer   of   evidence   is   made   at   the   trial.   books.  Thus:   “SEC.   on   August   22.   accounts.     The  Issue  presented  before  us:   8.   not   just   to  their  admission  in  evidence.   Johnny   opposed   the   motion.   st 11.   by   or   on   behalf   of   the   moving   party.  if  courts   were   to   allow   the   production   of   medical   records.  Servacio. The  CA  denied  Josie’s  appeal.   certificates.  The  order  shall   specify  the  time.  such   as   the   hospital   records.   or   (b)   order   any   party   to   permit   entry   upon   designated   land   or   other   property   in   his   possession   or   control   for   the   purpose   of   inspecting.  he  did  not  do  so  in  this  case.   or   photographing   the   property   or   any   designated   relevant   object   or   operation  thereon.   (Emphasis   supplied)     114   .   order.   that   Johnny   may   opt   to   object.   arguing   that   the   medical   records   were   covered   by   physician-­‐patient   privilege.   and   pertinent   hospital   records.    She  will  have  to  wait  for  trial  to  begin  before   making   a   request   for   the   issuance   of   a   subpoena   duces   tecum   covering   Johnny's   hospital   records.   then   patients   would   be   left   with   no   assurance   that   whatever   relevant   disclosures   they   may   have   made   to   their   physicians   would   be   kept   confidential.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A. form   carried   a   physician's   handwritten   note   that   Johnny   suffered   from   "methamphetamine   and   alcohol  abuse.   10.  The  request  was  accompanied  by  a  motion   to   "be   allowed   to   submit   in   evidence"   the   records   sought  by  subpoena  duces  tecum. 2   -­‐   It   is   of   course   possible   to   treat   Josielene's   motion  for  the  issuance  of  a  subpoena  duces  tecum   covering   the   hospital   records   as   a   motion   for   production   of   documents.    It  ruled  that.  place  and  manner   of   making   the   inspection   and   taking   copies   and   photographs. 1  -­‐    The  case  presents  a  procedural  issue.   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Evidence   quoted   above   is   about   non-­‐disclosure   of   privileged  matters.   not   privileged.   custody   or   control.   Section   24   (c).   The   offer   could   be   made   part   of   the   physician's   testimony   or   as   independent   evidence   that   he   had   made   entries   in   those   records   that   concern  the  patient's  health  problems.   —   Upon  motion  of  any  party  showing   good   cause   therefor."     Following   up   on   this   point.   The   CA   added   that.   Motion   for   production   or   inspection.   although   Johnny   can   waive  the  privilege. The  physician-­‐patient  privileged  communication  rule   essentially   means   that   a   physician   who   gets   information  while  professionally  attending  a  patient   cannot   in   a   civil   case   be   examined   without   the   patient's   consent   as   to   any   facts   which   would   blacken  the  latter's  reputation.   of   any   designated   documents. The  RTC  sustained  Johnny’s  opposition   7. Josie’s  petition  should  be  denied. The  issue  is  whether  the  refusal  of  the  lower  courts   to   issue   the   subpoena   to   obtain   Johnny’s   hospital   records   in   the   light   of   the   privileged   character   of   the   physician-­‐patient  communication  was  proper.”   12. 5.  but  more  so  to  their   disclosure.   a   discovery   procedure   available   to   a   litigant   prior   to   trial.   1.   Objection.   36.     The  Ruling  of  the  Court:   9.   states   that   objections  to  evidence  must  be  made  after   the   offer   of   such   evidence   for   admission   in   court.

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  

14.

15.

16.

17.

But   the   above   right   to   compel   the   production   of  
documents   has   a   limitation:   the   documents   to   be  
disclosed  are  "not  privileged."  
rd
3   -­‐   Josielene   of   course   claims   that   the   hospital  
records  subject  of  this  case  are  not  privileged  since  it  
is   the   "testimonial"   evidence   of   the   physician   that  
may   be   regarded   as   privileged.   Section   24   (c)   of   Rule  
130  states  that  the  physician  "cannot  in  a  civil  case,  
without   the   consent   of   the   patient,   be   examined"  
regarding   their   professional   conversation.   The  
privilege,  says  Josielene,  does  not  cover  the  hospital  
records   (which   is   a   document   only),   but   only   the  
examination  of  the  physician  at  the  trial.  
We  cannot  agree  to  this  argument.    To  allow  the  
disclosure   during   discovery   procedure   of   the  
hospital   records   —   the   results   of   tests   that   the  
physician   ordered,   the   diagnosis   of   the   patient's  
illness,   and   the   advice   or   treatment   he   gave   him  
—   would   be   to   allow   access   to   evidence   that   is  
inadmissible   without   the   patient's   consent.  
Physician   memorializes   all   these   information   in  
the   patient's   records.   Disclosing   them   would   be  
the   equivalent   of   compelling   the   physician   to  
testify   on   privileged   matters   he   gained   while  
dealing   with   the   patient,   without   the   latter's  
prior  consent.  
th
4   -­‐   Josielene   argues   that   since   Johnny   admitted  
in  his  answer  to  the  petition  before  the  RTC  that  
he   had   been   confined   in   a   hospital   against   his   will  
and   in   fact   attached   to   his   answer   a   Philhealth  
claim   form   covering   that   confinement,   he   should  
be   deemed   to   have   waived   the   privileged  
character   of   its   records.     She   invokes   Section   17,  
Rule  132  of  the  Rules  of  Evidence  that  provides:  
SEC.   17.   When   part   of  
transaction,  writing  or  record  given  
in   evidence,   the   remainder  
admissible.  —  When  part  of  an  act,  
declaration,   conversation,   writing  
or   record   is   given   in   evidence   by  
one   party,   the   whole   of   the   same  
subject   may   be   inquired   into   by  
the   other,   and   when   a   detached  
act,   declaration,   conversation,  
writing   or   record   is   given   in  
evidence,  
any  
other  
act,  
declaration,   conversation,   writing  
or   record   necessary   to   its  
understanding   may   also   be   given  
in  evidence.  
 
