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SHEET PREPARED 24 SCU
ED BY 2201ST ENGR.AVN REGT
^ B y authority of the
14th Air Force•
2 September 1945
FOURTEENTH A I R FORCE HEADQUARTERS
W E E K L Y I N T E L L I G E N C E S U M M A R Y
Transfer of 14th Air Fore© Head quarters during early August prevented regular publication of the 8 and 15 August Weekly Intelligence Summaries« With tfee cessation* fcheaj, pf ho&til* i t i e s i t was thought approfirlafc© t o postpone th© n©xt issue u n t i l official V*tf Bay t o incittd© a 3\amraai»y ©i activity during the final two wholes of eanbat# Moreover, boe&us* the 14th Air Fore© Saamayy hcta almod «rin©» Its inception to synthesize and disseminat© only such information as bor© ljnm©di« ately upon the 14th Air Force mis a ion against the enemy within the China Theater, i t is further appropriate that with the successful conclusion of that mission the Weekly Intelligence Summary should, with this issve, appear for the last time*
hi.i".J.t' ZQB1 urn 3200. .10
FOURTIESTH 1 R SENT
ENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES
JULY 1942- AUGUST 1945
AERIAL COMBAT ON GROUND DESTROYED 1291 1057 PROBABLY DESTRD. 558 220 VS
7 7 8
C.AIF 8 FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE LOSSES
AIR COMBAT GROUND FIRE ON GROUND
SUNK 994,389 TONS
JULY 1942 - AUGUST 1945
PROBABLY SUNK 414,700 TONS
REPRODUCED BY 2 2 0 I S T ENGR. AVN. REGT.
LOCOMOTIVES R.R.CARS TRUCKS
BRIDGES APPROACHES 573 654
DESTROYED 1072 DAMAGED 2707
BY AIR ATTACK
REPRODUCED BY 2 2 0 ) S T ENGR. AVN. REGT
SUMMARY OP THE WEEKS During the--week 2 - 8 August o p e r a t i o n s of t h e 1 4 t h
Air Force dropped sharply as a result of bad weather and
the commencement.of 10th Air Force operations in China,
Total missions flown were only 85 as compared to 235
l a s t v/eek. Combat sorties decreased also from 627 to 257.
P-51's f£ew 160 s o r t i e s ; B-25's, 46; P-47»s, 30; F-5»s, 7;
F-6 f s, 6; P-61»s, 4; P-40»s, 4; and P-38's, 0,
Only 658 briefed transport sorties were flown during
the week, about one-half the usual number• .
Leaflets were dropped over targets from French Indo-
China to Worth China, Ho consolidated figures on t o t a l
droppings were available*
. . .
.There were no interceptions reported during the week. One twin-engine and o * singlq-engine plane were damaged ne by strafing at TSINAN a i r f i e l d . One 14th Air Force plane was destroyed by ground f i r e . Targets ranged from the North China railroads south to the North River area# No missions wero flown this week in French Indo-China. ^Bridges, rolling stock, river shipping, troop concentrations, convo;?-movements, ground i n s t a l l a t i o n s and buildings wore, attacked. In addition seme missions were flown in cooperation with the Chinese ground forces in the C J N SE - i^ G A G. A C I G area, H A H I NJl T Y N -P O HN and in the northern SC W I H M area. In North China there were 24 f i g h t e r , 3 medium bomber, and 1 escorted medium bomber combat missions flown. Their principal targets were railroad bridges along the PINGEAN, the TSINFU, the T N P and the L N H I r a i l r o a d s . At least U GU U G A 15 bridges were reported damaged or rendered completely unserviceable. 81 locomotives and an uncstimated number of railroad cars were destroyed or damaged. Honan Province was attacked only oneG ." y fighters -b in the SC V A b a t t l e area, A Japanese hoadquart-ersf IH7N buildings, were attacked and damaged and an unostitneted number, of casualties was inflicted* The Y N T E River area around E N O was attacked once A GZ AKW by f i g h t e r s . In this attack 12 x-150f barges were damaged. In Kunan Province there were 12 combat fight or and 5 medium bomber missions flown. Those woro concentrated in cooperation with the ground forces attacking in this area. SINNING was bombed and strc-fod on at least 4 occasions. Buildings, trenches, pillboxes, especially in SINNING wore ..heavily bombed and strafed. Sixteen P-51 ! s"attackod in one mission, and 15 in another on this area in concentrated raids* Convoys which were s t i l l moving up* the SA G River valley wore bombed and strafed continuously. I M H N Y N , P O HN and C CA H I N wore a l l attacked as 3 G A G A C I G H J N SE directed by panels.
Kiangsi Province was attacked only 4 timos by fighters in tho K N River v a l l e y . J B H K ^ ^ ^ ^ R j a p a n e s o withdrawal A in t h i s area had boon completed. Buildings and supply dumps woro destroyed and an estimated 100 Japanese troops wore k i l l e d . In K A G U G Province the N R H River area was attacked WNTN OT twico by f i g h t e r s and once by escorted medium bombers* From YN T K to SAI-SHUI 20 sampans were damaged and 2 I GA cargo boats 'wo re-'sunk* From I H N to L K PO G 11 junks C A G O CI N , were destroyed or damaged* Due to regrouping of u n i t s no missions were flown in French Indo-China t h i s week. * • . • #
During the week 9-15 August op6rations of the 14th
Air Force were further reduced. Total missions flown were
only 68. as compared to 85 last-week. Combat sorties also
decreased from 257 to 219# P-51's flew 174 sorties;
B-25 f s, 21; P-47's, 13; P-61's, 7; and F-5's, 4.
Only 381 briefed transport sorties were flown during
• • . • • » •
Leaflets were dropped in North China -in the SIANG
and YANGTZE River areas and around CANTON, No figures
on total leaflet droppings wore available.
No enemy interceptions were reported during the week.
No planes were destroyed on the ground and no 14th Air
Force planes were lost to ground fire.
Targets were localized In three general areast the
North China, railroads, YANGTZE River area and in HUNAN
Provinceo Rolling stocky river shipping, warehouses and
troop concentrations were attacked.
In North China there were 19 combat fighter missions
-•flown* Their targets wore bridges on the T-SINPU, TUNGPU
.and PINGHAN railroads• Locomotives and railroad cars woro
destroyed or damaged. In addition ground targets .woro *
attacked at PUCHOW, YUHSIANG, TUNGCHEN, and FENTINGTUKOW.
In these attacks warehouses and other buildings were
destroyed, gun positions wore hit and an uno-stlmatod
number of casualties was inflicted*
Eleven fighter and one escorted medium bomber combat
missions were flown. These missions attacked shipping
from.HANKOW to POYANG LAKE damaging or destroying 33
sampans, 38 junks, 44 boats and 16 steamers of more than
100 foot. Buildings and warehouses In towns along this
route were also attacked. •
In.HUNAN Province there wore- 16 fighter, 6 medium
bomber and 1 escorted medium bomber combat missions
flown* Supply and troop movements north from HENGYANG and
CHANGSHA wore attacked. There
against the enemy troop
of LILING and ISUHO PERRY. Many buildings wore destroyed.
Rivor shipping was heavily bombed and strafed with
143 junks, 104 sampans and 13 large boats reported
destroyed or damaged.
Since the cessation of hostilities 14th Air Porco
missions have been of a reconnaissance, photo and
leaflet-dropping nature. Leaflets announcing the
surrender of Japan have boon dropped in a groat many
areas of occupied China.
SUMMARY-OF GROUND OPERATIONS FROM 1 AUGUST t o THE END OF HOSTILITIES
Japanese f o r c e s in Kunan c o n t i n u e d t h e i r withdrawal d u r i n g t h e l a s t two weeks of combat a c t i v i t y f a l l i n g back t o p r e p a r e d p o s i t i o n s in t h e TUNGANHSI2N a r e a , s o u t h west of HSNG-YANG, Between t h i s p o i n t on t h e r a i l w a y and • PAOCHING, due n o r t h , t h e enemy l i n e had l a r g e l y d i s i n t e g r a t e d , t r o o p s having evacuated t o t h e PAOCHirG- a r e a * Chinese o p e r a t i o n s along t h e l e n g t h of t h e Hunan r e t r e a t route represented only moderate pressure directed at severing the r a i l r o a d and highway. In the P O HN and A C I G Y U G EJ areas, Chinese elements maintained contact O N F fG although stubborn Japanese defense of these flanking positions had successfully withstood whatever Chinese strength had been ooznrai/bted. Constant a i r reconnaissance over the SIAHG River valley das closed an incessant flow, mostly at night, of troops and supplies, by r i v e r and convoy toward C A G H and X C O . Manifestly the enemy HNSA OHW w as making an a l l - o u t effort to shift the bulk of manpower and equipment reserves in Hunan to the H N O area for AKW transfer northward, • In Kwangtung Japanese forces had presented only
token resistance to attacks by Chinese regulars and
commandoes at TANCHUK during the first week of August*
What had been a major Fourteenth Air Force base until
October of 1944 was again in Allied hands* Thereafter small
remaining.Japanese garrisons along the WEST River moved
with increasing speed toward CANTON, Meanwhile, east of
CANTON in the WAICEOW-PINGSHAN area marked concentrations
were reported similar in strength and the nature of their
preparations to the concentrations preceding the initial
withdrawal movement from the 7/AICIIOW area in late Kay,
Sources in southern Kwangtung anticipated a second major
withdrawal operation toward either EUKONG or KANCHOW,
Troops and supplies were also gravitating toward CANTON
from the south. However, there were no indications that
23rd Array Headquarters or those of the South China
Expeditionary Forces were moving out of southern KWANGTUNG
where approximately 60 - 75,000 Japanese troops appeared
committed to the defense of the CANTON-HONGKONG area
against possible Allied landing operations, Enemy units
still held SV/ATOW in token strength as the eastern anchor
of what had earlier represented a strongly fortified
In northern Kiangsi Frovince during the l a s t two vroeks of h o s t i l i t i e s the body of 15 - 18,000 troops moving north along the K N River valley had completed i t s A transfer to N N H N * Likewise, the movement eastward ACAG from the C A G K - E G A G area of ,a similar sized bodyE H S AH & Y N had merged with-those from the south in the N N H N — ACAG K ItTEIANG aro a , Tho s e m o v in g o a s t f rom th e SIANG Val ley represented the bulk of two divisions seeking to avoid heavy losses in personnel and equipment being suffered by enemy forces in tho congested narrow t r a n s i t corridor from C A G H through Y C O t-3 H N O , 14th Air Force KNSA OH W AKW
fighters flying ciay and night missions OVGT the SIANG Valley
were inflicting sufficiently heavy d a m a ^ to force diversion
of troops and supply colunns from this"corridor eastward to
NANCIIANG* Such diversion, however,' proved only partially
successful in escaping attack; fighters and medium bombers
ranged almost daily from CKIHKIAKG into north KIANG'SI striking
at moving columns and supply areas. Throughout the course
of these withdrawals through the Chinese 9th War Area, enemy
troops vjore: forced to resist constant harassing activities
"by Chinese olononts under the command of General Ksieh Yo
tF Tho Tiger" - Conmandor of the 9th War Area. At the outset
of the JananosG movement north from KAFCIIOW down the K M
River valley .toward, NAECIIAIIG, General Hsieh had candidly
stated that ho could not hope to prevent the operation with
forces and equipment then available") to him• But he assured
unrelenting harassment so long as the. enemy was with in the
area for which he had assumod responsibility, Ke made good
Alons; the length of the YANGTZE River valley from
IIA1TKOW to^ NANKING and SHANGHAI the ground situation was fluid.
