Central Intelligence Agency

\Vashington. D.C. 20505

8 November 2016
i\fr. Alan Weberman

Independent Research Associate
345 East 94ih Street
Apartment 28 C
New York, NY 10128
Reference: F-2016-02381
Dear Mr. Weberman:
On 15 August 2016, the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator received your
Freedom ofinformation Act request for CIA documents on Dag Hammarskjold, 29 July 1905 18 September 1961.
We conducted a search of our previously released database concerning the subject of your
request. Accordingly, we located and are enclosing 127 documents, consisting of 880 pages,
pertaining to the subject of your request. Please be advised that the documents were the results of
many different searches on this subject. As an alternative to extensive tasking, and as an
accommodation, we are providing you with copies of these previously released documents. In the
event that this response does not satisfy your request, we ask that you notify us in writing that you
wish to continue with the processing of your current request to include an updated search.
However, we wish to inform you should you choose those options you may be required to pay
additional fees. We will hold your request in abeyance for 45 days from the date of this response.
The cost associated with processing your request amounts to $78.00. This consists of
reproduction of 880 pages with the first I 00 pages free at a rate of ten cents per page, which totals
$78.00. As a requester in the "all other" category, you are responsible for the reproducing
responsive records. Please send your check or money order in the amount of $78.00 payable to the
Treasurer of the United States citing F-2016-02381 to ensure proper credit to your account.
Sincerely,

Pf J,ul jt~~~
Michael Lavergne
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Enclosures

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SitUa.tion in the
Congo

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Hammarskjold's dea't h - will 'f urther·
the ach1evement of a unified
Congo, but ,for the· moment has brought·
events altr)ost to a standstill. ··· Tshomb~(b ) (3)
professes he . is still willing to t~lkr
but plans to return sa6p _to Elizabeth~
vi],.le ; The . . T~nisi~n Mahm.ou<d Khiari,
a. s .e n'i.qr-:uN ·.of.f.icia:,1 1 has .:been
ordered ~o N:dolti ·t o coi:rtinu.e negotiat :i ons, but the. '™' · claims tt will .not
change its policy.
B. The military situation appears
to haye worsened somewhat. The Irish
in Jadotvilie have surrendered, and
we have sever.a l · unconfirmed press
reports that the base at Kamina has
been overrun. Fighting has also broken
out at several points in northern
Katanga. In Elizabethville, UN forces
hold a number of strong fp9ints, but
·a re merely ·def ending them.
C. The UN's military predicament
stems from several· factors. Neither
the UN officials in charge nor the
nations contributing troops want a
military solution, and have since
the first day of hostilities held
back local commanders. Th~ combat
performance of · Swedish and Irish
troops ha$ apparently been dis(b)(1)
appointing·
~omplicate

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The us Embassy in Leopoldville ..
reports its concern · tliat ·a truce in
Katanga on Tshomb~'s terms will
seriously ·weaken Adoula .
E. The USSR has so ·far reported
Hammarskjold's death without comment,
but Satellit e propaganda is -beginning
to call for immediate institution
of the ''troika" s ystem for his
replacement . Yesterday's Security
Council sessio n devoted itself to
eulogies and deferred consideration
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of a successor .
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Algerian rebel leaders
meet Ambassador Walmsley

Walmsley concludes :
A . The Algerians were· "impressed
and heartened" by US willingness
to talk.
B. The new government wishes to
(b)(3)
demonst r ate its acc e ptabi lity t o
the West.
c. While firm on Saharan sovereignty,
they a r e flexible on transitional
arrangements .
Walmsley also notes the Algerians'·
de~ire to pin down the meining of
D.e Gaulle's "mystical language" on
the Sahara. This intent is clear
in the statement they issued last
Fr iday calling for resumpt ion of
talks.
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.NOTES

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There was another minor incident in the Berlin air corridors
yesterday afternoon, when a Spviet fighter dived in front .of
a US Air Force transport.
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g~~riflas

in South Vietnam
IThe press reports that Communist
attached and ·burned a provincial capital 60 miles north ol
!Saigon Monday, apparently· the largest action they have ye·t
ndertaken.
We have no official confirmation.
" ·

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rumah is back in Accra, and the situation there ·appears to
ave quieted down for the moment.

,____lthe Yugoslavs
have toTff tne Soviet-s-l:hey are not~p-r_e_p_a_r~e~a~-to sign a German
peace treaty which is already prepared and about which no
discussion ~s possible. L_
Jthere is no point
in attending a "peace conference" unless the treaty is really
c_~~~_Jto be negotiated there.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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THE PR<}\'IS•IOKAL CEASE-FIRE HAS EXPIRED, LEAVING THE SITUATION Di

PRE"d~RIOUs,

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THE US AIR ATTACBE REPORTS HE CAN FUID :KO EVIDENCE THAT HADARSKJOLD

KATANGA

B.

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-1,1p material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, ·because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
IntelJie-ence in this publication is based on all sources, including

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Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person ; as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
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20 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1.

Cuba: . MIG jet fighter being assembled .at Cuban. air base;
Soviet freighter may be:unloading 15 to 18 more. (Page t)

2. USSR-Indonesia: Indoner a mav ·be taking deliver y on first
two TU-16s from USSR. _
_Page t)
3.

Bo~ivia:

Stevenson r~ports crucial need .for asser.t ion of
government authority; armed forces say they will take over
if Paz goverilll)ent falls . (Page t) ·

4 . . Brazil: Quadros tells embass_ies . in ~exico and Ecuador
to push plan for offering· LatinrAmerican "good office~"
for US-Cuban rapprochement. L
j(Page tt)
5. Congo: Kas~vubu - and Gizenga r~gimes reportedly agre~ to
convene parliament at Leopoldyille next week. ·(Page tt)
6.

Tunisia - Communist China: . Tunisian inform.ation secretary en route to Peiping may negotiate exchange of diplomats. (Page tt)

7.

UAR~Africa~ ·

Cairo increasing. financial aid to African states
it considers su.sceptib~e to its influence. (Page tt t)

8.

UAR-USSR: Cairo-Moscow pl ona,ganda disoute wani, ; Nasir
orders suspension of attacks. _
_ (Page ttt)

9. Dominican· Republic: US consul attempting to dissuade
anti-Trujillo elements from ·taking measures to provoke
US intervention~ (P~ge i·v)

CE.NTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 June 1961

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from

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*Cuba-.USSR:
report
a highly reliable source
cates that on 15 .Tune a MIG jet aircraft was being assembled
at the San Antonio de los Banos air base ih Cuba. 'T his is the
ffrst confirmed report of the presence of such aircraft in Cuba,
but there is no indication of the total number delivered· to date,
nor of whether it is a MIG-15 or MIG-17. The Soviet merchant
v~ssel Leninsky K~msomol, which ·~rived in cUba on or about
16 June ma have delivered from 15 to 18 more MIGs •

.USSR~Indonesia: The Indonesian Embassy in Moscow, ac:cording to ·~ intercepted message. of 12 June, has informed. the
Burmese Embassy that the USSR will ·deliver two TU-16 jet
medium bombers to lndonesi~ in the near future . . This would
be the first transfer of such aircraft out of the Soviet Union.
IQ.donesia has requested permission for th~ two.bombers, accompanied by two Soviet AN-12 transports, to stop over in Burma
between 22 and 25 June en route to Djakarta. The TU-l.6 s are to
be flown from· the USSR to Rangoon via Peiping by ·soviet pilots,
and from Rangoon to Djakarta by Indonesian pilots with Soviet copilots. · Under the Soviet-.I ndonesian arms agreement of. last January, the USSR is to provide a total of 20 TU:-16s during 1961 and
( 962: six of which will be eguipped with air-to-surface missiles.
Bolivia:. Ambassador Stevenson, in commenting on his talks
with President Paz and Vice President Lechin, r.e ports that the
Bolivian position as a whole is "desperately bad," and that the
..basic problem is the need for assertion ·of government authority o
The army sent word to. Stevenson that it was fully behind Paz,
and rather than tolerate Lechin, .will take over with ·a military
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. junta if Paz f~ls . Any such attempt would be .l.i kely to meet -.
resistance from armed elements of .the police .and of the workers' and peasants'- militias. j
(Backup, Page· 1)
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*'B razil-Cuba: The Quadros administration ·in Brazil is
going ahead with ·plans to offer its goqd offices, together with
·t hose of Mexico and Ecuador, in.an "attempt to bring about a
·rapprochement between· Cuba and the United States," according
to a 16 June intercepted Foreign Ministry message to the
Brazilian embassies. in Mexico City and Quito. The message
emphasized .that Brazil felt the offer, as proposed by special
./""6
Cuban emissary Carlos Olivares during private .conversations
with the Mexican, Brazilian, and Ecuadorean presidents in· late
May, wouJd have to be "extremely discreet" and should. be aimed
sole.l y at bringing the United States and Cuba together for bilat-.
eral conversations. The message added that Brazil did not oppose the participation.of Urugu~y and Chile in.the "good offices" (b )( 1)
effort--as proposed by Ecuadorean Pre~ ident Velasco--and said (b)(3)

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it would like to see Argentina addecLj

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· Congo: Representatives of _the ·Kasavubu and Gizenga .regime
(b)(3)
report~dly have agreed to a meeting of the Congolese parliament
at Lovanium Univ~rsity outside Leopoldville on 27 or 28 June.
The UN apparently. will set lip a neutralized zone with a six- mile .
radius from which all unauthorized persons would be.barred. Leo
poldville officials recently indicated to officers of the American ..
Embassy that negotiations with Katanga were-also going well, although Foreign Minister Bomboko was adamant that Tshom l!""·~"----"-1
would not be. released before the reconvenin.g of parliament.
(b )(3)
(Backup, Page 2) (Map)
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. Tunisia_.- _Communist China: [secretary of State for' Information Mohamed Masmoudi, who leaves on 20 June for .Peiping, will.---- . be. the first Tunisian official to visit Communist China, and m,a,.y
have .been.given the mission of negotiati ng an exchange of diplomatic missions. Pres.i dent Bourguiba indicated as early as July, ~---~
~958 , tha~ he was contemplating an exchange of diplomatic] · ·

20 June 61

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(representatives. Last fall he said he wou~d thenceforth oppose _the m.orator.i um on the Chinese UN representation issue
in the UN General Assembly; Tunisia to date. has ~bstained]
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UAR-Africa: Cairo, which has long prov~ded moderate
amounts of ·financial assistcµlce to African nationali~t movements, has recently begun to offer relatively substantial aid
programs to certain African countries apparently selected on
the basis of their presumed susceptibility to UAR influence. A
-c redit to Mali of $18, 720,000. to buy Egyptian equipment and .
services for a variety of economic and social development projects was e~ended during Malian President Keita's visit to Cairo
last week. A similar amount was made available to Guinea's
Sekou Toure whe~ . he. was in the UAR in May. Both countries ..
are associated with the UAR in the "Casabl~ca group" of rad~
ical African states. Earli~r the ·UAR granted an·$11,200?000
credit for · development projects in the Somali Repub~ic. Cairo
has also provided some militC\}'Y a,id to both the Somali Republic
and Mali1

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uAR- ussR: The three-week~ old propaganda dispute between
Cairo and Moscow is tapering off. On 14 June, according. to an
intercepted message from Cairo to Damascus, Nasir .notified
.Sarraj, "The. attack on ~he Soviet propagcµlda machine is to s~t_o_.._-i
since the~r broadcasts have not attacked us for three days ."
Only a few scattered items critical qf the USSR have ·appeared in the .Arab press or r adio since 14 ~une . Moscow ap. pears equally ready to end the propaganda exchange. A 17 June
Pravda article entitled "Who benefits from .this? " blamed UAR
press media·for creating .t he dispute, but stressed .the USSR's desire for maintaining good relations between the two countries. At
the same time, the article made lt clear that Uie USSR would continue to defend Arab Communists . and to protest the actions_ot_tru s
countries hich " ersecute" the

20 June. 61

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Dominican Republic: Anti-Trujillo e~ements evidently now
be~ieve. their. cause is almost hopeless and are .considering:ex.tr~me measures in an effort to provoke US armed .interve~tion .
The US Consulate ·in Ciudad ·Trujillo ·reported on . i 7 June·that it
. believes it has; at least temporarily, dissuaded .two prominent
. dissidents from such . a plan .to sabotage loca,l ·American invest..
ments and create the appea,rance that Americ~ citizens are in
danger.
· ·
· ·.
The consul noted on 18 June _th~t _since.the departure of the
special OAS subcommittee on 15 June the government has made
no further moves to give the impression of democratic inte.11tions.
No additional Trujillo· associates have. been downgraded or ·sent
out of the country, and the MiUtary..Intelligence Service is again
in .evidence althou ·its behavior has been· more .co'rrect than
usual

20 June 61

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Bo.livian ~ituation

President Paz. told Ambassador Stevenson. that since the ..
1952 revolution. the governing Nationalist Revoiutionary Movemen~ had tried. to push ·social deve.lopmel_'lt cµid welfµe fast.e r
than.the country's economic· development would permjt. W~th
.Jhe help· of foreign . advisers, as well as µie United Nations,
the government of Bolivia.- is now completing a long-term pian
to .increase annu~ per capita . income to $180 within .six or seven·
years; Paz states that present per capita income is $90 annually,
but other recent estiniates have been lower.
Paz said th~t his arrests of Communist.labor leaders had
created a strong reaction and that the CommuniE?ts proved to
have wider connections than the government had supposed. He
said the s.ituation was further confused by divisions within the
government and th~t Lechin refused overt support. Lechin Jater
. told Ambassador Stevenson Jhat his equivocal position is helpful
. to the .gove.rnme11t aild .claimed everyone knew he was. supporting
the government since he was pa:rt of it. He impressed Ambassador Stevenson as thoroughl~ untrustworthy and opportunistic.
·Lechin, who heads the national labor federation, might be
· willing·to oppose .the Communist arrests .i f .he· .thought.he ·would
strengthen his position with labor. Thus far he has refrained
from overt opposition, . however, and he evid.ently did not ~upport
the demonstrations on 15 June calling for release of the Commu.nist labor leaders. A reliable observer estimates that the demonstrations .involved only 450 students, some 500 workers who took
. part only briefly, and street gangs who did ..the most damage. The
demonstration. was led by ·youths who frequent Communist party
.headquarters .
The Boliyian Army numbers about 11,000 and the air force
950. The. national police nuQiber about 5,000 . . The American Embassy µi La Paz noted in March· 1960 ~at the police and the army
together are outnumbered and out- gunned by the civUian militia.
Membership in the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement,. which .
polled 70 percent of the vote in 1960, implies an .o bligation to drill
. with local militia un.i ts.

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_Situation in the Congo
Cyrille Adoula, the moderate interior minister in ·P remier
Ileo's cabi,net, seems .the· likeliest candidate for the prime ministership when. parliament reconvenes. Adoula has Wide support,
particularly among Gizenga's more moderate lieutenants, and
the American.Embassy believes the stanleyvHle leader·.would accept a vice premiership under Adoula. Ileo appears to have lit.:, ·
support from any faction._a nd in.fact has been re:moved from
the team which is negotiating with· Gizenga's repr.e sentative.

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The embassy believes thaf Gizenga 's position. has weakened
.in the last two months: .If feels that coming. to a parliamentary ·
, . session is the lesser: of two evils for him, since m·the long run
his position in stanleyvi.lle would not be tenable without massive
outside aid. I
IThe onlY: aid effort~ now pend.ing- -the medical supplies being brought in by an IL-18 from
Ghana and a $2,000,000 .barter arrangezpent with Yugoslavia-will not be adequate to meet his needs. L

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In Katanga, American and UN officials believe. that the re -

cent expulsion of Be.lgian extremist advisers .to the Elisabethville
. regime improves the chances for .Katanga's reintegration with the
·. rest of the country. Agreement reportedly has been reached between Katanga and the UN for the replacement of senior Belgian ·
officers in Elisabethville's forces with UN officers. [Belgian. For eign Minister Spaak stated recently that he hoped that 50 Congolese officers would be sufficiently trained by 1 July to enable
Belgium to begin withdrawing. its lower ranking gendarmerie officers. Spaak reiterated his view that the implementation of the
UN resolution could be made easier-if tripartite grm,1ps made up
of Belgian and Congolese officials could work out arrangements
on the spot in'.the. Congo_.. However, Sahbani, Hammarskjold's
representative in Brussels, told US officials that he did not think
·he could persuade the secretary general to· "buy the idea," at lea st
until after the departure of some 23 Belgians already nominated
by Spaak for ,withdrawal and of at least .some Belgian mercenaries.]

(b)(3)

[ Spaak does not share Hammarskjold's recently expressed
view that UN forces in. the Congo probably could be reduced from
20,000 to 5,000 by the e~d _ of the. year. ~aak: believes the situatiori)
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UN withdrawal would be dangerous. Hammarskjold; ,. in stating
his views tO. British officials in eaz:ly June, had also sa:id ·he
hoped to reduce the annua_l cost of UN. op.er·a tiohs in the Congo
.from . $120,000,000 to . $20,000,000. British-officials are in ·
.. favor of the goal but believe Hammarskjold's .timetable .is overoptimistic

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Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko. told an American qfficial on. 18 June. that Leopoldville authorities had positive proof
that Indian Charg~ Rahman had been involved in subversive activities against the Congolese Government. [usually reliable ·
sources have reported that Rahman, apparently·without sanction
from New Delhi; has been ~dvising· Lumumbist elements in Leopoldville and has act~d as a. channel for funds from Gizenga to
his supporters in the capital. · According. to an untested source,
he also was implicated.in a plot involv4tg a· youth group and army
elements . . The leader of the. yout_h. group was arrested last week
and may have furnished the basis for Bomboko's chargesJ Bomboko plans to send a letter to Nehru, asking that Rahman'b~ removed quietly in the interest qf Congolese..:Indian relations.
· Should the charges be widely publicized, the recent improvement
in New Delhi's attitude. toward .the Congolese Government would
. progably be nullified.
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, Tunisian Secretary of State to Visit Peiping .
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~smoudi's vis~t,

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originally schedQled for late February,
was planned at a time when President Bourguiba, having beeij
excluded~y King Mohamed V from the Casablanca conference
. of chiefs of state, was groping to resist both international isolatioµ, and th~ label of having "sold out fo the ~est." At that
time BoqrguiOa was persuaded by Iraq to send his foreign. secretary to._t.h e A'r.~ foreign µiinisters'.. m:e eting iQ· Baghdad. .
The Peiping vfsit was indefinitely postponed when
Masmoudi, who · earll'er had established a degree of rapport
- - - - -- ith-De Gaulle, wa~ c~mi~sioned to prepare the way for the
e ·Gaulle - Bourgu1ba 'i rleetmg on 27 February. Now that
ourguiba has completed ftis visits to Canada, the US, and
ritain, the Masmoudi trip has been rescheduled, possibly in
n attempt to allay· criticism that little more than lip service
·s given the offici~l policy of n~-alignment. An exchange of
issions with Peiping would facis·tate
Chinese liaison with the
lgerian rebe.l s.
·

(b)(3)

Masmoudi reportedly will be acco . panied by the Tunisian
~mbassador to Moscow and Prague, the\dir.e ctor of youth and
sports, and the director of the Neo-Destour party's Arabic-language daily newspaper and the official ne.w's, agency. Although
.this is the first official Tunisian visit .to Pei'(;>.ing, Tunisian
labor, youth and women's groups have excban°'g!ed
relatively frequent visits with. sbnilar groµps in Communist hina ever since
Tunisia .acquired independence in 1956.:
-

-

Even though Bourguiba had long ago indicated h wou.l d in
due course exchange. diplomatic missions with the Si~- Soviet
bloc, Soviet, Polish, and Czech missions were not estkblished
in Tunis until 1960, and an. ambassador--Bourguiba's abl-e
proteg~, Ahmed Mestiri., the former secretary of state fo).'\.f inance and commerce--was dispatched to Moscow and Pr~gu~-.
Tunisian relations with.the. Soviet Union have apparently been\
disappointing
to Bourguiba and lesser Tunisian officials. An \
.

\

\
CONFIEJEN'TIA
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' off
er of technical assistance. in. the construction of three small
........
dams in northern. Tunisia. seems not to have gone beyond the
discU8ston stage. On the other hand, a .first contract under a
Polish $a~OO , OOO credit arrangment was concluded earlier this
month for IBe~onstrl;lction . of a metal-products factory at Sousse
and the em_ploylnent ; of. 34 Polisn technicians. Other Czech and
Bulgarian technic~s are employed under contract by Tunisian
governmental departm'ents, and relatively active cultural affairs
programs have receiv.e'd ailii.xed reception in Tunisia.

Tunisi~' comm~ith

Although
s
the bloc has increased
substantially in the past several years';'such trade amounts to
. less .than 3 p~rcent of its total foreign tra~]lich .is still predominantly with Europe, particularly France. j

j

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20 June 61

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The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense .
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Setretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, rhe Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force .
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Securi'ty Age ncy
The Di rector
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of ~epartments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
c :ellie·ence rn this publication is based on all sources, including

(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the bentfit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3)

~~T

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5 August 1961
CENTRA!:i INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS

l. West Berlin: l ,306 refugees. registered on 3 August.
( Page t)

2. East Germany:· Contingency plans being put into effect
against possible West German refusal to renew interzonal trade agreement. (Page t)
3. Tunisia. ( Page tt)
4. Congo: Adoula emphasizes his intention to reintegrate
Katanga into Congo. (Pag~ ttt)

6. Communist China:. Changes in commune system reportedly
made. in response .to agricu~tural difficu~ties. (Page tv) ·
7. Bolivia: Paz government takes control of Santa Cruz from
local leader. (Page tv)
·
8. USSR : New Communist Party rules. (Page v)

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0
(b)(3)

TOTAL ANNUAL REFUGEE FLOW INTO WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY
r-1
L-:.J

, - - , Re(ugee:s enterf"9 Weit Berlin (mott
L ~ of whom loter go on 10 Wo1t Ge""o•y)

Refvge1:1 ontoring Wo1f Germony diredly
GCfOP

fast-West German v>nol bonier.

60

1961

WEST BERLIN REFUGEE TOTALS
COMPARISON OF 1960 AND 1961 BY WEEKS

10000

9000
8000

'

,,._/

I~

7000

I

EASTER .

sooo

~

4000

- ~. ..ii VR

1961
3000

I

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0

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3. 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 7 14 21 28 4 II 18 25 2 9 16 23 30 6 13 20 27 4

J ANUARY FEBRUARY

MARCH

Al'RIL

/

MAY

11 18 25 1 8 15 22 29

JUNE

JULY

AUGUST

DAILY TOTALS SINCE l5JULY 1961
2000
1500

llH

J\

~ 221

~4

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JULY

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15

AUGUST

(b)(3)

5 Aug 61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE .BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5. August 1961

DAILY BRIEF ·
. · B~rlin R_e fugees: 1,306 l"efugees, including 116 "border
crpssers," .resi~ents of East .Be:rlin·o:r the. S.o viet Zone who
work .in West Berlin, registered in West Berlin on 3 August.
According to West Ber~in · Senat officials, the East German
poiice have jnstituted "exceedjngly severe" controls at sector ~d . zonal checkpoints, and observers .in West Be~lin
have seen large nu..mb~rs of people turned :back to the Zone.
Senat officials report that .i n.five confirmed .cases border
crossers have ii;iterceded through .relat.i ves .with.their West
· Berlin employers .fo;r ·written-proof of· dismissal in order to
regain identity cards s~ized .by the. East German police. There
are unconfirmed press reports that the percen.tage of youths
fleeing to the West normal! 25 ercent of the refu ee total
is unusually hi · h.

D b)

'--------'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--I

The whereabouts of East German party boss· Ulbricht
since 1 August is unknown. Despite denials by regime spokesm~n in Moscow and East Berlin on 4 August, Ulbricht may be
in the USSR to discuss measures for dealing .with the refugee
flow and the effects of .the bloc's Berlin and Germ
olicies
on the domestic E st Germ · ·situ ti on.
as ermany:
e a
that the West Germans ·may, ~brogate the lnterzonal Trade
Agreement, in retaliation for East G.e rman pressure against
West Ber lin. ·
con~
tingency economic plans are being put into effect under which
some planned long-term investment projects r equiring imports_]

i

o )(.
(b)(3)

~~~~-C-05-97-3-68_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,

· [!rom West Germany are to.be delayed until other sources of
supply are found. The regime is attempting ·to replace West
German imports with goods .from pther ·West :F;uropean and
NATO countr~es, particularly the. UK, France, and Switzer ~
land. Presumably, projects well under way and those of high
priority are excepted f ram these planiJ
.
liast. Germany at present is continuing to import heavHy
from West Germany and probably will attempt to accelerate
deliver of items needed to com 1 te rio
·

' - -- - -- - t .

(b)(1
(b)(3)

Tunisia: Tunisia's director o{ national security has ex~
pressed the belief. to the VS ·ambassador that B.o urguiba has
suffered a serious domestic' political setback-as a consequence
of the Bizerte affair, the :effects of' which will be ·felt more over
the longer term than immediately. The secqrity director said
on 2 August that ~ven though .the nation ~d rallied to meet the
crisis, pqpular confidence .i n Bourguiba .has _b een shaken to such
an extent that a political opposition could arise later which might
lean ·on Egyptian, Algerian, or Soviet support.
. E!rench.Ambassador to the UN Bei;-ard told Ambassador
Stevenson on 3 August that a. meeting between the French consul general, assisted by military advisers, and the Tunisian
gove'r nor of Bize:rte would satisfy the French requirement for
_ _ _ ____... a bilateral meeting with th~ · Tunisians. Berard saj.d Paris would
give assurances in such·a meeting tnat French troops woqld be
pulled back to the base, and .would tnen ask Tunisia to guarantee
normal communications at the base. Berard added th~t some
French reinforcements could make an "early and conspicuous
departure" and that France would be willing to begin substant.i ve
discussions on the future of the l)ase in less than.two weeks if
complete calm returned to the area. Although .the Afro-Asian
bloc apparently has enough sjgnatures to force ·a special session
of the General Assembly, such·a session probably would not be
· held until at least 8 August, giving both sides some additional
time to arran e a bilateral meetin . _ __ _ _ _ _ __ .r--(b)(
. (b1)
)(3

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5 Aug 61

DAILY BRIEF

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ii

Congo: Adoula's initial statements··following his assump~
-tiori·_of ·the premiership have emphasized .his intention to restore
Katanga as an integral part of the Congo. Adoula's implied
threat of military action against Tshombe has been supported
by .UN officials, who have reaffirmed .that moves by the central
· government to reintegrate· Katanga with .the Congo would .not be
opposed by the UN.
The American Consulate in Elisabethville reports that
Adou~a's statement of his intentions concerning Katanga has
made a strong impression Ori T~hombe and his ministers, and
. thaf Tshombe appears to be searching desQerately for me~s
r QJ.lr:serve stability in ~atanga. j
discipline among Katanga army umts
outsi=e the city has deteriorated to a point where soldiers obey
orders only on a selective basis. The consuJate observes that
K~tanga army units tnay be content to continue. under present
conditions so long as they are paid. Nonetheless, the Katanga
army no longer appears to ·represent a formidable military
threat to efforts by the UN and the central government to reunifhthe Congo.
.
~elgian Foreign ~inister Spaak ·has expressed to Ambassador MacArthur his concern over a recent mes~age from
Hammarskjold indicating that, in view of Tshombe's unwilli11gness to cooperate for Congo unity, the UN planned immediate
action .to disarm the Katanga. army. Spaak stated that he believed such precipitous action might cause the· Katanga government to react violently, and doubted whether the UN·w s ca able
of kee in the situation under control.

c

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5 Aug 61

DAILY BRIEF.

iii

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ommun1st Ch.ina: Recent reports of changes in the com~
mune system in Communist China reflect Peiping's continu~ng
problems with farm management and peasant morale. Refugees
from South China report. that ·production groups within the communes are being reorganized into smaller un~ts , .that some
farmland is being assigned .to .ind.i viduals and groups of workers for cultivation, and that communal messhalls are being
closed down. Local officials acknowledge that the changes
are in response to peasant discontent and successive hf d har~

D

vests. \~--------------------~J

Bolivia: The Paz government decreed the eastern province
of Santa .Cruz a military zone on 2 August, and army units have
taken control of Santa Cruz city from the local chief of the gov=
ernment parfy, Luis Sand9val. Sandoval is a leftist who for the
·past year has exercised .control. over the· area in almost complete independence of the central government. Paz seems to
have used as a pretext for his present move the arrival in Santa
Cruz of a Constellation aircraft allegedly loaded with contraband- -another example of the smuggling .with which Sandoval
has long been linked. Some 1,000 to 2 ,000 local militiamen, loyal
to Sandoval, have reportedly retreated into mountainous r__e__s~-____,
near Santa Cruz, and mav ·attemot to recaotu~e c.ity.

5 Aug 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

*USSR: The Soviet Communist Party statutes--the rules
governing party organization and activities--have been rewritten
to bring them into harmony with the :r;-ecently published party
program. The new rules, although ·basically similar. to those
currently in force, incorporate the language of the new program
and the comparatively minor substantive changes in party procedures it calls for, but without elaboration. The s.tatutes,
which along with the program await formal approval by the 22nd
party congress iil October, were published in tl)e Soviet press
today, instead of on 20 August aS originally scheduled. Need
for more extensive discussion prior to the lower level-party
c·onferences which will precede the national congress probably
figured in the dee ision to advance the publication date. . . ;'-t
. =h~e_ _ _ _~
lower level conferences will begin later this month. I

I

~.--

L---------------~

4 Aug 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

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Recent Change.s in China's Commune a
the &>uth China province of
Kwangtung, peasants are obtaining gr.e ater control over the
cultivation phase of farm work. The "new system," reportedly announced in the. late sp.r ing and early summer in .various
communes in Kwangtung, entails the ai;isignment of collective
land in one- and two-acre plots to individuals or groups of
farmers who are to be completely responsible for tending the
crops on this land. Boweve.r, commune authorities continue
: to specify which crops are planted on what land, set the yield
expected from each plot, and dispose of the crops after each
harvest. .Peasants will in effect continue to work for the collective but will be free--within the .limits of crop assignments
and expected output--to work the land as they deem fit. These
changes, if wideEipre~d, would i.n dicate Peiping's inability to
apply collective methods effectively at the field level. ·
'-------,-~~~~-----.,.~~---::--:--:-'

Many messhalls have ·also b~en closed down, apparently
because of their continued unpopularity With commune members and because of food shortages. Reports of messhall
closures are so far conf~ed to Kwangtung, but a re.c ent article
in the Peiping Ta Kung P3.o, w~ich for the first time since 1958
failed to state that foodgrain is being. distributed through the
messhall ·system, suggests these cl9sures may be more widespread. The public mes$hall is the major remaining social
change introduced with tpe original commune system.
Pe~sants are reportedly being given more time to work
their private plots, and ·this of all the measures to boost peasant incentives appears to ~ve been the most successful. The
· pe~sants z.e al for collective work has. clfi!a;rly flagged, but rem~ins high. where individual; plots are concerned. These pri'. vate plots appear to have contributed to an increase in the
supply of non~stapl~ foodstl,lffs. This has eased the food shoi;-tage, but a corresponding fmprovement in peasant morale is
not yet discernible.
9

To justify these private plots and the free markets where
such produce is traded, Peiping has been forced into awka.rd
..

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rationalizations. It has argued in the press that private plots
are "not a remnant of capitalist ownership," but rather are
. "entirely socialist in nature." The rationale here is that private production is purely subsidiary in nature and· in no way
detrimental to the economy. Free markets have been characterized as a "small freedom within the big collective" and
designated "an integral part of the socialist system of commerce. " I
I

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Violence Threatens in
.. Of Santa Cruz

~as~ern

BQlivian Dep~rtltlent

The sweeping revo.l ution of .1952 wa.S less popular. in remote .Santa Cruz .t han in any other Bolivian department, and
violent clashes b~tw:een right-wing groups and the government party--·t he Nationalist Revolutlc;mary Movement (MNR)-have occurr~d peri~ically. This· is the. first occasion, how~ ·
ever, when .the national government has taken action against
the MNR militia in Santa Cruz . It is also the first instance
·s .ince .1952 of a clea:rly drawn conflict betWeen.the .armed
forces and the MNR ·militia.
·

Paz, who was inaugurated.a .year ago, has. previously dis ...
played impatience with the erosion of presidential authority
which .o ccurred wider his predecessor. During February and ·
March of this year Paz arrested and exiled a significant number of right-wing. critics as well as s~vera~ leftist extremists.
~n June he arrested 35 important CommW)ists. · Twice this
year he has decreed a 90-day state-of-siege.
Sandoval has no official status in Santa Cruz beyond .t hat
of MNR leader, but his control of the local party appara:tus
·h as been such that he has hired and fired department·officials
"with. cynical regularity :'I
Santa Cruz Departmeµt reportedly sent no tax rev~e_n_u_
e-.t.--o-.th
,..,e capital in 1960, .i n part because customs revenue
was used to reward ..the m~litia for service to Sandoval. He
has also been linked with. the production and e~port of cocaine
on a large scale.
The army contingent regularly stationed in .the area numbers about 400 and consists of agricultural service. troops .
These have been supplemented by· other troops,: and both the air
·force commander and the armed .forces commander are in
Santa Cruz. I
I

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5 Aug 61

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Speciol Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for Notional Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administrarion
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Boord
The Deportment of State
The Secretory of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy. Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Deportment of Defense
· The Secretory of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretory of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretory of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations}
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Novy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander / Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Di rector, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director·of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Deportment of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Jnformation Agency
The Director
The National lndi cations Center
The Director

CONFIDEiVTIA l
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The Situation in the Congo
"

fihe initiative in the eastern Congo remains with the
~--------,. Lumumblst forces and their trlbai allies, who reportedly
are becoming more aggressive as a result of recent successes. Baluba tribesmen have cut the rail link between
Elisabethvllle and Kamina air base and, together wlth troops
from .Kivu Province, continue too ose relnforcemen ·
e
UN rrlson at Manono ·
e
in e area. do.e s not .Plan
o a e strong action against the dissidents unless o~--""--~
do so by headquarters in Leopoldville. '-----------~
CJ the Baluba forc~s will .succeed ln setting up an "independent" .~tate in northern Katanga.'"]

L-----------'

(b)(3)

(b )( 1)
(b )( 1)

ITshomW's government in Elisabethvllle reportedly now
has imported more than 100 Belgian paracommandos. Although
Tshomb6 apparently distrusts his native troops, ·Belgian officers with .the .Katanga·forces discount the possibility of dissension among Africans in th~ armed forces. The native .civilians
in many of the province's important mining cities reportedly
present a threat ·to order;· they apparently. have some weapons
at their disposal-;]
·

rUN Secretary General Hammarskjold has J
Ireiterated his confidence in Rajeshwar Dayal, his representative

(b )( 1)

in Leopoldvllle, and has ·rejected .Ka:savubu's formal demand of

14 Ianuary that Dayal be recalled. HamJllarSkjold took issue
with charges made against Dayal by .Kasavubu, but said he ·would
·refer the matter to the Security. Council for final action:j
(b )( 1)

Dayal has been withholding informatlon and slanting reports
ln such a way as to favor Lumumba supporters. However,
Hammarskjold angrily told American officlals on 14 January
that he was "very determined" to keep Dayal in the Congo,
despite a campaign of "Russian-type" innuendo which n,e implied
was coming from Western sources. Neverth_eless Hammarskjold
may yet· have to appoint a .new representative if the UN followsj

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Ube precedent of acceding to such requests from ·recognized chiefs
._of state in the country where UN troops are servlng21[

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· agriculture, notably those concerning the "new·lands," .t he
corn.;,.fol!"'fodderprogram, and. the substitution of incen.:.
tives .tn place of coercion and Communi,st enthusiasm as
motivatiqn_f_OJ.:J:he·Soviet f~ been verv fJ cibly
restated.j
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· •congo: There are indications. that the Moroccan Governm~nt 1s .mo~.ing to dissociate itself. from Ute UN Congo operation .. rh~ 3,000-man ~oroccan unlt in J:he country· reportedly
has bewuP'dered not to fight against. th'\l forces suppor.t ing Lu- ~ _...i;
mumbatJ.nd the Moroccan· crown prince recently stated µiat 1 ~ :J..J
h~ had unde_
rtaken to begin the withdrawal of h~s forces by 5 ~ ,,.;
February. Hammarskjold has· told US offi~ials that, with ·Kasa- {j> 1 ~
Vubu:havlng ll)ade pubµc:hts request for the removal of Dayal, 1 ,a; .:L.Y.v
chief UN representative Jn.the Congo, h~ c·a nnot now appo.l nt a ~ / P 3
.new-representative. Hammarskjold implied, however, that
Dayal's contract would not be renewed when it la ses two months
hence;'

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*Iran: The Shah, faced by chronic financial difficulties
and ·persi$tent nationalist opposition, is .trying to stre~gthen
his position with a new round of rigged parliamentary elec~
.tions, now about 20-:ipercent completed, '.I'he elections started
in .rural areas about a week ago and are scheduled for· Tehran
-about !he first of February. _The Shah .apparently has hoped
that the elections, besides fu1filling constl.tutional requirements,
wou1d produce a favorable impression on.the United-States, on
which.he continues to rely for financ.ial help. Although the Shah
wiil. obtain a reasonably docile parliament, the electoral me.thods and the disorders which may still result from _them, particu. larly in Tehran, will maintain .the breach.between the Shah and
,the people, and th0 posslb.il.).ty of a coup against him continues.
.
.In an effort to moderate Soviet propaganda the Shah ·plans
tq send a "good-will" mission to Moscow in March. Khru- .
shchey. accepted .the· mission in princ.iple on 8 January.· Iranian-Foreign Ministry officials feel, however, that the USSR will
. continue to press for a prior. agreement on some .points which
could be announced·in Moscow on .the occasion of the visit. The
· USSR's aim is a.political accommodation which would at least
: begin to weaken Iran's ties with the West, but .the Shah insists
he will agree to nothing which would. compromise Iran's ob.UgaL_to_th_e_Centi:a.L.TJ:eabr.D=n.W-M.ion_and_tb.e_UnJ.ted_sG±e"

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I

18 January 1981

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

(b)(3)

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

OFFICE Of CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

t

tu>:s.....-

Al'T'P.:R US:S

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cunRENt' INTBLLIGFNCE WJ:EKLY SUMMARY
18 January 1961

Moscow, Pe1pLna, and B&nol
have now all accep~~d a proposal
made by Prince Sihanouk for a
14-natioo conference on Laos .

The meetinr would ~rosun~bly be
held ia Cambodfo and would in._
elude re pre eentat iv ea .tro111 Burl!UI,
Thailand , and South Vietnam,
along ~ith the 1954 Geueva participant& and member countries
of the ICC tor Laos . Thia maneu-·
ver, which capitalizes on gro•ing Asian concern ovor tho
course o~ events in l.4oe , seems
intended to retain the bloc's
initiative on the diplOlf)lltiC
f"l•ont and prov ido a 111011.ns to
obstruct nny·suggested solutions
to the Laotian crisis on Western terms.

The bloc llMlY al50 feel thA.t
endorsement of the proposal will
encourage what it cloims is increasing evidence of disagreement among tbe We5tern allies
concernin
lie toward ·
Laoe.

(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

CONGO

In Katanga Province, the
initiative re~ins with Gizenga
forces and tboir tribal allies .
Stanleyville troops and dissident Saluba tribesmen appa~ent­
ly control the UN-policed
" neutral zone" ln the northern
port of the province, vitb
the UN unable to take any
c ountermeasu.res .

put down , but the questionable
reliability of the troops has
further Jeopardized Mobutu's
ability to m.ti<tt tho milltar)'
challenge from Stanleyville .
Lumumba ' s transfer from
the Leopoldville army c~mp ta
Elisa.botbville probably was
designed to increase the eecurity control over t~e e~­
premlo1· .

In Elieabetbville, Katanga'e capital, President Tahombe'S
dlstr~s t of hie Afrlcan ~roops
appa1·ently .Ls growing, aad tho
ontive civiliane in many of the
province's important mining

c ities repo r tedly are increastng1 restive . Tshom~'s rel.mo
......,c--,-,------:-::-.,.,--..,...,.aiay
recru t ng
~ropean foreign legion to
s erv~ as a reserve security

a

It

may

also

be

connected with the forthcoming
round-table conference of Congolese leaders , now scheduled tor
February in Ellsabothvllle.

ilelations between the UN
and the Ka5avubu government
cont t nue to worsen . On 14 January JCasavuhu de1n11ndod that
Raje5bwar Dayal, l:IA-arskjold's
personal representative. ~aa~
the Con o.

forco.

In the Leopoldville are~,
anti - ~obutu mutiny in
ar~y appeare to have been

a brief
tho

PART I

OF IMMFDIATE INTEREST

On

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CllRR!nlT INTILLIGE!fCB WE"l!'.KLY SUNM.\RY

18 January 1981

however , Ha.nunarskjold
publicly roitorated
hi~ confidence In Dayal
and ref'u sed to recall
him .

Before bu recc1 vod Kas~vubu's demand, Harnmarsk.jol<I

had told Aaerican ot-

f icials that. be was

"very determined" to

keep Dayal 1n the Congo, despite a campaign
of "Russian-type" in-

nuendo which be implied was. coming frora
westora souroos. Subse~ucntly he added
tbat public pr~aure
would prevent bis
yieldini to Kaeavubu's
request. He informed
Kasavubu th~t tho
problc111 'll•oul<I be turned
over to the SecurltY

Counc.11 .~1----------~

CUBAN

rum RA ITIA~ OliV!i:LOPMJlNTS

Havana is makina a new effort to eliminate . the potential
threat posGd by anti-Cll&tro
guerrillas 1n the ~ountains of
central Cuba . There are some
ind1cations that Fidel Castro
himself is directing the antiguorr1 lla opO"ra.tione. ·rhe
new dr1vo is evidently motivated by recognition that as
long ae tbere remains ~ rallying
point inside Cuba, the re3istanco could ~nowball into a major
etlort, as Castro's own expe~i­
ence proved .
· There ·11as a smaller turnout than usual at tbe 14 January
rally in Havana , called to obt~in
the " peoples• ratiflca.tlOQ" ot
government preparations to reslst
tho "imperia.l.i a.t inva11ion" the

PART I

OP IMMfDIATE

government had been describing
a:11 1.mminent for m.o re than two
weeks. f1dol Castro and President Oorticos explained, in the
forme r's ·words, that " any c;r:lminal surprised In the act ot committing a crime can be stopped
b6forc he CODU11it& it, " thus implying that Cuba's prop~rcd~css
had stopped the invasion.
Yt wae announced at the
rall) tho. t tho "na t1 ona l •Ob 11 i.za t 1011" ""'OIAld be coot:ln\lod
through 20 January, a11d the hope
'll'&S expressed that tJ1e new administration in the United States
would "nake rect1tico.t1ons" to-

,...~d Cuba . Ho~ever , Castro
went on, "the headache i~ not.
ours.... If there is no r-ecti.fication, that is alao very good.

INT~REST

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D

: *Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold.has been alarmed
by reports at the Frem~h ambassadors in :LeopoJdville and
Brazzaville a.re encouraging Mobutu. and Le.opoldville's Foreign
Minister Bomboko to under~e ·a military coup again~t the Ileo
gc;>vernment, possibly this week if President Kasavubu's cooper~~
· ti~n . can. be secured. · Hammarskjold also has reports of the ar- ~
rival of a .n ew· group of "French mercenaries" in Katanga, and
·
. s~ys the UN representative there has demanded .they be expelled.
The secretary general sees these alleg~ French· ac~ivities as
·undermining hopes.for a .moderate Congo settlement a,nd as playing into Soviet. hands J
.
In Brussels, US Am.b assador MacArthur reports .t hat Foreign Minister Spaak·has objected.to the proposed immedi~te
withdrawal of Belglan military ~rom Katanga Provil'\ce on the
.growid that it would provoke· Tshombe and cre~te a "defin~tive
·rupture"- between ElisabethvUle and Leopoldvil~e . . Spaa,k main- ·
.t~s that the Belgian cadres are the backbone of order and
· S~bility in Katanga and that thejr sudden with4rawal wou~d lea,d
to chaos made worse by ·the possibility of conflict with UN forces
deployed to replace .them . . Spaak admitted that the powerful
Belgian mining interests in Katanga might be "pl~ying a differ ...
ent ganie" there. from that of the government, but ~nsisted .that
he IJeeded ·f irm evidence o~ this in order to proceed against. them.
[Spaak '.also opposed w~at: he ..called the "B.~itish .thesis" that the]

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lcongo parliament should convene _in the near turt=u=re=----=e'-'-v-=e=n:. -lf
. .:=-· ------~
it meant a overnment dominated.b Gizen a. "
R

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. . ·THE PRESIDENT'S.
.·-lNTELLIGENCE CHE'CKLIST
<

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5 JULY 1961
"-TOP SEG~ET_

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3.

Hammarskjold alarmed
over' planned ·cong~
coup. I
I

. ,..

c __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I

Mobutu a'nd
(b)(1)
Bomboko,with French encouragement, are
J
considering a mili ta~y .coup aga'inst
the Ileo governmen·t. ·The a ttempt"would
allegedly t.ake place in the next '\ve&l(b)(1)
if Kasavubu's support can.be·assured.
·The Secretary General believes that
such a c·oup would piay into ·soviet
hands by enhancing" Gizenga "s support
.
among the-.·neutralist A.frical?-":. s~a t~s· · (b)(1) ·
and would destro hopes for ·a moderate
Con o solution.
I •
(b)(1)
(b )(3)
.J

.· ... :-· .

4.

Chinese.Communists.put.
o'ut' feeler on private.
talks with US.

An intimation of Peiping's desire for
a series' of 'informal, private ·conversations·with us officials came at ·a
· recent meeting· between US and C~i·nes'e
Ambassadors in Warsaw. The Chinese,'
(b~(3)
.taking an unusually affable tack,
urged an extension of such· contacts,
but took. pains to· hold the· Peiping
line 9n Laos, Taiwan and th_e UN,
In
recent months, Peiping. has made ·similar approaches through other cha n·nels,
always insis.ting, however-, that Washington must take the :LJ._rst s·tep toward
improved relations . [
(b )( 1)

For The President Only.~

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. Belgium - Ruanda-Urundi: @elgian Foreign Minister

D

Spaab

recently raised with UN Secretary General Hammarskjold the
problem of maintaining order in the Ruanda- Urundi territory
during the forthco~ing August e.lections, when hostility betwe~ ·

·a July

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tr~bal

factions may erupt into widespread vioJence. The elec~
.tiohs are expected .to set the s~ag~ f of the independence of
separate Ruanda and Urundi states, probabiy by mid-1962.
Pointing ou~ the inadequacy of the military forces stationed
in the two territories..::o-1,200 Belgi~ : troops· in addition to a
partially .t rained native gendarnier.ie of so~e 1,300 men-..:
Spaak proposed .that either Belgium augment its troops th~re
or .t he UN bring .in additional f orce·s·. The.f or·eign minister
a,.dm~tted that the .first proposal would pr.e·s ent "certain polit~
.ical drawbacks," given .the present internatio~al situation, ~d
he:,would.wish to have recourse to it only with the consent of
UN officia~ I
I
(Bacl:tup, Page a)\ Map)

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The Situation in the Congo
While public demands by the Gizenga ."g roup have centered
around .a vice premle~ fo~ Gizenga and a suitable pi:_Qportion of cabinet posts> I _ _ - _
--- 1
Glzenga is becoming.·more confident of his parllam~ntary
strength and that he ·Will ress vi orousl for control of an new
central overnment.

D

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(b )( 1)
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(b)(3)

D

(b)(3)

CThe American Consulate ln Elisabethvill~ believes that
Tshomb6, .intoxicated by tn~ependence day oratory and by the
flatt~ry of Katanga's European community, has reached anot~r
.peak of- intransigence. The consulate observes that Tshom~ has
pressed his independent course for over a year against almost
universal opposition outside Katanga, ·a nd that he i s unli~~ly to
abandon at tJtis .juncture· instruments:..-such as his foreign advisers- -wlllch .he :regards as having helped safeguard Katanga' s sep- 1•
aratism .and economic prosperitz:J I

I .

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CUNtteOOlAL
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COPY NO.
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77
02a9/e1

20 July 19Cl

CURRENT
INTELLfGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

ll.{)CU?llEn-T HD. - - ' - - - - l1l tHi'.llZ ct ~!.A.n, 0

D

u~~t..o

~:o·~~;-:~~: n

A~Tlh

s(i) t1qo

Hl 1~.J

D..l1!l !& T~ fVL___ _ ___J

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF

AGENCY

(b)(3)

CURRENT INTEUIGEl'ICE

(b)(3)
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CURRENT I.NTELLIGDCE DULY 80DARY

+
CONGO
Abo~t 160 ot the a1e members of the Congoleee legislature have arrived at Lovanium
University outside of Leopoldville. the site ·agredd on for
the reconvening of parliamont ·
by leaders ot the Leopoldville
and Btimleyville factions. Eltteaslve negotiations are taking
place as the two reg.1111ea--Bl1eabethv1 lle is so far no~ repre·
sented-..,.aneuver for position,
UN officials are hopeful that
tbe seeslon CBn get upder way
1n tb@ next f~w daye .

and tension between UN and
ltatcmga troops in nortberp
Katl\n1a is increasing. The
&nericnn consul in Bli1;1abethville believes tbat 'l'shamb~
is curr.ently at a peak of
intransigence and is unlikely to
cbange his ottitude. · Moreover,
the Katanga president's olose
assoc1Qtos, especially Vice
President Kibwe a.nd Interior
Minister Dllu.nongo, seem even more
etro.ngly o»posod tbon he ts to
tho idea of reintegratioD with
the reat ot tbe country .

Moderates in Leopoldville
appear to be makiDg an effo~t
to dovelop Q cabinet slate under
Interior Minister Adoula . The
Leopoldville faction r@mQins
weakened by tbO mutual 6USpic10DS o'f 1 ts .l eadera, howevel' ,
and appears unsuro , of lts ~bil­
ity to dominato pnrliament.
Premt.er Ileo, reali.zing tb.at
hls c~ances 9f reta.i.ning b!s
position ozi.oe parl;lament con....
venes aTe virtually nil, is
coot1Qu1~g hie tactics to d~lay

According to a Ulf official,
IUbwe lus repudiated the recent

-itie sessioi:i .
Tsbamb6 atill iasimtg ~hat
be will permit bis delegQtes to
attend the session only if there
is a prior "swmn.lt mee~iag" of
Co~go l e ae leaders .
Since &ttendaQce at parliament by representatives from Blisabethville wo~ld
reduce Gi~onga's chances, it 1~
questionable that G12enr& would
agree to such a meeting .
~e bomblt ia under conaidorablo pressure from tbe VM to
abandon his separatist position,

20 .JUly 81

~eatfirm&tion of the military
accord betnen TtlhOlll~ and lltobutu
and bas warned T&b.ombe} not to
attend parliament on poril of
aesassin.ation by rightist Buropeap elemeuts 14 Blisabotbville .
There are also indications of
uorea t, stem11d.ng from grievances
cono~rntng pay .,-id promotions,
111 th.in the KtLta~ga arm_y .

Lea.den 1n th:t> Leopoldville
r .egi!llle regard TebocnW '"r:seven
deputies arid .eight sonators as
·an import.ant and po-rbaps essential 1actor in the ir power
struggle with Gizeng~ , and nonattendance by tbeso repressent&tivoa will 1.ncrens·e Leopold.. ; . 1 ••
v11le's mJ.ag1•1ngs concerning
the s esl!llon.

More tb.a n 60 po.rltomentariD.iJa arrivod in Leopoldville
from Stanleyvillo aboard UN aircraft on 17 July. "l'he aroup was
beaded by ChrlstoP,he Gbea1e,
G1~enga • s extr""'~et t interior minister : GU:enga 1"G211ai.ned 1n stan• ·
l eyville &8 ~result of aa illness .

DEP.Y RBVIBW

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CURR&NT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 9Ull!MARY

. s~oke$men associated with
tbe Btanleyv1lle regime have
i~plied th.at Gizenga will see~
the Congo premiership when
" parliament opens. The spokesmen allege , bowever, tbat G1zenga will accept whatever
verdict reaglts tro~- the forthcoming see.111ion. One represea.tative 1nd1oated tbat tbere was
strong anti-1'Jlsavgbu sentiment
la the Stanleyvtlle group, sug~
gesting that the Presidont's
position may become A mnJor
issue in Leopoldville .

In view of tbe continuing
struggle bet~eeD tbe J.eopoldville
and Stanle1~ille grou»s, pro~­
peots 1or tho 011rly 1oniaUon of
an effecUvo coalition gove:rnment appear slight. Btcb side
eeems cautiously optl.mistlc ~OQ­
cernin« its _prospe~te tor cont.rolling piarl1ament, and neit~er

ls likely to aocept with rood
grace tba position of a minor1ty group lo n coalltton . Gi.zenga 1 s tollowere, bowe11er,
may feel tbat tPeir greater
cohesiveness •ill permit them
evontually to control any 1ovorDlllen t, and that even a eoalltion offers greater pr0111ise
than .,going it alone" in r.e:m.ote
Orlentale Province. ·

Foreign Minister Spaak in- .
formed UM Secretary General
eomm11rskjol<J on l~ .i... i1 tbs t be
fu Uy agreed ~ itb the UN policy
on the witbdrawol O·f political
and m1litory advisers troP Ka-

20 July 61

tanga and waQ ur11ns private inter.eats to e~e~t econoM1c pressure on Tshomb~. According to
Speak ; Hammarskjold did not press
· the question o~ immediate withdrawal ot all. Belgian military
ofticer·e other than to indicate
thiat the eoonflr it was accompltsbed 1n an orderly fashion
witb appropriate replacemonts
tbe better.

Spaak has been reluctaD.t
to withdraw all Belgian elements
wt th out. assurance.a that order
will be maintained, for violence
to bolgl.an civilians would adversely affect tbe tenure of t~e
Lefevro-Spaok government. In
reply to heavy a1:tack;a from rlrb'i5t elements in the Belgian Chamber of Dciputies .roprdins tbo
expulsion of Thyaaens--Tsbomb6's
leadinr Belgla.a adviser-....spaak
stated that much of tbe ~resent
difficulty ln the Congo arose
fro1D tbe fact Unit uoir.e Belgians
at bome and io tbe Coogo have intervened in intern11l Congolese
offairs. Spaak believes that tbe
Union ~iniere , the large 8elgiaD
combine 1n ltatanga, bas not been
effoct1ve1y using its influence
with TShomb6 to get h1.lft to cooperate with tbe modoratos God
send delegates to parllamont .
Altboogh Spaak has written Tsbomb~
saying t~at be cannot conti.J>ue
to rely on Belgian pol1t1ca1 and
m1l1tary support and ~rglog hlm to
o.ccept o unified federal Congo,
Spaak feels that the B~lgian Governmen·t ' a influence with s~
s been
eot1 roduced
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78
OCI NO. ozeo1e1

11

27 July 1981

·cuRRE.NT

.I

INTELLIGENCE
.WEEKLY
SUMMARY

C E N T R A L l N T E L L I.G E N C E AG E N C Y
OFFICE OF CU'RRENT INTELLIGENCE
llOa!NDIT

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25 1uly 1961

DAILY BRIEF

*Tunlsla-Fran~e: lj'unls.ian offlclais consider that Haul~

skjold's presence ln the country will forestall a Sovlet move to
reconvene the Security Council. Hammarskjold .ls expected. to
recommend some contlnulng UN presence ln. Tunisia to observe
the implementation of the Sec~ity Council's cease:-fire resolution of 22 July:;,] . ·
No meeting has yet occurred between the Tunisian governor
and the French .base commander who have been asked by their
governments to arrange Uie details of the cease-fire and the status
oft~ city of Bizerte. ·lfunisian Defense Minister Ladgham on
24 July described the current situation as still "dangerous" and
said the French were using the cease-fire to improve their position. Bourguiba has reiterated that a cease-fire and return
to the status quo ante will by no means satisfy him and that
~
France mu.s t agree to the principle of evacuation of Bizerte and

begin negotiations on such evacuation in the near futur4iJ
Rumors that new French reinforcements had arrived were
partially confirmed
[it was "likely"
some troops arrived with a warship whose matn mission was to
repatr.iate to France some 300 families of French soldiers. Simultaneously, the arrival early 24 July of the first unit of Tunisian
troops recalled from the Congo should substantially boost Tunisian
morale.
·
Although J3ourguiba will welcome the symbolic gesture of the
Arab League in offering to supply "volunteers" to assist the Tunisian Government, he probably will be hesitant to have any appreciable
number of Arab soldiers actually reach Tunisia. [}.adgham told the
· American ambassador on 24 July that aid offers of men and military advisers were being received from many countries and that
his government has decided to "acce t in rinci le at least.
d t
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CURRENT INTJ!.LLIGENCE WEEKLY SUWJARY

Bi.zorte
Pres1d~nt Bourgu1ba apparont:1y wil). ei;iek an.other meeting 0£ the UN SscUrity Counci1
to ehe.-rge that France has :f.ai led
to comp1y with the counci1 1 s

22 July resolution urging aa
immediate cease-~ire at Bizerte
and th-e wi thdrawa1 o'f ;fo:r:"c'e.si to

positions held before hostilities. began o~ 19 July,
Before
the tenuous truce was e.f-t&eted
on Sunday, Pr-en.ch -tore-es h.a:.d
s~cured all access ~outea to

t:ho1r base
ceas~-~ir~

~-omple}t,
A -tormal.
has yet to b& lil:r~

.ranged bec&oae the -Preach ha.Se

commAnder and the Tunisian provincial governor) wno have been
charged with ·se9url~g an agreement, have n-ot agreed on a ei te
for. tne meeting. France is reported to have suggested a
"neutral epot" -O\.ltstde Btzerte

t-or the

mee.t~og.

Bou.rguiba ma.y have in~
·tendo-d ·to .fore-stn.11 a B!milar
move by the USSR when he stated
on 25 July- that he wantG-d 9-no-ther meet.ing of the Securi. t.y
Council.
An l\.merican UN o~fi­
cial nad a hint on 24 JUly from
Georgy Arkadyev. highest ranki n& Soviet Ila tional in' the
Secretariat, that the USSR
might cal\ tor another council
meeting,
Tilts of:ficial estima-i.es
thut if the French do not coMPly

_promptly wi'th 'the counct.l resolution 1 thoro will bo ~ further
W.B-eting on 28 July ''an-d a
Gen~ral

wcek.

1

A~se~bly

specin.1.

seseiofi ne)Ct

Bourguiba on 25. July rene.,;i;ed his de.mends tbr. t Trance

evacuate. the base and reiterated his appeal ~or foreign
volunteers~ Citing ~ rieed .for

guurr1lla £ight~r§, t~chn1Cia~s,
and ~r.rnr; to aUgx:ieut his crippl~cl
arm~.
The r~turn of the 3,100
Tunis~an troops ~ro~ tnc CongQ
will boost morale, but Bo~r­
guiba .~eels a need ~or so~ething
more than p1edges of solidar.ity
and is

s~eking

tok~n

at loast a

international forCG.
Tho~e

is Still no evidence

"that T\Jnis:1.a is aol.iciting SinoSov~et bloc assistance~ despite
the tnct tha~ Tunisian ofticials
--inc1ud1ng Amhassador Habib
Bourg~iba,. Jr ., 1 in Washington-have hinted that Tunisia ml~ht
turn to th:e Soviet:' IJnJ.on.I

Tbe Bizerte

cris~s

and

Bo\•rg01ba"'"s :fe-eling that the
West

b~trnyed

ture

~ra ~X11GCt~d

hiD At this juncto be reflect9-d ln a modif.ieation of hi9
polic-y of pro--We:stern nonal.ignment1 'and aDti-Western tendenc1ee which Bourguiba has heretofoT.e held iii cb-eck are lik.ely

to emerge, Although he has
sought to remain ale>of fr-om

'

Harnmnrskjold, who arr~ved
in Tunis on-24 July at Bourgu1ba's invitation, is reported
hopc~ul tnat he can persuade
both th9

.fears of reprisal.a by tbo sizable French colony in Bizorte
and by Tunisian action in <le~
t-ainin.g and expelling Froncb ·
citizens and seizing French
properties throughout Tunisia.

Tun~s1~ns

and tho

French ~o conform to thg rseotionJ in which case .~r1t would
not be too di~ficult £or the
parties to reach a negotioting
_posture,'' N.egotiations, hcrl!'ever,
would b-e complicated both by
~-U

z-7 July 6J.

Middle Ea.s't"e-rn e~tanglemcnts
and llas quar-reled bi ttorly with
Nasi.r, h.-O 1-S no.,,, co!:llnitted to

rasumo full !M:!mhership in the
Arab League and to re-establish
diploma~ic relations.'~ith the
UAR. Renewal of these tiesi
hovever, 15 not likely to eliminA.te wholiy the suspic1on Wi~h
vbjcb A.r;-a.b leaders generally re.gard,.:Bourgu:lb-a and his e.sp1.ra.tions

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
·28 July 1961

DAILY BRIEF
.

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*Tunisia: ri:Iammarskjold is convinced, and probably .will
so .inform the'-secur.ity Council on 28 July, ·that the continued
presence of French.forces in Bize:rte, against the will of
Tunisia, must be· considered a threat to int~rnational peace.
and security ·within the meaning qf the UN Charter. He is almost certain to· recommend that France·accept the principle
of evacuation·as desired by Tunisia.and·the negotiation--"free
from any pressure from either: side"--of a reasonable schediile of evai:u9-tion:]

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ua ion
, /.___ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______.\have consolidated their positions in. the area and that French. paratroops had that morning completely sealed o~ the native quarter of the city. He
observed that no one was allowed in-:or out of the old city, and
that the paratroops had commandeered shops, bars, and other
e.s tablishments all around the perimeter for quarters and had .
set up emplacements at all strategic spots along the perimeter.
French officials in Paris, while admitting the encirclement of
the native quarter in reprisal for the capture .of some paratroopers and civilians ~ho had "wandered" into Tunisian hands,
claim that five exit points were established and that the area
. is controlled to .prevent unauthorized traffic and to "pen up but
not stifle"_the area until ~e captive·s are returne~:]

-

/

~rbed

\and strung
wire· at strategic points adjacent
to the naval air base, and that the Tunisian Army has set up a
. defensive line in the hills surrounding BizertEIJ
(!he governor of Bizerte claims that 400-500· French reinforcements had arriv~d in Bizerte on 31 July,and Tunisian
morale, ~aised by Ham~arskjold's visit, is a~ain ebbinO

ft.

French Foreign Ministry official reiterated on 2 August
that De Gaulle would not accept or be guided by any third-party
mediat~on, especially from the UN. This official declared that
the. Bizerte matter could not be settled in New York and that the
. best advice to give. Tunisian. Defe~se Minister l.adgham, who ·
was then in Washington, or other Tun~sians, "including Bourguiba,"
was t o start co~idential negotiatioi:t!J

~anwhile the French representative at the UN, apparently
on iristructions from Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, outlined in a 2 August conversation with American representatives
France's position on talks with the Tunisians. He said it was
the "absolute French prerequisite" that the first phase of talks
take place at Bizerte directly between :rumsians and French, ~

4 Aug 61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE .BULLETIN
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Congo: Adoula 's initial statements«following his assump~
ttOri'_ ofthe premiership have emphasized his intention to restore
Katanga as an integral part of the Congo. Adoula's impl.led
threat of military action against Tshc;>mbe has been supported
by .UN officials, who have. reaffirmed.that moves by the central
government to reintegrate·Katanga with .the Congo would.not be
opposed by the UN.
·
The American Consulate in Elisabethville reports that
Adoula 's stat~ment o~ his intentions concerning Katanga has
made a strong impre.s slon on T~hombe and his ministers, and ·
that' Tshombe appears to be searching desperately for means
to .reserve stablli in Katanga. ~
[ -----------~
discipline among Katanga army units
ou s1 e e city as deteriorated to a point where soldiers obey
orders only on a selective basis. The consuJate observes that
Katanga army units may be content to continue ~der present
conditions so long as they are paid. Nonetheless , the Katanga
army no longer appears to ·represent a formidable military
threat to efforts by the. UN and the central government to reunifhthe Congo.
.
·
l_!\elgian Foreign Minister Spaak ·has expressed to Ambassador MacArthur his concern over a recent message from
Hammarskjold indicating that, in view of Tshombe's unwill~g­
ness to cooperate for Congo unity, .t he UN planned immediate.
action.to disarm the Katanga. army. Spaak stated that he believed such precipitous action might. cause·the·g:atanga government to react violently, and doubted whether the UN·was ca able
_ __ _ __,, of .keeping the situation under control.
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· 5 Aug.61

DAILY BRIEF.

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10 Augwit

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE

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A ye.u..r ngo,

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tJSS.R.f

s

ROLB lN

t.hov1rht

i"t Bfnt an exce11-e:n-t opp-ol.'"tun1:ty-

to {q:flus-nca t+ho ConEW-'-B- polt,t ...
ic~l and CCQno-mi.c develQpoilQnt~­
a.nd 'tO adv.nae& Soviet go.ale :1(}~
A1'r1¢~ ~e

ing

a

a

tir~

wh.01~--by

adviaory

~Btabl~h­

posit:µ,~

nm

CQNGO

Co_ago-lose- dlli'.1.ng tb.¢- J):('c-ind'6!..
pond&oc~

Eb'uod Tti.bl~ C-0n1erence
·tn Sruats-el."!- c~r.ly tba t .year.
~t~cipal

rcaponsib111ty

ap-pareotly Wl'.liJ i;is9:.lg-.nee1 to tb.e
Belg-inn ~mun.1st par·ty (Pea)

rlt-h-111 t~Gt ce-Dtra1 govoTnment
at 1..eop:oldvi1le.
Por ·a t11t1e 1
·tho trSS'R'a -o-1>JO"ctive o:r uot:fy~
ing the .coTintry Undier Patric€
Lum:in"b~ co.11'!c.1dcd .-i ih i.be a.i,m

and, wi tblll "the. par-t;y, ·to (:0fitral COllltl'!i tt-oe P1Grriber Albert:
Deaonia.cit, Tr.1.pa t:-0 &ct Gc-r-

0-f. .ind.9pendont- A:fr-1<l'-IH:i .stt.:tee.

a.otne:-in(:,luding -01.%ef1$11.-vi~ 1 t.--ed

8ov1€t le~dQra~ ho~ev-cr, un~er­
~a~1n~ting tne e:rtcqt o1 AtroAsian support fqr the Un~ted

Prague, Q_nQ Y.o-s-cow

ID~ny,

o-trered tQ th_q

~-

"lff!t-1'"~

dial.agates~

e..ttd

the. 'blo-c du.ring and i~c-di.atel·\'
--.!!._t.t:e-r t.h_e_c.o.n.f_~e-___...

(b)(1)

Niitt.1ons 1 Ove:rp1aye-d thoir haM 1
and .:bl-oc a1.il:B ;ln ./\.fr!CtL
S"tlttered u aGvere set-~cis:.

A1though its opportuniti19;0
to 1..o:fluooce. the si-tua.tion bave

dimi.11iahed ~ Uc

l)S~R

do.ea n.¢t

cona.ide:t' t.he Congo n lo:;it -Cll.U-BE-.
An .e.ight73hn Sov.1et d:iploma t1-e

arr1. ved un~aoounce<I in
Gizetlge. :iiJtNnViold of' stunleyv.11Ic- Q~r-1.y laat trlQn.tb~ p.reosumably aot~c~p:itiD~ tbe reconvoning o:f t..h.11 Congoleae p::irl·iQ.aent.• fyo i:e.rnbera of" the- ·So-v.iet
PON;JiiUL M1..01BtT.y told an American o-fj'j_cial on 27 July tbnt
the tra!lR oxpQcte.a the forma"tio-:n 0£ c. Co-.ngoleJ:1:c- t_{OVernz.ent:
roprq.geotln_g Al), :ract1ons in
lilia~.ion

thQ

PAr.l.iame-1:1~.

to

lJosco'll' hrt:;: l>ollVfi

l.ay tho. gr-0ull.CJ"a'Qrk for culCo.ng:olc.u:Q ex-cre:Li.st;.9

"t.i vo.-t in:rr

Md tOO.Se <i-l.IO"JOODta B)ltli.tlll. tho-tic

to Lhe Colll1Wn1st. bloC.

Th'3" Be-0.1J..Omtt: .Ro"ad Ta.bLe
April ,,_nd early May o-f ·
1960 s:avo the Pea un-d bloc rep-l-"-01;enta t-\v-ee J._o. lh:-~B-Bt1l..t:! :turtiler
occaai.-(")o for contacts -with t-b-e
Cori.gol.ese.
~n 1at~

{·.

Af"ter tJie J)elg1an Govern-

ment cndGd its admi~~tr~tion
r;,1 the Con(;_-0 on 30 ·.:mne lS-6-0 •
Khrusht:!MV :;iont a personal me!'i.s.&ge rocogn~zi:rLg the rogt~~

Wid

rQq~e5ting diplon+i.ti~

r{l18-

"t.ions.

'nl.e SQ-vio-t tte.lega. us
.a:tt".e-111i:1ng Uie- tna.epe-n.de.nee~erQmonie:s re'.ltil1hed norQ than
a week .i11 Leopol.dv111e. aoo .at:.
tn-eir depn.rturs an agr-&ement
to exch~IlS'e ambaasador~ wAs

l"lnnou.oce-d ..
'Th.o· mu-tiny. lllhicb !lrokc;i- ·

out a week a:tt.or .ind0J)encte.nce--among- CongQl-o:so "t:r0-0_pB aear

Soviet: act:lona 1:n 'th-e

Leopql~vi.l.le.

ceived 1.ndet_v-ond.en-a.e ·g.nve no

cro-116~

who denan-dcd inpey a.n.d the- :r~val ot

evid~nce

BelgLILI:l.

o££i~cra--1n~t1ally

mo-nthB OO;fo.re the Cori.g-o rethat the

Kre-.ii~n

lead-

-ors anti_e:i.pat<;1d the 1a~.r d-Q--

velopme:r.rts- there.
Pl;'.;l-or to
19S~ the bloc rn~intalned ltm1 t-e-d COD.'t.nC tlil -wi tb Congo lG30

poli-r.:1,ca.l_ t1gu.res WoiJ,eb 'tbe
Cz..e-ch Co_ll:9U1&-tc. :i:g, J.i.eopol<1v-1llc.

'I'h-.:;i Comroun.W t5 beg.a1'6
ri tie:

9.}'B1:tim-

,o,,.),. <ti va,ti.on -0-f lGnd1.n~

ltilt

not. politica_lly :f..ll:9pired or

primar-ily

ant~-Euro{XIBn

in

Jt re-ceived impcti;m, bowe-ve.r t ~ri;tlll intl'1.mr;in.tory -anti-Bol gian speeches
boy L.um-u.nbo...,. wbo bad eome out
ahei'.l.d Qf. bis r~v.nla .in el-ec..~ioJ1b: n fqw weeh~ -0~rli~r ~nd
ch.Elr&o-to.-~

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lrn!e,pe'DClen.c:e. Thle w•e fol.Lo.ad
by 41 Soviet. Oov~. r;il!l$nt statement.

)N"ffljllted o : rqq111fft .f'.Nlm h1rll

and :P.re9t~flut K:aJ011,vv:b11 1·0.r tm
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~t•i~ th~OIJfh dt~ct m11it&~y

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pollttcal and ecof>Omic •it_..__
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follow~;u,1 86"& Sov~t

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cd t!N actio.n tQ ~qal vitll t -h e
deep i.o Due.rs Afr-J.c11; and at the
ai t.uat.1..0l!I i.o an effort to pire..... ti.me to tu.rltl.~ th'D use~· 8
vont 'lln£le..tinr11\ •es tern ioto:r~
po~ aa cb111111>'1on ot .1 u1t.ieol.ootaL- · 'Htn:tl9111, tore~ 'the wi.UICfJ".a:n.l of
~~~. b&~etl!!U;:t-oY of uc:rsrly 1114e.Belelo.n troops a:n.d ci.vlliao ad~~o't J\friC11.a. lii'ta."t.es~ .tu:id dev:lr;11JnJ • a.lld e:t.rongtbtl'D tll.e ·Oen•
lillb