Yet   again,   this   is   still   premature   to   invoke.     Note  
again   that   the   proceedings   are   still   at   the   PRE-­‐
TRIAL  stage.    The  Trial  Proper  in  the  case  had  not  
yet   begun.   Consequently,   it   cannot   be   said   that  
Johnny   had   already   presented   the   Philhealth  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

claim   form   in   evidence,   the   act   which   would  
justify   Josielene   into   requesting   an   inquiry   into  
the   details   of   his   hospital   confinement.   Offering  
of  evidence  is  only  made  during  the  trial  proper.    
Johnny  was  not  yet  bound  to  adduce  evidence  in  
the   case   when   he   filed   his   answer.   Any   request  
for  disclosure  of  his  hospital  records  would  again  
be  premature.  
 

BANCO FILIPINO V. MONETARY
BOARD
 

Background  of  the  Case:  
1.
2.

Banco  Filipino  is  about  to  close  and  be  liquidated.    
Hence,  it  was  subjected  under  receivership.  
This  is  a  Petition  to  Set  Aside  Order  to  Produce  
Documents  as  ordered  by  the  RTC  for  the  production  
for  the  production,  inspection,  and  copying  of  
certain  papers  and  records  which  are  claimed  as  
needed  by  the  Petitioner  Bank  for  the  preparation  of  
its  comments,  objections,  and  exceptions  to  the  
Conservator's  report  dated  January  8,  1985,  and  
Receiver's  Report  dated  March  19,  1985.  The  
documents  now  asked  to  be  produced,  inspected,  
and  copied  are  the  following:    
(1)  Copies  of  tapes  and  transcripts  of  the  
Monetary  Board  (MB)  deliberations  on  the  
closure  of  Banco  Filipino  (BF)  and  its  
meeting  on  July  27,  1984,  and  March  22,  
1985;    
(2)  Copies  of  the  letter  and  reports  of  first  
conservator,  Mr.  Basilio  Estanislao,  to  the  
MB  and  to  Central  Bank  Governor  Jose  
Fernandez;    
(3)  Papers  showing  computations  of  all  the  
interests  and  penalties  charged  by  the  CB  
against  BF;    
(4)  Schedule  of  recommended  valuation  of  
reserves  per  Mr.  Tiaoqui's  report  dated  
March  19,  1985;    
(5)  Adjustment  per  Annex  "C"  of  Mr.  
Tiaoqui's  report;    
(6)  Annexes"A","B",and"C"of  the  joint  
report  of  Mr.  Tiaoqui,  Mr.  Aurellano,  and  
115  

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  
the  Bank  as  a  result  of  such  violation  or  
negligence.  Similar  responsibility  shall  apply  
to  the  disclosure  of  any  information  of  a  
confidential  nature  about  the  discussion  or  
resolutions  of  the  Monetary  Board,  except  
as  required  in  Section  13  of  this  Act,  or  
about  the  operations  of  the  Bank,  and  to  
the  use  of  such  information  for  personal  
gain  or  to  the  detriment  of  the  
Government,  the  Bank  or  third  parties.  (As  
amended  by  Presidential  Decree  No.  72).  
(Italics  supplied).    

Mrs.  Valenzuela;    
(7)  Schedule  of  devaluation  of  CB  premises  
of  Paseo  de  Roxas  of  same  report;    
(8)  Schedule  of  BF's  realizable  assets  from  
P5,159.44  B  to  P3,909.23  B  as  of  January  25,  
1985;    
(9)  Documents  listed  in  BF's  letter  to  Mrs.  
Carlota  Valenzuela  dated  October  25,  1985.    
3.

4.

In  issuing  the  challenged  order,  the  court  below  took  
the   view   that   the   Supreme   Court's   resolution  
referring   to   it   the   matters   relative   to   the   bank's  
closure   does   not   preclude   the   petitioner   from  
availing   of   this   mode   of   discovery   as   an   additional  
means   of   preparing   for   the   hearing.   It   considered  
the   documents   sought   to   be   produced   as   not  
privileged   because   these   constitute   or   contain  
evidence  material  to  the  issues  into  by  the  Court.    
Respondents  Monetary  Board  and  Central  Bank  take  
exception   to   the   said   order   and   pray   in   their   petition  
before  this  Court  for  the  reversal  and  setting  aside  of  
the  same.      