Into HANKOW wore gravitating outlying garrisons in the Bulge
Area - principally froiu KINGMSN, TAN07AHG- and ICHANG, the
point on the YANGTZE beyond which the Japanese failed to
penetrate from, late fall in 1938 until the end of the war.
Traffic counts taken at arbitrary points along the PingHan
Railway north of • IIA1TKOY7 showed a large preponderance of traffic
moving north with only incidental .supplies being shipped
south* Movement was no longer restricted to the protection
of''daylight-hours attesting to the mounting urgency of
transferring men and supplies to the north* Transit down
the YANGTZE River was equally dressing, although hampered
b: extensive mining of the river. Special barracks areas and
administrative posts had been established between•KIUKIANG
and WTJHU to accommodate large bodies of enemy troops•
Fragmentary infornation from Honan indicated what
appeared to bo substantial troop movements eastward from
extensively prepared positions along the HAN and Till! Rivers
in western Eonan*. Since., early Juno whan determined Chinese
defenders stalled the enemy's westward drive in the mountains
between HANYANG and HSIA2J, Japanese strategists abandoned
the campaign for the 14th Air Poreo northern pattern of
fields in favor of securing defenses along the western edge
of the. Honan buffer zone protecting the PingHan Railway.
Fully cognisant of the rehabilitation program among Chinese
armies constituting an increasing countor-offensive threat to
their positions throughout central and north-central China,
the Japanese progressively committed men and material to "
strengthening western defenses. Applied to the Honan area,
the policy called for expanded defenses .at HSIHSIAKOU,
SICEWAN, LIKUAHCHIAO, and LAOHOKOW to oppose possible
Chinese operations directed at the progressively crucial
PingHan corridor. Despite continuing troop movements out
of the defensive area, there was evidence to support
the assumption that enemy strength along the HAN and TAN
Rivers was being maintained through adequate replacement.
Throughout the remainder of North China, the characteristic
paucity of information continued to obscure specific
developments. Strength in the Yellow Hiver Bend and farther
north in •'Shan si Province was being reduced. Progressive.
deployment of strength ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ the Kiangsu coast was generali§^aKkumid> aithd3gh"SriPelli gence was not sufficiently specific to reveal u n i t s , strengths involved, or the detailed nature of coastal defenses* What could be safely demonstrated and supported was the general impression of desperate enemy efforts to prepare vulnerable coastal areas and major lines of troop and supply movements against inevitable Allied attack* # *
Since the close of h o s t i l i t i e s , a Japanese document submitted to Chinese military authorities at C I KA G HH I N during i n i t i a l surrender'negotiations revealed the presence in China of 100,000 enemy troops under the Japanese 23rd Army Command, i . y . j in Kwangtung, the Luichow Peninsula and Hainan Island; 350,000 troops in the area under 6th Area Army Command, i . e . , Hunan,Kwangsi, and Hupeh; 340,000 in the 6th and 13th Army areas, i . e . , the Yangtze River Valley, N N I G S A G A, and the Hang chow A KN , H N H I Bay area; 300,000 in North China. The t o t a l figure according to the Japanese document wad 1,090,000 troops in China proper. The Japanese surrender to Chinese authorities has for the most part been orderly and in good f a i t h . In the Kwangtung and coastal areas, the Japanese insisted upon completion of formal surrender "at the top" before laying down arms. Reports from Hunan have described irregular Japanese conduct in the P O HN area with looting, burning, A C I G and raping following the end of h o s t i l i t i e s . However, General H Ying-chin, Commander of a l l Chinese ground o forces, has officially denied the reports, and regularized negotiations have gone forward at assigned points in the Hunan area. In North China an isolated instance of insolence and bravado was reported wherein an individual Japanese garrison commander threatened to fight Independently and resort to gas in defending his position to the end. Generally, however, Japanese commanders and ranks, alike, are acknowledging that the end has finally arrived and that the defeat of their cause .is complete and unequivocal*
^—? S. S. R U.
\ OUTER MONGOLIA
F. l.C. 5OUN0ASIES OF JAPANESE OCCUPATION AT ENO OF HOSTILITIES
PQEPAREO o BY too A-Q SECTION too too MILCS 14T-M U.5.A.A.F. Seo froo
REPRODUCED BY 2201ST ENGR AVN REGT
* \ >v
X I X t X t
O B J E C T
I V E
I N T E L L I G E N C E
x r x
THE CURRENT CAPACITY OF CHINESE RAILROADS
DATA ON AIRFIELDS
CLIHAIE OF SHANGHAI TRANSPORTATION - DAMAGE A!!D REPAIR LATE REPORTS OF PREVIOUS MISSIONS
THE CURRENT CAPACITY OF CHINESE RAILROADS 1# The c a p i t u l a t i o n of tho Japanese armed forces in China and the r e s u l t i n g n e c e s s i t y of r a p i d l y reoccupying v a s t a r e a s of t e r r i t o r y u n t i l now under enemy c o n t r o l , . poses a l o g i s t i c a l problem of c o n s i d e r a b l e magnitude. Not only must occupying troops be moved i n t o key p o s i t i o n s with t h e g r e a t e s t d i s p a t c h , bui? m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s and equipment must be l a i d down in q u a n t i t i e s . t h a t w i l l c e r t a i n l y t a x t h e c a p a c i t y of a l l e x i s t i n g means of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n t h e r e i s the problem, e q u a l l y u r g e n t , of m a i n t a i n i n g t h e c i v i l i a n economy of t h e l a r g e j c i t i e s of the e a s t e r n seaboard. ,! .;..2» I t i s evident t h e r e f o r e t h a t an e v a l u a t i o n of t h e / a c t u a l c u r r e n t s t a t u s of the v a r i o u s r a i l l i n e s i s a m a t t e r of the f i r s t importance. The following two r e p o r t s are p r e s e n t e d f o r what value they may have in determining the e x t e n t t o which tfrc China r a i l r o a d system may be employed as answering c u r r e n t l o g i s t i c a l n e e d s . 3 . The f i r s t report, Military Traffic on the
Southern PingHan;Railwayf was prepared early in August,
before V-J Day, by OSS, R & A, attached to A-2, 14th
Air Force. It is believed that this gives a fairly
accurate picture of the amount of military traffic
actually moved by tho Japanese over the r a i l line between
H N O and the Y L O River during tho l a t t e r part of
AKW EL W June and the f i r s t half of July. There is no reason to
believe that the capacity of the line has been materially
improved since that date* It must be borne in mind that
operations cited were carried on at a time when tho line
was subject to intensive air attack with the result that
a high percentage of traffic was limited to the hours of
darkness* Full twenty-four hour operation, under peace
time conditions, does not mean, however, that traffic
could automatically be doubled or trebled. As pointed
out in the report, one of the chief limiting factors is
the current shortage of locomotives and i t seems most
improbable that this condition can be materially
relieved for some time to come.
4.. The second report, Current Status of Railroads in Occupied China, was prepared by M.I.S., Washington, on 13 July, 1945. Although a portion qf the material in this report duplicates information previously presented in this Summary, the report is.reproduced hero in toto as a tirioly synthesis of intelligence on Chinese railroads. Barring destruction of installations by the Japanese or through guerrilla fighting, i t appears probable that the capacities given, here represent a close approximation of the current status of tho lines when due allowance is made for the difference in general operating-efficiency between war-time- and peace-time conditions,* Such an alteration in status is especially applicable in J&Q case of the southern Tatung-Puchow, the Poiping-Hankow, VHilliAftfi&iLkon-Hankow lines*
MILITARY TRAFFIC O THE .SOUTHERN PING-HAN RAILWAY N (Prepared by R. & A, OSS, Attached t o 14th'AF Hqs # ) I n t e l l i g e n c e supplied "by t h e Office' of S t r a t e g i c Services concerning r a i l w a y t r a f f i c on t h e southern Ping-Han RR provides the f i r s t d e t a i l e d information on t r a f f i c move ments along t h i s s t r a t e g i c r a i l l i n e * This information in .• turn affords a p a r t i a l check on the p r e s e n t c a p a b i l i t i e s of the l i n e .as. a f f e c t e d by Fourteenth Air Fore© a t t a c k s on railway bridges and ioco?:iotives. • . • •• The data are in the form of claily reports on train movements north and south at a point near K I Y N (32-O6N, SN A G 114-05E),.130 miles north of H N O . Such movements aro, AKW reported on 20 days during the 26-day period from 24 Juno-, to 19 July 1945, It is assumed in the analysis which follows that a l l traffic occurring on these 20 days was duly reported* Whether there were additional unreported movements.on the remaining' 6/days 'is not known, but the 20 daily reports can probably be taken as representative of traffic during the months of June and July. From these reports, supplemented by other information, i t appears that the southern Pin^-Han was able, during June and July to carry a volume to traffic which was substantial in relation to routine Japanese military requirements in this area, though incapable of handling heavy troop and supply movements and particularly of effecting quick transfer between H N O and the Y L O River, The line was AKW EL W being operated well below i t s estimated capacity, eithor because no additional traffic was required -for military purposes, 'or because additional locomotives could not be spared from other lines* Air. attacks had. not reduced operating capacity below the level required to meet tho ordinary maintenance needs of the Japanese Army in this region, but they precluded i t s use for largo-scale, speedy ro-deployment of combat divisions to other areas.