a

io -eet.ab-

.e~rcag blo~ ~$encc

o~ At'rtcaD and Ae~an
tiol!.~Uem.
ID Aftltioo 1 i.t

feruter

o:f:tered t1'9 posl!libillty

o~

na-

~rol

fovw.mui:nt.

Premtci- lf\l-

lllWlba a e:stl.'l!mo aottcolbnial
na.tiarui.Usm S~ljX>ri.od 't.l)e t>loc Te

open•

in.g to Co1mnn1~st pei:ii!!tr.11 Uon a·Ja;iy
~ 1u;ljg,ceat to tb• ~t.111 de~
,pen<lent to~1t~~ tes ~f ~r1tl8b
Ee.•t Atrtca, tb• 11\)i>tl.'lgu~m·
colonies, alld. Wifbin the
1're11Clli CO!linmntty, the new Cen.'tJ\41 Atr1c.an. RcJl'll;b ltc. and Congo
l?.eJ)IJbl ic Cl'r'-z:zo.villc) ,

ob,Jec't.i:V'e

0>t re110v.u a: Sut\cpclllll

.

tll1lu~nces ~ram A1r~ca.

statelll ta?Ore:d ml' laC.rv~ntto.111
as a memas ot eas.1.11is ·ten.11J.op,
r~torlDir

au~hQrit.Y

tba

Leofoldw1~1.lii

·Of' thc-

reat1De 1 and ~Vo1G­
:las ez:t.e11Biac of tM col-d \Yu

The eollapsi!! Dt the Pa.rib
''1Ja1111tt•• :llf!ettl!l8 two acnt'.bai
earlier ha-d eoded Mo!s>cow ':e p:rc•~EJIU.t attl~~e of ~ooc~l1a~1oa

tn:to At:rJ,C;!a .
G'haaa .a.ad' Guinea,
.111re.n.c1y atd.i.Qg 1..1.1~wt1be. i .t:o11n- ·
ciial l;y H 11art rd tri.n eff0rt

toll"ll;ird

1°"c:l&rSh.1p • ~o pa.r't.1Cl.ilA.l'ly .
tiqel' to coooerate vi·th tbe VJ9.

too

l•&de:l'l!!I had

1

'fu i111depcil.4o11't i\fric&n

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I

to promote el.alma to, Afrd,e11n

lh:l!lt. --~d soviet
a4o~ted qn 1ncreas-

t~l)' belllgeNtai p01lt.urc;i . •or-eover, t.be C'oo~o G1tullltloa £0~­
Jio'ft'ed i:.o tbe nkt! 0£ th.9 C:Ct.bfcir-ence· at. Commu"tst leadc%'4
at Buo~a~ ln lato J~ri.e. at
.'lih'l,1:1) Ute Chi.eCliae or.al;y nc:-

COago f;ro111 o.lrifel.coac for.1KA

I·:· '

.i.nter'lea.tioa.,

tow a lid the •est.

lne P"im.ior. and tbe mi--w eet

c.ueed

X~usllc.bev

Jn. addition,

as 11.c:cU.awr

ot softness

A. 11"c:1:r1c

poi.i;rt at 18'!Slle ..-.11.

~tie

degrgg-

an.d 0~11eter ot 11uppo:rt thi6
bloc: ebould p ve a1a1:foimlle:t
JtOff'DDDte 12' the IJll411U'4&vclqpod·
:11.reaa .

Coa10 coa.ld

b9

~n.dl.le

f~lly

A~

8t11:bll~"Dts,

ma~io act1v~t,,

.11.~ plU''t· of its
UDll·,

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eonv.eae~ tlO diGc'l:lil9

v1tll:ar6w~1

~11.d

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cm111ne ·for t:be
.force&.

Ia the early d11y• o.t t .be

crleis. Sovh·' t leaders sio1U;gbt
~

eree.te the

that

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A ree.ol~tton ~Nf•na­

111.bor~~lo~.

Ml:llSCQW

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in;g Dltl.1?1111Z •.e ".nr!Dl94 aa.itres.e10ll ,., acc-lq .1:111.e V3 · of eoi-

p~oPRJtaAda

&od

ta.

s t tQatl<Hfl, the

'lllOUbted an o"Xwast ve c:-Ji•.tao

of qff.1c1111l.

~ncl-~l>Y •ci'td:.clf
IW!t:1'1!co 1-be ~Jl8o­

~l.:eewbere

seaaiaa.

explolte4

rt.olh 111114

sav an oppo:i:--

preeeden~ to~ (~re si~ua-

1!1onil

liloviat le.ader.!I applllNDt.ly
.1·e -u th~."'- develoPl!lltlli& in. tibt;:
T.i tboait

t.IM)'

til~ity to ~hbmnec tttelr role
witJda. tbo ln:teroa.U.9 aa1 ·Ol'san.U:at.i.oa., to 1nsu1ate tbe

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pe~ialist aggression" made emcb
uooe~eary .
Responding

action

to Lumumba'e reitQrated tbrc~t
a tew days later to request
Sovi~t troopS, F1rGt Peputy
Foreign Mi.nieter .K uzncit6ov told
th$ scicor.1 ty Council that the
ussa would "CU\filtrer all requel!iltB"
of paaples struegling . for liberation. These carefully ooncomn11tt~l pledges, by appea.ring
reepoDBive to tho COngo G<>vern~ent 'o conc~rn, were ~lso inte11ded to bolster LWJ\ut11ba's
tom.1.oua bold over the governmental macbinory.
Meanwhile, the USSR bernn
rallying .neut:raliat c;upport
tor its campaign to brand tho

Weatora. co~ntrtos aggressors.
Pirst Deputy Prend.02" 111koya.n
a4Q Foreign Minister Gromyko
ox-pounded Soviet vie•~ on the
Congo situation to d1plom~t~
a:t a reception on 13 July and
callod on tho Afro-Asian countries to . join .tbe OS:JJI in ' denouncing ·the West's intorvcntion.
Bowevar, SOviot

le~ere

were caref·u l to avoid becominJ
isola~ed trorn tbe •tro-ABian
posi tion . Jn t~bo secur.J. ty Coll,l)ci.1, Jtu~notsov withdrew his
reGolution c~llill8 for evacuation o:f 'B elgian forca.&; within
thr~ dAy~ and acceptod a lllOd-

er.ate one for "a.poedy" withd.rawa:l spouso1·ed by Tunisia
and Ceylcm .

Sov~et

tatuc~ ~he

lead in urging

Septembe1•, 'lrbon bloc pe-rson.o.ol
wero expelled from the ·C ongo,

the Soviet bloc provided

~u­
e~trem~ st tactio~ w1th

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17 a:J..rcr~ft (;ioolud1ns ~ poi-aonnl plane for ,t.wrumba.), 1·0 0
t rucks , and \Jnknown quantities
0°1: tfln.A.l), A.J"lllS t IJIOlle Yr fOO<I, and

madicinea, The 'b loc ~•t 350
to 400 tecbn1cian11 llJld several
't11g11-1evel pol11:i~al a.Ad e<:onomi c adviaGrs, and SOvict IL-1&>
ferried Ghanaian ILild Guinean
troops to the COngo in guppor1:

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of Ltu:rumba •
~~d nnd . s~pport

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Tbo

.

of bloc

and l"Adical Af)'iCCUl t!lt11.te.s enco,;; ·aged LumUJ11ba. to take a ho.rd 1i.aa
w.ltb )119 oppo11ents 11.~d to de:fy tbe
UN . i11 order .. to. acb.ievo bi& eoal or

....
~

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· unifying the Congo un.dar hie personal. rule •

Re l)oasted o:t bloc

eu.pport ~nd of tho soviet tJ'OOP6
Wh.icb would be seat 'if hCI requested the111 .
Soviet leaders apparently

became concerned over the eI-

agseJl'nt"ed Congo1e1;e elCpeotat:ions

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UH a$sistance to thu COn~lcee
Qov·e rnment , llk>scow was obta..in.1ng max111\\lm propaaan~a adv~n­
tago by circUJ11venting the UH
tac111tie$ ~d delivering ai~
d1a-ectl)' to tbo Congolese. Tbe
first Soviet planoloe.d of :fOOCI
supplies arrived in Leo.PQldville
on 2(1 JuJ.y; :troro thea uatll 11t1d-

mu.ioba '~

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were

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t9 Lu1111.1mba'q and ~~vu­
bu 'a req'le.e t oo 14 July to
"watch de·v elo,pmente closely"
since the Congo Aight "!ind it
necessary" to ask for Soviet
~elp, lltbrusbcbe~ prom.i.sed
"rosoluto RQV..Sure!J" and t:be
"required ·h elp" if furtl\or " .i m-

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the US.SR 1111gbt intervene..

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of bloc s~pport . A party or
soviet rep:a-~&entatives heAd&d
by i'orei~ ~lnist:ry oftlolal
Foatn--lat:~r a.ppoi.ntod Bov·i ot
ohara6 d'o.ffaires--arrlved in
Leopoldville in lnto July
abOllrd a Sovl,~t food plane to
coo~dioste future movos •~tb
the wmum'b a g0vernme.n t and
cbannol fir.at-band io.forne.t.ion
to

force agai~st op_poattion eloment~
--par ticulai-ly seceas ~onist
KiitangQ Province--to unity the
countrf under Leopoldville. They
feared that polltleQl fr14irmentAtlon
into autonomous provLnc i al covernments. would eocourage continued
econom.la 4o-peo4Q.noe on Brussels
BJ1d tbat national a11ogiaQco
woul d be $ ubor.~nated to tr~ bal
ano seottona1 loyalt~ os.

Moscow.

During l.UIJlumbB' 9 visit: to
New Tork at tho end Of J u ly ,
tbe 1.JSSR sougbt to mod.orate
Coogolea.G demant1s. no Soviet
Govorn:ment state.i>Onts issued
between S1 Ju.ly atld 5 August
reAffirmed the OSS!l'e readl.oeB9 to ' ' to.to resoluto :mea:!lurqs
to rebuff 'the aggresGors ," but
they .oaro:tully avoided com~ · ·
roitttns Mosaow to UA.llatera l
Action ,

' '·'\

Sec ~ otary G<Jnera.l Uammo.rslfJold, ~owever. ruled that
the tm re:llolutionr.. did n.ot Authorize CJll troops to \IBe force on
l>Obalf of ~~o centr•l goverome~t.
~is failure to movo
agatnst Tehomtl& •s Bel.sian-bac'ked
regime in Xoitanga d:rew $tron&
A:tr o..Asillll and bloc orl tlcis:11 .
Mosoo• aaouo.ed 88.Jlllllarelejold ll~ d
~oder Secretary Bunche of connivance ·with the W~stern powers
to pOTpe tuate colon~al control
UQdOr CO~Or Of the UH.

An ·o((i~al st11to.ent on
20 August ca11tained tbo ttrs t
reference to "volunteelt's, •• a
flood 01 which ooal.4. come from
among "1oyal f:tiondsH 111 A!riaa
and other continents lt additional NATO units were sent to
the COA80· Th• Congo three
day$ later ~ejected soviet mil~
itB.ry b.elp, however, .e.tati.ng
that · it did not oeed ~oreign
volunteore. SOviot propa.gand11
began to claln thQt Moscow ' s
action ~ad preve ntod t~e US
from intervening in .the s ituation .

Wbon Mo~utu o~orth:rew Lil111._ll'lba on 14 Septll'llber and 9ul>s~.quently expell&d till bloc
reprcnJenta.t ives , Sovie t tactics
entered a now ph~so . Tbe USSR
launch4'1d ILD all-out <!&mpalgn
to wtoeck tho U.N'lil Congo operation _ Moscow ~ for tbe llrst
t i me, broke ~ltb tho ~fro-AsJ.aru.i
by ve'totng 10. -t'h e Sc>curity Co'li.11oll a codorate resolut i on 8ponsored by Tuni~~a and CoylOG des i gned to conf~ Hamm~slejold ' s
stnnd agAiost unllat~nl m~lltary
.support to tbe Congo .
Geoeret.1
Asa~~bly approval o1 the resolution on l~ Septc;miber provGke:d
tbe f~rat Soviet prop&lfllnda
criticism of tho Afro-Asiaq
poaltion , In his sboe-pounding ~ddre-5'0 be(·Gre t.he Gen.era.l
Aesem~ly
a. yeek later , Kbruob6hev reafrirmed tho USSR ' &
•uJIPOrt for Lulllu:ml:la and made,

Attitude TOWIU'd tbe U1ll
Sovlot lea.de1·• trom: thoo
outset rotarded tho UN operation in tho Congo n& no ~oro
than a te111porary expedient for
olla~atin~ DelgllUI intluence
and c:reau.ng conditJons tavoi-able to advancing bloc alms l~
A:f r.Jo4. The Afrio8JI · sto.t es expected that th~ UN would a.et in

h18 ·v tl'Oi'ka " . proposal

replacing
gen•ra1.

support of Lumlll!lba a11.d u 1Je

the

UN

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~y

CVRIUiltr IJ1l'BLl.10BMC& lf.BBO.Y

1Di'1uonce

So~iot

V~cs

TIKI bl.l)C' a dt.l"Clc:t :1.rill'Ol.ve-

mcnt . in tbc Congo vJ.J"tUa.l;ly
«iHecf wit~ tb.& ol«oure of tne
~v1et: and Czec.h Qmbassi.eig ~t

Leopol<h1.il.t.e· oc 1,:7 tioepten'oor,
iarul tbe· U'SU fl.011;gAt to c1-•AD6 l

aes1e.itance to pTO-IAliZtknlba

1orce1<1 tbrocqrb
!lnd the UAR •
~he

aaJor

Qu1a~~.

a~n~.

UN OOiiltro l of

~irt1el~ pre~ento~

Zl.111 sullditAntial 1m1ou1rt ol
fr Olli rea¢ld m tbe rebells

11,i~

vlthctteT tho UAR u11.1t .frQm tb.Q
OJ; cocnm11n(I. 1uul urged Ohm.11a ;ind
Moroc~o

to do tb.e

~NW.

,.'

Moscow •J>.par.!lptly regarded
1'All r;11.1pport · :.for Gizellij?a ;i.e
strecgtbani AS t:he ~a.1U .o.n o~
the ~xtremists ,taJJd t.bUPJ i.acil·
1tat.1oe J.osi.wi:bo. •s e\reotu1

It sr.1111gbt: to cob1aa a14 ettorta wi t.h
BD4 11111.da o.~allAble to

r~etor3.t:lon .

ard~CL to

tbe

U~a.

Gizeil.gn 1 s

m.i.as10111 ig ca1ro a
substnnt1~1 ~l.lll of moDey · ~d

(b )( 1)

a

qulll).U ty of v e . Bloc
et~te.s Joi.f:Jocl. tho UAll.; Qb.ana,
and Guinea in urg.i DI' B:u*'neeic
off !ci3.1G to ~"'11.1t UAk over~li~hta on rout~ to ftt:lil.D1eyville.
Wi.th. 1Dsa.rt:OW11'$ J'e:fw;al to ~u~
1;1tia pa.r1111salon. t.l.Oe aJWI. l'·ad'6.DSl. l l

le the Ult, noecov
re. ueo t .o ~ 1 ts obu0> of the
CO?IS'Q operatioD e:irperu1ee arid
dcml)Jl4ed

that

D~~e~Jold li2.li>-

icai African support tor

t~e

ut t p.l'opa!';a.la for w:i thdrav.l,.u~

1:11'<>-'. Luarulllba grCl:lp lf'nB re-.trtotcd

UN

tc tlqii,an,da -.for .IAl:n.umb::i. ·~ rctleasu
and rei.Cu(ftn.t eme:at and frn th&
dhar.m1ll!J ot J»:but\1 and 'l'elumJ)Q

111111.~~

for~q~ .

·'fbo USBR

r~pon4e4

to

LumWtlba '!9 ure8t 111. early .Do-

ceab6r v;t.th a

govorn.t0e~t

state-

ment ~cat~ng~y a~taClkins Jfn.nIDG:l'!lkj 01d and iJJe U» Coalllllllld
11.mt laf1ng ·tne bb.lll11 e.nttrely
on w.b.at lt allega,d as us intortere-o~q.
The statement
a.eraU. vaic;ad di!!ploaaure w;l..th
those ~frica~ oi.Pd Ast~ ~tate~

-.iliiah ttbave .cot preserved tlle.
requ;isite unity'' on tho Co.ric;oiS!lu~ .

80.... iet leaders 'C:OOlt A caU-

ti.<IUB· att i t1.:1d& t .ovard tbe 1'~
go"erfllU;lnt 1>1"001.ailw<l in &tu.leyvU.le by .Lumuai~ 1 s pr<>OOmm.aoia·t deputy Aatoi.uG CJ:2enga
1~ mid-J>ecenl;ior, ~resumably to

l!llllntui n Hex-J,.1>11"1 t~ Yi th re(:lkrd to evei.ts iJ? Leop0lcl:v:il lc •

Grmi.}'ko .Eita.tQd publ:i.c ly tJui.t

thq VBS!l roc;>0en1zcd Gizeeg~ RS

n:et1ft6 pro1111er,

wt

ne1t estend tormal

ll05eour cltd

recojtnitio~

t.o .1:1.11!1 rostme·. Atter ~ delay
ot tell clays , Khrull:ohi:tv re1>l1ed

·to nn Rppea1 for lllAte.ri.al a~­

si~tQnce trom G1zeDg~ bJ retcerA.t ln:s genor.a.l promises of'

SQviet BupjK)l'"i O.n.d· BYl".P~tby .

T.hci ·OAB. hovvver, tlu:.-w
its enti.To suppo.-t to (>i.zonga.
"- •l<1.ipl~tic" miss1.o n . 'il'i'S ,establi~h~d ror q~~ .1Jl Cil.iro, !lnd
tJAa oft1cl!!rCJ io St,1U1leyv1.llc

:forcos.

The $oviat leadt>.&'s aa,.. :in

tu:n11.nl;iit.•s delith~a.D11011Dced 1.c

mld·P·obru~y-a~ e~oenent . op~

pi>rto,r:iity' to ~IU'ry..forvnrd tha.1.r
c8DJ)o.1gD against eotontaliS1D . and
nga.i,o ldeqtl~y the ussa w1~
an.t i-West..,rn ele1119·11f:Ei -J.n Atric.ir.
~d AaiaThey hoped lt wou.td
lo~ to ~·be 'D'11;hd.ravm.l o-1 th-o
remalninB Afro-lts1~ contingents

in the Cougo , aad block an~ e~f~c­
t _l V'Q We.a.te-.rn-baek<ld UM ~ctton to
de11.l wltb the !dtuRt:1on.

lL<l!i>c;:Clll nlso ae~d on the
lssue ci.s a protext for MIMl111. ,D1!1
$ovt&·t · {l.°ttack11 oa ~arekj'old
11.nd fClJ:' prea1dn1r ltbrusb.cllev•s
plan tQ .reorganize ti)o- UM in tllle
}lope .o f glll'nori:n~ l\t:r<>-IJ.s i.aa

auppo:11t.

In

lErU~ c;?.re

lo late

P.cl!run.r y tQ JJebru a11:d otber bttll<ds

of goveramont

in

Asla,

Atr1CA~

Bul;"'Ope ,• 11;n<2 IAl.t.in ~.r1'ca ,, Kbru-

sll•cbe" aoll(:ht to e.atab.l1ah the
p~int that ~bo.'s doatb Jue-

t1tle4 the Soviet

.Kosa01r '.a atta.c::lt

~Qposal

and

:la.~

tall on
HB.mlllU'Bkjold. Re pro])0.9&d that
a l l "tor-ei.gn tr-oops" be wltbclrRWD trom tbe co.1;1s:o ud ~­

plaQed with a comn~sslon oi
Af..-ican ~ta~ea .

It& a .ge111t1.1re of. ::ree·tra.i.11&
provided 111.11.ftar-y advice And
toli'~ the now adii!in1.St '.r ti.tioD
t~ctmical .asrsiist:1111ce·: IQ111sir~

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111\ Wasbl:iarton_, l!!hr ..abohev d1 d

not di.ractly :!.mpl~ca.tq tb9 v~
i.c l.rWl\Dl!bll ' es diemtb, but he
obl~q~•lY ll'&l'ned against any
uDI liatera.l .i:otor~ot;t..on 1 n the
COil.ltO .

Shortly tb9reatt.Gr, COll-

lllWli"t Cb:i D~ ian·d "t.lu;t b toe sat.-

e lli'tea fonui.lly r11aopb:od

G~zenia'e ~e~:lile and ~11d
ox.;~go '111JbMl88dOTB ,

Pr-eeent

'o

Soviet · Att1t~do ··

lllODit.ollf' Iii lJ~~te:r dellUQO 1111,.
UOtll of UllllllJIU'Slrjold r~f l.octed
tb9 truetratlo.11 t:b• Soviet
lander-Ji! 11-ad felt sl'Jtee lilmwabo.

Wlll8 -o -v ertbrovn an<J bloc. n1s6lone $~llea from the o.;.ogo .
In attncki11s tbQ ~ oraani¥ai1~n, h~1teYe:r • tho V.SSll 1.ost
n1ppQt''t. MOn,g t:tie l.IJrlca.a a.nd
Aslam c;ountrl,qe, . llb.Ue the
Asta.a-Africa» •~iatoa dt6ae:reed

Ille

.9liCc~B

~ro-Astan

-----··- - --- ··----·

/· ·

··

1111 ln-tlue.not.cg

opl111oft .

[c I:lfo llel>l'!llau-7, i:o lle>11lci; the n<loption bf t.be: Uli Cieoera.l ~embl.J' of ~ l"lod&r ato
resolution 9,POD5Clred by tl!l.e UAR,
lJ.beria; o:nd Ceylon ypbi;.ld1:ng:
1111111114lf'akJold•$1 authority ln tile
Congo, a top Sov.1,~t ofUaiia.J,.

...

repo.rt;a1;!'l.f ch111.r11.ct11r 1zed thi;t
VAii '8 African pol.i.Gy 11;9 "eq1d voc·al" and. SJa1 d Bas ii' •:D r-aa l aim
v = i to 180111.to tJ1e '•aocd..11.U&t
onmp" fl'0!6 .A.f:riC.fl..
-

The ta1-l1:1:re Of r-oofle-cl. So-

v.i ot e-r i'orts to provide· Jlo1Cll ·t-o
GUenp imll to ltlstal.l hUi a.s

~Wilba'e leeitima.t~ suc~eesa~

...

clqseod out t;hi.s .Pba5a 01 •oscO'll'' a

\ t:!~!:O_'.j ,.,,...,. "'-]

(b)(1)

vi:ttl 00111e of Ji4min6rmkja-ld • 6
pollc ici5, tho:r were M~n.1.slou~
tll Ui)b1Hdt.11g- t 'laq i39U t'1t10ll81

su.tbo-r1t1 of. tlut -'l«:~otar)' 8911ernl, .nd t-hey 00111aidl!T11d th.,
UtUted Katioc!ll tho 0111y alt&1"•
native 1:0 1n•Olvem11nt i.n ICaat-

Waat pqiJGr

str~!Z'Qles .

~av~rtbela.~, with pol~ticat
-to:rces a.nd str-uot-ur•-61 st111 1a

.flux, tile COcgo rcr.ualam " poteat.lally tnt~-="'"""--~

"t.1 vu {of;__J

Soviet bope1' ln tho Ooi:iao
tv.r.tbel' lruat.rmt.ad by ~n

.c;irq
a.pp~ront

c.on£i1ct of

.....
f.:..
:

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(b)(1)

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:r

betwc1111 JIQ.:a;cotl' =!lll4f. C&1ro . As
early .., .Ja.mi.llr:)r tll••,.. -l'e
·BllUiS that tM Sovi,ot . 1Jn1Qll '

vg,g

~<1!111~1 ~oneerned

over

r'"'f!.:"',,·~..::x:~r ..

th.a IJAEI ' 8 .1:i:if lueDO& with iGi- ·

oliitr7 o.fflen],

viet

Aabags;;~or

'Pb.omp-

S(~le-til
r-.,atra~a&d wt~~

iwn Ill!. mld-M111y tbat tho

tuta beeo

So-

rlll'Spe<it

to the

Cong~, lliiJ~ ·t.ha~ i ( ihe
~itu$tlon &Uloti.ld d~tar torAto,

l_

reel

Stlould tho cuuen.t uJU1t.ab'le

~ioonetl:~J18 lll1IODIJ

tha~

?tae.tr wae 51111y:lia$ ·•U.p aor"1•1cu1"
to Af'rican aatlOAa:U.am 1111110
reet-:1:.Dg -~n the '' liwrctlll" ot

I ·

tio~ ~reall dow.o,

be

eKpect"'4 to

rel~

coaeol11!!1.0 ·ceic-

r.10ecow cC111ld

1UJ9~ q~tcklY

All at~ellJ)t

la

to lGLluenoe ~ub34quont ali~ente ,.anctJ:Beo.n:nJ..t:a

ronner

po~1~10~. LL~~~-~-~~~~~,---.

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COPY NO.
OCI NO. 029s;e1

I .

17 August !GG!

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
·WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

5

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLlot~;;.,,, '''"
JB Ul.ulCI IU CU;it..
0

0

Cli:C:LitS!il:flED

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04JOl;tol''ll.1 mtmM
is proe;,Qedi.ng vitb. ilU~

l1N 8eC1J;'IO t11ry

~F.r.k.1<>ld

pl.,l)ns tQ reor-jfnqize

tl'!~

·uN·

~Jl'lllAl"BkJold. eve.n b~!ore
Kh~~~bchev'$ attack, b~d estab-

of t.h.19 dem~nds a·f Atr~-Asian ,

_partlcu&a1•l )' Mi-1'..c-.a:n, aemb-.el'.$
~ la~~er

Making

sbare ot

poi;1t:1on~ .

Q~

poli~y­

6

Au~~s~

.h'O ·told U3 Q:f.';fic:1all.9 tba't .bl1&1
propotJ11d: :re!l:lf'$1il111zcstton ILa.$
be~n w~il .2"Gcet~¢~ by tho AtroA!l>hus. Re b¢l\i&vea that 1:Jl.l$
.f11ctol'. toget:t~er W'.it.ll t.he ~\lG­

·CeO~·

of

~~d bi~

the

to .a-ecoar.aiod.a te l!iome

·~e<el'et.n:ri:a t

lor

lnactequat~ly r-ep~o~entea .l~

Sectrot"-r.iat .

lished two cor..i.i.ttees to help
h1m ·.t,q s'tudyj,.og these d¢1m.nds •
~:b· 1'1.n.dinae. al.oq 1'1tb Baiµ..
m~rs:kj old.... OWi\ P1"'0POs.a.la. wil'l

probably becQmo the ~ocqe ot hQt
at tfac 16th Gt:!'.Qfill"al .Aa-

de~t9

thQ U~· ConfJ<) 0operl)tlon
$ym~8t~y tor thq

iv.

kRO'lrn

•~i•• •••••

19

""•!&"""' /

Tu~i$i11ns t~ the Blz9'1'te di~­
;puto, wU.l. coo.ctc>T' .' loi:liet

clJ'1l"g-e$ tJla. t. ho 1B .111 Cl "l11pe-~
rlalist stoq-re, •• and .make :I. t
diff1cult to~ tho U~SR to MUBter sappo~t ic. 11:s oppos1t1~n
t.o t:h~ :Se.or~t:Rr i.a t,

The quc;ii;;t.1on of

tl~e

$ccre-

tm..ry g.en~xAl's ~~ tbo.rity and o~
the Jle~60llD~l ~rut £ooct10~~ of
the ·UN Se~Nta.rtat vas brought•
into th~ for~grourbd 1n ·the ~ail
o1 1.9~0 bf IKllu:·uelU'.lb.Ov ~ s bit tar

a t:t~c'ka on RUl!i'lan.ltt-Jold. 'ih'EI
Soviet pre.tuie~ de.llW~ded tha.t
the ~OCl"e'l:lfll:y· ge:n~al ta office
be r~pl.aced bv a three-Ill.in "'aolltu::t:1 v~ ex.e~Uit .1 v& bo.;{y'' composed!
of :r-opre.scJiU.t.tv" o:f t.bc 'tles-t:,
thq Colllm\!lnia.t bloc, a11d th~ ~0'1.1~

ten-lat--m.ppobtcd by Harrmarskjold
Blll!l!lAn' of' 1900 0.11 'tho
1"'9Coflllli~nd.., tio:ll of. the ·1:4:t'h Geo-

in the·

Assembly egasioq--issued
report
14 J~n9 1961, The
report. is 11e.l'~pe: 111().l"e 11~;rtable

~ral

JPr.lcb a"p_por't, msu~ UK mmben; .
pa:rti\<:ularl,;v tbe A;fJ:o,..!\ailol.ns,
we:r~ .1.D $ym_p.athy

Ciu1pa1,g1:1

into

to·

Si!'~

on

~ta

f'ar t:b.e nu111bcr <>f tU181;e-.nts t t
cont;ains the fq~ 1 ts J:'18~0'J:iQle.D•

da:t '-«m6.

n•

tioM .
J\l tbott_l?JI th~
"t;l;'oika" proposal failed to ~-t

·tr8.l

The- ei;gh.t-Mimbe't' CQmro11:tet:i

of Expe.rta on tJa.e Acti v.1 t1et1
~nd Ol'lgiu11ZBit.i.oll1 oJ. the Scilcra-

A majority
~eaJlll.e.ng~i:I

ot t.ho commi ttr:-o

tbe.t

~

count.ry•s

population as V'Qll as its .f.10111..D.<Ji.al eon ti"ib"!tlone· w tbS< Wil b~

wi'th lr.Qsoo'lfi .fit
bloe n~t1ori•l.e

~DS1CleJl'C.(\

~01 _
pol icy-making po~itions
the se-creta~'-"' t o.n th111 prelli-

1.D
:iGe tb~t eqnih.b le ~O.fU'&)>fllc

d~~t~butioq shoul~ ~& th~ paramo"\'m.t oontrider4tion .1.o the hi.r1nc of trN eivtl e~vtu1ts. The
.Afro-./ls1 aa RO.·t1.okl$ aleo bll ve
loojt ct;JIJJplatn.ed that 'th-ey ·irere

i.n di.~t;ribllt1..lll8' "tJ:iG
t.he prot~sstonal. posts
u1 UlG ·a eeretar1at. Blitch :me111'b cr state wou14 be ~sa ig~ a
mGj.mw ot tw~ &ta:t'.f ·fl(!$i t loDS
Hi ol"de:r to l"E!:fle-ct '9'1 thin t.bc
Secreta~tat the IUll!lbe~abip O'f

b~lk

of

the UN 1118 a whole .
staff ~er

~n&

Ip ~dd1t1on 1
wouid be

COl~ftDENllAL
'SI Rlf"
SPECIAL 4W11CLES

17 Aue 6:l

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CONFIDEl<;jTIAL
CllRRXNT INTELLIGENCE l"IREKLY SUID!ARY

:.

recruited from every m~mOer
state to~ oacb 10,000,000 of its
population up to 150,000,000,
.n.nd one :further staf.f _p091t.ioD
would be allotte-d :for eaoh.
30,000,000 abovo 150 1 -000,000.

o£:f.icials. Tbe m~jority geve
no support to tbe Soviet member 1 e insi-atence on a three-rne..n

executive. However,

T.be rc:main.t.ng po.<Jt.B ·i!:lUbjeot to
geoBr~phic

taries general

distrfbJtion would

b~

appointed

~o

1t1001 a suggestion pr&vioualy
rejectQd by .Bammar-.s.kjold. Woetern officials believe tbe tbroo
deputies--~epr~aenting the three
pow~r blocs dei1ned by KhruaUchev
as East, West, and neutral--vou1d

majori~y

The

m0m-

shur~ policy~~1ni r~sponsihll-

then be allotted accord1ng to
the members' percentage ebnro
of tlle UN budget--the forrnuln
.now in use.
of the comthat the
policy-making rosponsibilities
requtred a more ~lexiblo ratio
for the h1gh&r _profession.al
m1~tee

thr~~

be.rs--lndiat Ghan.a, and the UAR.-·proposed that three deputy secre-

a'low

recogni~~d

do~

.and even paralyzo t.he
Ability to act

Secretariet~s

quickl.y in t1D1~6 of crisis.

posts:, such as under secretaries nnd head.B of political departments. They proposed a
similarly constructod ~armula
on a bns1s 0£ reg1ons rfither
than ot individual member states.

An advi.eo_ry _p:n.n-el consisting of three 1-0rmer prosidonts
o.t "the ~neral As-senibly~-Pearson·

Seven geograph1ca1 regions ~ere
Africa, Asia and the
Far Fast, Eastern Europe, West0rn liur-0pe, Latin Americn, the
Middle Ba.st. n11d No-rth .l\.tnorica..

of Canada, PrLnce W~n of Tha1land, Rnd Bela~oQ0 of Peru--waa
aske~ by HammarSkjold in Novem-

devi~~d:

ber "1959 to adv1ee him on correcting- c0rtai~ "ll'eaknesse-s" 1n
th.e organ1~:ation. The panel's
main recoromendnti.on called 1or
OGt.ablish~ng ~rom thrao to five
undor secretar~es general to deal
with spccia1 politif;a.1 affairs.
They u•ould n.ss±s.t the se-c:retary.

The co:n:isitt~e members split
on the ·D)oro :fundamental issues

involving the role o:f. the sccr~­
t~ry eenerR\.~nd
his top

WfGtOMAl OrsTii'fSIJTfON Of 'j((R_ETARIAl o-ma-ALS AT UMITtD

NATION~ flEAO.OU-A~TUtS

l,<c.rillUf

I

I

UN01i:

~CllHAll£S

rt"""''
r.om
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r~•<><>t-

·1,1c1•et~ u,~.

U•oir•-"''"'"~=

,0;Urll<> ?>t>

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1.Qt.'/[J; ffiOFESSJO'...!Al ~EV~l:,:

,1,N.D C.OWVP.UNJ V1Nf:
tle•".1'40\'m~""~"

~tu!~
•5;,,ff

•,A,.. rourr-n:'.,..;Jbo1.J;l1l........n- ~!t»ee cl (•i.trrh
• "Il-o<1u <r'S'"•
Qoldl>AA, :r.J ..fTl.dc!o fra.., """"t-..h.tr ~u.

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--·- ... ··-· ·-·.· ····-

SPECIAL ARTICLES

1/ Aug 61

..... .. ...
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CCfRREm' l~ELLIGEHCS WllBIU.Y BtW.l!ARY

general 011 oolitical mie:11U.onra,
such a~ those ~am~r~ltjold bas
undertakeA to SOuth Africa 1~
1960, Laos in 19G!I, a11d Peiping
in 19S5. Bach o! the !lve would
nlao havo ~e<tiponeibility for ~
gcoirra,phic r.egton.
Hnltina~s1'.,iold's

"udlllio1.strat1vo" J-uoct.lons. J\s-

would serve
only oa·e teria o.f three to five
years, Wh1lo under $8Cl'Gtariea
would serve up to two terJ11s.
Aaeietl\nt secretaries would be
selec:ted on a broad t<agio.n a l
s~stant socretari~

bO.IJ19.

Plaq$

The &ecretary general has
develope<t some plam~ of biS own
for reorgani~iDg the upper eoholons ot tho Secretariat . Ho .re;J octod t.be commi tteo •s reco.111Mendations co~oerning geographic
cU.st:ribut.lon as 'be1~ too in.flexJ.blo and not allowlag sutlic1ent
latitude for a secrefa~y ioneral
to hi~o the most OOllP~tcnt per30ll.D&l regai·dlese of origin .

Be agreed tha.'t 111oro p.o sts
auat be fouud for A~rican and
~ovlet
bloc personnel, but
aia1n noted tha~ it ~ difficult t.o get e.xpcrionced 'People
from "~"" 11tembcl'-(;t11.tee where
such por~on:s are needed to bclp
.govern their O'lllft oowit.ries. The
secret~ry genoral's dittiaultie.s lft filling the Ba~t Europoan quota ate• to eome degree
frOID the conduct of bloo pcr-

miD19tratiye affDirs, a le141
counselor, and a airoctor of
pe&+sonnel. T!le remaint11g t1vc
would be in chnrge ot trwiteesh..lp af;fnirs, econom.1c aod social affairs, te~hn1CQ1 assistane~
conference 11nd general. setrvices,
and public in.to·rtnation .

ttee• g proposal•, he l!As recently trnnstcrred 4ndrew Cordier
of the United States, who vas
bis oxeeutive nsslstalit, to tbe
PoSt of ·u nder secretary tor General Assembly a f fairs . Cordier•s
other <lutiea have been Uken
o~or by C. V. ~rasimbun ot
Indin as Choi de c.abinet .
~1

Uammarek.jold proposes that
two cate.gor1()8 of' equal rcuik be
establ.1ebed tor seo1ot" UN ot:f1ctale: five as~lotQnt secretaries· general with "politlcal" ,
respon•ibilities, and niue undor secretaries with primarily

~PBClAL

...

Office ot tho S·ucreiai-y GOneral
--a cbof de cab~not, one tor ad-

1.1ntil af·ter tho General AsS()•bly <USC\•S98& bis and tho COID-

5o~iot nationals h1~od by
tho VN often de)oy their arr1vnl
11t headquartel'S for more t .ttan
t~o weetts nftor reaching Now
York by reporting :t1·rs~ to tbe
Soviet UN mission. Rmployees
from the SOY1ot bloc do not stay
1b thoir Jobs 1or mot'e tban tbreeyears, and tb•y o~ten resi~n
without notice while oo home
leave. There have Mlso been
cases iu Wllich Soviet natloual&
have ueod UN aesignn~nts ns
cove~ for esplon~ro. Many Sov1ot
bloc appl.t.cants cannot meet
in1n11num language or educat-i on
requirements for higher UN .jobs,
·but; they l".efuse to accept posi·tione at the lower profefi!eiOlll.\l
levels.

~

rec011111onds

A.lth011i1Jh h:ama1u·s!rjold probably will not make 1111\ny changes

SOlll\ol .

17 Aug 61

~~rskjold

tour under eecret01ries in the

..

·-

Anotber i-ccent ap,potntmoat
of Robert K. Gardi.ner
Ghan~ a& dirfXltOr of ~be
D1vi~1on ol Public Administration. He wUl be the M.ibMt
t'&l\kiDS Africa11 a.t UN beadq\•artors. Gardiner is currently
serving In the Congo :as oac ol

L6
oi

~hat

rr~wn~rstjold'a

poJ~tical

aidee .

la hi~ efio~te to find more

b!gh p0sitions .fOt" A:fro-Asinos,
bo~ever, H~llllW.\rS~jold mU3t t~~e

.'

1Lito aecount tbe Jno~lo of bis
staf! . Western ~uro­
pea11 and U-~ offici..als of tbe
Pl"C~eDt

~rqturi3t--wbo provide its
bnckbouc--1uo I
lcUse.it1!3fied a11d taar pr!lcipitate
action to roducG their uuDber
regardless of their leastb of
se.rvi.c e an<l contribt,tion to tbe
organization . L0111ored ~or.ale
in the See~gtQriat at n ti~e
vben it faces turtbe1' at1:~ckS
Could affeet geogral UH operat lone at tho leth Ge~eral AS9Clllbly.

c

\

AJn'ICl.ES

...

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C.06224 7 48

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. .. . ~ONFlf)E,.~TIAl.
~

COPY NO.
OCI NO. 0095;61

11

31 August 1961

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

_/

,

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE Of CURRENT

(b)(3)
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CVRR.BNI' IIfrBLLIQIRCJ UEKLY StlDAltY

CQ:RGO
UN t ·r-oope ovor thee pas.j.f'J
'IMOk detai.ned for re~triation
approximntely 500 Buropoans,
moet or them Bel,ian$ servica
tn t~e X~tangan armed foraea ,
Tho evacuatlOll
merco~ar1e9
1ff part o.f

ste,p p&d-up uir

1110Ve

began on 26

August wi~h the a1rli~t1ng of
a 'oattaU.o n o:t lnd.ian troops
tT-om noi-thern Kate.ag~ to !'11e.a l>othv111e. Tho •lrlift ihllllediately trig.gEn"ed rumors that tho·
UK, in. support Of Ado~la~ WOU-ld
attempt to dJ.sci.rm Katanga • s
10,000-..an Dl1DY aod 3,-000...0dd
pol.ice . On 26 AUSU.St 1 UH re,Pt'osenta ti ve O'Brie.n del1v~red a
virtual u.l·ti.matum to Tebomb6,
warn~.._ that if be did not go
t;o 'Laopoldv.llle tho ''situation
'l'Ol)·ta woi:-.soa 1 •1 '4\-Dd entpbasi~iog
th.at the 'UN WAl!I pr·e pared t.o
Adoul~

in milit.a ry actiob
a1:1a.il1:llt JCatanp. Tshomb6 replied that b& would not .oogoti-·
MJsist

by tho UK, "nd O'Bl:len

Qte with LeopoldvUle under

ob:S~rved,

"Jt11tanga J.s in .s.e ceasion •1th.out
tho •e.an.s of matnte.i~QB it . "

of

11

Clil1Dpaign to force 'Tl!lh<llmb~ to
drop hie ~la:ims of Ka.tancran
indeponde»c~ and to entor into
negotiatioA& with Prem!~r Adoula
a:Uued a.t reinteoat.b g Kat.al'lga
wJ, th U1,e Cong'(> .

