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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

MACARIOLA vs. ASUNCION


FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that Judge Asuncion violated Art.14 of the Code of Commerce. The cited provision
prohibits public officers from engaging in business.
HELD: Judge Asuncion did not, or cannot, violate it since such provision is deemed abrogated
Although the cited provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce, it however, partakes of
the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public
officials and employees.
Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operations of the governmental organs of the state and defines the relations of the State with the
inhabitants of its territory. Political law embraces constitutional law, law of public officers and
corporations, administrative law. Specifically, Art.14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
nature of administrative Law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees
with respect to engaging in business, hence, political in essence.
Note that the Code of Commerce took effect on 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to US and later from US to RP, Art.14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been
automatically abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly reenacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
LAWYERS LEAGUE vs. AQUINO
FACTS:
The legitimacy of the Aquino Govt is questioned on the ground that it was not established pursuant to
the 1973 Constitution.
HELD:
Petitioners had no personality to sue and petition states no cause of action.
RULING:
a.)Legitimacy of Aquino govt belongs to realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the
judge (not a justiciable matter)
b.) The people have made the judgment, accepting the Aquino govt w/c is in effective control of the
entire country.
c.) Aquino govt is not merely a de facto govt but in fact and law a de jure govt..
d.) Community of nations has recognized its legitimacy.
e.) All 11 members of SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under Aquino govt.
The legitimacy of the Aquino admimistration is not a justiciable matter but a political one. It is political
because it belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge.
The Aquino government is a de jure and a de facto government for the people have made the judgment
and have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government and all the 11
members of the Supreme Court have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
FACTS:

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In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and
answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7
ISSUE: WON the provision is ambiguous?
HELD: No
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of
the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino
and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their
term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph
of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution.
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of
the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is
not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Lawyers
League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al)
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there
can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the
incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.or the abovequoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar,
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980.
On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reogranized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to
BP Blg. 129. On 1984, petitoner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice.
Thus, he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary. After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a
reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. A Screening Committee for the
reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower courts recommended the return of
petitioner as Associate Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the

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roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's
seniority ranking changes from number 11 to 26.
Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the President,
otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals.
The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and Javellana who are
affected by the ordered correction.
They alleged that petioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had previously
been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
ISSUE: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court exisiting before the promulgation of E.O. No. 33.
HELD: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to E.O.
No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that
was established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts existing before E.O.
No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary goverment
of Corazon Aqwuino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state
by those who were previously subject to it." or "as suddent. radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."
DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Petitioner received a Memorandum signed by respondent
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the
Minister of Local Government."
Respondent OIC Governor also signed a Memorandum designating other respondents as members of the
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. So the OIC governor in the memorandum
ordered the replacement of all baranggay officials of all the baranggays in the municipality of taytay rizal
Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners
maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of
office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. That with the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to
designate their successors.
Respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue
in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one
year from February 25,1986.

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Respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that
petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six
years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the
aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution. So elective officials under the 1973 Constitution
may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events
mentioned.
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive
order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials.
ISSUE: WON the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on February 25, 1987.
HELD: Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977,
should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante
dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners.
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of
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six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. Contrary to the stand
of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay
officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative. Thus,
Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor declared to be of no legal force and effect
TANADA vs. TUVERA
FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the
Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders,
proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents contended that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of
NCC.
ISSUES: WON petitioners have legal standing? And WON various laws in question should be published to
be valid and enforceable?
HELD: The petitioners have legal standing. The SC has already decided in various cases that a party has a
cause of action when the question posed is one of public right and the object is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty.

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The people are regarded as the real party in interest and need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws.
The SC also ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of such is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non
excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all Presidential issuances pf a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by
law. PDs that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or impose a burden such as tax
and revenue measures fall within this category. Other PDs which apply only to particular persosn or calss
of persons such as AOs and Eos need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized
to all concerned.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
outstanding shares of Manila Hotel. Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/share, and a Malaysian
firm, at P44.00/share. Pending the declaration of the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by the Malaysian Firm which respondent GSIS refused to accept. The
petitioner posits that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, petitioner should be preferred
after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls under the term national
patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, WON selling mere 51% shares and
not the land itself can be considered part of national patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable The
Constitution mandates that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that
a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
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2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

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3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the foreign firm, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the shares of MHC in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to
execute the corresponding documents with petitioner after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of petitioner and execute the necessary
clearances for the purchase of the subject 51% MHC shares.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.
DOMINO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks
to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. On 6 May 1998,
the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters declaring
DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City acquire the nature of res
judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding
the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition of DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be proclaimed as the winning
candidate in the light of DOMINOs disqualification?
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident
of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be
sustained. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceeding, to declare the
challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion
cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the
challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of
the voter's disqualification.

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Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the decision to be a basis for the
dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first and the second
action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications
for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
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one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
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establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of obtaining the highest number of
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votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. A candidate must
be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the
House of Representatives. Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in
the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House
of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over
the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality
of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC


July 31, 2012
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
COA Opinion states that there was underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when 5 retired SC
justices purchased from the SC the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the
Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the SC of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property
Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, when it should have applied the formula found in
COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT COA CAN IMPOSE ITS OWN COMPUTATION IN THE DISPOSAL OF COURT PROPERTIES.
RULING: NO.
Separation of Powers

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The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from
the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any
one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective
mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others. (Angara v. Electoral Commission)
Judicial Independence
Judicial independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to
resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its
constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those
imposed by the Constitution itself.
Thus, judicial independence can be broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and
institutional independence. Decisional independence "refers to a judges ability to render decisions free
from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other
hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and
legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective
independence of the judiciary as a body."
Individual judicial independence focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to
decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence
when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does
hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. Institutional judicial independence
focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public
accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority.
Fiscal Autonomy
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy.
The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. (Bengzon v. Drilon)
Application to the Present Case
The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the
Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its

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personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciarys properties to retiring Justices of the
Supreme Court and the appellate courts.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35
is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted
retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief
Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
G.R. No. 164763
February 12, 2008
ZENON R. PEREZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan for malversation of
public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime of malversation of public funds "that have been
replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the government is cruel and therefore unconstitutional, "as
government has not suffered any damage."
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAW RELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER AND THE SENTENCE IMPOSED
IS CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
RULING: NO. The argument is specious on two grounds.
First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take
and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as
a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather
than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific
purpose of the law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is
the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be,
presumed to be valid and constitutional.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is repugnant to
the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel,
unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.
G.R. No. 171101
July 5, 2011 and
November 22, 2011 (on MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION)
HACIENDA LUISITA, vs. PARC.
FACTS:

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The hacienda luisita was comprised of 6,443 hectares and owned by Compaia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, Tabacalera sold the land to the Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco)
owned by the Cojuancos.
In 1980 martial law administration filed a suit before the RTC Manila against Tadeco for it to surrender the
hacienda to MAR (now DAR) so the land will be distributed to farmers. Manila RTC ruled against Tadeco.
Tadeco appealed to CA.
In 1988, OSG moved to withdraw the governments case against Tadeco, et al. Thus, the CA dismissed the
case. The dismissal action was, however, made subject to the obtention by Tadeco of the PARCs approval
of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that must initially be implemented after such approval shall have been
secured and the case will be revived if any of the conditions is not duly complied with by the TADECO.
Markedly, Section 10 of EO 229 allows corporate landowners, as an alternative to the actual land transfer
scheme of CARP, to give qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase shares of stocks of the corporation
under a stock ownership arrangement and/or land-to-share ratio.
Like EO 229, RA 6657, Sec. 31, also provides two (2) alternative modalities, i.e., land or stock transfer,
pursuant to either of which the corporate landowner can comply with CARP, but subject to well-defined
conditions and timeline requirements.
In 2003, two separate petitions reached the DAR. In the first, respondents Jose Julio Suniga and Windsor
Andaya, identifying themselves as head of the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), and 60 other
supervisors sought to revoke the SDOA, alleging violations by HLI of the SDOAs terms. They prayed for a
renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation.
Revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the hacienda were the call in
the second petition. The Petition was ostensibly filed by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng
Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA), where the handwritten name of respondents Rene Galang as "Pangulo
AMBALA" and Noel Mallari as "Sec-Gen. AMBALA" appeared. As alleged, the petition was filed on behalf
of AMBALAs members purportedly composing about 80% of the 5,339 FWBs of Hacienda Luisita.
On December 2, 2006, Noel Mallari, impleaded by HLI as respondent in his capacity as "Sec-Gen.
AMBALA," filed his Manifestation and stated that he has broken away from AMBALA with other AMBALA
ex-members and formed Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc. (FARM). Should this shift in
alliance deny him standing, Mallari also prayed that FARM be allowed to intervene.
ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER THE PETITIONERS THEREIN ARE THE REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST TO FILE SAID
PETITIONS.
RULING: YES.
Supervisory
Group,
AMBALA
and
their
respective leaders are real parties-in-interest
The SDOA no less identifies "the SDP qualified beneficiaries" as "the farmworkers who appear in the
annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or periodically
employed by HLI." Galang, per HLIs own admission, is employed by HLI, and is, thus, a qualified
beneficiary of the SDP; he comes within the definition of a real party-in-interest under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, meaning, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or is
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose members were admittedly employed
by HLI and whose names and signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA. Being qualified
beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga and the other 61 supervisors are certainly parties who would benefit or
be prejudiced by the judgment recalling the SDP or replacing it with some other modality to comply with
RA 6657.

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Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular farmworkers, but are in the
category of "other farmworkers" mentioned in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, thus only entitled to
a share of the fruits of the land, this does not detract from the fact that they are still identified as being
among the "SDP qualified beneficiaries." As such, they are, thus, entitled to bring an action upon the SDP.
Further, under Sec. 50, paragraph 4 of RA 6657, farmer-leaders are expressly allowed to represent
themselves, their fellow farmers or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR. Clearly, the
respective leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA are contextually real parties-in-interest allowed
by law to file a petition before the DAR or PARC.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT SEC. 31 OF RA 6657 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RULING: NO.
FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of
CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the
fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon the
constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the following
essential requirements are first met, to wit:
(1) there is an actual case or controversy;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a proper party or one
with locus standi; and
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
Raised at the earliest possible opportunity
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, has yet to explain its failure to
challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, since as early as November 21, 1989 when PARC
approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter. FARM raised the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court.
Thus, it took FARM some 18 years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even
accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon
which the benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue
that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events
and activities which resulted from the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of constitutionality will not be passed
upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at the first
opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657.
Very lis mota of the case
The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of
the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be
made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored. Garcia v. Executive
Secretary explains why:
Lis Mota means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly
presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or
the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its

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favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to which the
FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI
with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is
whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such
non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain constitutional
and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of
AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the
said provision in the SDP that is flawed.
Moot and Academic
Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis--vis the
stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: "That after
June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory
acquisition." Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is
no longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional
should be a moot issue.
It is true that the Court, in some cases, has proceeded to resolve constitutional issues otherwise already
moot and academic provided the following requisites are present:
First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
Third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public;
Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
These requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE.
RULING: YES.
Applicability of the Operative Fact Doctrine
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution Nos. 2005-3201 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain "operative facts" that had occurred in the
interim. Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action null
and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting unfairness
must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or
juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The actual existence of a statute or
executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
(a) Operative Fact Doctrine Not Limited to Invalid or Unconstitutional Laws
Contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws
subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently
declared as invalid as embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals.
The Chicot doctrine advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative necessity
of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act was in
operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects.

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Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2an executive actwas declared invalid in the instant
case, the operative fact doctrine is clearly applicable.
Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine
should be limited to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are
accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature that have the
force and effect of law.
We disagree. While orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have
fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase "executive act"
does not have such specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the
minority, nowhere can it be found that the term "executive act" is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily,
the term "executive act" is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies
under the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by
the Court.
(b) The Operative Fact Doctrine as Recourse in Equity
Undeniably, the operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. Remarkably, it is applied only in the absence of
statutory law and never in contravention of said law.
In the instant case, respondents argue that the operative fact doctrine should not be applied since there is
a positive law, particularly, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which directs the distribution of the land as a result of the
revocation of the SDP. Pertinently, the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 states:
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer envisioned above is not
made or realized or the plan for such stock distribution approved by the PARC within the same period, the
agricultural land of the corporate owners or corporation shall be subject to the compulsory coverage of
this Act.
Markedly, the use of the word "or" under the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 connotes that the law
gives the corporate landowner an "option" to avail of the stock distribution option or to have the SDP
approved within two (2) years from the approval of RA 6657. This interpretation is consistent with the
well-established principle in statutory construction that "the word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word."
In its elementary sense, "or", as used in a statute, is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It
often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used, the
various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately.
Given that HLI secured approval of its SDP in November 1989, well within the two-year period reckoned
from June 1988 when RA 6657 took effect, then HLI did not violate the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA
6657. Pertinently, said provision does not bar Us from applying the operative fact doctrine.
G. R. No. 180989
February 7, 2012
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA, vs.CHAIRPERSON.
FACTS:
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government operations, the COA
saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, the circular in issue, which lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled corporations
(GOCCs).
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the preaudit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims

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that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been
committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center
laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing.
RULING: YES. This Petition has been filed as a taxpayers suit.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public
funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of public
funds through numerous irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have
allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues,
is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be
adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.
G.R. No. 185053
February 15, 2012
EUSTAQUIO CANDARI vs. ROLAND DONASCO
FACTS:
Respondents were members of the board of directors of Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative, Incorporated (DARBCI). They were elected into office and their terms should have ended on
12 July 2000. However, they continued to occupy their positions in a holdover capacity.
On 23 November 2005, respondents instituted Civil Case in RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato to enjoin
petitioners from holding a special general assembly (GA) and an election of officers. Respondents alleged
that the process by which the GA had been called was not in accordance with Sec. 35 of Republic Act No.
6938, otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.
The RTC issued a 72-hour TRO to restrain petitioners from holding the GA. Despite the TRO, but without
the participation of petitioners, 5,910 members or 78.68% of the total membership of the cooperative
went through with the GA and elected petitioners in absentia as new members of the board.
During the 20 December 2008 meeting, the GA ratified the Amended Articles of Cooperation and the
Amended By-Laws of the cooperative. A Certificate of Registration to that effect was issued by
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA).
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents still have a cause of action to file the case.
RULING: NO. There is no cause of action since the issue has already become moot.
In the present case, the GA has clearly expressed its intentions through the subsequent amendment of
DARBCIs Articles of Cooperation and By-Laws and through the election of new officers.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become
stale, such as the case before us.
The supervening events had rendered the case moot through the voluntary act of the GA as the highest
policy-making body of the cooperative to declare the contested positions vacant and to elect a new set
of officers. As a consequence, respondents no longer had the personality or the cause of action to
maintain the case against petitioners herein.
G.R. No. 193978

February 28, 2012

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JELBERT B. GALICTO, vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
FACTS:
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive
allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila
Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has
been unable to meet its standing obligations.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an inquiry in aid
of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government
financial institutions (GFIs).
Based on its findings, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the President to order the
immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives
and other perks of members of the governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs.
Pres. Aquino, issued EO 7, which provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed
compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.
The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7. To
support his claim that he has locus standi the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he
"stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary
increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and curtail[s] the prerogative
of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation." The petitioner also claims that he has
standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of
the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise known as the
"GOCC Governance Act of 2011." Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE SHOULD PROSPER.
RULING: NO.
I.
Petitioner has no legal standing
"Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." This
requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
25
controversies.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to "raise a constitutional question" when (1) he can show that
he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest
is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest."
In the present case, the petitioner has no material interest in the outcome of the case. The curtailment of
future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or

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expectancies. He has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right
deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the present
petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of
the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the
Court "as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and by the whole citizenry."
While the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the
President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials
and employees, the same cannot "infuse" or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental
importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society, we held that even if
the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort
would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to procedural
infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case. In other words, giving due course to the present
petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities, cannot but be an exercise in futility that
does not merit the Courts liberality.
II. The petition has been mooted by supervening events.
A moot case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." "An action is considered moot when it
no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead,
or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is
nothing for the x x x court to resolve as its determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events."
This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered the President
to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed
unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the
constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the
enactment of R.A. No. 10149.
G.R. No. 164987
April 24, 2012
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT
FACTS:
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together
with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, sought
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Secretary of DBM from making, and releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as
"pork barrel" funds out of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). LAMP likewise aimed to stop the
National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the questioned provision.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MANDATORY REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ARE MET
RULING: YES.
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of

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its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In our jurisdiction, the
issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.
According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and
the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the laws flawed execution
resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably,
as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would
necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to
taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy.
Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." In
public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person,
and could be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
21
unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in
taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

FUNA VS. VILLAR 670 SCRA 570 (2012)


Facts: Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008 following
the retirement of Chairman Carague. Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of COA. He was to
serve until February 2, 2011.
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Villar as Chairman and prays that the
appointment be declared unconstitutional for violationg sec 1(2), Art IX(D).
Before the SC could resolve the petition, Villar vacated his position when Pres Aquino III named PulidoTan as COA Chairman.
Issue: Whether or not the petition of Funa became moot and academic.
Held: Yes. A case is moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or when it ceases to present
a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening events, so that a resolution of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. There is no actual substantial relief which a
petitioner would be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition.
As a general rule, it is not within the SCs charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case, except
if: 1. there is grave violation of the Constitution; 2. the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; 3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of

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controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 4. the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
The procedural requisites for the exercise of judicial review are: 1. there must be an actual case or
justiciable controversy before the court; 2. question before it must be ripe for adjudication; 3. the person
challenging the act must be a proper party; and 4. the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity and must be the very lis mota of the case.
To have legal standing, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result
of a government action or have a material interest in the issue affected by the challenged official act.
However, the Court has acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain
individuals not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act standing
to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all
a mere procedural technicality.
The SC laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called non-traditional suitors may be extended
standing to sue: 1. cases involve constitutional issues; 2. for taxpayers, there must be claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 3. for voters, there must be a
showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; 4. for concerned citizens, there
must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and 5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.
This case is of transcendental importance, since it has far-reaching implications and there is a need to
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases.
Note: The main issues in this case were the term of office of the commissioners, rotational plan, etc.

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CAPALLA VS. VILLAR 673 SCRA 1 (2012)


Facts: Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase the PCOS,
both software and hardware for an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized
National and Local Elections (AES Contract). Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 to exercise the
option but opted not to exercise the same except for the 920 units of PCOS machines. Comelec seriously
considered to exercise the option and so it was given until March 31, 2012, the extended period to
exercise the option to purchase.
According to Capalla, et al the extended option to purchase the PCOS, as well as the AES Contract is
contrary to law and the Constitution.
The SC already rendered a decision on June 13, 2012 dismissing the petitions of Capalla, et al. This case is
a motion for reconsideration of the SCs decision.
Issue: Whether or not Capalla, et al were correct.
Held: No. Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the OTP. The option was,
however, not exercised within said period. But the parties later entered into an extension agreement
giving the Comelec until March 31, 2012 within which to exercise it. With the extension of the period, the
Comelec validly exercised the option and eventually entered into a contract of sale of the subject goods.
The extension of the option period, the subsequent exercise thereof, and the eventual execution of the
Deed of Sale became the subjects of the petitions challenging their validity in light of the contractual
stipulations of respondents and the provisions of RA 9184.
Based on the AES Contract, we sustained the parties right to amend the same by extending the option
period. Considering that the performance security had not been released to Smartmatic-TIM, the contract
was still effective which can still be amended by the mutual agreement of the parties, such amendment
being reduced in writing. To be sure, the option contract is embodied in the AES Contract whereby the
Comelec was given the right to decide whether or not to buy the subject goods listed therein under the
terms and conditions also agreed upon by the parties.
In this case, the contract is still effective because the performance security has not been released. Thus,
not only the option and warranty provisions survive but the entire contract as well.

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For a previously bidded contract to be nullified, the amendment must be substantial such that the other
bidders were deprived of the terms and opportunities granted to the winning bidder after it won the
same and that it is prejudicial to public interest. In our assailed decision, we found the amendment not
substantial because no additional right was made available to Smartmatic-TIM that was not previously
available to the other bidders; except for the extension of the option period, the exercise of the option
was still subject to same terms and conditions such as the purchase price and the warranty provisions;
and the amendment is more advantageous to the Comelec and the public.
Hence, the determination of whether or not a modification or amendment of a contract bidded out
constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the contract, when taken as a whole, would
contain substantially different terms and conditions that would have the effect of altering the technical
and/or financial proposals previously submitted by other bidders.
It must be pointed out that public biddings are held for the best protection of the public and to give the
public the best possible advantages by means of open competition between the bidders, and to change
them without complying with the bidding requirement would be against public policy. What are
prohibited are modifications or amendments which give the winning bidder an edge or advantage over
the other bidders who took part in the bidding, or which make the signed contract unfavorable to the
government.
While movants may have apprehensions on the effect to government contracts of allowing "advantage to
the government" as justification for the absence of competitive public bidding, it must be stressed that
the same reasoning could only be used under similar circumstances. The "advantage to the government,"
time and budget constraints, the application of the rules on valid amendment of government contracts,
and the successful conduct of the May 2010 elections are among the factors looked into in arriving at the
conclusion that the assailed Resolutions issued by the Comelec and the agreement and deed entered into
between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM, are valid.

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CHAVEZ VS. JBC 676 SCRA 579 (2012)


Facts: Art 8 sec 8 of the Constitution provides:
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the SC composed of x x
x a representative of the Congress x x x
In compliance therewith, Congress designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex
officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body,
the HR and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only
1 representative.
th
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only 7 members, an 8
member was added to the JBC as 2 representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC- 1 from HR and
1 from the Senate, with each having of a vote.
Chavez filed a petition alleging that JBC shall have only 1 representative from Congress as mandated by
Art 8 sec 8 par 1 of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case.
Held: Yes. Chavez seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the
position of Chief Justice of the SC. As a taxpayer, he invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the
rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful purposes.
The SC disagrees with JBCs contention that Chavez lost his standing to sue because he is not an official
nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the
Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. It is not limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate
in the land. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the
Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The SC considers this a constitutional issue that must be
passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a
citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time,
armed with issues of transcendental importance to society.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the
opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in
this case: 1. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; 2. The presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and 3. The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional violations in this case are not
empty attacks on the wisdom of the other brances of the government. The allegations are substantiated
by facts, and therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court.

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IDEALS VS. PSALM 682 SCRA 602 (2012)


Facts: EPIRA (RA 9136) mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer contracts.
On May 5, 2010, and after a post-bid evaluation, PSALMs Board of Directors approved and confirmed the
issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, Korea Water Resources for the sale of Angat HydroElectric Power including the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed areas.
IDEALS, et al contended that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when in conducting the bid, it
disregarded and violated the peoples right to information guaranteed under the Constitution. It also
alleged that PSALM violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of water
limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned.

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PSALM prayed for the dismissal of the petition because it was rendered moot by the issuance of a Notice
of Award in favor of K-Water.
Issue: Whether or not the petition had been mooted by the issuance of the Notice of Award to K-Water.
Held: No. Though petitioners had sought the immediate issuance of injunction against the bidding
commenced by PSALM-specifically enjoining it from proceeding to the next step of issuing a notice of
award to any of the bidders- they further prayed that PSALM be permanently enjoined from disposing of
AHEPP through privatization. The petition was thus filed not only as a means of enforcing the States
obligation to protect the citizens right to water but also to bar a foreign corporation from exploiting our
water resources in violation of Art 12 sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution. If the impending sale of the AHEPP to
K-Water indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to annul the contract award as well as
its implementation. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not IDEALS, et al possess the requisite.
Held: Yes. Legal Standing or locus standi is a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. The SC has adopted a liberal attitude on locus standi if the issue is of
transcendental significance to the people, as when it is of paramount importance to the public. When the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies
the requirement of personal interest.
Ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is of paramount importance to the public. That the
continued availability of water in Metro Manila might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the
privatization of the hydroelectric power plant confers upon IDEALS et al such personal stake in the
resolution of legal issues.
Moreover, if the petition is about the peoples right to information on matters of public concern, any
citizen can be the real party in interest. Requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.

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ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 314 SCRA 641


In most cases filed to challenge the constitutional validity of any statute or order, the issue as to whether
the petitioners are the proper parties has been questioned. In JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRAGE,
MANUEL H. AFIADO,
_______________
* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
642
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, Petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local
Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela,
THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, In his capacity as
provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial treasurer, G.R. NO.
133064, dated SEPTEMBER 16, 1999, the Mayor of the City of Santiago, the President of the Liga ng mga
Barangay ng Santiago City and three residents of Santiago City filed a petition for Writ of Revision assailing
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8028, converting the City of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent component city to a component city, the locus standi of the petitioners was questioned. The
Court in said case held that it is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by
one who sustained a direct injury as a result of the endorsement.