Thirty-one northbound trains totalling 723 cars, wore observed on the 20 days between 24 June, and 19 July.-The average daily train movement north toward H I - A G was SNY N therefore 1.5 t r a i n s , or 36 cars. Southbound movement was only 85$ of northbound move ment, tho 20-day t o t a l amounting to 25 trains aggregating 613 c a r s . The average daily movement south from H I - A G SNY N was therefore 1.25 t r a i n s , or 31 cars• Northbound trains wore apparently loaded more or less to capacity with Japanese troops and military supplies. By contrast, of the total of 613 cars moving south, 344 (56$) were reported empty. In addition, many other cars may have carried only p a r t i a l loads. This confirms other ground intelligence indicating that inilitary movements along the southorn Ping-Plan in June and July were prodon inantly northward from H N O . AKW
The average northboun^^^in0||As 23 cars in length. The average southbound teUBMJftl^Bo^cara. These train lengths seem surprisingly long for this r e l a t i v e l y weak railway* However, average train tonnage remains low. Over half the southbound cars were empties; while perhaps as many of 40$ of the northbound cars carried troops, and a high proportion of tho remainder carried trucks, tanks, and guns. This resulted i n ' a comparatively l i g h t tonnage per car. The sane number of 30-ton cars loaded to capacity with heavy freight might have required 50-75$ more loco motives., Rolling stock in tho H N O yards t o t a l l e d 141 cars AKW on 11 July and 136 cars on 21 July, Traffic north and south at H I - A G during this period averaged about 45 SNY N cars each way per day. If the l a t t e r also reflects traffic at H N O , tliis indicates a 3-to-l r a t i o between rolling AKW stock in the yards and daily arrivals and departures. In other words, the average turn-around time at H N O was AKW about 3 days, if a l l cars observed were in service* . . . O 20 northbound trains for which arrival time at f HSIN-YANG is reported, over half (13) reached that point between 0200 and 0700 hours in the morning. O 19 south f bound t r a i n s , 9 left H I - A G between 1900 and 2400 hours SNY N in the evening an'd 8 between 0600 and 0900 hours in the morning, ' '.'... •v T r o o p Movements '•' ";/
Northbound t r a f f i c was*almost 100$ military in character. Troop movement. predominated, the t o t a l number of troops moving north by r a i l during the 20 days being reported at 13,900 men. Tho average per day was 700; tho average per train 450, If a l l troops travelled in : boxcars at 50 men per car,^they occupied 280 cars or 40$ of the t o t a l . Movement a t ' t h i s rate represents the-transfer of one f u l l infantry division with supporting Army units (20,000 men) per month* . : Troop movement south by r a i l amounted to only 1,500 men during the 20 reported days. Tho average per day was., therefore only 75; the average por train 60. Presumably these, were largely replacomeis being shipped to .the ^ A K W HNO areas. * Military Supplies and Equipment At least 60$ of the 723 cars moving north through HSIN-YANG were loaded with.military supplies and equipment. Total amounts itemized in daily reports were as follows: trucks 219 tanks ' 118 horses 800 . 'cannon* (guns?) 170 a -unition (boxes) m 1,900 gasoline, alcohol, i'G's, r i c e , clothing, etc.-*--• .
Military froighiT traffic on"this 20 freight cars per day, is also just to move in one month the equipment of division as such divisions are likely China today.
scale, approximately about sufficient a Japanese infantry to,-be equipped in
Southbound freight movements, "by contrast, included
l i t t l e in the way of ammunition, ordnance., vehicles or
fuel. They consisted almost wholly of r i c e , s a l t , char
coal and bridge construction materials—probably also
largely for Japanese use.
As in the case of troop movements this contrast between northbound and southbound freight confirms the fact' that the-Japanese have been using the Ping-Han ,RR. to. carry out - evacuation of troops and equipment from H N O rather than reinforcement of the area. AKW Effectiveness of Air Attacks in Interdicting Traffic. During the 4-week period under review the southern Ping-Han was subject to a number of attacks by Fourteenth Air Force planes. Daylight sweeps, or the fear of them, served to confine t r a g i c to night movement during flyable weather. Bricl^e attacks south of H I - A G had SNY N put twp bridges out of service at the beginning of the period (24 June)* They remained out through, the last week of June* and at JLeast one of them through the f i r s t two weeks of July. .' ' .. , - . 1 •North of H B - A G in the stretch between H B - A G S TY N , S TY N and H I - H 2 G there were 5 successful attacks on 4 SNC T N , bridges during the period* At least one of these bridges was unserviceable fron 24 June to 2 July and 2 to 4 of them (including by-passes) after that date. O the entire n southern Ping-Han, therefore, 3 bridges wore out during the last week of Juno and 3 to 5 bridges during the f i r s t 3 weeks of July, .* From the above traffic reports i t is evident that these operations against the Ping-Han, while occasioning delays and temporary interruptions, did not suffice to interdict movements of troops and supplies on the section south of ESIN-YANG. Lacking evidence of congestion at points north i t must bo concluded that through traffic to the Y L O River was s a t i s f a c t o r i l y maintained at EL W this l e v e l . As noted above, car movements amounting to 723 cars in 20 days, or 1,000 per month, are sufficient to transfor troops northward at a rate of one full division of 20^000 men with divisional ordnance and equipment per month* T*his includes an allocation of 650 cars.for supplies and equipment. At 15 short tons per car, 650 cars represent a capacity of 9,000 tons per month* Actual tonnage moved was considerably below this owing to the high proportion of trucks>,.tanks, guns and.horses.
If personnel h|fd bG,e^;^Qy*^Py other means and the railway given over entirely to movement of supplies and equipment, a movement of 1,000 freight cars per month each with a 15 ton load would haul 15,000 tons. This larger tonnage could probably have been achieved with the same number of locomotives, for a 23-car train would s t i l l carry loss than 350" tons, which is no more , than half the train load on most North China railways* Military supply to the amount of 15,000 short tons' is a considerable tonnage- in relation to the routine requirements of the Japanese forces in China* A typical Japanese division which is engaged in garrison duty in China with l i t t l e or*no combat activity is estimated to . require no more than 600-750 metric tons of supplies. and replacements of equipment (excluding food, forage and construction materials locally procured). In sharp f i t t ing of a continuous character, "Its maintenance requirements in'the field rise to 2,500-3,000 tons. Thus 15,000 short tons per month Will meet the garrison needs of at least 15 divisions, or will maintain at least 4-5 divisions in active combat (excluding supply losses from air attack)* These estimates are "cited here because of a c m o o mn tendency to over-estimate the logistical requirements of the Japanese Army in China under present conditions; also to under-estimate the Japanese a b i l i t y to maintain the necessary minimum of military traffic even on r a i l ways under continuous air attack. (See R&A/OSS, H 14th q AF, Supply Requirements of the Japanese Army in China, 30 July 1945U I t may be added that even at this level of t r a f f i c , the southern Ping^Han was probably being operated well below capacity during most of June and July. There 'is no reason to assume that the line even with traffic confined to night operations and delayed loy several damaged bridges could not have handled 2 or 3 times the June--July'movement, or up to 30,000-50,000 tons per month each way if the, average load per car were as much as 15 tons. This would s t i l l mean -only 3 to 5 trains per day north and south, each c a r d i n g 350 tons; Locomotive requirements would be correspondingly increased, of course. As many as 15 locomotives are probably needed now to handle 1.5 trains each1way per day on the 334-mile run from H N O to the Y L O River, AKW EL W for the average haul per engine under present conditions is unlikely to exceed 6(7-75'miles. To treble the traffic would run the requirement up to nearly 50 locomotives. This number the Japanese could i l l afford to devote to this exposed and vulnerable lino except in an emergency, for their total North China pool has probably now been reduced to no more than 700 locomotives in operation for a l l purposes. At. this level of t r a f f i c , too, congestions of troops and supplies might develop in r a i l yards and at damaged bridges, bringing increased risk of losses from strafing and bombing attacks*
It should bo noJS8f>fihQt - weakened line like the a Ping-Han can only accomplish rathor slow movement of t r a f f i c , oven at i t s present low level. To nove troops and supplies the length of the section below the Y L O EL W River probably takes 3 to 5 days now# The time night well be even longer if so large a proportion of the traffic were not troops, trucks, horses, and southbound empties which can be trans-shipped across damaged bridges nore-easily than heavy military freight* At present the element of speed may bo of' comparatively l i t t l e moment to the Japanese providing they can maintain a steady flow of t r a f f i c ; but in a tactical situation dictating rapid transfers''%'of troops and supplies -tine might well be the c r i t i c a l factor, .* The net results of air attacks on the southern Ping-Han to date, then,"has been to confine traffic to military movements of comparatively small proportions and comparatively slow speeds,. The tonnage'moved has nevertheless been appreciable in terms of imriodiato Japanese requirements* Complete interdiction will require a more intensive and continuous attack on bridges and other installations than has yet been undertaken* This conclusion is entirely consistent with European experience, where very heavy and persistent attacks were required to-cut through the cushion of non-ossential traffic and" interdict the c r i t i c a l movements necessary to sustain the German Army's front-line operations* # * #
CURRENT STATUS OF RAILROADS IN OCCUPIED CHINA, ( M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i g e n c e S e r v i c e , Washington) 1+ General f e a t u r e s * All t h e , t r u n k r a i l r o a d s of Occupied China a r e s t a n d a r d 4f 8g-" gauge except t h e P e n g - l i n g - t u - T a i w a n s e c t i o n of t h e Tatung-Puchow r a i l r o a d and t h e Tungkuan-Luan l i n e in Shansi which % are meter gauge* All l i n o s a r e s i n g l e t r a c k e d except a' s h o r t s e c t i o n of the Foiping-Mukden r a i l r o a d between T'ang-shan and C h f i n - h u a n g - t a o . I t v/as formerly b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e s e c t i o n of t h i s l i n e between'Peiping and T ! ang-ku had been double t r a c k e d by the Japanese, b u t r e c e n t a e r i a l p h o t o s , while n o t a b s o l u t e l y c o n c l u s i v e , • s e e m t o i n d i c a t e s i n g l e t r a c k i n g only* (Note: "From a study of a v a i l a b l e p h o t o s , the following g e n e r a l summary of t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e trackage i s compiled: 1) Peiping t o Tanku - s i n g l e t r a c k . 2) Tangku t o Tangshan - s i n g l e except' f o r 2 s h o r t double s e c t i o n s . 3) Tangshan t o Shanhaikwan - m o s t l y double w i t h some s i n g l e s e c t i o n s • 4) Shanhaikwan t o Mukden - 70 to 80% double t r a c k with many s h o r t and a few long s i n g l e t r a c k sections• .