The UB

of TsS-om btt 'e a.nn y wa-e •10on.tro11.&tl"

T•hamb& replied on 29 Au-

auat that b,o bad 'toured .mU1tary

camp.s la tbo past 24 hours and
th~t "the a.ray vi:ll not 11aut1ny . "
A lllaJor d1sclpl1nary brOaltdown,
however, might well 1ead to th4
ool-la)k!Je of bta g-overmnent,
:ive-.111 prlo:r t·o the OW roundup
there were poriodi¢ refle<itions
of

p00r

dl8Cip1iae and aorale iq

arey caJDps ·o ear a:uaa!)etbville.
Tho BelS:i.Bll consul general ~a.8
~tnted that, ae early as 28 August. theJ"'O were soveral "1ncideJJta,. between .\fric.a n soldier~
and whites.

Belgi4.D Fol'·e1gn Miu1ater

Spoak ha& sent

Sec:re~cu-y

.Qeneral

li81111114.l'&kjold an •;energetto" pro--

test over tho VN aeaaure• asainst

Bel.!iila.n offi.cei-s- in Ka:toi.nsa. ln:J.tlally ho 'bad indiontod tbat his

sovernment would cotltlnue to coope-ro.te w:t'tb the W and would
remove Belalan off icere from
KatQ.Dga , p:oovideCI s uca ma:leuree

did not load ei:thvr ·t o A pan..iek·y
of the Europe~ population
or to· a arotiny of the Katan.gait
exod~a

pre~_G'Qre

Uiled forGeS .

However ,

t:.be dras-

tic act.ion of tbe OJI lll taking

In a ewitt predAwn maneu-

ve.r on 28 Aupst, lndiu troops
seized key poi.ots in B\1se.betb-

ville and boga.n the roundu.P of

Although Tehom.b&
o.nnounced that h.o aac.epted t't:u~
UH action and urged the populac0 to ~omaiQ calm, the U.N
placed I~terior Minister ltwlongo
under aotent1oa 1 appar$~tly as
a preoal.l tiontll' y 11oasu;re ,. On 29
August the UM ann~~d th~t
most of tho 800 vbtte ott1cere
Boig1Qos .

'Belslan of'ficers into custody
prompted the protest •ove . Bpaak
felll'B ~hat l~ae-soalc bumiltAtioo
of Be~glan nationals wou14 lb()
exploitea to the fqlleet by his
rlgbt-wing critic& at b009e .
In

tJon

tho

Co~go prope~,

.·...:

atte~­

h~s cente~ed

on the uncerta~n rolationship botween Adoula
and Gtzgngn and o~ maneuvering.a

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att9nd~nce

at 't be eelgt-ll<'e <J.0Df&I'4)\'lCC Of.
unoommi tt:ed nat1c;ins. AJ.tho"Bh
Gizenga is believed 1:0 favo,.

COD601Q&e participation in tbe
oonforenc-e. his m.-ain preocoupaU ,Q ll appeara to be with eecuriog
agree1te11 t

to

'V'U" lOWll

concl't.- ~

tioos he laid down for his 81i9.PO.rt of th.e o:ow government.. tn
tbo ueantim~, be has refused
to go to Leopo l.Ov1Uo to t a.lro
up bis vice

preaiers~~p .

WM inll:pac:.ted. by 'UN OfflCJAlG .

11'.tum o US consul attwapto.d to
contfa.(lt the plahe•a ~er1aan

.Pilot, lie

subfJeq,un.,tly rut"Urned to lieO.POldv 1 Uo afto~ bo1og "el(pr;tlled"
fr<Jl!l Sta.nleyville on Qizenga'&
orders.

Jordanian

.A tlfi:h 1Ur Jordan ob.art.fi!ir

fll"lbt.

t~

Sta.n.loyvtlle arrivf,!ld
on 26 .A11guat • .-eported.ly carry- '
i11g f9oa, clothin~. ~qd a::Wt
~8e.Qg·e.rs ,
V.q.l"tke previous
occasions, bOTever. the car~o

threa1:eBed at;

·U11.B

the &lrport by Gt.zengist soldiers, who apparently blanod
·b lm for the Uii' 11 dotetttloa ot
·tbe e.trcraft~ 'l'be consul WB&
placed under OM protection. sod

lQdtcated

Kl.'Dg

cancer~

Husayn has

over tbe 8tao-

le:yvJllo flisht and baa

tho

gro~.Ung

oitdo~ed

0( all A:lr J'Mdan

aircraft pencl1.r:lg ~out~ Of
a cou.rt of 1.Dqu1ry1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE auLLETIN
16 September 1961

DAILY BRIEF

D

*Congo: Attacks on UN forces in Katanga 'continued through
15 September. The US Consulate in Ellsabethvllle reported. yesterday evening, however, that UN officials there, while seriously concerned about the Irish company still under heavy attack at J'adotvllle,
believed that the situations in Ellsabethvllle and Kamlna were "in
hand" and that the Katangan fighting would "slacken~ " UN authorities planned to ~rlift two companies of Swedish troops from Leopoldville to Kamina yesterday, and early additional UN reinforceJ l'l)
ments were also expected in Ells abethville.
·.
/fJ1
. Hammarskjold, in conversation with. US Ambassador Gullion
in Leopoldville yesterday, was optimlstlc regarding the possibility
of a .c ease-fire in Katanga, and said that Katangan Vice President
Klbwe had promised to· help arrange ·a meeting between Tshomb6
and UN representative O'Brien. Hammarskjold said there was no
question of the UN giving up positions it now holds or of renouncing
its mission; he added that if a cease-fire could not be ·negotiated,
the UN military would take the "initiative," a step he said it had
avoided doing thus far in order to minimize bloodshed and destruction. In Ellsabethville, O'Brien hoped to. have a meeting with
Tshomb6 yesterday evening; as of 0500 EDT this morning it was
not known whether this meeting took place. Although both Tshomb~
and O'Brien are believed to be anxious for a cease-fire, neither has
· appeared wllllng to abandon his political objectives.
The UN has recently attempted to build up the authority of Kibwe,
who had announced on Elisabethvllle radio on 14 September that he
had assumed control of the Katangan forces ''because Tshomhll is
unable to carry out his functions. " Cease-fire appeals by Kibwe and
O'Brien went ignored, however, and Tshombt! yesterday continued
hls efforts to whip up popular support over "Radio Free Kata.nga. "
~tangan armed forces reportedly have been reinforced by tribal
· )warriors from the bush.
'
According to the American Consulate in Ellsabethville, UN
officials there have largely blamed local Europeans, especially
i

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Belgians, for the failure of their plan to secure Katanga·for
Premier Adoula. The consulate described Tshomb~'s white
allies as increasingly effective as snipe~ troop commanders, and drivers of armored vehicles. ~cal Europeans-apparently led by the Belgian consul general--are regarded
by the consulate as even more .emotlonal than UN officials. The
consulate has characterized the Belgians as threatening anyone not supporting them, ·and reports the consulate has been under
heavy pressure to join other Western :mlsslt!;iis\ in. ~f denun'ailatton
of UN "atrocltt~~
Hammarskjo .has canceled a press conference which was
t<;> have been held shortly after his arriVal 1n Leopoldville on
13 September. His statements to foreign diplomats, in New
York and Leopofavllle, have cited varlous bases for the UN actlon ln Katanga. The British ambassador in Leopoldville, ln
a 14 September meeting wt,th Hammarskjold., advised him that
lf the UN was not able to justify lts actions, Brttaln would reconsider its financial support of the UN operatlQA:]
The US Embassy in Leopoldville has received unconfirmed
reports that a military revolt has broken out at Inongo, where a
Congo Army battalion is stationed. The embassy adds that isolated tribal clashes occurred in Leopoldville on the night of 1314 September, and that politically conscious youth groups had
become more active.
Foreign reaction to the events in Katanga has been strongest in Western Europe, where criticism of tJ!e UN has been intense both in offlcfal and unofficial circles. ~ a conversation
with Ambassador MacArthur, Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak-in a "cold and bitter mood"--denounced Hammarskjold on 14
September as a "liar" who "could not be trusted.·" Spaak sald
that if the Congolese Government closes Brussels' Congo mission, Belgium will terminate all economldnd technical aid to
the Con
a.w_alLi.ts_te..cbnician

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DAILY BRIEF

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Situation ln the Congo

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(During Hammarskjold's stay in Leopoldville, ·he told Ambassador Gullion that he believed the Adoula government would
be the "greatest winner" from the UN Katanga operation. He
asserted that Adoula had been under great pressure from the
Glzenga faction to bring Tshomb~ to heel. The secretary general said he believed that if this could be accomplished, Adoula,
whom he characterized as the most purposeful, energetic, and
capable African he knew with the possible exception of Nigerian
Premier Balewa, would be master of the situation. Otherwise,
according to one of Hammarskjold's aides, there was a danger
that General Lundula ln Stanleyvllle would take action against
Katanga on his own account.]

(The UN officials expr.e ssed con~ern over the appointment
of Eglde Boclieley-Davidson as the chief Leopoldville representative ln Katanga. · However, they said he was presently under
the control of the UN and they hoped he would remain so •
Bocheley-Davldson has thus far been confined to Ellsabethville
airport by the fightlng tn Katanga. !
r-.·
·- ·
i A more accurate evaluation of the sltuatlon may be that
provided by Arthur Doucy, a Belgian socialist called by the
American Embassy ln Brussels "one of the most knowledgeable Westerners" on Congo affairs. Doucy, who ls a friend
and adviser of Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko and has
known Adoula for ten years, told American offlclals that he
fears the UN is unwittingly abetting a Gizenga takeover. He
asserted that anti-Commwiist elements in the government, such
as Bomboko and Suret~ chief Nendaka, were being isolated throQgh
the appointment of Gizenglst assistants, and that the dispatch of
Bocheley-Davidson to Elisabethville was part of a Gizengist plan
to take over K~tanga after the UN had neutral~zed Tshomb~ and
his associate~,
...{According to Doucy's informants, the radical neutralists at
the Belgrade conference worked to impress Adoula with the
necessity of retaining Glzenga's support; as a result, Doucy feels
that Adoula, who he says ls not a partlcul.ai-ly strong personality,
would prefer to make concessions to Gizenga rather than put up
a determined fight against Gizenga's efforts to gain control. Doucy
stated that he fears the GizenE?a bloc mav take over from Adoula
within three or fo.ur months:-LJ

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 September 1961

DAILY BRIEF.

j
. *Congo: Hammarskjold's· death further reduces the
prospects for an agreement in the near future to reintegrate
Katanga into the Congo. Tshomb~ is quoted as having told
a news conference In Northern Rhodesia yesterday that he
was returning to Katanga to lead a "flght to the end" against
UN troops. Tshomb~ said he was willing to discuss a peaceful solution with UN representatives and "will talk with anybody of good faith, 11 but not with O'Brien, the chief UN representative In Katanga. A UN spokesman in Leopoldville said
that a high UN official would be detailed to contact Tshomb~,
but also stated that Hammarskjold's death will not mean any
change in· UN policy In Katanga.
Attacks on UN positions continued through yesterday,
and reports Indicate the fighting has now spread to several
localities In northern Katanga. The Irish unit which had been
beselged at Jadotvllle has surrendered, and several unconfirmed press stories indicate that the UN base at Kamina may
have fallen to Katangan forces. I
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Situati.on in the Congo
Indian Brigadier I. J. Rikhye, who was Hammarskjold's
mil~tary adviser and with Undersecretary Ralph Bunche
seems to have assumed.direction of the Congo operation, on
18 September gave American officia~ his analysis of the
diffic~ltles encowitered by the UN forces in Katanga. Ac
cording to Rikhye, the original UN plan had had the limited
objective of closing down the Elisabethville radio station.
This action triggered the return to their units of many of
the ~uropean mercenaries who were in the process of repatriation, and fighting spread unexpectedly. Furthermore,
the Katangan sold~ers often were better a.rmed than the UN ·
troops, and the limited UN airlift capabil.l ty has been unable
to provide either support artillery or transport in adequate
quantity. Rikhye stated that the Swedish and Irish troops
were trained mainly in oolice function~~
~
.in combat. IL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ ___J_~
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41

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OCI NO.

029s1e1

21 &.ptember 1961

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY ·

OFFICE Of CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

/0

rmUHIT H .
H 011.1110£ Ill CL&SS. 0 .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEll.KLY .S1™hlARY

UN

SUCCESSOR TO TlfB

SKCRETARY GENERAL

The UM faces a loog per1.od ·

Burm.a, the UAR, Sudan, Morocco,

of tu.r:moil over constitutional

and I;raq.
Under this plan tbe
Gee.er.al Assembly would desigoa,t.e

problems nrising from tbe search
for n no~ secretai-y gonoral
who will be acceptnble to Qotb

t~e

ei~her tlte president of tho
current s.esa.ion--1.Co.o.gi s1im 0£
Tun1sia~or outgoing presid0nt
Boland of Ireland as interim
secretary general.
Th~ procedure was designed to avoid,
for the prea~nt, e~pacted
Soviet Vfit<Xis in the Security
Council .'of any nominee .!or

USSR and the West.

Soviet
continue to 1us1at
on -tha.ir 1•troika" concept, but
Afro-A,eian pressure may· lead
"to eventual appointment 0£ a
single successor.
Seiect1oa
delegat~B

o·t so aµthoritative a figure n.s
~a$

Hamnarskjol~,

however, is

t.ho ·ip'.og.1:t•ion·

·o.t· .S:19cretary

unJ.ike ly·.

general..

HRm.lllar~kj old' s death ticoqgh..t
to a hefl-d 'th_c :fight between 'Bil.ei

Boland told tbe US dqleg~­
tion oo 18 S~ptembGr his canvass
Of UN members showed that the

and West ovGr the l960 Sovio-t
pr.oposnl ~or replacing tho soc~
retary general with a triumvirate
r~p~~senting

procedure ll'ould not be easy· to·i
put acroea.
He report~d that
o_ppoa:t,~ion oa:me from ''W(lllintentionedn -O&legat1ons which
believe ~nat ong roan could not
handle both jobs~ ·Other op1:i-o-

the WQst, the Soviet

bl.o.c, alld t:he no-ut:i:-ala,
The ttr.ot-k8.·• idea was not 'llt'ell received
Oy the A:fro-Asian members, many
. of whom recognized that such a

reo-rga._niztttion would pa.ra.lyze
tbe SGcretari~t.
~ow~vart it
is PoS-91ble that, in ordeir to
~void a Soviet vQto, UN memQers
~ight agree 't:O somo version of
the troika in tho lo... ar echelons
of the Office of the Secretary
General.
'rh-e n.ppointment of a. n-eui,
secretary genA:ral is suhjG~t
to the concurrence of th~ five
perman~nt memb-e.rs o1 tho council
plus (l'ndorseooen't: by n majorlty
of the 99-membe~ Genornl AsSOJnbly.
The assemDly can, however-, decide that ·the choice a.£
a new secret.o.ry genBral is an
"important question" requiring
fi two-th~rds majority vote.
As n s~opgap mea~ure, the
con.ccpt of having the pres~d~nt
of the Genera1 Assembly.tern~
po:rarily h'.andle the duties at

th.e secretary gGneral was nppa:rently ~ell .received by severn.l 1JN me.mbe•rs,

including .

si tion crun.Q £rom countries
~hich are promotiig ~pecific
candidates ~or the post and
from tho Savi.st Qlo.c, which is
sticking to ~ts trotku proposal.
Prior to Hammarskjold's
most UN members were
agreed that the next secretaxy
g~neral would. come ~XOQI Asia
or A:fricn.
Mong.1. S l:i.11, u.•:t-hrol t
d~ath,

of Burma, o..nd

C~

V. Xarnsimhan

and Krishna Menon of ladJa
have boen mentioned as possi-

bilities.
.In the m~nntime, the adrn1n1strative duties a:! tho
.;Sacro,tary G9nera.l ts Of:fice have
been assumed by Narasimhan,

recently appo-inted.chef de cabioot i.o that office; An.drov
Cordier of the United State.a,
under secret~ry for General
Asaernbl.y a:ffaire; and another
Americ.nn, RAl.ph Buncb.e} uod-er

secretary .far Q.0.....\.1.:t•.i_cal a..!fairs.

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COPY NO.
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OCI NO. 029e/s1:

11

28 September 1981=

CURRENT
INTELUGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTEUIGENCE
DOCIUllllT ••• - - - ' " '_.._I- - - - IG C'HILllGI 11 CU.U. 0
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CUSlo UUlillUI TGI TS I { ~ (q\CI
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUYYARY
28
TR E
EAST-W~~LATIONS

Seyte~ber

11' E E 1C

1961
B R I B F

1 If

. . . • . . • • , , • , . . , . . .

Page

The Soviet Uolon's line on Germany and the Berlin
pr-Qblem ·· continues to combine an o.tt1:tude of reason a ble ness on detmile and procedures witb an uoyleldlog stand
on certain basic issues . Khrushchev , in his talk with
Belgian Foreign Min1$ter Spaak on 19 September , appeared
more conciliatory and flexible than at any time since the
Vienna meet.Ing with President Kennedy . Gromyko has not
yet reflected tbls line in bis tallce with Secretary Rusk
or w1tb Lord Home , and Moscow bas made further moves in
the m1litQry sphere to tmpress the West with bloc ~lli­
tary strength and co11tbat readiness . Exercises of the
Warsaw Pact forcea have been anGounced for October and
Nove~bor.
At the UN, the Soviets bave continued to advocate the trot ka, but the.re are ·increasing signs tba t
the bloc will event ually compromise on on arrangement
for ao interim appointment to fill out Hallllll8rskjold•s
term, plus appoiDtment ot thi:e_~T cretaries to
act as advisers.

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OCI NO. osoo1e1

I

5 Ocoober 1981

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE - AGENCY
J~

OFFICE OF CURRl:NT INTelllGENCE

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T.he l..Ctb tiN Coenernl &9settibly is. in it:s tb.U:~ we¢k ot
gaoeral. dcblli.tl! . fl!oet; activity,
~~ver, la t:akiDcfr placi; in ~:1vate .negot iatione a51.0~g ,l Jll a.em-

bers

0111

such koy

poeail'>ly be such th.a:t the ~iooup
io the end wo:uld. vote ~ 111.. bloe·

_and

a.tna.

The .'.30cret:arz GertC!l'Al.$hlp

the

:1~$uea 8:8

QPJ;IQ$~ ~~t~on~l:ist

'rhe ~oviet 4elegatioa 'bo.&
turther m.oditied .itis: ~it.ion
on ~ Hstmn.ai+~kl<>-l~·a auc.ceasor
'-o· ~-.. ··~:f:fort to. neet the A.froAaians 1 ob-jactione lil.m1 to gal:o
, their aU'PPOrt i'c»' "9<>!D0 form of
Tho SOcrJ:titY Cenmcn oo 2
· the t,...01.lea p:ri11:a:1pie. ThB bloc
O<:tobe:tr o.:g~lA ctete:r.re d cons·idor.a- : .is O&A~,..e:ait 1.y· p;ress.i~ a prO»OISal
't:i.ott. ot 1111.u:r.tta.n.ia ~ s and Mo:ngo: t.or 'the Security 00iunc11 t-Q ~
11a!s m.elllb61~~.hip ~p9:J.i.:!,ll.tio:111e ..
· a prcvb,.oual "Chief ot the .e .ecAll 11 coun.<ii.l. member.a a<:quiei:.ce-4 retariatH plus three depgti.e~-·
l:n the def·e rral, -rCIJ?<!:r'ted.l)i' to
one each .fl'QIR tl).-e- weet. tbe SoallO'lr tim.e tor- :t!urt.be:r. negot.1 a.v.ii:it bloe·; and. t.iw neutro.:1
t:iO.M 'IJ.Ull :N.11.tiomalist China ()n
s1:a'tee. 'l'hie fcmr-man. <Urect·oits opposition to 'MOugol:!a ·~ enrate would be r.cQ:'"1N'-d: to act in ·
try into ·tJti: ·v111. 'Iile USSR. still
tho !!ip:tt-;1.t of "coocord0 and. to
i11:$1Sti!ill :it wi.11 veto !11;u.1rit:a.n.:l~ts ' ~e"e until April 1963. when
ap.P11c.a.1tion. if' M.oi.1$-.)liP. is re..Ralllll1arskjoldi's te:r.rQ would bavs
J ect.od. :Milu,4'i:ta:tt1.a' s arpplica~1.r~d.
tion 1S . :U r et. on the as0111cm. J;)U.t
the USBR .bas cire\IDVOiited this.
In .h:.i:.is c:;Kpl~at.ion ot 'th is
plan to AJllbas:sador St.eva1J.;Bon.
tactical dJ.lc:mnia. by tbrea:ten'""
t:ias to vet:o )!~l.ll"itani& 's aclm!U!;.¢hl.e:f So-v i:et. deleptrai ~1.'"ltl va.s
e:ion unle10a Moosolia ha& Cll:rea.dJ
.ambieuous on tl\.e 41.-.,ie1;1tion of
bCCD &¢(:epted.
Wh~the~ tbe soviet terminolQS1
1.nvolved a V<'tto pQ'll'Qr i 'Q~ the·
'l'be 8eeur.it y OOt'i.:lj)C.i l ·win
deputies. On l October 1 howe"Pe:r.
tho SOV,iet tiel&ptlon _publi&Md
probably rr..eot 11.Knin soon on the:
i;;. f:O>:llial ata:te.:ment out lining
problem, n,_g.d., a, H~t:.lomal.iet veto
Oil »on.go11a tbeo. could ·a.<.:ee lel"a.te the propose.ls and d.e:ilY:1tm that
:admis1d.o :n o.f r.iongolia and :Uauri-

a.tld the ~ppointmeo.t oi
111ter:tm BlElcretary ~:i;i.orn.l.

t~u.

ao.

1

the as619mbly

®b~t<l'

J.IO$OQll.I envisaged a "Veto
by Bnf of thrai d~t :tel!;I •

.on Clltoese

repre$;Jonta.tioo ~o(t ~~t; a1so
l.ea.d. ~a e11!1.r1y SOV.iet efforts to

'Q~

.have 'the

asselilb~

Ta.~J)Cj 'ISl
requ~~itig on-

reject

credentia1s--a vote

:powc-r

The 1&>Viet oologntiQP hll:B

been

ly a s :i111J.i1lC maJorl. ty • 1'Jle west
w~nt!il to b111,v-e the issue debated
8.B .a n '' important q,uest:l.On" l"eQlliirilllJ: ;a. twc-thir&a ·\lm:e ,

6<)ok1~S su~port ~ro~

Afr(>-

Ai'll.1n_,a; ~or th:la :la.test plan.,
'l'be USSR l'eporteclly U.S· aaeed

to the ~DPOiAttn.e~t ot Bur&a'~
U 'l'ftitil" ll9 lliterim. ~rGt~..__-..
gertel!'o.J. With :i'!u.11

Al though .spokeaaen for "the·
f:.v.ie;tve Frencb African :stato!i :ln
the Bi+dit.a\1'1 lle El:J:'OU:P continne "
t.Q· ~:rt ·that. t -h ey wi.1 1 C:pp0$0
11aipei .a;i; a bloc 1f fitl\Ur 1 tad a

Ui de<n1.e<l UN tnehlti&.r.ahip because
of d ~~t1o.oa.1:1s~ veto of Mon~Q1.ta1' ·th.ere are indic11 t :io.l l!i that
th.0 gr<Np 1$ UO't M Ub:1.f1.ed OD.

,

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The V5all 1 B %$111 purp0se

tJ.U,19 1.61il~ ~ ~qme epokeamen
. ~109 to be to a void a deC'f:eicm
cl,lrlm. .Pore lgn Wn.ist;ry of.f1C;1c:i.l~ l'l.bi<:h 'li'Ould 1"0cOnfii:111! the eKistof Otm9r~J'li, °?O'g'Q, o.~d .even
· t:Sng '5J.tµa:t:ion and represent !.
Se~ga.l,.. IH'l'I\& re<ientl;, e.xpreased
def&.at .for the Sov1.'1·t contention
Qppo~:Uion. t;.Q ChiJJ.QlliJQ Co~P.;1$t
tha '.t tlw o~~ti-~ b!'attch of tllc
mtt11ibore»htp in the· v:n:. However,
~-.liJ!.<1ul.d be reo.ri;anizod. /
/
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ppointment of an Inte-rlm UN Secretary General
[The 52-year- old U Thant has been Burma's permanent
repz:esentative at the United Nations since 1957. A close
friend of Prime Minister U Nu, Thant has been regarded as
one of Burma's more able public servants. He is in accord
with Burma's neutralist objectives, but within this pattern is
broadly pro~ Western in outlook and, according to the American Embassy in Rangoon, a strong anti~ Communist. He
vigorously defends the right of newly emerging nations to oc~
cupy a neutral position ~tween East and West, and has been
a persistent advocate of Communist China's admission to the
UN. U Thant is a B\(ave, well-groomed man, equally pleasant to those whom he likes and those he dislikes. He speaks
excellent Eng~ish.J
fitammarskjold hi~self considered U Thant a capable nego~
tiator. In January, when he was searching for a successor to
Dayal as chlef UN mediator in .t he Congo, Hammarskjold said
he would appoint U Thant if the Burmese Government would
release him._]
·

(!n June 1960, as part of his proposed reorganization of
the UN Secretariat, Hammarskjold suggested.that five assistant secretaries general with "political" responsibilities be:
appointed on a broad regional basis. One assistant would always
be a US national and one a Soviet. The remaining three should
be "nationals from countries outside any power .blocs." Although
this phraseology seems to endorse ..the concept of three power
blocs, Hammarskjold on 20 July assured the US qelegation that
it did not establish any new cr•teria for the selection of. Secre~
tariat personnel. beyond· competence and geographic distribution,
as specified in the UN Charter. Moreover, Hammarskjold intended to retain the right to appoint these asslstant.il
\nuring the past week UN members, particularly those of
the Arro-Asian bloc, have been· promoting this plari for five under secretaries with a single secretary general. Their· efforts- plus the strong opposition of the West to the troika at the secretary general level--may have influenced the V~SR to accede to
U Thant's appointment with five advisers_]

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9 November 1961!

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
'i

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRIENT IN.TELLIGENCI!

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. ·. ·"

THI! DH SEClll!TARIAT WfDSB U THANT

U Thant's appo1ntment ae
interim UN secretary 1en0ral by
coneeueue ia the Security Co1mdl
and .the unaniJ110us endorsement
of tbe General Assembly give
him cons14erable latitude' to
act .as tbe •ole· oxocutive of
the UN Secretariat . Thant , oDe
of the first candidates suggested to succeQd Dag llaminarSkj old, bad made it clear that
the BLlrlllese GovernmeAt would
qot pel'Jllit him to accept 1:t
there \fGT& QD)' fOJ:IQ Of "veto
or compulsory consultations
•ltb advisers" involved. He
bas since pledged hiQelf "to
preserve the 1:mpartial1t~ and
effectiveness of the Secretariat.
Thant will act ae secretary
seneral until April 1963--tbe
date on which .Dam11arskjold's
second term would have expired .
He has retained Ralph Bunche
of the United States and Georgy
Arkadyev of the USSR as under
sec~etartea, •nd NaTa$i~D of
lnd.ia as chef de cabinQt. Be
sa1d tbat be would also iDvite

a "llllited number" o:f pel"aons
to act as " pri.ncipal. advis.ers
on 1~port.an.t •• . tunctions entrusted to t.be s ecr G1:ary genersl.:'
Thant will probably lean
over backvard in bis efforts
to ·be completely 1.mpartial .

He is unlikely to e~blbit the
strong executive leadership

.tre4uently exeroi&ed by BaJlllllarl'ikjold, who so11119times went boyond a strict interpretation of
tbe Ulf Charter . lo additioD to
tho active role he played in
tbe Congo. Hammarskjold had

set. up..-•lt.hoat a epec;:i:fic .mandate from the UN and despite
strong Soviet obJections--a
UM opera t too in Laos wb·i ch
included d1p1oniatic ~s well QB
well a.a economic advisory func-

t1ons. and bad appointed personal
Who served to
bolster Jordan in its <11.spute
Wl th the UAR ,
repr~s-entnttves

Thant is .m ore likely to
insist on specific mandates and
to seek ·1110r e active participation
o1 representatives of OR me~ber­
etates 1n the conduct of UN
operations ia crisis situations.
The implied COJDllll'tment to coneult with the under s~retaries
111·1 11 also Und to 4,1epr1ve bim of
tbe opportunities Hammarskjold
aometimes '1$ed to ~onf~nt tbe
·USSR 1111 th a fat t accompli.
Generally recognized as one
of bis country's ableet public
servaztts, the 52-ye·a r-old Burman
gained the :respect of all political factions as Prime Minister
U Nu's ch1e-f ad'Vtser tn both
domestic and fore~~n a1fai.rs .
At the UN, wh~re be has been

Burma'u

perma~ent

·'..

representative

since 1937, Thant is highly
regarded for his quiet and efficient promotion of Burmes~
object.tvee. A Buddhist ()f gl"eat
personal integrity, Thant is
~lJ\lo " hard wo.r ker ,
Thant

in accord
oeu'tral1et
objec.tives, but within this
pattern he is broadly pro-

w1tb

is

Burma •a

'Westorn

aecording

ln

outlook· and,

to

the American

ltmbassy 1n Rangoon , a stro11g
anti-Com111unl11t. Be vigorously

:

defends the right of newly
emerging nations to occupy
a neutral position betwe.n
Bast and ·west, and bas been
a pei-sie.tent advocate of
Communist Ch~na'a admission
to

the

UN.

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WDXL.Y REVIEW

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. *Con~o: [iiam~arskjo~d has sent a letter to Kasavu,bu im~
P.lying: that. he will ~k:the Security Council to take the UN out
of the Congo if M.o~tu uses force -in an·attempt to take Orien,--~,tale Province~- sUll nom.l nally controll~d by Ari.toine Gizenga's
L
"government:.~·· Hammarskjold told US officials, however, that
'-----~he does ·not expect clvll war .ill the Stanleyvllle. area, since he
, .M VJ
believes neither Glzenga nor Mobutu is strong ·enough to force
a- mi~itary showdown. , Hammarskjold plans to be in the Congo
on. 3 and 4 January:!· Khr\,lshchev, after a delay of ten days, responded to Glzenga's ·appeal for support by reiterating. Sov.i et
·promises of support and. sympathy but avoiding any specific commitment of assist~ce . CSudan continues to refuse transit to UAR
.-----~----. planes bound for Sta.nieyville, but President Abboud admits that
f~ghts over remote areas of ~e countr could robabl be made
._____ _ __,,__·.U-A>it, . h, ,._ou.·. t,._,S__udanese~oJVle_.

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Hammarskj~'S Views.on~

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Ci.JN Secretary .Gen~ral Hammarskjqld has senta letter ·to
President Kaaavubu:imp~ying that he will ask ·~he Secur_ity Counc.11 to take th.e UN 9ut of the Congo if Mobutu uses force. in'. an
attempt to take Orientale Province-- still. nominaily · co~trqlled
.by the "government'' of Antoine G~enga. On 25 December
LumUlJlba supporters entered adjacent Kivu ·Province and.arrested the -governor and.several Qther provincial officials.
Mobutu:.m.a y be expected to take· some kind o( retaliatory ac~oo~

.

Cliammarskjold toid US officials that he does. not expect civil .
war in the Stanleyville area, since he be_lieves that ne.lther Gizenga
nor Mobutu is strong enough._ to force a military showdown. The US
ambassador in LeopoldviJ.le~ however, believes ·that barring i;;ubstantial airborne. assistance from the. bloc or·the UAR, economlc
co.l lapse :will. come. to Orientale· Province in two to four. weeks, and
that there may then be attacks on Europeans and their shops. He
po~nts outthat·eince.t he Europeans are widely scattered throughout .
: the proyince, ·it will be very· difficuJt for the UN force. to protect
them. The Sudan .continues to refuse transit to UAR planes bound
for Stanleyville, but President Abboud.has admitted that planes.cou,ld
· overfly remote . areas -of.. the country without .Sudanese knowledge':]
(Hammarskjold, who plans to visit the Congo on 3 and 4 January·, hopes soon to get the Guine~ troops out of the country, as
he considers them Communists for all practical purposes. He does
not think that either. Ute UAR or lncija will withdraw its forces, and
he hopes to be at?~e to k.e ep the Moroccan.troops in the Congo. The
army. personne~ who retur~ed to Morocco on 25 December were members of a special training mission and not part of the Moroccan UN
f orce_1 :
·
Soviet Premier Khrushchev, after a delay of teh days, responded to an appeal for support from Gizenga by reiterating promises of
Soviet support. and .symp~thy ·but avoiding any specific. commitments
. for assist~ce -to the S.t aaj.eyvllle group. Moscow may be awaiting the
outcome of the Rabat meeting of African-leaders, to beg.i n· on 3 January, befor~ .takin a definite stand toward Gizen a and his rum
. ernment.

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CommWllS~ China. - Japan: A Chinese CommWlist· labor
·delegation, 1 which includes two members of tile. Chinese CommWli.s t party central committee, is expected to visit Japan.this
week. It is the first group of Chinese officials to visit Japan in
. . over two y~ars. It ·will almost certainly use its stay to offer .
supplem.e ntary gu,t~ce ,to japanese·leftlsts and Communists
on renewed efforts to undercut the security treaty. Observers
ln Japan speculate that the Ikeda government may. use the visit
to sound out .the Cninese on the question of re~umption of trade.

I
II.

ASIA~ AF~CA

.* CCgo: The status of Kat~ga Province .and of Belglap bases
in.the · ongo has become a major source of .friction betwe·e.n UN
and Belgian officials in the Congo. On 25 July, Brussels protested ·a press .l~terview by· the UN commander, General van Horn, · .
in.'Ylhich Von ·Horn ·"orde~ed"· the evacuation of Belgian .armed
.f orces from Katanga. . Subsequen~ly, Von Horn. authorized a milder statement in which .he nevertheless indicated:.! hat UN .forces
would shortly move to occupy Katanga.
-~ru:ssels continues -il)declsive concerning. the "independent"
Katanga government of Mo.l ee Tshombe, . and thus far- has stopped
·short ·of formal recognition. UN . Sec.re~~ry General :ijammars~jold
. will proba}?ly seek a B~.lgian withdraw~ from Katanga.dul'.lng his
present visit to the Congo, but a decisiQn by Brussels to recognize
. the Tshombe government could presage. moves b Bel ian forces
to·bar.Jhe e~tcy of UN fo_rces into Katanga.
·
· ·
(Page.3)
. Southern Rhodesia:- African nationalist rioting at Bulawayo
s . con~mue esp te strenuous efforts by 2,000 police an~ troops.
e Africans, aroused by developments .i n. the Congo, are protestg the arrest last week. of several nationalist leaders. The. whitett.l er. government apparently COI)tinu~s to· l:niscajculate.thejntensify Qf African aspirations. The government may: be pursuil)g a to~gh

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·UN Pressing for Total Belgian Evacuation
o.f Congo
.
.
.
Statements purportedly made by General von Horn, com"'.'
. mander of the UN forces Jn the Congo, "ordering" thf:'·Belgtans
to ~vac1.1ate.. Kat~ga·· reflect increased fr~ction between trN and ··
Belgi~· offiCials in..the Congo. Desplte .Bl-µssels' protest, Von
Horn on.26 Jwy·authorized ·a.n amplifying statement that "iQdependent" Katanga appeared ~o be "a.part of the Congo problem as
far as the UN is conc~rned." Hi.a statement suggests that UN
forces will shortly move .to ..occiipy Katanga,· wher~ order riow·.
is beJng main~alned by Belgian.troops invited in by Premier ·
Tshombe. · · . ·
.
. .. . · ·

.

;premier Lumumba, in New York, has quoted See;retary General Hammarskjold·as assuring him that "there is no.., question of
an independent Katanga." British Foreign 'Minister Lioyd, however·,
stated on 25 July that it would be a "very. grave mistake" for UN
troops to attempt to resolve the breach between the Congo and·
Katanga governments. Lloyd's statement notwithsta.Ilding, · Belgium
will probably be hard pressed .to justify its continued .presence in.
Katanga wiless it takes the lead and recognizes the Tshoml;>e government.
Meai:i.while, both Pr~mler Lumumba and Congolese. spoke~­
mel) .in I,.eopoldvi.lle.have expressed.reservations ·concerning.. the
$2. billion. Congo..deyelopment ag·r eement app~rently re~~ed .with
American financier Edgar.Detwi,ler. . Lumumba characterized .the
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~egotiatior.id as explor_atory, while Col)gole.s e offici'al~s~in
~
s~
is~t,,..
e~...-..__--.
no_c..ontrac was bind,ing until ratified .by the c~binet.
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P.aki.stan-USSR: Pakistan's announcement that it welcomes
a Soviet proi:i'osaI to discuss details of oil exploration as.sistance}
is symptomatic of Pakistan's desire.to enhance its aid from aoad by.introducing competition between.the US and the bloc.
e Soviet P.roposal,_ originally made in 1958, was .renewed in
sponse to a Pakistani initiative·last MafJ President Ayub
_JIJ obably does not intend to jeopardize Pakistan's alliance with
the US, but he presumably hopes to ar0 use apprehension. tha~t-----~
·

P~ki~tdn-'-i.A_mmdn1r. .J.owJ.1.rd__a_rnore3ndenendent~nolicv_.

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LATE ITEMS

*Republic of the Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold is
·expected to arrive in the Congo on 11 August and to .proceed on
Friday to Elisabethville where Katanga Premier Tshombe has l
stated he is prepared to begin .negotiations for entry of UN t r o o p s L _

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Pespite his eftor ts to reconsff u. e e orce u lque, Lumumba probably has no more than a few hundred troops loyal to himsell, however, and no Congolese aircraft with which to
airlift them to Katanga.
In Leopoldville, there have been anti-Lumumba disturbances for the second consecutive day. Possibly in reactlon to rumors of a c·oup attempt, Congolese police on
10 Augu~t raided the office of the Abako party, which on
8 August passed a motion of no confidence against Lumumba.
Several Abako adherents were reportedly wounded when
firing broke out, but reports that Lumumba himself was injured in street demonstrations have been denied by an aide.
The premier has warned that large numbers of Europeans
would shortly be arrested for ''plotting against the Congo, "
a threat which may lead to a new exodus by Belgians, including those in Katanga.
Brussels continues critical of the US for supporting the
UN resolution calling for the "immediate" withdrawal of
Belgian troops from Katanga and for activity allegedly prejudicial to Belgian interests ... <Although Foreign Minister
Wigny has indicate d that all Belgian troops c ould· be evacuated
from ·the. Congo by 21 August, Brussels still may hope to avoid a commitment concerning a date for the evacuation of.
its Congo bases!_.,·1?ublic criticis m of Prime Ministe r ·Eyskens'
r = =•nt haii snarkeil """' rnm~r<Ll>• ~ " " ....~• . . _ '

~o-s-:-rne are a contr-oTRRrny-1'.n

r e ous con
parachute battalion and othe r small units allied with it

·s . Li.s__a.0.0.arentlv rPs t r i,.to d

to th o

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The .provls ion al exec utive com mlttej
announced tn Vientiane by the revolutionary high command
contains ~iverse e lements unified ma~nly by their dislike or

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*Republic of the Congo: Congolese police loyal to Premier
Lumumba contlnue to patrol the African quarter of Leopoldville
- following anti-Lumumba demonstrations. on 9 and 10 August.
Lumumba, whose political position appears to have been weakened
by the recentJ}o-confidence vote agalnst hls administration by the ·
Apako party, f!..eportedly is planning a cabinet shake-up-in order
.. to ·displace his moderate ministers with leftist~ The Abako--the
best -organized party in the Leopoldville area, where Lumumba
has little popular support--ls opposed to the premier's concept
of a b.ighly centralized government.
~Secretary General Hammarskjold, _meanwhile, has told
Katanga Premier Tshom~ he will arrive in Elisabethville today,
accompanied by mllitary and civilian advisers and two Swedish
companies of about 125 armed men each. He will not take a
representative of the Lumumba government with him. In an
apparent effort tq curb lnfl~mmatory statements by Prime Minister
Nkrumah of Ghana, Hammarskjolddiscussed the situation with him
during a "refueling stop" in Accra en route to LeopolqvilliJ
Uiammarskjold hopes to call in the first large complement of
· troops--Irish, Moroccan, and more Swedii;oh--for Katanga on
14 Augµ.st. He plans to return to Leopoldville on 15 August to .
1begin negotiations wlth the Congolese and the Belgians on the .
dlsposltlon of Belgian bases:]
The Belgians, in their ·pique at the UN, have characterized
the maintenance of troops ln their trust territory of RuandaUrundl as logistically dependent on retaining their Kamina base
in Katanga;·they have hinted that they might be obliged to abandon
the Ruanda:.._u rundi trusteeship. Premier Eyskens announced on
· 11 Augu~t that he would request a vote of confidence on Belgium's
Congo policies next week.
Soviet officials are continuing their attempts to stimulate
among 4!rican countries dissatisfaction wlth UN efforts in the
Congo. IP.uring his 10 August talks· with Hammarskjold, however,
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov agreed that the USSR
would make all of its technlclans for the Con
1
u
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DAILY BRIEF
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1(3)

I

~ongo: ~ew

moves planned by .Lumumba to bolster his In-·
ter.n position.have an authorita_i:ian .character. These reportdly will .include .the suspension of judicial procedures in favqr
f ..trial by military tribunal and passage of a .law requi.r~g. that
es for newspapers and periodicals .b e renewed every two
s'J A major internal. crisis for Lumumba appears to have
averted by postponement of the Abako party's convention
cheduled for 13 August, at which· the Abako had been· expected
to declare the low.er.Congo region independent of the Lumumba
government. Lumumba also may avoid ail early. showdown concerni.?J.g the political. status of ~atanga in the expe~ta,tion that a
6 K...J
scheduled meeting· of independent African states in Leopoldville
from 25 .to 30 A~st will take a strong stand in favor of unifled Congo. · .
.
·
{!UN .Secretary General Hammarskjold pn. 15 August summoned
a new·'meeting· ot the Security Council following Lumumba's charge
that. the Congo had "lost conf.i dence" in Hammarskjold. In ·an effort to, retain the propaganda initiative, Lumumba also called for .
the ·dispatch of a .14-nation UN ·commission.t6 oversee the withdrawal of Belgian ~roops .

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'rhe Situation in

th~

~

Congo

Postpone'm ent by the Abako·.party of° a convention originally
scheduled for.13.:.16 August appears to have averted a major internal crisis for Co~golese l:>remier t.umun:i.ba: The Abako on 7 Au. gust. had passed a .resolution of no cQnfidence in .the Lumumba
governmer.it;•and th-e convention reportedly was to have been the
· occaslC!_n .for the Abako to declare the lo\ver Congo region. independent of the.central ·government. Although .the reason for the postponement is unclear,. it maY-h~ve ..resu,lted .from pressure by Lu~
. mumba -on A.bako le~er and Congo ·President Joseph Kasavubu .

. with Kasavubu:'seemlngly unwllling:to oppose Lumumba, the
. focal point for antl-Lumumba activity." may·once ~ain. become the
Cqngo Senate, whose moderate·president, Joseph Ileo, has become
. lricreasingly critical of the premier. ·The Senate; which has been in.
a(ljournment ~ince . 22 July, ls sched~e<I° to reconyene on ~6 August.
.

A

./ ·

.

ti'he.i,ti~uni.ba. government co~tinues to implement measures
.lgned to suppress internal opposition. · · Theae include the su·s nslon of judicial procedures Jn favor of 'trial, b~ ·military .t~ibu..;
als ~d passage of, a.law requiring that licenses for newspapers
d periodicals b~ renewed eveey two months. Congolese officials
· earlier. had closed down. the facilities of the Belgia,n and French
.n ews ·agenc.les ln LeopoldvilJe.J
.
. .

(b)(3)

Lumumba may avoid. an. eariy. showdown concerning the polltstatus of l(atanga in anticipation .that a scheduled. mee~ing of
independent African states in LeopQldviUe from .25 to 30 August
will· take·a strong _stand .i n f~vor of a u~ed Co~go. ·
~cal

~ S~cret~y General H.ammar~kjold on 15 August summ~ned
.a,new Security CoU;Iicil meeting--exp·ected.to b~ held Wednesday or
Thur~day--followlng Lmnumba's charges earlier in the day that the
----~· Congo had ·" lost ~onfidence" in Hammarskjold. In an.effort to retain
the prop~anda initiative, · Luniumba also called .for the dispatch of a
14-nation·UN commission--Ghana, Guinea, Tunisia, Morocco, EUilopia, the UAR, ~daJJ.; Ceylo~, · I,.ilberia, Mali, . Bur:r;na, · India, Af-

·.

(bH3)

anistan. and. Lebanon- ~to:....ri_'\ffiIS..e.eJh.e- wt thdr_awa.L.oLB.eJ.eian_t,momLL~

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II. ASIA-AFRICA
. India-Pakistan: Conclusion of ·the long- delayed treaty
dividing the waters of the Indus ruver basin now is probable
as a result of agreement on the most important disputed ·
points~ Altnough negotiation of remaining· details could· c~use
further delays, Nehru ls .scneduled to go to Pakistan to ~ign
the tr.e aty about 20 September. While reiterating his willing~
ness to discuss other matters wlth.Ayub, Nehru recently indi~
cated he ls still riot ready to take up the Kashmir dispute and
is not' interested in joint defense proposals. The Nehru-Ayub
meeting c.ould, hmVever, lead to general exploratory talks at
a lower level to continue the improvement in relations desired
by both ieaders. I

9 k_

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~:

Prime Minister· Ikeda· has announced that the Diet

is liKelyTo be dis1;1olved in November·and elections held shortly

thereafter. In addition to his desire to satisfy the general feel:.
tJ k..
ing t.nat he should seek an early public mandate, Ikeda probably
ls encouraged by impressive.conservative ~c.tories in three successive gubernatorial elections and by failure of the .S ocialist
parties to develop popular issue for -exploitatlc:m. Public opin~
ion polls also revea.l.Jm.usuallv strong eunriort for the new uovernment . .

a

L

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· Pa~tu ese Africa: Plans for strong reinforcement of Portuguese secur
orces in Mozambique ·and Angola have been
. reported to the US consul general ID.· Lourenco Marques by a re· liable· source. A civil.defense orgaiilzatton hae been established
in Mozambique, and armed tro<;>ps· and police ·are .much in evidence. These m_easures reflect increasing Portugu'ese distrust ·
<?f the native populatlon . ~d. a 2rowln2 fear of subverslon.lmm
neighboring territories. IL--~~-------___ _____

6)

•Congo: ,As Secretary General Hammarskjold prepares for
·-the· emergency session of the Security Council, he ls seeking sup- 0
·port for his 'interpre~ation of the UN's role in Congo, a position
already ·atta~lted by .t he Soviet Union. According to pre~e i'epo~s
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from the UN, Sovi~t Deputy Foreigll Minister·Kuznetsov has
strongly ·objected to the. secretary general's stand that the
9 August. resolution bars UN intervention in.internal Congolese
disputes.
.
·
·
Lumumba, in Leopoldville, continues to take repressive
measures against both UN.personnel and Belgian interests. On
~ 7 August he .threatened to confiscate all Belgian assets in the
Congo if :Efrussels did no~ 'quickly return Co olese. funds de oslted in ~elglum several_monUi__!_ago.

III. THE WEST
e Castro
re me s sen ng . a_rge amoun s o money o various other Latin
American colintrles to carry on Cuba's campaign against the OAS
and perh~ps to bribe delegates to the OAS foreign ministers' meeting now urider way in Costa Rica·~ This money may. be part of the
$8,000,000 ln too- and 50-dollar bills which Cuba .is known.to have

~8

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The Congo Situation
Secretary General Hammarskjold, und~r severe attack
from both Congo· Premier Lumumba and the USSR, is taking
the chaqtic Congo situation ·back to the Security Council in or~
der t<,> 9btain council support
his· position. He ma.Intains
that the UN forces are not authorized to intervene in internal
Congolese disputes despite the demands :of Lwnumba that the
UN crush -the rebellious·.Katanga government.

for

The session may ·be o~ crucial importance because Lu~
muniba, ·backed by ,the. Soviet Union, -"is increasingly critical
of HammarskjoJd and.has .t hreatened-to demand the withdrawal
of all European elements of Uie UN . force~ - an action which Ham~
marskjold has said he would reject in favor. of urging the withdr'a wal of ~e entire emergency for~e . . Either· course would
remove present restraints from Lumumba and prov:ide a wide
opportunity for exploitation.by ·opportunistic Afric.a n governments as well as Com·m unist bloc, countries.. ·
+

. In LeopoJdville, Lumumba continues to take repressive meas~
urea· against. Belgians and to harass UN personnel. Subsequent to
the widespread police checks of persona~ docun,ientation on 16 .August in Leopoldville, . Congolese troops Qil ._1 7· August set up mach,i.ne. guns at the airport and.interfered with plane landings. The
premier. threatened .to seize all B~lgian assets in.the Congo if
within. two weeks B:f\l.BBels has not returned Congolese funds, including gold, whiC,h were sent to Belgium several months ago.

.

~

1....lle al.s o reportec;Uy has given :the UN one week to take "satis~
factory" action.in regard to Katanga or he will send Congolese
troops into.that province.· It is estimated that Lumumba
ntrie
-infantry and six gendarmerie. battalions scattered throughout the
jive provinces, exclusive of :J{atanga, five of which are in Leom
poldvill~ .P rovince. Gendarmerie battalions have rio support weapons or transport, ~hll~ al• battalions are short of supplies, trans~
port~ and·trained officers.-

has

: J. : "

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.

Tsh()mbe, on the other·hand1ls believed to control about 2,000
~rQOpS of the ·former Force Publlque oi:g~zed into four battalions:]

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Ghe troops up to and includiJ).g the rank. of captain are CongQlese.
Some senior oUlcers are still Belgians. Tshombe has also recruited some 2,000 young warriors with no previous milltary ex~
perience. His force is reported to be very we.11 armed, with com, plete modern battalion.weapons and· plenty of transport. In addition, 250 automatic rUles and ;mimunltion h_:;ge been issued to.tribal
chiefs to help defe~d· Katang3:.../

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\Wil"Of' SECRFIJ
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ..
19

Augu~t

1960

DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
""

II. ASIA-AFRICA .
*Republic ~ the Co~go: {izN forces in the Congo ha~e
portedly be eh authorized,.to shoot in th~ir own defense followµig new anti-Western and anti-white incidents· whiCh were
. apparently instigated by ]4umumba. ·On 18 August, a Canadian
officer Qf.the UN force was injured and other Canadians subjected..to indignities by Force Publlque. soldiers at the ~opold.., . ,.
~
ville airport. US Ambassador Timberlake--who' was barred ·
- - - --';b y Congolese. soldiers from Lumumba's residence on 18 August-rns th8.t the Force Publique could be. incited to action against
e UN troops, or to new depredations ~ga.iiist whites in general.
~cretary General ~?imars~jold, meanwhile, has stated
hat he will invite any nation in the Security Council which disg.r ees with his recent actions in the Congo to present its views,
ossibly in the form of a resolution. He appears confident ~at
critical ·resolution will obtain only the votes of the .two Commu·st· nations. The British, meanwhile, are exploring means of
- -- - .averting a showdown between Lumumba ..and HamIJ1arskjold, believing that UN operation·s could not continue· in..-:th=e--=f=
ac
=e~
oi=-=
a _ _ _ _ __
.. determined Con olese demand for withdrawal.

re-

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disagrees with his recent actions in the Congo t~ present its ·
views, possibly ~n the form of a resolution. He appears confident .that a critical resolution will obtain only the votes of the
t~o Communist members)
· ·. .
.

.

· (qoncerning. a possible UN withdrawal from the Congo,
Hammarskjold professed to regard such a demand by Lumuml)a as unlikely. He expressed the conviction that .w mumba is
being· adv,ised by Communists i~ Le.opoldville, ·but stated.that .
he could see no alternative: to Lumumba at this timeJ ·

t1he British Foreign Qfflce ls exploring means of averting
showdo'Wn between Lumumba and Hammarskjold, believing
that the UN op.e rations could not continue in the face of a d~ter­
mined Congolese dema~d for withdrawal. · The pr_e llminary_
British views ai.-e that the best way of supporting the UN effort
would be by tackling the· constitutional dispute bet~een Lumumba. and Tshomb~ , perhaps by having the UN SecW'.itY Council
s_to_seek..to resolve,_·--~
appoint a c
the issue.
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alternative to his .control would be a pro-Castro regime, he is
· believed capable of ·a ttempting to align his regime with Castro
or even with the Soviet bloc. Moscow is likely· to be very cau. tious in respol)ding to such overtures, especi~ly in view of the
unanimity of Latin American opini
t the Dominican
I.tepublic as expressed in the OAS .
. LATE ITEMS

*Republic of the .Congo: Katangan President Tshomb~
has seized upon Lumumba's retreat from his attacks on the
UN to express "confidence" in the UN and to reiterate the
independence of Katanga. Tshom~ probably regards the
Security Council consensus as strengthening his hand with
:r espect to Lu:mumba; hls statement that he has "consulted"
tt > <:.
wlth antl-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congolese con.; , . . : . .: .·
.federatlon suggests that he still favors confederation.as the
most -_acceptable resolution of "the Katanga crisis.
According to press reports from Ellsabethvllle, the
566-man Mall UN contingent .in northern ·Katanga have become
involved .ln fighting apparently stemmlng from activities l;>y proLumumba, antl-Tshomb~ trlbesmen. Should tribal violence .
spread, the position of the Tshom"M government would be
badly undermined.
Meanwhlle, Czechoslovakia reportedly will take favorable
action ·on an anticipated Cone:olese reauest for several .hundred
secondary schoolteachers.•. I

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. The Situation in the Congo ·
Katanga President Tshomµ~ has taken advantage of Lumuinba's retreat f.rom his attacks on the UN fo express "confidence" in. the UN and to reiterate the independence of Ka·tanga. Tshomb~ probabiy regards .the Security Council con.:.
census in favor of Hammarskjold as strengthening his hand
with respect to ~umumba : his ·statement that he has "consulted"
with anti-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congo confederation suggests that he. still favors this· means of resolving the
.Katanga crisis.
··

I;
.
Albert Deconinck, . .
thelgian Communist party leader . ·responsible for Congo · .
affairs, now is ·planning to arrive in Leopoldville oli 29 or 30
August. He. will be accompanied by Jean Terive, the principal Belgian Communist adviser to the Congolese. Botll men
have had extensive contacts with .the principal Congolese. leaders, especially Lumumba. They may hope. to play a leading
role in .advis~g the Congolese, as well as to establish a party
apparatus in the Congo.J
J

(The Be~gian pa~ty has systematically followed up its initial contacts with. Congolese leaders. After malqng numerous
contacts among Congolese d,elegates to the round-table conference in Brussels last January, and at the economic conference last April, the party concentrated on infiltrating Congolese political parties and encouraging close· Congolese cooperation with the Soviet bloc. Trips ·to Moscow and Prague. were
granted numerous Congolese for "study purposes~
.
.
In Leopoldville,· Lumumba continues concerned over possible unrest. Congolese officials reportedly suspe.c t collusion
.bet~een Tshomb6 and elements in the former French Congo.
·New rumors of support for Tshomb~ from President Youlou
in Brazzaville appear to have been stimulated by the. forced
landing in Luluabourg of a Belgian air liner en route. from

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Brazzaville to Elisabethville with a group of anti-Lumumba
Congolese.
· Elsewhere there are press reports that General von Horn,
who commands UN.fprces ;in the. C<:mgo, may be r~placed by
Finnish General A. · E. Ma.1tola. Von Horn has been under severe criticism by :Premier Luniumba arid by some Western observers; his removal, following the replacement of UN representative atmche, ·would indicate that Ha.inmarskjold ·plans a
major reorganization of the :UN groop µi the Congo. General
Martola was active in organizing the UN Emergency Force
during the &lez crisis. I

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France'-Mali: France plans to· recognize Senegal_ as an indep n en coun ry on 11 September and thereafter to propose
its admlsslon to the UN, even though Paris anUclpates that such~---~
formal acknowledgment of the breakup of the Mall Federation
will create dlfflcultles both in Africa and in the UN. As far as
Soudan ls concerned, France believes its recognition of Mali
cov.ers that country and plans no ·special action. The Soudan·ese
members of the Mali Government, who have proclaimed Bamako
the capital of the federation as·well as of Soudan, appear determined to implement their threat to break off relations wlth any
nation recognizing Senegal's indep.endence and have already moved
to terminate some French activities in Soud?-n. In addition, special representatives have been sent to New York to push the
Soudanese position at the UN, and another Mali envo was scheduled to de2art for Moscow on 9 September.
~------------~

LATE ITEM

,.
·.r\/>· 1, .f•"
1

~: .UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, in.a blunt speech
to thel.JFrSecurlty Council in which he stated· that Ka.savubu had the
constitutional right to fire Lumumba, affirmed his- intention to keep . i\. 0
UN forces in the .Congo and stated in effect that the UN must'govern the
y.) Congo until such time as a legal and. responsible gover.nmerit established. Meanwhlle, the Tunisian UN delegate ls trying to r:ound up .
support, particularly from ·African states, for a resolution--drafted
by Hammarskjold--which would authorize the secretary general to
take any necessary action to restore law and order in the Congo.
Action on the resolution is expected when the Security Council reconvenes in the afternoon of 10 September.
.
In Leopoldville Premier I,umumba has strengthened his control
following his unexpected succe.ss in winning both Chamber and Senate

ls

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durther difficulties for the United Nations are likely to arise
with President Tshom~ of Katanga. On 9 September he defied
UN control of three airfields, including that at Ells~bethvllle, to
send several small planes to the northern part of Katanga where
an invasion b ro-Lumumba forces from Klvu was re orted ln
pro ress.