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Annotations have been made on similar issues in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) such as
Constitutionality of Statute or Action Must be Raised by Proper Party (Taxpayers Suit) in 15 SCRA 497501, Judicial Deference to Political Questions in 21 SCRA 822-837, The Plebiscite CasesPolitical or
Justiciable Issues in 49 SCRA 180-193, Judicial Review of the Effectivity of a New Constitution and the
Political Doctrine in 50 SCRA 393-413, and Political or Justiciable Question in 59 SCRA 652-673. The issues
raised in said cases are justiciability, standing, mootness, ripeness and political questions. This annotation
will dwell on the rule of locus standi of the petitioners in filing cases questioning the constitutional validity
of statutes or executive orders.
1. Locus Standi Defined
Locus standi generally means a place to stand. It refers to the standing of a person to file a case.
(Ballantine Law Dic643
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tionary, p.771). It is a place to stand; a standing in law or a suit. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
[1976]).
2. Early U.S. Doctrines on Judicial Review
The principle of judicial review which originated in the United States restricted the filing of cases by
individuals to challenge the constitutional validity of a statute. Early U.S. court decisions formulated the
conditions needed to adjudicate a case especially with respect to the challenge of the validity of a statute.
Decisions generally limited access by litigants to shield judges from cases that threaten their
independence and institutional effectiveness. They also try to avoid trying cases that involve politically
sensitive issues.
Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the boundaries for judicial action were quite fixed: It is most true
that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 [1821]). What the Court should or should not accept is
largely a matter of judicial discretion. Reflecting on his work at the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis
confided: The most important thing we do is not doing. (Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions
of Mr. Justice Brandeis 17 [1957]). The deliberate withholding of judicial power often reflects the fact that
courts lack ballot-box legitimacy. Although couched in technical jargon, jurisdictional requirements raise
fundamental questions of democratic theory. (cited in Fisher, American Constitutional Law, p. 96 [1990]).
Judges invoked some rules to preserve public support and to avoid conflicts with other branches of the
government, and provide flexibility of action for judiciary. The doctrines used to pursue those goals
include justiciability, standing, mootness, ripeness, political questions, and prudential considerations, all
of which help protect an unelected and unrepresentative judiciary. Although efforts are made to
distinguish these doctrines, inevitably they overlap. As noted by the Supreme Court: The standing
question thus bears close affinity to
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Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review

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questions of ripenesswhether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial
interventionand of mootnesswhether the occasion for judicial intervention persists. (Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10 [1975]). (Fisher, Ibid.)
3. The Issue of Adverseness
To resolve a legal claim, courts need to know that parties have been adversely affected. Abstract or
hypothetical questions, removed from a concrete factual setting, prevent courts from reaching an
informed judgment. The words cases and controversies limit the federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process. (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 95 [1968])
American courts occasionally consider a case even when both parties agree on the issue. In United States
vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), the Justice Department agreed with the plaintiff that a provision in a
congressional statute was unconstitutional. To protect its interests, Congress passed legislation to create
a special counsel. Functioning officially as amicus curiae, the counsel in effect served as counsel for the
United States to assure adverseness. (328 U.S. 303, 304 [1946]). In other cases the courts have appointed
a special counsel to satisfy the requirement for a genuinely adversary proceeding. (Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1,4 [1955]). (Fisher, Op. Cit., p. 97)
In affirming the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court, the Supreme Court also refused to regard the case as
a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding between Chadha and the INS. As the Court noted, it would be a
curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the courts because
the Attorney General of the United States agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.
From the moment of Congress formal intervention as amicus, adverseness was beyond doubt. Even
prior to intervention
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there was adequate Art. III adverseness. (INS vs. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 [1983])
4. Standing to Sue
To satisfy the requirement of a case or controversy, parties bringing an action must have standing to sue.
Generalizations about standing to sue, Justice Douglas said with customary bluntness, are largely
worthless as such. (Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 [1970]). After the Supreme Court
announced that the requirements of standing are met if a taxpayer has the requisite personal stake in
the outcome of his suit, Justice Harlan chided the Court: This does not, of course, resolve the standing
problem; it merely restates it. (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 121[1968]) (dissenting opinion).
To demonstrate standing, parties must show injury to a legally protected interest, an injury that is rather
than abstract or hypothetical. (OShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 [1974]). Injuries may be economic or
non-economic. (Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 154 [1970]). They may be actual or threatened.
Injuries may afflict organizations as well as persons. (Havens v. Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379
n. 19 [1982]; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 511[1978]). A threatened injury can be close cousin to the
hypothetical. Five members of the Supreme Court in 1973 held that allegations of injury were sufficient to
establish standing. Proof of actual injury was not necessary. On the other hand, actual injury may be
inadequate to establish standing if the Court wishes to defer to the states. (City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 [1983]). (Cited in Fisher, op. cit., p. 100).
5. Individuals StandingA Judge-Made Rule

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Individuals, functioning in the role of private attorneys general, may have standing as representatives of
the public interest. (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F. 2d 608, 615-616 [1965]). This
principle sometimes permits one
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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party to assert the rights of third parties (jus tertii). Federal courts are reluctant to resolve a controversy
on the basis of the rights of third persons who are not parties to the litigation. There are two reasons.
First, the courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of
those rights either do not wish them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court
litigant is successful or not . . . . Second, the third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents
of their own rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy, and therefore should prefer to construe
legal rights only when the most effective advocates of those rights are before them. (Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 113-114 [1976]).
Although standing is basically a judge-made rule, courts recognize that Congress can, by statute, confer
standing upon an individual or a group, and courts may defer to Congress on such matters. However, such
statutory phrases as phrases as any person aggrieved or adversely affected allow the courts broad
discretion in interpreting what Congress means by standing. Furthermore, Congress cannot compel the
courts to grant standing. Furthermore, Congress cannot compel the courts to grant standing for a suit
that, in the opinion of judges, lacks the necessary ingredients of a case or controversy. Congressional
efforts to confer standing are limited by the judiciarys exclusive responsibility to determine Article III
requirements.
6. Taxpayers Suit
The U.S. Supreme Court at first denied in 1923, the right of taxpayers to challenge the validity of a statute.
(Frothingham vs. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 [1923]). The Court reasoned that the taxpayers interest as
comparatively minute and indeterminable. There must be a direct injury to evoke standing. The decision
was based on a court policy as it will mean more cases for the court to tackle. The decision was criticized
as such a doctrine would put the government in the position of conceding that a taxpayer lacked standing
even if
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Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional conduct as providing funds for the construction of
churches for particular sects. The Court decided to liberalize the rule on standing but at the cost of
creating substantial doctrinal confusion. It claimed that standing focuses on the party, not the issue
when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is
challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue is
justiciable. It was feared that by lowering the barrier for standing, the Supreme Court not only
encouraged more lawsuits but invited collisions with other branches of government. In a later case,
Justice Powell warned that a relaxed standing policy would expand judicial power: It seems to be
inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation

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of power at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government. (United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 [1974]) (concurring opinion). (Fisher, op. cit., pp. 102-103)
7. Locus Standi of a Group
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court also denied standing to an environmental group that wanted to prevent
construction of a ski resort in a national park. The Court was deeply split with four Justices arrayed against
three. (Sierra Club v. Morton, 404 U.S. 727 [1972]). In that same year, it refused to decide whether the
Armys surveillance of domestic activities constituted a chilling effect on First Amendment liberties. A
majority of five Justices, with four dissenting, held that there was insufficient evidence of a direct injury to
present a case for resolution in the courts.
PHILIPPINE COURT DECISIONS
a. General Rule on Judicial Review
Since 1937, in People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), reiterated in Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990) and Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the Philippine Supreme Court
ruled that when issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]).
b. Early Decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court Also Restricted the Rule on Locus Standi
In 1945, the Philippine Supreme Court in Custodio vs. President of Senate, 42 O.G. 1243 (1945) held that a
person who questions the validity of a statute or law must show that he has sustained, or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. This rule was reiterated in Manila
Race Horse Training Association vs. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951).
In People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), the Court ruled that there must be a showing that the petitioners
interests are or about to be adversely affected by the enforcement of the ordinance in question. Unless a
person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of a statute or ordinance,
he has no standing.
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967),
the Court held that the invocation of petitioner as motel operators of their alleged right to being free
from reasonable search and seizure need not be taken seriously.
c. The Relaxed Rule on Locus Standi
In Rodriguez contra El Tesoro de Filipinas, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), the Court ruled that if a taxpayer cannot
attack the validity of the executive order in question or a law requiring
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the expenditure of public money, no one under our laws could question the validity of such laws or
executive orders.

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In Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993), petitioners having failed to show that they were the owners of the
artwork, it was held that they were not to proper parties to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the
auction sale of old masters paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the
Metropolitan Museum alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
In Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et al., 9 SCRA 230 (1963), the petitioner, as a rice planter with a riceland of
substantial proportion and as taxpayer affected by the purchase of the commodity effected with public
funds mainly raised by taxation, is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it seeks to buy
abroad and has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining
what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.
d. Taxpayers Suit
A partys standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949]; Rodriguez vs. Gella, 92 Phil. 603 [1953]), the Court said
that because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, it brushes aside technicalities of procedure. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr.,
232 SCRA 111 [1994]).
Objections to taxpayers suits for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are, however, in the
main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping
with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has
taken cognizance of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
these petitions. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 111 [1994]).
Taxpayer-Plaintiff must sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment or
entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review,
he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public. (Bugnay Construction and Development Corp. vs. Laron, 176 SCRA 243 [1989]).
However, in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), the Court ruled that petitioners do not possess
the legal capacity to institute the action for the annulment of the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
because they are without a present substantial interest as distinguished from mere expectancy, or
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. The phrase substantial present interest
means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under substantive
law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has legal title to defend and the defendant will be
protected in payment to or recovery from him.
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have
become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their
alleged unauthorized disposition. Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 571 [1993]). In Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor
Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994), the Court held that the petitioner KMU has the standing to
sue. Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and

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damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that
it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the
challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU mem651
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bers, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome
cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who compromise
the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored. Assuming arguendo
that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, the Court is ready to brush aside the barren
procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental
importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper
party. (KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]).
e. Locus Standi of Associations or Groups
When associations or groups of individuals are composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will
affect their vital interests, they are allowed to file suit. The petitioner, the Philippine Constitution
Association, is a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders from all walks of life whose
main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution. As taxpayers, petitioner may bring an action
to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]). A similar ruling was made in Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Assn. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
f. Locus Standi of Public Officials as Petitioners
The Governor of the Province of Rizal, representing the most populated political subdivisions, whose
taxpayers bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the Philippines justify the action. (Pascual
vs. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]).
In Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines
and a
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Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
taxpayer, filed a case to question the validity of some Executive Orders.
In Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1962), the Court ruled that any public official claiming to be adversely
affected by a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality in public service
and thereby limited in scope to officialdom may rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or
any portion thereof. Since the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or
private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process or liberty as
long as such requirement is observed. To the extent then that the questioned section of the statute
compels public officials to do a certain act, there is an infringement on their liberty. However, under the
Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
g. The People of the Philippines as Petitioner

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The People of the Philippines represented by the Solicitor General can be a proper party to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute (The Government of P.I. vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The People of the
Philippines have a substantial interest in contesting the constitutional validity of a law. Of a greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the moral wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the
state can challenge the validity of its own laws. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 66).
h. Locus Standi of Members of Congress
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA
452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of Congress,
filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989.
The Court then ruled that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter,
has the legal
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standing question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation
bill. (Id. at p. 519).
Where there is a constitutional question to resolve, a senator has usually been considered as possessed of
the requisite preconditions to bring a suit. (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 [1972]).
However, in Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, 246 SCRA 334 (1995), the Court held that the
absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly
intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant
action in their capacity as members of Congress.
In Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998), the standing of petitioner Senator Blas Ople was questioned. The
Court said that petitioner Ople, a distinguished member of our Senate, is possessed of the requisite
standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative
power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a petitioner can also
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O.
No. 308. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 [1998]).
i. Free Access to Courts
A means of providing guarantee to the constitutional provision of free access to courts (Art. II, sec. 11,
Philippine Constitution), any person is allowed to question the validity of a law under the principle of
taxpayers suit. However, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
654
654
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review

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Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending power. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to
bring this suit in their name as representatives of affected companies. (Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
o0o [Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review, 314 SCRA 641(1999)]

ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 548 SCRA 519


1. Introduction
Locus Standi means a place to standa standing in law or suit. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 358
[1976])
A review of recent decisions show that the Supreme Court has been liberal in recognizing the Locus Standi
of persons or entities who file actions questioning the validity of a law or actions of the government
issuances. In Planters Producers, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 (2008):
_______________
* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
520
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine
laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural
chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465
which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic
sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. The LOI provides:
3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a
capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected
until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all
domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and
Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January
24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI
refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It
questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and

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an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI
solely favored PPI, a privately owned corpora521
VOL. 548,
521
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
tion, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid
exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It
also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the
levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
The Supreme Court said that the mere fact of payment of the levy imposed by Letter of Instruction 1465 is
sufficient to acquire locus standi:
Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus
standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required,
and it did pay, the P10 levy imposed for every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true
that Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it
from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it bore the ultimate
burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of
payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil. Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the
LOI because it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The levy certainly rendered the fertilizer
products of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers much more expensive. The harm to their business consists
not only in fewer clients because of the increased price, but also in adopting alternative corporate
strategies to meet the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other fertilizer sellers may have shouldered
all or part of the levy just to be competitive in the market. The harm occasioned on the business of
Fertiphil is sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi.
522
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
Ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the States inherent power of taxation, the
RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with some modification.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
2. Meaning and Nature of Locus Standi
A party who suffered direct injury has a locus standi to challenge the validity of a law.
Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in-interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. (David vs. MacapagalArroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])

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The Liberal trend is to allow citizens affected to file suits as interested parties. A real party-in-interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a repre523
VOL. 548,
523
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
sentative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person.
He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
3. Difficulty of Determining Locus Standi
The difficulty in determining locus standi arises in public. The petitioner asserts a public right.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit
is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As
held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right,
however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to
interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.
(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act
with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury
524
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he
must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he
has a general interest common to all members of the public. (Id.)
4. Locus Standi of petitioner in cases of mandamus
To be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the
alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from
the enjoyment of a legal right. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal questions.
Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained

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or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being challenged. (Pimentel, Jr. vs.
Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622 [2005])
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in such a case that he has
sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. (Jumamil vs. Cafe, 470 SCRA
475 [2005])
5. Locus Standi of Government Officials
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely
525
VOL. 548,
525
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA
736 [2004])
In relation to the claim of a member of Congress to intervene, invoking his prerogative as legislator to
curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public funds to compensate Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as that as a taxpayer, it should be noted that the amount which the
Court di-rected to be paid by the Government to Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO),
was derived from money deposited by Manila International Airport Authority, an agency which enjoys
corporate autonomy and possesses a legal personality separate and distinct from those of the National
Government and agencies thereof whose budgets have to be approved by Congress. (Republic vs.
Gin-goyon, 481 SCRA 457 [2006])
A national political party likewise meets the standing re-quirement, provided that it has obtained three
seats in the House of Representatives in a national elections, which entitles it to partici-pate in the
legislative process. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 [2006])
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. (David vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006]; Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discre-tion, such as in cases of transcendental importance, or where the issues raised
have far-reaching implications. (Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in
the execution of the laws. (Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
526
526
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will
likely redress the injury. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173 [2006])

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A party invoking the transcendental importance exception to the standing requirement must show,
among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. (Francisco, Jr.
vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173 [2006])
This is one of the right cases where the Supreme Court held a liberal recognition of the locus standi of a
private citizen.
CONCLUSION
The tendency of the Court in broadcasting the concept of locus standi is in consonance with the
constitutional principle of free access to courts.
Article III, Section 11 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution reads:
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
This is only fitting as the courts of justice should be as available to the pauper as to the affluent in the
protection of their respective rights. Assuring him that the courts will protect him but only if he is able to
afford the prohibitive cost of litigation is like spreading a Barmecide feast before the hapless indigent. It is
at best a cruel deception, at worst a cynical oppression of the impoverished suitor. (Cruz, Constitutional
Law, p. 371)
The aforesaid constitutional provision is implemented by several rules in the Rules of Court liberal to court
procedure to enable citizens free easy access to courts.
527
VOL. 548,
527
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
Only recently, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno addressed in a forum vowed to further introduce reform to
comply with the constitutional principle of free access to courts.

JAVIER VS. COMELEC 144 SCRA 194 (1986)


Facts: Javier and Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the Javier were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad Pacificadors proclamation, Javier went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed
and the Pacificadors was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. Javier thereupon
came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by
the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his
proclamation, Pacificador took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

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The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, Javier was gunned down in
cold blood and in broad daylight.
The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of supervening events. Batas Pambansa
was abolished causing the disappearance of the office in dispute between Javier and Pacificador.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed because it was already moot and academic.
Held: No. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute could be
a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not
always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and
decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute
has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act
then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a
restraint upon the future.
Terrorism was a special feature in Antique, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned.
Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters were gripped with fear of
violence at the hands of the party in power.
What made the situation deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission on
Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained
against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed
Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly
and honest elections.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in
favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except only
to this Court.

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ABS-CBN VS. COMELEC 323 SCRA 811 (2000)


Facts: Comelec issued Resolution No. 98-1419 issuing a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon information that ABS-CBN has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the
vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President. The electoral
body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial
quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
ABS-CBN filed a petition before the SC arguing that Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing such resolution.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election
has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy.
Issue: Whether or not the petition was already moot and academic.
Held: No. The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11,
1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past
election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very
nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
The SC has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by

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constitutional guarantees. Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked
here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding
of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
ABS-CBN does not have to exhaust available remedies such as filing of motion of reconsideration before
the Comelec. The SC has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of
labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20)
days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998.
Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to
obtain a swift resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence;
the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari is therefore justified.

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CENTRAL BANK VS. BSP 446 SCRA 229 (2001)


Facts: Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional:
Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under
salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758
(Salary Standardization Law).
It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position.
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653,
the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.
Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c), Art 2 of RA 7653 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officeremployee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as
recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. The implications are quite disturbing:
BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in
rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given
higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-andfile employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of
job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for
all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the
more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no
specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of
employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent
as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated
them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the
legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting

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time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to
save them from reasonless discrimination.
Issue: Whether or not the SC acted with propriety in making void the provisions.
Held: Yes. Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given
deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be
more strict. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the
government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act,
not its wisdom. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main
functions of courts of justice and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are
under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it.
Basman
QUA CHEE GAN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD (1963)
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars
without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely
remitted the same to Hongkong. Petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio
King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States in order to evade
prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars. A warrant for the arrest of said aliens was
issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon filing a bond, they were provisionally set
at liberty. When their motion to dismiss was denied, they filed for a petition for habeas corpus and/or
prohibition. After filing a bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining
the respondent Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges against petitioners, pending final
termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
ISSUE: whether deportation board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges
Held: Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two
ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. This case constitute economic sabotage
which is a ground for deportation. The President may order the deportation of these petitioners if after
investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. This power of investigation may be
delegated pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue: whether the board had authority to order their arrest as
HELD: No. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's power to
deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. The right of an individual to
be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:.

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3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the
exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances,
the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. This is guaranteed in the Constitution and the
statute. EO 398 which authorizes the board to issue warrant for the arrests of alien and detain him during
investigation unless he files a bond for provisional release is illegal. An implied grant of power, considering
that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the
curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must
be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is
so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to
the liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest
precariously on such a shaky foundation.
As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null
and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.

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TECSON VS. COMELEC ( 2004)
FACTS: In 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his COC
for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.,"
or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F.
Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
ISSUES: Whether FPJ is a natural born citizen; Whether he made a material misrepresentation in his COC;
HELD: FPJs direct ascendant is his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou whose death certificate identified
him to be Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (date of birth: May 17, 1915),
father of respondent FPJ.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried,
and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate. The 1935 Constitution is applicable to determine FPJs citizenship. The
applicable provision is:
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

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The totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
]
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful.
GO, SR VS. RAMOS (2009)
FACTS: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go
alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. To prove his contention, Luis argued that birth
certificate of Jimmy was tampered, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that
although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos,
the document seems to be tampered since all the other entries were typewritten except the entry on his
citizenship which was handwritten as FChinese.
Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution and CA 625.
Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. He denied that his father arrived in
the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country
as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines,
and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog. As to erroneous entry, he attributed it to the employees of
the LCR.
ISSUE: whether Jimmy is a Filipino citizen = NO
HELD: Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a citizen. Since his
citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter.
However, neither the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the
Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the
passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice. It is a settled rule
that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under
the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our
considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina,
the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino
citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did not. The 1935 Constitution and CA
625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made.
The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. The proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was within "reasonable time (within 3 years)" after attaining the age of majority. It is true that
we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has
always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single
circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos
exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the
acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able

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to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter
indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his
real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the
rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may
misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. It
is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is
really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any
doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.
As to the application of the doctrine of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth): The doctrine was never
extended to the Philippines. It was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship but
it was abandoned in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine only benefited
those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the
mistaken application of jus soli.

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GONZALES VS. PENNISI (2010)
FACTS:
Michael Alfio Pennisi was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi,
an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed a
petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI). BI issued him a
Recognition Order which was affirmed by DOJ Secretary on March 3, 2000. Pursuant to such order, he was
recognition as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Article III, Sec. 1(2) of the 1973 Constitution and
makes him entitled to all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. Thereafter, respondent was
drafted and played for the Red Bull, a professional basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association
(PBA).
In 2004, DOJ issued a resolution revoking Pennisis certificate of recognition and directed BI to begin
summary deportation proceedings against respondent pursuant to a recommendation by Senate to
review recognition orders of Fil-foreign PBA players. Trial court subsequently issued a Summary
Deportation Order against him. Respondent filed a petition for review, with an application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals. CA ruled in favor of Pennisi.
ISSUE: whether Pennisi is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Yes. The issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not attained finality. Res judicata
may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: (1) A persons citizenship must be
raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; (2)The solicitor general or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and (3)The finding or citizenship is
affirmed by this court.
Pennisi was able to present the birth certificate of his Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos and a
certification issued by the LCR Of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that Quintos was born on 14 august
1949 of Filipino parents in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; and certified true copy of the Letter
Dated 14 July 1999 Of The Australian Department Of Immigration And Multicultural Affairs, Stating That
As Of 14 July 1999, Quintos Has Not Been Granted Australian Citizenship. These documents have more
probative value and must prevail over the statements of Barangay Officials of Nueva Ecija that no Quintos
and Tomedas have resided in the said barangay and such family names do not exist in census or master
list of voters. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The Quintoses and Tomedas were not
included in the census, such as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their absence in
the masters list of voters, they could have failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration of
Quintos birth (made 10 years after her birth) does not indicate fraud because it was not issued at
anytime near the filing of respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. Finally, the Australian
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself attested that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has
not been granted Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted a certified true copy of Quintos
Australian Certificate of Registration of Alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of
evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted by Barangay officials.

VILANDO VS. HRET (2011)

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FACTS: In 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her COC for the position of Representative of the First District
of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. Meanwhile, petitions involving either
the disqualification questioning her citizenship against her were filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) which reached the Court. Comelec ruled against Limkaichong. On April 1, 2009, the Court
granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec and directed
the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto
Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo
Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they
both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong
was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she
was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who
acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. On March 24,
2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the
House of Representatives.
ISSUE: whether Limkaichong is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Yes. Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the
citizenship provision under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. Limkaichongs father was
conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino
father. It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore,
following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has
satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of
naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age
under paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost
her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines, having
been born to a mother who was a natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent
was able to elect citizenship informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the
barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a
candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of
election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of
citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had
informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered
as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The
1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to
correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred naturalborn status. It was the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to treat equally those born
before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority

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either before or after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, those who would elect Philippine
citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article
[IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos.
Holding an Alian Cert of Reg. by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her
original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking
in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to
her daughter.
b. Election of Philippine Citizenship
IN RE: CHING 316 SCRA 1 (1999)
Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under
Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
FACTS: Vicente Ching, born August 11, 1964, was a legitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. He took the 1998 Bar Exams and passed but he was not allowed to take his oath because of the
questionable status of his citizenship. It was only on 15 June 1999, at thirty-five (35) years old or over
fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority, when he complied with the requirements of
C.A. No. 625. In the Manifestation he filed together with his Affidavit of Election and his Oath of
Allegiance, he stated the fact of his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official.
ISSUE: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?
RULING: NO.
The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21)
years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the US Government
to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority

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However, the SC held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible
rule. But it cautioned that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite.
Election in this case was only made over 7 years after reaching the age of majority and the court did not
consider it to have been made within a reasonable time.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was
clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege.
ISSUE: Would the special circumstances invoked by Ching be sufficient to vest in him Philippine
citizenship
RULING: NO as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Ching cannot take cannot find refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare where the court considered
the exercise of the right of suffrage sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. The facts
and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its
applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second,
the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child
of a Filipino mother.
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process.
All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in
making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this
golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

REPUBLIC VS LIM 419 SCRA 123 (2004)


FACTS: Chule Y. Lim, born October 29, 1954, filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court alleging that: 1) her surname YU was misspelled as Yo, 2) her nationality was entered
as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married.
Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina and 3) it was erroneously indicated in
her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate
considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both
Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never married because the
latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China. Also, respondent presented a certification

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attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is
no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The trial court granted the petition and ordered the correction. The Republic assailed the
decision stating that the respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirements of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority citing Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ordering the correction of citizenship
RULING: No. The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship cited apply only
to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate
child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not
required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.
Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority.
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old.
The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship
MA VS FERNANDEZ 625 SCRA 566 (2010)
ISSUE: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who
executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as
undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
FACTS: Petitioners are children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother all of whom were born under
the 1935 Philippine Constitution. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country
for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary
education in the country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have
already raised their respective families in the Philippines
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit
of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance. On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the
same. In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of CA 625 (An Act
Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person

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whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they
elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.

RULING:
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2)
an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Where the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and
statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed
if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done.
The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual
notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.
In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the registry, including both registration in
its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict
acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the
right of ownership and other real rights. Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the
confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid
requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the
petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a
serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity
as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect
Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to
register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the
permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with
subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted
supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry, although belatedly,
should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of
Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the
Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.
VILANDO VS HRET 656 SCRA 17 (2011)
FACTS: Petitioners filed petition for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET challenged her
eligibility. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was
elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had
not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her
marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of
Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization
certificate of Julio Sy.

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For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred
that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already
attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be
assailed through a collateral attack.
HRET dismissed the petition and petitioners sought reconsideration.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Quo Warranto petition operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of
Limkaichongs father
RULING:
Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he
makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which,
however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
Under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving
the naturalized citizens descendant.
ISSUE: 2. WON as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the
plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy
of the certificate of naturalization.
RULING: Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the
authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which,
as already stated, is not permissible.
The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and
September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition
and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.
ISSUE: 3. WON Limkaichong can derive Philippine citizenship from her mother at the time of her birth,
where her mother is already not a Filipino citizen as a result of her marriage to her father as provided
under Sec 1(7) of CA No. 63 in relation to Art 2(1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of
February 5, 1959
RULING: Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese
Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship.
Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of
Philippine citizenship. . It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to
foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting
and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or
other special law. It is only evidence of registration.

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Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original
citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has
consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act
constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly,
Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship
provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:
Article IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
xxx
With Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is
a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired
citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father
under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for
candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of
naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age.
The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
REPUBLIC VS SAGUN 666 SCRA 321 (2012)
FACTS: Nora Sagun, born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City, is the legitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother. She did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at
the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was
not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied
due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her
birth certificate. The petition was granted by the trial court.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is
procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible

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RULING: This Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. This was our
ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines, where we
clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x x
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.
ISSUE: 2. Whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has
complied with the procedural requirements in the election of the Philippine citizenship
RULING: Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese,
unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only
legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the
parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he
automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a
Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2)
an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A.
No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien
Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently,
the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the
evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing
of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding
provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in
the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent
had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary

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evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance,
executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance
suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority
and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The
phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation
proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that
the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship
by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and
other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine
citizenship.
5. Denaturalization
CO VS CIVIL REGISTER 423 SCRA 420 (2004)
FACTS: Hubert Tan Co born on March 23, 1974 and his sister, Arlene Tan Co, born on May 19, 1975. In
their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K.
Tan are Chinese citizens.
Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the
Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270. His application was granted
and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The Chairman of
the Committee issued on February 15, 1977 Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor. Thus, on
February 15, 1977, Co Boon Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the meantime, Hubert and Arlene
Co finished college and earned their respective degrees in architecture and accountancy in Philippine
schools.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court for correction of entries in their certificates of birth. They alleged that : Upon granting of
Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co Boon Peng in 1977, [the] petitioners who were born in the
Philippines and still minors at that time became Filipino citizens through the derivative mode of
naturalization. Our Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 535 provides that: "Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who
have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof;"
The court a quo issued an order dismissing the petition outright on the ground that the petition was
insufficient, solely because the petitioners father Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under LOI No.
270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under PD No. 1055 and not under
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473)
ISSUE: Whether or not LOI No. 270 and CA No. 47are statutes in pari materia which should be read
together so that petitioners can claim the benefit of derivative mode of naturalization under CA 473
RULING: LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in
the Philippines. While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial

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decree while LOI No. 270 governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same
purpose and objective: to enable aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having
demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture,
tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the economic, social and cultural
development of our country, to be integrated into the national fabric by being granted Filipino citizenship.
Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less
cumbersome and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are able to
integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute to the cultural, social and
political well- being of the country and its people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in pari materia. Absent
any express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the
latter law as an integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No.
9
473, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized
thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270,
like the petitioners in this case.
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father,
Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to
Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their
petition: (a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were born in the
Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;

REPUBLIC VS ONG 673 SCRA 485 (2012)


Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws are strictly
construed in the governments favor and against the applicant. The applicant carries the burden of
proving his full compliance with the requirements of law.
FACTS: The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition for naturalization despite his failure
to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
RULING: Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation means not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in
the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of
charity or a public charge. His income should permit him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the
demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income should not be
included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial for under the law the

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petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicants
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.
The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have included the spouses
income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative income. Second, it failed to consider the following
circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs expenses vis--vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own
real property; (b) that his proven average gross annual income around the time of his application, which
was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c) that Ongs
children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it
arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had an appreciable margin over his known expenses.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known lucrative
trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law
Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship
AASJS VS DATUMANONG 523 SCRA 108 (2007)
FACTS: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law."
ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional?
RULING: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what
really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
JOSE B. AZNAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with
the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local
elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council, as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in
his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a
citizen of the United States of America.