I t has boon impossible on tho basis of onl^ M^fe'sife-lT^to medium scale photos available on the greater part of the lino, to. be completely accurate in delimiting the single and double track sections. Soo: Rrilroads in Occupied China, Special P . I . Report no. 40> Vol. XIII, The"Poipin-Mukdon Railroad, Eq. 14th A.F., 5 Aug. 1945, p* 1 f f . ) Tho linos were originally well constructed and used stone ballast and wooden sleepers. The weight of r a i l s on most of the standard gauge lines is from 80 to 85 lbs* per yard, although thoso used on the Japanese constructed Peiping-Chinhsien line and on the sections in Shansi between Ta-t'ung, Taiyuan, and -Shih-chia-chu.'ong arc believed to bo possibly as light as 60 l b s . Lighter r a i l s probably Y/ere also used in tho reconstruction of the southern part of the Poiping-Hankow line and the Cant on-Hankow l i n o . O n the meter gauge lines 50 Ib. r a i l s are- used. Host of the bridges were stool structures with loading capacities varying between HS20 and 3-50. However, numerous bridges, especially on the Poiping-Eankow and Canton-J-Iankow l i n e s , have been so damaged, by aorial attacks that their capacity has been greatly reduced. In other cases temporary wooden structures are used to' replace heavily damaged or destroyed bridges. 2« Current carrying capacity. The North China railways have a rated capacity of 3,500,000 metric tons of freight monthly. Because of numerous difficulties encountered in operations, this capacity was not attained during 1944, and i t is believed that the railroads are currently carrying not more than 2,700,000 tons per month. These figures do not include troop movements, for which no average rate is available. No similar overall estimates are available for Central and South China railroads, but i t is believed that tonnages carried on these linos arc not large and that thoy arc oporat ing at much less than tho oro t ica 1 capacity. 3. Operating d i f f i c u l t i e s . The difficulties encountered by tho China railroads are chiefly tho following: a. Shortage of rolling stock caused in part by a high rate of meghanical breakdowns and air raid damage. Tho situation is further complicated by the use of large numbers of Uorth China cars in the Nanking-Shanghai area, tho Hankow area and on long freight hauls to Manchuria and Korea. It is estimated that the rolling stock of tho *v.-rth China railways amounts to between 1,050 and 1,250 loco motives and 14,000 to 15,000 freight cars, several thousand of which for practical purposes are permanently in Central China or in Manchuria and Korea. If to tho above figure are added the locomotives, and cars belonging to Central China railroads, i t Is believed that the total rolling stock in a l l of China would not exceed about 1,400 locomotives and 16,000 to 18,000 freight cars. Probably 25% of these loco motives are permanently out of use because of breakdowns or damage from aerial attacks. b . Inadequate repair capacity, caused more by shortage of materials and skilled personnel than by lack of shop f a c i l i t i e s . c. Aerial attacks against bridges, shops, yards and other installations, as well as against rolling stock.
d. Shortage of engineers, trainmen and other
railway personnel, A largo proportion of the workers
arc- Chinese, and they are inclined to desert because
of fear of air attacks.
• e. Severe weather is known to have interfered
very seriously with rail operations during the winter
4. Capacities of individual lines. Captured documents
and other sources indicate that the Japanese rate the
maximum, capacity of main lines at about 20 trains a day
In each direction; that they consider' the mean capacity
as 15 trains and the minimum "capacity as 8 trains. Upon
the basis of evidence- available as to actual operations,
it is believed that these maximum capacities are prac
tically never attained, and that the mean capacity more
nearly represents the maximum number of trains which are
likely to be operated. In recent tines it is believed
that none of the railways have operated more than 12
freight trains daily, andin many cases considerably
loss than that.
In the table below the estimated capacities of the various linos arc given in terms of short tons of military supplies daily in each direction. Tonnage capacities for bulk commodities, such as coal and ore, would be about 30% greater than in the case of military supplies, although the number of trains daily would remain the same. All estimates take into consideration grades, track characteristics, and the tractive effort of locomotives known to have been used or likely to be used on the lines* Locomotives with a tractive effort of from 30,000 to 32,000 l b s , are believed to be used linos of North China, on most of the standard Smaller locomotives are undoubtedly used on parts of thG Peiping-Hankow line. The use of a50,000 lb. tractive effort locomotive has been issumed on the tractive effort PGlping-Kukden lino and a 20,000 lb. locomotive on the motor gauge lines. The length of trains generally vary from 25 to 40 cars. Cars vary in capacity from 15 to 50 metric tons with the majority being 30 ton cars. The net load of military supplies is estimated to average between 16 and 20 short tons per car. Estimated Capacities of China Railro ds
(Short tons of military supplies daily in ech direction)
Name of LineNet Load Max.Capa per Train city Trains Short Tons Daily Practical Operating; Capacity Trains Short Tons Daily Daily
C an t on - Han k ow Lci-yang-Wu-ch'ang 200 Peip ing-Hankow Hankow-Hsin-hsiang 400 Hsin-hsiang-Peiping 700 Shanghai-Nanking " 700 T l e n t s in-Pukow 700 Lung-Hai 375
15 15 15 15
4 10 10 10 10
1,600 7,000 7,000 7,000 3,750
Nano of Lino
o £2r Train Jho Short Tons
700 700 300 260 280 2 50 860 280
city Trains Daily
15 15 15 10 10 12 18 7
Op era t ing C apa cIty
Trains Daily Short Tons
7,000 7,000 3,000
Tsinan-Tsingtao TohsionShihchiachuang 3h i.hch iachuangTaiyuan Tatung-Puchow Yung-chi-Ta iyuan T r, I yuan-T a tung P o 1 p in g - Su i 7u an Foiping-Mukdon. Folping-Chinhsion •
10 10 10 6 8 10 14 5
1,560 2,2<10 2,500 12,000 1,400
5. Can t on -Hank ow. Lin o. This railway i s in operation from Canton 45 miles n o r t h t o Yflan-t'an (23-42N,' 113-083). Frar.i Y u a n - f a n n o r t h t o Loiyang (26-2(3:i, 112-501) a 259 mile stretch is partially destroyed, but is being recon structed by tho Japanese* From Loi-yang to V/u-chfang (across the river from Hankow) tho lino is In operation, but i t i s constantly disrupted ^o~j aerial attacks on bridges, < yards, track and roiling stock. A number of bridges arc so seriously damaged that woodon by-pass bridges have to bo used, Through traffic on this section except for light motor driven tmins is bo 1 loved Impossible, and a l l trains travel at night because- of aerial attacks . There aro no passenger trains, and so far as is known the line is usod almost exclusively for n i l i t a r y purposes. It is believed that not more than the equivalent of throe or four light trains dally of 8-12 cars each aro able to operate* There is no regular train ferry across tho Yangtze Kivor at Hankow,-but several barges with a capacity qf 5-6 freight cars each aro used for tho transfer of rolling stock. 6. Fo ip in .^-Hankow Lino. This lino was opened to traffic throughout i t s entire length in October 1944 aftor reconstruction by the Japanese of a 203-mile section south of the Yellow River. It is subject to constant disruption by aerial attacks on rolling stock, bridges and other installations, while guerrilla attacks have also disrupted the lino, especially around Pis in hsiang. Trips from Hankow to I-Isln-hsiang, just north of tho Yellow River, usually take several days because of tho disrupted state of the section of tho lino south of tho Yellow River. The Yellow River bridge seems to bo unsafe for heavy locomotives or for more than a fow loaded cars at a tine,, and a. numb or of other bridges ar o • .n t h e same c o n d i t i o n . The a l t e r n a t e b r i d g e a c r o s s * tho Yollow HIvor v i a Chong-hsion, K f a i - f o n g and Pis i n h s i a n g i s a wooden s t r u c t u r e and ha s boon danago d on nci nas boon clana^od numerous occasions by aorial attacks. Southbound traffic car.-•'ios coal, salt, corient and military supplies, while northbound traffic, especially from Hsin-hsiang north carries coal, cotton, iron oro, and food products. Trains run only at night south of tho Yellow River, and avail able evidence indicates that not more than 3 or 4 trains daily In each direction operate over this section Average length of. trains Is from 15 to 25 cars, T capacity of the line north of the Yellow KivQi\ia.%c cr"-.bly greater. • "), k
7. Tientsin-Pukow. Lino • This is the nost important _____ railways of tho rallvTays connecting Central China with Worth China, because i t has boon loss seriously affected by aerial attacks and because a l l sections have been in operation for a long time* A large percentare of tho coal used in tho Shanghai-Nanking area is carried south on this lino. It also carries snail quantities of salt and other commercial goods, as well as military supplies. Southbound traffic is estimated at a monthly rate frori 150,000 to 200,000 metric tons. Northbound traffic carries coal, iron ore, rock phosphate, and other export commodities destined for Japan, Korea and 1 anchukuo in addition to local freight. The estimated monthly rate of movenent of northbound export commodities is from 50,000 to 100,000 metric tons. Current information indicates that only about 10 freight trains a day are operating in each direction on the lino. Its ruling grade is *67 par cent* The r a i l ferries at Pukow which connect this line with the Shanghai-Nanking line have been damaged at various times by aerial attacks, but they are presently in operation. 8« Tatung-Puchow Lino* This railroad, running the length of Shansi Province, is divided into two soctions.North from Taiyuan to Ta-tTung i t is standard gauge, The southern section from Fong-ling-tu to Taiyuan is motor gauge, thus making through traffic impossible. The southernmost section of tho lino from Feng-ling-tu to Yung-chi has been destroyed for some time, but from Yung-chi north tho line is in operation* Traffic o tho line has boon seriously disrupted by n aerial attacks, and at present trains operate only at night. One passenger and two 15-car freight trains nightly in each direction are reported In operation on the southern sections of tho l i n e . The ruling grade on tho meter gauge section south of Taiyuan is 1,25 per cent and on the standard gauge section between Taiyuan and Ta-t'ung is about 1.80 per cent, 9. Peiping-Suiyutan Lino* This lino is in operation throughout its' entire length of 508 miles, but has often been disrupted by guerrilla activity in the Kuei-sui-Pao-t'ou sector and has been subjected to aerial attacks in the Ta-tfung area, Tho section from Ta-t'ung to Poiping is especially important because of the coal, iron ore, pig iron, wool and other raw materials which i t carries from. Inner Mongolia to North China, for use there and for export to Japan, Korea and Manchuria. The estimated southeastern monthly rate of movement of those commodities is about 100,000 metric tons, Tho capacity of the line is limited by grades of 3,3 per cent in tho Nan-k'ou Pass north of Large Mallet engines are used in this p ass, iGipxng but oven so, the net load per train of military supplies which can be carried northward, through tho pass is estimated at about 250 short tons per t r a i n . It is believed that not over 8 to 10 trains daily normally operate over the section between Peiping and Ta-tfung and that oven fewer trains operate between Ta-tfung and Pao-t f ou.