Counter-­‐argument  of  Banco  Filipino:  
6.

 
Argument  of  the  Monetary  Board  of  the  BSP:  
5.

Among   others,   they   argue   that   the   tapes   and  
transcripts   of   the   Monetary   Board   deliberations   are  
confidential   pursuant   to   Sections   13   and   15   of   the  
Central  Bank  Act.    
Sec.  13.  Withdrawal  of  persons  having  a  
personal  interest.  Whenever  any  member  
attending  a  meeting  of  the  Monetary  Board  
has  a  material  personal  interest,  directly  or  
indirectly,  in  the  discussion  or  resolution  of  
any  given  matter,  said  member  shall  not  
participate  in  the  discussion  or  resolution  of  
the  matter  and  must  retire  from  the  
meeting  during  the  deliberation  thereon.  
The  subject  matter,  when  resolved,  and  the  
fact  that  a  member  had  a  personal  interest  
in  it,  shall  be  made  available  to  the  public.  
The  minutes  of  the  meeting  shall  note  the  
withdrawal  of  the  member  concerned.  (As  
amended  by  PD  No.  1827).    
Sec.  15.  Responsibility.  —  Any  member  of  
the  Monetary  Board  or  officer  or  employee  
of  the  Central  Bank  who  wilfully  violates  
this  Act  or  who  is  guilty  of  gross  negligence  
in  the  performance  of  his  duties  shall  be  
held  liable  for  any  loss  or  injury  suffered  by  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

The  respondents  cannot  claim  privilege  in  refusing  to  
produce  the  Central  Bank  records  because  it  is  based  
only   on   the   generalized   interest   in   confidentiality.  
Petitioner   cites   as   a   precedent   the   doctrine  
established   in   the   case   of   U.S.   vs.   Nixon,   418   U.S.  
683,   713,   which   states   that   "when   the   ground   for  
asserting   privilege   as   to   subpoenaed   materials  
sought  for  use  in  a  criminal  case  is  based  only  on  the  
generalized   interest   in   confidentiality,   it   cannot  
prevail   over   the   fundamental   demands   of   due  
process  of  law."    

Counter-­‐argument  of  the  Monetary  Board:  
7.

The  case  of  U.S.  vs.  Nixon  and  the  other  decisions  
cited  by  petitioner  are  inapplicable  because  the  
authorities  cited  refer  only  to  a  claim  of  privilege  
based  only  on  the  generalized  interest  of  
confidentiality  or  on  an  executive  privilege  that  is  
merely  presumptive.  On  the  other  hand,  the  so-­‐
called  MB  deliberations  are  privileged  
communications  pursuant  to  Section  21,  Rule  130  of  
the  Rules  of  Court  because  statements  and  opinions  
expressed  in  the  deliberation  of  the  members  of  the  
MB  are  specifically  vested  with  confidentiality  under  
Secs.  13  and  15  of  the  Central  Bank  Act.  The  "public  
interest"  requirement  for  non-­‐disclosure  is  evident  
from  the  fact  that  the  statute  punishes  any  
disclosure  of  such  deliberations.    

Issue  presented  before  us:  
8.

The   issue   in   this   case   is   whether   the   order   for   the  
production  of  the  documents  mentioned  above  (Par  
2)  was  proper.  

 
Ruling  of  the  Court:  
9.

Yes   it   was   proper.     We   accept   the   view   taken   by   the  

116  

Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.  2015-­‐2016  

court  below  that  the  documents  are  not  privileged.  

10. As  to  the  tapes  and  transcripts  of  the  Monetary  
Board  deliberations  on  the  closure  of  Banco  Filipino  
and  its  meetings  on  July  27,  1984,  and  March  22,  
1985,  (Item  No.  1),  the  Monetary  Board  contends  
that  "it  is  obvious  from  the  requirement  (Sections  13  
and  15  of  the  Central  Bank  Act)  that  the  subject  
matter  (of  the  deliberations),  when  resolved.  .  .  shall  
be  made  available  to  the  public  but  the  deliberations  
themselves  are  not  open  to  disclosure  but  are  to  be  
kept  in  confidence."    
11. The  Court  does  not  agree  with  the  Monetary  Board.  
The  deliberations  may  be  confidential  but  not  
necessarily  absolute  and  privileged.  There  is  no  
specific  provision  in  the  Central  Bank  Act,  even  in  
Sections  13  and  15  thereof,  which  prohibits  
absolutely  the  courts  from  conducting  an  inquiry  on  
said  deliberations  when  these  are  relevant  or  
material  to  a  matter  subject  of  a  suit  pending  before  
it.  The  disclosure  is  here  not  intended  to  obtain  
information  for  personal  gain.  There  is  no  
indication  that  such  disclosure  would  cause  
detriment  to  the  government,  to  the  bank  or  to  
third  parties.  Significantly,  it  is  the  bank  itself  here  
that  is  interested  in  obtaining  what  it  considers  as  
information  useful  and  indispensably  needed  by  it  
to  support  its  position  in  the  matter  being  inquired  
to  by  the  court  below.    
12. On  the  other  hand,  respondents  cite  Section  21,  Rule  
130,  Rules  of  Court  which  states:    