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On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent
is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigrant Certificate of Residence,
issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958.The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent ExParte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial
Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and
proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that
he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he
has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more
than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
Issue: W/N private Respondent (Lito Osmea) is a Filipino citizen
Ruling: Yes.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from
running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial
and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among
others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From
the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of
the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America,
the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration
and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being
an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the
U.S. Naturalization Laws.
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not
a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.By
virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo
v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed that he
was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos
government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out
that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it
necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated

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in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate
.Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

De Guzman vs Comelec
Facts:

Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vicemayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed
against petitioner a petition for disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is not
a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25,
2006, he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the
[5]
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired
Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run
as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Issue: whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No.
9225.
Ruling: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to
renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) naturalborn citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,
become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or
[14]
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship
upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it
must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek
elective public office, as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

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(2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute apersonal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU, Petitioners,


vs.
ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO, Respondent.
Facts:
7
The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a naturalized Filipino citizen
8
sometime in 1959. The said petitioners, being minors at that time, were also recognized as Filipino
citizens.
9
Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio, filed a Complaint dated March 5, 2004 for blacklisting and
deportation against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the basis
that the latter two are Canadian citizens who are illegally working in the Philippines, petitioners having
been issued Canadian passports.
Acting upon the Complaint, respondent Maricel U. Salcedo, Special Prosecutor, Special Task Force of the
10
BI Commissioner, directed the petitioners, through the issuance of a subpoenae, to appear before her
and to bring pertinent documents relative to their current immigration status, to which the petitioners
objected by filing with the Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner a Comment/Opposition with Motion
11
Ad Cautelam to Quash Re: Subpoena dated 30 April 2004 (Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum), which was
12
eventually denied by respondent Salcedo in an Order dated May 14, 2004.
Issue: W/N judicial intervention is allowed amidst deportation proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes.Basically, petitioners argue that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, relied upon by the CA in its
decision, does not apply in the present case because it falls under an exception. Citing Board of
Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, petitioners assert that immediate judicial intervention in deportation
proceedings is allowed where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the claim is correct. In connection therewith, petitioners assail the applicability
of Dwikarna v. Domingo in the present case, which the CA relied upon in ruling against the same
petitioners.
In BOC v. Dela Rosa, it is required that before judicial intervention is sought, the claim of citizenship of a
respondent in a deportation proceeding must be so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that such claim is correct. In the said case, the proof adduced by the respondent therein was so
substantial and conclusive as to his citizenship that it warranted a judicial intervention.
In the present case, there is a substantial or conclusive evidence that petitioners are Filipino citizens.
Without necessarily judging the case on its merits, as to whether petitioners had lost their Filipino

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citizenship by having a Canadian passport, the fact still remains, through the evidence adduced and
undisputed by the respondents, that they are naturalized Filipinos, unless proven otherwise.
However, this Court cannot pass upon the issue of petitioners' citizenship as this was not raised as an
issue. The issue in this petition is on the matter of jurisdiction, and as discussed above, the trial court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether petitioners have abandoned their Filipino citizenship or have
acquired dual citizenship within the confines of the law.
Jacot vs Dal
Facts:
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13
3
December 1989.
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,
4
California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioners request, and
on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice
5
Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification
6
Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice7
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.
8
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC
Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US
citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
Issue:
whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his
failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
Ruling:
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct
requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act
to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3
thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines).:

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EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ,
Vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in
the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time
of filing the certificate of candidacy.

Facts:
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay,
San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held
on October 29, 2007.On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the
ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,
petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003. He returned to thePhilippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed,
petitioner emerged as the winner.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is eligible to run as Barangay Captain.
Ruling:No. Petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced
his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may
run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that
should one seek elective public office, he should first make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement.

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Republic vs Dela Rosa


Facts:
Raul Lee(Petitioner) was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the
position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent (Frivaldo)
was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same
position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent
as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an
alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3)
that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in
favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid
votes cast, be proclaimed winner.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive
because the case is still on appeal before us.
Issue: W/N PR is eligible to run for Governor.
Ruling: No.Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under
the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not
for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely,
are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance
value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who
was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing
must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to
acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided
continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any
one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of
intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for
the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required
by Section 7 of the said law.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and,
insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the
copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).

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Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall
be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant
has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules;
and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to
government announced policies.
Sobejana Condon vs Comelec
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
5
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and the petitioner
took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenshipbefore the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
6
citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid.
She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of ViceMayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
7
8
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista, (private
respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning
the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification
from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute
a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The Petitioners Arguments
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no
longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as
early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.
Issue
For purposes of determining the petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.
Ruling:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
18
have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:

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Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx---xxxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
xxxx--xxxxx
21
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at
the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and
held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of
the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing
of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act
to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3
thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No.
2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225),
Willie Yu vs Santiago
Facts:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988
1
seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor
General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent
2
Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20
3
July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988
resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1)
jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and
detention of the same person.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for
five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular

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officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner
applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of
the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on
20 July 1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization,
"absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty"
and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai
Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
Issue:
W/N Petitioner is a Filipino citizen
Ruling: No. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of
his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become
a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown
that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only
established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID
would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was
given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and
other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
Vilando vs HRET August 23, 2011
st
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1 District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent,
Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged
that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father
was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichongs father. After election, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the
COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted
elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not
suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC.
Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her
motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the
COMELECs Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no

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impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law
is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the
presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino
absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization.
Respondent had previously participated in the barangay elections, accomplished voter's affidavit as of
1984, and was elected as Mayor. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case
of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably
showing a definite choice.
Sobejana-Condon vs Comelec (2012)
Sobejano-Condon was a natural-born Filipino citizen on August 8, 1944 but became a naturalized
Australian citizen due to her marriage to one Kevin Thomas Condon on December 13, 1984. On December
2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 9225, which was approved and she took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued
the order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
The Court held that petitioner Sobejana-Condon was disqualified from running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian citizenship under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Sec. 5(2) that
the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible
meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an
affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath, the Court held.
The Court further held that the petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the Court has previously declared that the filing
by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidate is already considered a renunciation of
foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of RA 9255 on August
29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship.
Reacquisition or Repatriation
Republic vs dela Rosa (1994)

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Frivaldo opted to reacquire Filipino citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law is
duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed in the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the
petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the
date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last
publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of
the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and,
insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the
copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall
be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant
has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules;
and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to
government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the
petition for naturalization before its finality.
Valles vs Comelec (2000)
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. Australia
follows jus soli. She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition to disqualify her on the ground of dual
citizenship.
Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The fact that she has dual
citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office. Filing a certificate of
candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship because in the certificate, the candidate declares
himself to be a Filipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine Constitution. Such declaration
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The mere fact
that respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and has an alien certificate of registration are not
acts constituting express renunciation.
Bengzon III vs HRET (2001)
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April
27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On
November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent
Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

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WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Angat vs Republic (1999)
Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He lost his citizenship by naturalization in the
United States of America. In 1991, he returned to the Philippines. On March 11, 1996, he filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City a petition to regain his status as a citizen of the Philippines. On
September 20, 1996, upon motion of the petitioner, he was allowed to take the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines which was scheduled on October 3, 1996. On October 4, 1996, the trial judge
issued an Order declaring the petitioner as repatriated and a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
On March 19, 1997, the OSG filed a Motion asserting that the petition itself should have been dismissed
by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum was the Special Committee on
Naturalization consistent with Administrative Order No. 285.
The Court ruled that when petitioner filed his petition on March 11, 1996, the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order
285, promulgated on August 22, 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory
issuance. The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angats petition should have
been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The
courts order of October 4, 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor could be a
source of right on the part of petitioner.
Note, the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for
petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 since these laws could only apply to
persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed
forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter
not alleged in the petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was
to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil
registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
Alterajos vs Comelec (2004)
Ciceron P. Altarejos, a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10,
2004 national and local elections was petitioned by the respondents to be disqualified or cancel his
certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and made a false representation in
his certificate of candidacy that he was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.

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Altejaros took his oath of allegiance as a repatriated Filipino on Dec. 17, 1997 before the special
Committee on Naturalization. However no copy of his oath was registered in the proper civil registry and
the Bureau of immigration until Feb. 18, 2004.
The registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. In the case at bar, petitioner
completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10,
2004 elections.
Tabasa vs CA (2006)
When petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the
United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who
holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner
theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and
that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.
The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor
children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner
overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children
of said natural-born Filipinos.
Tabasa lost his citizenship by operation of law and not due to political and economic exigencies. It was his
father who could have been motivated by political and economic reasons in deciding to apply for
naturalization.

MERCADO vs. MANZANO


307 SCRA 630
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
1
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City.
Ruling:

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Yes, he is qualified. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual's volition.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
REPUBLIC vs. VILLASOR (54 SCRA 83)
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an
order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
I, declaring a decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being
excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the State is immune from suit.
2. Whether or not the writ of execution directed against the funds of the AFP was validly issued.
Ruling:
1.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily
understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit,
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision,
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, with its affirmation that "a continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may
be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability
of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to
go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in

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the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined."
2.
No, it was not validly issued. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic
concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State
gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. A rule
which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may
be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of
garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to
permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as
long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another
reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it."
PROFESSIONAL VIDEO vs. TESDA (591 SCRA 83)
Facts:
TESDAs Pre-Qualification Bids Award Committee (PBAC) conducted two (2) public biddings on June 25,
1999 and July 22, 1999 for the printing and encoding of PVC cards. A failure of bidding resulted in both
instances since only two (2) bidders PROVI and Sirex Phils. Corp. submitted proposals.
Due to the failed bidding, the PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated contract with
PROVI. On December 29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed and executed a Contract Agreement for the
provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVC cards. On August 24, 2000, the two
parties executed an Addendum to the Contract Agreement Project whose terms bound PROVI to deliver
one hundred percent (100%) of the specified supplies to TESDA.
On July 11, 2001, PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA.
PROVI additionally prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment/garnishment against
TESDA.
Issues:

1. Whether TESDA, as an agency of the State, can be sued without its consent.
2. Whether or not the writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds, to cover PROVIs claim
against TESDA, is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental functions.
R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or TESDA under the
declared "policy of the State to provide relevant, accessible, high quality and efficient technical education
and skills development in support of the development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower
responsive to and in accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities."

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Under constitutional and statutory terms, we do not believe that the role and status of TESDA can
seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government, directly attached to the
DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman, for the performance of
governmental functions i.e., the handling of formal and non-formal education and training, and skills
development. As an unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with
both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.
2.
The writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds was not valid. TESDAs funds are public in
character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied
consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ
of garnishment or attachment. Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the
implementation of the Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds,
being sourced from the Treasury, are moneys belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in
the hands of public officials.
HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN vs. ATO (629 SCRA 451)
Facts:
In 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Bigo, predecessors-in-interest of petitioners-heirs namely,
Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de Robles, acquired a parcel of land with an area of
about 22 hectares, situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No.
2204 was issued in favor of said spouses.
However, in 1948, respondent Air Transportation Office (ATO) used a portion of the property as an
airport. In 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. It
also lengthened, widened, and cemented the airport's runway. Petitioners demanded from ATO the
payment of the value of the property as well as the rentals for the use thereof but ATO refused.
Eventually in 1988, OCT No. 2204 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160 was issued in
favor of petitioners. Despite this development, ATO still refused to pay petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity finds application in this case.
Ruling:
No, it does not apply. Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the constitutional
doctrine of non-suability of the state, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and
conveniently hide under the state's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields
to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that
the state may not be sued under any circumstance.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens' rights and welfare cannot sanction an
injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and
equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance,
and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated on the basis of quantum meruit for
construction done on the public works housing project.
It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is the life of the law. A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Litigation
must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts
must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are
to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. Petitioners have
been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property for a considerable length of time.

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Now that they prevailed before this Court, it would be highly unjust and inequitable under the particular
circumstances that payment of just compensation be withheld from them. We, therefore, write finis to
this litigation.
ATO vs. RAMOS (644 SCRA 36)
Facts:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with an area of 985 square meters, more or
less, was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by
petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations
to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00.
However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its
officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that
included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had
been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
Issue: Whether the ATO could be sued without the States consent.
Ruling:
Yes, the ATO can be sued. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune
from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was
organized.
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is
true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business
operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
implication consents to suits against the corporation.
The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government
not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of
the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit.
We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid
claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States consent has been rendered
moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of
2008. With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the
ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against
the CAAP.
CHINA NATIONAL vs. SANTAMARIA (665 SCRA 189)
Facts:

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On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG),
represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the
conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the
Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the
Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to
extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The
Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the
DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD
400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per
annum.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction against
CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the
National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. Respondents alleged that the Contract
Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic
Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree
No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code.
Issue: Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court.
Ruling:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal
nature of the act involved whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary
activity. The parties executed the Contract Agreement for the purpose of constructing the Luzon Railways.
Despite petitioners claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank
was mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do business in the
Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial
transaction.
It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs
governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity, just as the term "implementing agency" has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining
whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it
failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this
Courts ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be
presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result,
it has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
HEIRS OF GAMBOA vs. TEVES (682 SCRA 397)

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Facts:
This resolves the motions for reconsideration of the 28 June 2011 Decision filed by (1) the Philippine Stock
Exchange's President, (2) Manuel V. Pangilinan, (3) Napoleon L. Nazareno ,and (4) the Securities and
Exchange Commission (collectively, movants).
Movants contend that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has long been settled
and defined to refer to the total outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. In fact,
movants claim that the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership
requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution and various statutes, has consistently adopted
this particular definition in its numerous opinions. Movants point out that with the 28 June 2011 Decision,
9
the Court in effect introduced a "new" definition or "midstream redefinition" of the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue: How should the term capital be construed?
Ruling:
Pursuant to the express mandate of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA), as amended, which defined a
"Philippine national" as follows:
SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:
The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or
association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is
owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing
business in the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the
capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for
pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national
and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided,
That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at
least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be
citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be considered a "Philippine national."
Thus, the FIA clearly and unequivocally defines a "Philippine national" as a Philippine citizen, or a
domestic corporation at least "60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote" is owned by
Philippine citizens.
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy "effectively
controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the
ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose
capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIAs implementing rules explain that "for stocks to be
deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to
meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate
voting rights is essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the
term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as
well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of
directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.
Any other construction of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution contravenes the
letter and intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning of the term "capital" openly invites alien

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domination of economic activities reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals. Therefore, respondents
interpretation will ultimately result in handing over effective control of our national economy to
foreigners in patent violation of the Constitution, making Filipinos second-class citizens in their own
country.
Note: The FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the Philippines, irrespective of the nature
of business and area of investment. It spells out the procedures by which non-Philippine nationals can
invest in the Philippines.
c. Consent to be sued
How consent is given.
Veterans vs CA (1992)
Facts: VMPSI was operating as a security agency. By virtue of the provisions of RA 5487, the Private
Security Agency Law, the then Pt. Chief Lt. Fidel Ramos issued Rules and Regulations requiring that all
private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter
organized within the Region where their main offices are located. On May 12, 1086, a Memorandum
Argreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate
per guard for 8 hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside.
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty and recommended its expulsion from PADPAO and cancellation
of its license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA (Phil. Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security
and Investigation Agencies) made similar findings.
When VMPSI requested the issuance of a clearance/certificate of membership, PADPAO refused
to issue one. VMPSI wrote to the PC Chief on March 10 1988 but as the latter did not reply and VMPSIs
license was expiring in March 31, VMPSI filed a civil case in the RTC against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA.
The RTC issued a restraining order enjoining the defendants from committing acts that would result in the
cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSIs license. The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA moved to dismiss on the
ground, inter alia, that the case is against the State which had not given its consent thereto. On June 10,
1988, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from cancelling or
denying renewal of VMPSIs license, until further orders from the court. On August 11, 1989, the CA
granted the petition for certiorari filed by the defendants, ordering the RTC to dismiss the complaint
against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition for review.
Issues: W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the state without its
consent.
How is consent given?
Ruling: The petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed form is affirmed. The complaint is a
suit against the state without its consent. The PC Chief and the PC-SUSIA being instrumentalities of the
national government exercising a primary governmental function of regulation the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official and agency may not be
sued without the Governments consent. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. In the instant case, the
Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and the PADPAO did not constitute an implied
consent by the State to be sued; it was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the
salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly a governmental
function. The execution of said agreement is incidental to the purpose of RA 5487, as amended, which is
to regulate the organization and operation of private detective watchmen or security guard agencies. The

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correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of the contract by the State by the
legal nature of the act.
DA vs NLRC (1993)
Facts: The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental
entity. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential
pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of
Cagayan de Oro City against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency. The Executive
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally liable with
Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant
security guards. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Commanding the City
Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was
filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro,
alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void
and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner
also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's
governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
Petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution.
The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department,
which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the
petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity
from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issue:

1. W/N the DA can be sued.


2. W/N the writ of execution was valid.

Ruling: 1. Yes. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without
its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an
express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. True, the
doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants
the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued
under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may
not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States'
consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act
No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action

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between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to
have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private
respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in
the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have,
in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay,
overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money
claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.
2. No. Pursuant to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act
No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction
thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
amended by P.D. 1445. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to
unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is
to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against
the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained,
thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
1.

Express Consent
a. Money claims arising from contract

SAYSON vs SINGSON (1973)


Facts: Singson was the sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service. In January 1967, the Office of the District
Engineer requisitioned various spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. After a public bidding was
conducted on May 5, the Committee on Awards accepted the bid of Singkier Motors for the sum of
P43,530. On May 16, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications sent a letter-order to Singkier
requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein. In due course, Voucher No. 07806 reached

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the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for preaudit. Sayson approved it for the payment of P34,824, with
the retention of P8,706. On June 9, 1967, the Voucher was paid to Singson in the amount of P34,824.
However, it would appear that when the Voucher and supporting papers reached the General Auditing
Office (GAO), a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila. Quotations were
submitted at P2529.64 only, which was P40,000 less than the price of Singkier. In view of the overpricing,
the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works. The Secretary then held the district
engineer responsible for overpricing and charges for malversation were filed against the latter and the
civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor that led to the filing of the mandamus
suit below, with respondent Singson being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,700, the
contract in question having been upheld. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Issue: What is the proper remedy to enforce collection of money claim against the Government arising
from contract? Will mandamus apply?
Ruling: Mandamus us not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but an
ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the
Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be
entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. In other words, respondent Singson should
have filed his claims against the State may be filed. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may
be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain
administrative proceedings be had and exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be
specified if thereafter on appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the
Auditor General. Even had there been such, the Court to which the matter should have been elevated is
this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that.
It is quite obvious then that it does not have the imprint of validity.
b.

Incorporation of Government Owned and /or Controlled Corporations

NHA vs HEIRS of GUIVELONDO


Facts: On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the
Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, respondents herein,
filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to petitioners power to expropriate
their properties. On August 7, 2000, the trial court rendered Partial Judgment adopting the
recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs
of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per square meter. Petitioner NHA filed two motions for
reconsideration. One of which assailed the amount of just compensation. The lower court denied such
motion. Subsequently, respondent Heirs filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted on November
22, 2000. Prior to the aforesaid denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed with the trial
court a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-23386, complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the
implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of
the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries cannot afford. The Motion was
denied on September 17, 2001, on the ground that the Partial Judgment had already become final and
executory and there was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the case. On May 27,
2002, respondent sheriff served on the Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment against

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the deposits, moneys and interests of petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds
and personal properties of petitioner. Hence, the matter before the SC.
Issues: 1. W/N the State can be compelled and coerced by the courts to exercise or continue with the
exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain.
2. W/N writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the State in an expropriation
wherein the exercise of the power of eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose.
Ruling: 1. Notably, the foregoing cases refer to the dismissal of an action for eminent domain at the
instance of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case. The rule is different where the case had been
decided and the judgment had already become final and executory. Expropriation proceedings consists of
two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a
public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the
taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners. The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of
expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the
second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are
appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated December 10,
1999, which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any
court.
Petitioner, in essence, contends that there are just and equitable grounds to allow dismissal or
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings. The argument is tenuous. Socialized housing has been
recognized as public use for purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain. The public purpose of
the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just compensation that the
court has fixed. Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation
case. Petitioner cannot be permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to
abandon it later when it finds the amount of just compensation unacceptable.
2. Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings
even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. However, if
the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is
clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds
are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. In the case of
petitioner NHA, the matter of whether its funds and properties are exempt from garnishment has already
been resolved squarely against its predecessor, the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC).
Hence, it is clear that the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or
execution. Petitioners prayer for injunctive relief to restrain respondent Sheriff Pascual Abordo from
enforcing the Notice of Levy and Garnishment against its funds and properties must, therefore, be denied.
2.

Implied Consent
a. Government enters into business contracts

PTA vs PGDEI (2012)


Facts: PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and promote
tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros

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Golf Course Expansion Projects. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the
project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation,
to build the golf course. The sub-contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress
billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF.
PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA plus interest, for the construction of the golf course. PTA
failed to answer the complaint. Hence, the RTC rendered a judgment of default.
Issue: W/N PTA is immune from the suit.
Ruling: PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The application of
state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases
of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to
the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since the Intramuros
Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character entered into between PTA and
PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.
b.

Inequitable claim to immunity

EPG CONSTRUCTION vs VIGILAR (2001)


Facts: In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS Development Corporation, initiated a
housing project. The Ministry of Public Works and Highways forged individual contracts with herein
petitioners EPG Construction Co., Ciper Electrical and Engineering, Septa Construction Co., Phil. Plumbing
Co., Home Construction Inc., World Builders Inc., Glass World Inc., Performance Builders Development Co.
and De Leon Araneta Construction Co., for the construction of the housing units.
After complying with the terms of said contracts, and by reason of the verbal request and
assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds would be available and
[4]
forthcoming, petitioners agreed to undertake and perform additional constructions for the
completion of the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations and written contracts to cover
subsequent expenses for the additional constructions. Petitioners then received payment for the
construction work duly covered by the individual written contracts, thereby leaving an unpaid balance of
P5,918,315.63, which amount represents the expenses for the additional constructions for the
completion of the existing housing units. On 14 November 1988, petitioners sent a demand letter to the
DPWH Secretary. The money claims were then referred to COA which returned the same to the DPWH
Auditor for auditorial action. On the basis of the Inspection Report of the Auditors Technical Staff, the
DPWH Auditor interposed no objection to the payment of the money claims subject to whatever action
the COA may adopt.
The COA returned the documents to the DPWH, stating that funds should first be made available
before COA could pass upon and act on the money claims. Then DPWH Secretary Jose De Jesus requested
the Secretary of Budget and Management to release public funds for the payment of petitioners money
claims. P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of petitioners money claims.
In a letter dated 26 August 1996, respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject
money claims prompting herein petitioners to file before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, , a
Petition for Mandamus praying that herein respondent be ordered to pay.
Issue: 1. W/N petitioners-contractors have the right to be compensated for a public works housing
project.
2. W/N DPWH is immune from suit.
Ruling: 1. YES. Respondents posits that the existence of appropriations and availability of funds as
certified to and verified by the proper accounting officials are conditions sine qua non for the execution of

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government contracts. According to respondent, sans showing of certificate of availability of funds, the
implied contracts are considered fatally defective and considered inexistent and void ab initio.
Respondent concludes that inasmuch as the additional work done was pursued in violation of the
mandatory provisions of the laws concerning contracts involving expenditure of public funds and in excess
of the public officials contracting authority, the same is not binding on the government and impose no
liability therefor.
We find the instant petition laden with merit and uphold, in the interest of substantial justice,
petitioners-contractors right to be compensated for the "additional constructions" on the public works
housing project, applying the principle of quantum meruit. The peculiar circumstances present in the
instant case buttress petitioners claim for compensation for the additional constructions, despite the
illegality and void nature of the implied contracts forged between the DPWH and petitionerscontractors. On this matter, it bears stressing that the illegality of the subject contracts proceeds from an
express declaration or prohibition by law, and not from any intrinsic illegality.
To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat petitionerscontractors right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both
the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project
and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors honest toil and labor.
2. NO. Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the instant
[17]
case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty. Respondents argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State
Immunity finds no application in the case before us. Under these circumstances, respondent may not
validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the States cloak of
invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough,
the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens rights and welfare cannot
sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration
thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the States cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in
this particular instance, and that petitionerscontractors be duly compensated on the basis of quantum
meruit for construction done on the public works housing project.
REPUBLIC vs UNIMEX (2007)
Facts: Respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot container and 171
cartons of Atari game computer cartridges, duplicators, expanders, remote controllers, parts and
accessories to Handyware Phils., Inc. After the shipment arrived in the Port of Manila on July 9, 1985, the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) agents discovered that it did not tally with the description appearing on the
cargo manifest. As a result, BOC instituted seizure proceedings against Handyware and later issued a
warrant of seizure and detention against the shipment. The Collector of Customs issued a default order
against Handyware for failing to appear. The Collector then forfeited the goods in favor of the
government.
Respondent filed a petition for review against petitioner Commissioner of Customs (BOC Commissioner)
in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA reversed the forfeiture decree and ordered the release of the
subject shipment to respondent subject to the payment of customs duties. The CTA decision became final
and executor. Unfortunately, however, respondents counsel failed to secure a writ of execution to

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enforce the CTA decision. Respondent filed in the CTA a petition for the revival of its June 15, 1992
decision. It prayed for the immediate release by BOC of its shipment or, in the alternative, payment of
the shipments value plus damages.
BOC informed the court that the subject shipment could no longer be found at its warehouses. The CTA
declared that its June 15, 1992 decision could no longer be executed due to the loss of respondents
shipment so it ordered the BOC Commissioner to pay respondent the commercial value of the goods
based on the prevailing exchange rate at the time of their importation. The dispositive portion of the
decision read: xxx payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of the goods or properties seized or
forfeited by the Bureau of Customs. BOC appealed. The CA held that the BOC Commissioner was liable
for the value of the subject shipment as the same was lost while in its custody.
Issue: 1. W/N the state is liable for the loss.
2. W/N government funds can be charged with respondents claim without a corresponding
appropriation.
Ruling: 1. Yes and yes. Petitioner argues that a money judgment or any charge against the government
requires a corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by mere judicial order. Although it may be
gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondents demand will ultimately fall on the government, and that,
under the political doctrine of state immunity, it cannot be held liable for governmental acts (jus
imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The circumstances of this case warrant its
exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine.
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOCs ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping of
respondents goods.
The situation does not allow us to reject respondents claim on the mere invocation of the
doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail
itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it.
Justice and equity now demand that the States cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shredded.
Accordingly, we agree with the lower courts directive that, upon payment of the necessary
customs duties by respondent, petitioners payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of goods or
properties seized or forfeited by the Bureau of Customs.(no appropriation needed)
c. Government initiates a complaint. Open to counterclaim.
FROILAN vs PAN (1950)
Facts: On February 3, 1951, Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that:
Foilan purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197 for P200T, paying P50T down and
agreeing to pauy the balance in installments; that, Foroilan mortgaged said vessel in favor of the Shipping
Commission to secure the pauyment of the balance; for failure to pay the installments, the Shipping
Commission took possession of the vessel and cancelled the contract of sale; that Shipping Commission
chartered and delivered the vessel to Part Oriental; that Foilan appealed to the President and the Cabinet
restored him to his rights under the original contract of sale with the Shipping Commission; that Pan
Orental refused to deliver the vessel to Froilan; Froilan prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the
seizure of said vessel and that he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof. The lower court
issued the writ of replevin and Pan Oriental was divested of its possession of the vessel. On November 10,
1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint-in-intervention alleging that:
Froilan failed to pay to the Shipping Commission; that Pan Oriental refused to deliver the vessel to Froilan;
Froilan prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel and that he be adjudicated to
have the rightful possession thereof. The lower court issued the writ of replevin and Pan Oriental was

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divested of its possession of the vessel. On March 21, 1951, the latter filed its answer denying the right of
Froilan to the possession of said vessel.
On November 10, 1951, the government filed a complaint-in-intervention alleging that: Froilan failed to
pay to the Shipping Commission the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel; the Intervenor was
entitled to the possession of the vessel either under the terms of the original contract or in order that it
may cause the extrajudicial sale thereof under the Chattel Mortgage Law. Intervenor prayed that Froilan
be ordered to deliver the vessel to the Board of Liquidators.
On Novemeber 29, 1951, Pan Oriental filed an Answer to the complainant-in-intervention alleging that:
The Republic was obligated to deliver the vessel to it vy virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with
option to purchase executed on June 16, 1949 by the Republic in favor of Pan Oriental; that Pan Oriental
had made necessary and useful expenses on the vessel and claimed the right of retention; that Pan
Oriental prayed that, if the Republic succeeded in obtaining possession of said vessel, the Republic must
comply with its obligation of delivering to the former or causing its delivery by recovering it from Froilan.
The Republic filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental on the ground that its purpose
was to compel the government to deliver the vessel to Pan Oriental in the event that the government
recovers the vessel from Froilan. It was also alleged that moven was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court in connection with the counterclaim. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the
counterclaim. It is from this order that Pan Oriental filed the present appeal.
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that the state is immune
from suit.
Ruling: This is untenable because by filing its complaint-in-intervention, the Government in effect waived
its right of non-suability. Hence, the appealed order is reversed and set aside and the case remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings. The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the
right to sue private parties in its own courts. The State as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the
state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he
might have against the State.
REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN (2006)
Facts: Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al.,
defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case
is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through the
PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto.
PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other
properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of
corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus
sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by private
respondent Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names of corporations he owned or
controlled.
Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of
Directors of NOGCCI. As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not pay the
corresponding monthly membership due thereon totalingP2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227
sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale. PCGG filed a complaint

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for injunction with the Regional Trial Court. The complaint, however, was dismissed, paving the way for
the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of stock. On August 5, 1989, an auction sale was
conducted.
On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into
a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034. The agreement contained a general release
clause whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227
NOGCCI shares, among other Benedictos properties, petitioner Republic acknowledging that it was within
private respondent Benedictos capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and
the exercise of his profession.
The Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in
accordance with its terms and subsequently ordered the return of the sequestered shares or in default
thereof, to pay their value which can be deducted from the Republics cash share in the Compromise
Agreement.
Owing to PCGGs failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No.
0034 a Motion for Compliance.
PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration which the SB denied. Hence, this recourse before the SC.
Issue: W/N the PCGG is liable? Can it invoke immunity from suit?
Ruling: PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a receiver insofar as the sequestered 227
NOGCCI shares of stock are concerned. PCGG also acknowledges that as such receiver, one of its functions
is to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered entity or property, in this case the 227 NOGCCI
shares in question. It contends, however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be
considered as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must pay. Petitioner Republic, through
the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered,
the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the
government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit
cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly
authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the
level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may
have against it. Petitioner Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver
of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its
immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic
thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When
the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and
purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue
and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent,
precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent
to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the
corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.
3. Scope of Consent
a. Under Act No. 3083
G.R. No. L-30098 February 18, 1970
THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS vs. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO

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FACTS: On 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent domain for the
expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to N. T. Hashim, needed to construct a public road, now known
as Epifanio de los Santos Avenue.
The parties thereafter worked out a compromise agreement, respondent estate having proposed on April
28, 1966, the total amount of P209,076.00, equivalent to the land's total assessed value, which was
confirmed, ratified and approved in November, 1966 by the Commissioner of Public Highways and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications
On the same date, October 14, 1968, respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, forthwith served a Notice of
Garnishment, on respondent Philippine National Bank, notifying said bank that levy was thereby made
upon funds of petitioners Bureau of Public Highways and the Auditor General on deposit, with the bank to
cover the judgment of P209,076.00 in favor of respondent estate.
ISSUE: w/n the government funds maybe garnished to satisfy a money claim arising from an expropriation
proceeding?
HELD: NO. the Court holds that respondent Court's two questioned orders are null and void on the
fundamental ground that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.
As early as 1919, the Court has pointed out that although the Government, as plaintiff in expropriation
proceedings, submits itself to the jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the
judgment that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the award determined as just compensation for
the condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its favor, cannot
be realized upon execution. The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the legislature to
appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay
the award determined in the judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the
judgment.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of Public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
This doctrine was again stressed by. the Court in Republic vs. Palacio, setting aside as null and void the
order of garnishment issued by the sheriff pursuant to the lower Court's writ of execution on funds of the
Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the Government's Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine
National Bank. The Court emphasized then and re-emphasizes now that judgments against the State or its
agencies and instrumentalities in cases where the State has consented to be sued, operate merely to
liquidate and establish the plaintiff's claim; such judgments may not be enforced by writs of execution or
garnishment and it is for the legislature to provide for their payment through the corresponding
appropriation, as indicated in Act 3083.