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~: The UN command in the Congo appears to be involved
in an~ut effort to establish the authority of Congolese Presl<ient Kasavubu and·set the stage for an early attempt to remove
Lumumba from power. Working through .Col. Mobutu, =the chief
of staff and most important figure in the Congolese Army, the UN
appiµ-enUy ~rranged the surrender of arms on 10 September by
the bulk of the S,000 Congolese trOQps stationed ln the Leopol4ville area~ In addition, the ·uN provided the troops with thefr flrst
pay ln two months and announced an order--attrlbuted to the Congolese Army--- calllng for general cease-fire throughout the
Congo. Plans were revealed for the dispatch of a speclal UN
team to supervise along the borders of s~paratlst Katanga Province the truce which the UN com:inand clearly hopes w.111 result
:from· the. cease-fire order. The cease-fire order has been cautlously welcomed by Katanga President Tshomb~ and hls allies ln
Kasal Prov.lnce, but has ln effect been denounced by Lumumba who
stated on 10 September that Congo Army operations would contlnue
in Katanga and Ka.a~.

.IJtt-c

a

12 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF ..

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~ '"j OP SEGREI
~~~~~~~~~~~~

Meanwhile, Kasavubu has transmitted to Hammarskjold an
llst' of .a new cabinet, headed by moderate leader J"oseph
. lleo, to replace Lumumba's cabinet, which Kasavubu insists was
legally dismissed last week. Efforts apparently are being made ·
by Kasavubu supporters to line up support for the new"group, presumably with a view to reversing at a new parliamentary session
the endorsem~nt won last week by Lumumba in both houses. Direct action looking to the arrest of Lumumba. ls also apparently
under· consideration.
· At the UN, the Security Cou
i scheduled t resume meeton the Congo this afternoon.
inltl~

_J

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IU. THE WEST
Dominican Republic: ·Reacting to the recent OAS decision
to impose sanctions on the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo
government has called a huge Castro-type rally for ·24 September to demonst~ate its popular support. The government-con- .
trolled radio has also begun warning US bu$inessmen to defend.
Trujillo from US attacks if they wish to cmtlnue qoing business
in his count.r y. American officials in Cludad Trujillo see the future of US interests there as "incr.easingly bleak" as long as
Trujillo retains control. Domlnlcan Foreign Minister Herrera
Baez ls visiting Western Europe in an attempt to counter anticipated trade and sJ:llimlng bovco_tts by Western Hemim>here countries. [

ck...

=1

El Salvador: The stability of President Lemus' middle-ofthe-road regime '1s under serious strain, although developments
of the past few days have lowered tensions somewhat. Whlle the
state of siege.declared on 5 September continues, ~mus' con. clliatory moves have apparently succeeded in red,uctng the strong
public resentment caused by the government's~ lndlscrlmtnate use
of force against the Comtnunlst-enc.o uraged student demonstration on 2 September. Communist.and pro-Castro elements will
probably be quick to encourage new demonstrations as opportunity
offers, but stude~ers seem·fauhe_m:e..s.enL tn...he_t.akin!?....a]
conciliatory line.
.
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DAILY BRIEF

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~
The Congo Situation
The UN co~mand: in the Congo appears to have embarked
on ~ all-out effort to establish· the authority of Congolese Pres. ident Kasavubu and set the stage for an early attempt by Premier
Lumumba 's Con·g olese opponents to remove hun from power definitively. This effort apparently has the support of Col. Mobutu, the
chief of staff and most important figure in the Congolese Army- ~
control of which will probabiy prove decisive in determining the
outcome of the.Kasavubu- Lumumba power struggle. Mobutu, wh9
rece~tly _
c laimed that three quart~rs of the army was loyal to hfin,
reportedly ~rr~ed the surrender of arms by the .built of·the· S,000
Congolese troops stationed in the Leopoldville area. This action
took place. at a UN-controlled army s:amp on 10 September. In addition to ·i ts virtually ~ertain insplratio.n of .this development, which
would seem seriously to undermin~ Lumumba'e position, the UN has
provided the troops with the first pay many of them have received in
two months.
These moves by the·UN command coincided with its announceorder-.:attrlbuted to the Congolese Army--caUllng for a
general cease-fire throughout the Congo and of plans to supervise the ·
executiop of th~ · order along. the borders of separatist Katanga Province. The cease-fire order has been welcomed "in principle" by
Katanga President Tshombe~ whose regime Lumumba 'h as vowed to
crush, and by Tshombe~s ally, Albert KalonJl, the. leader of the
hard~pressed anti.:Lumumba movement in neighboring Kasai Provln~e. Lumumba, on the other. hand, dented the validity of the ·ceasefire order and announced that his troops were continuing to operate
"wlth great success" tn Katanga and Kasai. Press reports from
Elieabethville, however, indicate that last week's incursions into
Katanga froµi Kivu Province by Congolese Army .elements have not
yet be~n followed by any invasion in for~e .
m~nt of an

Meanwhil~, ~asavubu

and his supporters. have ·pushed ahead
formation of a new cabinet composed of moderate, federallst-minded elements to replace Lumumba's lefUst regime, despite the latter's continued ~laims to.be the only legal government
of the Congo. . Headed by Senate President lleo, ·the cabinet list transmitted by' Kasa\rubu to Secretary General Hammarskjold over the
week end names Kalonji as interior minister and Justin Bomboko as
with the

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foreign minister--the post Bomboko held until recently 1n the
Lumumba government. The.re ls evidence that Lummnba's opponents are making strenuous efforts to dev~lop wider supp~rt,
apparently wlth a ~ew to · reverslr~g at ·ari early date the. votes ·of
confid~nce. won. last ~eek by LumUinba, after·demagogic ·appeals,
in both houses of the Congolese parliament. KasaV1,lbu'e gr.oup
may also attempt to arrest Lumumba in the near future, especlal:ly .if it becomes convince,d it can rely on substaritlal support
from .Co~gQlese troops as well as the neutrality of UN forces 1n
.. the Leopoldville.area. The· group probably drew encouragement
from the ~irm stand· taken on 11. September· by Ghanaian.troops iii
·the face·of an attempt by Lumumba to regain by force control
over the UNm~rded Leopoldville radio station. ·
.

.

.

Bomboko departed for New York on 11. September to speak
at the UN in behalf of the proposed Ileo government, ;ind 1t is possib.l e that represe~tatives ..ot Lu~umba's regime may also arrive 1n
time for the Security Council's next meeting on the Congo crisis,
now schedule<ffo.-·the.a#ernoon of 12 September.
Moscow's immediate negative reaction to Hammarskjold's
blunt speech of 9 . S~ptember suggests that the USSR. may veto any
resoh~tlon . aimed at strengthening the secretary gen~ral's harid 1n
the Congo. · Som'e UN members reportedly are considering the advisabillty of calling an ·emergeJ?.CY ses.s ion of the General Assembly-possible on. 24-hour not1ce- in ordeJ" to keep the UN tn· the Congo ~
Hamm:a rskjold's 'p restige ls still suf~lcient, ·p articularly among the
smaller· ount
- ale sunnort from the_as0

~embly .

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12 Sept·eo

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ap:tnst tbQ r"lolrr1:aa tb:re:n·t o:t

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.ai"b le, baweYe:r... e lt:be·r wit'hla
or rimtlhlt ·the. par-t1e,a oa t.h e

CUbll.fl iss:ua. Be1:1tecwr-t lie.a
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the rostp& tJOD '01 tho JJTO-

~ba;o Areal'•• wbo ie prOV!insmt
ln- t.h13' WO, to be t'.b.e IC$U3& tor
bre~t;l;ng th.er coa.Ut1oo.
e.Jt4n.*
·couri: bel;.tevciG tho.t cno.ny tlrtD ·
:embens ue dli.i.U.ws tan.eel w1th
the.it' l\1lrt1 and could &v&ntu-

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"tlto Coneo s Uv.a Uwi M,G been
c:ompoundod by- t•o coupe attempted

p,:.o9 i,d~r>~ :tta!il~vqt;i~ •a e.ff'or.'t to

d~~~~ the premittr CU1d: ca.PJ>Oin't
uodera,t~ J~el)h ·u eo!. the prest-

the senate. in

b .i !:i

sto.n.a.

Gld DOl! recei 90 ' DOPulll:r OT ..u
:l t:arr :ru.poo:rt, an<J Ilo~ . c.b~c

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lie !si.stcad ut th~ poli ticlll.
etrlU~l!i.C! in Lcopol ifvUle ,
bi
ta.ci.,, bQt~ y~~vu.bu and l .l eo
h.a-ve mi'lr'ed so alowly i:tu.t
Aa?ef'j,c~il F.mba:S ll'J off1c16:IS de9e'i''lbe ~h¢ tr Jlil.c;'e ao enn..1.l-U.ke,
•nl!. report t!hnt Kaeavubu. ~acts

more 1.ilw a

vept.able

e~ery

day ,~•

Oo 14 Sovtoro'bcn:·:.. Colon.o.l

Jrowtu~ DC!Y'l 7 •PP01R"t~d ritiJJJ

¢oama.ni;to.r la chtef, &nnouQC.04
th~~

~1ld

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wae ta.k"J.ng cl:i;l.rge
would enfof'Ce, .o. truce u;oUl
t -llo

3\ .Oec:e111Mr, t.bus &nAbll.Dg tb.e

to

DaXlng the

Ut.9t'iln

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et'udooui and tc.c·lln1~ia.ns woold .
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!if·1 th. tho UN. 'fiQ- p.r opoacd to

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tb~ Crmgq•s cli'U'-t
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or etl"4't18 ~ai;tio.ns o~ tht!i Pfll"t.
ot .t el.ldiog COS\golcu;;o poUtic::b"lls,

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SUCCO~::lllE[.
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b'a.· cld-11 .tibat lfobu.tu h11.d been

A.r~ted "'~ ~~a~ebUV d.~oied,

bove•e·i i, 'the e1.t~·t1011 r~a.lDS
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th!e.s ot th& bulk ot tb& eoa.1iole.s11 ArflY 1.l.llCl9&:1'.

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Sopte~ber

1960

t-uQ1t11nba, nftqr

beutin~

off

ltbsAvu~

e.UOJ."t • llo d1s:a1ss .
him, ccil:lod a ioum.p
sessloa o..f tlte Na~ ·

·uonll'l AaSi>cmbly "!1hi¢t

¢a 13

Se~t~ber vot~a

l)tm unae r 1oed "C'il l
pa~'C'l'ci , " a.1ad 'bac kod
h1ec Dt.ta.cka · 0 ·11 the
UN's ~ote ia tbe co-o-

'fhe J)'.remler ap-

pa¥Qntl~

UDC

th.is

nope:i to

~tioo~

cbal le:n.&red blt tho

opp0$1.doo on tbe

.'.."l".OU.'f tdl!I a oQ\101'\la W-Di•
J, ~¢ 'kJ:De-to Jµ.tt't ty

~ho ost~bUstme.td

a dlo-htO.r .hiJ>,

oI

TbCil pl'q.n:ie:r ··s
abilit.7 to rct;A.i.o ·
power bas ma.~ t..'b e· mf
t•s~ VQ9UY morie CU:flic~l t .
f\lrtbe~

t,roubla toT 9acret-..r)'
<;enerel llluw:t.u!lkjo:ld
ru1s ar1sen fl"Oil Hvaa.l of tho
Af.r lca:n s tR t~ Whlo.h aympa·tbl:z:e
wit~ UtmunibA-•& pr.octaiaea et.;.

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f~.\'!8

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for·ts to ner:ac.rvc 1"J\r> unitJ o.t
to comb~~ f.o~Gl~O

·nave 'JJH!a e-xploi tod
Tb.Iii c.o-u~cll sea-slot! on 1.2 Scptembo.r ft.S adjo~rned beciua.se Al.l ~ti;ppl~t9d
mo~l"OQ would bave eidcd Lu'

--nota;bly Be l.lfi&D and Prenah"'imp(trt ol #1tm . (ig.ln'lta. Ci.b&Da.,

slon o·n 14

a·u

.Suda.o, a.od the UAll bno
~~ro.ca.ton.410 ·-i:o wHhdHw tr.oo_
ps
trOn the cno CocmuLnd •Dd 111J)11ed
tba't ll?1~7 would 1* i>'lt o't LuO.ltn'b~ •e dJ.e:poao.l.
WUbin tha
liL!>t few da:7~ ~ ba.&'f'4'r, as the
W :rel.a.x.ed l:ts eon.trol of the
LeopoldvtUo rAdio sta.tton a.nd

a.lrtlela,
acioptod

D.

Gt.tea. and ~daa

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11Jore o,onoUi.lltor)' pol.-

lc:!f tovud ·t .bo 5ocrata-r)•

aea ~

or"l ·
.
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l\u boec; b,andlcap_ped i11 bb offart~ i .a u.~ ~c-urtt.)l Couhe .U

to

~et

backlDg tQr

~ t~uab

001-

t.cv l .fl tbe Congo 'by 'tb.c wa.vqr-

lag

at A.rro-A.s.laA

PAJlT I

govor~•nts,

.,tiotJo

by tho U3SlL

Qlwab~ ; ~o~ · ~a'-ul>u;
.;kt~r.aed

th~ !Se!s-

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vas a.<J111·Jto.b TL;ntstA propo3ed

.:i. pod..of.t.~CCHi COfftlllBitiOl:i

to

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F.or sev!Il'al. da.·1 e
A

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1ii ebo h.1111..i llrQa, al though i .t
18 no•t clear wbo:tho;r tl!.19 ' bas
rosuhod ·fro111 the geaa.:ra t ¢.eaaeflr-e ';:hlc:h tho .UR &Aft1>tmced on

bQ~n o~dered
't'b1~
81~uattoo was prob-

10 Sopte.a.ber hmd

.by t.be ~(l·l?Ole.!UI At'a.y .

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R~ly 1~

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tcm Sovi~t IL-148 ~bic~ h~d b~n

used lo 'tra:nsport ~011:c 200 ·Lu ...
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Qt tho Wf r-estrtctlcm.&, ~1a1.lm
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tbe- same -t:l.IW, Prqeldoiit

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r 191ng l>Y Ba l,"1~ll tribe:S:ne.n at.·
KaM110 .
Tsbom~6 Qel~omed

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:regr.es en C.R:ti vq.IJ i Q

dosignBtion aa
oeAt two

neet

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to diSGUl!t8 a. .Ce<l-

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Tshomb6 c-ont.:l"lwee t-o mQk-.c> i;t;11tcneots t~~o~1~B ~omplete :iadeoeod.eoco toT Kntcnp. 'Th18 a.rip:uielfl.'tl;y to 111.rge.1 1 • ba1·g~1n.us
. taotio, but also d.estgru:i·d to
appe-al t.o lc>c~ l •.clvocAte-.s ot· 11
SiJFaJ"~"C-9 l(a t~l'l-8!'1 · : . .
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C?~le't- Bloc

ltovo.9

'f1\o ~u:Diat bloc 1& beeo.ttln(t llJOr-e itt•ol:ved ta the
!Chru4h-Che-v ·,
J.q tbo ·•troa~9t Soviet a.ttRC~
OD Ha;a.~~rSkJO l O to d.Atq, ChllJ'god

OonBO S'1taAt1oD.

e>n. 1~ SoptGDba.r t:b1u. · the UN ee.c-

ratar y teu~ral ts "'C.Oll~10\l.~ly
wor~1na ln ~he 1ntorcDtsi of tho
i11pt)l'i11.1.,s:~n" l .n tbe ·C oa10 a.n4

t.b.11.t hie

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.''ctontaU -v1tll

tbe pol1ctoa ot tbe countries

wbic;;b ba.~o atwa,y.s; ~pOoQGQ th$
potU. ti on~ of. -oo l.Ooi.aU-:m . ,..
All&1'4i1?'.l tig que8Ho11~ etbot\rd
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4enc>ubc·~4

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Oovc.rnlilcint. ht: cho.onclad thra.ugb
tb.e Uli as a :r-ur.ti.er ef""fort. to

uptto.l<f co l.onilil i.s t 1.at91"ests ,
D.D~ lndicllt~ that ho ~P..Y pr·Cl.68

the Co.n~ lsm-ue nt tho f -ortbc0111og ml 09Del"al A.ssetiblY .11.eetiog.

JG tlte .u n.1a SO'i'tet <Jo\'ei'amen.t sta.t:em~nt on ttlo f1Ub-Ject, ·
isaued .on .e Sept-her,. :i.b e asse
~OC'll~Od "EIM~l".S.'1014 Of h ..iting
t ·o show t:he "mirdduiia ">-t ~.m.Pta..r­
t-1altty'' a.rilJ of •topenly 11orking
-f<;Jl' t;tl• b'J'lld .t t or " the c.o.lodt u~

is ts~ -th6reby e:a..promlr:J;t.ng tnca
UN. '' "°&OW detiArid~d tha.t tlll'
1o.rcos oc.cupyt.Qg Coruio l.G-89 Ur-

fleld9 a.ad rauiio sta.t.ic;tns bo
dl.!ilAt .fl:&OO> ca,nd -cal.led on the
go•e·rim:eot~ 't ih9;9 U'fX)pe are ln
tb a

to aa.rr¥ out tho "eood_
Oec1&1o.a.s... -o i tho so ..

CO~o

eoi-~:oc·~

Cll.%':i t1• ~rictl, bypaas1ci.~ tlltt
IDl C<Kmiia..nd 1 f 11CC~3-8N'f.

. Tbtl USSR~ f1 r.el)·ly 011 10 Sop•
tembor . tc,> • l)Qt.9 ·f ron lllltwiar&l'Jo l ·d ~,gud.ln_g dh-oc·t Soviet
ll.1d 'tO th" C'ottG'O 1ndic~to~ Noscowt9 inteaUora t ;o ce>ntl.nua itA
ua.i 111:to~ai a,\IPP<>I' t fo r .Ltutilinhll •

Tbe- SOvic-t. not• ~tR"~ t-b.at ·Ille
~CU:ri"t)' Cou.nci l TO$/O 1,u"tions · .

''do ao-i ua cn.ttnot re!it:r .icrt ..
tbQ right .of the Con.~olege Go.v-er.nmoot to ro-quoe·t a.110 l"Ooehe
Aas1sta.oee d1.E"eo1:-l.y
ei>nraci:it:~

,tl'OG_I

899'-

91 'l·tllGl' eouotrtes 1u1d

as&ert6d thut So~1ot ~1~ 1ft the
i~t·11 ·O l oh'll a.ir'Cl'·a .t't a.lld raoto:r

vob.1-=.la:i; w~ "!f\tllt a~t!s-i.11tcot ••
fN'Ufa tbe:se rc(lolu·i'J.-one . ·Moaco1,1
9X_p:r~98&d 8.U.rpriae- tbA:t t.h1> ~QO­

rcta.l"y

.go.~vrgl w~e ~tt~ptimg

to

¢0.l)tJto.l ·tlid Co:ng.o,e irel&tiotis
·~tttl ouv.u• Bt.bt'i':t, spa<: Uie:a.Us-

tha USSR.

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Th.• e·HurU oo io ·IAoe bu
.,.,g.oll o now 1.nd moro erlt1~1
t~rn vU.b t-h& J'l!l-J1"'diatio11 ot t ;h.e
$ouv-acn~ Phouma cover~roeot 'by
Q(Jl:IO'r-a.1 Pliou:ll.1 aaa Prii:lca .BOun:

ou11.

TltoU' .soU-ettl•d ••twvolu-

a

d~

Wbllo ill et:t•at aettins- up
fil¢to goVel'!\IJOnt 1D 6a-

VaQOAktlot

~ Olm.

a.ad 11'\oUtJJ.

a:_p.JJll,,rcr.rt.i.t do not .ta.tond tbifi
t-0 be .11 sepa-r~t~s-t. · r0:st1to. at
toast .at tbt.a uae--. "tt\ci-J -'-"""

CJVlll"

pl:edged g u.pgon to nAlf sa \rD..Qg
aad seat o~a:ruis to Utan.fl

Uy

f!Ot -11A;!ct~ l'ttD c:on•Utu--Ciol'.I.,
"'OW!lted-"' -tbe 8qu•1um~ go.v el;'Jl.tient ; a.eel ae-cre&d ID&l"t 1-D. l law

·u ons ·t o 't.he

t,Eiro~fi,liOLl.'t

tbO loyal:tJ ot ~U fOUT 'l'J11.l~
l'OIJ10D- comnabdocs outo.i de qi
V:tont.ta.110_, .as wo11 as tea of

-u .oaary (loamt tteo 1r proe'J,attJied

Rridio Sava.iitia.khet on 10
S«il pt~unbe)' that l t had teui_po..ra:r-

taos .

All ml.U.tu:.,~oNJM n~rs . t.?-1'~11 eel'va.llt&, .a.nd
· ;people vere :r.eq,u er;te-d t--o rec-

o;nize

the . au~h6rlty

oJ -oom-

miti.ee Cbairtta:n .Boim OWn &ltd ~o
d~rei;n.:rd V.tentta.'OC ' G 07~o-re.

Oun

Po\t.Q.
ls t bQ
o~d ~~e-di~ary l"l.ller.

oO-Jear-

ot

$O~th­

er.D 1.lloe. •ho reoou.nced hla

c:1:a 1118 1» 1946 in favor ot. e
ual.Ued ,~Q-$ undor t~o _K11)g ~t
LiiaoJ Ptiab11ug • . Descr.ib&d o.s

a.:n oa:i'iby. Pl"ac·n q-a 1 IMO or ac~j,oa. ~"'n ~ 1.8 ~.Ucvc4 to
Jtnve c 'h Afe:d iJl reoe:at :ye"_r.q

ovor thQ lack 01 scoJ)O oJtered
for Ais cnorg1c6 by iUa 81.DO-

o.ur& lJO.Si.t-ton a.Ii.a iaJtpec:t.Qr ~.n,..
4>.ral o~ the Xi.ru:.<lcm.
Baun Ou'wa.c ao aot-1.-J'apamr.so l'Q8.1sta.n.ce
l!i?ader i.a •or1d h r n .. •Qd. ii!
1~~4 ho lod comaabao troops
llgll1Jl.St tb.c Sn-VAd..1DB Vle-t Mlnh.
D9 vma premier iD l9d9•$Q. -~
f~11on aU111.11ent wUh ·the h:Jt
•nd t~ i.JIJ)051~1on 01 -autbott~
tnri~ft g°"er.D11.e~t~

PART .I

Pru.bllng t--o

1'hc

h phi,~ tb~t.r

ac-

llloiu.re:-h.

~~Clt.lbo-t.

group c!A.im

the c:mmtry 'c; U P-rovt neul
~rbOJ."a , but their ~u•t•~no4

'°"""

~1jlll:lr~e

laela.Dc~ &n.d l.l.ntey Df
i$ «>?e~ 'to qu.*1;tioD.
Th& -first

tiUitary region cocnqand·o·r, wi-th
h~Octuar-w:rs

·J n

~ag ~~~g.

bQi.r. tt1ftl1'5 Qd Jl,1 tnaelf · tw·toe· Cl.lid

oow seen& te~htiwlf to bo
supporu~ t~ .sou~~ s:ovon11eat . th.~ l oya.lty of lonr
aohelcm miU~ry i.m itis- -u O\fGll
110.1 '0 di:f.ficult to .1ur,::al!ls.-;.
DOUD
OuR' aiid Pltowt •.Ul .r.eq_ulr-6
outside. f:i.~r:ieiA-1 -an4

iou·u .-uc.

s.u _pport i f t~&7 ~ t ·et- ca n 1
out tbou -plans.
1.bD4 ID:r,

SOQ.vv.ma. has

f eactcd 'o· che 8au:n Oum • P'l\ou~l
a -l,loE!p Yitll 111ode:riu..ia11, ~P·

J>al"eDUy .vtt.U hoptnir 1or a

-COQJ'Olliee .
1'1! MO doclU"ed Q
at~_te
oeargon.c-y tlrt'vu1d1out '

ot

-the aDWJtZ'ft bl.It ba6 aot -Y-•-t

bl'IU\dad Phoue»t. and SQuip. ~"' RB

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_____,

(b)(3)·

ECRET : _ _ _ _ ___,

The _Congo Situation (Information .as of 0300 EDT)
Colonel Mobutu has moved to consolidate control in the Leopoldville area. 9n 16 September, troops loyal to him prevented
·
a mee~ing--called by President Kasavubu--of the Congolese National Assembly. _Mobutu troops also raided Lumumba's r esidence
and arrested about twenty of the pre~ier's staff, although Lumumba
himself remained unmolested. Censorship reportedly has been imposed at the. Leopoldville telegraph office. This .activity ls in line
with Mobutu's announced policy of "neutralizing" c·ontentious political
forces. ·
· Mobutu also repeated his demand that CommunlS.t bloc diplomats
leave the Congo by.noon· on 17 September. · According to press sources,
on 16 September personnel of the' Soviet and Czech embassies begari
preparations to depart Leopoldville. A TASS newsman was quoted
by a .western jo.u r:ilallst as saying, ''We are ill leaving tomorrow. "

.

.I

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/

I

L_
. The-latest attempt by the central government to invade Katanga
apparently has failed, and at least part of the Congolese invading
force has retired across the border into Klvu province. The Tshomb~
government continues to be troubled, however, by serious disorders
among Baluba tribesmen in northern Katanga.· Ti;ihomb~'s troops
reportedly have killed fifte en persons ln suppressing disturbances at
Manono in the north central par t of the province, and another 20.
tribesmen have been killed at Luena, about 60 mile s southeast of
Kamlna.
·
At the Security Council meeting on 16· September, Tunisia and
Ceylon introduced a modera~ resolution. designed to confirm the

( b)(3) ~

17 Sept 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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present ·UNJ20Sltlon Without spectflcally co.nc;lemnlng the USSR's
actlvttles. \Ilda resoll:ltlon was vetoed by the USSR, supported
by Poland wlth ·France abstaining. The US then called for a"
emergency s·e aston of the General Assembly which· was· summoned,
oyer a negative Soviet vote, ·for 2000 EDT 17 September . ...se~.re.tary ·.
General Hammarskjold ls.confident that the African states w.111
support hlm ln the Assembly, arid he believes he ·c an force the USSR
into the unpopul# position of defending unllateral military su art
of the Con o ln. defiance of the UN.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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·=ZJF

SECRET...[

The regime ls making a special effort· to min- - - - --'-r-...-:m
=-rz=-e=-:::i.'o=
m estic apprehension. During Gursel's absence,
Deputy Pre~ier Fahri. Ozdilek, former chlef of the Army
General Staff, .is the acting chief of state, closely sup•
_ _ _ ___ ported by General Madanoglu, apparently the· dominant
member of the Committee of National IInt ruLLj

I

L--~
, ~~~

· · ·Congo: (Tension between UN officials and the ~obutu
r --'--- -----, regime niayTncrease following Hammarskjold's criticism
of the Congo leader at the·Security Council session on 7
December, when he stated that technical and financial aid .
outside the UN framework were r~sponsible for the rehabil~
L-- ------ ltation of".the Congolese Arn;iy and Mobutu's strengthened
position.lln the Congo, the UN Command has ·reacted strongly
·against Mobutu's order to control the transport of UN mil~ .
itary supplies which came soon after announcement of the
·impending withdrawal of Ceylonese, UAR, and Yugoslav
· ·for·c es. The Yugoslav action wtil deprive the UN Command
of some of its n~cessary aviation maintenance men; the UAR
withdrawal:. will strip the hard~pressed UN forces of 500
troops.
.
Colonel Mobutu has taken measures to attempt to seal
oft the ~umumba partisans in Orientale Province, and ·President Kasavubu has proclaimed a state of emergency in that
[province, probablv in nrenaratian for . ~i~tarv lnti(~:~o~.

III. THE WEST.
Chile:- US~~: Tbe conseryatlve Alessandrl government
· ha~ expressed concern to the US Embassy in Santiago over
. Soviet tra(le overtures, particularly off~rs to supply petro
leum at well below world prices and to purchase substantial
quantities of copper. The offers, presumably made by Soviet
· representatives now-in Chlle, are presented as straight com·mercial tra~sactions and not barter. Leftist politicians a;re
0

i
9 Dec 60

· . DAILY BRIEF

iii

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C 0 6 5 410 4 9

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for Release: 2016/07/05 C065410491_ __ _ _ _ __ _ __

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oc1· NO. 00011&o

111

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

(b)(3)

CENTf.h"L
OFRCE Of' CUl'lENT INlEWGENC!

(b)(3)

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' co6s41os1

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i•

CVBRllH IKTELL.I(lJ.}(CB WlmltLY SUMMABV

29 Docember 1960

.A "bala.nce of wea.fQia$c;1·.1
•s a.n-d Mobutu 'e
tot>ees ,. lb wb1cb MOb1,1\'.\l hesitated to move ailitA~ i ly •1a1ns~
t.be '#ell but iaccee:slble reg1.12e
at Btaelc:7v.tllo, cmd.ed. o".ll· 25"
b~tv.·een Gi~e:aga

Dceeml1~r

vhon G1z.a1a•9 aold.lors

entered ltiV\1 Provine.a.

of at;»o\rt eo

•~n

A force

se1Md p.rovt.n-

Ci.al ).QQ.dor• a.n.d a m.111 tary Cl.Om•
r"a.rcied as leant~ tD~W'CI

$rad,~r

Altb.otJ#fJ his hold on K1vu
_preca.r1ous, t·be eaaa

18 .P n>bab.l y

W1 tb wbtc.b Oh;en;p acb.1e"·e d . the.
fin.-t of b.1..8 goals , w1tb littlo

GutrddQ belp, Ca.ti be ur,;oatcd
to boq8t tbe ~1881deat:s • -pr-ea ....
tiae bo~ •Hll tn a.ad out4 i~C.J
"tbo Con~o.

The s1tuaUoo 1.n K:hu will
- 1ncr~aso pr~aur~

oo

Nobu~q

to

tmdertoko a1.li tary
oporatloo9 agal4St
tho di~•ldente, aotwi,.tbeU.ndi.ng UN oi>.po-

niuon.

e&D1arsk,101d

bu sent a letter to
Ka-6l\V~Q i~pl7icg ·that
be wlll aek tbe Socurity
Co.uacll t .o tilko t .he UN
out of tho- Congo it
li!Cbutu wJas :f-Dl'~9 in

aa at tatpt to .ulte
Or·. iantalo Pro'ltDC:ft.

bi!l&v·u bu--i n ~n -~P­

pa.raat at·t 91npt to avoid

au

ogatrv.ctioa1st role
ralQtivv to tbe UH-·

~ indi.c&UJl]

I

ie

willb~

I that 6~

(b )( 1)

to reoeho

tbo 1ons·~a1Uayed w
concilia:i-100 ~ids­

sto~t

pret~ra.bi1 ~t

tbe .. ume of iJIL!llJW&r-

skj ol.d 'B \' il!l,i t to L6'o~ol GVJ l

le oa

~-4

uao-

uitr¥.
Bobutu.
a f.ew-

41.t bougb oo more tba.ft

l:luad~d t:~oopa

by tbc dle.eidents,

were us6d
by 27 DecC!'.11-

bo.r 11~ch of' the f"rC1V lftc.e appcmr-ed
rqpon.etve ~o tb.e Oiiz.ooga.. r'OS'lllle.

lle&DWtllle, G.1.1;in®, GJn~na,
.Dli • · &Gd. the UAR h~v~ a~ceDte<l

~n 1.Av1tat1o~

from Kina Uohatted

V of Moroeao to n9ot .1o Oi.sa-

blaa.aa on 3

Jan~

to discuss

pl:'Obl oma.
In add.l t.ioa to
jt.f'Ov idj.ag a •O\Ut<l_1Qf boa rd ~O:r

c~n

By

saineel

bls iDUta-tho Gizenga

~o.nt.rol O"f

a food-pro-

area ·ea._p&·blo of Ul~vt•t1DIJ tb.e serious 1.'6od •ibc:trtniie

d~cing

1.a Staate7vlll~ .

aat.i-WQR_te.ro pt:OhOUD.eemonta ~ tbo
m~t-igs ~5 e.x pected to procnote
4hc~s1on ol pos.sibl.o jotnt a.cU11:n• to atd the 8t1Lol0,y1t.U .lo

d.1BS.1Ce.4tS.

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541051

Page 9 ot 11

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CURB.BNT l'tfT£.U.1GSNCB t/.E.BlLY
~ . Dece~l~H'

Sovie>t

Gro~>to Oh

ta~oign Miniot:ir
23 December eatd tbon~

SD~llY

l9GO

ia.nc& trom ~i~ensu by roitoratin~ aeneral pro11·L aee ot Sov1.et

ttio 11-ssa rec~olites G1zienga a8
tho "o.ct.t ng p.ter:iier of t.be lesHi~to sovucmc:ot oJ tbc Qon-

init llaf spao:l'lic conmJ.tments.
~oeco., ~AJ be a~'.t\-ltiag the ou~­

so, " b"Qt tho <USSll bllo ao tar
refrAio~d fro.II oxtoQdjng oid
aiu;t e,;pU,c~t ;-ccogni~ion. to
h1e StanlQV.l llo rciJaO. Oeo-

ot A1riol1XI lcadors before

a

ll}'ko. ropqrt:lug on davolOPRqnt.a
ltl t.be c~11go, told 't.llo $\.lp.l'qo
SoYiet tllai ••cuttbr.oat11 in t.bo
pay ot. tore1B:Dere'• b~d &dJwrnG.cl
the pa.rlianeft't e.1eetec:t ·t>y the

In IA)Opoldvillo. tho apot. 31 Deem'be·I", or.tgimlll,)'
eet by llobtr.tu ae the ~el.'11.tcu~l
cfat.e. 'tor b.U 1nteT'11D sovoromcu't.

COagolese peQr.Ue a.ncs ha<I 1.llrprts.one.d ·t:rte lawful preniier,
l;mmba. He asaertea th.At. tb.1e ,

'bov.•cvcn·~

could riot be 'l"eearded
aa ia. vlct:0r, . for the 11:Coloa..t.a.l~
ists" boC11W110 it had diapelled
tbe o~ivo i1lubida that th~

ur.iU volunua.:d ll' l"OUQQPlCJb tbcir
rule ta 't.b9 ci;>.loni~:u,1. 1'.bG f~i.l­
u:~e · or the VH in Cho Cougo ~.h·V-il""
t1on. be ~~ld. tl'a.keB c.lOlttr tbo
·~11rese1ria need" tor ~h1uwtos
·cbe &tructut"a ot

euppo'f't. aod s11npatUJ1 'bui avo1dqOlllc·

o~

thQ Cn.sllb1tl.a(la. mc:etiag

de~ini~e

gov".nunon t .

taBio~

at.&Ad tOWArd the rump

·

111'0.\l.~b

has B't1r.r.ed new d.1ssena1oa over

the absence or c1vt1 gove.l'nlft&nt.

io the CGago. Mobutu appears to
:ta."or. the retenUO'il of hie cocnm1sa~oner.s wiaar ~ pr~er reapons.1 ve to· 'hislaa1f;

Kasavubu ~

aq tbe o'Ul.6~ baad, !avo~a the
~0;ntol'Qtton o( 1he lloo cabinotJ
w1:th wbicsb h.o dt:11pla.ood L'\ml'Wlb11 .

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

that body.

Xh.rush~he<v, aftor a delay
ot t~n· da7s, ~~spoftded 04 2~

to ao appe•l for assist-

bQoC111b~r

Following

~ progr~•$

in

the caruer tau:s, aaet - •eet

Gonna11 .a egot1.a t1ons on reacti'la·t .ion o-1 'Ul,e i:a.terzoilAl tracte
oarce.acut were 6t1.1 1 1.a. the bard
bA.rsat.nl~ir phase u
of 20 Decomba1". 'l'tic !aat Go~n rdprese.ata~1 vo on 22 Doco~~or . $uddcnl,y ~c­
vereed. hi'1 ' c:cm:c.i.U.o;tory 11hitudo,

compla1ne¢ 'bout

~1..a.ke "

to tbe

westel"o p..-an, .ad. ukcid toi- ;i
poetpone11e.it.t ot tbe n·e got.1at1one
uo~tl 29 DecEHlll>er.

Tfte

USSR

tor ·tbe

!1.rs~

htgb-leve1 puh110. su9port to Bast Gernaot's
c~to'l'td to pressuro eocui ·into
tlee 18

giw~llg

ro1;1awtag tho tt'ade

~c·t.

fo

Us s·O'eeeb to tbe .sopr-erte soviet

om 23 .Deecmber ~ Fore1p l11n1ster
Oriocn)'ko wa:r -iied that. l.ailure to
rea~h 6.n agreement ~'O~ld be
14
.ft'a\J6ht •i th UtlCXJ'CCt o<l IUld
qi.i.itQ ~orOWJ conscqucmcall, ••
11lght ellei t an Eaat Germa.n
•;:roto.Uat.o ry 'bl~.'' aq.d CQ\lld

even J.ead to !'• dll.tlgorous c:ori-

pl tcat~on in relat19ft& betseen
the tour pcwers:." Tbts tbreat

-Wblcb coa:tt"A&'te wUb the iren:e.ral tott& ol Gr-om:rko"s eoeecb
- a t 1.ndlcate· that. Ulhd.Cht

appeU.~ to Uosccw for .speet.U-0
.support to strengthen his hand
in the· tiallts .

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541051

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541052

' *-Mali:-~~all arms':.and ammwtlti~n.___ _ _-,-_ ______

_J

· CJhavebeen ..transshipped .by _truck.from Guinea to Mali at
·regular· intervals last month. The arms, ,which probably are ·
fr9m stocks_given Guinea in 1959 by Czechoslovakia, are be- -~ (c:::..
· ll_e ved intended for distribution to internal security forces and
for stockpiling. Acquisition o~ 'bloc arms in .t his way, report. edly arrapged during Uie early December meeting between top
Malian and Guinean .leaders, reflects the growing influence of
·the·nro-Gllinea extremist faction-in ~fall's single-party reglme.t

_____I .
I

J

~

...

I

(,£j( 1)

(11)
(1(3)
(b (3)
ll

*iongo: Mobutu's unsuccessful attempt to move his troops
Jnto ivu Proy;ince on 1.January may influence him to def er any
f~her such efforts. for the present. On 30 December,. similar
moves had been' reported about to be undertaken from points in
. Equateur Province i~to neighboring Orientale Prov w
now.
~controlled bv Lumumba's dePutY G'zen a. Re orts
indicate a .general breakdown of the governmen
terrorized by undisciplined troops. These
troops were conv-inced. by ~ltators from Stanleyville that .t he
Congo will return .to colonial status if Lumumba is not released.
Meanwhile, Hammarskjold's sharp rebuke of Belgium on. 2 Jan"Uary' for allowing Mobu~uis Klvu-bound troops to land in.the UN
trust territory of Ruanda-Urundl will probably encourage Lu. mumba 's supporters abroad to press for addltional curbs on the
Mobutu regime.
Reports that clearance-has .been requested for ·s evenIL-14
aircraft to .l and at Khartoum .en route to Stanleyville suggest a

.!)jc::-

.....____ur-o~pean ·settlers

3 Jan 61 ·

. DAILY BRIEF

~I-

Approved for Release: 201 6/07/OS C06541052

v

I

~)(3)

..
possible earty attempt by Soviet bloc or other pro-Lumumba
elements ·to buttress Gizenga's regime. Sudan's foreign minister repeated on 31 .D ecember, however, earlier Sudanese
a s s u rances that no such clearances would be ranted.

-r---~-'--------

---

--~ eria-France:[Rtghtist opponents of De Gaulle in

Alger a reporte y. ave definite .plans for street demonstra4 January. Moslem viol~nce continues nightly
in Oran, with Moslems reported ready to mount CQWlterdem-.
onstrations if the ri.g htists go into the streeD Possibly reflectlng.government fear of widespread abstentions in the ·ref erendum, De Gaulle appealed in.his New Year's Eve message for
. "vast approval" of his policy and implied he would resign if
.. there were a large number of negr ive votes or abstentions. ·
tion~· beginning

D

(JJ ft::::.

1(3)


I

(b (3)

IV. THE WEST

*East Ger~any - ·west Germany;CVest Berlin Mayor Brandt
has indicated that in· the recently concluded interzonal trade

talks, the East Germans accededto all of Bonn's demands and
agreed not to implement. the restrictions on West German travel
to East Berlin which last September had-led .Bonn to cancel the
~)( 1 )1
trade pact. West Germany has not yet informed its allies of the
detailed formulation of the new agreement
1
ermany accepted we . er woriling than it o._r_i_g_
i n_a_ll_y_d_e_s_i_,r.ed
. . ,rr.e=:'"n,------J
"'
)
3
several points in qrder·to reach agreement. The East Ge rmans
(b)( ) ·
were success~ul In insisting that .their concessions w~~ld remain
in effect onlv if the strictest secj ecy were maintaine~
I

(1(

'-----=--~

I

_(Page 4)

·

(b 3)

.* EI. Salvador: The provisional gover~ment appears moving to
<Pr:reduce US · eco~omic and military assistance. The defense minister
.. told a group of US officials on.28 December that his government

· 3 Jan .61

DAILY BRIEF

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541052

vi

CQ.6541053
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Approved for Release: 2016/ 07105 C06541053

COPY NO. ,,,J
Oct NO. ·C>2<i$1s1
t FGb.fl.laJ"Y U Hil

·CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

,

'

'

(b)(3)

CENTRAL

(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 20 16/07/05 C06541053

CQ6541053

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541053

""'

CunaENT JNTELLTG~~

W.lif!lr.LY

S0r4NA.RY

2 F~bl'ua·r)' 196.l

the UDltod statas, euba,
Ropublic, ana
Pre>DO$iruf jo-int con:c.Ui-

. ~xeept
DOlniDiC~D

the

~l'~

seeds throughout tl\ls pr-0111n.;c•·
1\ttd T1er-c '1W41'ting' hC!'lp i.I.). thoir
~Jan~ to.,; the US.
1'ber&fore,
~astro went on, ''We oow b.;nre
to cl CP.n out Q U O\lr o:t ficos !

nt:ion of "the us-~!'-n prob ...
10Q•1 bv tho LaUn Aoorican&
act tog ·outside t.b.e framev.'Ork o.f
tile Org~abaUon of ~~¢1'.lcan
3tates or· the Uu1ted "Nat1~ns.
Cb1ribo,ga•s 1n1tlnt1vo ~B ~­
rou..eing little su;p port, 1.n part:

and tho purgos tu p.rov1u.c 1al

bec~usc.

offie~e

the

tnc~oqt ~""1-

dorea.o Covernmeot lAcks J)r-es ...

tigc

woUJ.d cunvc;r-t

Ln~

V:U.'l ar;

to.r o ·°'\.atni •a &peooh, tbo loade1·
of the. '" Second Fi"Oot of the E~­
c.a11br:n.y," mop <ivitorro:z Me!loyo,
a.Del ~ ·n~bq.r or other Cuban l!l.rtll)'
oftleers arr1ved in Rey We~ t by

ac:knowl4>ciged tho oztent ot 'the

<l-Ow1t.&rre'\lolutio·11:lr1 threa f .
tbere. He clRimod that ant1~
Ctls1.r4> (;\ten1il.as 1 wh1cll -he ·
n1cl ni;imborod. CJVo:r 500, i .n tJte
Eacellbr"l' Moun ta.l as are ••·ferul~d.

io to tho poiot whore tboy canWb.en. tbese ·renc-e.s

'bo.t·taUon'$

of Gilltia woll and epocially
ua1.o ed W111 advaoce o.a thelli ...

Castro blamec.1 tbo

·C~atro pl.edged that mill ..
tayy ·o_peratlon.a "l.n 'the n.ounti\i"4G

prov1n<!le ot Cubn. ;, Trto d;lyo bo-

la. a s.Poocll on 28 Ja-n"Ua.ry
i n Llls VU las P.roviace, Ctistro
fo~ th& £1rs~ time publ~ly

~e ~t.rong eno-~.

n

.:l.nto ••the most revoluti.oo:r.ry

i11 tho hQ111h1pho:ro .

not e:scape,

this pr9vinee."

open boat

oec~ing

asylvm.

Cho

Guov~r~. o~~hitcct of
at~ t:iet economy
th~ oft~c~al

the r ,e gi.ne 's

n.nd

cbioLly re-

spon.siblo tor ne~t:1a ting l!let
ye~r t -s econoaic ngrecaien t.a wi. th
thG bloc, mn.y soon ra.~_.._,..___...__-----,
'fo~l c.ab111e·t ·poet.

(b )( 1)

couoter~

.i>-evolutiobary .:tctlvit:f ln .L il.$
VU.la~ OJ:> '.th~ "ba,dn ~evoluUoll.­
o.r1ea ot the ns.eeona P.r<>nt. O.f
the ~caebrtty. •• an iridog~odont
gi-oUJ> a.11 iec1 wt th Cast.ro foree.a
dur!.ng tbe :J..&tter part of the
o.nt~-~t1et~ ~~vol~ti~n
an4
tJie1' ln tegr11 t-ed ·1 .nto &etN '$

G

expected short y

·o res.1go as )>l"esi.d'err t of the

N°RU()nal Banlt t-o

ta~o tbe
1ndu~

o&t. ot minister or

ri

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

QONGO

.

'Ibo o:tforts o:t President
and Colonel HObu~u to
co"otcr. the n.Qtivhie·s ot tile
pro ...commtl.bist 01~.ena.n. .reigitne
l!As~v~bu

&.

€;rowing

·trend t;O\Jar-d f .r aguieoU.'t'.l.011 of

.PA.RT I

(b )( 1)

ncrw

~rmy •
He ma i~ tb oso ''&\lbve.Tst ves have pla:nted 41.v erslon·i .s:t

in Sta.n.l.oyv·iHe to.co

(b )( 1)

t ,b.o Congo and a.re .b.1nderea. by l'.l.
Bhottll,gti of m111 U:ry oupplio".
JQa.n Dol :tlro~go, t=asa vc1bu 1 s
in forca:t.ton min 1st.er· a.cd Ute
le~der ot £'q\1l1.t.eur
Provlneo~

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Piigo

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41053
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CUJUt.£'.NT 1M't.BLLIGENC£ WBEK.L.Y SUDAllY

2 f'Qbl"\Ul..cy

i~ nbrtbw.eat.e ro Ooago, ho.B b~n
aeeo~tat~n~ ~1th (fl'qQps
~1,4bborJ-ne n;ipublico O'l tho

in

vrcncb Comn.uaity tor ·1t.111tary

assista.aoe II.Ml

son"Y=-~.t.:llJ.~....___

l,~8).

expected to hJ!le place .nt n

later d~te ~B .6llsabotl\v1Jlo~
but in vi.ow of tbo ~cnr.fcrcncc ' 6
unreprese.attt1.ve imture and th.a

_ _1 oootlnllecl d.isa11Ueement belt$O.l.1
K&savu.bu Anet btari:g.l l P1'cs1.dent
'J.'$!laa.b", ao alpifi~D.D·t declslon11

(b )( 1)

1u•a expeuted .

l1.eta.r1•h.1..la mu;a\'lt.b \lt bne l:'E>Joci.d a n$.Utary
• t.Tt::l.11."Y with 'n:ihcmb6 !llld Kn.lcu:~jl,

leade-r of the South Kasal &'ta.to,
but l.B e'QJ9Ctu4 to 6UlQl1t C:OUl:lt-0~P,"l'Opo!J5'l.G.
~~ a.ad

Kolonjl ho.ve agreed 14 ll\at\l&l

l"eCO(tftltlOJl as &\ltOnQ!llDU6 tnlltClS.

!'tie all. tt·4 ey sl t"Ua t ton on

the front1e'J' of Bquat:eur and

Or.!Qn h l.q p71;1yJ..nec; ~am\.ii:11: ob~cur~.
ltoJsnvubu h~e a~de a
Dollls11ngol
j :; 1>1~~ to ttae Walt~ States ·zor
~~~-=-c:....:....:"'--"""-"''-'-~~~~~~~~-J.
prorrtPt. ~~~o~t 5't;.6iG~o.nQv--.s:us.__,,b
="~~
~~su
~
.~=o~
a~&~110C=ws=so=
. ~a-a
=
. ~
po
~e
=s~
10~1
~e
~---'
gcs:t·ing t~t Dclgi.a;n 11rm8 be
-sic rgar of tc~ i tori1:'1c vi t:h
~upa 1:.B Ule l'rcmch Cot:tingit:f'll;
CoQgo Jtqpqt.>lic.

boLlg.bt ·B1.n.U...r -to thoa& bow s.n
· use Sn. t~e Co;ngi;i.-99 t~t tbq
t.eo.poltJvlllit .-og.imo ·could t.Ake
the ini tb,t.lv-e 11.plnst G1UD!fa..

Dol.lb.ngu. ~roba.'blf coa..
t"rol& tho Baopla ti-ibo, 'li!eiic~
.to.rao P. 8U.lilb1c f'U"t Of tbe
Co.ngol~8e .Ar.Dy,
De ~.lane to

Ciung,n'a r1:1gitiitt 1 too, 1.e
short of Supplies &n(J bu 'lOQkOd

sa.do1' on 28 Ja4\lal"Y tor
tor ihi~ puztpC>ac.

~l"')'·

ntee a :t:oroo or t:rt.kS11.~ i.o
protoct Bqu.atc:iur Provi.ftoe 1u1.d
appro11ah.ed th& Aa.t)rlou ainba.s&r>nG

~ctivi.tle• .ill~acrate

US

Such
the UD ~

w111:1nposs 9f loenl Ca,,a-oJcn.;c
1cadol"G ·to f!ltJbmcrgo thed..r IUI•
pi.rG:·t .lollb l.u ordo:r to P:.N!l8&:rl'e

unt·ty .

tilt- prepcrde>r:r .,011 t1<t.n.l
at Leo-poldvl1l·e ot

coa1e.rea.ee

COnBOloso

t•etion~---~thout

parti.cipo.tioa of G!zens-'8 ed-

bereute.--..chOse lts <>'1!1.Cers and
'91ll&a0'2 in 41Jilcl&Aion o'f a,n
aaaad:a a.Dd prC.C: cd ura l amt: tettL
Sub~tcua ttve

dtsouaa.lon.e

uo

to

C~tro

M1d the bloc tor mttt-

tn:.ry al~. Hovevo.r. Sudan ~ontiPuoe 'to :r-otu•o to allow dd ill~
t01'1Q.l t.o ltll>Ve across its 'tO¥r1turf. 'lAS'S sDDOlllicea on 30 .Ja.au..
that

Sudanese

thD

lf$SR bad a:skcd
Abboud ~o

Pre~ld~a.t

SO.l.ets t~ &Qlld t.ood
20 truck&
tb.rougb the Su.d&1:1 t .o pro_:Lun.unba
a.reas 01 tl.te couao .

l)&'ntU:

il)Q

f\Jl4 ~Gd:1c.11:1c. 1.n

.Sudancieie of'fich.lu fear
th:a t 11nlet1e t"ber.e .ls

e-ffect;.~ve

uw ana il'est,el'D ac t,t.oo •

~t\9 Oo~go

datortornte tu
the p6int mere the Sudan wo·uld

~~tuat~on ~1

be fa.catl 'lltb a de !ac:to

Com-

n~Q~~t-~vpp0Jtcd ~crlllJC~t OD
i .t bo:r<Ser . 'The. Swtil.ne8!l to~lg'Jl

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adtiln.tP5t-: ro.tioo. ta r1>vortedly droady catlocU;ns ·ttt.Kett- .. tbe
Baluba tr ibcSD.ao ~o•­
tilo ~o 'J'aJL(lmbA, togotb9l" wl t-h Coaa:role•o
Ar\Qy ulUta loyal to
St~DlGfVJll~. •ill ba
.:11i a. posi t1on t9 .lau11cb

th-et

11,.t-t.RCQ aaalt'IS\.

.n.1B.1oi; eoaptox tLnd 1'.U.fi>n.-d.is ~riteti u-> 40'>.tiO!!r
i~~l\1 ·~ital to 50Utb•
llJ~JJ KiLtllllp. l).n 30 Ja.o ..
-u.ary Ka't.Aiiga -atrcratt
dr.op_p od '>o:cllU:J, J)'r<>biably lrtpn>Ybsr:id ·fJA."90Urie bombtJ or 6J'e>An~93t
on !lJ&ri.QaM>.

t1:1

·""'

T8hamb6"'::; tOS:'~

bt~g~

m11.r a.teo :tio

o~to.rJ.ng

a dl.tfic·ul t
pGr:tod :ln. h.b rolattons

wi.tb ai,1g.il:!1a TMI tOYcr-nmoot ti~a , -cro.ided -c:o

replaGe - tba a.."lgiaft
h ·tJmsa. su·110·<1
for.CQS W1tll & Fre:w:h o.ff.t..aar.

lrlniotalr' bJUI ~Ai.eel re'D'Ortl!I :tbia.t
triucjq tl'OR t"IW @u-Cld ·l uld. mt•
tOJ'.06 the CotJ.i!'O wit.b arag
O'l2A11"a1

..fA~

~---=--'--------------.

com.iU'ld~.r of tbe

t

n1s

4e<t191on

m~y C.A.USO 0. !lllllJOl'-

! 1ty of. the acvor.·a..l. '1µ~$d Belgi~

o:t..Ucqre ser;v'i U wit·b tbe
Katucn. £~e~ to ro~dgn a.no

creato

~ · OO!"~oua ~~l~~ry

te11 ror ·u1e st.ate.

Cimen:ga's farcqs
1>Jto·11~~0

&J.ve b)'

~ ~1"11

h•v-t.a talrOT!. '-M Off~in­
l~tt1 ·01

an inv-uioo

o.t ·remote nort".ho.i-o IC;a.o'11.l J:Jro'r-

1:n:oe.

Oao srou;p re·p oH•d:t,. u

·a.tm11ig iit 1.ulull.bo"rt; tb& o-ttlar
·ts tr.1il:!B to r~n.t;b p:ro.-4lra'\lmba
tl!>\"l'"t l'OrJ hi eU1:C'.l?'tJ l..CIOopo l.1tnllci

PrOlrlccc.

~~zen~suppartea lblubo
t.rJ.b:Al state o~ L\•-.:t.tlba. ·oeo·tel'CIO

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nt-uss~lB. t:bc 8el(#AA
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a.p-provi-l to· e~.fQt"CB O. .h .• fo.r -

lo

:for~i~

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·0e1s::hn e:J:tinog to

set"Tit t.a or rcci-u.U . f "o i- .f ore.1.p
~aiio:,;r li·b lcb could leosen ovcTt.