examined  as  to  communications  made  to  him  in  
official  confidence  does  not  apply  when  there  is  
nothing  to  show  that  the  public  interest  would  suffer  
by  the  disclosure  question.  ...  ,(  Agnew  vs.  Agnew,'52  
SD  472,  cited  in  Martin  Rules  of  Court  of  the  
Philippines,  Third  Edition,  Vol.  5,  p.  199).    
13. In  the  case  at  bar,  the  respondents  have  not  
established  that  public  interest  would  suffer  by  the  
disclosure  of  the  papers  and  documents  sought  by  
petitioner.  Considering  that  petitioner  bank  was  
already  closed  as  of  January  25,  1985,  any  disclosure  
of  the  aforementioned  letters,  reports,  and  
transcripts  at  this  time  pose  no  danger  or  peril  to  our  
economy.  Neither  will  it  trigger  any  bank  run  nor  
compromise  state  secrets.  Respondent's  reason  for  
their  resistance  to  the  order  of  production  are  
tenuous  and  specious.  If  the  respondents  public  
officials  acted  rightfully  and  prudently  in  the  
performance  of  their  duties,  there  should  be  nothing  
at  all  that  would  provoke  fear  of  disclosure    
14. On  the  contrary,  public  interests  will  be  best  served  
by  the  disclosure  of  the  documents.  Not  only  the  
banks  and  its  employees  but  also  its  numerous  
depositors  and  creditors  are  entitled  to  be  informed  
as  to  whether  or  not  there  was  a  valid  and  legal  
justification  for  the  petitioner's  bank  closure.  It  will  
be  well  to  consider  that—    
Public  interest  means  more  than  a  mere  
curiosity;  it  means  something  in  which  the  
public,  the  community  at  large,  has  some  
pecuniary  interest  by  which  their  legal  
rights  or  liabilities  are  affected  (State  vs.  
Crocket,  206,  p.  816  cited  in  Words  and  
Phrases,  Vol.  35,  p.  229).    

Section  21.  Privileged  Communications.  The  
following  persons  cannot  testify  as  to  
matters  learned  in  confidence  in  the  
following  cases:    
xxx  xxx  xxx  
(e)  A  public  officer  cannot  be  examined  
during  his  term  of  office  or  afterwards,  as  to  
communications  made  to  him  in  official  
confidence,  when  the  court  finds  that  the  
public  interest  would  suffer  by  disclosure.    
But  this  privilege,  as  this  Court  notes,  is  
intended  not  for  the  protection  of  public  officers  
but  for  the  protection  of  public  interest  (Vogel  vs.  
Gruaz  110  U.S.  311  cited  in  Moran,  Comments  on  
the  Rules  of  Court,  1980  Ed.  Vol.  5,  p.  211).  Where  
there  is  no  public  interest  that  would  be  prejudiced,  
this  invoked  rule  will  not  be  applicable.    
The  rule  that  a  public  officer  cannot  be  

Rheland  S.  Servacio;  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira  

 

NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE
AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY
Background  of  the  Case:  
1.
2.

This  is  about  the  ZTE  scandal.  
On   April   21,   2007,   the   Department   of  
Transportation  and  Communication  (DOTC)  entered  
into   a   contract   with   Zhing   Xing   Telecommunications  
Equipment   (ZTE)   for   the   supply   of   equipment   and  
services  for  the  National  Broadband  Network  (NBN)  
Project   in   the   amount   of   U.S.   $329,481,290  
117  