. Under a Charter
G.R. No. L-32667 January 31, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATION
FACTS: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court

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which had become final and executory. 1 A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued. 2 He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite
Employees and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case. The validity of the order assailed is
challenged on the ground that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character."
ISSUE: w/n the funds of People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (a government owned entity) may be
garnished?
HELD: YES. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the
sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not
follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court
of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later
Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of
the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable
for, as a government owned and controlled corporation. The NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated
October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established 'all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to
court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended.
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through
Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By
engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself
pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law
governing private corporations."
The invocation of Republic v. Palacio, as well as Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, did not
help the cause of petitioner at all The decisions are not applicable. The funds appertained to a
governmental office, not to a government-owned or controlled corporation with a separate juridical
personality. In neither case therefore was there an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued, the funds
of which could thereafter be held liable to execution and garnishment in the event of an adverse
judgment.
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the
doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental
funds are immune from garnishment, refer to Merritt v. Insular Government, a 1916 decisio. Since then
such a principle has been followed with undeviating rigidity, the latest case in point being Republic v.
Villasor, promulgated in 1973. It is an entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v.
Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate
existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That is
what happened in this case.

c. Execution
[ G.R. No. 113191. September 18, 1996
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: On 27 January 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-0690-93 for his
alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Forthwith,
the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers,
were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of

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securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development
Bank.
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision.. Petitioner was later constrained to
make an application for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction following the issuance,
on 16 March 1994, by the Labor Arbiter of a writ of execution.
ISSUE: w/n the writ of execution is enforceable against ADB?
HELD: No. Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:
"The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in
connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell
or underwrite the sale of securities.
The above stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be able, nay well enough,
to establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the
purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form.
The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official
capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are
treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be
respected.
"It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government x x x it is then the duty of the courts
to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, x x x or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle
that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction x x x as to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that `in such cases the judicial
department of government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.'
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of
the municipal law.
"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that
it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found.
(See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states
"The Supreme Court has long settled the matter of diplomatic immunities. In WHO vs. Aquino, SCRA 48, it
ruled that courts should respect diplomatic immunities of foreign officials recognized by the Philippine
government. Such decision by the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land.

REPUBLIC v. NLRC
263 SCRA 290 (1996)
FaCTS: The full ownership of PNEI was transferred to its creditor, the National Investment Development
Corporation ("NIDC"), a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank ("PNB"), following the latter's
foreclosure of PNEI assets. PNEI was one among several companies placed under sequestration by the

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Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG") shortly after the historic 1986 events in EDSA.
The sequestration order was lifted to give way to the sale of PNEI by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT)
which, in the meanwhile, had taken over the management of the company. The continuing deterioration
of its financial condition prompted PNEI to lodge a Petition for Suspension of Payments with the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), a move calculated to prevent further dissipation of PNEI's assets and
to make PNEI a viable source of income for the government.
The management committee, which was created to handle the business operations of PNEI, presented a
report to the SEC that recommended, in a move to best serve the interest of all parties concerned
(creditors, employees of PNEI and the government), the sale of the company through privatization in
accordance with the rules of the APT. As a cost saving measure, the management committee also
recommended to the SEC the retrenchment of some 500 employees of PNEI. The retrenchment was
carried out.
The filing of various labor complaints against PNEI was the immediate result where PNEI lost against the
employees. By virtue of the writ of execution, various pieces of property of PNEI were levied upon and
sold at public auction. Meanwhile, APT filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Execution. By then, the
proceeds of the sale of some property had amounted to P1,200,000.00. The amount was deposited with
the NLRC pending resolution of APT's motion. On the other hand, the employees filed a Motion for
Intervention before Labor Arbiter Aquino claiming interest over the same property of PNEI because of the
union's own monetary claim against the latter. Proceeds from the sale though were not enough to cover
these claims, together with the claims of the creditors.
Issue: Whether or not APT can be sued to be held liable to the obligation of PNEI
HELD Proclamation No. 50, creating APT which has been mandated to "take title to and possession of,
conserve, provisionally manage and dispose of assets" that have been identified for privatization or
disposition, clearly provides that said instrumentality, among other things, can "sue and be sued." This
provision indubitably shows that APT can be haled to court. Nonetheless, we have likewise since
explained that suability does not necessarily mean liability on the part of the particular instrumentality or
agency of the government. The liability of APT under this particular arrangement should be co-extensive
with the amount of assets taken over from the privatized firm.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO


FACTS: On 02 June 1999, Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of
nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession of a four
thousand nine hundred twenty-four-square meter (4,924.60 sq. m. to be exact) property against the
Republic of the Philippines (in whose name the title to the property was transferred and registered. The
property in question is located at 1440 Arlegui Street, San Miguel, Manila.
On 27 August 2003, Judge Hidalgo rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Mendoza. A certificate of
finality[8] of judgment was issued by the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Michael B. Robles, on 27 November
2003. On 10 December 2003, respondent issued an order[9] directing the issuance of a writ of execution.
On 07 January 2004, Sheriff Cachero further directed the National Treasurer to cause payment of
P1,942,576,312.45, thus:
ISSUE: w/n the writ of execution can be enforced against the state? NO
-w/n the state can be held liable for attorneys fees? - NO

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HELD: In the present case, respondent Judge patently committed two inexcusable procedural errors the
pronouncement of costs against the government and the subsequent issuance of the writ of execution, in
violation of settled rules and jurisprudence.
In the decision dated 27 August 2003, respondent Judge declared the Republic liable for payment of
attorneys fees and cost of suit, pertinent portion of which reads: 7. Ordering the defendant Republic of
the Philippines to pay the plaintiff attorneys fee, in an amount equivalent to FIFTEEN (15%) PER CENT of
the amount due to the plaintiff.
In declaring the government answerable to the attorneys fees of the plaintiff and other costs of the
suit, the respondent utterly disregarded the well-established rule that costs of suit are not recoverable
against the government (Section 1, Rule 142, Rules of Court). As early as 15 November 1918, we ruled in
the case of Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Rafferty that no costs shall be allowed against
the government of the Philippine Islands where the government is the unsuccessful party. This was
reiterated in the case of Philippines Veterans Affairs Office v. Anover and The Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office v. Tamayo, when we ruled that court costs are not recoverable from a government agency.
It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent
to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in
effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. In Republic
v. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus . . . The
universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

4. Suability vs Liability
E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
FACTS: The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle and collided with the General Hospital ambulance. As a
consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, and he had to
give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
The court find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is
P18,075.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing
the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These
were the two questions submitted to the court for determination.
ISSUE: Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount?
HELD: No.

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By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state
for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is
difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from
suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with
the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition
of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only
question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from
suit.
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause
not previously recognized.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official)
so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of
Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according
to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and
that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth,
which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This
matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION v. FIRME
195 SCRA 692 (1991)
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Judge Firme is impleaded in his
official capacity as the Presiding Judge of the CH. Private respondents are heirs of the deceased Laureano
Banina, Sr. and plaintiffs in the civil case before the aforesaid Court. On Dec. 16, 1965, a collision
occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and owned by the Estate of Nieveras, a gravel
and sand truck driven by Nianandog and owned by Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fen-tando and driven by Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano
Banina, Sr. died and 4 others suffered physical injuries. On Dec. 11, 1966, private respondents instituted a
complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot, owl-ter and driver, respectively, of the
passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the
petitioner and the driver of the dump truck of petitioner. Private respondents amended the complaint

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wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, -Bishg, were impleaded as defendants. Petitioner
invoked, among others, non-suability of the State.
On Oct. 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs (private respondents)
ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs for
funeral expenses, actual damages, attorney's fees and costs of the suit, dismissing the complaint against
the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot. In an order dated Nov. 7, 1979, the respondent Judge Firme denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. Hence this petition. (Respondent Judge failed to
resolve the issue of non-suability of the state in the guise of the municipality.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando is liable for quasi-delict committed by its regular
employee?
HELD: We arrive at the conclusion that the Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by
its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the
death of the passenger imposed on the Municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation. Accordingly,
the petition is granted.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them
the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by
them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that
they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the
injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the
claimant cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the Municipality insist that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed.
We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN VS. HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR


G.R. No. 168289
FACTS: The case stems from a Complaint filed by herein private respondent Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao
against herein petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its chief executive, Felix V. Ople
(Ople) for collection of a sum of money and damages. It was alleged that sometime in the middle of the
year 2000, respondent, doing business as KD Surplus and as such engaged in buying and selling surplus
trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and related supplies, was contacted by petitioner Ople.
Respondent had entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality through Ople for the delivery of
motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the
municipality. However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondents
claim for payment.
ISSUE: W/N the municipality maybe held liable? YES.
HELD: The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its
political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but
only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as
it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special
law[34] such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which vests local government units with certain corporate powers one of them is the power to sue and
be sued.

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Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan v.
Allarde,[35] where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the
state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue
upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to
satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that the
legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus, where
consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the
resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment.[36]
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects. x x x

VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000


699
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
ANNOTATION
VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FROM LOCAL JURISDICTION
By
JORGE R. COQUIA*
________________
1.Introduction, p. 699
2.Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity, p. 700
3.The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, p. 702
4.Absolute and Relative Immunity, p. 702
5.Theory of Absolute Immunity, p. 703
6.Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, p. 704
7.Immunities of Consuls, p. 704
8.Honorary Consuls, p. 705
9.Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State, p. 706
10.Immunity of Officials of International Organizations, p. 708
11.Immuntiy of Intergovernmental International Organizations, p. 709
12.Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations, p. 710
13.The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity, p. 712
14.Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats, p. 714
15.The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case, p. 714
1. Introduction
The concept of diplomatic immunity or exemption of individuals from local jurisdiction originally started
from the immunity of diplomatic envoys such as ambassadors, minis________________

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* Member, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).


700
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
ters, our counselors representing their countries abroad. Heads of states or sovereign rulers traveling
abroad enjoy inviolability from local jurisdiction. As international relations developed with the formation
of the family of nations, the concept of immunity persons from local jurisdiction has very much
broadened. Immunity has extended to consuls, ad hoc diplomats, international organizations and their
officers. International law now recognizes a system of granting immunity from local jurisdiction not only
intergovernmental organizations but also international non-governmental organizations and their
officials.
The nature of diplomatic immunity granted to officials of intergovernment organizations was the issue in
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent, G.R. No. 125865,
promulgated on January 28, 2000 now under annotation.
The petitioner in said case, an employee of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), an intergovernmental
banking organization who allegedly committed a crime of oral defamation invoked immunity from suit,
citing a provision of the Headquarters Agreement between the Philippine government and the ADB, that:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing
missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
(a) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.
2. Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity
Diplomatic immunity with the law on diplomatic relations among States was developed much earlier than
all other aspects of international law. Even before the emergence of Greek civilization, the records of
ancient China, India and Egypt showed practices observing respect for emissaries and recognizing the
sacred character of their office. Although no
701
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701
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
permanent embassies were established, the Greeks and the Romans sent and received envoys who were
accorded respect and personal inviolability. By then, traces of the principle of exterritoriality as now
understood in modern international law had already been recognized. (Grotius, Book II, ch. XVII on Right
to Legation, trans. by FCG Kelsley, Carnegie Endorsement for International Peace, Oxford, 1925).
Up to the fall of Roman Empire, ambassadors were regarded only as personal representatives of the kings
or princes. With the development of the Italian states in the fourteenth century, embassies took on a
more formal character, especially in the case of the representatives of the Holy See to the various secular
courts. By the fifteenth century, resident embassies were established and some form of diplomatic

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procedure developed. Eventually, questions of precedence and inviolability of envoys arose, which
resulted in serious disputes among States. (De Vattel, Book IV, ch. V-IX [1773] Law of Nations).
By custom and tradition antedating all other rules of international law, the diplomatic agents sent by one
state to another have been regarded as possessing a peculiarly sacred character, in consequence of which
they have been accorded special privileges and immunities. The ancient Greeks regarded an attack upon
the person of an ambassador as an offense of the gravest nature. The writers of ancient Rome were
unanimous in considering an injury to envoys as deliberate infraction of the jus gentium. Grotius wrote in
1625 that there were two points with regard to ambassadors which are everywhere recognized as
prescribed by the law of nations, first that they be admitted, and then that they be not violated. The
basis upon which this personal immunity rested was generally found in the principle that the ambassador
personified the state or sovereign he represented. From this principle developed not only the custom of
according special protection to the person of the ambassador but also a comprehensive exemption from
the local jurisdiction. In explanation of the privileges and immunities thus granted, writers worked out the
fiction of exterritoriality, which held that the ambas702
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
sador and his suite, together with his residence and the surrounding property, were legally outside the
territory of the state. This fiction obtained for a time of foothold in international law and served the useful
purpose, on one hand, of explaining the actual immunities granted to foreign representatives and, on the
other hand, of emphasizing the sovereignty and equality of the several states. It was, however, open to
the disadvantage not only of being a fiction but of permitting inferences more comprehensive than the
position of the ambassador called for. The conception is abandoned in the Vienna Convention; which
offers no theoretical basis for the privileges and immunities it grants. (Fenwick, Charles G., International
Law, Appleton-Century Co., Inc., New York [1965]).
3. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
The law on diplomatic intercourse in general as now codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. Likewise the law in consular immunities and privileges are provided with the 1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
4. Absolute and Relative Immunity
Immunity from the exercise of local jurisdiction may be generally classified as absolute or relative.
According to the classical, or absolute, theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign sovereign could not,
without his consent, be made a defendant in the courts of another sovereign. But according to a newer
and restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, such exemption has been recognized only with respect to
sovereign or public acts of state and not necessarily with respect to its so-called private acts.
Long ago, the principle of sovereign immunity embraced both the government of a foreign sovereign
(state immunity) and the individual head of the state in question (personal
703
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703
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
immunity). Today the two forms of immunity are quite distinct and have to be discussed separately.

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5. Theory of Absolute Immunity
Regardless of whether an individual is constitutionally the actual head of a state or only its nominal head,
he or she enjoys complete immunity from suit in the territory of another state. This principle applies
equally to crowned heads of state and elected heads of state. And whatever the sovereign may do in the
territory of another state, he is immune from all prosecution, civil or criminal. This principle was applied in
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, Queens Bench Division (1894) 1 Q. B. 149. The Sultan of Johore, a young man
visiting England was sued by a woman for breach of promise to marry. Although the Sultan was not
exactly a head of a state, the English Court dismissed the case on the ground that the Sultan of Johore is
immune from suit. The Court held that (1) certification of the status of a foreign sovereign by means of an
official communication from an adviser of the British sovereign binds English courts and is to be accepted
as conclusive as far as those courts are concerned, and (2) the relationship existing between Great Britain
and the Sultanate of Johore was based on a treaty of protection by which the Sultan was to enjoy the
protection of Great Britain, engaging, on his part, not to enter into treaties with any foreign states. In the
opinion of the court, the agreement by the sultan not to enter into treaties with other Power does not
seem. . . to be abnegation of his right to enter into such treaties, but only a condition upon which the
protection stipulated for is to be given. If the sultan disregards it, the consequences may be the loss of
that protection, or possibly other difficulties with this country; but I do not think that there is anything in
the treaty which qualifies or disproves the statement in the letter that the Sultan of Johore is an
independent sovereign.
Similarly, the Gaekwar of Baroda, named as correspondent in the divorce suit of Statham v. Statham and
the Gaekwar of Barosa, (Great Britain, Probate Court, 1912, p. 12, cited in
704
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 138) was declared by a British court to be immune from suit because of his
position as sovereign of an independent state in India.
A foreign sovereign or head of state not only enjoys personal immunity from suit but also cannot be
named as a party defendant to a suit brought against him in his official capacity as the representative of
his state. This was brought out clearly in the case of De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, (Great Britain, Court
of Queens Bench, 1851, 17 Q. B., 196) in which a British court dismissed on grounds of immunity of a suit
for money allegedly wrongfully paid to the government of Portugal.
6. Immunities of Diplomatic Agents
The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomats Relations exempts the heads of diplomatic missions, such as
acting ambassadors or nuncios, or internuncios and charges daffaires from the exercise of local
jurisdiction. The diplomatic representatives enjoy personal inviolability. They are exempted from exercise
of jurisdiction of the receiving state. Even if they commit an offense they may not be arrested. The
remedy of the local state is to consider him a persona non grata and will be asked to leave the country.
Should he refuse to leave the country he will be treated as an ordinary individual and the local laws can be
applied on him.
7. Immunities of Consuls
Consuls do not belong to the class of diplomatic agents. They look mainly on the commercial interests of
their own states and perform non-political matter such as issuing passports and visas taking deportees
and verification of documents. Generally, they are not clothed with diplomatic privilege.

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However, 1963 Vienna Convention of Consular Relations grants the privileges and immunities in so far as
they are performing their curricular duties. Consuls do not enjoy im705
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Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
munity from local jurisdiction from private or commercial transactions not connected with the consular
duties. This rule was followed in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249 (1936). The consul of Uruguay in
Manila invoked the immunity from criminal prosecution for falsification of private documents. The
Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed was not in the performance of his consular duties hence,
he cannot claim immunity from suit.
8. Honorary Consuls
By agreement among states honorary consuls are appointed to perform limited curricular duties. They
may be citizens of the receiving state and are non-career consuls of a special category distinguished from
career consuls. Various national criteria define honorary consuls as persons who are not regularly
salaried. They may not be nationals of the sending state, and can engage in private gainful occupation,
and permitted to perform only certain limited functions. In view of the wide use of honorary consuls, the
Vienna Convention deals in detail with their status. (See Chap. III, Arts. 58-68.) The drafters of the
Convention refrained from defining honorary consuls and merely attempted to codify the existing practice
of strictly limiting their immunities to a minimum level necessary for the proper exercise of official
consular functions, for example, freedom of communication, immunity from local jurisdiction with
reference to official acts. Other immunities are limited so as to prohibit the granting of special benefits to
honorary consuls acting in private capacities. For example, consular archives of a consular post headed by
an honorary consul are inviolable provided that private and official documents are separated; tax
exemption extends only to renumeration received from the sending state for the exercise of consular
functions. Consular employees at a post headed by an honorary consul and members of the honorary
consuls family are granted none of the privileges provided in the Convention.
706
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
9. Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State
The traditional absolute theory of immunity exempted a state in every way from the jurisdiction of other
countries: its government could not be sued abroad without its consent; its public property could not be
attached; its public vessels could not be arrested, boarded, or sued; nor could any property or real state
owned by the state be taxed or attached in whatever country it might be located.
Under the doctrine of immunity of the State from suit even officers representing the sovereign state are
exempted from local jurisdiction. This principle was followed in the Philippines in several cases at the time
the US Military Bases were present in the country.
One of the earliest decisions on this subject was Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). The US
military commander was sued to restore the apartment buildings they owned and leased plus rentals. The
Supreme Court in dismissing the case held that the real party in interest as defendant in the original case
is the United States of America. The lessee in each of the three lease agreements was the United States of
America and the lease agreements themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her

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agents. The consideration of rentals was always paid by the US Government not only because, as already
stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by such Government but also because the premises were
used by officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately after the termination of hostilities.
The Supreme Court held that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have
no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised
and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The US Government has not given its consent to the
filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latters consent but it is of a citizen filing an
action against a
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Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
foreign government without said governments consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country.
In an earlier case (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]), the Supreme Court declared that it is well
settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by
permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.
In Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission, 87 Phil. 328 (1950), the
respondent, a United States agency established to compensate damages suffered by the Philippines
during World War II, was held as falling within the above doctrine as the suit against it would eventually
be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government because x x x, the Commission
has no funds of its own for the purpose of paying money judgments.
In Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo, 89 Phil. 568 (1951), a suit against the Alien Property
Custodian and the Attorney General of the United States involving vested property under the Trading with
the Enemy Act was a suit against the US. Similar rulings were held in Parreo v. Mc Grannery, 92 Phil. 791
(1953) and Johnson v. Turner, 94 Phil. 807 (1954), Miquiabas v. Commanding General, 282 C 1948).
In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974) a suit filed against the US Naval Base Commander in Subic Bay was
dismissed under the doctrine of immunity from suit without its consent.
In US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 482 (1985) the suit filed against the US Naval Base Commander for breach of
contract was likewise dismissed on the doctrine of state immunity state immunity from suit.
In US v. Ceballos, 182 SCRA 644 (1990), the US Air Force Officer who was sued for conducting buy bust
operations, to prevent the distribution, and possession of prohibited drugs in the US military base was
considered as an official function. As US government officials they are immune from suit.
708
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
Likewise in US v. Alarcon, 182 SCRA 646 (1990) the suit filed against the US military officials for damages
due to injuries suffered by complainants who were bitten by their dogs was dismissed as the suit was in
effect against US government. The complainants were committing theft of government property within
the military base.

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In 1994, the Supreme Court in Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524 (1994) reiterated the settled
jurisprudence that the Vatican as a state represented by the Holy See may not be sued. The Republic of
the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its
ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since
1957.
10. Immunity of Officials of International Organiza tions
Historically, the present law on international immunities of international organization started from the
experience of the International Labor Organization and League of Nations and eventually the United
Nations and its agencies.
The immunities enjoyed by the United Nations includes immunity for United Nations assets, wherever
located, from any legal process; immunity of all United Nations premises from search, requisition,
expropriation, confiscation, and any other sort of interference; immunity of archives; complete freedom
from all financial controls, moratoriums, or other monetary regulations; freedom to hold funds in any
desired currency or metal; freedom to transfer funds; an absolute exemption of all assets and revenue
from all direct taxes; exemption from all customs duties as well as from any foreign trade prohibitions on
goods needed for the official use of the organization; a guarantee of most favored diplomatic treatment
as far as rates, priorities, and so on, connected with all media of communications, are concerned;
exemption from all forms of censorship; the right to use codes; and the privilege of transporting
correspondence by courier or otherwise under
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Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
the full complement of customary diplomatic immunities (Glahn, Law of Nations, p. 154.) Officers in UN
agencies also enjoy immunities from local jurisdiction. When engaged in their official functions, judges of
the International Court of Justice enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.
Similarly, the representatives of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy
(EURATOM) possess customary diplomatic privileges and immunities in the States where they are located.
Special diplomatic missions are usually sent to States the purpose of which are specified by mutual
consent between the sending and receiving States. Members of these special missions normally enjoy
privileges in international law, except in respect of personal actions, or professional or commercial
activities. They enjoy civil and criminal immunities, and are exempted from customs duties and
inspections.
In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Supreme Court sustained the position of
the Department of Foreign Affairs that the WHO official was entitled to all the privileges and immunities
of diplomatic envoys and order the quashing of the search warrant on him issued by a lower court. The
Supreme Court said in said case that the executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly
recognized that the petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of
the Host Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge of the
Philippine Governments official position that accordingly, Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a
Philippine court summons without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine
Government.
11. Immunity of Intergovernmental International Organizations

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The growth of intergovernmental international organizations dedicated to specific universal endeavors
such as health, agriculture, science, technology and environment has broadened the concept of
international immunities. The reason
710
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international rights organizations, its officials and
functionaries, is to secure them legal and practical independence in the performance of their duties.
(Jenks, International Immunities, London [1961])
The Philippine Supreme Court has ruled on this type of immunity. In Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development CenterAquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AOD) v. National Labor Organization, 206 SCRA
289 (1992). The Court in said case held that the SEAFDEC, being an international organization enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory it is located.
In Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681 (1995), the
Court ruled that the United Nations Revolving Funds for Natural Resources Exploration, which is a special
fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations enjoyed immunity from suit. The United Nations
Revolving Funds is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for
exploration work in Dinagat Island. The Labor Arbiter of the Department of Labor has no jurisdiction to try
the case involving labor disputes.
12. Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations
The principle of immunity from said suit has been extended even to non-governmental international
organizations which are performing meritorious services to assist countries in the promotion of health,
protection of environment, and development of natural resources. By agreement with the government,
non-governmental international organizations which volunteer are exempted from local jurisdiction in
order to give them freedom in the performance of their activities.
In response to the plight of Vietnamese refugees an agreement was forged in 1981 between the
Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating
center processing Indo-Chinese refu711
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Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
gees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in the Philippines. The
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), a non-profit international humanitarian agency
incorporated in New York, was accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee center in
the Philippines. Duly organized under the United Nations Economic and Social Council where it enjoys
consultative status, category II in the U.N., the ICMC was granted status as specialized agency with
corresponding diplomatic privileges accorded by the Philippine Government.
In view of a certification election of employees union of the ICMC issued by the Director of Bureau of
Labor Relations of the Philippine Government, the ICMC filed a petition for certiorari with the Philippine
Supreme Court invoking its status as recognized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and
immunities. The Department of Foreign Affairs through its Legal Adviser intervened in the case on the
ground that as the highest executive department with authority and competence to act on matters