". 4 ~
10 * Peiping-Mukden Lino » This is tho most important line connecting North Chin w i t h 1 a nc hu i i a p n g orh h l an u r r and is foolloved to have the highest capacity of any of tho railways in North China* Thus far i t has not boon seriously interfered with by aerial attacks^ although i t has at tines been disrupted by guerrilla activity* It is believed currently to be devoting most of fts capacity to the movement of coal, iron ore, pig iron, phosphate rock, aluminous shale, salt and other raw materials to Eoroa and JTanchukuo and to Korea for export to Japan. Estimated current northeast ward movement of these commodities is about 300,000 notrie tons per month* Current information would indicate that only about 10-12 freight trains daily are operating in each direction on the lino # 11• Foiping-Chinhsien Line* This proyv^os an alternate route connecting Ivlanchukuo and North China. It passes through very rough country, however, and is believed to be a very low capacity line* Operations at times have boon seriously interfered with by guerrilla activity, and at present it is doubtful that even 5 trains daily arc in operation.
DATA . N AIRFIELDS O In t h e f o l l o w i n g l i s t of a i r f i e l d s , those have "boon s e l e c t e d i n t e r r i t o r y formerly occupied by t h e enemy which a r e n o s t l i k e l y t o bo of s e r v i c e t o or along t h e r o u t e s of ro*-occunying f o r c e s . Only t h e l e n g t h s and d i r e c t i o n s of runways a r e g i v e n , t o g e t h e r with t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e f i e l d as i t can be determined fron t h e b e s t and most r e c e n t photo cover a v a i l a b l e . HANKOW-WUCHANG AREA M i s s i o n 5 M 8 7 , 20 Aug 1945 A 1 . HANKOW A/D ( 3 0 - 3 6 N , 114-15E) 4 NNE-SSW runways 5000' x 150 f , 4400* x 150',
3300' x 160' and 3100' x 160' .
2 WNW-ESE runways 4100» x 160 • and 4600* x 270'.
1 NW-SE runway 3500 ! x 160',
2. mi C A G HN 1 N-S 1 3-W Field A/D (30*31N, 114-203) runway 4400 ! x 175T runway 4100' x 175' serviceable*
3.T«7UCIIANG SAT, A/F (30-37N, 114-22E) 1 ME-SSW runway 5300' x 380' Field serviceable. 4 . H N O SAT A/F (30-35N, 114-08S) AEW 1 NE-SW runway 4900' x 180' Field serviceable. 5 . TSIIIGSHAN L/S (30-38ET, 114-29E) 1 NE-SV; runway 5000' x 250'
Missions 5 MC 192 and 193, 24 Aug 1945.
Runway and taxi strips o/opear abandoned and over
grown, probably usablo only in emergency.
AREA Mission 5 ME 166, 25 J u l y 1945
1 . SIIIHHWEIYAO L/S (30-15N, 115-04S) 1 NV/-SE runway 4500' x 150' Ru nv/ay un s o rv ic oab 1 e .
KIUICIANG AREA Mission 5 ME 172, 28 J u l y 1945 1 . KIUKIANG A/F (29-48N, 115-5713) 1 NS-SV: runway 3000' x 170' 1 NW-SE runway 3000' x 2 8 5 ' Servicibility doubtful.
2* E H TA K W L/S (29-49N, 115-565) R ?O O 1 NW-SE runway 3 8 0 0 ^ ^ 0 0 ^ S t r i p undervicofibitR "^•-'v-*^r" 3 , KIUKIANG SAT L/S (29-45N, 115-58E) 1 NE-SW runway 4400' x 215' Strip unserviceable
Mission 5 M 179, 15 Aug 1945 E 1, NANCHANG A/P (28-38N, 115-52E)
1 NNE-SS" runway 3275f x 320 !
Field limited operational
2 . NAITCHANG L / S (28-42CT, ' 1 1 5 - 4 9 E ) 1 NNW-SS3 runway 5900' x 180'
5 MS 176, 15 Aug 19.45
Mission 5 MS N10, 20 ,.ug 1945
I ING A/P ( 3 0 - 3 2 N , 117-04-E) 1 NE-SW runway 4525* x 305' Field serviccable
2, ANKING SAT A/F (30-3211,- 117-063) 1 N3-SW runv;ay 5500« x 215' Field serviceable.
LUCHOW AREA Mission 5 M 17, 9 Fob 1945 D 1 . L C O L/S (31-52N, 117-19E) UHW 1 E-W runway 2900' x 160' 1 NW-SE runway 2500' x 250' Strip unserviceable.
Mission 5 MB 56, 10 June 1945
1 . W J U A/P (31-24N, 118-23E) TH 2 E-VJ runways 3500' x 160 f and 2450' x 110' F i e l d serviceableo
NANKING, ;,REA M i s s i o n 5 MB 7 4 , 24 Aug 1945 1 . MING K K N A/D (32-02N, 118-48E) U UG 1 NE-SW runway 2800' x 320' 1 Nw-SB runway 2600' x 320' Field serviceable. .
2, NANKING SAT A/F (31~58N> 118-503) 1 NS-SW runway 52Q0f x 320:% I Field s e r v i c e a b l e 3 , NANKING E L/S (32-02N, 118-53E) 1 NE-SV/ runway -3850' x 130» Strip serviceable. 4 , TAI CEIAO C A A/D (32-OON, 118-493) HN 1 N-S runway 3300' x 185» 1 ESS-7'NW runway 3200« x 185f 1 NE-SV/ runway 4300* x 300 • Field serviceable*
Mission 5 MD 142, 10 June 1945
1, V/IJTSIN A/F (31-45N, 119-53E) 1 3S3-WNW runway 2500' x 180'
Sod runway, probably serviceable.
Mission 5 MD 77, 13 :*pr 1945
1, TU1TGTAI A/F (32-53N, 120-183)
1 N-S runway 5450f x 1000f
1 E-V: runway 6050T x 695 !
N-S runv/ay appears under construction. Field
probably not serviceable.
^ MB 74, 24 Aug 1945
1. CIVIC CENTER L/S (31-16N, 121-32E)
1 3-W runway 7200* x 200'
5 ! r 72, 20 Aug 1945.
'B Runway and taxi-strips appear in good condition.
2 . GE FAI R A L/S (31-16N, 121-32E) .E OD 1 NNE-SS / runv/ay 7200' x 175T Runway s e r v i c e a b l e . 3. HFNG JAO-A/D (31-1ON, 121-2013)
1 NNW-SSE runway" 6500* x 330 !
5 MA 88, 23 Au^ 1945.
4 . KA G A A/D (31-21N, 121-31E) INWN 1 N-S runv/ay 5200* x 380 * 1 S-V/ runway 5600 ! x 490f 1 M/-SS runway 4900' x 830' 1 NS-SW runway 5000' x 490 ! f i e l d serviceable*
5 . HINGHWA A/D & SEA PL/JffE BASS (31-10N, 121-27E) * 1 N-S runway 5400' x 4;?0? 1 E-W runwav 4300 * x 420' 1 1TE-SW runway 4300' x 420' 1 I7YJ-SE runway SgOC x 420 H 5 r.B 7 1 , 19 ,iU#¥945 a A/D and Seaplane baso probably s e r v i c e a b l e . 6 . TACI-L'JTG A/D (31-18N, 121-25E)
1 N-S. runway 4800' x 200'
1 E V runway 4800' x 200'
-J 1 NE-SV; runway 3400' x 220'
1 NY/-SE runway 5200' x 220»
7 . "700SIJNG .,/D (31-25K, 121-18S) 1 HW-SS runway 5700' x 320' 1 NE-3W runway 3600' x 320' Field serviceable* S-W extension of -1TE-S7J runway nrobably unserviceable*
Mission TTtS 161, 20 July 1945 1,5 3BTYANG A/F (32-04N, 114-06E) 1 E SW V f runwav 2900 ! x 125' (^od)
N- S ^ 1 1TNW-S3E runway 3400' x 125' (sod)
Runways probably u n s e r v i c e a b l e .
FisTTon 5 1I 169, 26 July 194 .D lf j ; CKENGESIEK A/F (34-441^ 113-44T3) 1 IINE-SSV; runway 4500' x 165» Field serviceable.