  and   even   blunt   or   harsh   opinions   in   Presidential   decision-­‐making. 8.   respondent   Committees   issued   a   Subpoena  Ad  Testificandum  to  petitioner.   2007.   petitioner   filed   with   this   Court   the   present   petition   for   certiorari   assailing   the   show   cause   Letter   dated   November  22. At   the   core   of   this   controversy   are   the   two   (2)   crucial  queries.   and   will   hamper   her   in   the   effective   discharge   of   her   duties   and   responsibilities. 9.   2007.   He   stresses   that   his   conversations   with   President   Arroyo   are   "candid   discussions   meant   to   explore   options   in   making   policy   decisions.   2007.   2007.   Executive   Secretary   Eduardo   R.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   and   (4)   petitioner   has   not   come   to   court   with  clean  hands.   Ermita   requested   respondent   Committees   to   dispense   with   petitioner's   testimony   on   the   ground   of   executive   privilege.   petitioner   did   not   appear   before  respondent  Committees. 7.   He   disclosed   that   then   Commission   on   Elections   (COMELEC)   Chairman   Benjamin   Abalos   offered   him   P200  Million  in  exchange  for  his  approval  of  the  NBN   Project.   and   26   and   October   25.   objective.  However.   petitioner   testified   before   respondent   Committees   for   eleven   (11)   hours.   The   context   in   which   executive   privilege   is   being   invoked   is   that   the   information   sought   to   be   Rheland  S.   Disclosure   of   conversations  of  the  President  will  have   a   chilling   effect   on   the   President.   Petitioner   reasoned   that:   (1)   his   (petitioner)   non-­‐ appearance   was   upon   the   order   of   the   President.   20.   Without   responding   to   his  request  for  advance  notice  of  the  matters  that  he   should   still   clarify.   However.   in   the   Letter   dated   November   15.   However.     Arguments  of  Neri:   10.   2007.   (2)   there   is   no   valid   justification   for   petitioner   to   claim   executive   privilege.   the   latter   issued   the   show   cause   Letter   requiring  him  to  explain  why  he  should  not  be  cited   in  contempt.  to  wit:   First.   is   the   necessity   for   protection   of   the   public   interest   in   candid.   On   September   26.  Servacio.   Issues  presented  before  us:   12.   6   (b)   whether   or   not   she   directed   him   to   prioritize   it.   2007.   are   the   communications   elicited   by   118   . Respondent   Committees   assert   the   contrary.   2007.  2007."     Arguments  of  the  Senate  Committee:     11.     In   the   interim.     On   November   20. 4.   In   particular.   He   was   summoned  to  appear  and  testify  on  September  18.   on   December   7.   The   expectation   of   a   President   to   the   confidentiality   of   her   conversations  and  correspondences.  citing  him  in  contempt.   claiming   he  was  "out  of  town"  during  the  other  dates.   7   and  (c)  whether  or  not  she  directed  him  to  approve.   these   discussions   "dwelt   on   the   impact   of   the   bribery   scandal   involving   high   government   officials   on   the   country's   diplomatic   relations   and   economic   and   military   affairs   and   the   possible   loss   of   confidence   of  foreign  investors  and  lenders  in  the  Philippines.   The   Project   was   to  be  financed  by  the  People's  Republic  of  China.   he   refused   to   answer   the   questions   on   (a)   whether   or   not   President   Arroyo   followed   up   the   NBN   Project.   Unrelenting.   and  (2)  his  conversation  with  President  Arroyo  dealt   with   delicate   and   sensitive   national   security   and   diplomatic   matters   relating   to   the   impact   of   the   bribery   scandal   involving   high   government   officials   and   the   possible   loss   of   confidence   of   foreign   investors  and  lenders  in  the  Philippines.   petitioner   refused   to   answer.   he   attended   only   the   September   26   hearing.  like   the   value   which   we   accord   deference   for   the   privacy   of   all   citizens."   According   to   him.   He   further   narrated   that   he   informed   President   Arroyo  about   the  bribery   attempt   and  that   she  instructed  him  not  to  accept  the  bribe.  on  November   22.  2015-­‐2016   3.  Thus.   Respondent   Committees   initiated   the   investigation   by   sending   invitations   to   certain   personalities   and   cabinet   officials   involved   in   the   NBN   Project.   Respondent   Committees   found   petitioner's   explanations   unsatisfactory. Neri   contends   that   respondent   Committees'   show   cause   Letter   and   contempt   Order   were   issued   with   grave   abuse   of   discretion   amounting   to   lack   or   excess   of   jurisdiction. disclosed   might   impair   our   diplomatic   as   well   as   economic   relations   with   the   People's   Republic   of   China.   They   argue   that   (1)   petitioner's   testimony   is   material   and   pertinent   in   the   investigation   conducted   in   aid   of   legislation.   Petitioner   was   among   those   invited. 5.   when   probed   further   on   what   they   discussed   about   the   NBN   Project.   if   she   is   not   protected   by   the   confidentiality   of   her   conversations.  requiring   him   to   appear   and   testify   on   November   20.   invoking   "executive   privilege".  2008.   (3)   there   is   no   abuse   of   their   authority   to   order   petitioner's   arrest.   they   issued   the   Order   dated   January  30.Y.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     6. (approximately   P16   Billion   Pesos).    It  argued:   Maintaining   the   confidentiality   of   conversations   of   the   President   is   necessary   in   the   exercise   of   her   executive   and   policy   decision   making   process.