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involving diplomatic immunity and privileges, it has legal interest in the outcome of the case. The
Supreme Court sustained the intervention of the Legal Adviser of the Department of Foreign Affairs that
the certification election of laborers and employees union violated the diplomatic immunity of the ICMC
as an international organization. The court reiterated the principle in WHO vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
[1972], that the determination of diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question which is
conclusive on courts. (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
The Philippine Supreme Court made a similar ruling in the case of International Rice Research Institute,
Inc., a Ford and Rockefeller Foundation-supported international organization, with the principal objective
of conducting research on rice production. The Supreme Court sustained a ruling of the Secretary of Labor
that an application of the Philippine Labor Law on the employees and the laborers violated the immunities
and privileges of IRRI as a recognized international or712
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Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
ganization. (Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. International Rice Institute, 190 SCRA 130
[1990]).
13. The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity
The privileges and immunities of diplomatic officials are not altogether unlimited.
The theory of restrictive immunity was raised for the first time in the Philippines in US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA
487 (1985). In the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar, he averred that the US Naval Commander of
Subic Bay should not hide himself behind the cloak of immunity since when he entered into contracts with
private individuals, he went down to the level of a private. Justice Abad Santos, writing that the majority
opinion of the case, however, ruled that the US Naval Commander was entering into a contract which
involved public and sovereign function of the US government which is the maintenance of naval facilities
for the use of the US Navy.
Since 1952, US Government has followed the policy of recognizing the restrictive immunity of a State.
Through a letter of Jack B. Tate, then acting legal adviser to the Department of State, to the Acting
Attorney General, a policy was laid down that, thenceforth, private activities of foreign sovereigns would
be denied immunity in American courts. Several United States court decisions followed the new policy
(Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 American Journal of International La,
93 [1953]).
The United States Congress enacted into law the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 which took
effect on January 19, 1977. Said law codifies the re strictive theory of sovereign immunity by limiting the
latter to public acts and excluding all commercial or private acts. It also laid down the procedure to be
followed in filing a case against a foreign State. The decision of vesting sovereign immunity is exclusively
with the courts, thereby eliminating political questions in the Department of State.
The principle of restrictive immunity was applied by the Supreme Court in US v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
(1990). In said
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case, the private respondent sued the US Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding for contract for barbering services. The Supreme Court held that barbershops subject of the
concessions granted by the State Government are commercial enterprises. They are not agencies of the
United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only
the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military organizations) but such similar indulgences, all
for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to
improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not
more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are, under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to
the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to
them in their respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private
respondents in the court below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the conclusion
reached in the United States of America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.
In US v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 (1990), the court also ruled that the US Air Force operating the open mess
complex at Camp John Hay is a business enterprise opened to the public and that the principle of
immunity of suit will not apply. The business was proprietary in character. Such services are not extended
to the American servicemen for free as a prerequisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United
States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is
well known that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many
of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility
pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are
concededly reasonable and relatively low, such services are
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Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to
justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. For that matter, not even the United
States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment
contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit.
14. Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats
Members of official missions and delegates traveling abroad to attend international conference are
accorded diplomatic immunity while in the performance of their official functions. The principle of
restrictive immunity applies to them, however, for acts not directly connected with their official duties.
15. The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case
In the case under annotation, the proper procedure was for the municipal court to inquire whether the
petitioner had committed the crime in connection with the performance of his official duties as an officer
of the Asian Development Bank. Sec. 45 (a) of the Headquarters agreement between the Government of
the Philippines and the Asian Development Bank states that the immunity applies to the performance of
their duties in their official capacities.
The immunity of Jeffrey Liang was not absolute. The principle of restrictive immunity applies to him. The
municipal judge in outrightly dismissing the case on the ground of immunity of the petitioner from local

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jurisdiction was not proper. It will be different if the person enjoyed full diplomatic immunity as what
happened in the case of WHO vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 243 (1972) the official was a U.N. officer with full
diplomatic immunity. Thus, the certifications of
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Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the WHO officials enjoyed diplomatic immunity are conclusive on the
courts. It was a political act of the executive which should be respected by the court.
For that matter, had there been a preliminary investigation as averred by the petitioner, the case should
not have reached the Supreme Court. The preliminary investigation could have clarified whether the
petitioner committed oral defamation in connection with his official duties as an ADB official.
o0o

GIL
BANAT VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national
papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."
Veterans explaining the First Party Rule:
Formula for Determining
Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis
given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it
should be entitled to twice the latters number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing
the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party
-------------------Total votes for
party -list system

Proportion of votes of
first party relative to
total votes for party-list system

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first
party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified
parties.
Formula for Additional

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Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:

Additional seats
for concerned
=
party

No. of votes of
concerned party
-----------------Total no. of votes
for party-list system
----------------------No. of votes of
first party
-------------Total no. of votes
for party list system

No. of additional
x seats allocated to
the first party

In simplified form, it is written as follows:


No. of votes of
Additional seats
concerned party
for concerned =
-----------------x seats allocated to
party
No. of votes of
the first party
first party

No. of additional

xxx
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number
of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero
additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 0788. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC.

ISSUE:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined
the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

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3.
4.
5.

Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?

HELD:
WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3
August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.
RATIO:
1 & 2. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation
of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20%
party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that
a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections.
3.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.
4.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is
arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38
seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
5.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of
the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative
the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in

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party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion
of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
ABAYON PALPARAN VS THE HRET
FACTS:
Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat Tayo and Bantay
respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over the
Party list.. and its representatives.. HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the
nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifivcations of petitioners.
HELD: Affirmative.
The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications
of Aangat Tayo andBa nt a y. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were
chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire
into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits
as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of districts and party list.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House
of Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives.

Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote
for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. Both
the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of
party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization in the context of the
facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayoa nd Bantay, respectively, and
the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the

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House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC


FACTS:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on
moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELECs field personnel.

ISSUE:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
HELD:

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Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,
the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy,
at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) vs
COMELEC and the House of Representatives (2010)
FACTS:
The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered
under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the
May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent
to participate, CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five

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nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required
number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the
certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein
petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L.
Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the
nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) CruzGonzales, and (3) Borje.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting
as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second
nominee. The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed
were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have
garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that
CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
Notwithstanding Villanuevas filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment
of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC
failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter
pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No.
07-054.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of
the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested
that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office.
Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because
COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
The COMELEC approved the withdrawal of nomination of Atty. Luis Lokin. Hence, this present
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List
System Act.
RULING:
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
o Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted only
when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated
to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these
cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth
being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."

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Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three
statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither
the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement
thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be
implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs
should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying the laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941, because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provisions
phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase
anew or in a new form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not
altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,
because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new
ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination
already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done.
Considering that Section 13 of the Resolution No. 7804 to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC was invalid,
CIBACs withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin ang the others and its substitution of them with
new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin
and the others could only be for any grounds expressly stated in section 8 of RA 7941.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a partylist organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted to the COMELEC.

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANAS vs COMELEC, CIBAC PARTY LIST represented by VIRGINIA S.
JOSE SHERWIN N. TUGNA, and CINCHONA CRUZ-GONZALES (2012)
FACTS:
On 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution expunging the Certificate of
Nomination which included herein petitioners as representatives of the party-list group known as
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC). The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution,
prompting Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita F. Planas to file the present Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing both
Resolutions, praying that they be recognized as the legitimate nominees of CIBAC party-list, and
that petitioner Lokin, Jr. be proclaimed as the CIBAC party-list representative to the House of
Representatives.

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Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.)
7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution and bylaws, the
platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys
public service. Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking and
governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections.
On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to
the COMELEC a "Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
in the May 10, 2010 Elections." The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who
claimed to be the partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as
the partys vice-president and secretary-general, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8744 giving due course to CIBACs
Manifestation, "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO the determination which of the two factions of the
registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent
to participate is the official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations
xxx."
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva,
submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. The
nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla
submitted a second Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin, Jr. and
Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as "acting
secretary-general" of CIBAC.
Claiming that the
nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For Disqualification," seeking to
nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented
herself as "acting secretary-general," when she was not even a member of CIBAC; that the
Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the party
and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of
Nomination on its behalf.
COMELEC granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the
records, and declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing
respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
RULING:
By virtue of the mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the
nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee, the
COMELEC promulgated its "Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List
Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections." Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of
these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance with
the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the

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marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent.
A careful perusal of the records readily shows that Pia B. Derla, who has signed and submitted, as
the purported Acting Secretary General of CIBAC, the Certificates of Nomination of Respondents,
has no authority to do so. Despite Respondents repeated claim that Ms. Derla is a member and
officer of CIBAC, they have not presented any proof in support of the same. We are at a loss as to
the manner by which Ms. Derla has assumed the post, and We see nothing but Respondents
claims and writings/certifications by Ms. Derla herself that point to that alleged fact. Surely, We
cannot rely on these submissions, as they are the very definition of self-serving declarations.
Pia Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and
clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the
COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the
evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members of
the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the
affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered with
COMELEC.
WHEREFORE , finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the
COMELEC expunging from its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia
B. Derla. The nominees, as listed in the Certificate of Nomination filed on 19 January 2010 by
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, President and Chairman of Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) Party List, are recognized as the legitimate nominees of the said party.

MILAGROS E. AMORES vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.


VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a
nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of
nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant
to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his
change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be
qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
ISSUE:
WON Mr. Villanuevas assumption of office is legal.
RULING:
the Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA
No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election.

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In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of
his term.
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must
be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector
nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL
youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no reason
to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation,
the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law
was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been the objective
of RA No. 7941.
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for
public respondents ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondents shift of
affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as
there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes
his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided,
That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliationwithin six (6) months before an
election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party
or organization. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list
organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee
who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination
under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the
elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba
legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth
sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May,
2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. Moreover, he did not change his
sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found
that he shifted to CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17,
2007.
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no
moment. A party-list organizations ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference,
their qualifications according to law are a different matter.

RONALDO LAYUG vs COMELEC, MARIANO VELARDE (alias BROTHER MIKE) and BUHAY PARTY-LIST

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FACTS:
On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and
concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No. 10-016 [DCN]) Buhay Party-List
from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He
argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As
such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987
4
Constitution , as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act. Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real
estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of party-list nominees under Section
6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807, the Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of
Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.
In their Answer thereto, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay Party-List is not a
religious sect but a political party possessing all the qualifications of a party-list. It is composed of
groups for the elderly, the women, the youth, the handicapped, as well as the professionals, and
Brother Mike belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented elderly group. They likewise
argued that nominees from a political party such as Buhay Party-List need not even come from
the marginalized and underrepresented sector.
On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution denying the petition for lack
of substantial evidence.
As a consequence of such entry, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers for Party-List, promulgated on July 30, 2010 NBC Resolution No. 10-034 proclaiming
Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House of Representatives. Being the
fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay PartyList.
ISSUE:
WON the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
RULING:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members"
of the House are:
o Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall
be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list
1
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay

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Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano
Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the
fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's
qualifications
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested
by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states
that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We
ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of said party-lists.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTION AND OTHER CASES (G.R. NO. 203766 ETC., 02
APRIL 2013, CARPIO, J.)
(pasensya na...pertinga taasa man uyy)
Facts:
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in
the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to
apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization
that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN,
GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC,
on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC
disqualified the 39 groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A
BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW,
PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI,
A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were

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able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of
these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Issue:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani
and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
49
Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Ruling:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of
this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional,
and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied
by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The objective of the party list system under the 1987 constitution is to democratize political power by
giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the house
of representatives.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system ofrepresentation. Simply put, the partylist system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his
or her party-list group or organization of choice.
Both sectoral and well as non-sectoral parties are included in the party list system.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-listsystem to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.53
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead,
the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the
proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended
the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of
votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the
entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that
could not compete in legislative district elections.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or

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organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
What is the proof that the party list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties?
Section 5(2), article VI of the 1987 constitution which mandates that, during the first three consecutive
terms of congress after the ratification of the 1987 constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again that the party-list
system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of
one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be
no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the
party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government.
A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties. Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
provides that a political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On the other hand,
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the partylist
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the

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party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular
sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent
a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens
who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless
of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily marginalized and
underrepresented. For sure, professionals are not by definition marginalized and underrepresented,
not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may lack well-defined political constituencies, and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests andconcerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent
the marginalized and underrepresented. Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are marginalized and
underrepresented would lead to absurdities.
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in section 5 that are, by
their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.
These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.
For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector does
not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her
sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically marginalized and
underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical
Coordination Board.58
How about sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, do they need to be
marginalized?
No. They belong to ideology-based and cause oriented parties. Allowing them to run as party list will give
give small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a
chance to win seats in the house of representatives.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly,
women and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the
sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of
society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the
House of Representatives. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and
will give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in

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economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives.
Political parties can participate in the party-list elections through their sectoral wings. They cannot
directly participate because they neither lack well defined political constituencies nor represent
marginalized and undderpresented sectors.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack well-defined political
constituencies nor represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political
parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those
who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them the opportunity to have members in the
House of Representatives.
Political parties are allowed to participate in the party list elections through their sectoral wings in order
to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections
so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies. The participation of
major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House
of Representatives, of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking.
Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative
district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional,
women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
The qualification of a party-list nominee
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to
the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
THE NEW PARAMETERS TO BE FOLLOWED BY COMELEC
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking
in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

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5.

6.

A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized
and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees
of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or
that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC


Facts:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes
of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act
No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective
interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the
full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 19982001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of
office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then
faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed
performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B.
Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to
Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for
three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of
November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render
complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
Issue:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule;
and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section
43(b) of RA 7160
Held:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule
embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official
has title to office and can serve

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The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that
an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption
7
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis
of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation
as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and
executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1.
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office
is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term.(EXCEPTION)
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves
no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office
for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the
thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not
be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to
stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a
permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84
("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. 1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,"
which ends on 30 June 2004.
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao
del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected
Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of
six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President." Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and
Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because:
(1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645");
(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek
election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881; 5 and, consequently,

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(3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or
regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646
("R.A. No. 6646").
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended
petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an
amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and, in
addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on
petitioners' standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his
proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for
lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to
this case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14
May 2001 senatorial elections.
Issues:
W/N a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.

Held: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.


However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to amend
Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth
(13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr." Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless
expenditures and the voters further inconvenience.
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in
our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions
that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so
may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest
elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary
information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While
the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELEC's failure to so call
and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should
not take chances in future elections.
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the
Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus: In case of vacancy in
the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term
A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they
contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements
in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions 24 or even in its press releases
25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term Senate seat
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it

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would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the
special election.
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made
by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election's
validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without
any call by the body charged to administer the election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to
fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be
held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed
is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do
so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call
for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place
of the election.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call . . . a special election . . . not earlier than 60 days nor longer than
90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy" and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELEC's
failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy.
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by
the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of
proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate
the holding of the special election.
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special
senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in
our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of
the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for." Similarly,
petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section
4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is
misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of
candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
PHILCONSA VS MATHAY
G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa), non-stock, non-profit association, whose members
are Filipino citizens and taxpayers has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the
Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such
implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution which provides xxx No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such, increase. The reason given being that
the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have

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expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of
the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the
increase becomes effective?
RULING: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation
between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the
singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for
the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the
singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House,
underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that
the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before
the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative
until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will
have expired.
LIGOT VS MATHAY
G.R. No. L-34676 (April 30, 1974)
56 SCRA 823
FACTS: Petitioner LIGOT served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional
officials and certain other officials of the national government" was enacted into law and under section 7
thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman)
were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided
that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not
entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous
decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay "that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14,
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase."

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Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term having expired on
December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by R.A 4968
which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of
at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided
"in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of
pay as provided by law."
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in
petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its
supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim. Petitioner's request for reconsideration
was denied in due course. Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners claim for retirement gratuity be computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress.
RULING: No. Ligots contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act 4134
could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when the full term of
all members of Congress (House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have
expired, by virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is selfevident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969
such as petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as
provided by law" and the Constitution during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the
similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the
Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do
indirectly what can not be done directly."
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was already operative
when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969 cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned
for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation.
PEOPLE VS JALOSLOS
324 SCRA 689
FACTS: Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six

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counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion (Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge
Mandate As Member of House of Representatives) asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties
of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will. He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman.
He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that
it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be
heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges
a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general?
RULING: No. True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its
benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The privilege of immunity from arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication
or equitable considerations.
Section 11, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution provides A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations.
Aguinaldo doctrine does not apply to criminal cases.

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Neither can he rely on Aguinaldo doctrine. The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising
from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by
Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency
or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make
him a free man.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded.

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We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.
TRILLANES VS PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817
556 SCRA 471 (June 27, 2008)
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
Later that day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of
rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. A series of negotiations quelled the
teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that
evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup detat defined under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Close to four years later, Trillanes has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won
a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Before the commencement of his term, Trillanes filed an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" Among his requests were: (a) To be allowed
to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate xxx (d) To be allowed to give interviews
and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press, (e) With prior notice to the Honorable
Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters
and other members of the media who may wish to interview him. xxx
(NB: letters (b), (c), (f) were withdrawn upon his MR when the court denied this Omnibus Motion)
Trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The trial
court just the same denied the motion. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case.
(2) Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate as senator.
(3) Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners
who are held without bail as in the case of Former Pres. Estrada & Former ARMM Gov. Misuari.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case.

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Trillanes in attempting to strike a distinction between his case against Jaloslos argues that the latter was
already convicted albeit his conviction was pending appeal, whereas he is a mere detention prisoner. He
asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his
favor.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited
provisions apply equally to rape and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is
beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. The trial court thus correctly
concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. SC
categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more
precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only
signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of

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the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule
of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves.
Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been
charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur
Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." He harps on an alleged violation of the equal
protection clause.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on
these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
17 SCRA 876
FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money,
by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in
question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion
having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding
order of dismissal.
ISSUES: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not,
(2) whether it is libelous or not.
RULING:
(1) No. The publication is not a privileged communication.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the
House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that Article VI, Section
15 of the 1935 Constitution it states that The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives

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shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. The determination of the first
issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase
"speech or debate therein.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein,
it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress
presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the
trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
(2) Supreme Court are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for
damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein
alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano,
plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise,
added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they
may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. SC do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our
Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as
"planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public
hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations
are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the
same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said
communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to
stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned
passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup
d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
OSMEA VS PENDATUN
G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
109 PHI 863
FACTS: Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., filed a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity.

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HR 59 created a special committee to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the
Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960. Said charges
emanated from his one-hour privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted a
serious assault upon the dignity of Garcia as the then President.
Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and
third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule
XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had
uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by
the House.
The respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of
Congress to discipline its members with suspension
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Osmea parliamentary immunity was violated.
(2) Whether or not SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition.
RULING:
(1) There was no violation of Osmeas parliamentary immunity.
(2) SC has no jurisdiction.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for
words spoken in debate.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for
"it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense." Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as
construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in
doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because
the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual

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circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such
situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
LIBAN VS GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
593 SCRA 68
CASE: This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his seat in
the Senate.
FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with
this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners
are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman
of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that
by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member
of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board
of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v.
Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to
another government office.
Among others, Respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition which appears to
be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed an act which, by
provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office and further insists that the PNRC is
not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI
of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an
office nor an employment.
ISSUES:

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1. W/n petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled corporation;
3. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent who is
Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate
RULING: We find the petition without merit.
(1) Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition.
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto.
Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for
usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto,
specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that
he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In the present
case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have
no standing to file the present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayers suit, the petition
would still fail on the merits.
(2) PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, otherwise known as the PNRC
Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is
to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental
Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to
be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers
during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to
any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim
separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the
PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy.
Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend
to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.

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Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in
order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear
to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of
all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society. It is imperative that the
PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or
controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC
does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC
Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the
PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are
not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government
office.
(3) The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private
Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special charter on 22
March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government
or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would
be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private,
it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general
law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code,
except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
Although PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or
controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the
government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private
corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by
special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the
PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers, is
void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the PNRC
Charter, as amended, are void.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of

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the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
LIBAN VS GORDON (MOTION FOR RECON)
G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
639 SCRA 703
CASE: Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard
J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision),
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-intervenor Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC), and the latters Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper filed on
December 23, 2009.
FACTS: The Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
[5]
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC
Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled that the PNRC
should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Respondent raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95
was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding such issue; and (2) as the Court
decided that Petitioners did not have standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court
on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it was unnecessary for the
Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites Laurel v. Garcia, wherein the Court said that it will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be
disposed of on some other ground and goes on to claim that since this Court, in the Decision, disposed of
the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners, there was no need for it to delve
into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment should be deemed obiter.
ISSUE: Whether to sustain the constitutionality of the PNRC Chapter.
RULING: As correctly pointed out in respondents Motion, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was
not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was
not the very lis mota of the case.
This Court should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial
restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have
based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a

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consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after
more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August
16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No.
1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of structure,
but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the
international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis.
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
113 SCRA 31
CASE: This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
FACTS: An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private
corporation, was held where Puyat and his group won.
The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings,
questioning the election. They claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman,
Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional
grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman
could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body.
Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional
prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that, May 15, Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A.
Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run
for election as a Director. The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30 and was sought to be
registered on said date. The next day, May 31, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in
the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. It is
this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC
Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 11. No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a
court with appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case wherein the government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by, the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
RULING: Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to
be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the
petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in
the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of
262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25 before SEC and one
day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before
he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C.
Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he
decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of
the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in
the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually
to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be
pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
Election of Officers
Santiago vs Guingona 298 SCRA 756 (1998)
Facts:
During the election of officers of the Senate, Senator Santiago nominated Senator Tatad as Senate
President. Senator Ople, on the other hand, nominated Senator Fernan for the same position. Senator
Fernan was voted Senate President with a vote of 20-2.
Senator Ople was voted president pro tempore while Senator Drilon was voted majority leader.
Senator Tatad manifested that, as the only ones who voted for him were himself and Senator Santiago,
the two of them comprised the minority and that an agreement was entered into between them that
he will be the minority leader.
The Senate was grouped as follows:
10 members Laban ngMasang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United

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Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member AksyonDemokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent

23 total number of senators (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as "independent".)
According to Senator Flavier, the members of the Lakas NUCD-UMDP is also a minority since there are
only 7 members and that they had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Senator Guingona
was thereafter formally recognized by the Senate President as the minority leader.
A petition for quo warranto was filed by Senators Tatad and Santiago alleging that Senator Guingona had
been usurping ,unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the Senate President to recognize Senator Guingona as the
minority leader.
Held:
History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the political party
to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with
a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer to "the
group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not necessarily more than one half. This is
sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller
number of votes or adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesser would be the
minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which
is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multiparty system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several
minority parties, one of which has to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for
purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either
belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe
which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select
the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that
43
the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." To
our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
The Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there
an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of

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choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.
But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of
the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during
their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them." Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the
courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority.
Quorum
Avelino vs Cuenco 83 Phil 17 (1949)
Facts:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada requested that his right to
speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President
Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
However, on the day of the session, the opening of the session was delayed. He was not given the chance
to speak despite his attempts to claim his right to speak. A commotion broke outside the Senate gallery
which prompted them to adjourn. Nevertheless, Senator Tanada opposed the motion to adjourn. This led
Senate President Avelino and seven of his followers to leave and abandon the session. The remaining
senators continued the session which was then chaired by the Senate President Pro-Tempore.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it
to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position
of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of
the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.
Note: Except for Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United
States, all the Senator were present. 22 Senators were present at the opening of session.
Issue: Whether or not there was quorum?
Held:
The session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten
senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that
met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved
only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly,

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because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators
Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House does not
mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri
Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the
latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr.
Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be
no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there
would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this
decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino,
it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the
Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at
any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from
the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve
senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Rules of Proceedings
Arroyo vs de Venecia 277 SCRA 258 (1997)
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that
there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after
a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of

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the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
wassigned into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken
if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a
case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Garcillano vs HR Committee 575 SCRA 170 (2008)
Facts:
A few years ago, the Garci tapes (alleged conversation of GMA and Garcillano) became the subject of
Congressional hearings and joint investigation of different HR Committees. The hearings were indefinitely
suspended; however, the they decided to submit reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
4
Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees
be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in
their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House
5
Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of
Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
10
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the
Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
Held:

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The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of
the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general
45
th
circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 Congress, however,
of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
46
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section
21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published
rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules
of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before
it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates
membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
th
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Dela Paz vs Senate Committee 579 SCRA 521 (2009)
Facts:
On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National Police (PNP) officers
arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the International Criminal
Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the delegation was
Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to
retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.
On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow airport
departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately P6,930,000.00]
found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly
equivalent to P2,970,000.00).
Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP
delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government confiscated the euros.
On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting them were
subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for the investigation it was to conduct on the
Moscow incident on October 23, 2008.
On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of attending the hearing,
petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with
2
Motion to Quash Subpoena. Senator Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committees
jurisdiction and commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.

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Issue: whether or not the respondent Committee has jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident.
Held: Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this
power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.
Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:
12) Committee on Foreign Relations. Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to the relations of the
Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular services; the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all
international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow incident
involving petitioners is well within the respondent Committees jurisdiction.
Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee may
conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by
officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and
on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its attention by any of its members. It
is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP general
and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him
millions which may have been sourced from public funds.
Subsequent to Senator Santiagos verbal command to Balajadia to arrest petitioners, the Philippine
Senate issued a formal written Order of arrest, signed by ten (10) senators, with the Senate President
himself approving it, in accordance with the Senate Rules.
Discipline of Members
Alejandrino vs Quezon 46 Phil 63 (1924)
th
Senator Alejandrino, appointed by the Government General to represent the 12 Senatorial District, was
deprived of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from
the first of January, 1924. The resolution was adopted by herein respondents.
Senator Alejandrino prayed before the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents
enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null
and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction
against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as
Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from
preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of
suspension, into effect.
Issue: whether the court has jurisdiction over the matters prayed for by Alejandrino.
Held:
the general rule of mandamus is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a
coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie
against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely
legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they
have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of

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power. So it has been held that there where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the
courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement.
the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members
for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act,
sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may
expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the
power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the
power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that
neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the
Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not
authorize it to suspend on appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding
what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet
the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess
the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that this
conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of
all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a
credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of legislation and
of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against the Legislature and the Chief
Executive.
Osmena vs Pendatun 109 Phil 863 (1960)
Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida
K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of
infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them
to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do
so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up
other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened
after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be
subject to censure by the House.
Issue: whether or not the House has the authority to censure petitioner.

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Held:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This
section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that
country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or
civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than
Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize
the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate. its purpose "is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for
"it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense."
Issue: whether the House may still bring action against him when it had taken up other business after his
speech.
Held:
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, and such approval amounted to a suspension
of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited
number of members have agreed to a particular measure."
Issue: whether a speech attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct.
Held:
the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea
conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which
the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of
separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to
interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
and is supreme within its own sphere.
Santiago vs Sandiganbayan356 SCRA 636 (2001)
Facts:
Review of the act of Sandiganbayan in ordering the preventive suspension of Senator DefensorSantiago in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for her alleged violation of
RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

Issue:

Authority of the Sandiganbayan to issue to decree a 90-day preventive suspension of Senator


Santiago from any government position.

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Held:

It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the
validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form
and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and
there seems to be no ifs and buts about it.
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by
BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
Nature of preventive suspension it is not a penalty because it is not imposed in judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. (BayotvsSandiganbayan)
The Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as
the jurisprudence in which this Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to
decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each
xxx house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of its members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed shall not exceed sixty days.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Kahulugan

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Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569 (2005)
On June 2, 2004, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator in the May 10, 2004 National Elections. While failure of elections
were declared in some precincts, COMELEC reasoned that they would not materially affect the results.
Barbers, who ranked next to Biazon, filed a petition before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation.
When this was denied, he raised the issue before the Supreme Court. Does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction?
Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the
Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate.
The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barber contests Biazons proclamation as
the 12 winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers
complaint
Hernandez vs. HRET 2009
Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna in
the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his complete/exact address
as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta.
[5]
Rosa residence).
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046 (PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC
and the latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in
his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan,
Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in
[
Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District.

Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna in
the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his complete/exact address
as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta.
[5]
Rosa residence).
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046 (PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC
and the latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in

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his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan,
Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in
[6]
Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District. The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said
petition for lack of merit
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, docketed as HRET
CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners
[9]
election and proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.
Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner lacked the required
one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution

Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is
full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
[33]
Tribunals, which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the
winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office
[34]
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives.
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC
had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of
the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET,
when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is coequal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the
matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers
to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo
warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the
issue of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only
where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct
and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Mendoza vs. Comelc (2009)
Facts:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan vied ofr the position of Governor of the Province of
Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the
office
of
Governor.