2 . CHENGHSIEN SAT. L/S (34-43N, 113-43E) ; 1 VJNW-SSE runway 5300 f x 620 f
1 NE-SW runway 5500 ? x 300 f
5 M 150, 1 July 1945
D S t r i p s e r v i c e a b l e .
PUCHQU i,REA Mission 6'MC 164, 3. Aug 1945 1 . PIJCEOU A/P (34-55N, 110-17E) ! 1 NE-SV; runway 4600' x 2 3 5 F i e l d sorvicGablo*
AMT AREA C Hiss ion 5 M 164, 3 Aug 1945 1 . AHYI A/F (35-08N, 110-58E) 1 E-"; runway 4800T x 240» A/F appears abandoned. Runway u n s e r v i c e a b l e .
K i s s ion 5 M 1 6 4 , 3 *>uz 1945 C 1 . "&JNCHENG A/D (35-O21T, 1 1 0 - 5 4 E ) 1 N3-SV/ runway 4 7 0 0 ' x 3 2 0 f 1 E-'J runway 4400f x 320'
-/ LIITFEN, ARE.. M i s s i o n 5 EC 1 6 4 , 3 Aug 1 9 4 5 1 . LITTFEN A / F (36-03H,- I l l - o i l ) 1 M3-3SW runway 4 0 5 0 ' x 1 5 0 ' Field serviceable
L031UTG AREA Llissicn 5 M 167, 4 Aug. 1945 C 1 . L Y N A/P (34-43N, 112-24E) OAG 1 ENE-V/SW runway 3000» x 360» Pie Id u n s o r v i c c a b l e •
tLIOV/ RIVER-BRIDGE ^HEA Mission 5 1J 158, 31 J u l y 1945 -C 1 , Y L O RIVER BRIDGE L/S (34-59N, 113-34E) EL W 1 B-W runv/ay 5000 f x 340 f (sod) Strip
Mission 5 EC 172, 10 Aug 1945 1* ANYiiNG A/D (36-0811, 114-21E) 1 NNE-SSU runway 4800 510' Piold s e r v i c e a b l e
SIFSI/J^TG ,,REA Mission 5 H 180, 14 Aug 1945 C 1 . "S INS IMG A/D (35-16N, 113-55E) 1 NNS-SSl/ runway 5400» x 330' (sod) 1 N-S runway 3350' x 330 ! 1 SNE-V/3W runway 3560 f .x 330' Fiold s e r v i c e a b l e »
Mission 5 M 178, 13 -ug 1945 0 1. KAIFENG A/D (34-43H, 114-24E) 1 NNS-S3V/ runway 4070' x 165 Field serviceable.
OHUKIATSI AREA Mission 5..MD 176, 4 Aug 1945 1 . CIIUKIAT3I A/F (34-26N, 115-443)
1 N~S runway 4800' x 275'.
F i e l d s e r v i c e a b l e .
PSITG-PU AHSA Mission 5 K 1A, 9 June 1945 1 . PE^GPU A/F(32-57N, 117-253) 1 NE-3W runway 5450* x 9 5 0 ' 1 NNS-S3W runway GOOO' x 950» Field serviceable SUCHOW AREA F i s s i o n 5 K 167, 4 Aur 1945 G 1 , STJGE JGEOW A/D (34-17N, U 7 - 1 2 E )
1 EN3-WSW runway 5 0 0 0 ' x 320*
1 MW-SSE runway 3300» x 5 0 0 ' ( s o d )
2, SUCHOW A/F (34-18N, 117-103)
1 N-S runway 2450 ! x 160 f (sod)
• 1 S-W runway 2450» x 160» (sod)
3» SUCHOW L/S (34-18N, 117-OGE) • lNNE-SS'ir runway 3000* x 1 5 0 ' ( s o d ) S t r i p sorvic©able#
EAIGH0V7 AREA Mission 5 M 1 3 5 , 12 J u l y 1945 G 1 . IIAICHOW A/F (34-36N, 119-083) No runways . Landing a r e a s o d , 4000 f x 4 0 0 0 ' Field s e r v i c e a b l e .
Mission 5 K 157, 30 July 1945 G 1 # TAIYUAH A/D (37-56N, 112-31S) 1 NNS-SSW runway 5500' x 230' 1 NW-SS runway 30001 x 320"» Field serviceable* 2* TAIYIJAN S A/F (37-4711, 112-36E) 1 N-S runway 3000' x 240' Field probably s e r v i c e a b l e , / .SKIEGHIAGIIUANG AHEA Mission 6 M 1 3 4 , 12 J u l y 1945 b 1 . SIIIKCT;IACHUANG A/D (38-04N, 114-253) 1 NW-SE runwaT 4 1 5 0 ' x 1 9 5 ' Sod l a n d i n g a r e a 4500» x 1 5 0 0 ' 8c 5 0 0 0 ' x 1 5 0 0 ' E and N of runway* F i e l d i s serviceable* 8 -18
2« SFIECHJACHUANG L/S (38-03N, 114-4OE)
1 N-S runway 5800f x 325*
/ L'i*sTion'& 2 ff166, 3 Au$ 1945 . 1 1. TTSISII-JN A/F (37-29N,l llo-223) 1 T[-S runway 6800 x 820' Field serviceable*
151, 23 July 1945
NCHS^ L/S (3G 1 IT-3 landing , )
rea ov'OC x 1SGOT graded anA rolled.
Fission 5 tC 147, 19 July 1945
l^TSIHA?-' A/t) (o6-40H, 3.10-5513) 1 NEl-SSW imnwa-- 3900' x 3 4 0 ' 1 M3-SSW runv/ar 5000' x 7 0 0 ' (socl) 1 im3-SSV' runway 3900' x 6 2 0 ' ( s o d ) Flo Id .servic sable • 2* TSBTAN Sat*"A/P (36-39:1, 116-543) No runway, sod. fiolo; 4000' x 3500' Pielcl ••irobrbl'5' sorvlceablo*
^ARBA 3" 176, 11 Aug 1945 >G GHMGTIELT A/? 1 (3S-52H, 11S-00E)
1 K-S runway .0300' x 625'
/ 5lfC 190, S2 August 1945 1 . TSJlvOKTAO A/I) (36-101^ 120-24E) 1 IT7-3:3 runwa'7 3790' x c90' 1 TTS-sr runway 3575' x 520' Field sorvi.coa"ble. 2 # TSINGTAO Seaplane Base (33-031!, 120-17S) 2 concrete .soaplane i-'arnns 5 5 ' wide C 5 H 185, 19 Aus 1G45 Seaplane base rrobably serviceable« 3 . LTI'TINa A/D 1 NN17-3SS 1 ENS-T.V8W M 165, C Buildings (36-131?, 120-242) runway 3400' x 170' runway 3300* x 170' 19 Aug 1945 on runwavs render f i e l d •unservico'alxle • l /
Mission 5 MD 122,. 24 May 1045
* LUMTSUN L/S (36-23^, 120-143)
1 HW-SE runway 4000' x 620'
S t r i p Drobably unserviceable*
FAOTOU 4iT-iJA M i s s i o n 5ltG 1 1 1 , 16 June 1945 1 . FAOTOU -A/F (40-35!?, 110-0233) 1 NV7-SE runway 5 2 0 0 ' x 3 5 0 ' Field serviceable *.
TATUffG AI^A Kission 5 KG 153, 2 6 . J u l y 1945 1 . T T 1 G A/D (40-021T; 115-143)' A UT 1 NKW-SSZ runway 7200 f x 500T sod, F i o 1 cl s e rv ic eal) 1 e •
• . -A
Kiss ion 5~IrC 96, 23 Uay 194 1. K/LLGAF A/> (40-471T, 1M-5C3) No runways, aocl landing area 4300» x 3000* F i e l d probably u^ s e r v i c e a b l e •• 2 . K L ^ I S L/S ( 4 0 - 4 ^ , 114-53?;) A G AT 1 lTvw'-33 "runway 5300 f x G50f 3o:?v i c ib H i t y d o L 11'u 1 • u> 3. KALGAN S/ L/S (4O-472T,' 114-52S)
1 NVf-SE runway 0500' x 660»
Field serviceable •
4 . -HSUAIUnJA A/F (40-43IT, 114-57E) 1 NW-SS r u n - a y 5000* x 230» Sod landing area 4600' z: 2200» v-aT u n s e r v i c e a b l e . •
i^aTon 5 t!(T 155, 29 J u l y 1945 1 . FAOTIKG A/F. (38«5^N, 115-3CS) 1 NS-Sv; runway 3800 ! x 7 0 0 ' , sod Sod "area 6800« 1TITE-SSV? x 4500' 3 •ServicibilitT douotfult
Hiss ion "¥5 M 192 and 193, 24 Aug 1945 G 1. NANYUA1T A/D (3C-47F, 116-241) 2 3-7 runways 2450 ! x 500 f , t 2550' x 185* 1 S-V7 runway 3700' x 475', sod 1 mi-S3 runway 343C» s 630 ! 1 E~!v runway 4150 ! x 200' . 1 H-S runway 6550* x 630' 2 1T-S runways 3200* x 60O» & 3800' x Fie Id s.erv ic eali
2 , LAF?IEITCEANG A/D (33-57N, 116-J 1 K-S runwa^ 3200* x 210* '" 1 N3-SW runwa^ 3000' x 150» 1 1TV;-S3 :^nwa7' 3000* x 150» Flo Id s e r v i c e a b l e * 3 . TUNGKSEH A/?1 (33-553$, 116-393) 1. MS-SSV/ runway 5300< x 680 *
Sf:7sr3TorrirW^193, 24 Aug 1^
1 . TlSN^SIi;: A/D (39-0711, 117-22E) 1 U!Tv"/-S3E runwar 3800» x 280* 1 EN3-.7SW runwa7 370C1' x 200 f 1 FW-SE rvmviaj 3300 f x 250 f F i e l d serviceable» / HANiCJIOW .A?CA Liission 5l.:?3 177, 16 Au«; 1945 l , riAFGC::ow A/D ( 3 0 - 2 0 1 , 120-141:) 1 }!ES-SSW runwar- 4550 « x 200 r 1 NITW-SSE runway 2600« x 120» ^NS-SSV/ nmwa3 r s o r v x c e a b l e , NN'7-SSIJ runway H a l t e d , s e r v i c e a b i l i t y .