  Court   of   Appeals   delved   deeper.   16.   as   Chief   Executive.   17.   as   embodied   under  Sections  21  and  22."   Apparently.   its   right   to   such   information   is   not   as   imperative   as   that   of   the   President   to   whom.   The   Court's   pronouncement   in   Senate   v.   Nixon.  or  as  the   rules  of  each  House  shall  provide.   The   heads   of   department   may   upon   their   own  initiative. In   Senate   v.   In   fine.  of  Article  VI   of  the  Constitution.  their  objectives  are  different. Neri’s  petition  should  be  granted.  to  wit:   SECTION   21.   Congress   cannot   compel   the   appearance   of   executive   officials   under   Section   22.  the   appearance  shall  be  conducted  in   executive  session. In   In   re:   Sealed   Case.   the   oversight   function   of   Congress   may   be   facilitated  by  compulsory  process  only  to  the  extent   that  it  is  performed  in  pursuit  of  legislation.  The   rights   of   persons   appearing   in   or   affected  by  such  inquiries  shall   be   respected.   the   objective   of   which   is   to   obtain   information   in   pursuit   of   Congress'   oversight   function.     SECTION   22.   The   former   pertains   to  "communications.   the   appearance   is   mandatory   for   the   same   reasons   stated   in  Arnault.   appear   before   and   be   heard   by   such   House   on   any   matter   pertaining   to   their   departments.   15.   its   aim   is   to   elicit   information   that   may   be   used   for   Rheland  S. In   United   States   v.   with   freedom   to   explore   alternatives   in   the   process   of   shaping  policies  and  making  decisions  and  to  do  so   in   a   way   many   would   be   unwilling   to   express   except  privately."   19.   such   department   heads   must   give   a   report  of  their  performance  as  a  matter   of  duty.   When   the   security  of  the  state  or  the  public   interest   so   requires   and   the   President  so  states  in  writing.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     legislation.   the   other   is   the   deliberative   process   privilege.   Ermita.       18.   Ermita   20   is  clear:   When   Congress   merely   seeks   to   be   informed  on  how  department  heads  are   implementing   the   statutes   which   it   has   issued.   Interpellations   shall   not   be   limited   to   written   questions.   Section   21   relates   to   the   power   to   conduct   inquiries   in   aid   of   legislation.  in   keeping   with   the   separation   of   powers.  In  such  instances.  documents  or  other  materials   119   .   the   claim   of   executive  privilege  still  exists.S.  respectively.  Servacio.   The   Senate   or   the   House   of   Representatives   or   any   of   its   respective   committees   may   conduct   inquiries   in   aid   of   legislation   in   accordance   with   its   duly   published  rules  of  procedure.   the   presumption   is   founded   on   the   "President's   generalized   interest   in   confidentiality.Y.   Unlike   in   Section   21. Senate   cautions   that   while   the   above   provisions  are   closely   related   and   complementary   to   each   other."   It   thus   considered   presidential   communications   as   "presumptively   privileged.   did   respondent   Committees   commit   grave   abuse   of   discretion   in   issuing   the   contempt  Order?     Ruling  of  the  Court:   13.S.   states   that   Congress   may   only   request   their   appearance.   30   the   U.  but  may  cover  matters   related   thereto.   14.   Written   questions   shall   be   submitted  to  the  President  of  the   Senate   or   the   Speaker   of   the   House  of  Representatives  at  least   three  days  before  their  scheduled   appearance. Despite   the   revocation   of   EO   464.   while   both   powers   allow   Congress   or   any   of   its   committees   to   conduct  inquiry.   .  Section  22.  with  the  consent  of   the   President.   It   ruled   that   there   are   two   (2)   kinds   of   executive   privilege.   Simply   stated.   or   upon   the   request  of  either  House. This   distinction   gives   birth   to   another   distinction   with   regard   to   the   use   of   compulsory   process.   they   should   not   be   considered   as   pertaining   to   the   same   power   of   Congress.   .   when   the   inquiry   in   which   Congress   requires   their  appearance  is  'in  aid  of  legislation'   under   Section   21.  2015-­‐2016   the   subject   three   (3)   questions   covered   by   executive  privilege?   And   second.   Senate   draws   in   bold   strokes   the   distinction   between   the   legislative   and   oversight   powers   of   the   Congress.   one   is   the   presidential   communications   privilege   and.   while   Section   22   pertains   to   the   power   to   conduct   a   question   hour.   Court   recognized  a  great  public  interest  in  preserving  "the   confidentiality   of   conversations   that   take   place   in   the   President's   performance   of   his   official   duties.   29   the   U.   Nonetheless."   The   privilege   is   said   to   be   necessary   to   guarantee   the   candor   of   presidential   advisors   and   to   provide   "the   President   and   those   who   assist   him.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.