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The
respondent
seasonably
filed
an
election
protest
with
the
COMELEC.
- Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts soon followed.
The
revision
was
conducted
at
COMELECs
office
in
Intamuros.
- Thereafter, both parties submitted their other evidences. The formal offer of evidences was approved
and
COMELEC
ordered
the
parties
to
submit
their
memoranda.
- Mendoza and Pagdanganan complied with the order and the case was then submitted for resolution.
- March 2, 2009: the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the
provincial
election
contest,
to
the
Senate
Electoral
Tribunal
(SET).
The
petitioner
filed
to
dismiss
further
proceedings.
- April 29, 2009: The motion filed by petitioner Mendoza was dismissed by COMELEC 2nd Division.
According to the latter, COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the
resolution of the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper
coordination
with
the
SET.
- The petitioner moved to reconsider the order but still COMELEC 2nd Division denied the motion on May
26,
2009.
- Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election contest within the SET
premises without notice to him and without his participation, the petitioners counsel wrote the SET
Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated June 10, 2009 to confirm the veracity of the reported
conduct
of
proceedings.
- The Secretary responded that the action was authorized by then Acting Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle.
- The petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests are judicial in
nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process specifically, (a) opportunity to be heard
and
(b)
that
judgment
be
rendered
only
after
lawful
hearing

apply.
- The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element of the
right
to
have
judgment
only
after
lawful
hearing
is
absent.
- Mendoza asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body should have
jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the proceedings (2nd issue).
- Private respondent Pagdanganan argues that the proceeding referred to by Mendoza was COMELECs
decision-making
process.
- Public respondent COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on whether it can
conduct appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody, the issue boils down to one of
discretion the authority of the COMELEC to control as it deems fit the processes or incidents of a
pending election protest.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings without giving due
notice to the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction in
appreciating ballots which are not in its official custody and are outside its own premises, authority and
control.
Held:
While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the legality of subsequent
COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our standard of review is grave abuse of discretion, a term that defies

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exact definition, but generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
After due consideration, the Supreme Court held that the petition is bereft of merit.
These are the powers of the COMELEC as mentioned by the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of
the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and the registration of voters.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC are the cardinal primary rights in
administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay Requirements 1-7).
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record
and
disclosed
to
the
parties
affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving
at
a
decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of
the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is to give an opportunity to explain ones side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of
COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the
standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the
right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of
the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or
submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a
subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.

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In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at the hearing and
deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an adversarial
contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make their presentations, and
controvert each others submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under
these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of
any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps it is
taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest. In the context of our
standard of review for the petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the
appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election
contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and
other election materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over
election protests involving provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be intruding into the COMELEC en banc
rule-making prerogative when the Second Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET
premises side by side with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down
any new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had previously enacted.
ABAYON PALPARAN VS THE HRET
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat Tayoand
Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over
the Party list, and its representatives. HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the
nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC
Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners..
HELD: Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners
Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under
their
internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5,Article VI of
the Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of districts and party
list Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House of
Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end,would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds
for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.It is for the

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HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be
a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that
characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay , respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld
its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan

Layug vs. Comelec (2012)


Facts: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and
3
concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No. 10-016[DCN]) Buhay Party-List from
participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that
Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified
4
from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , as well as Section
5
6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 , otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither
does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El
Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required
6
of party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 , the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections. On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
3
Resolution denying the petition for lack of substantial evidence.
Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the COMELEC En
Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve him, his representatives or
counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was only on July 26, 2010, after learning about it in
4
the newspapers, that he personally secured a copy of the Resolution from the COMELEC. His motion for
5
reconsideration, however, was denied by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order dated August 4, 2010
for being filed out of time.
Held:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdisdiction
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected
from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
1
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two

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seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William
Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had
not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the
issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested
by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.Section 6 of said Act states that the
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
1
coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided
2
under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
3
Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec (2012)
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and
lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In
September 2008 he began occupying the house. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the
May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel
[7]
his COC before the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC
when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En
Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the
residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del
Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place
to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the COMELECs finding that
he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of his right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting
[15]
elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution
vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
[16]
House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that
of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
[17]
proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from
the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no
final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he
sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs

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Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue
any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his
proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged
lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been
[18]
proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Tanada vs. Cuenco
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied
by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET
would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3
justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only
one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by
the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be
dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Held:
Although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall
form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised.
Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines.
Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted
by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of
an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in
the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a
resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former
Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and
annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without
inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating
the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.
Abbas vs. SET (1988)
Facts:
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of
the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by

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the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the
resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly
share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution
of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not
to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is
that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
Pimentel, Jr. v. HRET, 393 SCRA 231 (2002)
During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13 organizations were
proclaimed winners.
Subsequently, the house of Representatives constituted the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12 members to represent it in the Commission on
Appointments. No one from the party-list was named to either constitutional body. Petitioner now seeks
the inclusion of party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing that under the Constitution, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats in the CA based on
proportional representation.

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Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the Senate exercise the power
to choose who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 slots of their respective electoral
tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments. Thus, even assuming that party-list
representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests with the House, not with the Court. The discretion of the
House to choose the members is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory rule on proportional
representation. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent
a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that
the House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET or the CA. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is premature.

Codilla vs. Comelec (2002)


Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin was
th
the incumbent representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May
th
2001 elections for the position of representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification against petitioner
alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the city government of Ormoc to
extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the
purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order delegating the hearing
and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII.
The same division sent notice to the petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case. Eventually, petitioner
was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial results showed that petitioner was the winning
candidate.
Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with the COMELEC
Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt
was attached thereto. She also filed a second motion, a copy of which was sent to petitioner with the
corresponding registry receipt; however, theres no indication when petitioner received the motion.
The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b) the Regional Election Director to speed up the
reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete records together with its
recommendation to the office of the Clerk of the Commission. At this time, petitioner has yet to be
summoned to answer the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of the
Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his right to rebut and refute the allegations
against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he
received the telegraph order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after

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it was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification.
The same order declared the votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the
immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was proclaimed, took her oath of
th
office, and assumed office as the duly elected representative of the 4 district of Leyte. A copy of the said
Resolution was sent by fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a petition for
declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the COMELEC en banc (a) reversed
the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared the proclamation of respondent null and void.
Respondent did not appeal from this decision.
th

Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4 district of Leyte.
Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the Ormoc Regional Trial Court. Petitioner
wrote a letter-appeal to the House of Representatives through respondent De Venecia, but no action was
taken by the latter. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1.
2.
3.

WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.


WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction
to review its validity.
WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the petitioner as the
th
legally elected representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte.

Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a
party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and respondent cannot be
validly proclaimed on that basis.
The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be
considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC Second
Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and
ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor.
Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled doctrine that the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration
and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office
a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be
declared elected in his place.

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2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its
jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet
enforceable as it has not attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office
th
of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 Legislative district of Leyte. For these
reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the
administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents because of the
following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest number of votes; the order of the COMELEC
Second Division, which ordered the proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en
banc which ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc was not
challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.

Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569 (2005)


On June 2, 2004, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator in the May 10, 2004 National Elections. While failure of elections
were declared in some precincts, COMELEC reasoned that they would not materially affect the results.
Barbers, who ranked next to Biazon, filed a petition before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation.
When this was denied, he raised the issue before the Supreme Court. Does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction?
Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the
Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate.
The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barber contests Biazons proclamation as
the 12 winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers
complaint
Hernandez vs. HRET 2009
Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna in
the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his complete/exact address
as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta.
[5]
Rosa residence).
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046 (PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC

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and the latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in
his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan,
Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in
[
Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District.
Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna in
the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his complete/exact address
as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta.
[5]
Rosa residence).
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046 (PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC
and the latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in
his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan,
Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in
[6]
Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District. The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said
petition for lack of merit
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, docketed as HRET
CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners
[9]
election and proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.
Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner lacked the required
one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution

Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is
full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
[33]
Tribunals, which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the
winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office
[34]
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives.
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC
had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of
the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.

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Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET,
when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is coequal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the
matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers
to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo
warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the
issue of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only
where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct
and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Mendoza vs. Comelc (2009)
Facts:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan vied ofr the position of Governor of the Province of
Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the
office
of
Governor.
The
respondent
seasonably
filed
an
election
protest
with
the
COMELEC.
- Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts soon followed.
The
revision
was
conducted
at
COMELECs
office
in
Intamuros.
- Thereafter, both parties submitted their other evidences. The formal offer of evidences was approved
and
COMELEC
ordered
the
parties
to
submit
their
memoranda.
- Mendoza and Pagdanganan complied with the order and the case was then submitted for resolution.
- March 2, 2009: the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the
provincial
election
contest,
to
the
Senate
Electoral
Tribunal
(SET).
The
petitioner
filed
to
dismiss
further
proceedings.
- April 29, 2009: The motion filed by petitioner Mendoza was dismissed by COMELEC 2nd Division.
According to the latter, COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the
resolution of the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper
coordination
with
the
SET.
- The petitioner moved to reconsider the order but still COMELEC 2nd Division denied the motion on May
26,
2009.
- Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election contest within the SET
premises without notice to him and without his participation, the petitioners counsel wrote the SET
Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated June 10, 2009 to confirm the veracity of the reported
conduct
of
proceedings.
- The Secretary responded that the action was authorized by then Acting Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle.
- The petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests are judicial in
nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process specifically, (a) opportunity to be heard
and
(b)
that
judgment
be
rendered
only
after
lawful
hearing

apply.
- The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element of the
right
to
have
judgment
only
after
lawful
hearing
is
absent.
- Mendoza asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body should have
jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the proceedings (2nd issue).
- Private respondent Pagdanganan argues that the proceeding referred to by Mendoza was COMELECs

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decision-making
process.
- Public respondent COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on whether it can
conduct appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody, the issue boils down to one of
discretion the authority of the COMELEC to control as it deems fit the processes or incidents of a
pending election protest.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings without giving due
notice to the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction in
appreciating ballots which are not in its official custody and are outside its own premises, authority and
control.
Held:
While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the legality of subsequent
COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our standard of review is grave abuse of discretion, a term that defies
exact definition, but generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
After due consideration, the Supreme Court held that the petition is bereft of merit.
These are the powers of the COMELEC as mentioned by the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of
the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and the registration of voters.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC are the cardinal primary rights in
administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay Requirements 1-7).
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record
and
disclosed
to
the
parties
affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving
at
a
decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

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The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of
the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is to give an opportunity to explain ones side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of
COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the
standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the
right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of
the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or
submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a
subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at the hearing and
deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an adversarial
contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make their presentations, and
controvert each others submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under
these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of
any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps it is
taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest. In the context of our
standard of review for the petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the
appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election
contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and
other election materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over
election protests involving provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be intruding into the COMELEC en banc
rule-making prerogative when the Second Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET
premises side by side with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down
any new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had previously enacted.
ABAYON PALPARAN VS THE HRET
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat Tayoand
Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over
the Party list, and its representatives. HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the
nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC
Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners..

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HELD: Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners
Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under
their
internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5,Article VI of
the Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of districts and party
list Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House of
Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end,would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds
for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.It is for the
HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be
a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that
characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay , respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld
its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan

Layug vs. Comelec (2012)


Facts: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and
3
concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No. 10-016[DCN]) Buhay Party-List from
participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that
Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified
4
from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , as well as Section
5
6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 , otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither
does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El
Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required
6
of party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 , the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections. On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
3
Resolution denying the petition for lack of substantial evidence.
Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the COMELEC En
Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve him, his representatives or
counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was only on July 26, 2010, after learning about it in
4
the newspapers, that he personally secured a copy of the Resolution from the COMELEC. His motion for
5
reconsideration, however, was denied by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order dated August 4, 2010
for being filed out of time.

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Held:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdisdiction
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected
from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
1
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two
seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William
Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had
not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the
issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested
by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.Section 6 of said Act states that the
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
1
coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided
2
under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
3
Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec (2012)
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and
lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In
September 2008 he began occupying the house. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the
May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel
[7]
his COC before the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC
when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En
Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the
residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del
Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place

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to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the COMELECs finding that
he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of his right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting
[15]
elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution
vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
[16]
House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that
of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
[17]
proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from
the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no
final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he
sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs
Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue
any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his
proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged
lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been
[18]
proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Tanada vs. Cuenco
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied
by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET
would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3
justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only
one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by
the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be
dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Held:
Although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall
form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised.
Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines.
Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted

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by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of
an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in
the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a
resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former
Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and
annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without
inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating
the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.
Abbas vs. SET (1988)
Facts:
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of
the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by
the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the
resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly
share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution
of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not
to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience

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dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is
that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
Pimentel, Jr. v. HRET, 393 SCRA 231 (2002)
During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13 organizations were
proclaimed winners.
Subsequently, the house of Representatives constituted the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12 members to represent it in the Commission on
Appointments. No one from the party-list was named to either constitutional body. Petitioner now seeks
the inclusion of party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing that under the Constitution, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats in the CA based on
proportional representation.
Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the Senate exercise the power
to choose who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 slots of their respective electoral
tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments. Thus, even assuming that party-list
representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests with the House, not with the Court. The discretion of the
House to choose the members is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory rule on proportional
representation. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent
a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that
the House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET or the CA. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is premature.
Codilla vs. Comelec (2002)
Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin was
th
the incumbent representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May
th
2001 elections for the position of representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification against petitioner
alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the city government of Ormoc to
extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the
purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order delegating the hearing
and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII.
The same division sent notice to the petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case. Eventually, petitioner
was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial results showed that petitioner was the winning
candidate.

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Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with the COMELEC
Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt
was attached thereto. She also filed a second motion, a copy of which was sent to petitioner with the
corresponding registry receipt; however, theres no indication when petitioner received the motion.
The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b) the Regional Election Director to speed up the
reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete records together with its
recommendation to the office of the Clerk of the Commission. At this time, petitioner has yet to be
summoned to answer the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of the
Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his right to rebut and refute the allegations
against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he
received the telegraph order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after
it was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification.
The same order declared the votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the
immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was proclaimed, took her oath of
th
office, and assumed office as the duly elected representative of the 4 district of Leyte. A copy of the said
Resolution was sent by fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a petition for
declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the COMELEC en banc (a) reversed
the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared the proclamation of respondent null and void.
Respondent did not appeal from this decision.
th

Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4 district of Leyte.
Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the Ormoc Regional Trial Court. Petitioner
wrote a letter-appeal to the House of Representatives through respondent De Venecia, but no action was
taken by the latter. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1.
2.
3.

WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.


WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction
to review its validity.
WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the petitioner as the
th
legally elected representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte.

Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a
party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.

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Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and respondent cannot be
validly proclaimed on that basis.
The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be
considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC Second
Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and
ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor.
Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled doctrine that the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration
and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office
a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be
declared elected in his place.
2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its
jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet
enforceable as it has not attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office
th
of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 Legislative district of Leyte. For these
reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the
administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents because of the
following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest number of votes; the order of the COMELEC
Second Division, which ordered the proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en
banc which ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc was not
challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.
HON. WALDO FLORES, in his capacity as Senior capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office
of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of
the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) vs ATTY. ANTONIO
MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
(I sincerely apologize na taas ni, procedural ang case. Please focus on the Doctrine of Nondelegation of Powers)
Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as Regional Director II
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando, Pampanga.
On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a concerned citizen
dated January 20, 2003 relating Montemayors ostentatious lifestyle which is apparently
disproportionate to his income as a public official. The letter was referred to Dario C. Rama,

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Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) for appropriate action. The
Investigating Office of the PAGC immediately conducted a fact-finding inquiry into the matter
and issued subpoenas duces tecum to the responsible personnel of the BIR and the Land
Transportation Office (LTO). In compliance with the subpoena, BIR Personnel Division Chief
Estelita Datu submitted to the PAGC a copy of Montemayors appointment papers along with a
certified true copy of the latters Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year
2002. Meanwhile, the LTO, through its Records Section Chief, Ms. Arabelle O. Petilla, furnished
the PAGC with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor, to wit: a 2001 Ford Expedition, a
1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, and a 1983 Mitsubishi Galant.
During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, a
media organization which had previously published an article on the unexplained wealth of
certain BIR officials, also submitted to the PAGC copies of Montemayors SSAL for the years 1999,
2000 and 2001. In Montemayors 1999 and 2000 SSAL, the PAGC noted that Montemayor
declared his ownership over several motor vehicles, but failed to do the same in his 2001 SSAL.
On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Charge against Montemayor on
May 19, 2003 for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019in relation to Section 8 (A)
of RA No. 6713 due to his failure to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging from
1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser with an estimated value of 1
million to 1.2 million pesos in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. The charge was docketed as PAGC-ADM0149-03. On the same date, the PAGC issued an Order directing Montemayor to file his counteraffidavit or verified answer to the formal charge against him within ten (10) days from the receipt
of the Order. Montemayor, however, failed to submit his counter-affidavit or verified answer to
the formal charge lodged against him.
On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference, Montemayor, through counsel, moved for
the deferment of the administrative proceedings explaining that he has filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA questioning the PAGCs jurisdiction to conduct the administrative
investigation against him. The PAGC denied Montemayors motion for lack of merit, and instead
gave him until June 9, 2003 to submit his counter-affidavit or verified answer. Still, no answer
was filed.
On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285
enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation for sixty (60) days. On September 12,
2003, shortly after the expiration of the sixty (60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolution finding
Montemayor administratively liable as charged and recommending to the Office of the President
Montemayors dismissal from the service.
On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through Deputy Executive Secretary Arthur P.
Autea, issued a Decision adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of the PAGC.
Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision. This time, he argued that he was
denied his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate his case
notwithstanding the pendency of his petition for certiorari before the CA, and its subsequent
elevation to the Supreme Court. The motion was eventually denied.
Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE PAGC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL FROM
THE SERVICE;

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WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OF ITS JURISDICTION TO


INVESTIGATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE DEPRIVED THE PAGC [WITH ITS
JURISDICTION] FROM PROCEEDING WITH ITS INVESTIGATION.

RULING:
The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to speedily address the
problem on corruption and abuses committed in the government, particularly by officials
appointed by the President. Under Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, the PAGC has the power to
investigate and hear administrative complaints provided (1) that the official to be investigated
must be a presidential appointee in the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
and (2) that the said official must be occupying the position of assistant regional director, or an
equivalent rank, or higher.
Respondent contends that he was deprived of his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded
to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents
supporting the complainants assertions.
Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous
complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based
on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to
engender a belief that the allegations may be true. Respondent also assails the PAGCs decision
to proceed with the investigation process without giving him the opportunity to present
controverting evidence.
We find nothing irregular with the PAGCs decision to proceed with its investigation
notwithstanding the pendency of Montemayors petition for certiorari before the CA. The filing
of a petition for certiorari with the CA did not divest the PAGC of its jurisdiction validly acquired
over the case before it.
First, it must be remembered that the PAGCs act of issuing the assailed resolution enjoys the
presumption of regularity particularly since it was done in the performance of its official duties.
Mere surmises and conjectures, absent any proof whatsoever, will not tilt the balance against
the presumption, if only to provide constancy in the official acts of authorized government
personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing of the issuance of the assailed PAGC resolution by
itself cannot be used to discredit, much less nullify, what appears on its face to be a regular
performance of the PAGCs duties.
Second, Montemayors argument, as well as the CAs observation that respondent was not
afforded a second opportunity to present controverting evidence, does not hold water. The
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the
party is given the opportunity to explain his side, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with.
Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an order informing Montemayor of the
formal charge filed against him and gave him ten (10) days within which to present a counteraffidavit or verified answer. When the said period lapsed without respondent asking for an
extension, the PAGC gave Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day period to file his answer, but the
latter chose to await the decision of the CA in his petition for certiorari. During the preliminary
conference, Montemayor was again informed that he is given a new ten (10)-day period, or until
June 19, 2003 within which to file his memorandum/position paper as well as supporting
evidence with a warning that if he still fails to do so, the complaint shall be deemed submitted

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for resolution on the basis of available documentary evidence on record. Again, the deadline
lapsed without any evidence being presented by Montemayor in his defense.
We stress that the PAGCs findings and recommendations remain as recommendations until
finally acted upon by the Office of the President. Montemayor, therefore, had two (2) choices
upon the issuance of the PAGC resolution: to move for a reconsideration thereof, or to ask for
another opportunity before the Office of the President to present his side particularly since the
assailed resolution is merely recommendatory in nature. Having failed to exercise any of these
two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be allowed to seek recourse before this Court for the
consequences of his own shortcomings.
o The cases filed against respondent before the Ombudsman were initiated after the
Office of the President decided to dismiss Montemayor. More importantly, the
proceedings before the PAGC were already finished even prior to the initiation and filing
of cases against him by the Ombudsman. In fact, it was the PAGCs findings and
recommendations which served as the basis in the Office of the Presidents decision to
dismiss Montemayor from government service. Clearly then, the exercise by the Office
of the President of its concurrent investigatory and prosecutorial power over
Montemayor had already been terminated even before the Ombudsman could take
cognizance over the matter. The Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take over a task that is
already a fait accompli.
As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGCs recommendation to dismiss Montemayor
from government service is supported by substantial evidence, we find in favor of petitioners.

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,


vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARYEDUARDO ERMITA
FACTS:

There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were
circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center
and Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two
of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam
results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the
successful examinees.

President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules
and Regulations).

Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review


centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving
permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and
professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno
however believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate
of EO 566.

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A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner
filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude independent review center
from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to
tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs coverage to
public and private institutions of higher education.

In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of
independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said
Executive Order No.566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI,
tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.

Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the
annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative
power, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other
organizations/institutions were granted by the Court.

On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s.
2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review centers
to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC
resolved torequire the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the
RIRR, and CMO 21, s.2008.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands theCHEDs jurisdiction; and
2.
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
HELD:
1.
Yes, it expands CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconstitutional. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR
clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to
public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private
post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the
regulation of review centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows
that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance
the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in
preparation for the licensure examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program
that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
A review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered "programs x x x of higher
learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as
"education beyond the secondary level or "education provided by a college or university." Further, the
"similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services" in areas not covered by
licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not limited to, college entrance
examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly
qualify as programs of higher learning.
2.
Yes, it is invalid. The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book
III of EO (invoked by theOSG to justify GMAs action) requires legislation; as the provision clearly states

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that the exercise of the Presidents other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law."
There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has
no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. The line
that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under
the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested
this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition,
is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.The President has
control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of
itsofficials. Corollary to the power of control, he is granted administrative power. Administrative power is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise
of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of
rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its
jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities.
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:

Before us is respondents Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated April 2, 2009 which
granted the consolidated petitions of petitioner Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court
of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby (1) restrained from collecting from
petitioner the amount of P28,413,783.00 representing the transitional input tax credit due it for the
fourth quarter of 1996; and (2) directed to refund to petitioner the amount of P347,741,695.74 paid as
output VAT for the third quarter of 1997 in light of the persisting transitional input tax credit available to
petitioner for the said quarter, or to issue a tax credit corresponding to such amount. No pronouncement
as to costs.

The Motion for Reconsideration raises the following arguments:


1.
Section 100 of the Old National Internal Revenue Code (old NIRC), as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7716, could not have supplied the distinction between the treatment of real properties or real
estate dealers on the one hand, and the treatment of transactions involving other commercial goods on
the other hand, as said distinction is found in Section 105 and, subsequently, Revenue Regulations No. 7-

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95 which defines the input tax creditable to a real estate dealer who becomes subject to vat for the first
time.
2.
Section 4.105.1 and paragraph (a) (iii) of the transitory provisions of revenue regulations no. 7-95
validly limit the 8% transitional input tax to the improvements on real properties.
3.
Revenue Regulations no. 6-97 did not repeal Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.
ISSUE: Whether or not
properties.

allowable transitional input tax credit is limited to improvements on real

HELD: The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit.

The first VAT law, found in Executive Order (EO) No. 273 [1987], took effect on January 1, 1988. It
amended several provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Old NIRC). EO 273 likewise
accommodated the potential burdens of the shift to the VAT system by allowing newly VAT-registered
persons to avail of a transitional input tax credit as provided for in Section 105 of the Old NIRC.

RA 7716 took effect on January 1, 1996. It amended Section 100 of the Old NIRC by imposing for
the first time value-added-tax on sale of real properties. The amendment reads:
Sec. 100. Value-added-tax on sale of goods or properties. (a) Rate and base of tax. There shall be
levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax
equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods, or properties sold,
bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor.(1) The term 'goods or properties'
shall mean all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include:
(A) Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or
business; xxx

The provisions of Section 105 of the NIRC, on the transitional input tax credit, remain intact
despite the enactment of RA 7716. Section 105 however was amended with the passage of the new
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (New NIRC), also officially known as Republic Act (RA) 8424. The
provisions on the transitional input tax credit are now embodied in Section 111(A) of the New NIRC.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) disallowed Fort Bonifacio Development


Corporations (FBDC) presumptive input tax credit arising from the land inventory on the basis of Revenue
Regulation 7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue Memorandum Circular 3-96 (RMC 3-96).

However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax shall be the
improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or
after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988). The transitional input tax shall be 8% of the value of the
inventory or actual VAT paid, whichever is higher, which amount may be allowed as tax credit against the
output tax of the VAT-registered person.

In the April 2, 2009 Decision sought to be reconsidered, the Court struck down Section 4.105-1 of
RR 7-95 for being in conflict with the law. It held that the CIR had no power to limit the meaning and
coverage of the term "goods" in Section 105 of the Old NIRC sans statutory authority or basis and
justification to make such limitation. This it did when it restricted the application of Section 105 in the
case of real estate dealers only to improvements on the real property belonging to their beginning
inventory.

A law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole
law. It is the cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statutes clauses and phrases must not be taken
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be

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interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

In construing a statute, courts have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole;
construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; consider each
and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute; and endeavor to make
every part effective, harmonious and sensible.

The statutory definition of the term "goods or properties" leaves no room for doubt. It states:
Sec. 100. Value-added tax on sale of goods or properties. (a) Rate and base of tax. xxx. (1) The term
goods or properties shall mean all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary
estimation and shall include: (A) Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in
the ordinary course of trade or business; xxx.

The term "goods or properties" by the unambiguous terms of Section 100 includes "real
properties held primarily for sale to costumers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business."
Having been defined in Section 100 of the NIRC, the term "goods" as used in Section 105 of the same code
could not have a different meaning. Goods, as commonly understood in the business sense, refers to the
product which the VAT-registered person offers for sale to the public. With respect to real estate dealers,
it is the real properties themselves which constitute their "goods." Such real properties are the operating
assets of the real estate dealer.

However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax shall be the
improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or
after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988).

As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code, an administrative rule or regulation cannot


contravene the law on which it is based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section 105 insofar as the definition
of the term "goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act beyond the authority of the CIR and the
Secretary of Finance. The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the
product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect
of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the objects and
purposes of the law, and should not be in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law.

To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of
the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is
intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void. While
administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue regulations to implement
statutes, they are without authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than what it provides, or
extend or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit provisions of the law.
Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of
Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative
ruling, the basic law prevails.

To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of transitional


input tax credit under Section 105 is a nullity. It is clear, therefore, that the allowable transitional input tax
credit is not limited to improvements on real properties. The particular provision of RR 7-95 has
effectively been repealed by RR 6-97 which is now in consonance with Section 100 of the NIRC, insofar as
the definition of real properties as goods is concerned. The failure to add a specific repealing clause would
not necessarily indicate that there was no intent to repeal RR 7-95. The fact that the aforequoted

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paragraph was deleted created an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the provisions of
RR 6-97 and RR 7-95
VICTORIA GUTIERREZ
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM)
FACTS:

These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and fringe benefits into
the standardized salary rates for offices in the national government, state universities and colleges, and
local government units as required by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and
implemented through the challenged National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59).

Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government employees. Its Section 12
directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being enjoyed by
employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that
the employees may be receiving from such consolidation.

Pursuant thereto, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC 59 dated
September 30, 1989, covering the offices of the national government, state universities and colleges, and
local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the specific allowances and additional compensations which
were deemed integrated in the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and
Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on May 3, 2004.

The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10 dated October 2, 1989, covering
all government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. The DBM reissued this circular on February 15, 1999 and published it on March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the payments of honoraria and other allowances which were
deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates. Employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its non-publication.

Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001, clarifying
that only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue to be granted the
employees; all others were deemed integrated in the standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of
allowances and compensation such as COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which were
already deemed integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized.