L i s a ion 5 I-':s 1.77, 18 J u l y 1045 1« WHITS CLOUJ A/D (23-10N, 113-15:3) 1 N1TE-3SV/ ^nnwa- 426C f x 400» 1 li;-r.V-3SE runway 37:;:0» x 300' Piold s e r v i c e a b l e *
1 2* Q IIDH 110 A/D (23-03F, 113-192) : 1 H-S runwar 5000 * :c 320T 1 -3-7/ 2-unway 3100* x 1901 Field s e r v i c e a b l o .
3 . UlTIVS^SITY L/S (D3-07IT, Ho-2033) 1 1T/-3.3 runway 5400» ;c 350' S t r ip a o i»v ic o ab l a . 4 . ^IIAIJ^OA L/S (23-081T, 113-243) •1 H-S runway 5000' x 300'
S t r i p s c rv i o o ab1e.
5 . WRITS CLOUD SAT, A/F (93-14ZT, 113-17S) 1 FKS-SSV/ runway 3700« x 330 f PieId serviceab1o,
1*57, 18 July 1945
KAITAK A/D & Seaplane Base (22-12N, 114-12E)
1 NW-SE runway 4400« x 310'
1 ECTE-WSW runway 4500» x 180'
2 seaplane rarapa 50 f wide
A O AREA MY Mission 26 PS- 6 rS-5M164-D32E2V ( 2 6 - 3 9 ) , 15 June 1945. AMOY A/D (24-32IT, 118-08E)
1 NS-SV/ runway 4200»! x 30C «
1 1TT7-SS runway 2600 'long, under c o n s t r u c t i o n ,
F ie Id s e rv i c eab 1 e •
S-.7AT0W AREA Mission 20RS-6RG 5M170-22 IV ( 1 - 2 9 ) , 19 June 1945 1 . K.ILOK A/F (23-23N, 11G-41E) ! 1 NS-SW runway 3900 f x 150 1 NOT-SSE runway 3600* x 315», s o d . Field serviceable•
NINGFO AREA Mission 5 M 4 , 16 Jan 1945 C 1 . 1TINGP0 k/F (29-54N, 121-33E) 1 WNW-ESE ininway 5600» x 470 ' F i e l d u n s e r v i c e a b l e and abandoned*
CLIMATE OP SHANGHAI (Taken f#om General C l i m a t i c Information Guide fro. 1 9 ;
submitted by 1 4 t h A i r Force Staff Weather Officer*)
LOCATION AND' TOPOGRAPHY •
The a r e a c o v e r e d b y t h i s 311 id© i s t h e p o r t i o n of t h e c o a s t of China i m n e d i a t o l y s o u t h of t h e YANGTZE R i v e r . The c i t y of SHANGHAI i s l o c a t e d on t h e l e f t ( w e s t ) bank of t h e HWANG-HJ (WHANG-POO) R i v e r 12 m i l e s from t h e mouth of t h e YANGTZE R i v e r , There a r c a few i n s i g n i f i c a n t h i l l s in t h e v i c i n i t y of SHANGHAI r e a c h i n g e l e v a t i o n s u p t o 400 f e e t . There arc higher mountains f a r t h e r t o t h e west, about 80 miles from SHANGHAI, but they have only minor influence upon t h e c l i m a t e • REPRESENTATIVE CLIMATIC STATION The climate of the e s t u a r y of the YANGTZE River i s
r e p r e s e n t e d by the observations taken a t ZI*-KA-WEI#
(31-12N, 121-26E, elevation«*22 f e e t ) ? All c l i m a t i c
elements r e p r e s e n t e d . i n t h i s guide a r e based on records
of 10 t o 62 ye'ars of observations except for c e i l i n g s ,
v i s i b i l i t i e s and wind frequencies for which 6 years of
observations were used*
GENERAL CLIMATIC CONDITIONS "' ; • .
The c l i m a t e of t h e lowor YANGTZE River v a l l e y i s governed essentially by.tho laternation of maritime tropical air from the East China Sea and tho continental tropical (summer) and continental polar air (winter) from the interior of the Eastern Asiatic continent. The main governing influence upon- tho'climate is tho change of tho seasonal monsoon winds which, In winter, carry polar continental air from the interior to the sea and, in summer, .maritime.1 tropical air from the sea to the continent* TEMPERATURE,. •
T h e * i n t e r p l a y between w i n t e r and summer monsoons c r e a t e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e range of t e m p e r a t u r e . The mean f o r January i s ,40 degrees b u t cold waves o c c a s i o n a l l y d e p r e s s normally high and' the war-"eat month i s August (mean 83 d e g r e e s ) , Tho a b s o l u t e maximum 1*0corded i s 104 d e g r e e s • Under t h o i n f l u e n c e of c l e a r s k i e s in w i n t e r , tho n i g h t temperature goes below the f r e e z i n g p o i n t on as many as 16 days i n J a n u a r y . In summer, d a i l y maxima f r e q u e n t l y exceed 90 degrees and, frcm t h e middle of May t o tho middle of October, d a i l y maxima of 75 degrees a r e normal.. PRECIPITATION. ' P r e c i p i t a t i o n , in t h i s a r e a h a s a very marked annual v a r i a t i o n * Of t h e annual t o t a l of 45 i n c h e s , t h e m a j o r i t y f a l l s In the' summer with a maximum value in J u l y when 7 inches a month a r e normal* T-he cool season (November through F e b r u a r y ) , w h i l e n o t a c t u a l l y d r y , has mean p r e c i p i t a t i o n ^Located 5 m i l e s west of t h e c i t y of SIIANGK.
below 2 inches. During tho sunnier monsoon, excessive amounts of p r e c i p i t a t i o n arc occasionally observed v/ith a 24 hour maximum of 10 inches. Tho maximum monthly amount observed is 19.4 inches. Long l a s t i n g rainy s p e l l s (7 or noro successive days) arc infrequent and c o n s t i t u t e less than 5% of tho cases in most months, July is an exception with 10$ of the cases of rain s p e l l s l a s t i n g 7 d$ys or longer. The majority of a l l rainy s p e l l s , however, last, less than 3 days in a l l seasons • In March, April, August and October, nearly 75$ of a l l rainy spoils l a s t only 1 or 2 days in succession. Snowfalls are observed nearly every year in the form of l i g h t snow f l u r r i e s , but .snow covers arc observed on the ground only in exceptional, cases* CLOUDINESS ., .
Cloudiness i s r e l a t i v e l y high from January through September. In tfhese months, more than .6 mean sky cover :5s observed with a peak of nearly .8 during the height of the summer monsoon in Juno t From October through December, moan cloudiness i s between .5 and .6.. During May and June, 18 to 20 days a month are cloudy (mean sky cover more than »8). ; Clear days during these same months (mean sky cover l e s s than # 2) can bo expected only a t the r a t e of 2 a month* From October through January, about 8 or 9 days a month are c l e a r . Low ceilings are^ r a t h e r rare and do not occur on more than about 6 days a year. F G A D VISIBLITIES O N Dense fog occurs on 3 t o 4 days a month at the height of the summer monsoon but i s not unknown at any season. V i s i b i l i t i e s ' b e l o w 1J miles occur on 7 to 9 -days a month in the early morning hours from November through March. V i s i b i l i t i e s are usually b e t t e r in daytime, although, during £he winter, dust burdened a i r masses from tho i n t e r i o r of China are comraon and excellent v i s i b i l i t i e s are, r a r e . Tho lowest frequency of poor v i s i b i l i t i e s occurs from July through September, and good v i s i b i l i t i e s aro prevalent in those months, e s p e c i a l l y in daytime. WINDS ' ,
Wind v e l o c i t i e s i n SHANGHAI a r e g e n e r a l l y l i g h t t o fresh with calms and gales occurring only r a r e l y . From August through November over 40$ of tho observed wind velocities exceed 18 m.p.h. The change in prevailing wind directions between winter and summer is s t r i k i n g . In winter, 61% of a l l winds come from tho northern quadrant (N, NE, NW); in summer about 68$ of a l l winds are from the southeastern quadrant (S, SE, S). Occasionally typhoons from the China Sea strike at the coast near SHANGIi/lI and extreme wind velocities over 80 mop»h« have been observed in conjunction v/ith these storms*
COMPARABLE U.S. STATION
The climate of SHANGHAI Is most closely comparable'
to that of Allondalo, South Carolina, 60 miles north
of Savannah, Georgia. Moan January temperature for
SHANGHAI is 40 degrees compared to 48 for Allendalo.
The mean July temperature for both places is 83 degrees.
The absolute n in mum. temperature is 10 degrees in
both places. The absolute maximum is 104 degrees in
SHANGHAI compared with 106 degrees for Allendale.
The total annual precipitation is 45 inches for SHANGHAI,
44 inches for Allendale• Maximum precipitation for
SHANGHAI occurs in June while the maximum in Allendale
falls in July* However, while there is a slight monsoon
tendency In wind distribution in South Carolina, no
striking reversal of prevailing seasonal winds as
observed in SHANGHAI takes place.
AIR OPERATIONS (GENERAL)
THUNDTHF-STORMS SEVERE ICING JUNE-AUGUST 3 - 6 DAYS/MO DEC.-JAN
DEC-FSB 1-2 DAYS/MO.APRIL-SEPT
ABOVE 13000• NOV-MAR.7-9 DAYS/HO.JULY-OCT.3-4 DAYS/MO. NOV-MAY 1 DAY/MO.JUNS-OCT,0-1 DAY/MO •
MAY-JUNE 18-20 DAYS/MO.OCT-DEC
8-9 DAYS/MO, ALL MONTHS (EARLY#,LL MONTHS AFTER HORNING 1 4 - 1 6 DAYS/MO)NOONS 5 - 8 DAYS/MO.