 32   The  situation  in  Judicial  Watch.   The   Court  conceded  that  functionally  those  officials  were   performing  a  task  directly  related  to  the  President's   pardon  power.   recommendations   and   deliberations   comprising   part   of   a   process   by   which   governmental   decisions   and   policies   are   formulated.   The   majority   concluded   that.   the   communications   relate   to   a   "quintessential   and   120   .   indeed. Simply   put.   The   above   cases.   core-­‐presidential   function.   congressional   or   judicial   negation   of   the  presidential  communications  privilege  is  always   subject   to   greater   scrutiny   than   denial   of   the   deliberative  process  privilege.   25.   the   sole-­‐ authority   to   receive   ambassadors   and   other   public   officers.   and   discussions   in   closed-­‐door   Cabinet  meetings.  39  there  is  also  a  recognition  of  the   confidentiality   of   Presidential   conversations.   Presidential   communications   privilege   applies   to   decision-­‐making   of   the   President   while.   35   and   information   related   to   pending   investigations.   or   eventual   concessions   which   may   have   been   proposed   or   contemplated   would   be   extremely   impolitic.   the   lesser   protections   of   the   deliberative   process   privilege   would   suffice.  to  wit:   1) The   protected   communication   must   relate   to   a   "quintessential   and   non-­‐ delegable  presidential  power.  v.   But   more   specific   classifications   of   communications   covered   by   executive   privilege   are   made   in   older   cases.  Servacio.   Unlike   the   deliberative   process   privilege.   Curtiss-­‐Wright   Export   Corp.  Inc.   and   their   success   must   often   depend   on   secrecy.   correspondences.   the   communications   elicited   by   the   three   (3)   questions   are   covered   by   the   presidential   communications   privilege. 21. that   reflect   presidential   decision-­‐making   and   deliberations   and   that   the   President   believes   should   remain   confidential.  the  power  to  negotiate  treaties  etc.   for   this   might   have   a   pernicious   influence   on   future   negotiations   or   produce   immediate   inconveniences.   In   Re   Sealed   Case   and   Judicial   Watch."   2) The   communication   must   be   authored   or   "solicited   and   received"   by   a   close   advisor  of  the  President  or  the  President   himself.  In  Re  Sealed   Case   confines   the   privilege   only   to   White   House   Staff   that   has   "operational   proximity"   to   direct   presidential   decision-­‐making.   a   full   disclosure   of   all   the   measures.   such   as   commander-­‐ in-­‐chief   power. In  Chavez  v.   found   insufficient   to   justify   the  confidentiality  of  the  4.   appointment   and   removal   power.   demands.   such   that   the   information   sought   "likely   contains   important   evidence"   and   by   the   unavailability   of   the   information   elsewhere   by   an   appropriate   investigating  authority.   the   bases   are   presidential   communications   privilege   and   executive   privilege   on   matters   relating   to   diplomacy   or   foreign   relations.     In   US   v.   and   covers   final   and   post-­‐decisional   materials   as   well   as   pre-­‐deliberative   ones   31   As   a   consequence.   especially.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     military   or   state   secrets   34   identity   of   government   informers   in   some   circumstances.  the  US  Court  held:   “The  nature  of  foreign  negotiations  requires   caution.   they   are   characterized   by   marked   distinctions.   the   presidential   communications   privilege   applies   to   documents   in   their   entirety.   a   non-­‐ delegable.  2015-­‐2016   20.  but  concluded  that  an  organizational   test   was   more   appropriate   for   confining   the   potentially   broad   sweep   that   would   result   from   the   In   Re   Sealed   Case's   functional   test.  while  the  presidential  decision  involved  is  the   exercise   of   the   President's   pardon   power.Y.   in   relation  to  other  powers.   the   Deputy   Attorney   General   and   the   Pardon   Attorney   were   deemed  to  be  too  remote  from  the  President  and  his   senior   White   House   advisors   to   be   protected.   Courts   ruled   early   that   the   Executive   has   a   right   to   withhold   documents   that   might   reveal   Rheland  S. 22.   somehow   provide   the   elements   of   presidential   communications   privilege. Using   the   above   elements."   Accordingly.   36   An   area   where   the   privilege   is   highly   revered   is   in   foreign   relations.”   24.   the   deliberative   process   privilege.   There.  PEA.   The   judicial   test   is   that   an   advisor   must   be   in   "operational   proximity"  with  the  President.   26.   Turning   on   who   are   the   officials   covered   by   the   presidential  communications  privilege."   The   latter   includes   'advisory   opinions.   The   first   is   rooted   in   the   constitutional   principle   of   separation   of   power   and   the   President's   unique   constitutional   role.   3) The   presidential   communications   privilege   remains   a   qualified   privilege   that   may   be   overcome   by   a   showing   of   adequate   need.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   and   even   when   brought   to   a   conclusion.   Nixon.   perhaps   danger   and   mischief.   the   second   on   common   law   privilege.   involving   what   the  court  characterized  as  "quintessential  and  non-­‐ delegable   Presidential   power".   however.  Department  of   Justice   33   tested   the   In   Re   Sealed   Case   principles.   to   decision-­‐ making   of   executive   officials.341  withheld  documents.   the   power   to   grant   pardons   and   reprieves.   we   are   convinced   that.   the   privilege   is   meant  to  encompass  only  those  functions  that  form   the   core   of   presidential   authority.   First.   That   privilege   was.   Thus. 23.