On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of integrating their COLA into their standardized
salary rates. Employees of other offices of the national government followed suit. In addition, petitioners
in G.R. 159007 questioned the disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits that the COA auditing
personnel assigned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) used to get. Petitioners in G.R.
173119 questioned the disallowance of the ICA that used to be paid to the officials and employees of the
Insurance Commission.

On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502 which provided that all
Supreme Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including COLA, of government employees under
R.A. 6758 applied only to specific government-owned or controlled corporations since the consolidated
cases covering the national government employees are still pending with this Court. Consequently, the
payment of allowances and other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA, remained prohibited until
otherwise provided by law or ruled by this Court. The circular further said that all agency heads and other

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responsible officials and employees found to have authorized the grant of COLA and other allowances and
benefits already integrated in the basic salary shall be personally held liable for such payment.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation nullifies the integration of the COLA into the standardized salary rates;
and
HELD:
1.
Petitioners argue that since CCC 10 dated October 2, 1989 covering all government-owned or
controlled corporations and government financial institutions was ineffective until its re-issuance and
publication on March 16, 1999, its counterpart, NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 covering the offices of
the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units should also be
regarded as ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on May 3, 2004. Thus, the COLA should not be
deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates from 1989 to 2004. Respondents counter that the
fact that NCC 59 was not published should not be considered as an obstacle to the integration of COLA
into the standardized salary rates. Accordingly, Budget Circular 2001-03, insofar as it reiterates NCC 59,
should not be treated as ineffective since it merely reaffirms the fact of consolidation of COLA into the
employees salary as mandated by Section 12 of R.A. 6758.
It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform
the public of its contents before their rights and interests are affected by the same. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates is not
dependent on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This benefit is deemed included in the standardized
salary rates of government employees since it falls under the general rule of integrationall
allowances.
More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it was factually integrated into the
employees salaries. Records show that the government employees were informed by their respective
offices of their new position titles and their corresponding salary grades when they were furnished with
the Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA). The NPASA provided the breakdown of
the employees gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the composition of his standardized pay
under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was considered part of the employees monthly income.
In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a consequence of the consolidation of
COLA into their standardized salary rates. There is thus nothing in these cases which can be the subject of
a back pay since the amount corresponding to COLA was never withheld from petitioners in the first
place.
Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation does not nullify the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates upon the effectivity
of R.A. 6758. The validity of R.A. 6758 should not be made to depend on the validity of its implementing
rules.

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COCOFED VS REPUBLIC 663 SCRA 514 (2012)


FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The
source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. The Philippine Coconut
Administration was tasked to collect and administer the Fund. Out of the 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at
the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized national association of coconut producers declared by the
PCA. Cocofund receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller. During the Martial Law regime,
then President Ferdinand Marcos issued several Presidential Decrees purportedly for the improvement of
the coconut industry. The most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund
for theacquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution of the
shares of the stock of the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the coconut farmers (Sec.2).
Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUBs outstanding capital stock or 137,866 shares at P200 per share
(P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut farmers. The rest of the Fund was
deposited to the UCPB interest free. Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA
were given their corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million worth of COCOFUND receipts
were registered and a large number of the coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares to
private individuals. Simply put, parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various
projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments through the years.
After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1which created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to
file cases for sequestration in the Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of
stock in the UCPB registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA.
TheSandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the Coconut
Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 1 and 2 of PD No. 755 (and some other PDs)
were unconstitutional.
Now, petitioners come to this Court contending that, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
concluding that Section 1 of PD No. 755 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it
authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB shares to
the coconut farmers. Section 1 of PD 755 was complete in itself, prescribed sufficient standards that
circumscribed the discretion of the PCA and merely authorized the PCA to fill matters of detail an
execution through promulgated rules and regulations
ISSUE: WON Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
RULING: YES. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. This decree authorizes
PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy
the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition of such bank.
Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who

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plants a single coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB
shares? If so, how many shares shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as
to the number of shares a farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined
by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the disposition
of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement of the
national policy declared under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to accelerate the growth and development of the
coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development. The said law gratuitously gave away
public funds to private individuals, and converted them exclusively into private property without any
restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose. Conversely, the
private individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to dispose of them by sale or any
other mode from the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any guideline,
standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that
would ensure that the same will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut
industry pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte
blanche to distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full
disposition of such shares to private individuals in their private capacity without any conditions or
restrictions that would advance the laws national policy or public purpose, present a case of undue
delegation of legislative power.
Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation
G.R. No 179579, February 1, 2012
Facts:
The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as (1)importer or consignee;
(2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and depending on these factors, wheat would be classified
further as either food grade with a tariff rate of 3% or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%.
The regulation also provides for an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity
descriptions and countries of origin. On December 19, 2003, the respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas contending the following: (1) the regulation
was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation
classified them to be a feed grade supplier without prior assessment and examination, (3)the equal
protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated the non-flour millers
differently from flour millers for no reason at all, and(4) the retroactive application of the regulation is
confiscatory. The petitioners thereafter filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) the RTC does not
have jurisdiction of the subject matter, (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper,(3) CM 27-2003
was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of the respondent
were speculative and premature.
On March10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision ruling in favour of the
respondent. It held that, on matters relating to the validity of the regulation, the court held that the
regulation is invalid because the basic requirements of hearing and publication were not complied with.
The petitioners then appealed to Court of Appeals but it was, however, dismissed. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: WON the issuance of CMO 27-2003 is valid?
Held:

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Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is invalid. The Commissioner of
Customs (1) violated the right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when he failed to observe
the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code, (2) violated the right to equal protection of laws
when he provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation, and (3) went
beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer
to examine and assess imported articles.
CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law
Center. For tariff purposes, CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. This is a violation of the equal protection clause
under the Constitution. The Court does not see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it,
where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food
grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to
7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade
wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The
regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that the customs officer must first
assess and determine the classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed.
Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer
had the chance to examine it. Finally, Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the
Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs
officers prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so
that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of
the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House.
During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum.
But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There
being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is
thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

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Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members
of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open
to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.
ABAKADA vs PURISIMA
1
FACTS: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or
reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in
the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or
his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her
Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two
representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by
their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees
whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria
adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions,
including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and
issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose.

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Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed
upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It
ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power
on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
ISSUE: WON Section 12 of RA 9335 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House
of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at
least two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight
Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter
become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May
22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition
for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
52
presentment.
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
53
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which
consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative
power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two
chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto,
both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become
a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of
the members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)

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Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making
under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto
is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if
approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
54
55
Congress. Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President. As summarized by Justice
56
57
Isagani Cruz and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. , the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for some
measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by the
Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same
nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a
committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in
its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most
important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at
least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes
and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three
readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference
58
committee representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and
the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the
59
signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication.
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to
sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the
legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and
obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
61
requisite of publication under the due process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is
62
wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and
the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role
of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

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Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there
may be similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court
refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case
assailing those provisions is brought before us
SENATE vs ERMITA
FACTS: The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray
for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
2
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations dated September 22,
2005 to the officials of the AFP. Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005
was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
7
Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of
E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at
the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of
the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from
the President."
On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga
sent a letter to Senator Biazon informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the
Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or
Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has
been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."

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Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation
scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan
and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings.
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari
and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the
resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it
has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public
interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and
prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue
Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to
the hearings but most of them failed to attend having invoked E.O. 464.
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 21 and 22 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution
RULING:
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two
provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through
the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage
of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads possession of any
information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under
Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the
question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President,
or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard
by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article
VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis Section 21 which
provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." An excerpt
of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows that the framers were aware that these two
provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is
a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers

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accountable for their acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in
Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973
Constitution which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the
parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the
legislature and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National
Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in
the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before
their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the
confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet may be changed.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the
question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of
powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from
the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear
in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit
information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question
period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive information in the performance of its legislative
function becomes more imperative.
As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the
Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of departments and
agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a
parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive
branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the
executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are
adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive
branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the
nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made
reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is
intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive
information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of
most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex
gratia by the executive. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is

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"in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and
the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a coequal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the
basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional
independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker
Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.
LEGUIN
MANTE
MANZANO
CIR v. CA, CTA & YMCA, 298 SCRA 83.
Facts: YMCA is a non- stock, non- profit institution that conducts various programs and activities which
are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and
charitable objectives. Thus, YMCA declared itself as charitable and, at the same time, educational
institution.
In conjunction with its operation, YMCA is, on the other hand, earning revenues from its leased
spaces to other private individuals and parking fees from non- members, among others.
In 1980, YMCA generated, inter alia, an income of P676,829.80 from rentals of the leased
premises, and P44,259.00 from parking fees on non- members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued an
assessment to YMCA.
Issue: Is the income derived from the rentals of real property owned by YMCA established as a
welfare, educational and charitable non- profit corporation- subject to income tax under the National
Internal Revenue Code and the Constitution?
HELD:

Section 27 of the NIRC, viz:

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Exemptions from Tax on Corporation.- The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in
respect to income received by them as suchxxx

xxx

xxx

(g) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare;
(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other non- profitable
purposes, not part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or member.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and character
of the foregoing organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities
conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax
imposed under this Code (As amended by P. D. No. 1457).
A reading of said paragraph ineludibly shows that the income from any property of exempt
organization, as well as the arising from any activity it conducts for profit, is taxable. The phrase any of
their activities conducted for profit does not qualify the word properties. This makes income from the
property of the organization taxable, regardless of how that income is used- whether for profit or for lofty
non- profit purposes.
Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides exemption not the institution
itself, but from real estate taxes of all lands, buildings and improvement actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.
Neither an exemption be given in light of Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Charter. We
reiterate thatYMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from
its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non- stock, non- profit educational institution is
insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of the income tax.
To avail of the exemption, YMCA must prove by substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the
classification non- stock, non- profit educational institution; and, (2) the income it seeks to be exempted
from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744.


Facts: Francisco I. Chavez (Chavez later, for brevity), as tax payer, citizen and former government
official who initiated the prosecution Marcoses anf their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of
the public treasury, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports
bannered in a number of broadsheets sometimes in September 1997, viz:

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1) The alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in
Swiss bank; and,
2) The reported execution of a compromise between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the State to disclose
publicly all its transaction involving the national interest, Chavez demands that PCGG make publicly any
and all negotiations and agreement pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill- gotten
wealth.
The PCGG interposes several oppositions for the denial of the reliefs being sought by Chavez,
however, admits forging a compromise with the Marcoses, stipulating, among others, viz:
2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the
FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE
PARTY shall be net of, and exempt from, any form of taxes due to the Republic of the Philippines. xxx.
Issue:

Was the said compromise agreement valid?

Held:

Legal Restraint on a Marcos- PCGG Compromise:


xxx

xxx

xxx

Second, PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the
Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is
vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28(4), Article VI of
the Constitution, specifically provides, No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The PCGG has absolutely no power to
grant tax exemption, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill- gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their
properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights.
Any special grant of tax exemption in favour only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will
also violate constitutional rule that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal
revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt
as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayers financial position demonstrates
a clear inability to pay. xxx. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the
commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears
to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify
the collection of the tax due.

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES v. QUEZON CITY & THE CITY ASSESSOR, 433 SCRA 119

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Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP later, for brevity) is a non- stock, non- profit entity,
established by virtue of P. D. No. 1823. It stood in Lot No. PR- 3- B- 34- 1- B- 1, SWO 04- 000495,
registered in its name, measuring 121, 463 sq. mtrs., and situated in Quezon City. A wide portion of the
said hospital at the ground floor is being leased to private parties and being utilized as canteen, small
store spaces, offices of some professionals, medical clinics, and the like.
LCP contends as a charitable institution being committed to provide free medical services to
indigent patients, and must thus be exempted from real property taxes. It reinforces its claim by saying
that it is being subsidized by the government. And, such character shall not lose by mere fact of collecting
fees from the paying patients.
Issues: Whether the LCP is a charitable institution; and, (2)Whether the real properties of the LCP are
exempt from real property taxes.
Held: 1) We hold that the LCP is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. xxx
xxx
xxx
2) Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, anent the second issue,
that those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real
property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
In order to be entitled to the exemption, the real property is ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and
EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusive
of others; debarred from participation and enjoyment; and exclusively is defined in a manner to
exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes,
it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The words dominant use
or principal use cannot be substituted for the words used exclusively without doing violence to the
constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the
direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purpose for which the charitable
institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of
whether the property is used for tax exempt purposes.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts
of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the
portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether
paying or non- paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

EXEC. SECRETARY, et. al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC, et. al., GR No. 164171; GR No.
164172; GR No. 168741 (482 SCRA 673).
Facts: On December 12, 2002, Pres. GMA, through Exec. Sec. Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156 entitled
Providing for a Comprehensive Industrial Policy and Directions for the Motor Vehicle Development
Program and its Implementing Guidelines, that provides, among others, viz:

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3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of the Freeport, of all types of used motor
vehicles is prohibited, except for the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The above- cited Order is being bombarded with suits for declaratory reliefs from Subic- based
used vehicles importers and traders, among those is herein Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., before the
RTC of Olongapo City, unanimously seeking, inter alia, for the nullity/invalidity thereof for being
transgressing to the constitution.
Issues: (1) Whether there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; (2) If the answer is in the
affirmative, whether Section 3.1 of EO 156 is reasonable and within the scope provided by law.
Held: The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued pursuant to
EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that its application should be extended to
the Freeport because the guarantee of R.A. 7227 on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an
exemption from customs duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate
for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.
Concomitantly, the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police
power, which is vested on the legislature. Absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President
through an executive issuance, is void. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi- legislative
power which may defined as the authority delegated by the law- making body to the administrative body
to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative
policy. To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:
1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and,
4) It must be reasonable.
EO 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. xxx. There are thus
explicit constitutional and statutory permission authorizing the President to ban or regulate importation
of articles and commodities into the country.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

With respect to the third and fourth issues, an examination of the nature of a Freeport under
R.A. 7227 and the primordial purpose of the importation ban under the questioned EO is necessary.
R.A. 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of
the Clark and Subic military reservation and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form
of Special Economic and Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and
social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.

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The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and capital within a
portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest their capital in a business climate
with the least governmental intervention.
With minimum interference from the government, investors can, in general, engaged in any
business as well as import and export any article into and out of the Freeport. These are among the rights
accorded to Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises under Section 39, Rules and Regulation Implementing R.A.
7227.
In given discussions, we hold that the importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid
administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits
of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other
existing laws for such is the sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government
cannot usurp.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid
importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its
application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which R.A. 7227,
considers to some extent, a foreign territory.
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only outside the
Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of
R.A. 7227.
This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative
authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid,
such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adopted to secure the end in view. If shown to
bear no reasonable relation to the purpose for which they were authorized to be issued, then they must
be held to be invalid.

SEN. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, et. al. v. EXEC. SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., et. al., 252 SCRA 695
Facts: On April 18, 1993, House Representative Antonio Abaya filed HB No. 8817, entitled An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of
Santiago. After public hearings on the said bill were conducted, the same was passed by the House of
Representatives on Second Reading, and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. Then, it
was transmitted to the Senate.
However, prior to the transmission of the said HB No. 8817 to the Senate on January 18, 1994,
Sen. Vicente Sotto III previously filed before the Senate SB No. 1243, entitled An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. Public
hearings were also conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government on SB No. 1243. Later, the
Senate Committee on Local Government submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817 approving
the same without amendment considering that HB No. 8817 was all fours with SB No. 1243.

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Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on
Third Reading, with amendment proposed by the Senate which, on the other hand, the House of
Representatives approved the same.
The enrolled bill was signed by the Chief Executive as R.A. No. 7720.
Issue:
the

In the enactment of RA No. 7720, was there a compliance with Section 24, Article VI of
Constitution?

Held: Although a bill of local application like BH No. 8817 should be constitutional prescription,
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that R.A. No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the Houseof Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was
passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. xxx. HB No. 8817 was the bill that
initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of R.A. No. 7720. No violation of Section
24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant
controversy.
xxx. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate
in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.

JOKER P. ARROYO, et. al., v. JOSE DE VENECIA, et. al., G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997.
Facts: A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the approved bill, which originated in the House of Representatives as HB
No. 7198.
During the session on November 21, 1996, a number of representatives delivered sponsorship
speech, after interpellation. During Rep. Rogelio Sarmientos turn, he was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. After the head count, it turned out that there was really a quorum.
The transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as
published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996, showed the factual accounts
thereof, viz:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question
that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

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THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report,
and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
The bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue: Whether or not the House rules were violated that would render the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 null
and void
Held: The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no
quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice
Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken

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if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject,
however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINCNE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 235
SCRA 630.
Facts: A HB No. 11197, seeking to amend certain provisions of NIR pertaining to Value Added- Tax
(VAT) was instituted before the House of Representatives, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and Enhance its
Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 and 110
of Title IV, 112, 115 and 116 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113 and
114 of Title V, all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
After the same was considered on the second reading, it was approved by the House of
Representatives after the third reading.
After the HB No. 11197 was transmitted to the Senate, the latter came up with another version
and recommended the approval of SB No. 1630, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and Enhance its
Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108 and 110 of
Title IV, 112 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113, 114 and 116 of Title V,
all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes.
After considering the HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630, the conference committee ended up with
the endorsement of another/third version of the bill, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System, Widening its Tax Base and Enhancing its
Administration and for these Purposes Amending and Repealing the Relevant Provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as Amended and for Other Purposes.
The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines, and became R.A. No.
7716.
Issue:
of

Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 is void for it did not exclusively originate from the House
Representatives.

Held: To begin with, it is not the law- but the revenue bill- which is required by the Constitution to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. xxx. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute- and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law- must substantially be the same

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as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. It would be to violate the equality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINCNE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 249
SCRA 630.
Held: (On Motion for Reconsideration). While Article VI, Section 24 provides that all appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills must originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, it also adds, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments. In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely
new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to
which a bill is referred may do any of the following: (1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make
changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely
new bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or, (4) to make no report at all.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO v. EXEC.
SEC. ERMITA, et. al., 469 SCRA 1.
Facts:

Article VII Executive Department


C. Prohibitions
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department
to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional
compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII
prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment.
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor
General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless
otherwise allowed by law which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII,
section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet
member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, Section 13 of the
constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions
is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment
which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies

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and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII
cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative
intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to
particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.
National Amnesty Commission vs. COA 437 SCRA 655
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by
then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and
review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members
appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members
turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12,
1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment
ofhonoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June
27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
Issue: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members
Ruling:
We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is correct that
there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex
officio members' official representatives.
In Civil Liberties Union, we elucidated on the two constitutional prohibitions against holding multiple
positions in the government and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph
2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees against holding multiple government offices, unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other office, profession,
business or financial interest, whether government or private, unless allowed by the Constitution.
The NAC ex officio members representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below Assistant
Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions.
First, the NAC ex officio members representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition because
there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position and authorizing additional
compensation therefor.
Bitonio vs. COA 425 SCRA 437 G.R. No. 147392
Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in the DOLE. In a Letter dated May 11, 1995, Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the
DOLE designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. in
pursuance to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995, As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving a per diem for
every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per
diems to the petitioner.

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The uniform reason for the disallowance was stated in the Notices, as follows:
Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their primary office
and to receive compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Civil
Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. Disallowance is in pursuance to COA Memorandum No. 97-038
dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report No. 509
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Ruling: We rule in the affirmative.
The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary where the Court declared Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to hold
multiple positions in government, unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their
Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly
provides It must be noted that the petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of
his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no
separate or special appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is
prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise
applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary
of Labor.
In Dela Cruz v. Commission on Audit., it was held that
"The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached
to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the
Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the
primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come under
the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other
such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution."
Similarly in the case at bar, we cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of
Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal. As the representative of the Secretary of
Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the same capacity as his principal. Whatever laws and rules the
member in the Board is covered, so is the representative; and whatever prohibitions or restrictions the
member is subjected, the representative is, likewise, not exempted. Thus, his position as Director IV of the
DOLE which the petitioner claims is not covered by the constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties
Union case is of no moment. The petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by
the Secretary of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would
not have been in the Board at all.
Public Interest v. Elma 494 SCRA 53 (2006) G.R. No. 138965 June 30, 2006
*concurrent
appointments,
incompatible
office
Nature: CPM + TRO to declare null and void the concurrent appointments of ELMA as PCGG Chair and as

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Chief

Presidential

Legal

Counsel

Facts: Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on he was appointed as CPLC (Jan 1999 during
his term), but waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Supervening events: Theres actually no more controversy involved: In 2001, Elma was replaced by Sabio
as PCGG. Nachura was then appointed as CPLC but pending resolution of the case, he was appointed
SOLGEN.
Arguments: Public Interest Center
CLU vs. Exec Sec: Art IX-B, Sec 7, par2 and Art VII, Sec13 are violated by concurrent appointments CPLC
and PCGG Chair are incompatible offices.
Arguments: Elma
As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions dont cover other public officials given
the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary. His appointment falls under the exceptions
in Art IX-B, Section 7
The 2 positions are not incompatible.
NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance of the case because the case is capable of
repetition, and to serve as a guide to the bench. (Symbolic or Teaching Function of Judicial Review)
Issue 1: whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision regarding multiple offices,
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
NO if based on position.
YES if based on primary functions test.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG
Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary,
even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
CLU vs. Exec Sec: The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple offices or employment. The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to
the rule against multiple offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President
to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials office. The Court further qualified that additional duties must not only be closely related to, but
must be required by the officials primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in
an ex-officio capacity, which denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office,
and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.[18] Thus, it will not
suffice that no additional compensation shall be received by virtue of the second appointment, it is
mandatory that the second post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is
exercised in an ex-officio capacity.

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*Even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the position of
PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to respondent
Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant
secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent
Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because
neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions of one office do
not require an appointment to the other post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question are not
covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under
Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility
between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
Issue 2: whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the prohibition against
multiple offices imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
YES.
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People
v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to
interfere with the other.
[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x Where one
office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent
and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the
one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the
nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from
the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and
impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. x x x The offices must
subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other,
before they are incompatible at common law. x x x
***In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The
duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of
various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive
departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an
agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the
review of the CPLC.
*note: Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 (provides that CPLC review Decision on
investigation involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential appointees with the rank of
Secretary conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)

Public Interest v. Elma 517 SCRA 336 (March 5, 2007) G.R. No. 138965
Facts:
Elma sought - the reconsideration of the Decision in the case of Public Interest Center, Inc., et al.
v. Magdangal B. Elma, et al. (G.R. No. 138965), promulgated on 30 June 2006.

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In its Decision, the Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the respondent as PCGG
Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these offices is in
violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible
offices. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the
heads of various executive departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving heads of
executive departments. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are
subject to the review of the CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of the 1987
Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a
secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. However, had the rule thereunder been applicable to
the case, the defect of these two incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section
allows the concurrent holding of positions only when the second post is required by the primary functions
of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity. Although respondent Elma waived
receiving renumeration for the second appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not
require his appointment as CPLC.
Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration be granted.
Ruling: DENIED
After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents Omnibus Motions, we find that the basic
issues that were raised have already been passed upon. No substantial arguments were presented. Thus,
the Court denies the respondents motion for reconsideration.
In response to the respondents request for clarification, the Court ruled that respondent Elmas
concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible
offices. This ruling does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on
incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when
he accepted the second office as CPLC.
There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What is in
question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elmas concurrent appointments, and
[2]
not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. The mere application of constitutional
provisions does not require the case to be heard and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of the
respondent, the decision of the Court in this case does not modify the ruling in Civil LibertiesUnion v.
Executive Secretary. It should also be noted that Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7
February 1989clearly provides that the Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or
resolutions of a Division may be appealed.
D. Succession
Estrada vs. Desierto
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.

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In the heat of people power , At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacanang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be
a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
the duties of the Presidency On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,
as her Vice President.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria
Macapagal- Arroyo claims she is the President..
Issue: 1. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President
Rule: Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. In sum, we hold that the
resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was
going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge
after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to
join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is

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now in the part tense. It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary
leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella
is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases
at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the
week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence
when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press
release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to
respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner
clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor
of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people.
Issue 2: Was Estrada merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and
hence is a President on leave?
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of
the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that
"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII. Considering
the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at
about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175
4. Also, House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176 stating that expressed its support
to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
5. Further, bills were already sent by the Congress to the Office of GMA as president.
6. Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. In
fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid

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to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Borja v. COMELEC 295 SCRA 157 September 3, 1998
* In case of temporary disability
Facts: Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on
June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30,
1998.
Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the
theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998
and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified from running for reelection as
mayor of Pateros. On motion, the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to
run for mayor. It ruled that Capcos succession into office is not counted as one term for purposes of the
computation of the three term limitation under the Constitution and Local Government Code.
Capco was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes and was
proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Issue: WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor
Held:

Yes

Ratio: Purpose of the three term rule: First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the
only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the
freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official
concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to
disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred
from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third
consecutive term. Monsod warned against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will
choose as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution
provision recognizing peoples power.
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The
first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a

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result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the
right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection.
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose
whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served
three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would
therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC
that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election.
The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such official[s] from
serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local
official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official
concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on
the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he
was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be
considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the
House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if
one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter
how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowed. This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide: Yes, because we
speak of term and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower
House.
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of
Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from
office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term
for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected
and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than
refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of
a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to
the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. This provision says that No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office
at any time. Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have
served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who
simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has
occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on
elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the
constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose

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of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by
automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that
office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected
primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters death, permanent disability, removal or
resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the
good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the
Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think
can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than
four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the presiding officer
of the Sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct
powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. It
cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that
in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted
in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

MUNEZ
OMELIO
EFFECTS OF PARDON

CRISTOBAL v. LABRADOR
71 PHIL 34 (1940)
FACTS: On March 15, 1930, the CH found respondent Santos guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced
him to 6 months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law, to return to the offended parties
the amounts of P375 and P125 respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. On appeal, the judgment Of conviction was affirmed and the respondent was accordingly
confined in the provincial jail from March 14, 1932 to Aug. 18, 1932. Notwithstanding his conviction,
respondent continued to be a registered elector and was, for the period comprised between 19-~4 and
1937, seated as the municipal president of Malabon, Rizal.
On Aug. 22, 1938, CA 357 (Election Code) was approved by the National Assembly, Sec. 94 of
which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any
crime against property." The respondent forthwith applied to the president for an absolute pardon. On
Dec. 24, 1939, the Chief Executive granted the petition restoring the respondent to his "full civil and
political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money
or property responsibility."