~lsrl·n.n .u:ss,i:s;ta.r;ee to t:1n 11...,
Ln.!JU!ailL"'. ------.

(b )( 1)

at 11.a.zion.o .4n &ataii.ca Pr~vipco,
a.ppc11ua to btt de•eloping s..nto a
JJorto~s tlina.t t:o tfle XAhi:tp

aov&ranent-. AO "thle re,J.ln.c be..
catr<n1eh·o o:-..,1 ts prov!:l'C1&l

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vonav·i..c·hh Ti!!r1 t.ed .h iq ci.o route

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Congo Situation: The _generally favorable response in the
·uN to Hammarskjold's s~ggestion that-the Congo crisis be
solved by neutralizing rival Congolese military factions has
led to similar. but more comprehensive proposals by several
UN members. Typical of these is a Nigerian plan which- - in
addition to neutralizing the Congolese Army and the fighting
forces of the several ':' breakaway states"--would make the
UN responsible for law and order, permit the release of all
political prisooors, including Lumumba, and provide for the
establishment of a new, broad-based government. This government would then draft a new federal-type constitution

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permitting a considerable degree of provincial autonomy and
call for general elections under UN sponsorship. Reaction
by the Soviet representative at the UN to the neutralization
proposal of Hammarskjold has been reserved. The Congolese spokesmen at the UN, when apprised of specific neutralization proposals, strongly objected. Although Gizenga
and Tshombe have not released statements on their reactions, a maximum amount of pressrre woul~blv be

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The military situation in the Congo continues to pose
difficulties for the UN .forces , which ~ave recently been weakened by troop withdrawals. On 4 February, a UN Nigerian
unit was ambushed by a pro.-Lumumba force near Kindu in
Ki vu Province. Although an uneasy truce was called after
an all-day exchange of fire between the two wiits, both sides
have continued to maintain their battle positions. An improvement in the security of. the outlying areas cannot be e:>q>ected
until more troops under UN control arrive in the Congo.
Mal.3.ya and Liberia have expressed a willingness to supply
additional military aid to the UN force, and ~e Renuhlic of
~ scheduled to provide a "token" unit. [
_
L__J(Backup, Page 7) (Map)
~.---~
South Korea: The recent reshuffle of the cabinet, which
brought five new ministers and four vice ministers into the
government, is an attempt of the Chang Myon administration
to rally more parliamentary support. Popular expectations
were high following the ouster of Syngman Rhee last April,
but the·Chang Myon government, beset with factionalism and
corruption and handicapped by a demoralized poJice establishment, has not shown the dynamic leadership needed to
·gain p()pular support. Popular demands for reprisals against
those associated with the Rhee regime has.led to ex post facto
legislation. Action under these ~ws could exclude from public
;Life large numbers of the limited supply o(trained personnel.
. With a,n assist from a heavy propaganda barrage from the
North, tlie belief is spreading, particularly among younger

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Situation in the Congo
The American interest in promoting a new approach
.to the Congo is meeting with general approval from many
UN delegates. Latin American and Scandanavian representatives consulted have expressed general agreement, a UK
delegate has recommended to London that the approach be·
supported, and the UAR representative has characterized
it as a "step in the right direction."
The French position is unclear. A French spokesman
in Washington suggested on 3 February· that Paris probably
would cooperate, but at the meeting in Paris last week of. the
foreign ministers of the Community of Six, the French foreign minister was quoted by his Belgian counterpart that
the "UN effort had fail~" and that France was considering
. extending ''bilateral military· and other assi~tance on an adequate scale to Kasavubu and his supporters."
Most representatives of the neutralist Afro-Asian.bloc
in the UN have stressed the need for Lumumba's release at
an early stage and indicated that they would tolerate Bel~
gium 's continued presence in the Congo only under strict UN
control.
The situation in Katanga continues to be confused. A
Kasavubu adviser told the US Embassy on 1 February that
negotiations ·b etween representatives of the Leopoldville and
Katanga governments to form a common military front against the Gizenga regime had collapsed. Tshombe, after
rejecting Kasavubu's final offer, announced his refusal to
send a .delegation to the round-tatte talks scheduled for 15
February.' The adviser added that since further approaches
to Tshombe would prove useless , the Leopoldville govern~
ment probably would eventually renew its attempt to elim~
inate Tshom~ by armed attack.
Tshombe, however, may believe that hi s regime will
benefit more from Belgian- - and possibly French--support
than by becoming involved with the distant Leopoldville

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forces . Hammarskjold implied to Ambassador Stevenson
on 2 February· that Belgian supply efforts to Katanga were
of greater m
itude than those to Stanle llle
the UAR
and~

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supervises party affairs . in the USSR's largest republic. Compared. with some other·Soviet republics, the RSFSR had a
satisfactory agricultural year in 1960 and there has been no
indication of executive failures on Aristov's part. His demotion app.e ars to be the outcome of a competition for authority
·among Khrushchev's lieutenants. His removal from the
RSFSR post, in which he has been replaced by a newcomer
to the central command, appears likely both. to strengthen
the grip of Frol Kozlov, as Khrushchev'B principal party aide
on the RSFSR party organ.~ation and to enpance the oosition
·of Dmitry Polyansky, the .RSFSR premier. L

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C~mgo: Britain, France, and Belgium have now expressed
.reservations concerning a:ammarskjold's recent proposals that
the Congolese.Army be neutralized. The British believe that
the military situation in the Congo currently favors Kasavubu
and that his position would be undermined if the troops in the
Leopoldville _a rea were disarmed. French and Belgian representatives have also stated th.a t the proposal would be
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detrimental to ~savubu's legal position, and mi ht result
·1n the earl restoration to ower of Lumumba.

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Burma: General Ne Win appears to have staved off a
potential challenge tO his control of the Burmese A.r my. On
3 Februar·y , he reportedly accepted the resignation of Brigadier Maung Maun·g, as well as the resignations of .several
other senior officers, and ordered five of Burma's .13 brigade commanders to attach~ posts abroad. .These actions
would eliminate those who have argued most strongly for a:
resumption of mllltary government and against Prime Minister Nu's olfo of ra rochement wlth Pei i .
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Iran: The Shah is· reported to be discouraged by election dillfculties, problems ln Iranian-Soviet relations, and
uncertainty over future American policy toward Iran. The
fear of resurgent nationalists~ led him to impose almost
complete control over the current parliamentary elections.
This in turn has brought an increase ln antlregtme activity
o~ nationalist groups. While the Shah has given. earlier assurances to the Ui:iited States that he would not make any
slgnific~t polltlcal concessions to the ·ussR, he has instructed his prime. minister not to be "totally antagonistic"
toward the USSR but to flnd out what the Soviet Ilni.on.Jrn_uL
· be willing to do for Iran. I

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Congo Situation
A British Foreign Office official has indicated that Britain has some reservations concerning the recent United
States initiative in the Congo. The American Embassy in

London believes that the British will ask for a further review of
proposals before they are willing to support them.
Representatives of the French· and Belgian governments have
also r.aised questions concerning the plan.

the

The British believe that the military situation in the
Congo currently favors Kasavubu and that his position would
be compr.omised by a neutralization of ·the Congolese forces , .
as the United States plan suggests. Moreover, they question
whether Kasavubu will accept the plan and doubt that many
UN members would be willing to make the necessary sacrifices to carry it out if it is accepted. They reportedly favor
a more gradual approach to the problem, waiting to bring
forward the proposals at least until the end of February, when
· the UN's conciliation commission is scheduled to publish its
report . . The commission, which is now completing its investigations in the C~:mgo, is expected to :r:nake a report generally
favorable to Kasavubu and the moderates.
Nehru, in a conversation with .t he US ambassador in New
Delhi, welcomed the new plan and expressed complete agreement with many of its elements. He reiterated, however, his
belief that political prisoners , including Lumumba, should be
released earlier than new proposals envisage.
Meanwhile, .Mobutu appears to be planning a military op-.
eration against Gizenga's force~. He stated recently that he
. had reports of disaffection among Gizenga 's troops in eastern
·Kivu ·Province and that he was ready to move into the area in ·
the near future . . Prepa.rations for the move apparently are being made with the assistance of Mobutu's Belgian military advisers. However, any operation will be hampered by lr=i=s:.ti
.=.=·-=c=-=s=-----~
ties db the wireliability of Mobutu's troops.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 February 1961

DAILY BRIEF
Congo: Hammarskjold stated on 10 February that if
Lumumba is dead- "·which appears increasingly likely--the
UN must temporarily take over in the Congo. He has in ·
mind the placement of airports and ·all other transport facilities under UN control, the establishment of a protective
· guard for all Congolese political personalities, and more
drastic steps to.protect Belgians from reprisals by Lumum ·~
ba's supporters. Hammarskjold said he would justify this
action to the Security Council as a necessary emergency
measure and ask the Council for a new mandate to cover
the situation.
The uncertainty regarding Lumumba has apparently in~
terrupted at least some of the efforts which had been under
way at the UN to formulate a new Security C
· o t "on
~med at promoting a Congolese settlement.
,_
_____ __ _ _:_·_ __Jp'-n_lO_F~ebruary. that a meeting
__
y ith representatives o~~e~
n=
e ~--_.J
tralist African states was unable to decide what to do in view
of the news about Lumumba. The Security Council meeting .
scheduled for 13 February seems certain to focus mainly on
the question of Lumurnba's disappearance, with the USSR calling for immediate UN action to establish the facts and for the
immediate release of Lumumba if still alive.

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The Congo Situation
Although proof is still lacking, the conviction is growing
among observers in the Congo that Lumumba and his two fellow prisoners are already dead and that the story of their escape is a fabrication developed by Tshombe's Katanga regime
in anticipation of a UN move to force the release· of all political prisoners. . Leopoldville's newly designated Premier Ilea
reportedly confirmed Lumumba's death on 11 February, while
a former Congolese official is said to be claiming to have witnessed the execution of the three prisoners following their
transfer.· to Katanga in mid-January. A high-level Belgian officer serving with the Katanga forces is also reported to have
stated that Lumumba is dead and that he knew the identity of .
the person who executed him. The Katanga government is officiallv still pressing a search for Lumumba, but
I
Katan a official a ears
really concerned over the alleged escape.
a growing belief that Lumumba will never'-'jb:::e:-f&.o~un
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Tshombe's regime has cast further suspicion upon itself
by indicating it would refuse to cooperate with the mission of
inquiry sent to Elisabethville by the UN Command. Tshombe
told newsmen on 12 February that the "escape" is "a strictly
internal affair and the UN has nothing to do with it."

.___ _.I Soviet UN delegate Zorm expre-s-s-eu

ms sirepm.."Isnruv-t.-.xr-----'

reports of Lumumba's escape and said the situation in the Congo
would become "uncontrollable" if he had indeed been killed. In
the Security Council meeting on 13 February Zarin may exploit
any discussion of Lumumba's f~te as further proof of Moscow's
charge that Hammarskjold has proved himself uritrustworthy and
· 's m date for the
na:

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15 February 1961

DAILY. BRIEF
. C.c;mgo: The harsh tone .and far-reaching -demands of the
Sov:iet GOvernment's statement of.14 February reflect Moscow's determination .to exploit Lumumba'e death to discredit
and .terminate the UN: operation in the Congo. By making deman$ which are probably unacceptab_
l e to the majority of UN
members, the Soviet leaders are seeking to ·discredit Hamm
skJold,-· exploit widespread .c oncern over. the effects of Lumum-.,___ _ _ _
-ba's death, and strengthen the.Soviet bargaining position in future talks on a Co~go settlement. Moscow's statement- probably
foreshadows increased pressure on .t he Sudan to permit transit
of Soviet a~d to Stan~eyville, and raises the ssibllit of formal
Soviet recognition. of Gizenga's r~glme
*Reprisals ainst whites for Lumumba's death may still
_take place,
~---;-~--.-----:-;.-------~~.-------_J

. -- Mammarskjold haS sent order s to UN headquarters in Leopoldvll.l e ,to stop all operations by·the. var.ious Congolese mill-:
~---~ .tary forces . Execution of these orders will primarily ~affect
.'4obutu's operations in Eq _
ro lnce and Tshombe's offen-

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. I.iaos: ~he Soviet Union seems anxious to appear r osponsive to recent US statements that developments in Laos have
a direct bearing on_~o..rlei=Amerlcan relations. Two ~e~or So
vlet journalists told!
that the
USSR did not want an international crisis at tliis time over Lao

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Soviet Government Declaration on the Congo
. The Soviet leaders obviously view Lumumba's death as
providing an excellent opportwilty .to carry forward their
campaign against colonialism .and again identify the USSR
with ·extremfst, anti-Western .forces in Africa and Asia.
. The Soviet Government's statement. of 14 February
revived the harsh tone of Khrushchev's indictment of colonialism ' and the United Nations' role in th'.e Congo the General ·Assembly last.fall. The de.mands made in this statement .w ere lncluded in the draft resolution circulated py the
Soviets yesterday for presentation at the UN Security Council today. The statement and resolution suggest that the
SoVtet leaders may hope that Lumumba's death will lead to
the collapse .of the UN operation through the withdrawai of
the remaining Afl!o-Aslan contlngents..:-most immediately
those of Morocco, Ghana, and Indonesia. .Moscow would
exploit to the hilt the dispatch of Western troops as an attempt to reimpose colonial rule in the Congo. The Soviet
·leaders probably believe direct Western intervention would
make .it extremely difficult or impossible for the _W est to.
marshal the· support of moderate Afro-Asian powers for a
·~ew approach .f or a Congo settlement.

at

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The Soviet statement's call on all .~ 'freedom-loving
states" to·respond to the appeal for aid issued by tne "legltlmate government of the Congo" headed by acting premier
Glzenga and the avowal of Sovlet support fQr the ·s tanleyville
regime appear to foreshadow formal recognition of thls ·reglme. Such.' a step woµld be calculated to bring pressure on
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Afro-.Asian governments to follow suit a:qd also to prepare
.l egal justification for ~ore vigorous bloc efforts too~"'-'--'""'-------.
channel fore · e

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In addition to this attempt to discredit and terminate the
UN oper:atlon and block any effective Western-backed UN
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action to deal with the crisis, the. Soviet leaders are seizing
_. upon Lumumba's death as a . pretext for reviVing their charges
against Hammarskjold. Since Khrushchev's sharp attacks on
the secretary general's conduct of the UN operation, it has ·
been apparent that Hammarskjold ·has been selected to serve
as the. s·c apegoat for Soviet setbacks in the Congo. last ·fall.
Moscow9s latest demand for his dismissal and its declared
refusal to recognize his authority as·secretary general probably do not foreshadow-a Soviet-led bloc withdrawal from the
UN. This latest statement only makes more explicit the p.o sition Khrushchev took last fall in his pronouncements before
. the Genera.l Assembly. He warned at that time that .Hammar- .
skjold's failure to resign 'WOUld lead the USSR to draw the
"nece.s sary conclusions" and threatened to withhold Soviet cooperation with any of his decisiona. At one point, Khrushchev
hinted that if Soviet demands for revamping. the UN executive ·
machi.D.ery were not accepted, the bloc might withdraw and
form a: separate international organization. However, be
. stopp,e d short of making.any specific threats or commitments
on .this point.
. As long as he believes he h~s the support of the smaller
UN ·members, Hammarskjold is unlikely to resign. However,
. ~e VSSR's refusal to recognize his au.thority will make the
conduct of UN operations more difficult.

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\Hammar& jold has already order ed the UN force to occupy alrlields
· and 9ther communication cente;rs and to set up military con- .
· trol points in ·areas of Congolese military action. Th.e tiN Com. ·.mal)d ~eported:,ly· has been. ordered to stop all forces engaged
·in offensive action but to use force only if force is used against
it. However, the smaU siz~ of .the UN units, . coupled with ·the
equivocal nature Of the directives themselves, will render effective UN control difficult. Neutralist ,nations reportedly believe that the Security Council should pass an. emergency.resolution . urging that all possible measures be taken to avoid
civil.'vr.lr ?Jld. calling·for the cessation of Belgian and other ,
foreign interference. · Repre·sentatives of Nigeria, a leader of
moderate Afro-Asian opinion, ·have state4 that if Hammarskjold
moves rapidly to take over temporary control of the Cong~

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(Nigeria will increase its military .c ommitment .to the UN
force. Otherwise, they said, the Nigerian units will be withdrawn"]

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As .long as the USSR remains. in the UN, it will have to
conduct rout~e business with the Secretariat, the staff of
which is predominantly." loyal to Ha.mmar~kjold. The US~R
vetoed the reappointment of Hammarskjold's predecessor,
Trygve Lie, .in October 1950, .link~g him to the UN action
in Korea~ The General .Assembly later that year extended
Lie's .a ppointment for three years. The Soviet bloc responded
by officiaUy ignoring Lie as secretary ·general for the ensuing
0
'
e finallv for ced him to r oaian in 1 (LJ:ij"--'-.-~
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OCI NO. (}268/
23 February l9

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKtY
SUMMARY

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bQUi;:ive!! 111 eeee.oi..t.a.l "to aoy
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0
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eontrol or ~be UN;; Ula
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19 · cot a .u ttlcrtlzed. to

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oeet ibr.oe key !f~81.91"B dOll4.ada

bv.t ae.t ~Y ot tbi; ~n4'U1-0%lr::a
oc:e.ess.ary ·t o ·t ile UN Oli$ft.U,on
.l u 'he Co~ . 'tbe .-e.&olutton
tailed to ~t.ar<lic't the ti9Y4J#;11:llt
ot aiau.t >lel AS woll i.a peraQn~~1 ia~o tbe Conao.-~icb voul4
ba.110 blt4!1l Ila obfl.O~ re:ft;trance

to UAR

trocJJ tbe
FOl 10--

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ltotlo

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can tla:1 a P°'$$..,ht1 rolo u -r·o storlat "M:e to-· U.1e Coo.go, ,prdcularl; tbq6e• i11iH".f89 e&l.l..t q

tor illricdlate removal 01 tbe

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0

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in the ca~µ-y. Tiiie .18 tho
fi'f"8t IJ_n:o UN tl"OoPS ba•Q bGon
CLllowe>d to v;o baymul ·stt:r"G ueJf....

dolcn.5·11,1. ft,(IJta\il'CS 1 •lld 4'1i8
coucGi.l '8 •ci!jC)I) ostlLbHsbee &
proc.odon·t fo"h.iicll ·eaao.r tIB ·mellbe:rs

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!'be. VSSJPe: •l>S,QOttioa 1r°"
vot-1.nc cm the re&olut tt)D. pol,~µi
up tb.o <ll:t1.ic.tal1.f ilte ~l~t
tc!l1dons ta:<io iD t:beir eff'>'.rte
to ACl\1ovc· t:rtotr obJoctivee io
tbe Congo 'W1tboot at· uu:i 1!Ul1t.'9

pa.seed bJ t.bct !~(.l\;ii::l'tt co~cil
Oct n loi>ruary, fn1t~OJ"1&CO tbe
ue.e- of ·rorcc b7· UH 'troop.. 1'i'
D~~e~ey 't.O nv~rl cJ.¥11 lli'IU'

Uitd

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~~ !ltt~cJui

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11oden:t ..e the utlco;,,pram.uutig donaad~ •~ fwtb lo U.f 14 Nb~ua,y at•terient .
Tbe US3A cr.o
b• ~xpoct.cd, bowo~or, t,o O:PPO~O
S"t;tOblJl .Y a·t11 cittort. ai1De4 at
tn.r•a1·tb&.iii11s· "'11r.ara.lrJ·o.ld 'fl
t)e.t'800-Jt,.l ~ll'tl!Ol'.S.t, In ®al1ng

w.Hb tb$ s.u·ua.Uon.

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l t iilso fa.1,lcd to .spe~Uy ~"a
UH aaaret.ry se.oorai ~, Jn°i'.'"
~·r.Uy re!ipcm&;ll>le fO'I' the lfJt
OJXfrat:1on 111 tbe C\C>Qgo.. '" ud•

~o r4fe~ea~o , 1n0rieove~, to tb~
~ovcl'DIMDt: ot
CoD10 or ~o

KA.savubu

n-o

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ef:noe Uio

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se~ity

C-owicU

t1as ll.lfA.i.n -.i1J.e"'2cd tbo cU:rcct! ~

ot . tbe OB O'.C fort t.o 1:.be OX.so.
tbt- po&aibillt)' at a bea:tol!d oo.:..
1)0,to OQ l:.1>'1 taauo 11.t t'.be r<iJSWl•d

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1.8.J:'gC J'Dl U.e~ 1 D C~ 1.ll.C$C ci tieo
t~ OllJll'OU t:odtgPA.tion O.'VOJ'
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0111.y DDnl a.Rd t ·iaa.Mia1.....b ....,.e
bCMl~ eoU11icd witb ~s•iom~
of eon1.1donea in t.ho ability a:f

tao

CGagolo~o

~o

•lD ovontu.t

vtc~rf ~RO slv• ~~o 1A,p~oast~11
tbat PeJpi1t8 lnteDCl& t"!' le't otb• t:j; ~Ul'f OD 'th.e flS'M • 'l'b•
~~~- ~SlA~ ~&~Gl~~~ haVO ~1·

eo
u

bean loii.d 1.11 "tbol.'r coll.daaD.ll-'
.on. ot' UtJllf&ba• 1111 "ell.Nor. ,• .

Ofl 19 i'e ~'°CllLJ'J', Pe t.p.iog _
H 'j )l"0'88Qd ~dlJl~H ~ 4UJta.bUen

dl:Pl.oaaC'lc nl.tto~e \'U l1 OtlS/908*, A .JO ;l;tit COl!IDIH\l4tl• Of

20 I'• 1»"1.10.0 annouaceics ·acxee111)1)1:
.tor. ao eacib&qe ot .M tllaaea.dore.
Pet,Pine 1:15 lil:ely to a.<?cired.lt .
1110 e,.lltxlcisador ill a .a otbor
co~~ ~~Y to Sta.atoyo•l l•.

":frJ.ea.n

DAB a.n6 bloc PN'8.flu.ro to al.lo•
s~Ues f.Ol' Ol:q11g11. to truus.lt
' · t Iii& &rula.>, U: &~t'J.'fi that iar

teraal ~re~slll!t3 are mow torclai
the- Abboud rqime 'la take •
bal'de~ tioo io ~cs relation!J

vith tll.e mil. On lG Fobru1r.J
tlia Slap:racm Counc u ..... tbo CO\lD»

t'J'•

~abl•

't~ 1"1.\1.&g b0~1 ~$0n1 CL.

co

tJli

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tho deol.!ston. to Ge~ <tbo
~ba.:rpl.f '\fO'l'dod cab:l.o 11a,5 appaita
OD't lV made ILD • l"Cl~ul.t ol pub.Uc
~~c~.lo~ .l e 't.b$ SU4ao to .14d9~tb .
O~ 14 anc.t Hi
feb~, 8.a al.l. belt' ••U-q~gan­

.«ii.tWba' &
iz:~d

p;ro.,.lAJm!l.'Jl·ba. street. ~ht11.on­

iStr.a.t.J.ona took place ta tilrea
toi;,ius .i.D tbo SuAbl.a.
Tho gcworDocnt ft.!! CDil~l'D•C11 ~wcr the poa..
~ib111iJ 't.b.&~ ~ in~carual BU•
d1L'llit&0 e1pJ>as;h·ion gro~ Wbid1
~ ~cJlnU)l' be911. Pl"•N~ toP
.D. l'(t'tU'l"D

•cnlld

llas

CIO'Y -

r.e.let

'l;Q

ca;v1.~111.n JOVG~AGDt.

tllo O:>ng9 pr9blet1. tor
1 ti; own. 1nu•.posaA..
Tb• CA..b'.), • ,
'Vlatcb r~c~lvcwt wtdo publ 1.~tir .
·s .a tnc Sa4.an:~ pr~•a, protia.1>11
QO

doo.- sun pral;JIB.._

~1;11'

ec

c-.t~t

chsng•

'lb i:u !OflOf'Mll>nt • e policy ot
&ilppo:rc :t or. t.1~ W, b11t ia ratb~t) •

it&a;i to

op lo ton..

to public

I~ Accrn the torolgn ainJe\<~,.8 c>'.f O~ll:ll , ~\Q(P , ._U,

ICOl'~¢¢0·,

. ~ 1 tboqp th• 511ca.~ae
~.-...~n t
co~ u~~" to

Ha~J~ld &ta~!ns

'lba t 'tM UN ba4 taUect to ub..te.-e
1:\:tl 1)'ri~~' a!_~ l ri ~"~ 4;?.c>na~.
a~4 ui.t l,fDl"~ liiJaeGui. tliPi
•t,t't t~eo to solve tbe _pro'bler:i.
tb& :iau.~Ao •o~~d ti• loroed io
-vitbd:n• .l.tD troop:s trwi \be

~Od

U.• V.ll laJl\I• relll-

'lt.h04 ·u.e,: ·8 'WOrt for ca ...
seg"* • nd c~Jl~ for tbe 11111edi ~
at$ •lt'b4r&1'11.l of an foreign

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re-tnd.OJ'SQ;cl Ghafla hoaicieot

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tbe ON fore& lllto u Afl"teu
corumnd llnd re-caaaeD.ded a. Jta l t .
t() Cl.Qblll?Uou ot 'C'oago'lese
f.~r<:es . 'IMY-•• !ff P~9PQ~Dd t~ t
~U

.(<tNf.S:D ai;:;U\'·itioA bo con-

t~d

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t.wwaba • " ·de-• t!b •

a U ;U•t:Y

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a b.road-

11 ba..!Jed .l.aofoldYillo cave'1'11•
•utot . Gi.unc;a • o :po•i ti.on •PJIGreatl.:y is 'fOAkoo.l oge 'bl# uoopa,

.PLJ'tlC.ul,.a~ly ~Q

tbe StaQ.toyyUh

Draa, &re subject to

coa•

it~cle

trol trcia above; tuccts 1ar P•7•
lQir thom reportedly vil 1 ran

out 'by ·t.ha and of Ji!ar<h; 11..D.d bla
1;~outaaai1t in KiY~ 'Pr9v1o~•,
Acl~t.

Jta;11tlAauz-a, fiip~t .11 18
Sttiale~v.tU•'•·

ro11-i.att.ng

efforte

6'\lb.Jtct a.lb to ~l.oeer- coacro.l.
Jlow..-~-.:_. CUMnga 'has 11-ttle to
.bo_,. ,f ·p,r 1ii a "'•1>.P~.h•a~n1 • w·t tb
kelTid.u. t.~d be 9robftbl1 wo11.U
be n1<l-u<::ta11t to &~ceut • polit~o

'ibe prel.i.'lJ i.n •rr t'epo., t: ->:f
Co11o.U1Ail.ol) COt:iP199lcn"an 1.1•11t111ber b~ on •h.l.c.11 IDQJl~.
of' the Ae i.e.o ar>d" A1rlc;ao Mtiions
~

the

~ho haYe bnd ~~Jll!J iQ tbe Cona:-o
arc- iocprosC!otcll--was. odo piab•
.l lc on 19 :PbbJ<Ullq. It .rcccni•

cotW.a c:llo oato.bllGblMtnt or a

iaal c$0l.u Uon .iapo&ed

l1)'

the

io~l:uollCle ia
S:O'VO'.f't,a'ltUli •

the IAtoPoidvtilo
.

broad.lJ baeod Co.Q80'.!<1AO savor...-.
'19tU , ;ti~ HDOV~l. Of t;C:.O llftll'1

f .rom po-U .Uae 8.11.4 UIJ r•orp11o-

izatioJi u:nde-r a. naU011al d~te·a.:se
coullc 11 ,. tbe roi.ease a ·i: po'.U .t.ii:.al ·pripoi:urra, and par1·~111"
~SI a.p-1ron.1 or uua n.o11 g~v­
•.ttliJ.e~t . S lO~e- 1 t:e NC~h_,$~
uou. ~ae tb• Jl.4H> 1o•ero11e""1:
•s •

sft.l'~'lQI

pol.n.\ for- .........._

tllbliellJ.111 t. o• U011a.1 reaii••,
t.be report iG like b co bo co·R>~eBia-1 to la.D&vub1&·J bo•"Yer,
rec-on.t ropor~ ~TMl .i<la~e tbat.
Tlllbl.d.bia D.i:lO bi.G a.aaoe!.Atoo IUo
1.c ~ !SlO<lc3 ~o acco.p t 0.01 re-cori.ctU.ai l.ctl pi'O$>Oie&ls. a.1 tbo~i.

on 22

Febru~rT lie 41d ~onou~ae
bis •a:Aealflbt "i'th. w · Ofi'l.C.Uhl8
to ctop troop .11twe.unt:a in 'Ka•

taop. P'roT.iaoo ~

Tit• reacl:'lon of 1ba '6:&:Z4HIB&

~est.e

co cbe

oo

diea1doo't4•

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rec-

oo~e~tiofto ~r~~bl7 ~ill dcl~ad . '
th~

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eotioat~ O't

to roGimt coa-

tto1&C1l econonic, poli-cioctl, and

~

unb:!i!!l a:si!nu.•ad ot o.41'.11111.caot

ta.rse-eC.fll$

rep~lsa-18

tor

the de:a:ClJ ot W.1.mba Hd Me
a.lrlct S1lptj1Grtore-two o:t tboa ta
latt.n;a '&Jld COVDll lll AlbGJ't
ICA.lo1'j1•~ "'Soutb _ b.(1~1,. etat.o'-'•V~·

ao

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at.ro<lltioo, aw~r..

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pl uioo COQf;.ol.oo-~ -croopo, 'fie-"'
~lttod

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ln J'Ao.poldv"iUo, .Proaior""8 ~fJlUL~G l,t~ .l"l!t'iJartodl:v ha.a
•nl&.rgtd bt9 PJ'OJ>O&Od govarn.M :11t·, tollo•l"8' dJse1;1ee'loe:e •Ull
tomier s115lport.e.rs o.f 4ttl~• ·

Tb.ct addit'ioDG a .1 iepdly will bt"'
~ludo aa•oral Lwuill!ttmt•, but
Da-1\)' or tbe .Q,ppotoCo•l!l ba.•.o 11ot

beiOB

pe~~O~dlly ~~n~uit90.

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22 t'ebruary- deaOi.llJG6'Jeti:c Qf uy
u~

dlsa:nilllb•bt ot Oa<nn.Ol•s& rot'-

ce:s pr..ooa.bl:_y ls a. retij)(i:i!f& to
tb.c.se prt:55Ure11.

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$100,000.000 a.id nofP"M! Wt4l•r
. tlN contJ:'ol .

J?cono•t.c e.mad1 tioit:5 ia otbo t t .lut Cozi;:o u-e alee;
su-~"fo~iDS tum t.h.e poU t.lUl CSUU-tqrr-u.to:n.
Con 8 o
A OS o1.Udal Wb<> 1."0"~ pu~o

eent l; vielt &d St.oley-

• i l.le eltp!ta ts t.ll~ e ooecmy the.Fe to c.olla~e.
J.a •1• ·or c.i~bt we-elm ;
Jtatani;n, the · rlc-llest
Aro• i~ tbo couctry,

ta a1ao ruaDic~ n
~q41q~~fY ~o(•~~t .

BofOJtci b6 ae;r-eed
to Uaiito.cl coo~oraU.oa

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OnUed .N ati9'fts .• rt ~ iR~id tba"t

tho· UJC ~uld -be ree{?()n.&U>lo .f'o:r
o~y bloodoh~ ~s~ltlne trq~ tha

re colu.t lo~.

a ~oapor•ry bA)t ~~ ~ie •tt~~a
·to · coottr¥ue ottoooho o»era.Uoas llgiiiast il;;luba tdbtl
.ESU.lJiVQ~tcJ's of Glmeqg.a in north.. ·
~rn bia.ctp Vl"o\ttaco ~
14•"t
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'lhio biU.a.1 a.•enet lo~ 11.ppar·
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atatit /' e.ad
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lilto te . "' .laGO!l =-c11:i.d90-, • lo"JDS a.nt.i ..tomnn1.is~ Balu.ba le.a'ISe.r
ift Lcopoldvillo, deoied oo
20 l'ctbru&rJ' Uaa.t
a 01 .fhl.O-b
"youth 11.0Y0111tot" had bee.n

nO'W· a1-

inter..-

.0Uo1\ally f.ollov1.ng its i.nvol•e..
.tl}CJl.t .lCJ ~ aeo. th 01 1~a1umba;
bhoalt& ~UJIU$9 lO :rarwr;o co
coop~ro.te •lUI ~ba I.loo ·p ver:n•

:ror•G'd .

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tbtt a.inloterlo.l 9or.tfoll0:11 lott

·m&nt io

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th·c .

riirha~.

'lb.111 c11.i °tllrJ it~tlao to-

Europeaois q;ay b•"•

·~tea

~~

t.n.e &dQfil 't!J1. th tbo eGQ.b.l ialmtt irt
Of a '! C~18t COngole:me

eiaUo.rly auued .

la08t -cc:wipla~oly 1.:lo1atD>d

alre~a,,

back by

a1H1be-r of Af·.l! i<:aoe -A4Jo4gad loya.1
to "bhoabe b;a,,-e beiD a:re.ed 1n ·
order ~o tbv•rt ~ po&siblo at~~opi l>J lJU fOl"<'~O t1J d l.~.litCI lltO

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into

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tntriJl!I~ bey Cht Bahi1'ae, who,

Tbe

seen \.o

CO~au~U;t

la.bcl

~uJd

b~va COIL5lO~ra.bto app~1

-to ors•.n.l:.t-. ho~& ot .Lue1111iba ' •
t.l thO&Dlb ti.ta
appeal ls 1111~11 10 · bo leer;anod ·tg a-oa.e ext.en~ e,y tile

~~a,p \'ep:r~~n:.u­

~:unort.erb.

'l'elboab&' 5 ai1reenrnt •Hllt.t.o Dlf •PpA.INH\tly "pu·t at le.Mt

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II

COPY NO.
·OCI NO.

.

7i

O~t/tU

S March 1941

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY ·
SUMMARY
.

.

CENTRAL INTE.llfG .ENC.f AG :E·NCY
Office Of <:wsu:NT

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~~ IRrJltLlGRNO.S

'l'lre 1f'ICAr!l1«t by G1gqqp

·fo-rcCG t:oto t.be

Luluaboun. ~i"ea

o~t ~~.l Province,. li:bic}) cDused

a.uch sj).Pi"'ohension .in

Leopol~

~i

l,lQ, b~ fado<l out tbU vc:ok .
U.N ao.urc.es clal.ln t.bllt Lu..l\llibourg
ts • ''UN <:-it.ft:ti f)~e.i"theloss
CoqoJ,ese tr-oops o1 lro,but\i., ac-;
col'd.iatJ to p.rese l'~Orts, l:l11V&
engaged 11J riots with ~9 loca.1
populGce ·wftieh h•vb ~esul~ed in
11().ro t.tum 40 fa1.alit.1ea. TDe

tn0 bAS c;onf1t'lt.Qd ttiat -A.nO-tb&.J'
Gize.oga for-co cS't1T.IUlt-1;d a·t two

batt.o.;tions iu ctW11llf from Jkc:il.a.

io

~a~tral

batvi Ue1

Cone<>

t~nt

c11pl~l

Caquil.-

of Bqwa.t·e ur

b,c.vi.aee, 9bic'b ttio UN :f'Qp01"t.e
virtually 1¢fU&l"dcd by ~copold­

v i11.l!t toi-c:e:s . ~rskjold 'tol.d.
Amb!lesrutor Btovon~~n on 28 ·F&~­
l'lllll'y

re~e.&tt
~be Copgo
balao~ Olf pQWet-"

lie d1<1 ' o.ot th1ok
operatioas 1n

1Dil i~ry

l.illd C!!AQged 'tb<J

asa.oai: tho va.:ctous !actiOne.

WllKLl &UID&Alll'

Off:lcct :a of t.ba. illVt&.ding -fol"Co
did n.g t .ba.V'e: oontrol ot t.bei:r
men, and iho force· ovi·d .errU.y
dl-epc-raeel· ..tithel" th:Aq eubrt1 t to ·
a. dt.c~t airrcc:a.~11t 1!'h~cm
1tG lead~ra had n~ottatea with
'ttlo looal t1tf ~C>at'-initcn't . n·1.r;en1ritst· O'flie~..-s 1nve>hed. iD
n~(JOUAt. 1on9

thEmo

a.nd the ccm-

-.acter ot 1ibe pro-ltobutu garrison uk&d 'for ti&ild recebod tJ!J

although tbe~~ are
i ndieattons th~t the ~9opol~­
•ille govermtent i.Utends . ~o tAke
pr~tectlcm,

ua

dieclpl.tnal"f QC.tloc ~inst
Tb1s cootu;sion 1'D
Lul-v.AbOUre tllust:r&.tos the ct~­
·p endonce Qf cc.aa ol.9aa mil 1t11:ry
opcra.t.1onlP oc tbo vhiDB ot ino~t'J;col:'S".

dlvidual. uni·te :
Th~

G1£enaa

for~

in

Luluabou,rg, a~c.ord'iilg i.o cyewitncsse&. d.1.d n~t ba9e -ovan tb9
;iOS't moa:ger logi Q:tJ.ea.1. 1a-i,ippori
--aocJ otb.cr 8~gl~yv11lo C.Olw:tll.9

10. part:h&.n ttasa.1. P:N>-V1.n.c:o. The

opet't\ting tn ltA•ai are probabl~
i:n a ei1r1il&t' oo:ndi t1on . G-1..,..
~l!foaa "~ ovel·~ll au.ppl1 pro1;>1cm.
ap..1)~8 co bo preoa.-rioua".

poli'tiC!l'J:ly ap11.U>etic <lr ta-

The ox.J)UlSiQ"Q of f1v~ Co:nmunlst ;tou:r.aaua-ta f.rom Stan ....

"Fc:lr a't le-a.~t a ilJogtb. G1-·
zenea 's fo1"Ca bal•-e apparen~l~ .
o~ora.~1,1d

with

rol$."U,v~

fl"eodom

populA tlon t here. wtticb. il!o'lud41$
Li.munba ~q O'ftl t .d.b-e. 1d.b.er tv
11o~s oi.~a.aga "e Sti:lal.E\pv.U ..lti r-o-·
s"j.~e.
Tbc f-o.r~o thAt "too.k"
J.cl.uab~ appp.r-co·t 1y .tJ:id rea-

son. to

expec~

t.Jw.t. UO'butu a.a

troop:; woul4 .not :resi o.i .•
.27 Fob.l "W\l'Y1

~be>

to .t l)q- busb ~fte:r- lil'bandoalns
t :1>0.i:r 111ea.pon.a t aAd Clan& w.1tbdra•t6g ~ the o.ototbeast. towa..rd.
·1tt.Vu· PN>v"111<::1? , AccorctJ.ne to
. ~ourc~,

All C°'1gole&e

huve b&eJl c:l.ear-eo
l!LD.d t.be :a.i.zrport.

~bout

cot

rece1vin~

•14

Wll4

1nt~nde4

to. d.l'1U'll0lt.ize
t:1on. ·

by -Oi.z@D&ra

tlf,,s S@Pl.1

su.aa.-

troqpa

quJ,ttio' Lulullbou-rg 1•lJ.JLe VP "1\V8
on lilliLDd:. •• SQDI! diBappcA r1.og i n•

UN

p.iqu-ed

'f:irom CGAJWilst countf-1.c=-s.rrob~bly

.Tll·e C'1 ·Z G'11Siet v-1t.bdraval
befrap oo

l qyvJ.i.le oa 2B ;ti'\ibi"Un.ey-a.1logedly boca.us:e Gh;eqa 111US

~roop;

.t rca tbe mty

Acco:rd.i.ag to the Ctn1.g:2l:1:11us
lJN eomw..ndar on "t"hc SOQ.ne , t .b e

Th.o Sudana.l!l.e mf de"lel?a-to
~e-rl-c~ o.f'.Ucim.l Oii
27 Febl"LJAi"J tbat Khartcnm d~

t.o,ld a.n

oo·t lP:te21-d to .g"ive

~'P

to

so--

;.t·i e-t· and liAa preBS"\tl'O !for tt'1u1.a-

it

~isb~B. - B,Q- s&~4 v~rious
wer~ t,rei.nc 'tl'ied. but

devtcoo.

wolll d n()'t; e.:ucc.eed.
GJ::i::.e.dJJta. D.ppa.Ni:aUy re- ·
ll:P.if.IA

tbe . llOni:nant figw-e

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Ql.ltlll:EHr 1BHLL1GENCE.

r-ep<1r1-eif ~lll! . (Juional L.widu.b,
Gize,q:a 1 8 dl16.f Of $tia:tt, l'Opart.c clly .ieued o:nle-J!'S ott .i e ·
fi)bruaey tliat •DfODe 1Wlost.ioa
Euro~JJ wt ').:t l>o •hot~ an.d
Gbmtaa II.ad ~.'°U,~:r ~rood
that O.nly lb~ CfmU'lll Sta.=1:1-.y...

v1.J.l.o_govcnur:c.nt

~an ord~r

the-

daa t-'b a~t-cnce ~ Giz-~np, who
taa.s U .t.U• 1 rt'ba.l .,up,por-c asd
bn.a aa.illtaJ.n.ed b-ie l>Oi:i-t..uon ·
1A.~cl7 thrwp -pc>U Uca,l rnan1.p-

\)1A. Uc:>~. DAY bava ~Cllc«i it
,IW'cpc&AS .

~, ~ere~d~~

eovever, be •P-Pl!&r6 ti9

r~novcd

bav~

.oaaa pot·. eftl·i Al c-1111111.8 •

.Denaro SCllunu-, tonierly .bt.8 regroaentat~vo 10 <:a.i~~ 4:Dd '10r-o
regently ~ l~dlrt,8 U.gu.toa 1:.n
tbo 8t1utleyvillo regime, ls
roportcd ta b11.ve fled, l)t911ir!..~~l.f v.~ ll. 1'GGQ1·t

ot

wuia.Y'

tl>Q.9i

BDllMRY

Ui&

i.b~

t'.t':lbes eup-poned

L~.

At.;i.'ti,nlt :D.f•;l~• · .iHniete. .
Kaacli nit c.ryi.us to ·n lee t.-o
battislion8 o.t volunte.ent in t!lo
a..copol.dv1. l .t e- IU'Cll , and l"OpOrt ..·
®l)' ~~ -~94. A1~1't Jra.)QOj.J,

Ure ~t.b KHU s-e•ue,
hi.a two b11dalioas of
poorly- t..-aiAOCl ;:-roopo a1llin.et
'tltG 01T.enp tor~• 1.tt LuJ.Qll.1>o\i1t. Wh!m '"hta :r~quest ne
repor(.ed t.G ·the UK eiomaacl,

~nd

h6:Ad

to

pa,pa'l protened , obJectins to
·1ta;t.ol\j ~ 'e ·~gg&"'Cfilll 1, ve poa'tura . "
Accof'dt..oa- -to UH ~·oi;u:c• ·1t1 >1'•'7
Yot'k, DlOQj1 •e. ,.roo.-_oe bad t•.k•t1

I:

Ft'i!i=...~r w1.._

I

A 'a t l"Q(;'g:le

tol! DO'l8l'.
Ill

~be r10~-

id!QPoldville.

1n1 l>J COrigolCU10 u11y cilseDtit
app.ea.r e lo bave re~uJ~ed fl!O.a
·: for bOCll 01 an

1-l:IP~~ail\8 ~t­

tAck by g.iz.~·s COlt:IMS &tti1
t.bo poaaibility of li.ttcm~t8 by
UN tof'CCl.tJ ~o disor~ ~Obutu ' s
~-rioo.1)8 .

xasa~uJ>u 1 a :r11dtq.. .lld..

drf!S8 o:n 27 -P-&br~y .in •Mc::b
ho 11~C'd . r ·ca·iistaa.C4t to UN
••t.u£.c,1~0" !Ill}' ..ormoa tbo lllre.ad:Y" 'tfmse e.11.v aUOft 1>·o tROll
l,JH . PQ~.sonnel and tbe eoa.aoleee
-&~, 4nd further attaca\e oo
tm· p~rson.ncJ. CCllO}G lCAd. tO re•
halhtOJ'J' a~tl.0 1;, ~lt' tt1o U')r
to~ctt

..

Jo 1.atc Fe:bnary, OOngo.
ott.i aiiAl!l in 1,.aopolcf,o
y1}}El •e'f'e -l i&-kl'nt' f....,..tiC
fortS to put t-oceth~r a fO&"C.e

le&o

•f-

~~tb

Gai;er.al MobutuA wU:b. ~J>­
p.roid.,nat,oi., 1, ~00 troops.. is
10 t ,bc v1ct.n.tt,7 of Bllm'.ba., poll•
f!~ly ~t-J.U hop~

llJto

~1.o_ft.Ula

a0ur()a8 est.imt-e
be ha.:s

oat n11 &•t 't:aek on .St•nle_yvUle.
l"Ollo.ittg -o Bl tebnia17 mooUq:

mr

-.'.ltb
c~lld~ nc.X~, ~
W tl.l prQlll&od t-o ·~1to up oirn1
d.ei:le118lve _11os.LttoDB to p...v4111c
!&atilt.rat.ion" frOll Sta.n.leyvi:ll.e ,
bac be ratun;od t:o maot with
i..un41.1u to . d1•c~ ~ c~...fin .and est•t>US:blrJetrt of a

cns.utral 1tooe.
K-Ol)~t~

11Aaco
C.Ul'U~.

tbe7 9'0u1d bo 1.u>l.uoly to

cf1aoti vc

oppasi~ion

in

J,.eopold~1llo l?l'ovi~oe,

2 llor 81

f<.1:tces

an4

MiglJl Join
•U.U ary •l -

~~~-~l•

lo- •

11.gninst

~

eus~curn

whor~

·BamsarsJUol<I

tbtllk& tbore t;!J a Chanco tbAC

forcscfS non•

Leoi;iol4V1'l l'1';

IDf

~JQt .. Uth~Bb
sGi1c t.rucb b~ t "'P

by rtYar fran '(loquUllatv11:1d,
b• wo~Jd 11ot bo ~1• to ~

vtilcb to oppo~e a~·a
•dY6.QC~. JO tb~ ~V9.n~ 01~gll~~
011

to ad'VIUl.c.o

Provhoo .

kobutu

:oar

all

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(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541061

·CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
•.v .... . •

8 March 1961

~:~~~:~

,f~J'

I

.

.:· ,··

::·~:

':

! ·-:··-:·;
'ir.:~:i;;~
1••• :·:. ·:~:
u-.·~:.:.

;~~~

·.:····:·· ·

E-:·T-:

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•. i:.·:. .)!-.·
:.:·~.(·r,,;

,:.f_~t~~
(b )( 1)