 It  is  settled  in  United  States   v.   v.   51   Article   229   52   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code.   Ermita   stressed   that   the   validity   of   the   claim   of   executive   privilege   depends   not   only   on   the   ground   invoked   but.   the   President   did   not   interpose   any   claim   of   need   to   protect   military.   is   subject   to   limitation.   the   present   case's   distinction   with   the   Nixon   case   is   very   evident.   Executive   Secretary   Ermita   categorically   claims   executive   privilege   on   the   grounds   of   presidential   communications   privilege   in   relation   to   her   executive   and   policy   decision-­‐ making  process  and  diplomatic  secrets. 30.   The  third  element  deserves  a  lengthy  discussion.A. The  right  to  public  information. non-­‐delegable   power"   of   the   President.   Nixon   48   that   "demonstrated.   the   procedural  setting  or  the  context  in  which  the  claim   is  made.  like  any  other  right.   it   was   held   that:   “Thus."   It   stressed   that   it   is   "not   concerned   here   with   the   balance   between   the   President's   generalized   interest   in   confidentiality   .   petitioner   can   be   considered   a   close   advisor.   No.   with   the   exception   only   of   those   covered   by   his   claim   of   executive  privilege.   In   this   regard.S.   diplomatic   or   sensitive   national   security   secrets.   also.   there   is   a   pending  criminal  proceeding  where  the  information   is  requested  and  it  is  the  demands  of  due  process  of   law   and   the   fair   administration   of   criminal   justice   that  the  information  be  disclosed.   But   petitioner   made   himself   available   to   them   during   the   September   26   hearing.   there   is   no   adequate  showing  of  a  compelling  need  that  would   justify   the   limitation   of   the   privilege   and   of   the   unavailability   of   the   information   elsewhere   by   an   appropriate  investigating  authority.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     Nixon.   or   decisions. 31.Y.  Not  only  that.   In   Nixon.   the   power   to   enter   into   an   executive   agreement   with   other   countries. Furthermore.   33.   where   he   was   questioned  for  eleven  (11)  hours.   35.   36.  i.   34.  This  is  the  reason   why  the  U.   in   Nixon."  Unlike  in   Rheland  S.   Senate   v.   3019.   and   Section   24   (e)   54   of   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court.   in   Senate   v.   but   in   a   legislative   inquiry.   it   does   not   follow.   the   questions   veer   more   towards   the   exercise   of   the   legislative   oversight   function   under   Section  22  of  Article  VI  rather  than  Section  21  of  the   same   Article.   Ermita   ruled   that   the   "the   oversight   function   of   Congress   may   be   facilitated   by  compulsory  process  only  to  the  extent  that  it  is   performed  in  pursuit  of  legislation.  as  may  be  provided  by  law.   Access   to   official   records.     32.   being   a   member   of   President   Arroyo's   cabinet.   and   to   documents.   subject   to   such   limitations   as   may   be   provided  by  law.e.   the   communications   are   "received"   by   a   close   advisor   of   the   President.   United   States.   the   record   is   bereft   of   any   categorical   explanation  from  respondent  Committees  to  show  a   compelling   or   critical   need   for   the   answers   to   the   three   (3)   questions   in   the   enactment   of   a   law.   and   papers   pertaining   to   official   acts.   The   courts   are   enjoined   to   resolve   the   competing   interests   of   the   political   branches   of   the   government   "in   the   manner   that   preserves   the   essential  functions  of  each  Branch."   Here.   Instead. Respondent   Committees   further   contend   that   the   grant   of   petitioner's   claim   of   executive   privilege   violates   the   constitutional   provisions   on   right   of   the   people  to  information  on  matters  of  public  concern.   Section   7   of   Article   III   provides:   The   right   of   the   people   to   information   on   matters   of   public   concern   shall   be   recognized.Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.   50   We   might   have   agreed   with   such   contention   if   petitioner   did   not   appear   before   them   at   all.   not   in   a   criminal   proceeding."     However.   These   are   in   addition   to   what   our   body   of   jurisprudence   classifies   as   confidential   55   and   what   our   Constitution   considers   as   belonging   to   the   larger   concept  of  executive  privilege.A."   Respondent   Committees   argue   that   a   claim   of   executive   privilege   does   not   guard   against   a   possible   disclosure   of   a   crime   or   wrongdoing.   the   information   here   is   elicited. Further.     In   Nixon   v.   45   Second.   Section   3   (k)   53   of   R.   Nixon   held   that   a   claim   of   executive   privilege   is   subject   to   balancing   against   other   interest.   and   congressional  demands  for  information.   In   the   present   case.   i.e.   shall   be   afforded   the   citizen.   .   Ermita.  Servacio.   transactions.   Senate   v.   except   in   a   highly   121   .   Sirica.  2015-­‐2016   27.  he   expressly   manifested   his   willingness   to   answer   more   questions   from   the   Senators.)   No.   We   see  no  dispute  on  this.   as   well   as   to   government   research   data   used   as   basis   for   policy   development.   .   while   Congress   is   composed   of   representatives   elected   by   the   people. 28. 29.   6713. The   provision   itself   expressly   provides   the   limitation.   This   authority   of   the   President   to   enter   into   executive   agreements   without   the   concurrence   of   the   Legislature   has   traditionally   been   recognized   in   Philippine   jurisprudence.   specific   need   for   evidence   i   n   pending   criminal   trial"   outweighs   the   President's  "generalized  interest  in  confidentiality.  Court  was  quick  to  "limit  the  scope  of   its   decision.   it   was   held   that   presidential   communications   privilege   are   presumptively   privileged   and   that   the   presumption   can   be   overcome   only   by   mere   showing   of   public   need  by  the  branch  seeking  access  to  conversations.   And   third.  Some  of   these   laws   are   Section   7   of   Republic   Act   (R.   Under   the   "operational   proximity"   test.

 Servacio.  2015-­‐2016   qualified   sense.   that   in   every   exercise   of   its   power   of   inquiry.”       Rheland  S.   the   people   are   exercising  their  right  to  information.  Dana  Flynch  de  Lira     122   .Evidence  Case  Digests  3rd  Batch  A.Y.