CEILING 1000 FT AND/OR VISIBILITY l i MILES GALES SEY 8/10 CLOUD COVERED VISIBILITY 6 MILES
AIR OBSERVATION AND PHOTOGRAPHY" SKY 8 / 1 0 CLOUD COVERED VISIBILITY 6 MILES PARACHUTE OPERATIONS WIND VELOCITY 16 M . P . H . AUG-NOV-JAN. MAR-JULY. ( 4 0 - 5 0 ^ OF OBS.) (20-30?o OF OBS.) ALL MONTHS (AFTER- ALL MONTHS VISIBILITY 6 MILES NOONS 2 2 - 2 5 DAYS/MO)(EARLY MORNING 1 4 - 1 6 DAYS/MO GROUND OPERATIONS-GlflTERAL BAIN FREQUENCY • APRIL-JUNE 1 2 - 1 4 DAYS/MO OCT-DSC 8 - 9 DAYS/MO TEMPERATURE 80 DEGREES F . JUNE-SEPT 2 0 - 3 0 DAYS/MO.NOV-FSB. NONE. TEMPERATURE 32 DEGREES F t D E C - F S B . 8 - 1 1 DAYS/MO. APR-OCT. NONE, MAY-JUNE 18-20 DAYS/MO. OCT-DEC, 8-9 DAYS/MO. ALL MONTHS (EARLY ALL MONTHS MORNING 1 4 - 1 6 DAYS/MO . ) (AFTERNOONS S DAYS/MO.)
MECHANIZED OPERATIONS RAINFALL SNOW COVER JUNE-SEPT. 5 - 7 INCHES MO. NOV-FEB. 1 , 5 - 2 . 3 I N . MO. MAR-NOV. NONE. DSC-FEB. 1 DAY/SEASON
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE TEMPERATURE 32 DEGREES P . DEC-FEB, 8 - 1 1 DAYS/MO EIGH TEMPERATURE JULY-AUG (MEAN DAILY MAX.9O-91 DEGREES F . DEC-FEB 2 DAYS/MO SAND AND DUST STORMS ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION HEAVY RAINS JUNE-NOV (MAX .MO. NOV-MAY(MAX.MO. /iMTS. 1 2 - 1 9 INCHES AKTS.6-9 INCHES; MAX. 2 4 HRS. 1 0 . 4 I N ^ A X . 24 HRS. 2 . 9 INCHFS
MAX. 42 FEET MIN.^4 FEET
DSC-FEB 1-2 DAYS/ MAR-NOV .NONE.
DEC-FEB 1 DAY/SEASON MAR-NOV .NONE.
APR-OCT.NONE NOV-APR(NO TRIPS'90op) MAY-JULY NONE.
SUPPLIES AND STORAGE
TEMPERATURE 32 DEGREES F«
DEC-FEB 8 - 1 1 DAYS/MO APR-OCT.NONE. ALL MONTHS(EARLY MORN HIGH HUMIDITY
ING RE. HUM. 90% OR MORE) ROAD COMMUNICATIONS RAIN FREQUENCY SNOW COVER APR-JUNE 1 2 - 1 4 DAYS/MO DEC-FSB 1 DAY/SEASON
DAYS/MO, . MAR-NOV NONE.
TRANSPORTATION - DAMAGE AMD
The high-light of the final days of combat operations, was the damaging of the Yellow River Bridge #195. Photo cover on 13 August revealed that two spans of the bridge were out at the north end. Investigation of the source resulted in credit for the damage ending up with the ground forces., This was the f i r s t time that the bridge had been success fully damaged, since 14 April when the second span from the north end was knocked out by an a e r i a l attack. Going back over the f i r s t 15 days of August which were not covered during 14th Air Force Headquarters moving operations, wo find that bridge #84 at E O I had been skip-bombed on A Y 2 August and 2 spans wore destroyed as revealed by photo of 3 August. However, a by-pass for the bridgo was nearing completion* O the same day 200' of bridge #265 at SINYMG n were shown by strike photos to have been destroyed. O n 1 August a pilot reported that ho had destroyed 1 span and damaged an abutment" of #256 at KINEIAMG. Bridge #92 at N I T received slight damage to 1 span on 4 August and #105 EK J at SL H was rendered unserviceable by direct h i t s on IA O 11 August • The two bridges at A Y H , #126 and #130 v/hich NAG have always received more than t h e i r share of attention wore both h i t on 2 August but v/oro revealed as serviceable by photo on the following day. WUCHANG LIUCHOW RR
The only a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h i s l i n e during t h e f i r s t h a l f of August was a t SBTTSIANG whore b r i d g e s #46 and #47 wore roportod as h i t on 1 August. Photos of the same date showed #46 as s e r v i c e a b l e and #47 u n s e r v i c e a b l e b e a r i n g out the claim t h a t i t had been one-half d e s t r o y e d . TUNGPU R R We think we can safoly say without fear of contradiction
that bridge #102 at YUTZS was the scene of more "Damage and
Repair" than any other bridgo in the world for a correspond
ing period. It ended July out of service but started tho
first of August intact. A hit was reported on 4 August
destroying 1 span and possibly damaging another. Photo on
5 August showed the bridge unserviceable but by the 9th it
v/as again usable. The following day it was hit again and
damage claimed to a pier, an abutment, tracks and ties*
This was a dull period in comparison to Juno &nd July.
Two other bridges which received considerable attention in
recent months wore numbers 122 and 123 at KIEKSIU; #122
was rendered unserviceable on 1 August but the by-pass was
intact by 3 August; #123 was reported hit on 11 Aug. with
2 spans"and 1 pier reported destroyed and 1 abutment badly
damaged." At JIUNGTUNG bridgo #142 was hit on 4 Aug. destroy
ing oho pier and dropping 2 spans. This damage had boon
repaired by 9 August when photo revealed that the bridge
The highway bridge at TACKUENTIEN (-26-33N, 111-42E)
west,pf tho railroad bridge #100 was attacked with a
vengeance on 28 and 29 July and is reported to -have
ended, the month put of service-.
Photos of 29 July: reveal that the road from
HENGYALTG to .CANTON Is in excellent condition and well
travelled. • ' .
,»4. J t 4\ A
LATE REPORTS FROM PREVIOUS. J)JISSIONS
(Reports from Ground Sources and Photo Cover
Compared with 14th AF Mission Reports)
Prepared by Operations Analysis Section
20 July Attack at KA1FEETS
Chinese ground sources advise that on 20 July, 30 U.S.
pianos attacked KAIFEMG killing more than 100 Jap troops
and Chin030, Freight train arriving at station was
completely destroyed* An identical report was made by
OSS ground sources.
14th AF Mission Report: No attack reported on
20 July Attack on ANYANG
First phase photo report of this bombing shows that all
bursts wore in target area* Five gondola cars and rails
at south end of yard wore probably destroyed* Extent of
daraago to barracks area was uncertain because of smoke.
JL4th AF Mission Report: This mission not reported.
21 July Attack on TAPiUAN
First phase report of bombing on this date shows 25^ of
bomb bursts in the target area. Ten direct hits on spurs
within target area probably damaged RR station and1trackage.
Similar damage was probably c aused by about 20 hits on
spurs north and northeast of the target aroa. Concen
tration of bombs was such as to probably render tho choke
point unserviceable.. Remainder of bombs struck a storage
depot northeast of target area; several small buildings
were probably damaged. Ho report by 14th AF.
24 July Attack at ANKING
Chinese ground sources report an attack on ANKIFG during
which a military supnly depot was completely destroyed
and 4 0 Japanese, woro killed. OSS sources made an identical
report. Ho report was given for this date by tho 14th AF.
24 July Attack on HAINAN Island .
OSS ground sources report an attack by Mustangs on the
city of LINKAOon HAINAN Island. A tower 20* x 2 0 % 30'
high, storing ammunition was hit, the ammo Q-xploding
for 15 minutes, killing an estimated 100 Japanese••
. 14th AF Mission Reports None given'for this date*
24 July Attack on PUCHI RR Bridge (No, 24)
First phase report shows that one bomb landed in the
superstructure at the, west end of the bridge with no
apparent damage visible on available photos; four near
misses observed* Bridge probably-serviceable, but
temporary damage to tracks or bridge deck may have been
sustained by the.direct hit*
14th AF Mission Report: 4 Mitchells bombed RR
bridge at PUCHI damaging superstructure of first
span from south approach. 4 accompanying Mustangs
scored 6 direct hits on gun positions, then
strafed surrounding territory, probably damaging
4 storage buildings.
1 August Attack in SINSIAITG Area
First phase photo cover of this attack shows approx
imately 20 new craters in the railroad yards, 26 cars
are shown to be damaged in addition to 15 cars end 3
locomotives which, woro probably damaged by'near misses
of the-bombs dropped by the 1st and 2nd elements.
Bombs dropped by the 3rd element caused the-damage of
10 additional railroad cars and 3 locos> 6"cars wore
probably damaged by near misses. Photos show that tracks
have been disrupted in the center of the yards, through
service, is probably temporarily out, and that the loco
revetment area has been blocked off by bursts on the
tracks• . • •
14th AF Mission Report: None given for this date,
1 August Attack on KAIFENO
First phase photo cover shows that 7 freight cars
..received diroct hits or near misses and wore probably
destroyed or severely damaged and that there was possible
minor damage to trackage in the freight depot. There was
probable damage to 4 warehouse type buildings and to
sorio passenger cars in the train in east section of the
yards by near misses,
14th AF Mission Report: None given for this date.
5 August Attack on SUCHOW
First phase photo cover of the South TSINPU RR Yards
No. 32, SUCHOW, indicates the following damage: 1st and
2nd •-•Iorients made 100'jo hits along center and west section
of target and 100$ hits in south and center of target
area. Estimate of results of third element's bombing
is impossible duo to incomplete- cover. 20 cars were
destroyed, 25 severely damaged,- and 15 probably damaged;
one car shed 90 T x 20' is 50% destroyed, and one ware
house 200 f x 25 T received one direct hit. Strike photos
of second element bomb bursts show a .coverage of 60%'
in an area having a large' concentration of railroad cars,
estimated at 200.
14th A Mission Report: A mission report is F given for this date indicating r. bombing raid by 14 Mitchells on Hit Yards at an unstated location. 90% direct h i t s are clamed; 6 large fires were started with smoke rising to 6,000 foot. Many secondary explosions occurred, probably emanating from oil and ammunition dumps