Congo:/

(b)Q).
"f"' "': ····

Lout Gizenga's participation, the only significant result of \withthe

confere.nce probably will be a slight strengthening of the tle s
between Leopoldville and Ellsabethville . ~ID Leopoldvllle ,
~
!:· ~.~:,_,,
:...; :~'.:,~·.-~: .~:·,'.~
American and UN officials believe that there ls little time reht~l
malning before inflation gets completely out of control, with
,i'.-, . ;.;:i·jJl~
the c·o nsequent possl'1tlitv of disorde rs in truLbl~cen~
.=. ~ '(b)(1 )
"·~!,,..
civlltan pop~lation. L
For
;~~.i·J
eign Minister Bomboko and the UN commander, Genera.I McKeown,
;;;\~i[]~. met on 5 March and agreed on a number of measures ·to reduce
t":Lkb)(3 )
.·: :;
tensions between Congolese and UN troops, partic'ularly in Ma..
'>;,;,
tadi. Hammarskjold admitted
~,::C~
)( 1)
.;~~~~'.
i--1 that Rajeshwar Dayal, h._i_s_r_e_p_r_e_se_n_t_a_U_v_e_i_n_th
_ e_t;_'o_n_g_o__.
,
"::~:~)
~able to communicate with any Congolese leaders and ln\~'<i:J
dtcated that Dayal would not return to the Congo after his trip
· ..
to New York: for "consultations" which is scheduled to take lace
\~:~;{
tn a .few days.=.:)
.
0u ~:(b)(3)
~~~i~:
(Backup, Page
~
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.~::;-:-;..~

.

•·

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J

~

*Laos: (Information available as. of 0400 EST) Vientlane's 1
IP
forces ln the Phou Khoun road junction area withdrew ·in µie face.
.
of aggressive probing actions initiated by Kong ·Le - Pathet Lao ~
·forces on 6 and 7 March. Indications are that the enemy forces
had not planned a major attack, but were quick to capitalize on
the government's hasty withdrawal ·a nd may have gained at least
temporary control of the Phou Khoun road junction. General
Phoumi ts making urgent plans to regain the lost ground, but the

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C0654 1 061

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Situation in the Congo
[Hammarskjold stated that Makki Abbas of Sudan would
immediately be installed as the UN's acting representative in
the Congo and that Dayal would 'leave "this week!' Continuing
tension in Matadi apparently has postponed Dayal's departure.
~----~ He continues to hold himself aloof from the Congolese; ·..re~•::· ,.,~
cently he failed. to turn up at a meeting with Foreign Minister ·

(b)(3)

Bomboko, reportedly for fear that Bomboko "might make a
political attack on him:')

·

.

~-------'

[Hammarskjold also pla~s to set up a Congo planning and
advisory group within the UN secretariat, composed exclusively
of Africans and Asians . Within a few .weeks he hopes to send to
the Congo as his permanent representative either Adnan Pachachl
of Iraq or Robert Gardiner of Ghana, both of whom would be members
of the proposed grou:P0
. .
the UN
Command has failed to provide leadership in the economic field
·as a result of its preoccupation with political questions·, coupled ·
with Dayal's ignorance of economic factors and his tactic of withholding budgetary support as a means of pressuring the Leopoldville government. Moreover, foreign aid furnished so far has
suffered from a lack of coordination as well as from inefficiency
and v~nality on the part of Congolese officials. UN financial experts in Leopoldville believe that the establishment of a flexible
fund under UN control is the only way to salvage the economic
situation, which apparently has not resulted in popular outbreaks
so far only because most of the population is not dependent on the
money economy. However, the population in Leopoldville, where
most of the working force is unemployed, · is vulner~ble to inflation in basic commodities, and the UN econ~mists bi lieve outbreaks will occur when the price spiral takes hold. _

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(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

8 Mar 61

CENTRAL INTELIJGENCE BULLETIN

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COPY NO. 1a
OCf NO. OH0/61

..

.CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENT RA.l

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 March 1961

DAILY BRIEF
~:Jn a 9 March discussion· on the Congo with an
AmerrcaDofftclal, Hammarskjold expressed the belief that
further outbreaks in the Lower Congo were unlikely for the
· time being. . Refatlons between the UN and local authorities
however, :remain uneasy. He ·indicated that he had not yet
found a replacement for Dayal and said that Makki Abbas of
Sudan, the interim appointee for the job, was "not the best
man in the world but would be all right." Hammarskjold ls
also hopeful that several additional countries will contribute
contingents to the UN fore~ Another UN official has said
that the Somali and Malagasy republlcs mlght contribute a
batt~lon each wlthln .a month.
The Tananarive conference, by conceding the existence
of several de facto centers of power in the Congo, has
strengthened Katanga's clalm to autonomy and has enhanced
~l~~~L':,Uos:on..aa the Jeailln«
In the anti-~

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~Laos: ~his remarks to Ambassador Thompson on
Laos;-mirushchev to.o k a generally positive line, pointing
· out that the US and the USSR agree that the objective should
/ /,be neutrality for Laos, that this represents a step .forward,
and that bilateral conversatlons should be continued. He said
that neither the US nor the USSR stands to gain anything from a
continuation of .the fighting and that this would only damage
relations between the two countries. He warned, however, that
any prolonged ·delay ln reachlng a solution would complicate
the problem and could cause the flghtlng to flare up:. He also)

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Si~uatlon

LJ

in the Congo

According to a UN military official in New York, the
1,000-man Moroccan contingent in Katanga seems to have
embarked on a systematic program of harassment and noncoqperation with the UN Command. Their morale ls said to
be completelY. broken, and they allegedly have ''laid down
their arms." @ammarskjold had hoped to send the group to
M~tadl in a show of force, but the.troops reportedly stated
. that they would obey directives only from Rabat. Rabat has
ordered this group--the only remaining part of a force which
originally totaled 3,200--to withdraw from the Congo, but
it has been delayed by transportation dlfflcult~
The Tananarive conference apparently has agreed that
the existing centra~ authority should be scrapped, along with
the present provincial structure. In their place a group of
new states~ based largely on tribal lines, would be created,
with an ill-defined "community of united nations" arrangement for a central authority, presumably in ~eopoldvUle,
which would become a "neutral city." The participants apparently are agreed that any solution .re.ached at the conference
will be an interim on~ and that ·any definitive reform must wait
until the country ls pa.elf.led. The absence--and presumably
the nm:1concurrence-... of Glzenga will make implementation
of these proposals difficult and will probably lead to opposl._
tion to them among hls international supporters.
Tshomb6 seems to· have been successful in his efforts
. to reach agreement on replacing O~e present structure with
a loose confederacy. Except for Albert Kal.onji of southern
Kasal--who ls largely dependent on Tshomb6's patronage-the other participant~ have an interest l~ retaining some
type of central authorlty--Kasavubu and Ileo by vlrtue of their
positions in. the present central government, and Leopoldville Provincial President Kamltatu because of his long association with Lumurp.ba's ldeais of a unitary state. However,
local ties still have considerable importance for most of them,
and none seems to be willing to face up to. strong pressurei.

11 Mar 61

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from Tshombe. As a result, the conference has been aQle
to issue a. vague. communiqu·e recognizing states now exist~
lng '11by· right or in fact." ·
The only well~defined point on which the participants
agree seem·s to be opposition to the UN. For the ·most part
they a;re try~ng to Um.i t.their discussions to general principles, -leaving contentious details to be woi:ked. out in a larger
- · :conference tentatively scheduled for: th~ end of March in
Elisabethville. Such a conference, which· might be attended
by as many as 400 leaders of varying political statur
ould
. be Uke~y- to become involved. in extensive wrangling.

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Congo: Hammarskjold is. inc'.!'easingly worried .over the
· possibility of incidents in connection with the arrival of the .
Indian UN conti~gent, whose first units are. to fly into Leopoldville on 16 March. He told. American officials on 13 March.
that it was of great political importance that the Indian operation be carried out, In view of the heavy prestige commitment
of Nehru and the Indian military.

I

.

l~h-e~a-ls-o~r-e_c_og_n_i_z_e_s~tha~t-t_h_e~

Congolese hostility toward the. UN results from the Congolese
belief that the 21 February Security Council resolution authorizes the disarmament of the Congolese army and the imposition
of UN trusteeship. He apparently feels that this attitude, reinforced by the anti-Asian feelings connected with Dayal, might
focus on the Indian troops. Hammar s\(jold also believes, although he admits he has no specific evidence, that the recent
mllitary incidents in the Congo and the outcome of the Tananarive conference resulted from a Belgian-inspired pfan to b_u_ild
u a olitical and mUitar_y_b.as_is_ofJ.:e.si.s.tanc..e_to-1he_UN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

'

16.March 1961

DAILY BRIEF
Laos: The failure of the 14-15 March talks between
:0~ 0/::
Souvanna Phouma and a delegation of the Vientiane regime
i'
makes it clear that an early political solution of the Laotian r::L-<-A!. ,_;t_,_,
crisis is unlikely. Souvanna's insistence on.a 14-nation con~_
·
_ :;~:-.
3
ferel)Ce as prerequisite to any settlement for Laos is in il's 2, ;- .'.5
:~!j
sharp contrast to the flexibility that he evidenced. in explor;JJ'---·'-:D \~;·.'.
ing solutions. with General Phoumi last week, and is almost "
. I ;1A~7
,_
certainly conditioned by the uniformly negat~ve reaction of
';JS"
. the bloc to the.communique he issued with Phoumi.
Indicating that the Communists foresee the possibility
':1\ of a long st_ruggle in Laos, Peiping on 14 March broadcast
·i:;i;;;
a-Pathe_t l,a9 order of t):le day calling ln_Laotians to prepare
for a·"prcitracted war of resistance!'
'(b)(3)
. (Baclrnp, Page 1)
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ffiarnmarskjold told ~~erican official on 14 March that
he is thinking of sending Dayal back.to the Congo around the
first of April. However, he thought that he might install three)
.

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[African.assistants in Leopoldville before Dayal's return and
----·that these assistants would perform most of the UN re resentative's duties.

(bj(1):- .
(b)\~Jj

France-Algeria: The French·Government announced yes- d.-L.L<-&,
terday it is ready to begin official political negotiations with ./-; .
.
.the Algerian rebels. The meeting of leaders of the rebel pro-!. 5 ;.i.,.3 ', c./
visional Algerian government, which began in Tunis on 14
o.;( ;J~<-<£J
March·and will probably continue through this week, report- tJ
r
edly is assessing ·the results
of
secret
preliminary
contacts
.
.
with the French. Both the French and the rebels have. attempted
to keep secret the content of these talks, held in Geneva, but
reports indicate that some progress was made on.the status of
the French minority and arrangements for a transitional government. The problems of imp.lementing a tacit cease-fire
:agreement, which Paris appears willing. to·accept, and determining sovereignty over the Sahara are likely to be especially
difficult points during negotiations. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Backup,
Page.5 )
.

. Union of South· Africa: 1'outh
Airica's decision o. n 15 March
e

nhot t~ sefefk atdillittanhcde to tfhe Commonwealth as afrepublic, and
t us m e ec ·to wit raw rom that organization ollowing severe condemnation of Pretoria's racial policies, wi_ll probably
have little immediate effect on the Union's domestic affairs.
. The English-speaking ·mtnority--some forty percent of South
.Africa's whites--bave been politically handcuffed in recent years
and are not likely to provoke significant disorders. An eventual
. loss of the five-p"'rc.ent tariff preference would not affect more
·than about eight percent of South Africa's. total trade. However,
Pretoria's action is another major step in the Union's virtual
withdrawal from the outside world. Its impact, moreover, may
be greater in international African and Asian circles, where the
concept of the Commonwealth· as a multiracial ·club will be
strengthened. Prime Minister Welensky of the Rhodesi~

CJ

.16 Mar 61

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Situation in the Congo
· ffi_ammarskjold apparently feels that Dayal 's return to the
Congo is necessitated by the "question of 1ndian prestige";
ultimately, however, he hopes to have an African at the head
of the operation, with another African and an Asian as deputies. He has stated that Makki Abbas, his interim representative in Leopoldville, is popular with the Congolese--a view
which was confirmed by Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko
in Leopoldville. However, Abbas is to return to his post a8
executive secretary of the Economic Commission for. Afr.ica in
a few weeks]

(b)(3)

.
With the exception of Joseph Ileo, whose job as prime minister in the Leopoldville regime apparently was abolished, the
participants at the Tananarive conference reportedly are well
satisfied with.the "Confederation of Central African States"·
proposed in the conference's final resolution. The Congolese
apparently. have decided to wait until the confederation's constituent states have been formed before determining its structure. So far four such states, in addition to the eight proposed
at the conference, have been proclaimed. Three of the twelve
are in Leopoldville Province, and.Kasai and Katanga contain
two each. Another state reportedly has been formed from
parts of Leopoldville, Equateur, and Kasai provinces. In addition, an Orientale ·"government-in-exile" and.the remainder
of Equateur have joined the confederation as separate entities.
This process of fragmentation is likely to continue. Although
·this trend is derived from the tribalism which.has made the
(b)(3)
larger pol.itical groupings unrealistic, the resulting sta"t"'"e"-s_,al=----most certainly wiJl be highly unstable.
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ITaieb Sahbani, secretary general of the Tunisian foreign
secr'etariat, left Tunis· on 1.3 March for Brussels, where tie is
to be Hammµskjold's representative in talks with the Belgian
Government.
~
the timing of his mission is unfortunate, since Belgium is
~the midst of an election campaign and cannot be expected to
take new initiatives· before the formation of a new governm~t)

11

c=

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Situation in ,the Congo
(b)(1)

.----------=-c-:-:-----:-: Katanga President

Tsh,'-o-m~b~e was reserved but cordial and did' not discuss the
specific11 of the Indian troop movement. It is impossible to
determine whether Tshornbe intends to carry 'through his implied threat against Americans; but the consul believes that
----!~if 'violence does occur,, it will have been instigated,bi:Tshombe's
J!::elgian.advisers. /A.ccording to another report, a, European .in
'-----,~Ellsabethville stated·on.15 March that "immediate and serious
internal disorder will result throughout the Congo", ff Indian
.. troops are ~rought ~riJ
.
.
.

~ro-Asian representatives at the UN apparently have nqt
yet developed a position toward, the Tananarive conference.
Most of them, with the exception of Guinea. are reserving
.
judgment on the conference.(
~

(b)(3)

-.

(b) (1)
(b)(3)

r-1·---;=hether Kasavubu's installation as head of the confederahfa claim to recognition.by tqe UN, which has
acknowledged him as chief of the republic set up last June.
This question was later raised pubU:c.ly ,by Gh;µia, which asserted
in a 15 March statement that Kasavubu,had abdicated "by accepting an office which is dependent upoh th_e_cUs_s_QlutiQn_oLthe
Congo Republic?.J\

~validat'ed

J

suCs~overn:nrennnrs

.:

~

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.

(b)(3)

or~d ~~~ops

postponed me willidrawat
from thE:) Congo as a result of a strong plea from· Hammarskjo.ld.
The government reportedly has not decided whether to remove
these forces or not. I

(b)(1)

(b)(1)
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Situation in the Congo

D

{!J:amniarskjold told Western UN delegates on 22 March
that UN forces will run out of supplies if the port of Matadi
is not reopened within one week. He believes that uninterrupted transit through Mafadi can be assured only by the
presence of a small UN force in the port area.: Efforts by
Hammarskjold's personal representative, Makki Abbas, to
obtain permission from the Ilea government for UN re·-entry
have not met with· success, and unless a favorable decision
·can be obtained within the riext few days, Hammarskjold sees
no alternative but to bring the whole question of the UN ef---~
f_o_:tt_in_tbJ:_C_omto_oncfL9ore before the Security Council.
_J Hammarskjold is well aware that it
Tsunffkely the Security Councll will issue more.positive directives <in the Congo at this time but he will ask for council action
because he is "fed up with bearing full responsibility himself~

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(b)(1)
(b)_(1)

[uN troop commander General McKeown ls now under orders
to proceed from Leopoldville to Matadi with 200 Tunislan soldiers
with the objective of taking control of warehouse and other facili-.
ties. Troops are instructed to use force only in self-defense,
"if stopped and Hred upon.'']
Mobutu stated on 20 March that ''blood would flow" if the
UN attempted to retake .Matadi, and he is.reported to have
warned Congolese officials on 22 March that it would be impossible for him to prevent Congolese troops from resisting with
force such l!N action. He expressed the fear that his troops
would turn against their commanders and government officials
as well lf they were ordered not to resist. In the past, however,
Congolese troops have often refused to stand up to a determined
military unit.

CJ

{iasavubu app~rently ls exploring the possibility of a.peaceful UN return to Matadi dill'1n.R:_bls_c_ur-1'.JillLvJ.slLtoJhe reglon,
and Ilea[_
!that a solution
could be fauna, although he could.not predict when the "people"
of the city would permit a re-eritri;) T.he Congolese are likely
to regard the UN initiative as an ultimatum which disregards .

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their recent efforts at conciliation following Dayal 's departure,
a development which would reverse the recent trend toward
improved. relations between the Leopoldville regime and the
UN Command~
(b)(1)

I

;the Union Mlmere had waY.s ot
bringing pressure on TshombE'\ to reach an agreement with
-~sayubu,. "lf it really wanted to,"

(b)(1)

~------------------(b)(1)
.
.
.
. (b)(3)
Peiping has.given a somewhat less than sattsfactory response
to Gizenga's requests.for aid and the namln of a Chinese ambassador to Stanleyvii.le.

(b)(1)

[L~::-,,--i::-c·-·

·~c---------$-.

(b)(1)
-

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ast fa.u. the hinese ommunists extended a 2, o00,000 ·monetary
grant to Lumumba supporters. Chou accepted the appointment of
a Congolese ambassador but said transportation difficulties. ruled
out the sending of a Chinese ambassador to Stanleyville at this
time.

(b)(3)

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. Congo: Ham marskjolci -:-:---::-:-:--- - ---:-:-------:-- ---;,.--__J
I
- reels Tshomb~'s military operations in northern
Katanga--wruch have already resulted in the capture of Manono
and Kabalo--foreshadow intensified civil war in Katap,ga ~,!gye
ish its author_~ti,.~..~~e
-area.
f Tshomb6's offensive does not stop soon,
his forces will have to be "neutralized." Hammarskjold has
requested that approximately 1,200 Indian troops be airlifted
from: Dar es Salaam to Kamlna with~n the next few days; their
arrival could provoke violent incidents by Tshomb~'s supporters
in Elisabethvllle. Although military talks between Mobutu and
_Stanleyvllle General Lundula are apparently proceeding as
scheduled, the po~itical conference between Gizenga and representatives of the Leopoldville government.a scheaiiled to ~gin ·
on 9 4eril. has been l?OJ!$llO_Md. The Leopoldville ,emissaries
apparently feared for their s afety, and now have suggested that
:J~nt""""Q ™" helcLin_nentral territorv. Possibly Addis

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Situation in the Congo
(b )( 1)

Tshomb~'s

recent military moves in northern Katanga were
made to tindercut hls rival, Jason Sendwe, and to increase
hls own prestige so that he could dominate a conference of
Congolese leaders apparently to take pl~e in late April in
Katanga. The danger of spreadlng the civil war in Katanga
arises from Sendwe's announcement in Leopoldville on 7
April proClaiming himself chief of .t he ·Luluaba state and
callirig on its people to resist Tshomb~'s invaders.
Kabalo wa·s reported calm on 9 April, with UN troops
holding the railway station and airport. However, there have
been clashes between UN Ethiopian troops and Tshomb6's forces
which have resulted in casualties on both sides, and further
violence could occur at any time .
Elsewhere in Katanga, Tshomb~'s government is removing restrictive measures against UN troops, but gradually so
as not to lose face with the public. UN troops on B April had
water and electricity in all installations, but food supplies
were still low. The UN commander in southern Katanga
stated on 8 April that continuation of the relatively relaxed
attitude depends on events at Kabalo, reaction to the airlift
of Indian troops to Kamina,. and the ability of the Swedish
and Irish UN forces to maintain order in Elisabethville.
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Congo: Hammarskjold told a group of Western r.~.P-­
_llGDtiUX§s on 8 ApriJ that K;mayy);n~'s [eC~Pt..lelt~•.~hich
suggested a phased entry of a UN police unit into Matadi,
was unsatisfactory. He said that Canadian communications
personnel, who ·w ould be essential to any military movements
throligh the port, would refuse to go back under such an arrangement. However he stated that the Kasavubu reply did
not warrant stron U ac ion an im 10
a e o
o ain
ur er concessions rom the on o ese b ne otiation.

(b)(3)

r

(b)(1
(b)(3).

e ,
-man n an
con ngen estme or Ka anga
remains on shipboard off Dar es Salaam pending a decision in
New York concerning its dispositlon. A UN plan to airlift the
contingent into Katanga ls stymied at present by the unavailability of aviation fuel in Dar es Salaam and by the inadequacy of
the local runway.

President Su rno
will have a 'profound effect" on
of the world.

11 Apr 61

Peining's_r~-1allons

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Taieb t:abhani , Hammarskjold's representative in Brussels, said that Belgium was blind to the fact that unless it
modified its policy, pressures inside and outside the Congo
eventually would deprive Brussels of all its influence in the
country. He asserted that the Belgian arguments with him
were hypocritical and completely unconvincing. In respo.n se
to Sabhani's pressure for the removal of Belgians in. Congo.Iese service , the negotiators in Brussels allegedly alternated
between a narrow legalistic position and references to the
mood of public opinion in Belgium. Their early April announcement that Belgium was prepared to cooperate with the UN allegedly was the result of a threat by Sabhani to br eak off negotiations completely.
After talking with Lefevre and ~aak, who Will probably
head a new Belgian government within the next few days,
'-.iLI"----~
Sabhani indicated he had enough hope ......._.......... . . . . . .
and continui
di c
hem..__

-.

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11
·NO. ·onstoi.

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
.WEEKLY
SUMMARY
..

UoiCTi~- t.l: GEiN<:! AGE.NC.Y
Qfflc;it Cf •CURA!tff INf:mtJOENtE

CENft.A.l

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-Congo: The 2,300-man addition to India's UN contingent
has disembarked at Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, and the
first planeloads of troops are expected shortly in Katanga. In
view of Tshombe's warnings against the reinforcement of UN
forces in Katanga, Hammarskjold is considering sending UN
military commander McKeown or hi denutv to assume nersonal. command of UN forces there.

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. Angola-Portugal: Terrorist Fl.Ctivity in the area north of
Luanda is continuing in the face of a steady Portuguese military build-up. According·to the Portuguese news agency ,
,.tllousands" of Africans attacked a village about 100 mil~s
northeast of Luanda but were driven off with heavy casualties
by the small garrison there. Disorders have also ·been reported
in. Cabinda..

·-

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ous an
a a
ona
c ial authorities are 'IJ.4UJ..1Cll!._.ll..l..l'-l!.u.u.u.u.i=s:..u:L..d.Uu..__;,LJJ::.....uica::..a..uu..ua:._uL.__
mobilize reservists.

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In Portugal, Salazar.has been reshuffling the military supporters of ex-Defens MinL~niz.._lollowinu the c a bin
<?hanges of 13 April.

-

·-

DAILY BRIEF

15 Apr 61

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CURRENT

10 .April 1911

INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY

SUMMARY

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The Situation in the Congo
The UN Command appears increasingly disposed to take
a tough stand in its relations with the Leopoldville and Katanga
gov~rnments. Hammarskjold's unpopular Congo representative,
Rajeshwar Dayal, reportedly plans to leave for Leopoldville on
28 .April. In Katanga, whe.re the UN continues to airlift· reinforcements from Tanganyika in the face of Tshombe's threats,
the situation .remains tense. UN officials in LeopoldviUe have
stepped up efforts to return UN -forces to the port of Matadi
even at the risk of jeopardizing the recent improvement in
their relations with the Kasavubu government. Pointe Noire,
which Hammarskjold has mentioned as an alternative port to
Matadi, handles on an annual basis only one third the tonnage
of Matadi, and all goods brought in there wou~d have to be
brought across the Congo River at Brazzaville.
Only ln Orientale is the UN Command inactive. The status
of the proclaimed truce between Mobutu's Congo Army and the
rebel. forces remains unclear; although a Stanleyville broadcast has denied the existence of any truce, it is possible that
some agreement has been reached among commanders in the
field.

_
_ ltlle Ministry of African Affairs in B~rus~
sels had assured Belgian officers that service with Tshombe's
forces would be considered equivalent to service in el
forces with respect to retirement.
on instructions from Brusse
arne Be gian
officers against participating in any action against the UN Com-

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mand .

Prospects for a meeting of Congo political leaders at Kamina,
the purpose of implementing
ear dubious.[

Katanga·~ c~ scheduled for 20 April for
decisions reached at Tananarive- ~ a

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York ·again denouncing the Tananarive conference last March
as "no't representative of the country'.' and as a maneuver "desigged to c_o_unteract the_mqrk of the General Assembly."

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Congo: Foreign Minister. Bomboko's statement on 7 May
that the Leopoldville government plans to try Tshomb~ for
treason will heigh~en. tension among his followers in Katanga,
who are already· ·concerned regarding possible UN moves to
disarm TshomM's armed forces. An official of the Katanga
government has ageged to the American consul that the UN
is preparing an "offensive" against Katanga, and warned that
the· Elisabethville government would sabotage key mining installations r·a ther than per.qiit them to be turned over to the

ntrlllJlovernment.·

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_ ___ ____· _ _

Hammarskjold has previously indicated that he hoped
--o-'
to appoint a committee to assume Dayal's functions, ossibly
ei:Jlls return to 1.eonoldville for a token neriodl
--

<-r-c---

rus c ev s remarks on t e in erna iona s uation. ~ur.ing. a 6 May speech in Yerevan were apparently intended to assure the US that recent events in Laos and Cuba
have not damaged long-term prospects for the improvement
of Soviet-US relations. According to Ambassador Thompson,
the Soviet premie:r laid stro'n g emphasis on the need for discussion of subst~ntive matters in bilateral disarmament negotiations with.the US. . Khrushchev referred t~ talks which
were to take place "soon," on the disarmament question and
asserted that Moscow was preparing for these talks with
0
"complete seriousness." Turning to the recent events in Cuba,
Khrushchev called upon Cuba and the US to "live like good·
neighbors," and in generally restrained remarks on the situation commented that the USSR would like to look "optimistically" on the .future course of Cuban-American relations. Khrushchev reiterated th~t Moscow desires a genuinely independent and neutral ·Laos. He mad~ clear his view that an improvement in relations with the US depended not only on. the outcqme
of disarmament negotiations but on the settlement of the Berlin and German proble.m s as well. He repeated standard demands for a reorganization of the United Nations, but called
8 May 61

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Con~ l!iammarskjold said on 9 May that contrary to
fears in lG.tanga, the UN did not intend to use force to secure
the withdrawal of Belgian military or political advisers from
the Congo. He added, however, that any Belgians who fell
lnto UN hands would be repatriated. Hammarskjold now plans
to keep Dayal in New York for about five weeks; thereafter, lf
relations between Leopoldville and the UN remain cordial, he
wlll return Dayal to Leopoldville for a brief stay. Hammarskjold sald that Nkrumah is no~ pressing his threat to Withdraw
Ghana's troops from the Congo and expressed doubts that the
Ghanaian President would do so"J
According to the Amer.lean-Embassy in Brussels, Belgian
Foreign Ministry officials regard the arrest of Tshomb~, who
ls now being removed to Leopoldville under guard, as a stupid
maneuver which might increase unrest in Katanga without facilitating a rapprochement between Leopoldville and Stanleyvllle.
Brussels ·reportedly ls attempting to keep ltself disengaged from
the publlc dispute over Tshomb~, although it has told Congolese
. repres;-ntatlves lo li_ew York that lt disapproves of LeoPoldvllle

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on~
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nmeu any IUTwe

demonstrations, except at one spectfled publlc stadium where
assemblles may be he'ld '.'~o express the people's demands" i and stated lt will take strong measures to maintain order.
Crowds, including many students, have been in the streets,
however, celebratlng the collapse of Shartf-Emainl's cabinet
and hailing the government's announcement th2.t the pollce offleer responsible for killlng a demonstrator last week would
be prosecuted. The teachers' organization, · which sparked
the earlier demonstrations, appears wllling to continue its
strike for higher wages, although its leader, Mohammad
Derakhshesh, appears undecided. He has been mentioned as
a possible candidate for minister of education, a cabinet post
not ,Yet filled by Aml1!9
.
l!Amini has told the American ambassador that he intends
to draw up a new election law, to work for and wlth the Shah,
and to ask for prompt US aid in carrying out major refor~

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/Hammarskjold reportedl; told a We~tern official recenUy that he intended.to appoint Rajeshwar Dayal an under··
.secretary gen~ral, in line with a recent recommendation
that the number of such posts be increased. This appointretur to the Con o
.ment presumably wou.ld preclude Da
~~mmarskj Id's re resentative.

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Congo: Anti- Gizenga commentary on .R adio Leopoldville
·Lndicates that Kasavubu so far ls holding to his own propos·a ls
on reconvening the Congolese parliament. The Leopoldville
radio on 17 May characterized the Congo crisis as "in its
·
final stages," and after alluding to Gizenga's counterproposal
observed that "no delaying tactics will prevent. . . the convoca
tion~par:llament" by Kasavubu.
elgian officials in Ellsabethville· have again voiced concern at the ·security situation in Katanga will deteriorate as
Be~gian military personnel are replaced in coming weeks.
The Belgian consul general has said that: he had ro confidence ~­
·in the ability of the U:N to protect the. 12,000 Belgians in Katanga, and that Belgian nationals in Elisabethvine· have drawn
up emergency evacuation plans. The American Consulate believes that at present these Belgian fears are exaggeratecfJ
fflammarskjold has told Ambassador Stevenson thafn'e
·planSro send Dayal back to Leopoldville on about 25 May for
.roughly one month. Hammarskjold stated that he was convinced that the -r eaction to Dayal's return would not be so'
sharp as to paralyze .UN operations. He insisted that were
Dayal not to return to Leopoldville there was a real danger ·
that India would shift~osition_noi_onlY..JllLthe_C_on~o but on
broader UN issues:] _
·(Backup, Page 3)-:-(M=--a-p~----------. -.---~
France-Algeria: {[espite the hope of the Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) that the broad outline of an agreement with the French· would be .reached through -preliminary
ontacts before talks begin at Evian on 20 May, recent re~
orts indicate that little common gro~d has been established.
0 K
he PAG negotiatii:ig team reportedly still feels that Algerian
overeignty~ -including the S"ahara--must first be recognized
efor.e it can offer concessions for French participation in. the
conomic sphere and guarantees for the European minority.
he PAG is said to hope that the negotiations can be completed
n three months- - but is ready to bre ak them off if no concrete
rog·r ess is made within two weeks.. T.h e French team ls ·.
xpected to be firm but courteous, .since it ls well aware ~rom]

19 May 61

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Tlie Situation in the Congo

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ffiammarskjold's decision to return Dayal to Leopoldville
--despite the danger of undermining the UN's newly improved relatlons.with the LeopoldyilJ.e government--reflects his sensitivity to Nehru's views. Despite Dayal's wipopularity with vir~
tually all Congo factions, Hammarskjold has long favored returning him to the Congo at l~ast for a token peri~j

(b)(3)

Gizenga's determinatioi:i to resist Kasavubu's call for a
meeting of parliament in Leopoldville appears to have sharpened differences among his followers -which .forced the adoption of strict security measures. The American Embassy in
Leopoldville reports , however, that Gizenga has released from
.prison Colonel Yangoie, the army officer who in April negotiated with General Mobutil's representatives concerning the
desirability of reconvening parliament. The embassy speculates that Yangoie's release was prompted by a desire to avoid
unrest in the army.
The embassy notes that recent arrests in Stanleyville stem
from opposition to Gizenga among moderates , notably those in
the Orientale provincial government. The easing by the Leopoldville government of the economic blockade of Stanleyville
reportedly permitted an influx of goods to the provincial government which strengthened its hand in relation to GizeQga 's
"national" government. While the Gizenga regime appears
doubtful of its abllity to control a new meeting of the Congo
parliament ap.d continues to b0 troubled by factionalism, the ·
American Embassy believes it is not likely to collapse soon.

I

~--------'

' 1fn Katang~, Belgian interests ~ppear wider pressure from
both'7the UN and the Katanga government. Hammarskjold's
personal representative in Brussels has told Ambassador
Stevenson that the new Belgian Government seems to be yielding to .f inancial intere sts and the press and is doing little to
bring .about a progressive withdrawal of Belgian advisers from
the Congo, particularly Katanga. In Elisabethville, the Mwiongo
government has severely criticized officials of Union Miniere,7

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· fur alleged acts inimical to Katanga, ~d has said it intends
to replace Belgian technicians with ·French advisers. Munongo's
pique has probably contributed to Belgian a rehension concerning the safety of Belgians in Katanga.

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Congo: {[ammarskjold has informed US officials that
Dayal will not be returned to Leopoldville as senior UN representative because of the latef;!t demonstrations of Congolese
hostility toward him. Hammarskjold implied that he regarded
,___ _ ______. the behavior of the Leopoldville government as outrageous and
~ndicated that there might be a delay in dispatching Dayal's successor--U Hla Maung of Burma--to Leopoldville. He stated
that Nehru had been informed and had agreed to recall Dayal
1f-lr'
to Indiy ·
li:he Leopoldville government will probably regard Hammarskjold's decision as a victory.which will strengthen its hand in
dealing with other Congolese factions. Several reports indicate
that the Leopoldville government is favorably disposed toward
negotiations with Katanga, which recently has indicated its will~
lngness to dis(:• oarlldnatlon In a Congo federation as desired
by KasavubuJ
(Backup, t>a:ge
1ivr
.
Afghanistan-Pakistan: Pakistan Air Force planes continue
to bomb hostile concentrations in Pakistan near the Afghan border. I

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!Pakistan continues to be confident of its ability to handle the situation in the
border area following the 20 May attacks, which were apparently
OK
launched by Afghan special forces disguised as tribesmen and
supported by dissident local tribesmen. Kabul continues to deny
that its forces were directly involved in the 20 May attacks, attributing these entirely to local Pushtoon tribesmen resistin
Pakistani GovernIJ:lent "oppressiont '---- - - - - - - - - --------1

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; 24 May 61

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goaa on.. Stich •t.tbHy Dllf b!>
fllrtber fllti~'lU:o-d ~7 ~11- t:r1"1
of. t.b.e iQUl'l'~t' ae'nedD whicb
opaDti, on 29 l(&y, .DiecoDtcct

v1ib1n tbe aray ta
spread.

ati~i ~1~&-

Ac tbo &\ltut. 11eeot.ta•

(b)(3)

"'dlfll~~lt.

Mot1cov tlae tons aalo1ained
t!t111t O!t\lJ' d.tHcC tcalka botne:o
t.b~ i-eb6lis ocd tbq P'tencri on •
hui.o Of' eq~Al'lt)' Cllli reJiitore
,Peace to Algerill _ lo 11a,.c~,

anncJ\fDe~oeoc cbo~

ta.l1UJ 1t01.tld be held ~ Kb.Mlarn:ibov
u C?o.n'Cl'Cft"ADt:i.omo w1th i\nt> dip..
' lomu.a
.a.rr eiicourlllJil:llJ Uao
. ~d U1e ~¥iet bibacmuSor lrt

"'°'

P&rUi- =iollght' ou~ De OauUe to
11xprua ~J"l#S:M~v'e .boSK" t.ar

• Hl'C:etv1 esoulc110ot ., - At tbe
eame Umct, Soviet 1l1.t'Bt 'Deput7
Pl'11it:S$'1."' ir:osnlD. tried. to
etUfen the rebe~' ~Je'tartee
. · to •Dl' campr9•~~~ wlUI rn.~~e,
a.dv;t,alqg t .be.r t to aeimnd l'-ccog-

t:to~ p~oc:eedl, uu~ fru11trat.lt.>.~
CIX~7o=.t9'8 ll'llY
pr.cmp1; l!(aDD
tbe1J io nlle a11

Utlbl!i &d tb.o ao'lo t'OpH1Hn,ta...

·amoiu:.al,lllltlOO 1.1.ltU~C OD l>CI ·
G-aull.9 a.a ~ 18.!lt· dccpcratc •h

T.lJi.le t.bcra a.ra ll4VllJ.l"l'98
tbe USSR ln a. eooUnu...
atio~ ~~ . tbit rer>elUon,
SovJ•t leaders a.t tho preeeAt

or tbe riJbtist

ot

fort. to ,p!'IC!V'cot All$i'1&tl tnde•
pcnuic11.e&.
- Sovt.a·t AtUt1.1&te9

So~..-iet. :IM!'W~ medi o.~ 'tnl,11$·
•dc.omi11g' tbR •I J.U.f 't O.f 1>e-cvUa.·tton:o. till Ve caut.ion.e-cf tha.t ttJ,o
~Qn<¢b stand •il.l dot~1M
1'be\.ber tho Aige:rt•.4 problea
vlll b9 90\'Yed by ~·rieuct.1.u.t

.,e.aim or otbor.•tee. ·

T~o aq9'$'J'GJ:l.,.Of

v1..::U e

bu

1'4!\ftai.Ded

deciis·ion to

1

tlw~•

·O f

Aleett•.

tor

ti~

a~ pr-obo.bly tOCllued
nJ>J»r:t a settlcaa~t . p:roVlded the .rttbctla coa ener&e

to

f 'ro111

tho

~tutiol\9
8:Q

tv1i CO'h'\.l'Ol of

ta

ladoP4tflf~.,,
A.lgci.r-la, •Ub U.iilted,
tt · ·anr,, ·Uee WUb ~ct. ·
't'O,, 'WC!!ix!
J

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fnoc· com-

lo :toopQ'1d-

t1r.o tn Ue

FOCO!lVIUH,

pt.rli&. ..

mcn.t tbe-, a 1. U\ou~h tbe Stllll•
lOJ\1;1,l i . rq:ime con ti.D\ICUF to
deriand t.ha't u . 1DCOt :at ~u.10~ ..

K&H"9Uh1U ·~~r9 · 10 re~ ca.ze.aga. 'i;i c1,a!1a to· rcip:ra~ot tbO

l98~tl pnr1111crnt ii.a ·nt lb.I oot
&J11 cro:n:pi~L••· ft:& Leopo;tdvillc ~·~10 ~ e•td tbo Con10
. c·r 1e1a ia "1.D tto :ti:Ml .sta,se•"'
a.nd ba:11 wat"nod Uat ' 1n o deLilyi~
ta.c~c9 ~1li preVlDl~ • .. tbe

·COlllVOfl&UoD ot pmrll•~nt:'' by

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~gc

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(b)(3)

SECRE,

CORRStfT lN:rEl.Ll CD'CC WEEn.Y RBVJW

In ~otriu;~ .

~ ·~auUtiUoi: "i.th 1Vbor.tb6 1 ~
9 ucc~oaor·s l~> IUUilU' O XA u l'lltB.. (t

.Lctol)C>l~Vllle probably tcela
tl\at .U8 8\IJCC~ti i:D bloc:ltlcg
tbo ret1trn of lD'- ?OR~~~qtatl•e
Oaytil to th.o Conl!O .bu s ·trenitb-

IWnonao

lflfOr~ed

t~Gre ~re

iu·

dlcat.ions t~At ~opoldvtlle GAY
oarti~1-pa.t 1on

lq parlianeat. Tba
io k.ntanga
J' Opor·tedl y ha.:1 lmU.CA tod ta11, t
H is p:rcpu-o4 1:0 -ace-opt ,fl -COngo
fcdaratlOll as propa~eG by K~D­
wubu . A Congo'lcaa PQllU ~Ul!J
~~1umv~rate

tuie iotorocd An.~~eador Tlmbrr-t~ko tba~ t be K a e~v~bu govcron9n\ hoe received a ~rogo$al
fnm ltunoogo aM 19 <lraf i:tng a
C0UfttQPp~po8k 1 .

cncd

•bu

itllJDll:r:i*~old ­

W o.thdale on 22 tlay

Dayiil

WOQJ(t

ft Ot·

b~

rotur11od ·to Leopoldv.1 lle

be-

cause ot ~he t11·teat ~XJ»"'l(f• lons
or eoc.z:!::a tsoect Uty coward
hi.SJ.
r e~Jol~
etated
~~II t.

tiobru

And

h~d ag~Qod

b:l·d bean .lnfQ1'1'.t.ilCI

to

rec~ll

Oa:r:a1 .

Ct

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ti~ na~a .

f

5£tlct:71'

the

Congo

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(b)(3)

"TOP S!efta-Jl.__

Tb~

Stanl.e}'v:t.l:l.o· re1111:e--

.conf..roated ~•~b t~e l'Qlt~ital
tb.r~.t. <>t • t~ppr.ocbc:u1c1111· bo-

tweQ" teopoidvH\o a.ad 11.lit&•

tietb.vitle a!Ml 'lli'ltb deterior•~­
.1ng •eolJUlld.e cooditSoDJP tt>
Orhatlile ProvJ.,itC9'-hU n .o ved
to bol::.at4,r UfJ ~U..1.1:.ar1 ,p oautoo.

Acco.io:1,tln1J
tl'OOOtt

tro•

fl ppe11.rod

lbco .

10

prcica 1".0por-t;e , ·

Stan.teyv.1.U~ haYe ·
~'­

hi force in las.a..t

Al~boueb tb~r..

1a no fin:»

i~fornittoa t.bat .Oise~ pl~
11:111 ~l\JOr otteDC11tvc nc't\01'~ ia-

~o·r~opt.:d meaHBQlil f ·r oa. Oizenp
to ~~ ·have IU'Ked t.bat tbo
Ghansai.1 u Prt·S .idel:lt ~pocU te
~1.t. Ul-C.ing ot Sovle.t araa to

ue-

Sfn.ale;vvU~e .

hAvqo bffb onlered back lnio t .be
Al"Q.IL

le<i.U.ft ·Charg~ &b11an 1«1
t.ooJ)OldYJ. lle; who Ol:l ~18 O'RI
:.in:l.tiltitivc· l\JA8 labored acUvolr
on. C.iunsa-•e beh&lt, ant9i:t i-e~enily

that ho Q14

01.Eeaga b.• O eeoush

'l)Ot b~lieve
YOt'1!1t ta

to becolDO pr.a.l .er .
ftAltolllD 1pecubtoCI tltllt i.t Gtzcn-

Pllt't'll!-ttl!'lit

~a porwS9t9~

in

scek.1118

tho ·pre-

.alotSnl;P lie .rould mn~ely- w~a.keD
tbe ·•· 11at~~a.ll9't"' PoS-iUon a.Dd
pa~ ~•

•a.1

for di.;:utorahl.O

~Y SOiile Drzbor of tbe present

't.eoPC>l.d'VUlo ao•eraaent .
.R elllUons 'bono~ c c.be U'lf
And Ka~ •~UM>'.r-ltic• bllvo

lleP,Oi'~• ot IU-l U.ary activ•
i ty to K11.ea't •ll'J"!v to 'h aTO J.ed
~A\P\ll>U (0 fli&C:CI A.ibert 1.alo.Qjt
v.nder '911rY01l.lca~c., tn. · Coct\li.l•

co~Uaut« etl'ained u
Of CRf. llOVOG to ret:&lo

hatvtllo .

lfua1;uiso tt:reet.ea.ed an1cd
U tbe mt aov04 to
~~ ove-r .atrt.1old11 a.t Albert....
v~ll~ aod NyuQfly, be ca1l11ncd
bJm.ol,f to • r0:r.aa1 pro~cn..
of Ulc UM •c.tion a.pd ~ppeared
tUUtiou!i to llVOld • 8UiOll$
ruptu~o wit.tt \lie llN ~llnd.
('roP &'.IPCnBT
jWc:lrou)

A OJ r.eport ha.a al.-

1,.~Gd ·~bat. 8.l;SHllA~V· isoveaAts
by llal.o ojl •• Jt-lloSPl 8,irn;, iaga.lrui~

tt lba.l 09J»mttrt.5 folla.-cd a

ll\ltld~vp fildDcod by a 8'lciao
ni.o ing co~n·v . Ghaa$1lUll UlC
troopsi, ~1cb teceotl7 voro
vt~bdra.-n

fNm 111ou-th91'111 ltU&l,

RWl6ra ot a 'POHltll• ~.ill­
ta.ry croup b ,!lV'O lod tbe aav
t.rulan Qo-1e.t-nmeDt to tatta 89•~ .la.l preoautio~ .
Prl11e •~al.II•
t~r Ali AD1n1 oa~,bU.$bed IL
l'IU'tial ·a1i'Uary al.ed OD tb•

ot 19 KAy, ·a tt·O o.I\ a1
otticial
that, " to _. on 'lie es.at4t

•f'eo1a1

~"' be told IUI ..Aae·U cil.D

•i.•,

a res~l'llC·
eoz:ttrol,
b1 t.orco U aeceasa.ry , 9f 11.•J
ll~OU .ta nor tbcl"J) K.ata.n1• ~ Al.•
t~~ah

resut1uu:.o

I

depu..t.7 dl.l.or ot Sit>VAk, ropo-rto<t-

ly 11.u ~ea :reliend ot. ~.ls cc.ma.ad: ~,empor1LPU7 } be le.h on !2
Ka.J io.r a. ti"1'9 to Israel. G:ci~~
oioa 1 Fti14\:u> tlU"Okbata, coal:l&.Dchtt
o1 the Second tndepeDdeot lnf &11tr;v 81-.lpd,O 1.u. Teb:ro.o, baa boee
filCD~ Ori ...,

M bad ull.ed Ganara.1 Tt~
!BILkhtia:r, folM!le.r cble:t of Ute·

lot 16 lfa7·

far~khDi&

go to t.h:O C&.8Pl&a tor a fav d'.&15.
ll1"ltf11.itJe:r Generlll Ala.v~-Ua.•

t.or Mosso.deq

Orli[lt.01•1lt1oQ (·~VA.lQ, to

l.a,go

(b )( 1)

••:tn:.poc.U,on trl"."

lllltlo~al lotelli~noe · &114 ~Q­

rtf\,.

(b)(3)

bad

au~'~

'Tlei~ed

(b )( 1)

tbat

the Vil•

•ll•" foraer bqei1
Pr1Do Ni'A.18U v.tn.r

UY'ttra.l. JOU&

b~
&th~

~or

iafor:nad UlO

(b)(3)
2S

~J'

61

'!fUILY UVJEV

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Po&IJ'•

n or

27

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Congo: [Foreign Minister Spaak: of Belgium has informed
Ambassador MacArthur that reports of unrest and anxiety
among .t he Belgians in Katanga have aroused misgivings within
the Belgium Government and furnished certain elements, presumably economic groups in Brussels with investments in the
Congo, with ammunition to oppose his policies. Spaak empha(b)(3)
sized that while he is prepared to withdraw Belgian military
personnel as soon as possible from Katanga, there must be UN
. replacements acceptable to Katanga and with the capability of
maintaining order. He indicated that a mass withdrawal of
Belgian civilians and ~echnicians might otherwise occur. If
such a withdrawal occurred it would result in economic chaos
in Katanga"J
President Kasavubu's ideas on the reconvening of parliament in the Congo differ notably from U:ammarskjold's. In
contrast to Kasavubu, who appears willing to seek an accommodation with Katanga but not wi~ Stanl.eyville, Hammarskjold
has publicly stated that a meeting of parliament without representatives of both the Leopoldville and the Stanleyville governme11.ts "would not make sense." He added that the UN-controlled
Kamina base in Katanga- ~the site desired by Gize
for
(b)(~-~~~: meetin
of
arllament-would
be
a
ractical
site.
r'-'"--'-'--__...._""'-=--'=='-";::_.=....:.:....:;____:_:_..=..=::..;:.;;_=-::...-=....o::..:::;._::=..::....::=.==...:=.::...:..i..- -- - - - - - ~
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(b)(1)

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J'.

~-------- ~ 1 June 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

1:
.......,_.,,

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~(b)(3)
:.:.""·.

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-.
(b)(3)

@ections. He told the US air attach~ that the CNU would
continue to function but with no voice in mllitary affairs.
He noted that all CNU members would be allowed polltical ·
.( {areers following elections~ Tansel claimed Madanoglu
was on his way out and reiterated that the strength of the
country now lay with the commanders of the mllltary forces.
When questioned regarding the status of the General Staff,
Tansel remarked that lt would function as before but under
the control of the minister of defense.
The American Embassy tends to view Tansel's explanation as an overslmpllflcatlon of the forces at work and believes
there may well be more serlous_s_traln6-bJlth_IDtbULtbe_C_N
._,_U
~----­
..____ _ __
and within the armed.J<ilrceru ~
ong~®zenga;-~tlU."Wgn

an mte-rm---ei

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

,

has presented a plan to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold
under whlch representatives of Glzenga and Kasavubu would
attempt to work out an agreed basis for a meeting of parliament and formatlon of a new government. He suggested Luluabourg as a possible site for such discussions. Gizenga agreed tv-\ .
to consider the post of deputy premier for himself but insisted
' ~
on parity with Kasavubu in the number of cabinet posts. Under
Gize·nga's proposal, Kasavubu would cease to act as chief of
state until cleared of complicity in the death of Patrice Lumumba.
Dissatisfied with the help he has received from the Soviet bloc,
Glzenga reportedly said he was willing to "cut loose from them
and throw in his lot with the real African nationalists.'' Kasavubu
can be expected to resist the proposals for parlty in the cabinet
and restrictions on his powers. The United Nations, however, 1(b)( 1)
likely to brln ressure to bear_on Kasavubl.Lto enter su.c.h.JlrutC>.=(b)(3)---'
lations

12 June 61

D.AILY BRIEF

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b)(3)

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wou~d

be suitable for. the premiership because both-had been
"too much involved,"!
I
IMeanwhile._,_,S.,.o. _u_v_ann
__
a_c_o_n..ti
.,. ,·,_n_u_e_s_t,.-o----;--,
lin
_ g_e r_.. in
.,.-----,P=-a- r--,i,--s-, -~
While Souphannouvong is scheduled .to le~ve Peiping for Hanoi
on. 5 July."
·
·
.
_ _ _ ___._,
[Mi.litary action .during the past few days has been limited
.to small~ scale skirmishes, . the most notable of which were
·several enem.y probing actions against overrunent ositions
~ut 30 miles nor.t h c;>f Vientiane_]
Bloc air.lift operations continue.__,..o-,--_-.--,e_s_c--.---e--.--u--.--::e,...,-r--r:--,------.---'
·5 Ju:Iy. I
J(Ba~kup , Page 5)

D

: *Congo: rsecretary General Hammarskjo~d .has been alarmed
by reports· tkat the FrenGh ambassadors in LeopoJdville and
Brazzaville a,re encouraging Mobutu. and Leopoldville's Fore~gn·
Minister Bomboko _to undert~e · a military coup ~ain~t the Ileo
. g<;>vernm.ent, possibly this week if President Kasavubu's cooperar - J
· ti~m can. be secured. Ham.marskjold also has reports of the ar- L _,, ,,I
rival of a _new· group of "French mercenaries" in Katanga, and
(b)( 3
.says the UN representative there has demanded .they be expelled.
·
The· secretary general sees these alleged French act_ivities as
·- undermining hopes.for a _moderate Co:r~go settlement a,nd as play~
i~g into· Soviet handsJ .
·
In Brussels, US Am_b assador MacArthur reports _that Foreign Minister Spaak: ·has objected .to the proposed immediate
withdrawal of Belgian milita,ry .~rom Katanga ProviJ:lce on the
.ground that it would provoke· Tsho~be and create a "definitive .
rupture". between Elisabethville and Leopoldvilie. Spaa,k·main.t~ns that. the Belgian. cadres are the backbone of order and
· St~bility ~n Katanga and that thelr sudden wlthdrawal wo~d lea,.d
to chaos made worse by·the possibility of conflict with UN forces
·deployed to replace .them . . Spaak admitted .that.the powerful
Belgian mining interests in Katanga might be "pl~ying a d,iffer...
ent-ganie" ·there.from that of the government, but insisted .that
he needed .firm evidence o~ Uiis in order to proceed against. them.
[Spaclk :.also opposed w~at: he _.c alled the "B;ritish _the~is" that the]

5

~uly

61

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iii

f'C 06541086

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\:congo parliament
i

shou~d convene in the near fu~t_u_r_e_e_v_e_n_·i_·f _ __ __ _ __,

Indonesia: Continuing surrenders of leaders of _the insur~ ·
gent: Federal Republic of Indonesia have encouraged Djakarta
officials to bel~eve the. three- year rebellion will collapse within
.a few weeks. The recent surr.ende~ of the dissident commander
in Central Sumatra followed clos~~y .the capituhl.tion ·of most
leaders in North· Celebes. Negotiations with·important rebel
leaders in North Sumatra are reported to. be progress~g. well.
(Backup, Page 7)

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D

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)(3)

MaJi;.USSR: A c.e ntral m~tenance base .for-Soviet-bui,lt
aircraft supplied to Ghan~, Guinea, and Mali, utilizing ·Soviet
technicians,, may be est~blished at Bamako in Mali,
(b)(1
The French military who now
~-------~---~~
occupy the base will be completely evacuated this month. · Mali re-.
1
.p ortedly has contracted for two IL-.18s and.three IL-14s as well · 1
L_,,1
as other smaller Soviet aircraft for its civil airl.i ne.
(b)(
I
~O Soviet air and groun.d crew ersonnel
---=------~

L

·w

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l

----------.---- - -----'
(b)(1 )
(b 3)

5

J~y

61

DAILY BRIEF

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iv

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960

I

(

'

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

i

support.
Soviet of~icial s who
are working closely ~ith the
Congo Government :wi.~1 probably

Congo Premier Lumumbn ':;J
abrupt wi thd:i;awal of his mo·re
extreme charges against Sec:..
retary General Hammarskjold

encourage Lumumba ·in! further anti:..
UN and an.ti--West'e rn lmoves which
m,ight
receive Afric~n backing.
.
.

and the UN Conunand in the Con-

go bas forestalled an 5nternational crisis for the time being.
Lumumba had threatened to demand complete withdrawal of ·the

I

The USSR bad s~rongly supported .Lumumba illunediately
prior to the 21 Augu!st UN Secu rity Council meeting, In the

UN force.

forth official Sovi~t stateme nt
issued ori 20 August,! Moscow con.:
gratulated the Congolese on their
success so far, and iagain went

Lumumba's about-face followed a Secu1·ity Council discussion in which the majority
voiced suppo r t for Hammarskjolds

policy of ~~ni nterf erence in
the Ka ta n g<~ dispute . His action
probably ste mmed f rom realiza-

on record with its Standard arnJ;>iguous warning tha~ "peace- lov-

nations. The USSR withdrew an
anti-llar.ima rskjold res olution at

:alleged plans to "dismember"
th e Congo were not abandoned.

l.ng countries" would have to
take "othe r s teps " if ·Belgian
forc e s were not wit~drawn and

tion o f h i s go ver nment' s growing
i s olat i o n from other Af rican

the 21 August sess ion when it

The s tatement contained
first reference to

failed to g a in As ian-Afr i dan

~

--

.

Mos cow ~ s

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUL!t!ARY
25 August 1960

CENTP.Al Afll:ICAN RC:PU3UC

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FEDERATION :-OF.'.~P.HODESIA

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"volunte'ers 1

,,.

·a "flood

11

of .

· which".C6uld coine irom amo'n·g· .
·,'-'.lo}·al ':friends-" on other Co'n-

"finent's:- ·as -we:ll a.s from Afi-.iC·a·n
·c:o1.ni--'tri"eS . if additioal NATO,

are

sent to the co~'iiO:-·:. . :,
:-'.·in.f!. coa·go .On ·2~ A.ug:ust re·je·c_t·ect
·so\r.ict. ID:ili-tary- help, howe.V'e:r, ·
s.ta:t.in·.g it does not need ·.Sll.Ch
Volunte·ers frorn foreign cuUiJ.:...
t.i':ies ... The USSR's belated:~--:•.:
"re-·.feX:CI?Ce to tl~e possibiJ.·i-fY-:
o:f · ~-0·1u·nt:e·ers :is ·rem:i.nisc.6-n:-t·."
.~{f· ii:s 'Siinil'ar ·th:t'eat du~i?ri·'~(

• tini--t.5

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the Sue~.. c'i-.±Si;,;:.:_·_issued four

days af):er· the •Ang10-FX:eiich
cease-f:ire was a·nn'OU1iCed.

. ·:

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_.-ctexeg·a
?f

sOvi·e:t
t~ Kuznetsov
on 2o A;:,_~sf o:f'f'·iC:_i:.a'.ity_ demanded
t:he wi~·1;<li;.Wa.1·
C~n.~d:i.an troops
from tb.e .Coifgo-~. arid--ldc?livercd a

statement tO Il<\inmarSkjold pro. testing. -as_' ·1.r.col11j:i.;t:ete1y·· inadmis· .s~bleu ·~i_s·. i?lan .-.:fO:i:'ia :civ.ilian
UN adm-in-i·st:C:atio,n ... to -·give technical a.rid ildinirl.i~_tra ti.Ve- ~s­
sista.·n-C'e .t:O ":tt1e· ..cOn[i:o Governmsn~ .

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, 2~ AUGUST 1960

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Approved for Release: 201 6/07/05 C00016846
.

rtooo\li6;8~4~6~

'

I

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEF.KLY SU11MARY
25 Aug11s t 1960

}'oscow, alleging th'at the
US and its allies would occupy
posts which h a ve a "key s ignificance " for the ~con omy and all
vital activ i t i es of the country,
obje c teu to the exclus ion of
Zaste rn European e xperts from
a~ong the 65 e nvisaged in the

plan and to the all~ged ~ele­
gation of African personnel ~o

Congo to' Ame rican interests and

£o~ce

Brussels has announced
rem~ ining troops in
the Con~o will be withdrawn by
tho~gh

30 August, the Belgi~~ ns reportedly plan to leave behind a token
forc e of "technicians." Brussels'

insisten.c e that the :final status
of its bases 's hould be the sub-

ject of bilateral negotiations
witl. the Congo Government may
prov . ~de Lumumba with his next
.issue.

On 23

a~d

to be carrying A-balco officials

24 August

rnumba probab l y ho pes, howe ver,
tt e es t a blishment b y a nt i -Lu-

mumb a Con g ole se of a s e pa rate

p rovin c e i n southe rn Knsa i.
There is al s o a possi bil i ty tha t
this i s the opening move for
military a t t i on a g ainst

Ka t a nga,

.I

-

.

the Leopoldville area rema i ns
sporadic and ill defined.
Tlie
Congo Senate continues to b~ a
focal point for criticism of
closed dow11 by Lumumba. The
Sec e ssionis t Abako has r e sume d
its criticism of Lwiiumoa, but
appe ars hamstrung
the c ontinued support of Lumumba oy
Abako and Congo Pre sident
Joseph Kasavubu.
'

by

I"

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Pa !;e 7 o f

lU

.

. .... .

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Opposition to Lumumba in

OF ntMEDIATE INTEREST

PATIT I

-

from Brazzaville to i Tshomb~'s
council of war in Eiisabethville.

the regime,but in a ~ governme ntal
crisis it would prooa~ly be

th~ t by e stablishing a prese :lce in Ka s ai he can prevent

----..-+

closing down of . feri,'y s e rvice

French Congo were intensified

the :tribal warfare wnich once
again hns .fl;11·ed be ·i: ween the
Lulua and Baluba tribes. Lu-

.

anti-Lumumba Congol~se from
several . provinces wa s follo~ed
by new a:.r rests ·, of~. Belgian "spies "
in Leopo:l dville ·a~d . l bt the

when a Belgian airliner whic h
mad~ a forced landing at Luluabourg on 21 August was found

he airlifted between 600 and
1,000 Congolese soldiers to Kasai
Province, os t ensibly to curb '

..

Lumumba contintles to
maioifest uneasiness in his
handling of internal affairs.
A meeting in Elisabethville o f

between Leopoldville anct Brazzaville. '"Luniumba-•s · fears 'of
collusion between Tshombe and
Presid~nt Youlou of: jthe former

Meanwhile, · Lumumba vrobably hopes to develop a Congolese Army, both as an internal
security forc e and as a means
by which to force his way into
Katanga.

commander, Gerieral · von
Horn, may be replaced by a
Finnish officer, General A.E .

r,1artola, who played ,an importa·.i t role in org~nizing ·~he
UNEF during the Sue~ crisis .

that its

----

to have been made available by
Hammarsltjold as a means of
bringing the UN Command and
the Congolese Army into c l oser
coordination. There are p r e s s
reports that the over-all UN

Despite his s e tback in
the UN, Lu.~umba probably will
return to the offensive. Al-

~-

po i nt Morocc an General Ket."la n i ,
deputy commander o:f the UN Com mand, as his "advisex" in organizing an army. Kettani appoar5

"second-rate posts," and charged
s u ch a plan would subordinate
the £uture d eve lop~ent o f the

could become a "dangerous
precedent."

.

Lumumba's mos t recent s t ep
to restore the once-effective
Force Publique has been t o a p-

"

...

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tb0016846
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C00016846

I

I
cur.m:NT INTELLJGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

25 August 1950

A Canadian en~ineer in
Leopoldville h~s indic~ted to
-rhe American Embassy his con-

cern over the presence of an
estimated 60 Soviet and satel-

lite

~echnical

Personnel io

LeopolUvill-e, which would probably include doctors, medical
technicians, and aircl:ew members.
The number of such per-·
sonnel
incrensed
~ follOwillg

the arrival at Matadi on 2.2 Au-;
gust of the soViet veS5el
Arkh~ngel.sk With

100 trucks and

an undisclosed number·of technicians aboard. According to

a Congolese

Lumumba

official~

is expected to ask for and receive in the immediate future
~~~~~l!~a/hers for Corigocese

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P.a·;e 8 of 10

CURTIENT INTELLIGENCE \'(EEKLY S!lil1M:ARY

S September 1960

REPUBLIC OF TRE CONGO

The powe:r struggle between
President· Kz.savubu and P:r-emier
Lumumba rer.1ains unresolved and
the situation continues iluid.
Lumumba~ who has maintained bis

rival factions, but to illany observers its actions appeared
to 1£vor Kasavubu.
LumUJTlba
quickly SUill'Iloned the ·cabinet
and

r~ceived

its sup:Port.

The

popular suppori and influence

cabinet accused KasaVubu of

over the police and most ~rmy
units, retains the initiative.
Kasavubu at p:esent appears to
have been rebuiied in his biO
to oust Lumumbi, and 'several oi
his cloSest supporte?s are in
the protective custcdy oI the
UN Commdnd in.the Congo. However, the Pre~ident may be gain-

tre~son for. trying to dismiss
the p~emier and took ;~ver his
functions until the National
ASsembly could discus~s the situai.:ion~
~t the me.etirig of the
Chamber o.f Deputies--lthe Senate
:-efused to meet-- on 7i September.
Lumumba was in c9~~·r.91. after
making a~ fiery atta:c.k; on the UK
for pre-Venting an a"rm'ed attack
on Katanga.
The· .chz.ffi'ber 1 s resolution de·cre€:d tliit the dismissals :of Llimumba .. arid Kasa-vubu

ing signi£icant mi 1.:i.-tary support.

orl 5 September, K2:.savubu 3.n-·
nounced the removal of Lur.iumba
from office after the President's political organization-the Abako--hid put incTeasing
pressure on him to use his consti tutionRl powers ·to get ri'd

of

L~mu:n.Oa.

Several other po-

litical groups, generally repres"entat1.ve of regional int.erests opposed to Luru.ur.tbR'S st:rong
central government, joined in

this pressure. However~ UN ·
troops guarding the radio sta'tion failed to prevent Lum11I[lba

frc-m Oroadcasting seycral appenJ.s Ior ;;-opular support during
which he announced Kasa.."Ubu • s
ous·te::- from the presidency.

The UN took over control of
radio st;;:.tion and
t•.ro airports to prevan·C tlle• outbreak of disorders. Qffici~lly,
the Ul'; Comrr.and was pursuing a
policy of neutrality between
Leopoldv~lle's

were invalid, arid.Ludurnba re-

mained in the poli ticial saddle.
I

.