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On Nov. 16, 1940, petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of respondent Santos
from the list of voters, citing Sec. 94 of CA 357. The CFI denied the petition. Hence, this petition for a writ
of certiorari to review the decision of the lower court sustaining the right of respondent to remain in the
list of registered voters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pardon granted by the President restores the respondent to the full
enjoyment of his political rights.
HELD: An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting
from the conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent is conditioned in the sense that "he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or
property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political
rights."
1.
Under Section 11(6), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, there are two limitations upon
the exercise of this Constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, to wit: (a) that the power be
exercised after conviction; and, (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to
the limitations imposed by the Court, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by
the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
2.
The disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those
who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power
likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes an that is left of the consequences of conviction.
FELOBELLO v. PALATINO
72 PHIL 441 (1941)
FACTS: Petitioner Pelobello instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI against respondent Palatino,
the mayor-elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. He alleged that the respondent, having been criminally
convicted by final judgment in 1912 and sentenced to imprisonment, was disqualified from voting and
being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by
plenary pardon granted by the President on Dec. 25,1940. From the records, it is admitted that the
respondent committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already been merited conditional
pardon from the Gov. General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected
councilor for the period 1918-1921; was elected municipal president of Torrijos three times in succession
(1922-1931) and finally elected mayor in the 1940 local elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to
criminal conviction under Sec. 94 of Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but
before the date fixed by law for assuming office.
HELD: We adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations
imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by the legislative
action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities

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resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
Under the existing circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon
was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus
extended on the date mentioned above and before the date fixed in the Election Code for assuming
office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of
the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and
disregard what at bottom is a teclu'lical objection
LACUNA v. ABES
24 SCRA 780 (1968)
FACTS: Respondent Abes had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision
mayor. After he had partially served his sentence, he was released from confinement on 7 April 1959 by
virtue of conditional pardon granted by the president, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison
term and fine. Without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have been served on 13 Oct. 1961. In
view of the forthcoming 1967 elections, respondent applied for registration as a voter but the Election
Registration Board denied his application. The denial notwithstanding, he filed his certificate of candidacy
for the office of mavor and won the election. Petitioner Lacuna placed second.
Petitioner filed his petition for quo warranto with application for preliminary injunction,
challenging the eligibility of the respondent to the position of mayor to which he was duly proclaimed
elected. On the same day when hearing was held for the application for preliminary injunction, the
President granted to respondent an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored him "full civil and
political rights." Thereafter the lower court dismissed the petition and declared the eligibility of
mayor-elect Abes to his position. Petitioner appealed.
In this present petition, petitioner raised the following arguments: (1) That the restoration to him
of his civil and political rights by the presidential plenary pardon on Dec. 7,1967 did not retroact to
remove the disqualification existing anterior to the grant of the pardon; and, (2) That by reason of his
conviction and non-registration as avoter, Abes was not a qualified voter at the time of the election, and
was therefore ineligible to the position of mayor under Sec. 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code. On
the other hand, respondent contended that the absolute pardon blotted out all the consequences of his
conviction, including his disqualification.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the date fixed by law for
assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualification prescribed by both the criminal and
electoral codes.
HELD: We conclude that the pardon granted to respondent Abes has removed his disqualification, and
his election and assumption of office must be sustained.
1. The new rule consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effect should not be
necessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, which was not
contemplated in the constitution. "We adopt the broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the
limitations imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment
has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.xxx We are of the
opinion that the better view fi-i the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to

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unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the
environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal
conviction (Felobello v. Palatino).
2. Petitioner emphasizes the non-registration of Abes as a voter in order to differentiate the case
at bar from Pelobello case. The fact stressed does not, however, make the case dissimilar because
registration as a voter is not a qualification for a candidate or a voter, within the meaning of "qualified
voter" in Sec. 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting. Moreover, the
non-registration of Abes as a voter was predicated upon the same disqualifying effects of his previous
conviction that were blotted out by the plenary pardon.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
FACTS: On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Mosanto (then assistant treasurer)
and 3 other accused, of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum, to
10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. On appeal, her conviction was affirmed by this court.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but pending said motion, she was extended by the President
absolute pardon which she accepted. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the city treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post since the same was still vacant. In a resolution, the
Ministry of Finance ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her former position without the necessity
of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed
the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbavan had required to be
indemnified in favor of the government be satisfied. In her motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
ruling, petitioner stressed that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; and that she is entitled to
back pay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the sum of
P4,892.50.
The Office of the President, to which the petitioner's letter was referred for further review,
adopted the resolution of Sandiganbavan and held that petitioner is not entitled to an automatic
reinstatement on the basis of her absolute pardon but must secure an appointment to her former
position and that she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. In this present
petition, petitioner contended that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case because she was
extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal. Without that final judgment
of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her
employment remained suspended. According to her, when pardon was issued before the final verdict
of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the Pres. declared her not
guilty.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

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HELD: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as asst. treasurer, she must
reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
1. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate
for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It
does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out
the moral stain- It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a
criminal indictment if or-dy to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon
blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were
innocent.
2. The rationale is plainly evident. Public officers are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private
interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
3. The 1981 amendments to the 1973 constitution had deleted the earlier rule that clemency
could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before
conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the
High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 constitution, the former limitation of final
conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material
when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the
same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.
4. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords
no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CONDITIONAL PARDON


TORRES v. GONZALES
152 SCRA 272 (1987)
FACTS: Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa (two counts), and was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term from 11 years, 10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1
day. These convictions were affirmed by the CA. On April 19, 1939, a conditional pardon was granted to
the petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. "Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from
confinement. On March 22, 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. On September 8, 1986, the

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President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was accordingly arrested and confined
in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Claiming that he has been deprived of his
rights under the due process clause of the Constitution since he was not given an opportunity to be heard
before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and that he did not violate his conditional pardon since
he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 2 counts of estafa nor the crime of sedition, petitioner
files this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon.
HELD: No, a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is not necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon. The grant of
pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive
acts and which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

DOES PARDONING POWER APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES?


LLAMAS v. EXEC. SEC.
202 SCRA 844 (1991)
FACTS: Sometime in 1989, petitioner Llamas, the incumbent Vice Governor of Tarlac, filed with the
Department of Local Government verified complaint against the respondent Governor Campo for alleged
violation of some provisions of BP 337 (Local Government Code). Prior to that, he had instituted with the
office of the Ombudsman a verified complaint against the same respondent for alleged violation of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). After that, the DLG Secretary imposed the penalty of
suspension for a period of 90 days upon the respondent upon his finding that the latter is guilty of serious
neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority for entering into a loan contract with the Lingkod Tarlac
Foundation grossly manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac province. Respondent's appeal was dismissed by
respondent Ex-Secretary Orbos. Pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of BP 337, petitioner, on March 1, 1991
took his oath of office as Acting Governor. Respondent Governor accepted his suspension and turned over
his office to petitioner. However, on March 9, 1991, respondent issued an "administrative order" in which
he signified his intention to continue in office in view of the pendency of his motion for reconsideration of
the DLG's decision. Without ruling on the repondent's motion for reconsideration, respondent Orbos
granted Executive Clemency in favor of respondent governor in the sense that the latter's 90-day
suspension was reduced to the period alreadv served. ' Thereupon, respondent Governor reassumed the
governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to the petitioner. Petitioner
questioned that grant of executive clemency on the ground that executive clemency could be granted by
the president only in criminal case as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the constitution
which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the president has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases.

HELD: It is the court's considered view that if the president can grant reprieves, commutation, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal case, with much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

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1. Applying the doctrine Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," we cannot sustain
petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the
president, with the sole exception of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may
be exercised only in criminal cases, it would be indeed unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's
proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded in as much as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.
2. A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of executive
clemency in administrative cases. Under Section 43 of PD 807, "in meritorious cases, the president may
commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in
disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of service. "
3. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, but the constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done by the
proved criminal and in the process exempts him from the punishment therefor. On the other hand, in
administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is a mere substantial evidence to support the
decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by
technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will be unjust and unfair for those
found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot
be extended to them, even in the case of modifying a decision to sub serve the interest of the public.
WHO MAY AVAIL OF AMNESTY?
PEOPLE vs. PATRIARCA
341 SCRA 164 (2000)
FACTS: Accused, member of the New Peoples Army, was convicted of murder and sentence to reclusion
perpetua He appealed to the Supreme Court. While his appeal was pending, he applied for amnesty under
Proclamation No. 347 of March 25, 1992. His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty
Board.
ISSUE:

What happens to his appeal?

HELD: The approval of his application for amnesty serves to put an end to his appeal. Amnesty
commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses. Amnesty
looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense. The conviction of accused is therefore reversed, and he is acquitted
of the crime of murder.

POWERS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

LANSANG v. GARCIA
42 SCRA 448 (1971)

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FACTS: On August 21, 1971, while the Liberal Party was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda,
Manila, 2 hand grenades were thrown. As a consequence, 8 persons died and numerous persons were
seriously injured. On August 23, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation
No. 889 suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners assail the validity of Proclamation No. 889.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Proclamation No. 889 is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC has the authority (under the 1973 Constitution) to inquire into the existence of a factual
basis for the issuance of a presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
for the purpose of determining the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Far from being full and plenary,
the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumscribed, confined and restructed, not only by
the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but also as regards the time when and
the place where it may be exercised. The requisite for a valid suspension is outlined in Sec. 10 of Art. VII
of the 1935 Constitution. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both
conditions are present. Upon the basis of the evidence presented, the court rules on the validity of
Proclamation No. 889.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying the system of Government of the
Philippines, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under
the Constitution, is NOT ABSOLUTE. It goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under
which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts
within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law (Constitution), and the authority to determine whether
or not he has so acted -- is vested in the Judiciary Department, which, in this aspect is in turn
constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Judiciary is merely to
check, NOT to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act.
GARCIA v. ENRILE
121 SCRA 472 (1983)
FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus and mandamus filed in behalf of 14 detainees. The 14 had
been under surveillance for sometime as members of the CPP. Nine (9) were arrested on July 6, 1982
while holding a meeting in the residence of one of them, Aurora Porong, in Nueva Ecija. Taken during the
said were materials said to be subversive documents, detailing how the group would infiltrate youth and
student organizations. Also found were a .38 caliber revolver, live bullets and several rounds of
ammunitions and P18,650 cash. Four (4) were arrested the following day, July 7,1982, while one of them
was arrested on July 15.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that the arrest of the detainees was illegal on ground that
it was affected without a warrant and that their detention was likewise illegal because no criminal charges
had been filed against them within the period provided by law. In their return, the respondents alleged
that shortly after the arrest of the detainees, Presidential Commitment Orders (PCO) were issued against
them and it was by virtue of these orders that the detainees were being held in custody. The SC denied
the petition.

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HELD: We hold that upon the issuance of PCO against the petitioners, the continued detention is
rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released over after the filing of charges against them in
court, to depend on the President, who may order the release of a detainee or his being placed under
house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases.
1. The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for
any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant. Its legal
effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in
view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of power to suspend the said privilege
provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion/ rebellion has
not been repelled or quelled, and the need therefore in the interest of public safety continues.
The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as
Commander-in-chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to
determining its legality in the light of bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom. This must be so
because the suspension of the privilege is a military measure the necessity of which the President alone
may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces,
of protecting not only public safety but the very life of the State, the government and duly constituted
authorities.
2. From the clear language of Lansang vs. Garcia (42 SCRA 488), "the function of the court is
merely to check-not to supplant the executive or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act." If, however, the constitutional right to bail is granted to herein petitioners by the
court, thus the procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the Rules of Court what inevitably results is the
supplanting of the decision of the President to detain pursuant to Proclamation No. 2045, of person's who
come under its coverage.
3. What has been said above shows the need of re-examining the Lansang case with a view to
reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil 87) and Montenegro vs. Castaeda (91Phil 882), that
the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon
the courts, and all other persons." This well-settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared
that the "function of the court is merely to check not to supplant - the Executive, or ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested
in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." Judicial interference was thus held permissible, and the
test laid down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily.
This would seem to be pure semanticism. If we consider that with particular reference to the
nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the grave emergency he has to deal
with, which partakes of military measures, the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume
the authority to check or reverse or supplant the presidential actions. On these occasions, the President
takes absolute command, for the very life of the nation and its government, which, incidentally, includes
the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and
to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust
and pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them.
CASE DIGESTS
f. Power and Function of the President

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MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Facts:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed
by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held:
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for
the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inherent in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution
itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated
The Power Involved
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President
has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

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To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.
Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external
and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times
of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed
forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep
the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been
recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of
Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to
the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of
our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's
power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of
compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she
has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of
violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the
commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The
State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to
its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of
the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the

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people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
OPLE vs TORRES
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue.
Held:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive
power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance
.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He
has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the

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extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the
dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the
State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid
dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives
no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
KMU vs DIRECTOR GENERAL
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 420 requiring all
government agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline and harmonize their
Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs,
achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility and provide convenience to the people served
by government entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions
by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO420 infringes on the citizens
rights to privacy.
ISSUE: IS EO420 a valid exercise of executive power?
Held:
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the
heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their
systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to
their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format,
especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum
compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative
power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the
Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus

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and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in
the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to
achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents
constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not
extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply
to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID
cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed
to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are
several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve
public services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the
President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the
President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO
420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply
an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
Difference in AO 308 re: Ople vs Torres:
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power
that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople
v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System,[19] a national ID
system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where
none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card
systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and
user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents
constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under
the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
REVIEW CENTER vs ERMITA
Facts:

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There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were
circulated duringthe examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center
and Inress Review Center.The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of
the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing).
The PRC later admitted the leakageand traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam results came out
but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful
examinees.
Subsequently, President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED
to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno), approved
CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).
In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an
organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to amend, if not withdraw the IRR arguing,
among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs)
or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers.
On 26 October 2007, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying
for the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and the prohibition against CHED from
implementing the same.
Issue/s:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the
CHEDs jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
Held:
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs
coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degreegranting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the
CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers a program or
course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by
the PRC. It also covers the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals
whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC.
A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a
degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is only
intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees. A reviewee is
not even required to enroll in a review center or to take a review course prior to taking an examination
given by the PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in a review center, attendance in a review course is not
mandatory. The reviewee is not required to attend each review class. He is not required to take or pass

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an examination, and neither is he given a grade. He is also not required to submit any thesis or
dissertation. Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered programs x x x of higher
learning that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
Further, the similar entities in EO 566 cover centers providing review or tutorial services in areas not
covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not limited to, college
entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial
services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under
]
RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is
vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of
rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its
jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither
institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
Hence, both the EO 566 and RIRR are unconstitutional.
ANGELES vs GAITE
Facts
Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care and provide for as
she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took care of her as her own. Petitioner also
gave the same attention to the half-brother of the grand niece. The latter would seek petitioners financial
support ranging from daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses.
After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan, failed to do an important
task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since no more support was given to the
latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her to different provinces while asked the help of certain
individuals to mislead the petitioner and the police. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan
through a dragnet operation.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in
Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as
the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a
complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the case. This was however
denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a
petition for review with USEC. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with
SEC Perez and was also denied

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She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the ground of
Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua or death
Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal
Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of
control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost
unfettered power.
Issue:
W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of the President?
Held:
No. it does not diminish the power of the President
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum
Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in
our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."The CA cannot be
deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the
Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular
No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions
issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated
and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on
preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except
those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of
the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.

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It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases.
Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of
Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses
the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner
cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is
he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice,
especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego.
BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:

These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are
certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve
the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives
over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise
by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be
a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing
with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional
class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as
Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary
investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties
of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice
notwithstanding the latters expertise in said matter.
The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of cabinet positions
and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
Presidents effectivity in running the government.
BUKLOD vs ZAMORA
Facts:
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He
subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created thru
EO 196 the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially
the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme
Courts power of judicial review in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the

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president has no power to abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and
that the abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.
Issue:
WON the president has the power to abolish such public office.
Held:
Yes.
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the creation of
Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the EIIB employees,
but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task Force Aduana was
created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the government.
Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196 provides that the
technical, administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of people who are already in the
public service, they being employees of other existing agencies. Their tenure with the Task Force would
only be temporary, i.e., only when the agency where they belong is called upon to assist the Task
Force. Since their employment with the Task force is only by way of detail or assignment, they retain their
employment with the existing agencies. And should the need for them cease, they would be sent back to
the agency concerned.
Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under the direct control and
supervision of the President as base of the governments anti-smuggling campaign. Such a smaller base
has the necessary powers 1) to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, or office and to use their
respective personnel, facilities and resources; and 2) to select and recruit personnel from within the PSG
and ISAFP forassignment to the Task Force. Obviously, the idea is to encourage the utilization of
personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of
maintaining an independent office with a whole set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven itself
burdensome for the government because it maintained separate offices in every region in the Philippines.
And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the government that the creation of the
Task Force Aduana was especially intended to lessen EIIBs expenses.
While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana, we find the latter to
have additional new powers. The Task Force Aduana, being composed of elements from the Presidential
[36]
Security Group (PSG) and Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), has the
essential power to effect searches, seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not have this power. The Task Force
Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations; and to use their personnel,
facilities and resources. Again, the EIIB did not have this power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the
additional authority to conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth. This was not expressly
granted to the EIIB.

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Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v. Civil Sevice
Commission, we ruled that a reorganization in good faith is one designed to trim the fat off the
bureaucracy and institute economy and greater efficiency in its operation.
Lastly, we hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in our
law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith
suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in
an office or its salary.

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SECRETARY vs MABALOT
Facts:
The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman Memorandum Order No. 96-735, transferring the regional
functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending creation of a Regional LTFRO. Later, the new
Sec. of DOTC issued Department Order No. 97-1025, establishing the DOTCCAR Regional Office as the
Regional Office of the LTFRB to exercise regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct
supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office. Mabalot protested.
Issue:
W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the
powers of the
legislative department
Held:
SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders.
In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the
challenged orders, Court upholds. The President, through his duly constituted political agent and alter
ego, may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment
of the DOTCCAR as the LTFRB Regional Office of CAR with the concomitant transfer and performance of
public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; (2) Statute; and (3) by
authority of law. This case falls under the third category.
The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and establish the LTFRBCAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the Presidents power of control under sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution.
By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to
undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.
Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers, stating that unless
Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws xxx
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD 1416. These decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.
Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization of DOTCCAR valid?

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In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in the instant case was decreed in the interest of service
and for purposes of economy and more effective coOrdination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera
Administrative Region. It thus bear the earmarks of good faith.
DENR

vs

DENR

EMPLOYEES

Facts:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the
DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The
Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR
Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees association,
COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid; and Whether the DENR
Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Held:
The DAO and Memorandum are valid. The acts of the DENR Secretary are likewise valid.
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII, Section 17
of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

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However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
(and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National
Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular
executive department. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the President through his duly
constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional
Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public
functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer
of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter
had not expressly repudiated the same.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to reorganize the
administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional centers. In identifying the
regional centers, the President purposely intended the effective delivery of the field services of
[23]
government agencies. The same intention can be gleaned from the preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14
which the DENR sought to achieve, that is, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in
delivering its services.
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no
buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month of Ramadan,
(3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolled in schools in Cotabato City, (4) the
Regional Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsond, through a
resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders. However, these concern issues
addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our form of government
that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the
legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other
department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed,
measures taken or decisions made by the other departments.
CONSTANTINO vs CUISA
Facts:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the countrys external
debt.
The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate
the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs.
Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/

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Freedom from Debt Coalition averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and
they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the
Constitution.
And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by
the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of
the President.
They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that
the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an
entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not
respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country.
Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
Issue: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents. (Governor of
BSP)
Held:
Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal imprimaturs, as well as the
doctrine of qualified political agency.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to
execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost
objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter
of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with
creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and
defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very
existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and
would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.
Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency, later adopted in Villena v.
Secretary of the Interior from American jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated
to or exercised by an agent oralter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes
this clear:
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it
should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by

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subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no
amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3,
[58]
SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).

These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at
least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise
of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within
this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in
question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within
the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital
public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not
from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance.
Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego of
the President is bound to secure the latters prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. In the
matter of contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, the repudiation by the President of the very acts
performed in this regard by the alter ego will definitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein
succeeded in demonstrating that the President actually withheld approval and/or repudiated the
Financing Program, there could be a cause of action to nullify the acts of respondents. Notably though,
petitioners do not assert that respondents pursued the Program without prior authorization of the
President or that the terms of the contract were agreed upon without the Presidents
authorization. Congruent with the avowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and restructure
existing foreign debts, the lack of showing that she countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to
conclude that said acts carried presidential approval.

With constitutional parameters already established, we may also note, as a source of suppletory
guidance, the provisions of R.A. No. 245. The afore-quoted Section 1 thereof empowers the Secretary of
Finance with the approval of the President and after consultation of the Monetary Board, to borrow
from time to time on the credit of the Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment
may be necessary, and to issue therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government.
Ineluctably then, while the President wields the borrowing power it is the Secretary of Finance who
normally carries out its thrusts.
It bears emphasis that apart from the Constitution, there is also a relevant statute, R.A. No. 245, that
establishes the parameters by which the alter ego may act in behalf of the President with respect to the
borrowing power. This law expressly provides that the Secretary of Finance may enter into foreign
borrowing contracts. This law neither amends nor goes contrary to the Constitution but merely
implements the subject provision in a manner consistent with the structure of the Executive Department

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and the alter ego doctine. In this regard, respondents have declared that they have followed the
restrictions provided under R.A. No. 245, which include the requisite presidential authorization and which,
in the absence of proof and even allegation to the contrary, should be regarded in a fashion congruent
with the presumption of regularity bestowed on acts done by public officials.
Moreover, in praying that the acts of the respondents, especially that of the Secretary of Finance, be
nullified as being in violation of a restrictive constitutional interpretation, petitioners in effect would have
this Court declare R.A. No. 245 unconstitutional. We will not strikedown a law or provisions thereof
without so much as a direct attack thereon when simple and logical statutory construction would suffice.
RUFINO V. ENDRIGA, July 21, 2006
Article VII, Section 16

Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the
primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines. PD 15 increased the members
of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, increased further
the trustees to 11.

Eventually, during the term of Ramos, the CCP Board included the Endriga Group

the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning Estrada's appointment of seven
new members to the CCP Board. They claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely
vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the
ranking officers of the CCP.
o The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the
CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one
trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely
vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in
consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees,
whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other
hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more
than two consecutive terms.
o The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino
group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Maosa's term. The CCP Board
then had 10 incumbent trustees. They maintained that under the CCP Charter, the
trustees' fixed four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation,
incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified
since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to
fill by election any vacancy in the Board.
o The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control
of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP
"shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."

Rufino Group: that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers
lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to

Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the
Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The Rufino group took their oaths of
office and assumed the performance of their duties.

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elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than
the appointing power.

- CA: Endriga group entitled to the office.


Issue: w/n Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that:
A. [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution;
B. [it] effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision over the
CCP
Held: UNCONSTITIONAL
POWER TO APPOINT

The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate
the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
the President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.The President shall have the power
to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)

The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the
Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the
Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our
democratic republican government.

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of
officers.
1. heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. w/ the
Commission of Appointments consent
2. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. consent not
required
3. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law. consent not required
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing
power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission,
or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of
PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the
CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
o * there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by
law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

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-

The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter
of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of
agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants,
Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like
requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members
of the commission or board.

This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by
28
the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to
29
appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the
30
Constitutional Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or
conditions.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to
appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only
one conclusion the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint.

Also, the power to appoint can only be vested in the HEADS of the named offices. The word
"heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for
several reasons:
o a plain reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution shows that the word "heads" refers to all the offices succeeding that
term, namely, the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. This plain reading is
consistent with other related provisions of the Constitution.
o agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but have only chief
executives or heads of agencies. Thus, the word "heads" applies to agencies. Any other
interpretation is untenable.
o all commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads. Since the
Constitution speaks of "heads" of offices, and all commissions or boards have chief
executives or heads, the word "heads" could only refer to the chief executives or heads
of the commissions or boards.
o the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions uniformly refer to "heads" of offices. The 1935 Constitution
32
limited the grant of the appointment power only to "heads of departments." The 1973
Constitution expanded such grant to other officers, namely, "members of the Cabinet, x
33
x x, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards x x x." If the 1973 Constitution
intended to extend the grant to members of commissions or boards, it could have
followed the same language used for "members of the Cabinet" so as to state "members
of commissions or boards." Alternatively, the 1973 Constitution could have placed the
words commissions and boards after the word "courts" so as to state "members of the
Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and boards." Instead, the 1973 Constitution used
"heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
o the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of

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that collegial body. Thus, the 1935 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint
"in the courts, or in the heads of departments." Similarly, the 1973 Constitution speaks
of "members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the enumeration also
applies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the enumeration. Since the words "in the
heads of" refer to "departments," the same words "in the heads of" also refer to the
other offices listed in the enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards."

Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law, under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers
of the CCP.

the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. The CCP, being governed by a
board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.

** Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP
Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other
hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing
officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the
CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
o It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to
"elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill
vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations
on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the coworkers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no
constitutional basis.

Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power
of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts
with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring
controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.

POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all
35
executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional
power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress
36
cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the Executive branch.

The CCP falls under the Executive branch. Since the President exercises control over "all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over
the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have
control of all executive x x x offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the independent
constitutional bodies from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP
performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.

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-

The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch
outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it
independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of
the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of
control over "all the executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this with the Executive
branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law
putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This
will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among
the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in
the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political
44
influence and pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the
CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office
or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.

MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007


Facts:

GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003.
Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating
thebus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and
convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron
Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to
direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the
extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law
contravened the Public Service Act.

Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the
Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the
MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus
operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to
conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and
the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties
without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial
court sustained the constitutionality.

Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision,
this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the
authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to
order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

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MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy
in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and
elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp
failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an
immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to
coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South
Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief
Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.
Issue: Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private
investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and communications
systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and communications.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not
the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of
the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the
implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the
DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to
establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies concerning
traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs
and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering
and education.

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority
to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project.

MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes and the means.

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As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not
merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested
statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control traffic on national roads.

Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of
any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience
of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper
subject for the exercise of police power.

Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be
addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?

De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of
traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that
franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem,
this Court has not been enlightened

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of
terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the
franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.

Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the
Public Service Act.

Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to "impose such
conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public
interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The
law mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and
operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.

Anak Mindanao vs Executive Secretary (Aug. 29, 2007)


Facts:
AMIN charges the Executive Department with transgression of the principle of separation of powers.
Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President, and the Judiciary may not encroach
on fields allocated to each of them. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the
executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases
and controversies. The principle presupposes mutual respect by and between the executive, legislative
and judicial departments of the government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as
19
they see fit.
20
AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be
transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders.
21
While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the President who, as Chief Executive, holds
22
the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, it posits that this broad

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power of control including the power to reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a
23
manner contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty of the President to ensure that the laws, including
those creating the agencies, be faithfully executed.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an extension of the
24
President, and the creation of the NCIP as an "independent agency under the Office of the President." It
thus argues that since the legislature had seen fit to create these agencies at separate times and with
distinct mandates, the President should respect that legislative disposition.
In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these administrative agencies should be the subject of a
statute.
Issue: W/N the President has the power to reorganize administrative agencies without need of an
enacting Statute?
Held: Yes
The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive departments, bureaus
and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative power.
The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the
will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress
of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The
legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged
it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive
power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.
It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He
has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
25
effectively. (Italics omitted, underscoring supplied)
The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to
26
carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing
27
laws and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which
places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and
jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive
28
agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but subject
to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus,
agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the
President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

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In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is best equipped to assess whether an
executive agency ought to continue operating in accordance with its charter or the law creating it. This is
not to say that the legislature is incapable of making a similar assessment and appropriate action within
its plenary power. The Administrative Code of 1987 merely underscores the need to provide the President
with suitable solutions to situations on hand to meet the exigencies of the service that may call for the
exercise of the power of control.
x x x The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the
nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. This is
the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
32
Office of the President.
33
The Office of the President consists of the Office of the President proper and the agencies under it. It is
34
not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed as agencies under the Office of the President. The
"Agencies under the Office of the President" refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to the Office for policy and program
coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any special
35
department.
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
36
simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged against these guidelines, the challenged executive orders
may not be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion or in violation of the rule of law.
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, et. al vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary
FACTS:
The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo.
Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all
their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to
source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the
condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost
compared to what was offered by the NPO.
Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its
income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the
NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that:
(1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No.
285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and

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(2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the
gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: WON the 2 contentions of petitioners have merit
HELD:
Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally
granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which
in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an
agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above
authorizes the President (a) torestructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the
Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice
versa.
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the President
Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among the offices in the Office of President
Proper but also the rest of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the President
implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the functional and
internal structure of the Office of the President, including the modification of functions of such
executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions
to be transferred to another agency.
Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the
government for all kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest of greater
economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private
sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which
remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as
the Commission on Elections may determine
At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity
of its printing responsibility to election forms.
To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the Presidents power to reorganize
executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general
appropriations laws.
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004
(the year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the authority
to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any department or agency in the Executive
Branch.
The President has the powerto reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said
appropriations act, including the power to implement structural, functional, and operational

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adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of


funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS
FACTS:
Consolidation of three cases.
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary
of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod
thereof, respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in
number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among
them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Opinion Court of Appeals: Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a
preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of
sixty (60) days.
The respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for
another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor
Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary, that the Department of Local Government in hearing the
ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had
been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged
refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party and the running political rivalry they
maintained in the last congressional and local elections and his alleged refusal to operate a
lottery in Iloilo City.
He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety
days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), notwithstanding which,
the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the
aforementioned cases.
He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in
order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request.
He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable" grounds, among them, that
he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital" witness was
16
also hospitalized but that the latter unduly denied his request.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local
officials.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend
and/or remove local officials
HELD:
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her

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prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local


officials.
It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than
to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over
local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government
under the general supervision of the Executive.
It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President.
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub
silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional
control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation.
he Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the
President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the
Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."
The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to
"liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila."

HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES


FACTS:
The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato
Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija.
Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of said province while private respondents
Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G.
Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging petitioner
with grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
Private respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session
hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when
petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall.
Petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them;
close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who encircled the area.
Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of
P150 million from the Philippine National Bank.
Petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan.

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