Lumumba rs cont:ro~l over the
L.eopoldville poli.:c·e \./as indicated by their attitck' en a proKasavubu demOnstratidn on 6

September during

~hich

several

of i:.he mob ~~1.ere kille:d by gun-

fire.
Eis control ov'er the Congolese N'ational Army-:-the former
Force .PUOlique--is le'ss clearcut.
On 6 SBptember ~artisans

of moda:-i.\'te Jean

B01fk~ng:o--the

aanr;alc.. tribal leader' :from the
northwest region of t'.ne Congo-among some troops bro'ught in by
Lumt~C'l'ua fro;n Thysvil1e liberated
him from jail.
Lumumba had
arrested him on 1 sePtember for
~llegedly plotting against the
government. These troops may
str~ngthzn the military position
o:f Kasavubu, wno is in alliance

~age

PART I
Approvea Xor Rslcno9
1· D APR 1976

Date

S of 12

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUGWARY

8 September 1960
w lth Bollkan g o , Kal ouj i o f the Kasai,

an cl '.rshomb~ o f Ka.tang& . Support of the
Bangalese is vital to
the J?:reside nt beca us e ,
l o ng with Kasa vul:>u's
~kon~o people, they
~ ominate the p opulation of Leopo l dville
and h~ve f Q~ years
comprised about 40
p e r c ent of the f ormer
Force Publique.
.\!any of Kasa vubu' s supporters within Lumumba' s govern-

ment have sought UN

~~~t;~!!~:r~~a~:~!u-

a tion; Foreign Minis.
d
ter ·Bom b ok o, t ippe
-:>ff by the Congolese
chief ot· staff con,
cerning his imp e nuing

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asylum and then joined PresiBelgians, America11s., · and other
dent Kasavubu, Senate President
Ni\'J.'O elementri: .wo.u ld .stop their
Ileo--Rasa.vubu's candidate for ·
"evil man·er!ivers." -.· j
.preniier--and two othe~ miniS.
.
1
~crs
at the President's home
Such· criticisms raise the
)-lDder UN protection. This reprOS!JeOt t .h at the . ussaj will enliance on UN protection, particu- courage and su~port ne ,~·moves

larly if followed by other Lu~
mumba opponents, will provoke
the premier to try cjrastic meas-

ures a~ainst UN operations in
the Congo. On 8 Septe mber he
demanded the withdrawal of all
UN troops from the Congo.

East European
propagandists have given strong
s upport t 'o Lumumba in the wake
Soviet

a~d

of the attempt e d coup. Radio
,1to s cow on 7 S eptember critic ized UN authorities for "cpen
interf erenc e" 1 n the Congo's 1nternal affairs a n d for "hampering t he est abli s hme nt of law
a nd order," ins t e a.d of s uppor ting the country's "lawful ~o v ­
e rnment." Another Soviet comme ntary claims that the situation would !'undoubtedly right

PART I

by the Lumumba regime aimed at
modifying tbe role
i~e UN
:forces in the Congo. l?reviously,

of

Soviet o:fficia.ls had suggested
to Lumu111ba that
call for the
creation o:f an observer group
comprised of representatives of

he

various African countr\es which
would ensure compliance with
the UN Security Council resolutions, but did not press the
proposal because of labk of support from African and ~sian
governments.

,

i

Hammarsltjold has called for

an early meeting of th~ Sec ur i ty
Council in an effort to st op unilateral aid from the ohtside.
::Ie was presumably re:(erring both
·to Soviet and Belgian a ctions.

He also hopes to secure approval

P~ge 9 of

OF HIMEDIATE INTEREST

12

~~-----~·-

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_

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMll.RY
8 September 1960

:tor the disarn1ing of the Congolese troops.

their Soviet crews, to. b ecome
involved in actual fighting.

T~e Sovie t b loc h as b 6Cn
exp:!.nding the scope and size o:f

Other Congol ese t r oop movements indicate that the ?..umumba
government i s planning to move
against Kata nga secessionists at
an early da te . Lumumb~'s !Prces are
reportedly moving toward the
nor thern Katanga border through
Ki vu Province, but an invasion
attempt must await the outco me
of the fighting in Kasai.

its activities in direct s upport

of the Lumumba regime.

There

now are well over 200-· bloc · personne1 in the Congo , including
hi g h-level economic delegations
:fro~ the USSR ~nd Czechoslovakia
whic h reportedly are discuss ing
the possibilities of economic. ..

aid with Congolese officials~
As a result, agreement s providing for larg'e -scal e bloc econ omic and techn ical assis tance
to the Lumumba g ~ vernment may
be announced shc•rtly.
.
M:e~riwhile; the central government is continuing its efforts
to regain control of secessionist
ll. reas in _southeastern Congo. ·
Savage but indecis ive fighting is
occ tfrring between the Congolese
Army and forces of the t ri bal
"lllining State'' of southeastern
Ka sai Province centered in the
town oi'. D<>.ltwanga. Battles ha.ve
t aken place in several villages,
a nd hundreds
persons--mostly
B~luba tribe s men--h ave been
killed. Te n Soviet IL-14 aircr~ft have airlifted Congolese
troops to s t rengthe n Lumumba's
for ce in Kasai. Moscow is , however, unlike ly to allow these

of

aircraft,

w~ich no~ bea4 Congolese markings but have r etained

. · --

!

Tshomb~ may be troubled by
dissension among the trib~s in
northern Ka'i:anga. Missionaries
who recently returned ! from the
area report that there. is wides pread support fo r Lumumba·, and
mos t of the urban centers are under control of force s : oppo5 ing
Tshomb~.
·

.

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P agg

INTEREST

OF IMMEDIATE

P.\RT I

--

In K3.tanga , the g overnment
of President Tshomb~ has had
little suCCHSS in broadening its
international base of support.
Tshombe's mission to ~es tern
Europe receive d no prqmise s of
aid, but ·nine tons of :a rms arrived in Elisa betlwille on 7
Septe mber by plane .fr 9m Be lgium.
The Belgian comml\nder jot the
Katanga Air Force hopes that by
November he will be able to purchase six armed aircraft and
fiv e C47s suitabl'e fo'.<' paratroop operations. He !also plans
to add ten pilots to the present
total of 15. .

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CONTENTS .. . .
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Introduction

. •
1. Fact• m•sJ:tng ••••• , •••• t

t .,· .

.,• ~·· .!t;:
. !. .

P•i:~

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2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , ..... , • • , , , • • • • , • •

,lt .

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2. 'the two flichts •o Ndola .... .. ............ ,rf. ...:.• : ,; .......... ...... .
.
; ~';. J. _,;: •.
:-. Tb.ft accidnt: . . .......... . ........ . .. ........
.:' Accident t.fteory ......... , , ... . .... ; ...... . , •••• ; .. ~•• ·...: , : \ •••• •••• •• •• ••• •••

4

,.1·: ··· ·· ················••

5

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.
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5. The aea~n

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14

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The tn¥e.stt:11tsot1 • •• , , • , •• , ", ..... ~ ... . , , •• : ' :" • • · .: • ..... ... , •• , . ... . . . .. . .
'9. The Unto,.. iho•iottt o! piton • ,.;. . ... , ••.• , , ••• ~ •~', 1{ .; ; " • • • • • • • , , , , , • , , • • • • •
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17

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lLl.UST.R.ATIONS
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On \he m;:lu bi:iwccn 1!1t t11h :1nJ the '"re ptct<y ... ri abo11t ;,..1.ac happened. They
lSth Scpicm':>cr 1961 :al'I airpl:lnc «~hcJ uy the ~:xidcttt. 'WU due m miljudgment

11~.>J' NJola in Nonhern Rhodoia (ptcscnt -b)' the pllo~ and thty QR also upb\\I\ bov
<by Z:an\bia). Tlic plane: - & DCGB own• h DlM abou1.;

co! anJ opcmcd by rht SYdislt <:lurur • . No more lltr~ to~ sa~d before onr con•
~otnpany Tu111:Ur - C31Ticd 16 penont . cludn 1hat the 1nvemgu10t\ 'WU llOt
·
incluc!ins \~crew'. None of them suniivtd. uid the rcpons 'lttrr no1 worxtd <>11t 111 a.
One oi the pmengcu WU Dsc .Hamrn:U• propff wa.y, .
;
>kjiild, Secret:it)' Genual of tho uniuu!:
No tObnM WH 1hr •«idet1t •nn°"nud
. · · Nationt.
_, _-- ;~ · ·:-0~-th~ rAd~ than 1 """.°u -ailed b~-a-~
T!ia ~c;cident <aui~d src:1 pvhlic (Oneem: ·f llpct requesnn1t my •1ews on Oy~ g 1n the
anJ rumouNo vere 1m.mtd1a1cly set about; ·Congo. The re..100. 'WU th~• unu . • fcv
1: 11"' ~iru~t.ion c:i<lcd for a 1horo11gh -inveni~. months before the acddent I lud bten~vi;ation ~nd n resolul1: aod_ final na~cmc11t. _inc. u c:i.pt~in Oil~ pbne. ch:1n~rcd~~ ~he
;o> to 1he U •Jsa of the acc1~n't. Ai tt ,_..,
U1111cd Na~1oru, Tho ~rme. '\lth1ch'1mpli.cd
"cvrt ::iimcJ for s-uch a ~ri;c1 we :ue to-day_ _-·ttaiupon3c1bri• of UN offic:1:1!5 ,.as nmnm t!tc nme p osition u if there had ~n 1!0 ' tallied by my ~rn~ny - SAS - for cu1e
in,•rstigation .,. :.II. ·
yr~. Two mo"tht before 1!i. .Ndola _acci·
On the ~111.cr hand, npul pilots "he de11t Treneair ·ioolt. over with their newly
tuv< nude A cuefui nucly of the 111bject boughr D°C"4B,

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1lfrtt ln1own t0 be ln_varl:thly mon 11nor\tioJox :u the pl.anr1 1n11:hr c~1cr control :irc:i•
without·11tior
or in ether<'""
w"hcn i •fli1:ht pl:tn hiJ beet< rcc.:ivcJ a"d
.:o:n1111unic~rion. WU mainuincd with the
plac-e o~ <ks1ina1ion rhe plane appmal. at
anotltet . ~lace somo . rh~tt hun~rtd imlu
11way uU1~g for, [Qn~u1i; 1nt1nm1ons.
Thr 11 ~ 1 urc of the civil air OpctMions
htini: ~nclucird by urcraf1 11ndtr ch~rtcr
. to lh._(,•. l,Jnit.-d. N;1tion' W~• ol»en-cJ by
IPALPA {lntor;tational Jltdemiol\ of Alt•
line Pilo~s Associuio111). ~t 11n tr-At!' A•
er>~grcu ·~ 1%'2 a rcsolu11on WM aJoptod
whkh
brou~ht to 1he l\Otlto o( 1he s~
rct.:a1y G<ncrnl ohM \IN, ln the re~lutio11
tPALPf. >tron~ly .urg~ IM 'UN ,.J1er1
oporatinu their own n1c:11ns or air ttanivor•
t r.don 10 OPor•he in a.ctlW'dat.ce "ith JCAO

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lCAO i1 nn iMi1ulio11 u"Ja- iltt Vlllm!

Nntiooi. !.' · · · · ·

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tcnrillni of tltt llii;l\1.
ThC'lc ~circu11m:inccs .,.. IMAUOftcJ by
tho inv.-" 111:\lnrs, hw1 no CO!ftmtnlf nrc"f/•
11rCf1iCIJ. I ; • ..
• •

Oi1l se.:uh1y 111~1\lm }Ult.'r~ ·fh~J
fly:.1i;~ - ' l'hc.. fll~~c _wu. c1~1I. .1 he pil1m.
"m: utuad with cml p1lor • llcuecs re-

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The V 11ltc:J N"iocu 111~in1., incJ !\ lari;e
Out or 1t,,nspor1 Jim ·aft in tht Con&o.
•nic UN oir ni-cr:ui11nc, l1owt-vcr, 1!1<l by
rar not mci:t ... ith ii"' !CAO $t~111l~..1s,
Wlic11 UN vb11tt ;ipf>C~•'<:•! O'fCr simoonJ·
ing "~·~. 1i.~>' often w r.itltutc1! A hni :ml
10 cirr.~1Jii~d ~vi~·•c11. Tlte UN opcl'lltions

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l:alk!itt~ 11 · -_ W:4t Ndu l~,. 'Tli1i:-pi1M i11 COITH~tAnJ di1! 11111
rm 11~ ii1 01ceorJ;1.11cc with dcar.111ce1 i;ivl!11,
~ilv c 11ic'. i'.11rn1it1"· 11dil~ a (!li;h1 pbn, 11~
1
.Curio!( ff~hr continous raJio '°'ntch i1 was, howcvcr,"porn1:kltd to -do to-l>ut lor
111,iiM., li•<!•I, 1m.il i11n r.-1mru m'f Arnt 111 rt- rtll\lh: t?'1;11ha,,ho11r11- 1'.IO rct·~lll't1l 1111 ~,i.,r.
l\llbr iomv:i!i, an\1 whtn tlac nii:ht pro•
in~. '!"he fli~lt~, wi1 11111lc:nnltcn wnlt nu ft~
~~ 1 11 1i1n.1u.:h Jiffcrel\l ~m1
n1r11111i·
pJrcnt j~fum"\io" ·oo tltc wo~1l1f1 w n.h·
bllily ji h turnctl (lVtr from flf'IC C<mlnJ! don'
c:oul• , l'ott lllt>IO lh~ll -~fl\lt fiolln
lltlil 111 rlw Olhrr, ' l'l1m• l'll'(~o!urc-1 fonc1Jr1n . ~fr~r r~ 'kc:nf( Clllllltlo.'tll , ...fin t<l l'I~'\' w,,I
ury 111d l •vcrywh.,rt• they 1liJ .., h1 1%1
ni.1in1~i11i-d. /I l11ri;c 11lW1.'"""' 111 M r11:..1 " 'tt
""'' ;., J,(ri..-;1 whh ,:11~ o~crri1111 - 11.c
flowu 1Yi1ho111 Ptly r<•nmi, oth~r tlhln '.l'f
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mem!>c:r sutn. Anioni; oth« tt.in~ mcsc
The st~t1:•or affniri of 11" 'UN 1.ir open•
rules inaply th.11 die pilot iikt 11 flijtlic pl:11.11 ti0n1 i1)' tl\c ~~1.:n ,i> no1 JiscuJJc~ in ~riy
h<!fore '1\\oQ-off. Vitnl.i11f1•t1Mtion front the of the N1l11f;\ rciioru aldiu~i;h 1htt wuul,I
-- mi:ht. pl~11 ;, tmttmlmJ !O at! ;@trOl ·• """~ b~~ll 'prapcr: . .
·. 'il!l"ilt rh~t will M a!Ftc1~J by llic. mct.1.
tbc "1ecido11t flir.ht .... by no n..i:an1 ~II
." ··tti.SfJ mi the flii;lit p\:\n ~ clc~r<\11« it · exception fto1n \JN ro111inc. The \IN A;,
, · prrp:1rc1I Mil 1r:i111aniut!\I ro '"" fli~hl ht.- ), Cummii~~ h 1 1.~o!Jvillt •new o.nly, ~S
· (ore 1~~u-11H, 1·~1.~.urr, .:limb, :ihltudo · '-."mi110M tlrilH' :10 1.•kr"11ff thM 1lc111natu111

<,

One. r"~' i11111·~fi.1tcly mack 111e ~, n:· was 100 hourt ;11 monih. A strict adherence
:: ; j
muk.::bln 1he <itd•lcnt ()((1ltt"'I durinc
10 1hc ere;,, union's <lircetlons 111 «i fri;i.•i·
.Tl.c" n ii:ln;. The cri\y ni~ht flyi11i: the SAS pilou nwm d111y 11nd minimum ren li •1'1Ct mada i1
,JiJ in 1hc Cuni:o 'Wn on the bK p~rr of .o11tcl'lrt imrnuH1lc \0 i;tt i1110 the .icii:hbolll'•
flii;h1> boun,t for the home b~oc, Ul)f'olJ• hol)lt of !CO 1111un ti m1>tt1h. 'rh~"~tcet~!:'
_j
ville - ,, l>-'o:l! ~11i!lpt"d . lUf'!Kln.. Odll!r h:i~c col\1c iMo lnlni; in 1h1 lnMc1t _o(
· ~ .;:
nilll" fly i n~ """' o:nm\;lcnJ 11. hn~~rJ :u nil\ht •a.fc!ty, :Ylrl! p1c-~cciuc11t rll~ht
pt.Jiu lli.ls for n11vl~!ltlun .111J lOMftl\lnl~· tiinc of 1lte Ndola ernr rmmlx:n it not
cinu "WC ;n'11fficir1n. Ar~n ftom,,,~11~, ._A(mlllllC\I ror ih fttl)' or rht rr11nn), Th~rr
l,11..li11i;' .\I 1111knnw11 11i~~1s dut~~~ilii;ht- ...>~ nn Llc"ription _wh:1t10Cvor of d11\y n1td
. .ir.: nc,·cr fC(1>m111rnJ1li11:. ,.n 1li~·Ncluln. l'l:it 1itnc _ 1lurm~ the tln1•• prc<c•li11~ d1e w ___
•'"'"" rbc .1ir.:1.1ft 1y1i.c wm1 qui1c new ., ntl riih-nli·:'l1rt> .f.A11tdt hi11•~..~. 1:.\ tst 1l10UJ:h :
;,, ""·" flrinR ln Alri~,,. Yn 11~!11 (lyi"ll' ;· n"l)o'-. 1T1111u,-,1C,.f11t -~111il.n hnn ltnlml 11111,
~!
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l"" m1o1 •yitt•I~ 0 11 lltr ni~li1 l!C' .-:;·:. . l>llfln-11··•he 20 ~IAyt lm~•llourly 1,..ro,..
f..r..- th~ ~ ~.i.t.~1t ~ llii;hlllll l~tia.1\1:>1h•ill11 ;•W ~ci\tcu4 .llio a1J'llo1 flrw 1~8 hn»rs, Hir
- ,..;. ~·le. -r1i,... ~ dl'l!\!11111.'""' Mii llUt Jis· ·{l~!1t'ititc In /\~un 1'<11 ll? hours. or hi'
c1M1M'ti in ~">' o( 1ltc .-C(iJChl rtporis. •. ~
I01tt ~.,. hOiin ~7 wcre.~on~ on flight duty.
(h~r fuu l3tcr Cllnl~ OUI, The pilots or
There is :fell.JOn 10 bclic\'O th;i1 tho m~jor
,,,.: N,l..b l'fCW h~.1
n in C'<ttlt of lhe p~n
•he ((('\If 1lid ~ h:1¥c Qrty .-.~I fUI
~Jii:h1 time t1mi1,,1i.n11 l'm~rib~,1 hy 1hc
tl11rins;· 11te l.m 36 lu)(lrt priur 10 1hc 11cd·
.-s ...-~.1;,11 Ci>·il lk1.m l ,,f Avl.triu11.
limit t!ein •
·
1!i~1.11c.t "'~ $ 1~5 houn a mo11tli. 11ic lii'llit
. A highilr Jhan J1or1111il ulilr,11.1io11 of _1hc
P.'~KrilM:oi by th~ w111 v~:on ";rcunen1
pilu'! i1 prori\able for 1ho company, and

<1cupt

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,
· - . ·· ~- .. . ·; '. i· •

··piy for prnn houn.
tn 1'JS9 she Swcdith l'ilou
Jiscovem:I .l tui;o number or v lolarions of
die oHici:al . flight u~e limitnioM 'Wlthi11
Traru:air. Tu Board o( Aviation had faltcd
ln it1 wperviiion of iho cOl'llpan~. h failc.!
l&ain rcg:irdinc lhr C'1~~0 oper.iuOM i11.
1961.
l'cr'°nal d~u i"cluding nh11ion 'bac'k·
~1w11J ~1111 wniliiiunJ uI du1y durlf!C the
d•y1 P="dini; the ~~ident belo"g 10 t11y
accident ."'~L ~".the Ndola repO<U thi1
lnfonnauon 11 in•sur.;. }-fad lt been there
the report$ wol!ld have looked otliet11t~.
h had ihcn been nccmary :dt0 \0 iriveni·
K•tj the pOJ.Sibilicy of crev emn.
·17 !"""' y,u···11ie -...orld atp1.1Ad-avia1iua l• ta~cd
~ 1 in ;ic~ordance wi1lt corn1110"ly •ectpte.l
.f'lllCJ. 7!me )1.,vo bcro form11latrd by
!CAO (lntcm~tio11~ Civil Av~iDG Ot•
~~nizntion) ;11d rn:idc rc;ulatiOM by t!le

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iiri..~ tliem- tO ~pcr:iM iii ·~<cord1_11~nn1b ~ -~ !tn,:abo-1~ lntfldmlt4 eo~ittonl :Ofi'liahi ·

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~ii ;1it te:olailcim ._-Gt,·~r itnposaible; m -'~"- !ass die uC11' at lu. O'trll cll.cmiOlli: ·: ::.·( .::'- .->:~ ~ ~/u•C\( -.ii Villa He11tiq11e ln A11tola. l>c:•_'· "'~"I: c•cr 1.slkc 'f~nc~11y~lla. Nci1hu Sa~rain rrot!I .f1)'!11g.
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, ~ottd. I~ p~no m c-o ttVcrc-dugt'r• . .- _~ ..;-_ .._ ~ .; ~ ~~~ -_;;/ -. pt~;, iig""I .,..~, made: a11~ _th~ ~1''°" •· ·11sliu~ riot ~dol~ h~d ~·i•cd any ~ti1111
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~le Ni..,.tt11 Uopoldv1lle :ill4 Ndoli by
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., .. :clocll~; :."111• ('Arrit\n of 001\IC filed c(·'. ' -:.'. F~ig~t plan fo~ l'ldoln. fll&ht ~ o~•:-: ·. . ·· .-: ~ :.:.
l.otd Ynt• ' rtaI lhniugll 111 a twt1ne manner a11cl m ..<_· . ·:i .
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cloaQ11rQ IL• dei«•hl UI ~~

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t;,7

!ttt. ln l'Yl!I• .

:o\ltitVJc• arc 1111\'ll)'t. ginn .,..1111 ttlc•
t~. 1!rll le:w~I. 11" o!~atlon of
N~ti\:: i• 4160 ~~1; 1'1)'111 ~ ovet NJu"1•• 11t
"',, .
:i1tu11d:e5tcd ahot\lde «I~ 6oo.o feet - \l~ing
.:: _. . :.:. ;.-.·" :. ·Ndol111 :r.t1lnmet 11est1nR '!- dui ac111d

·;.,:, .
" _.,

·

:·::~:(.
J~.-::·'\~~t

1l011

m« .:tv

_:<:{t..

:-:;~::>;~;:;~j;l::.!:;;:S~,ei~~--211111« rhc! ildoJromt ;, mo f~tt.:'.~;~< ·:.' ·:.') ti~j:;';/'J'l:i.: .-:tilde~: ..,ulhcr :'W .. line ,,it\, II()
·t;~,::::. '/c::'.:'{~1olllh.·'ilijitlfiM1ollt i11d.c; "iiil1ilhy S 10 to

~f.{~~: . '.::._: :;;:;ii,;,1.;1~:/.~Jlit1t ~: Wilt blo•lnt fr01l> tltc
. -~iJ',1:; : ,;_;:'i;~~~·':11iW:'"iii:lllcl~:\lllltt bnJlnc ~m to be
~~~::' ' ;};;~~~ff~'j--~~·'. .~::1!1111

' ··

,:~r!~A1~~·~·wew«saiilt.ly 1\111._;ny. ,:~'.1

""

Ni!ol•'•

:.·:~~k~f'¥f+ -N.i:.-jfflillot._s,~l!SY :uktJ for 1.\e.tC111

·:·~ :1j-~ .....: ~:~.~~~J:t

~mDl>'t'

I

.i,..:·.i~l1:
•·.'·J:~'.!lu . :M_-·:. ""';,~~ ; , W..... ~.
Ndol~ tliite " OO)S).
222~ • '..:·:·:·,

'l1mc
11\1ered to

lt •••

l~ut
.

~:.~1'-.~'L
:tt[ ~t-.~::~:!::-.::.,"";~~:~
.;:.:·.!~~r.:=~.~~.;:~:
·· >i~- ·_. ~j~[~
t~J- '"· i~~·
-"'l"~:sr~i rln!i,~J. ~ ~11nl'itn1nti1>1\ uf 1he-. ;lhil'W1~t

- -.. ~ .::, - .. - ••&.11
~

'Nd11lllf,~\~•~U~P:"

(Jl

nnce 1nform:111on ~bout tins alr.:r:i.h which
nto hm1u lucr ftrrl""3 over Ndola corn·
Ins from thr c.\it. SllBDY dcparttJ u\opo\dvillc 45 dnutC3 IM~r tl1en CORIC
aftJ arri•etl owr N_Job I hour nnJ 3~ 1111num 1fm thi' !anJing Qt 001\tC. Al·
thougk It "'" 3Ct .,. (asttt, SE.UDY uwd
1' •/1 \011gcr m,111 ifmc, 'Tho ro111~ u.kan by
SE!lDY h~s \ic~1\ TtlOn~rvc1cd r.nd i~
shown - ~J1np~reJ 10 that of 001\IC ln rii;. 1. Jr i1"' \ic 1101tol 1h~c SF.DOY flew
throui;I-. Nairobi l'~l11h1 l11fotll'l"tion l\t~ion
wltho11~ r<>ponin11 .\hi• to Nal~.

r.~;-~: .':ri~::>~ " _. t!u1:Cff«t, it..,., &elie¥'ed ...t Ndola·•lrpbrt
_:: -~~--';-: _.. \$'t~. · - 1~hMt . Him111Mtl)a\ii_;: -Nii•~-o" 11oatd.

.

~

~

S:1lisbuty S:EllDY gave lu dlntir1a1it:>n u
DC4 and place of clc·

..~ ,_. :·.

\

/AN

·

Half '" hour l,cfore tlit landing ol
OOR.IC. Salubury- -Pliglrt lnfarmadbll
Center ..,,~ Cl\ll~ by ~" airCflfl lde.,tirY'
hlg itstlf u SllllDY and a.~kbg for inlor·
m:uia11 abciut 00!\tC. On rcq11i:t1 rror11

'!he

_ • ____!!lfB]Y__ · ·
- - - - '~ORIC
0

or flight,

Y;; ~ ,fr;.~~.:~.~:~L;.;ili'
\.:

lncl\ld1111; S11fabt1rj
: _- {;:/ ::. and Ndola ..-· i..- about tht tllgln k·
:-~;{ _ -_lorct-cl. T!ie Jihint landed witht11.11 Incl•
.. ~:-~:_
clmt at Ndolt afw fiu ancl a half ho11T1 ·

: ·'.:'. .- :
~ ~~!

; ·. .

· .·
_ ~ _:; ~-_.. ·; :: ·
) ~r:N Ti~A l AfF.l_{,f: ~ t!:})V~t,JG; . _

f~

·~~ .:':: <.- ,::~::" _:'." pt11'2! con1tol '\1111u._-

· ·• · ! y· . ·:, ·

-. ..

(

) - · _§
........ 1

~

1

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·,

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.-..·a :~~,;[~~;;-<

. ._ •·
t

Hovrt:--Minurc:
Milct

;

'911\L\llil; i1•e
11i.tu1., tow~r coolrul\1-t tt1•cc •'11:1111111~"1! the
n1 1im~er scnln~ ~"J 101,: thf 1)1~ne 10 te•
port wl1e11 ri:~chhll, 60~ (~ct ·
Munliii1ll~ C,01\lC we~ i,:cttinl: rc~Jy 10
13lii! i>_fl

rOf .~h~lou~.J ~h~I·" to S~h.ibury.

Thct ctinlfollcr ~..,111.i hQve to sec 10 11 th~t
'"l'~miiori-wn• tt1:1i11.1niM•' hc1wccn 1hc 1wo

-:.iTcrafi.;:f!u '""1;Mp<cti1111 SlWl..)'t 10 CAii

·~ R~in ttpc111i11~

' °"°

feet. He wo111J

1hc11

- itnio fo1mic1ioi1t for 1hc awnmh. At he
dit1 ll(lt hm irnm 1l1c pb 11e hf cnltcd i1 RI

:!.115, There •M nc ""~wtr.
001\ IC l\nw hncl i11 c11i:in~1 r11n11h•i:·
Sl!UOY wo• '""""C51'f11lly ullo..J 1cver:1l

:~~; ,_ .c~r:if'U:e iif lil\-~ti\fly !If~~· h It Vi:ty p~O- tim'5 \,011. f.OM the Uf\V~r ~1111 lr11m
.~;;~~-~:\ -b:a\tle tit1u . ltit_,:~tentlon .,.•• 10 -cofuf .\n OOiltC. '11.c roimollct bclicv•,I 1\1:11
- ·/:~ o•~r ._Ncl.ota';'.Jliii11lrl 1cHht 1111tw:i1 .ntll s1moY ,,,u aomcwhere well br NJolo ind
W;;rtd~il. tlhlt~de at1c\ apeed in or!ler to p:r· 11~« 6000 feet, · M 2230 0011.IC was
. · ·:!(f iW111 -a::~~~I" 'llin11i111: ~itttsi•. AflP~ch clm.:d for ui..~orr 11n.I l"mucied to ~ly
'-<~ 11 ~,idlnir •o1tlJ ~~ 1 lioc jun A n1u1inc us1wanb !Lcc11iai; below 6COO fen ~1111~
·riii1!:W'.-;!};;"·

..

·-

..

.

"~~ Sin!-~~- orlgltl~ll)"
· ;~:'.lit?.'r> -- · ·

.:

· . ·· ·

cave'· It~ tttlni.itv.I

.. · ·' ·

in tlici .,-lci11iry of N•tul~
Whac

h~d httppc11nl to SEllDY? - R~·

,

I

f~.

--.- ·::;:· :". ~=,~~~:~-~::'~.:::· ~r:~~~~~?;:~n~.~:-r::~;~~~{:~..;::;:::?~~:~~~~'.~~}~:;~'J~~'.·~:~~~~;:::'..;~:~~3'.~~~·)"J;~ ·:? 3:.·:~ ;:·:·-·:.i

!:; cf.I) flilll~ tt~ OUI oC thG quition. ln thri' - .runl.tt ddtitty;Now ilia P™'~ ·-:~. ll'11iln1i . -,.
[:;

(.

;.~::'<~:?·~ ~",:~·:::·

:-:c.

.
=.'.. ,~~ ~·<·~-·

._:·... . ' -. .. :~ ' • . . ·:.

~.

-_.~ ·.. ·:.

C-tte tl~ p!Afll! ~old· lia•e Rl\lmrd "to the" . ..; t11d w"her• ..., ino lH to11nd? . . . .
. . :.:~·;;;;·~.;;;:: ~
\II.at dt4 mtdeitt ~ •t llt), .thl'H:
ail"J)»rt. ll! h• !.'9t ~11ii;t1c4 altituJc•. 6COO . lt n llOt t;) \II! -..unuercd at i( tht: 1e11Td1 ·'. ' ··~:· · ·; :. ' .:.:: •. '1111\lfttl ahtt "lM Int rMl10 <Dnt~Ct. When

f.i' ·

f tt1, .lw:iitin~ ?ii;ht Jignals.
lrcm !'.1~0111 str.rtocl luilf•hurtedly. Tac
f··· i!mc h M hii;h tcr~l11 .iiro11nd NJola. f~~t al~,r:ir1 w~t ~t our at 0700~.The .ac•
l · ~ v."!J"e 110 ob.tNCt10t1t at 6000 feet OP tlVllY mcttaitd dunni: the dat. AJ It wu
:tbovc. A.' 1~ pl.tnc ~ ~bovc 60C0 f«t It ~(ITTed 1h:11 Slill~Y had mumed to ,11c
,.,J, ob-<t....,.!1 u.f~. At !1m die cotitTOllcr. Coni,o0 - whet. 1t pnibably y'41 to be
· tltlhl;ht 1h:1~ the pilot ltad changtd t~ found - the 1Utch wat dircaed'illwar.i.t
[
c;uciw;y .:ind ~1 iryinll to coruaet tome st1\:: . ·~he Co~eolest bordtt. It -wa1 a <OnlDlcfc
rion in tho Con~.
11lrprl1e "When the ~ttclu1i:c •t uto by
. There: -~ h<>wcvc:r, a lo~ic:al :answtl 10 ch~cc Wlll fou11d 9 1t1ilrs .....et or N<lola
~,! ·: .IJl..
L . q•·••1iim'ofthr wMrnhnun nr c;<"DY' · .;.....,...
_._
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.11'<'..:itl ntt

UIC

lilcv1 ·US7 f.-:1
Dnt~M" (""1\
·: • ~y; 9 !Tloiles

...·

!\n.lio

R111iWftt..:'·=

b~Qln

Elow1 ·.
4160 fcr:c

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:·: the-mntroll_
et called

·.<· alrudr crashed,

~~.lli it :1p~.11re.! ~··ithout· ·prior · noiificariott
'The
c~ation of tlic• accident
lite ,..u
~-.· ..
.
\

I:{ :u.w.t~ 1 1 ~.cly disap9ur the s:nM Y~y. ll . 4l.7 feet a~d lt w~1 J1t1n~ 111 &!tolaie
!:. }ml prob2bly i;ooc back to the Cotlto. · · ·
bwh. The at1craft ~ ~Atactt.d the ttut
Tbc Ndoi~ ro""ft controller caull!r.ed : . "~ ilotn1al angle of drM~nt - .:i~ ) ~
•.
,
.
· .
. · ·
,
.
·
~'lC comro. CCl\ltr s ' Silisbury. At 23~1.:....~ - heild1111g for Ute :urpc!rr ;i.nc! liMd
• 1
· · _,
alt··
• ..i.
L

rcquat
oe.,s
were orig11•11.tn1
to . :' · up ,..m tne. t\ln~y.
Spttd and attitv<le
,
• si~ t -.,.__

.
1
n:,ev.a11t .a1rp.om. S:i11, outy, ~1ns~m!tt.,t!:, . :1111!1 bee11 llOnN.l fot •pprouh.. Tiu: lsnd·
1
· - . J .L. N..1-1
•Ill~ .~r ..,.
~
-n:!pon•c'b'I'
• ny, pttm11u;o
""'
.,., a co11......, aoW11 lltld Iock~, I laps -~ ior

.
,
• '·
.

·.
no I!. 1.r to clo.e '"' ttauan. D11t1ng die n11:nt . :lppr~h,
all
4 nt111es ti~tl been ckTclop·
.
S2hsh\U'y .and Johanneiburg Wttt... bUJt.-- -..;!'lg:.· po•cr
a11d thor propellen irerc ill nor·
, u•• b . • ·• .., ·.·.· · •mQ) pitch t11:11,:c.
·
uyu•~ lO eontae11 int "'"'au\ onuc:t ·111t1e
.I
. .•
.

··
'··· <:o11~a. Rep :~ fra111 Cotigo a"fl'\11' wero
"lMo thm alttfl'ICl~ts o( the alrplaOG 'fftrc
.,


<·. f)at rcce1nd 1111t1I 054•, It rhrr, l,.eanl(' !0111111 411tl inveatii;aced. Corn:n faltt\dter
-<"id~nt. chat "n .:icci<ltnt miihl haYe hap• settini h.'ld 'Men tiocd.
·
flf"td 10 SE!JDY.
Tite technical inn1tigatio1t did ntM 'ftflii;ht tafrt! ~lh £o-r CO-Optn.tiott he• vc:il any m.lfUllCUotlani; tltlt could have
t""c:n1 ,~,., p.•!1ia- nr.o!~r cloo.•
caimd lhl! acadi!llt.
_,
T>line. In tlti• c~~ tlw nci>li,encc -ef.. tM
. All · CYidfllce foW'td pointed 10 11 llOlftlAl
-p;l"t .in ; onm:111if ol SEDOY. wu mattlio:d.
appro•ch hui11i; ~ doM .am! that the
on!:- by thu o1,1lle-air T.raffte CiJllUOl pcir-, airualt Wiit undtr fon c:t1111rol 1>11til i1 liit
sor.>1d ::111 Uopcl~le "\lt!hicli uw die p!aiie , :tbt trca. .
.
ui.e .off •11d ~ncn ioolt.' iloo in-t ,in in . ".;.irfllm wttdit1 (ound It wu m:ablit~·
·!• . ~ ·<= i::;<;
· '
·
1j;
.
~ ... -- .. ,
'··' :··· ..
-.;,·.: , .
/.,
'",
· · .-:·· :.;'"< . . , -,;·:
.,,.. ·. ··
t

· .i·. :.·:' __:
.·, ::,. :~ · :
-: · .: ·.' ·
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:·=;.. •
:. · ·
.:'
• ' ••
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.. :: , .
..
i~

·-

'
,

SEllDY ai :.1215 h h~d

Suenl witnen;c1 -..t~ ~ncl who hAd
obttrveci 1lir plane utml 20 OI' Jg ttt0ndt
Mfim die crash ~hc11 it •ppatt11d1 W'ectr
Mlaw tl~ir liM of vitio11.
Accldnt
tt ,..at esc•blishcd tliat S!:Bt>Y In {act
did •"e<:ljtC a11111'l'roull
Olllr abnormal
things being that llO rtpon: vu Rivel\ at
'· 6000 f.- tll.at dlinl1i 111dc
!£It and the
••,.
,.pproatli scal'tl!d vichoot a ~lllU&nce, and
lhat !he airtnft In a viwa\ dC'lcenc!i11.. "l'O+
.
or
cedure 'Wat brou•ht too' loor.

.. i,..:·: · . ·. :
1

0

I I '\'t. .. : ;
rol!!ld ,th3t Sl!llDY hsd I'"""!
ovc~ NJ,,i;j. ~Om\l•il\S: fro1n th~ ~~rt, hc;J.
i1111 for ~!!~ '"di<t: bc~con two n11tl ~ hnlf
mil~'t weit. of thll, ,flcld: Tt h1cl t l1en 111;Jc
a " Ght tu~•\ ..10 -; north-"W~rtcrly he1.!i1111.
:\1'1~ 11f1cq l,l)·h?ll . !n this . ~ir..:aion fo.r :
wlu lc m~<lt ).1lcfti1um. SE.llDY 11~,., In a
pmcm 1i.1ii!nr 10, th' instrument ltt-chrwn
procNt11~- 11r!~d\)!:1".(1tc fig. 2),
· I.'.'

lt

N

t

1

:JJ 'I

·., · ·
' •

(J1

'

".!c:sc~iulm~·i:
was1..,Jei! 'ihli ma be
• •
,
••
y
~n in
diccnion •t 1il·\ Mg!, ra10 of dcicct1t "'at
m:i.intitintd. ,. • • ·
="DY ' : • __, ' Nd I
1· .1.'
"''"'
~n""" oYot
o a eu 1tt m:m
d ..a • ....
I · ud "l"L • •
t'Xptct~ an<> "1U1 ex«s' a ut c. , "" .,
· -'1c:itton
•·· , tnn
t.
.,_ I
L
11.1L10 :an Ill<>
u1e ast pan or .<n<:
.. ... __,_ ·
'"OO•·r
h ...__ __
1
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"~"'" """"' .110 uu
d' ..a ... o
L. •
d
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• ; i:ct may no """
I
no" '" 111" ~- o.vuutr - 1& 1 not m10 ~at an.mcrutmc r.tte,
·
·
d'ff'
1
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· v•rv 1 1c11 t to eit" a111, .,.. 11\vet11•1ton
W"nen .•rp
·•-•'
--'- t11rcr:i
·
( f 'W··••
0
_,
y

..~nQ.,<n~
... II\ det•
., lllllst have betll pondtnh" 0¥et t~C "UHc-•
""'-t• m•••t t" ..t it •••
L~d -·~•• ,,, _ _.
· ,


.
"
, .,
""~ ' " " ':"'" · ""
• ..,..., •r"'"
. ·.· tton. A' noclung tt 'IO~ (ol)fld In t110 .o.cd· Tht _..,,;1 ·., · h.ivt beett ljp tO N
J
; .~
.
". .... 1 ...
'""w mr.,
orm;i.
·· ..mt rc""ru :l" .....1a11at1on., "vcn
nafe.. O - ,· "'-It~ cJ 2• • k·
... ·
:·. ..
r- ' .
..,.
,
"
!'u• •ni; ~ <>l'e - ""· no~. "' 11110
· !n ~he la•t ndl~ ~rt it 'WH 1tate~ tha1 "'.."'. ~l)l!~dl(nr. l:u1cll114: ~ar •lid fhps ex•
11'1.iurmf1 ~' •~ dcteeht. The iihtmet~r
11em1on is . 16~~ lo.cf~ 'l'o lilted eff e•cc~•
.«tilng 'Hf d1eca~. Conseq.w.tly tht r.IU- ~etd t~~· ~ft!&ft. Ii \elil 'al (Dllll<Ult tU!l•
-'Jltetcn ,.•re \lt1der control. The tower con· tude ,..~h,.p()"!'~!~~f, :ne protedurc may
.. ltOllrr rtquntcd tha pbne to re_po~ •t 6000 h•ote uk~n ,4.0 ·~mi,nO. m 1hl1 calC!.
:: fett wl1ieh ~'" n.elinow!edgcd by A '.'roger". .. . 'rlic 'IOWCl\~l\ttoll~ tle.,..<t ' '"" SEl'.IDY.
' 'The conclusM>n •> l~llt 11>htti S!l\DY ~·· . 'nie potltion .( ,hho ~mh Jitt and the time
_porm! OYcr NJob it •:lt alibv• 6000 fett chiJJi.t:d bct,rt"tn th~ 1lur tlld io mcu~~e end
.ie~c!Kling.
1hc crash indtcAtt 1i1ftt the 1iraaf1 h:i.d 111s1
·:'. The •tut ·e&tinuited time of arri"a\ trnn.. ·:: y.u;cd tlic'. Hclio bct1t011 w~ 1he !:ur remiitflflroin SEBD"t "'~• 2220. Thi! actU11I ji&rt ..,~, tntad1" ·•·•·:
nrivsil w:11 :tc 2210. /\timing of dw: dtscc_r" ·· · Jf ·the r.ulio ba:iJ" w:l1 pasted at 7000
· JO Iii co be d~wn ~t ~ ftct - the lnlt1nt .· feet or ~botc-'i• m:iy very 'll'dl have t~ken
approado•lutude of NJola - ten MIJ'lutt•
up to two 1ninuici ·t11 con1ple1c tl1c r!l'l<'.Cll t
~· bo1ore arrival 'lloulll b<1v<! born ci:m:mcly
10 .t.000 Mil rr.lucit the: tpzci! io 165 knots.
. bill! 1iirm~111hip. The ~ir~ft :mi-.cd tC11 11~i' ·wouhl:lm..-c bo~11 1hc ca.., w!1cdw the
..;l!iinuic• before iu e1tlm~tc, 1'hh it ~nothtt descent wii1 '.;~ 11 ;,1 .:11 hi1:h spml or slow :11
.:'· in1l~~tion 1hat the :thimdc "'"' ih t>~ecss of tow ~IN'cJ~ . t· .
. ·.: 6000. /rec on nrriYA I,
11 ri~r r•:wi"~ 1hr ~irpurt 11"' ~i,..·rnf1 w.i1
.,,.,: · Whtn pnsition 1cpom uc 111ntlc durinc hc:1Jcd our o~lr nn•1i11inli~l>i1cJ, cc~1plc1~ly
. -!leicCrlt a!titt1dc in()i~tion u UJ\l~!I)' give11
bl:itl< :1rc.~ wi!h• 110 41round rd cm•m.
u e.g. "BOVO feet desunding to liOOO", Jn
In 1his situ~t icin R c11rcful pilot wont.I
·t :·.-.. 1h~ l;ut rtpnrt from Sll!IDY only chc word h~vc :ukc:.l for ~ c!c.tr.incc 10 return 10 1hc


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t:: -' _.:..-_- ~·. .:. ·:._,:-,~-~'?'.?~!··1: ~·.'f~-:::::··>;·~,_~,:~~~l~\\:t;~:~~~t-f':·.: ~:~·.:;; :·=Y;~~;t~F:;:.-\:1}-.\+~~~~0.~~~::,~~:f\;~:"t:'i~3J/ •.. (.: :;~--:7::-~:-''.':·..:::· _,: ... ... : ·,:. ~ ·-· . . . .•
~-.: . :.~i1.:'1 ,1 .in .,,.d~r w:Jl\al!c -A llOrl'll.lt l~ndini: :-i At N401a. Thi• IYfH.~i· ..p,;;.;;,;,c~:~~ilt' l~r
U) · .:ir~lt. He "'_oul.1_ no doubt have bte11. : g,~-c:uiet ~ilot 1~ill,
-ai'kp,lt ' CO.:opcri-<

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.: ~~:·: ·:'.;:"·(~fi~t:~dhiocii :.;:,,, :14. "o•en:~.~ or ~t-,.l;lbt· .

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'
~-. cl.;:,.reJ ~c:Clrci1ngly 11nd 1old 10 repott on UOft ·~ 1ha p1lou
M'tC m be very
· · .: .. .,. · · • A d:u1gCtOU1111t11•tion Illa)' h,owevtt ari.o
·.
JQl\'n-""'"'i k.;. Ha -wo11!d. then ha"c m~~e aiu1w1\I~
.
"·:
if thd approach i1~111 fo1e wcatller 1.nd
.
~ !d1 :urn ~cl. to , he f1tld, muted \ht
Mey- pilou ..,.ollld "have a undency to
"the runway is visible co 1he pilot, ea~cially
.
"" f
d! L
dd
I
.f ... .
'
.!c•.;cnt at 6 ~1..v. •et .;,n ct tne 1ptt r1>p .um1d-d\u ~rt of the p~eoure whel\ cl:c
·" ~
•. nc 11 n~ informN ~n. the rHeeu or op~u. When Cffdtn~ the rictJ. he .~11~d b:l.n • :Ur_cr~ds flown.llUt fron1 t~e radio bcaon.
··:::~
. ·llCa' m.111io ... if.he ii ti~ .°" if the app•
·.~v.·crcd ~~~ • lmudc 10 c1mut, bel~ht It u dtffl(\llt 10 Jl'dsc th' dmanu ttav~tlccl
, .•
~h u m1d9 m ~ liumtd 1t11n11tr, Tha
t<tld .:lcv:rnon pl11t 1200 fut - !~ dns cast "when _the runway is behind and ~nnot lie
pilot may t.~n 1tnd IO conarunct 011 tl1c
S~CO fut. ~c "'ould h.ave potmoned 1ht saen 1.11d - :after surtini; the turn back runway lii.htt, b:uc h!t jud,in; on th.t im. r
.>
• d I
1•-1
l
. :i.m:r:i ' OP cl)'llln•win Ct; para ~ ,~· ~ ~c "the ri~M! .i~ nnr Ultoe co find hirmtlf •lo>e
·.... •
JlrtMi~ he: geu from ' ' - ind .tur~an!
Nl\W.:I)' fla111 ~ ·.:It 20 -d~t- -rruuimutnnc . :aM! b1g'h "'hich wo11ld lo...:e him IO . in:allc
.. . .
the aliimo~. Dy help or fat~ imprcuion1
.i •pc:erl of HO >tnoll. When :ahem rhe f'\Kl" .. a ~H~ final t!accnt.
.:
tw inay_th111 get tbO lo,., and hit the cround.
~"~>' tnd he would have low~N:~ the b.nd• : . 1"he :i.lti1udc i11 thi• cue being ~000 f~
!
M:i.ny_a;;c:Ktc1u1 h:a•e ~urrcd this w.:iy.
111i:; ~c:al, soon afttrwudt ttaftlll!! a de.. . - 600 lcrt abo.c normal circ.'llit hciC}n _SE~DY ::'uhed 9 mi~. "1Cu of Ndola.
wicl111i; le~t hand 1 uni_down ui the J'llft• :: ,.;:. • famw dt:t.t ·~y ptedispou 1he 9il11t co
..~
At. tlus potnc 11 shovld 11111 liaw bNn •I
~y. This " w l1lOit m~rlc: and s•fe r:ie- .. 1;Cllen't!in ·lie ;$high.
.
-:''-;:.
~ fecL Thu. •en i"dicuil!M ac 1he
thod ol :tp?r~ there 11 :ind every p1h:it . :,:; ·:· "Sooft :af;er·itarting the li:ft wtft dnipaiot · :>'
~ si111 . dt•t SEBl)''t might jlltf h•ve
i• ir~incd in .it. 111!1 crew wo~d have had .:':· &~o1N. rul'lway in sight an<l triu 1~:-mun· :.:'~I
COll14I OlitcOf iu li:ft tur11 •hen it hit die
p!1:111y of ume to p~re ~lf !Of \be .. ~at th...4!m:i.nce to it. 01.rin3 daylight or
gfOliftd~ fl~~ .-wue at to JO ·dci;rim, 1n for
1Mdin~ ~nJ ,h.! fin;.,! !lpproach wovlcl hive - lf·"fly1A1: over ll H11l11ed uct 1hi1 m1y .Y •"f · ::;,;::
·
~&UI appto•~· f,.. aU pt'Obabllify c~e land•
hrc11 n1n1lc cl.nr 10 tl1c runw~y d~ i:n:uly .will be J1>1111, lh1t" the con11l1iom WWJC QI . · :~. ·
.:111s· CC!lr ltcli \iccft ·tcxw11ch:ll ancl tile rla9f
<-lin1in;1cini:.i,hc risk-lif c.ronou• J11tli;~ .:::' N1lnl" the ttm1i11 bclov nnd ~tw«I\ tllo \~~:~·
..:>"*·to 20 dq;ttt• whc" the! left UM Till•
·
· · ...,.. nlrn;tft ;inJ tllo: rvnw11y w~1 in cl>l•'t'l•~ ·i!~~;!·
:·~ IUfltd, fl111pa .l_O ~•ini; bctw JS'lcch:'! "t •
in hci~ht,
-:~
01h(r r ih•u wnLil<I h~•o .iu\ecl
11
Jarl11m•. Under i uch ccmdi1ioM it :1( irn· :t:~;~::
:.f(. later s111i;e. When s~nDY:: w:u CM1tbri11.,J
(lur~n~c to m:lrr an in11t11111cnt .:ipprl))(h, poltiblt to ;w,e 1he disr-.n~ ~ltn ;'111)' Jo. -.::
·,_,·frOfrl the riufio bncon t11Cf piloc flew On In·
Wlicn ['M»in~ rhc r.idio bacon they wu11!J
gr~~ of nC'.cur~y. 1f d~ccrit 11 SfQrud .1hc ;.q}.
~·urunteim. his'"°"' likely tl•~t t.c was abla
h~Yt 1ut nc11 <IS Jci:rect ri~hr 10 a nunh- ."1ltl1otle •houlJ bo ~ct~J 'olrhb dacft11H• ..._;~·;f;
.· ) o 1'111\intain hi'1',llltfujjtc: durini: t'hit llQl!C
"'~'"''Y l•c.\<foti;. Afrn ~~· =b,,.ls tbey i11i; 11iS1.i.ntt tn tll( . ntn'il'~)'. A11<1 \1°1t1lci'·,fbo · ..
/ rif iht •PJWOlidt th~" t~fu •heft hr i:ot the
w.111lJ ""'·c .tmi:..1 i . ~rt 1fflnJ uirn ·h:id1 :1buvc ~d:\11!<l clma1mt.\11c:e• it wns c,ulto ... ·~i:;i{
::~nway in •ltbt.
"' 1he liclJ. l~11rin11 thtt rmaJurti ti.Cy . lmpoMihk tu f11dl(1! 1he \icii;ht.
., -!
. ~\~'.
.·::;) ;\ll'hcn Si!SOY attl~ed rih NJ111R, 1l1t
"'' mil.I 11.w a ~u111pcJ t!1i: kscc11t _:lt .6000·
A mict :iJhcmiee to dte i111tnJmthr ':.::~k-, _
., ,, .:.'.:-"i~Hiura af 1t\01101onriot flylng w;o to be :sue··
!cc~ ~nil lot tht ...-ii 1lrop 11lr, /\t 1 6~ .'· llf•11~h p~l11reo Wlnll\I not rnoft n1\tell ; )'1 ~}::··~<· '· :_. ...ffod~ \ly the fw.m!Rlltu e>f vfg1>rou1 aiwl
knnl> n~I" wou!.I h<1vc been tet to 10 de· -:. Ji((mncc, Then it ;, 111ppim-d tbAt the air• ~ :-.1;t:~::'; :.:.: ,....·::: p-iso activlc, i'cCjuircJ For 11ppnn(h and
i;c;:c.s. Afm 1l1e t11rn b:ic'k the ~ctt IQO• . ""'" is flown Ollt from tha r."ldio bc:icon;nt " ...
~:~,·,;._'bi\dini;. While the captain .,.,3 flying 1111d
1uci1t 1u m11 fin~\ lei dnw'll ...,!l;,1,1 h\\n l\}\pro2~h 1rccd, M,\ '" the prumluro· i• ·, .~J-;'. ·:~;. !.":- .: ·· :gj~ing 1he ord~i;. 1ilo .:opilot W:IJ to nmd
hn'll juJ~•1: by o111er'Jint: the ri;nw;1f timrt\ thl' 11ilu1 kno'Wt t!lc •lin~11« from.1l1e. :·.:)'.'; .:~~ .. ,
rM .dic!cklbt. m11ke tht 11cceunry mlio
• lii;lm.. The ,l~·~rnt w1111l1l h.wc hc~n tfaru~1I . t;1,li11 bcncon cxprc'k'<I iii n1inuu:1 At1J II!" . .. !;; ;;{:.~':~:~. , ·..., to1itocl• 11nJ~:~sin the c4pt:ii~. 1110· fli~!it
hy lowcri11i: rhc b 111linr; 1:c.sr, the ~i,..~{t · · ..-n,,.1., 'Jnc i;rt1c111t iuc3, huwcvcr, .lt that : :,; ·~· .• ·.·
'1. :.otlll!inet,. waf tv en•~~ the itcnis c~llcJ liy
\\'otilJ Ii.we l>ecn liiic<i Uf with 1hc nan..,;1y 1 finA I clc:sce111 J!iuuld he mncJ -.iiheo in·'.
•.
. ·::die_Cltpl!oe "dfld rcsponJ to otden from tho

:c~pmlsl at.' ° ptl't"er 10ttir.3s, gear and flllps
:.nd 1hc alti~1e11 carefully cbeckcd d11rin5 ' boll1'1d and at 11 di•t••ct from the 'ru1Jw1)' ':
final ~J>prouh, Durin; the proctdurc 111rn of abour 4 ml!~. 11 i!loulcl be st011p1d *' :
;.szulngi. .
the aircr.\;t would have ~n a1 hr away minimum Qlrin11lt - field elcvatil><I istlis
:"·.The pllke arri•~d earlier 1!uin expected.
r"...n the licl,t Mg tu? 111i11!1.
soo feet, in 1hi1 C:llC 4700 feel. 't'hit'ilftl.
;h it 11Ctilblt tMt the captni11, co~lot or
. This is th~ in11rumcnt ~pp-ch modi· tvdc $hould 1>~ kept untll 1ha mlio bca~Oll
EliQlit en11in~tr "''-' not ' nicd in Iii$ mpcc·
•. ( 1,-d for r.i~ht ...,Ith Ti11l)I rcfc~nco to ti.a
h:u bun p;mcJ lnhouod and until clofC t0
:
- "·d•e ~hlon ai thu tn01Tll?nt. Al\yw;1y, the
it,TOund. llnJ ur tl10 pN:~ailhl& cimnT1Jt:m• · th<: rllllw~y. 1i1e prtK~uro Im bccn'.Jaid
. :· ~tly, 11rriv;tl 'WU 1 111tprko tt> the ~tcw
•en it """ crruinly Vic fa"ctt way 10 b nd dO'f!.h
approach unJq bad :weather
~ ~ . .:i . wnich mi11ht :auo ~Ve M t the b.Jr&in of

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tliit ll)~~,~:ic. of th. tlii;li1 ~ihlch R~d

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be~. ~~~cl:t~li~ • 111 d~ rei:ulu m~nncr
Cll111cidc~t."lt~ 11ot111al piuscnccr nltht.

Wh«lfto th~pofition-ovcr the r~dlo bcuon
had bec11 c;1~b!iil!fd the cap~·1
'd h
,,
n lO. ' e
.:opllo1i.10 make rho radio report. At the
SAIN! 1i111c. he ,Slatted a riclu C\lrn to a
nottl'l·l',CJ14r1Y. heading. This action wu
quite oorl!\.ll 1'(~~hcr he intended to ma~e
al\ i""r\111\eftt .spnro.sch or 10 • • L
. ..
10111 1nC
Ndob ; holcllnc p.iuettt. He ordered ""
copilo1 ·to . re;d ~Ito Dtforc Uflclini; Cheek·
liJt. Fl'lim t\\c moment tht ndio bc~con ,..~,
p:\Pcd 'im~i'.ch~'~ircnfl w:as positioned on
it• new,h~lnji u ·aecorid1 ~bpted. !n diii
time ,~ position r~~t W.:11 tlladc uid the
:r.ltimct~'r. 'C:htck~d; :Th• uptain .11trmed
die d~cj!At al' 6000 fen ind srarud ·IO
blccd· o'r f· ~~ecri·i,~td by 111ainuinrlll: die
a!tirutle·wfdi i ' J- ·powcnc\ting.
lt le poniblli·'dut ''" opl.\ill •• •htt
m~u 1PIJ •41w Clljllloc to rtpon chat
6000 Ii.ti! bc~ 1mcbcd 1111J to ulc for per•
n•i'>io"··to'.•noalie "" iqtm.tnmu :lftproacli.
· The c1•pit~~·~vt.~ -11"1! j\111 m,,iJ• n ~ron,
tho114;l11' -.li;t·' ~o• cwld fitst ·tomplctc cite
cl1ecll lilt"il~til the point wlioni d>c l:uwlinll
l\C.:lr l•"taJ~ndcd an1I poKp(,HcJ the tnn11min li>JI Ct-ltr·.lnwn•Y.il,-1Mlw•vcr, 011!er~
btf"Oi'l!'-lie •hihl itM" -11111 fat in tho chukllu
Riid'l1C1,\lm1 cnntin.;:J wlth tl>1: cbcc!..li.n In
Iii :miti~blf lori:eitln~, or funhu pl)n po11·
I~ his r~\llO·l!)tjSftl:"•
'. Con1!1ltiMi011 ·mun be ~~en t0 inc
fatig11c of IM er- ""'"'"".,,ho wer~ flOI
prtjl:m:J to. lltideruhc the fli~lit. 'I11c 1l11m
of · fnti~ur 'lir( tli"incr. There is ;t ilovt
Jo~ ili .ii'io~r~l ,wor~. Ahh11ui;h tl1i11i;• aro
licl"l: ·it~n~'•lo"wcr they ~"' no• 1.M:i11r: Jone
more c.•cm~ct.' 'Whc" the ;1ctuci,1 situation
dtm~t1ds a~ionl' •t.• ti11c llO f11tt th11 lllCn•
1al WOfk b. lcft behind the individ ~~1 wm
.11!ip aetiOfll ~r ponponc 1'11t1'ft 2nd h• ..,;11
Allill junir '.!O conrh11io111. In ~ud1 Q sil!!J•
tion 'nythin~ may h~ppon. Wlll!rc 1cvMI
pcrsOM, ll~ i_ovolvot! C0-<1pctatinn m:ay be
ruined. , ' f •
1'hc f1e11 thAI S£BOY Ji..d bi:tn d~red
9

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;·: JO'Wn .co .die, :~111tiat ippniach ,Aln~all~:~r:~ :::nlltf~11 t~ tu~}"'. ·a~t· wlii ni~~.if~-.~~~: ~~;=fi{:~:i;~~~1;f}w\~irolft\-; 'l't11i··~ltitf~fi~ ~ ·ditconeJ -~ '. · ·.'1'11~ l\o.vd or ?i1-.~tlK~1ioo ~t111sitted
. NJal11. :iflil tbat thttt w:i1 t111 ndt0, corn• ~- ./Th~ cot\Jitlora, ~tt: tJ~( :fOt;;.u :OJ'ridl'?.?.r.:'';":·.::"'·''.'{~"..1 3 · ln•me reyoft o( 1~·lloml of lrrv.mii;ation. cccl1n1al 11ml ~pm\10n~I t'llpbm, lt ls t i• •
. m11niaiiu.n- wi1h OtMl.I_ mii;ht ila•e' made,~: ··;illusion. A concnbun'ft b~or 111ay h~~~ · •/:'.:',~;:: :. /;: }:'. - Ju tnl. tt!'O" wu diO 1>1;;1 oi'I which the dla•hn1t how tl~ic ex.per~ brin; "P 1111Ut• .
iht , 1pt~1n unrc tlut the.re: ..,,, .no. othst., .'been clult the Ndola nrn'll'iY 11 wry n>,... - :· . .
"., : h ,. ·
lid ~i
h Ped
tct 111 the abovt 111ent1ontd ~lid at tho same
m 1ff..e 11ot0uind. lt <s ~iaitilc tl~ 1'c tA~ ;. ·!!'GW. Dcceltratioo'in fotw~td ~;ecd anJ l(• · . .' · · .
· ·"
earing. wmi m .:
i _e
eta1 1i111e 'follthli0hl All lft;i.ttcn clfdka1~ 10 11~
cd to 3UR tke. approuh, compl<te ;t11 'th.;.~ ".(ckratlcn dOWY1.,,arJ1 due: IO. the turli > <
' ~- - .
. . Ccnlrniuion or tnqil!fy •'"' tli~ UN Coln· li!Jln on the 4ccidtnt. On•;, /on:cd to IM:·

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oj)ttp:lf;UiOIU for l~nd\ni; and ·ihci:i : jart)•;,.,!r:~\nbutM 10 11 <ornplt1e wnaory ilhniori ::
·.
pett th~t ~ ,.;u Oil final :ipproult;: Sllcb ~· ::~--~ich made tnc ca.ptain believe th.at he -wa• :'." .
;r. ti11c ot :Wion w.iulJ .:om~'idc::Yi1h ;he . too ·Mi;li. H~ orJmc! "Fla.pa JC", ~q>t d~ ".
\
du....il'lg Up of UtC whole fli~l1t.,,aui .a1JO ,pDY.!mttlng l!!W :l'1d W~t .inro a:'.lc1(Cnl :
J
wim ~ 1"$tir,~y of: wi.~rn U).~~'\1'-e.: :o~ 111Gn~-ci!J.1\. ~000 f~ct -per miiw1c. ihe co•.:
-ap«o. .., l1:1J 1l~cR h.. -cp1n1on--ol .i.~~r,~.J!:T·:~ --cncrc~ f11o11ed ..,_~Mo:lt ~e : . ·
~rtUl)! scrvici:s.
· .,, · ;'.::.(:: ~;:Mimctct .~l\d went 0 " with d11t e'h«k.li•o. · •
' . _, 11\e ' '• ' •
"' r !\ 1
d 'be '
.: '
: ;:.. . . ~~l~•n, ~·
t 'G· "• tncnc 't
· ·• · •
i\f_ur ~s !IC(~ on a 11Gt1h·wH1er!y '.. ~'tlltn. !•ne up_'~~ otrcrafr ..,lt'h' _rhe .Nfl: .
.
110
~~mi: tl": =·p~in s111ncd a lcfc ~·Du~ . ::'Wlly•. D•tn~ a:i.tuficd tlm. 'he 'WU "' on
.to 1ns..rfi.:10111 .. 11p01ICQU ol '.he llit'tRlt:.:. . coru~t: ~ltdt J>Atlt he ll!Ql'~•e_d pawc':t· ·
t)'pe he du:i~ht rhat he ""~ qv11c
~~;".'.-, ~K«Pl~s. the "COrrctt :apprc.'\Cl~ . -~ hi ..: flln"A·~,-. He k,iicw ,,e wH prc_ny h1g~: ~.~ .;~l!"fCbf.;!'wcd.'thc noso ~f. the urcraft,. ~nd . .. .
befcl'1: th<' tUf'I\ ''"'' ~nril or IOCl)lo.aftC!~ •.;:du11,; actll bc1ni: t'ha "ICtlft\ ot: '" Optlca!
. . " · "· · ~. ' ,_..-., ... Iii · ;~~tl
,·.
wMJ• t!tc ~ .wtH1o"'°" w 1'S:A~.~.!':., ;~\l . -~ _.. , t'hc., 011pcaln ·d,11ui;ln 111~ )1111_111'>. =~
d1cn w•lctat .,C~r Jown" nlld ~!*\~~~ :~:.µ~rt')ir~u 'fully uf'c when it :d~en<lcJ. l1tt# i·;
He 1n tlic •rccll;Jn1p'funl1"l"CO: l·otl:IJ.~~::<•t'Mi-r.fi>inld. .
,.,~. :.. §:f...

minimt, the t:amc dltcv~Oll i1 t0 bf f0\11\(f
in tlie npom o( tlioe l'W'll 'llcldits.

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:J.l ~' Mt\lf..ll 1r 1>J1c wor1tlu~ ov~ the in· . .,,,jfo. 111UUW lta•o nwn•t:-i ." " nrr1.,.11l. n;ttl- '. :
j\~"""Y or d•c ~.loin t~('f ~ontroll~r n_r.
l\~ from N:.loln. Jn llus lll>l~llC'Ci . when ~ ::
I
1« ih~ ~r.!~h.. :;~,1, R • hlle ,,( thuu~ht 11,
fh:tln WC\t • .1~t11h~<I under the knist 11!J. '
h.w.-...vcr, \.l;l!(C<I •'Y 1.hc . TAct tlut ..~11' 111· t>ntl~~I \'t'ltl<h tl<ll\I thnt 111"'11~11~ Jh1>Uht h~vt!..
''.·.uly ~ '" 1 w~ wlu1 h.'IJ h.11•~ic.J . J\t:1h~. lin:tl e:1.~crly ~~!icr•c•:· ."'1'1 f.itlu~hullr:;•
1111>1.· wl.1•11 n · ...:curr~~I, .:1~t.1 Jc111 :Yr.1s ,1Ji, l\..1nllnl\ 11nd h!.,abc1.w1llo Jh\'luW hl\Vl! .-.
· '·
, !.i-i
tlw (\lfllrnll.'t \0(11\lJ tlii nk ..r. \1c llfl.'n ~Pl (lfott l!Ult1 Ir W~I ktlU'\1111 th~• . .
.111..! th~ R110J,..i.1i1 11ir 1~ffi.: ,...,,11ml -s'ta-;:; Sl!JIUY hQJ bn<k<I. Nu1hi11s uf··tho 1un .;;''Yi•'C pn...:~1letl io A•-.!Ofll:u~ wid1 t.:i.-v1J '. k'ippenccl . Alhl Uop6tdvillo dosiid iia It:\•.: ;
.
ti""' t1i J \IOITll in L':lte of li~tt!tl'11p1i111\ of" tiun fur tf.c nii:,ht cn111i1111 ,1c1.;\y in tho ~;;:
"'"""'""1ic:uio1> whh , ;,,.,;\f(, lola t ri1lci,m: 1c.:ircl1 for stnov. TI!C! ln~ttcr is llOC •~!\Cf! :·~ ':
i• Jir...;inl t.-v~,J, the ~h1lllni3h iiir 'lt:.li•
"l' in ihc ncd.lcn1 r~poru. ~ .
-~~ .. , ' . ' .
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.' . ·. o? llie n•.hcr. 1m1..l 1111hv11h1nl1 11'.ll ,.~~- <.: :' ; .
The ~'!If'"'"' or ScllUY w~s ~ul~ly fl!6t.i1111 ,,, 1110 the 11 r (~Hie conil'6t ser.icq at'fi.'.:
ponsil>lc for the foct th<1~ tho :icciiltM "W1ll . bcln; c:rl!leiMd. Tha Uritislr J-tlsh Commis- .. ; '· :'
not im~i.ttely diMXJttred. Ry st~tflns tho ·aiM cr in 1\bodcsia 1tnd .11jii Ndol~ Airpurt .
" "
IJ>flru.~ch wi1hn111 a clce1rnncc, '9o'hl•out nm\~l\CT were to rcctlvo· Mt 'H~mmnr.:,J.;: .: '. ..
c~ -i:Mni: nmi~e, h~ p11~ \lie wht1lc ~· ..-ekj8icl. Whor1 he did I'll!( Affilfi!'.•iity ihoui;ht : !: '.' :
•'1l1'iry sy>1U:1>1 ®t of fun.:tfon. Tltit 111~~" . thl\t Mr Ha~mj4i!4(l\iiJ ch"ll~ed hit
u R'1t diK~ 1>y the i11v~i11-1on.. •' . . ; .. nrltul (or polmcl\I ru1911J, .•IKI rtturncJ 10
Untkr ordill:M'J' d«tlll'l\Stalli:et Uopit1~·. ' .•i-e Coneo. Thi idea ..... <011,vcycd to the
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lie.a that tho \\oard cf Jn"''li~aticlil Mm!d
bctpokc d,panmc111,
,,

• ·
.
Tranu!t i
.
A1 the time of tltc 'Ndola aecidellt t~ id~1nlfy a111l e112t1r. SllllDY wi1h0111 be!n11
ownrr of SEBOY Traimif Swe.!111 wu In · o'b$ttr·1 w-IJ ":ave L-•·tlltre111 \v ' 'ffj.

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an c:1pa111ive state. Openlion for the Unit- cult.• "'!'(ci•ll)I ·:ta-kine i>110 consideration
~ NariDn1 had jun 11:aned al\d """ to bo me unccrninty ... 10 the uprcr~ 1i121e or
gmtly inc:rcas.."11. The comp~11y "'"ii\ 1.li arrlnl or StBDY. To 1'hoo1 the pbn•
rcooomiully icn1itive siwati°"' Agaltist dQw11 'Whho\rt t9'vin' d1esm•lte11 jiltot e( _ __, .. . .
thu bacl.grolnl4 one unJcnand1 die anin oick11cc WG11fd have llccli i111pouible.
·
.~ .. •
$Ian plated by the: COll\j»Anl' in toMectl<ln

•.
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'r11.11 normal 119prouh ptllrtn noWll by.·
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w1.,. I tc 1nvc11111~t 11.
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.
-~"' • 'll4ll Mt "' _, " ."" .,rnc... or ·";,· ;.:· / ·
'The SD'."c J:iy. :it the :iccl~e!lt wa1 kn~vn ilut-1.. the c111t111l1111 of l~11tllr:a tiear •ru! · ': the pmn!cnt :u«l the n1i:hc openuion, f'npl. U ~Inf "'e nttnil"'t lU'lll.1l1t pla"~
, m:'l111\.~r of 1~ · (\!lll!"'ny APflCll~ on n1~11~lccd rhe l'ilnt.:_Wftlll\I nil~ hnn re•
Swalrsl1 tdcvill!ciiri lioJ nd.iu 11 liett 111t~- \NC!~I ~t11r iln<l 'Oipt'.lll;nln, ln""·'<I ""
i,,& huur. 'l'bil .....~ w\1~n the 1huotini;·J~tt :ul•llil.i11~1 tO tic.:~: or (fap1 wm m :i•
ihcoll' W;l,I •ct abg11t, a m:utttpiuo or PR· fot . f111al. •Vflmcb. Nothing but poor
""'rlt, The inil>lic ~t cxnctly whu it Jami, JV'11;t11ent l!y 1!10'-'it'ilin oft nplnin the lu.,
Nuliully 1!iou~l1t of tlic (:ia thRt the t;..·;i : nhiliiifd ' II l:il~ll'll\'nc~nt -Of fin:11 nflprot Cntlcmen wcr~ mlt ;,, tlic J10•itkin 10 lmow-·. Mk. '(( ~i'ui; ~ 1 r:ic\c4t 1 11 ~ pilim wn111.I
111111¢ tl1~11 any "'"~ pcl'J0!1 j,. SwW1m,
lt:i¥~ iold m(Wtf th~ tn1li11, '111~ 11l~M W3S
Aud !~t~r wl!l'n Tr:111~1it puL lu ll!Cuty in 1111c pit'l:c ~~·I uml1>t ,foll CO•llfol wh1'l ir
limY11rd to ~t<.~i!m( cmr.n1illliun1 h cerfain•
hit il1e·gro11nJ,
ly I l1 tr
r.n ~~' mo.
'l'hc t~d111lcal h1vcrui;"11un n·u,11rJ 18'
Shoul.J s.l!nDY h•vc Dull -forced d~n prior to accid1ont 11111lf11nttionini: i~ ~'?'
by ~n :air •; •1nck the~ wiu but 01•c l'lolll!_lo ~ JY.!tt uf 1!1a plonc, Tlui \i11tl~1 or 1hc 1.1ld1v1·
COlll\CC1 " 11h ih.l t (\~~ck, n.~mcly, the _K"\ : clu~lt rnponslhlc .fM f11m11 1!1t lllftr;!ft
IA~f.~ Fo11i;;1 ~?.f.lnl'I', ~ ~"~II Jl~t;j:~ ·:. wrre cuminc,I, N11 b.1lk1 'W~n,lt Wffe
bmh 1r.11il~nc •le<IJ:nn! fnr •~. \ltm11 ""'' fir!•:·: fotm<I, '11\c cM•h Jhc, 1hc tc1nt11\ .m11nul
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Yt\lc. fly.mM. tu lmo "'' :It ;,mt= "1 tne In•
nllll lt1t11en1h 111~ r~·~· '1••Wn by Shll!)Y
v..:s11i:11unc oo~r.I. It ""~' found out 1h~1
w~~ s=hoJ lor cv1tlcncc of jliDOuni:.
the l'our;:i h:ttl llM'Ct flown ever Rhodesian
Nuthini; was found, A world lc1,.Jing crimi•
1aHltory without pcrmiuion, it had "ot . no!oi;ht wu cnQPi;od by tlie t.111i1cJ N:i·
liown on Sc1mmbcr 17th, it h~d n~er rio11s. After :1 cnmprchcnti~o ~,,J;;,,t1ic.1•
flo wn ,!utinH nl~ht l\J i1 WM not cq11ip1ml )01U invcui11Mion ha rcjcctc1l alt 11,wli~ of
(01 :1i~htllyi11n and it did ili>t have. <he
i,hooti"i; 1luw11, qbo~~e an1l tcch"il;,,1 de·r!\nae w r~d• Ndola.
ra:o, anJ Jecfa~ thmt 11~ Gc-.:lJcnt WAI
TQ. crrruigt. ~ rcndn·YOUI "-10~ or Ndil!iii
Jue t6 pilo1 amlr.
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hiac~yjust. ai~mertrliir. c.hc-pb'nt-~·.- .. '1ier ~~ t<i . ~.,;~art ,-lc :.,idi a110 ~bt~ · ... · ....·· : :·· _,..··: ·"

>hot COWTI or ,nposed to Hl>o!age. Dot J[' pl:i.nt'l 1i~1i;ht lfYual c!ayt
is Jiff1n1lt to preunr· "' .!cr:ileii -dicCH)' ·

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""On!i a rri;'ll. Tnns:i.ir tried. "The comp;any . The tapt;till of tilt mt pllJ\e ~11 fUghr ·.
·· • •
p11t io lien t~cltnir:i.I aod oponriona1 .. operation• .nm1.-i:« in i'r.truair. Ncit ·the
br:i.ins at ""ork, decided for the Jboodng . ·one ,,.!to wa1 oo TV. Thi• ..,u a new one,
.!.n1·n line, :ind omc out with a thcoi'y' " and ."'11mb~ nto in ~ r°"' of thtt:a ill a
whi.:i1, l1own-c:, cEd nm ~.nd tht ~t ~ .· yur, 011, OM -.{t&1io11 he sbow~ ~ &
_,
fore any uf the <Qmm1n1on1. And yet. pooro wblch !t~ h.1d ukcn on a. day·lighc
ir.1n..:iir "'"as in a very ;;ood position 111 appro1dl l'tdola. He told~ tht Kt w111
pcnonncl from the cornpany took ;pan ti\ on hit way to the Swedish lloard of Avia- ·
~he ·l«h~icr.l invmi1;~ti0t1, ~d .rim_Juuul.: :< tidt\. .By help of the photo )ie 'lrOuld --:"• ·
,.
u•fomu:ion w~l illus ~t aU 11me1 an1lt b!c; · ·~lain thtt ihere cou_ld h;ve bccft flO . mis• .

Jud;cmcl\t of th• hcight by die captain of :
H p.,..cv~r unmlistic and lruitl~ the
SUDY.
~cul~uiCJ•u 3 \,0111 shooting c!own :>ncl U·
.
.•
h0til' t: h;i.vi: l:cco they have ..crvcd ;i 111..jor
To me thu photo m~nt quite die 'Op• · , :.
purpo.sc. '!'hat it to c!raw tl1e at1ent!vn f rOlll poairc, The~ Wat the flu del(l~tc b1i1h . :!:
ti..: n"'ti:=I exphinarlon1 of ~ aceid¢11t.
"WUt ol Ndob., cx:i.<r.ly the type of terni" .; ·
_ill(o which planes dtW:nd 1zi s'ittillar '"i~ ~
Tut 11ii;hu we~ m.>Oe in ardet tO check . ~ "illlu. (In :appioacli· d•:rini: 11l~h1 :it i1 ~
i>n 1cr.irnUT1iC<J i;iven by "WitnC1scs who saw · · fl;ia11 oYtf' il \>lack hole., rl.e i:il°' Qo.,a .'.
SEOO'\' on the ~ccidC\tt 1\liht, :Tna"s3lr ihat thuo •n: no ohrtrucriont befuw. he.., :
(wlin c-.,?) p11t i'plafte and a uew tO ~•:;;~ -~c• hi1 l:ei11ht by 1he flln-•')': Jlghil '.!;_:
poiaL A• a ·l'Ulllt.of tht test flights it.oWi:"· alicad 11.nd -Onund1 in10 tlie groun<!.
· ::/ ·
coruidcrci" possibility,lhac stl!OY 111ii;ht
b"r b.:.eJ, lowet tlmt 6000 ft>..>t alnady
Tdo nor kl\Ow what the tcsu.lr ,;., o( the · _:':
when j1 pated OY~r tht' field.
talk. :at th~ ll(latcl of Avist ior..
, ..

<:..

lf SEBDY rc..lly wa1 d1u low, alld to
lhc l11iow!:d'e of the captaln, :llett wu l\O
mnon lor thtt ·~iJe approuh 1111d~ ..,a,
. Ndol.t.

or

'rJie i mtrc1tin11 }'IOillt [s, 00wt\'tt1 uat . ,.~
tlu: r.tpuin .of
test plane 10 ye•n e&r• ~ i:_

ma

<

Iler si:rvecl a. copilo< Oii' a DC.6 .,1i1c1., on
11p:iro~ch ta Cairo ""dl1:' eonffi1icmw 1imllar ~:·; .·

to tliaae •t ~doll\, hit the gro~ad, A m11iA .·;·:;!...·
iow clue 14 mim:Ading hndins -.;m brob olf and 1~ '. J!!•n• :. ,.:/
orthe altimcius or misunderwinding o( the . l.ouneed in'° the 11ir •11•ln. Tht piloti madc.:.f'
clcv;ition of tbc airport, o~~ o"l1 lllY lt 10 the n&r.,.,ay •hm thci pb1u c™~·;::­
th::it 1h! JI l:.nc was bound to cmh.
Tha p•'8engcr1 alld the :rcw -wmr 1lil'td~ · .- '.•

11 tl1c

Jr is v~~Y Jiffi,uh to ~11li:o ~ hti~l1t "Of
.l<1 ov~fl;ri"r. 1iw~ft. In t lii1 itt•l~n« ·1hc
• wio1enc1 wore to :wmp~tt -rli.: ~1cight ul

tll<l tcs< flll'!IC with th.· u of sn1m Y. Wh1!11
iMy t.l.., SellDY iic hcig!n did 111>t me:tn •
' tl1ini; 111 them .as tl1c,- dill no1 k11ow thl\t
12

·.

No IC)t Jlit;l1n "C1'& m~dc ~t. Ndoia !i.
Of'1!er U> flnd 011~ ab:iut \ht f'O'!ibilitlei lor
m!1juJRio11 rhg hci11h1,

Onco l A•llc.I fllRht or~atlan1 m1111ag~
1!!rcc ol Tfl\n~ir about hi1 •icwt

1'11111bcir

on ih.: N•lnln 1\Cchle11t, Thftt w1 bf1111'9 ltt1
'l'r:ms.~ir n11rt, w~ b. ,..~, ·.1ill will\ ~111
C ivil Avl~ttOl'\1 lloard; He WJi.yf.t•j relll(•
t.int.

Hi1

onl' tofMll!ilt ..,,.,::tfi~t"thr &Cci·

<1rnt l111d bc<0rue a. p<itit.~~:I :."°'~:: :

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The,;.1a iri1i

1" dC011ing with \he Nd?la actlae11t the
Swrdish:P.tCN 'Waned a lot pf printc!t._ i11bt
on ~1~rional Huff uf no nl u~ Vtrj' little
of factual inform:ui01\ ,.,._~ given. 111e nptru Oft aviation wen ~i1r~udcd. H t!ie
pnn had_btcn,thc k:a1t i.11~m1:cd in whu
the Sw~11h P1lou Auoc1&tion had to uy
it would soon h;i.vc found 011\ ,.,bit W~
wrong with the i11vcni~atlon.
At "' urly Jt4Gt o~ the l11Y~tlgatkln lt
was found that JC)Jlle or 1!ie bod1H o.{ter l~
pcuoiu ..,he h.\d ~~ on board S'EBOY
copwncd bYlleu, . '!'ho bis. ~~·. nniclc.
1
down on tht p>~bhc. Swcd:srt
H11u111al a ·
. p~ were di,pa1ched 1_0 the b.n~lt-ficld in
.·,. : oruct TI> Je~1tro the nide1\te. Afw " fffl
0
· day1 'leFf lntlc waa heard.
'.~ ' The built.lb~ qv.ii. ll(lf!llal. <)n boatd
.'.f· S'E8DY ..,,..~: IOl'llO :onnrd UN 10!dierL
Th_ey aitricd afll!m11!1ition f,,r their t112·
ch1n~uu. W!lc11 ·dti: plano .:ru!ttd and
tiaU&lit,fire the amniu.nitio111u1plodcd. Thas
of the bCldlft <011ai11ed not {)nlr \wtlets 1"ar abo ~n:ridi;e-c.a~s, Tht !nj11riu
wrre "~ ~~rft<ial. le wa1 e1ttbli1hed
<. th:tt nonoi of '1ie buUea had pe1red t!lc bore
I ":.bl ;1. wnpo:i.. :·
·.L:..,'l'•ninlbftiu .by Mrlcaiu v lto had eccn
.:, ~& alii•li p)aftt behind dte big" WaJ lnOtner
. "'111er 'wme- e\'Cll editorial1 on,
lf 1hc Swedish tritninal ~p~m Cit the
tC4M llad bttn a1ked the wliclc thing could
'ha.,,e ~ dropped 111 once. A ~y pttton
may act confumf by the n~vi11at1ol\ 11ncl
~n1i-cdllrlon llg1m of 1 bi~ p:mc~scr •ir•
c:r~ft. ~ tn\irnoniH wcr~ ch11ngcd t'Yt ry
now 1it1d. .thtn. Some of th1:n1 rdertttl in
tin•c ro ihc J,u11ini; of OORIC. Son1c of
the wi1nc11n aM•' 1hc cr~'11 11nd tll1I 110t. rertirt it, othcn IO<l1cJ the pfoc• l\011r• ~fort fh~ wrcck~~a wi\• cliKnvcrc:tl.
111c neilr1r~11cn m'ksetl die inwcsilnit
point though. The .,,itnaste• weni founJ in
N1lo~ tieer·h.:l!lf 11nd ~ro1.1gh1 forwm! by
11 STicdc by n!lme .Mcimon.
Wlwi 1!.~ S'!l~l;h go'l'Crll1111mt - hand

to

pl ~tlC· 'W:ls

O,i11ccrnins t~ Wt.imol\its io th!; ftapcn, cirh:r ?lie crew of SimD'Y w:u lremcndm:•ly in~~t or ihc wirne..J.
'
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In lmid1wjt~ che \JN - ~nno~ rhAt it
'\:.'ould l)<I\ lie r:cl're•cn1ed 1~ the RllOl!ttian
l\1l11lc, Co!"1Tiivlo11 ~F Inquiry tJ1i 1 wu
checrcd1by;,r~ Swcdi1h prcH :u :a wi1e dcri•
1i<:r1.
11 ,.. ,
Ac~o'ri!i.~~ tQ,tY'llid intcrn;i.tion;\ ai:tec·
mtnn ti~ Rho,9cs1an com minion w;11 the
'°r"'ccjWdy ~ cltJ with tlM! ciie. lntct-

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11~1i111tal rnle• \'ttf'Ct 'haw~nr, diucl)orJL-cl,
A UN ~orp,":i~io11 ha~ ~" forme<! al\d i11
"P.°'~ 'Y~! .~wa!t.cd wn!i lu;h•i:ruos tr.pee•
m1bn1~
. · 1
To ~. ~~~
UN report ..,... received
1.y 1l1e ~"<\ icliih.p~~ i: may bo 1wit~ble 10
re~~· ~C! ~P, Dt~• NyMttr {d;e -L>~ily
Ncws),;?'l\'~d~'1 ljjggqt niornini; p~~.
The """ -m ~e1e"teii """"' 1.,0
~&l'·...,.\<1~:11e~dli11tt1 "Shirp cri1icllll'l by
UN i~•CJC:g.,.iim •Gain11 che aviatio"
:1uthon:~rr:·~( ~~~...i:r." ud ''TM Ndala
cuu<ropfi~·· a1·Mplettl)'. 11rnclnd my1·
1ery", ;· ····-.: •'

Th• t'ir~t'll"iii!tifie nlrh io the uit.iciam
directed lt.V,,.,di t~ IJrhitll Hii;h Corttlf!is...
sion~ ill ~('iiodtti~.&11d cht Ndola • irport
mo\l\t~r. ~f~ itc\iiral'fr pmend• tbn the
UN -<0·!1111\'is1i61d1#.s come aero" 50methini;
itnt1ijitY,·n~. ~:e criticism it an f~aC1 copy
ol wMt WBS ) ODS before Slll~d Ill ;n« rtpom f;.;\o\ 'thC° toard of fo"eitiC>'tion ind
the Kli.;acit.\n"C<i1-nn1iwioK of ltiq~ty.
Twod nJlvkluals, one of 1hen\ tll)t at all
eonnecl'c-clllwith ' :l•i~<ion AU1ho1itle1, none
pf thtm.~~tive '11, the ~I r tr~Jl1c C011tr01 aer•
vi~cs, ,l~e b)"'. r11t· O~s;cn• Nyhetcr c0t1YcrttJ
10 "tl•e' a•H~.dmt. authori1ici of RhoJclli"'.
1
No (~ n11Wiaillh ttiticl~cd ii\ any w;y tM
ll.ho•lc•fon :~ v ili 1.lon nu1'"1ritlcs "'l1ich wure
fo11nJ •.101 h·n,.cl'•~ctccl <:•::tctly the way one
<:nultl 'll~ 11~c1, -wn•itl•rh1111hc 11e1u~I 1hua•
tiun, · ~1i1\I _In ·~c<..-onlAllcc wi1h rq:ut~tl""s
lni.t 1lqw11~1 ·1• 1.
<~
·r~n1>n;:-·i:~ 1-0~ o( m~ucn Qa tf1c'"'~bovc
mentlonrd:-rs of "1)1lrte ~11 ~ccllc111 " "'Y to
~ven l1fC(rii11ciition !ron1 wh:11 u fflCl!ri1I,
In•n11l ~tlitotinl inc ncx: cby rhc D't.fll'

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inap~!>illry i~iSDC"fl,

pointing out tl1':
oi
/
h did nOl. ma1w iF this w~ done by ~n
\lntnn~ful ~'tion. There would Ile r.;i
<:>l\C villing to corrcc1 it. - 'There 'Wat,
"\ ' ;l<!C1"al :ips:ropri~1c \0 :id~ctti>c the ~p:l·
howcvu. h WM clone: by ltic"i111: 1he Avi~·
I bilily of Swcdi,h pilou, s ...odh!I inves0,:i- tio11 Docird into opcmian. 't~ ~y a./:c
yl ion, Swedish :i111iiori1ii:i. Swedcl in ~enc·' 1be D"Ccnt Nybcror had UI ptin; ' roctl•
I- u.I, and th~ o:iuld "'t:r'f well bt: done by fyi11~ nocc •isncd by die hc~d of 1hc bo;irJ..
!\11hc1ct ln1inumd 1~1 the Nclol01 cop1rot:

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ifl_,,~i;:ationa ac~

1\irmft uciclcnt
nUdc
in onfor IQ !ind th~ ca.lllC. [n 11) clo~G 'OM

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1'h• lnnolgaUorr

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way1

ha~ ~he Wiii by wlucn JI -y k pou1blc &o
a•oid furihu 11cc:idcnlf of die J;lme typ.
ThD invcstiga1ion1 ahoul\! be ;ccountcd
f..>r in such a 'Way dm die ~-.iblic w:hir:h
cn1r~u i1~lf ro ai.t <no.poN4ion d~uly
Ull ~ . I CVttythU\g h~ bcc11 IJOllC ill
or.kt " . ··_ul ~".IY cMec:t al1~t mii;ht ~!'.i..w-~t ;:i..1~1 10.. tlf~y

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Tiie diffffGlll :1wd1ori1io that clcah
~~e NJ1>!" ac~i.tcn1 .aa "'ell .u &he ~i1·
'401>1 and -dic1t n:J)Otu ate shown 111 Ii; l.
·..
·,
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Tho UN cormninion coruiucO "' per.ions
from Sweden, Y11got~avla. Sicrr.t. Lcoae,
. _.
Nepal aocl thQ Ar~CJ111nc,
.
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h~. -~ ~- .~~.of
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~u1b(lriti1:J clut i1 .»'Ill ll\lllJc ~ 11".CU o( dlC

•he rii.- Jt.
pilu1
fruM 1lic 111i1·
c~\.<:t u1lia p1'-: ~:a\~ "l~c UM he maka
1umM'lf ""'1 co1e hi.ft h11 lifc.
'
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. Ar a rcs11t,..
'".,." ill a~owtt•'
ini: _lor •ccidcm invUti~ioia, .A~iu11
u.:iilcft1 •Cf"ltt\ arc
aclvaar:.Ge to

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'Wllh ·~ll Jtlfm~t 11t all in finrhna 1hc, C!IY.!JI
uf 11\, ai:ciJc~J,
One can hardly blama the JlhoJaian
i1h•.:s1i11Mio1l.

~

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r~ j~ll. w~ ~WcJ "~' - ~ .t0mrn1JllOC'I

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D!1ilcnopky;,
• To mali.c:1h'.n111 '#one 1l1q UN

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Ul

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inardcnofindtb~gu1c-of .1ht!· nccidcn1":· ill AnothM; !.'!~!'ll" 11nJ 0111l"1~iw-J!in -. '

a!IJ lo m~ke ihc ~pnri 11nq\IC)lionaillc..
• Tn Glhet '°""ui~ inveui11:Uio1u Jm t.c111
ool.11c.I ft"'." rulil1c
tl1c
pom nmatn (Dnfi.Jcrnial an,! ot1ly ;,,
'umminA 11J' i1 f1wb!l 1hcJ, Jia. chc accitl<llt
~t'll (.iri:oucn Bculun, ac all 11 p11liliihed.
II• rnu11 ~,ci,le<m :uc UllC Ill-pilot Cf?Or
chc ii.:ciJ~111 ·~rurt1 are ,,( i;rc.lt ....iluc ta

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..,,.,,,,,., •1• ........,..

~er hu th" po11ibf1i11 t11 ~d ... Swnliah

·

hen

- •.

lknrd of AYia1i011 appointc' ~ DNrd

[

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~~Id l1~v1 lll'IUI' tha~ dte l\hod~a.1:1

:luthomau alone J°111Nld ha~.-becn

.

- .

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l~ga.l

sible for thl invemi;~clo!)1 ·l'h UK·'W011\ci
'11cn h•'l'C ~- trc.ncd · !~ ·Briti1h scylc.
Kno~ing that i~ ~tpofl ~Id_ be llCNti~I·
ud "' cYU)'._1ie11~•l Dlc ;l\llodwan con\11115Jion wou!t!, h••n l\ad. :1q C°"11 OIK w\ih 'full C>1pla11;1rion ~ ~ ~c ~~°"~ •1!91'9rt•
cd br ~lt.fac1,1
bonn11 on 1(.
~
TI1is is 11\c w~y, •.ac.:i.Jeat it1vCl\ii;21i0 ,,.
A11{pcnoM IJC!>".tfn&ini; d ie Unluol Na~
• . .
• •
.lrt: lrr..1t« in for i111bnt.'.r Gt~.u ll«1~i~
{lQfU• .JhO s~~,!~h AVMlll>A J\o:\rJ •"''
.uul thr U..'iA. fl• tl1e iol'nti+;.u~'" ,.,,,.,.., p ·,.,. °ff'atWir arrlv~I .ill ch~ •~IO, 31'tl u11.lcr
11,J 11, fo11r ~·;ii!Jh!~ 111 d>C pYMi.: 1 , 1.1 Jii·· .-- 11K •dr(1111"1A1~es t1_1Ct"c_" tt01 vet~ much to
c~ibu1c1l ..II Jro11nJ .1hc wc:irlJ tlic J11.,,cs1ii;~· IJY a.liu~t is. T., Min;; Ill Swedc1m11ic ~l\•
!"'" rommin ion i1 p~t ~do iu unnolt .,~1li;at10n l\ou.t wu, however,, to lmn;

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Dealing with the Ndola K.C]dcnt i11

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Herc w-1• a 1;n1.,1ion whc11 il 'JIM 2on-

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.,..~re atud:cd 10 it. This bod)' of teeh11~
~uJ orc•.nion:1I c1q1em

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c1hcr th.o1ic.1 and '"'~that the ace!·
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al

all pvt

ap~r

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.

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The CClnch1slol\ (If tht UN co111J11illion it
riJic;ulou• burlni; 111 mind tbi:repOA by dt

frft.Su\~,
.

. . .
Dr Fr~l·ur, Clu~f vf t~c Sricntittc

Dt~RlllCnl oft~u~ich Polio: ;and Pt~·
fa- ef Sclmcc ctun1nolo1:y 11 thci \J~1-

. trcnicy o( 2'1rich wu cspcci"ll7· cni;.i.i;cJ by
'lie UN 'CCfC:Ul'ille h1 ci~c~ 10 iotrc.Ui;ue
inm chc J'O"ibilims that tlie pl~nc had
· "lie~ •I "\loin or npo1cJ 10 1.1hoc:i.:c.
· The
·
"J'IU:•·
~ ~ ~ n\Ott .::ireful
·1 ..Luanunauon.
I l d
. :. , I"n11 rcpon he a1arct lM\ • , ..c p a.nc 1;i
1\m ~OWTI ~ espo~ to .,boQ\;e he

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made,-

fc:ir. 111 !01hcr 0'whre11 IL • . . • .
,.
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'"' lllYC11t1~nuo11 1,

011ly

i1Alf di:1ncl1' 1.

. ' ..:· · : . •"\ · ".

,.

0

nrobb\r'-te• •;,~~- ~~. tlDlla1, h as no1 ,__
1>e"ll
~t · 1c~~
'• has nor •uoeq aCQ!u11tc1
~l
-· ._,

<nh~r

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.

• •. · ·
::~-~:: .. ·:; '.'~_:;:/:{~. ..
~ _ll!f!Stlly ·i~~'OllS .::.!j pilot~ . ' - _:•. ',•_
.,
. · ·' ·:. '.Jii
itli~{:;1..'
i 1~1. -- > of a...;"~l!On
.: ; . . i1n:rt
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· '.: :· fli•ht And
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· . . . :···
' 1 .. ~ \ l ··· tlO!'I
-wcri·i~w~ .pc.lely \>y Mlp ·~r. ch ~ 1111 · .'·. · '"~·I".( .11 . d'( . .- ;1 · ~' - nc

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,- ·.·· ,:':<•"l'!f',
IJl<.""11 tq
m.tucrl'
"- · Lj-~
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- · ...::.!"'Hie! ........ . ;imJyJtl"of 1:~ Cat~gcxy ~(
. . . ·c
-~
II
: .: '·." _llM'4 "'~~ Vll4 ~~a 'I ton1k!o1t1 11101t

I\(

fore 1hc n!ioddL.aA F11hlic ComtnlnlOI\ _of . '1'lur trim of :he NciolA cue bc!or-e the
l!UJoiff ;iod 1hc UN Commiuio11.
l\~l(W!c,ion :uul UN comminions wcra tlCO.•
T!11: lklAr•I or J1wni.iµ1ioe 'Wotknl on' · miflc1\ h)I t. wlll'llini; co1111ui11tc O.J)~i~1cJ
!our 11\cDfitt 1\au l1a.J bi:m
be•. · by tkc SW"~dlsh
!;i>VUDlllC!li.
. laid Jo>itl\
.
·
• f · ( Tha
£ '°rnmntcc
} • 1.
lon:b;inJ, i.e. cN:!!IY ~1ion. u~''' tee•. ~11prQK&l ln •~tu a..:POtt o c.o11nc wit.,
nic:il malfon;:;ioii
pile\ ·mor. ay •Hi·
1hc way tlii
w:i.1 Jcalc llitll. lt l'll\y be
-01ni11g ~'be .ftrn lhrci: of 1hete theories M d _.' it"!=-in1> UtLt die c;1llllll\!ncc \'C<ltlltcC
~;itin; Ali w6tk OD Ulll/(l lh~y ••m~ apcoc~fi.4 rain•rlt.1.
climiuattd, and piloicrcor •as illd~ ...
11\iollt "the Rho.iulan commluion iuaich
bcin;; die Qu1c ci
accidCllt.
..., ''The!
'llM in every respect p\Jb•
h•is rhc fini time an a"idcnl invntic~~:· lie!< ··1,11· ni;~•lk. lrnp~nWjcy and comp\:1ion lw ~n lmtcd ihii ,..} which w. ·· un~ i,_.G,\1~.,d irou "1lt&Ads. All artu•
com" Jis.utrolll whrn the diHctcnt ihto· lllClltalion ~m\ded ••~pied a11d d1~N
rics
:igciin in• fW!lhling up. It wu -...u
.renrimOft. m libcf1Y of the
c.:nainly JO in alii1 cut u me ponioiliriu KMil~VC· of pantc:a ~.call aad hear Wit•
ior piloc error were not diJcimed and th• MBOS. ·Tlie rcpreseom1vcs co11ld fruly "!'• ·
opcr.iionol dai:a wich ;. buries on piloc fotd..-ckotc v1cva uwi~C0111mcat on wlm •d
ttrGt were miuina.
•o -'os~glu fonll.:
·~ h ... L , • ,..__
Abo11ohc UN-commi.aion \he eomll\!llff
e vip0ru (rom 1 c "'-'esllti ........,.
Th of Inquiry
mi.iioD
•nd '11• UN C:Ommh· .~: ..Advcne .tt111arll 1111ttt, bo_wC\l:r, bo
i
bl
. (
"B ni of . .made 01\ the factthat die procceilillg before
~ 00 m:n: e ~11t .ppon 11 c1~ oa · ·.. the commiai~n. :is a rule did noc inch1de
TillCJtiS~Uon, •
• •
.

JUth a-~ or lh& 'mi.ioi\i1y of"tu wimn·.
The ~.n1ln1:il\ COl'llR\ISHOI\ cttaloluhcd tH a1, a«otdi"I: to Al\glo-~lCOn eundard,
t!lac •he uu14 of tb< :icclJ~lt w.upl)~t...~ . n mode ~y."c1ou·enminatiot1".
ror.
Tlir« "1C'llbe"* of the S"itdisli Aviatloa
. .
.1 L- (
·



e
rom111m1PO amn,cu tn~ a11r
no
..rd wbo cook put in
t~ J •invu1111at1on
l.. Th • 0

'
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L
. --'
111corics m • 1umm111g 11p an11 cone ....c... · bavo wri\~n • report In s~.. ts.,. ncl\C1l~
wt llCMIC of ''um eo1ald bt climlNted (ul.,.. . · lG : • d k d ••ConfiJ ti I"

~nJ

.

~-~·. h~4'
d:~let."arc .not VffY pr:,b.ble it
--~f·-'-....i

pi.~ •

·

rn.iuc •.
t111: ~
nwc1ut
ucnt
w;u Ci\We<. Y ......--_,_
·
1.1i1ion :i.J•prop~N:J a l'Lj)Orl ,.,.., wi-: ...e
Wh)' WAJ the profo;sor
h" h I 1 ,
d< ,_. ,

b.un "" ~· 1c 1.'e 1an1'1lJ wcr;: m~ ~ .,.,.. _. wor..>

.. -

·;·. '· ..:l·:·· •
,. ... .. . :.. ..·

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prcsslont

<Aru.11\
.,

ind.

a.1

·~at tlit pilo ..;~ .· ~.1

:::~,

' '.'. ·~~ •~.

[\..)

w,

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~.:: a ;iw:u~,r, ~ .1.f1~-ult1ea.

&q.,~~u ~ti'*.' · ~':ui,;::
\\i«~ l..dlt•tt1~· ~~II\ ~

Cllft'I~: :·~·. i.

Ll:i

0
0

°D'1t, tl~~ro ls. ~:10th" ~itu1ldo11, r.n.i rid I·
-colo1nl)'i c~ou~I\ when fM"ll . ir,_.fitto 111~·
d•c~, •!1'1'! ~·,when 6pproad1ill1> a run'fi~Y

d~n~~ ~~~hl. ~E

l..~t\IAtcd

_ . . .· _,,: ;··
•·· ;.:::
; : .: .
.'
•.
1hc nmw..y
.:··· ··· -: ··· ·. ·.'"J'IU. 1D•ll"~catlo11.wa.,'"l1ow•~et', not 'IVit"l-~o ~ti. ~n~ilbllcd a"3 thc~c la-llO tto11\l..,_, ' ·: · •llificM:nt for ltl1b~ in poor ' !lllii>ilhy. The ~c. Su;i:1,_!\l!M•'i! iind
~I\ ~v~ chc pilot · ·
' . ·:.:: . piloc wed lii~_.MJUc• Im tb~lll gave him l:fDlln1 teie~nc:'es, and if l11d 111iw:d ~ the
~
rep~
·.::; . f.U..~t~s. l~1~en1e~•rc d~~· . al~ k~iu.ha l~nd=rlu, ~ ..QJily ctif· .
'.~ .;.· ·· ~ fot lnl~lllellt dy1ni;: tn ~~ ~tl the ferc.o.e:f~p~ ~ ~ayl1£1\t a~pto~ch 11 th~t ~It · • .
.:: ~-- · ~w.meou~ et.uted 1na ~i.!ou d1ff!Qll·
ho~ll " ·. ni1s:s1~i;: llut 1r ih' appro:ich 11
-.'
~ Tbt "~di11~• w~e not "!111plo cnollllt :-iad11 over "'•ter O'~ O\'cr • ::1~1cr1 an1& there
·· : '° '1Ja•la'~ •nlO 1)\~ 1n!or111a1K>n. nHdcd, Is I! no . o_c h~ ~111'?-do rclncMo e11ccpt the
· ;:
bppycd 1~.u pilou rather -~lined . Jn appt<>atlj A,nd .rvnway lighu. The impm·
.-·. ·
.

·
·
· f ' L L. '
• 'L


-·"··: . . 1ltcir own • - , v.O _ac.ad~~ OtCUtrod. tlOM .o ~n!'-le :'.1~~
convinc•Ajl IO
, _ The Lin~·~ were 1mrrov.d. •nd ""' tht p1lot._l~.l1.c ,1ft.t1rcd he has a Ol'<lllt: 1~·
.....-,.. io!i.ll'ilOCllU desig11ed and
'piloo 'have dency 1~ fycus hir eyc1 01\ thi 1\IOW-t)' ·.·.f~ if~d'9 b:ccll fl)'l!ll lnllC" "'9fC 111f•f which is_:at;an 11ur;icfrJe Jjn-0,1~ - rachct
in"rllll!SflU 'han wlU. vi1u.l -.rtfc~c~
dun Gn ihe mao of ir.u.nnn~a with ihei:
I ro·~ llfQUnc!..
diglu anJ. :11oii1ms right la 'fro11t of hilll.
.,.,. .
. of
. •
He checl1s-j1he lllnl\ld11 ilnd hclllh< ,f tlie
• . , . IJ\11tU1110111a110n
a mod•m airctak
• f • '-.. · "
·
d .\.
·. . b '" L
c.
·
QtrctA r :vf\ll'~·{r~ar.l \g th• -~n1u1 ll11hti,
•II "''' v~ulOI) y 'fl'H~n It
Hown
I ..•.• . h . ~· . ..
.
on , . .
.
· .
on Y · &JY111tl
\ t c a1nl""'"' ,ln\ltai\Or 11111,k
1

•· .. ·
. IU 114tlhllf)Clin II lrc~doutly 1mprtt• gl~ntet, 1 • •
lll
cop1e1 an mar t
cu a '
uvc - nen to the profu.[011al in•~
·.
·' · '

·
..., Nt~!~~ .mllkl. ?c.i~I• _:.~o_!~!~
.
;
.
·
..
Theipi\ot !'lay-in 1hh w~y b~Cl>IM tdb~t
radio.a ll.
Fly1oa w~h vuual tcftrcnu ~o 1~ lD an 11r.1ital illu1ion. ln Cis •. 4 II jhown
'TM invcniguion hat been commented
i:rourul 11nd uum1mcnt flyiils arc 1wo .Uf.. how the opilc~l illii~~ ~Im.
1
upon by -a ~ilo& cirpcrt o( th. Swcdi1ll P~·
fdrcnt .iu, The profcai.<>nal !li!C>t 11111 & be_·
A ~1111~ay ~111:ncd OJI "' 1011i;111 or latid 11
10
1on Auoclat1on. lilt comft\Cfll suru as !oi·
,.
able ~aat~r boill of '"~· Trollhlo tl\ay, sm1 th1Jus;l1 1 t1\i:. c;o!;Kpi1 wind~hivld of ""
\()Wil •
• .
howcnr, arlH -when l~rr-& " a ll\htt11rc of . aircrni~ 1!'P'~~hi11i; over the
111'ldcr
"The m\'ut1i:a1ion •Pl'~f1 to hav.i l>"'I
~~ t".'o olMlthoda ilf lli,hr, or ~htn ,,...._ Jiffc:r•nt:,,.Mt"itiom. The di~taucc co 1tlc
ma11c "'1th all d11 can:Mncu •hat it '"''
"'
uuon1114 frocn .OllC lO chc oilier,
· ; runwoy ii:in' ali ini1anccs tho 1.amc - 11bo111
tomary. 11.ovidcd "that lh& rttulu •CC!lun1·
Thi1 i1 rhe c•ie •lien cho alrcnri af1tr:= ·.·.half . ,.,,;;.:, •··•
.
-~
• , · .. · I n :) a1w
.,,c approaco
cd for uc facn one ""scarcely
c~cn sup• · ·
14 i1111nimcnc apr•-•
.. ~•rh• 1u.:,••
L, iht clou~i
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howaftr, Ill my Opll\1911• bcc:om~ -rather . ..:: ·::: ~· ·,:. ,: ~!~J~_.Aparnch :11114 f\lll.;tay llrhd!I,.·~·, ·~ · l" C:} • n.1 I) ,L..
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:~~h~H\ die :&trcn(c clcyiatc ft01J1 ihc COi'*
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glidc·~il1. 111c nrOt in =1icigl1\ c.t~ by. ;Thimi, i•··lll lii;ht orran, c:rncnc on bo1lt 1iJca
miJJll~cinio \!111 huri~;)l)·~~ft"-'ICI wj1h in• . of tlic r110111Ay en.!. Sec.ii fronL~n ;\pj~Ch•
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~rca1in& .<lilcncwc from t'l<e:Nn~y· A one · !ini;·airc.r.:1(1 \hi• o~"QCl!lCl!1 llivca d1e pik>I
dq;fco fl1i1plaCC111c11t of tM ~orizo~ 11~iu . ;ml ti.,tutindicati~:~n he ia below •he
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12ncc uf ht\U " milr. - u in f~• .+, At· 9 i ;~1hcn;1inttt\ltinp, thao 1ytei:in1 Pfiority ii
~ 111il1:a J~1a11u - A• M NJ.ol~ - i~ 411ci111 • ;1( ~11ni:1\:i111m 111 l\lrponi wi11> lt~vy uAf·
I
•lS ic« crrw ill hci~11,
·
1lic;•111d •to1d1c n111w1y11lt(J~t\y ln ·UMI, t'or
·n,c n1i~j11J~HIC11\ IO far Ji~uiJOd is Hll\ny )'\1'111 n> "°"IC 'l1~rc wlll lio 1' ~mt
•"'"l•Mtn, ~lnl)' c1ic li~ltu (0011in11 the '""•
on ""'VC-:' 14liJe-p011h but i11 II ctll!lll luw Al•
c:>.vwJ purc:ly by upti,a\ :\11111iun1, 1f tl1c n\1111hCf of t1111W~YJ whhOlll ;i11y ~lr1J of
W.lJ '~R be 1\'Tll. le it 1tlf!I (llau•ib1c U) ~··
tit¥dc as;., (),
pilu1 i• ~11uc1 11"' inflllC1l~C of 1ecol~.i.1iDn
~lid•·p:,,11 lnclk ~ rl"'!.
·
•~IM 11',111 1!\c ain;r.-(1 i1 011 .,.'""' 111i,lc- ·:. 'l1u: nciiu111'1 of II••' •ircrAfl cNlr1i;n with
fo r.:t:i - ;11 \I( h wlw11 ftllllt.lni: ;i tum ·;"111a 1•~oblch1 it, howevcr, 110101117:i1'11~1·
!'-''" ia ') ..nJ Cl.II> lilw in J). 111c ..-.1nclu· · ·. mlft)' ~;iriablca - upt.:i11ly rpccd ,;:nJ raut
1hc n1at1er bwimc• more hu1icQto, 01hcr ·.t cr of. i;cuin~ ~~!fer cquip.rnc111 ..h •ctu~lly
'"'" i1 aTTmJ 10 by imalri,.qi11i; \\le hon:toll . ef dl!ICGM - 111.J d11rin~ ~pPfonch the air·
>ell!e• conic ir110 chc picniro ~nJ it may \)e
'h~ppens '. th;i1 pijci11 If.UH 1hcir own tlmlits
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•J
j~tcJ Ill •~n~nry illusina11,
,,;,;h. inili~~1io111 - \lorh Hn'\ M•I vi$U.\\ h j, l..tnJ of a KCU.IJ IUIUrC Wilh 1Mlill$ Ill
/\I (.'\II all\I be M:CD ( t4'111 (i • '4 the ruU•
l\ny :1ppro~'h 1h~t ;, m.1 Jc untlcr rli.c
~nc(m•!<cj11\c Af'1•n>~cll 1oa low,
im.ti;i11c •h.:tt tk h1•n1A11• ii 'WMll it .::m·
W.l)' cnanollr. Aivc iliHcrc:rnt'pcnpcctivc:t
~-011Ji1ioni di11:usml here cousu :1ny pilc>C
:111cre h 1101 m11eh lhcrMurc on rhc 1en•
''"' lNI .c..i..
1
tltpcnolin1: ~n wl•i~h h.i""t i1 ·ii ~n from.
diHicul1i~1. Gener.ally the 1ircraf1 is ;!!,); illu1il)l11 of pi!°'a. aAd wlm d1~re is
The .us111np1ion ~ 11'4 .alrcr,11h'• po•i· 111ia i1 a co11dilion 1l~t i• 'llml by niany
brought lower that1 daittd during 1t1fllC' has ~n ·p\lbli1hcd by flichc SafCI}' Fo11n•
tion i11 n:btioll IO tho .111lilc-pa1h in c) and .pilou. They c;my in IJlinJ a pic11uc of lhc
puc of 1hc approach. ~i(hcr 1lic pilot ·al duion Jnc•. ·New York. Tlln is !ht caic
J) IM)' be COrte(t, b111 le may aJIO be com•
&:OnWllC the runway .JtoulJ form w}tM teen
1bc ...on1rol1 or the other pilot di1COvcr1 the · ·wirh a p~pot w1i11cn by cap1ai~ f, !>, Coe·
ttlnd, "'t0ai;.
lrOfll the ideal &lidc-pacl\.
coodicion, po•er it •pplicd,·11nd 1ho 11lr- . quylf dliof pih11 of SAGE.NA •irlloet. Cap•
The •is.ta\ -itnprcuion of e) a1~y tcfcc 10 •
Thar method -0£ j11d&rncnt !JIAY bu 11\e(~I .
craft i1 bro11cli! blck JO it•c c!c1i"d glide· ! : ;:iin ·eaeq11y(1 p~pc, 11 cntidcJ:.11'11c Seti· ··•
c) i,a,, l\ir aircnh ia 100 low aiid n t1yin& when approachin~ wcll·llno'VA r1111"ayt, i~ ·
.. 11.uh,
. .: . : ·: '·
i ;.· .;: H.olrY; JlltniQll• of Pil~" •11d .~" p11bli1h~ . :
iA ~ 1111\0 hi~h ;iui1uJc, a11J di; impi~Uin · other 1i11•:"ioo1 ii may be J~lf0\11.
., .
-7-hc 11ra11gc ~nin~ t,;, ~owevtt; .ma~ ~h,rc : ,;, in 1.~.5.t. ;k i~ .P~~blr. ~~1~!:, ·~ ·""°'' .CJ.~.···.·.'
.ivud11
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time of t~ f\!pon of c:ipt1.~
C.Xquyr a i;rnr number of accidents ~
to sen'°rr ilh11io111 ~ ...: O«Urrc.l. As pro·
ll.ib!c ou;ie h.:as kca itidicucd pilot cf'l'or
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with an uiide by M. l!. S?.tulding Jt. in
Dv1incfl Commm:ial Av~tion, January
1959. R.:forring to dsht rcunt accicknu
Jht •11•hOr pointed Out

now

"VitUa{ C11et

~ Miskad Y(111H.

What c.n 'be done to avoid •cci;knts Jue

to ~llu1io01~ - Airport equipment awl ait•
cr;ifc irurrumcot:i.t!on it bdni; improv~.
.
cauu ~pp• Din in 1951 taptain ~cquyt ~tioncd

aiotis &11d tomc.:imcs wilh a tcfr:rcnc;c co
Q?ttin C<ic<J'IY''' p;ip~.

.

.

Scn$Qry illllsioiu do llO'I: o~ ly
otlicr itcmsa
ro.u;h ~i.Unu, but ;i!ao ulu-oft.accidcnu• .

And, in how M&ny &ee.i.lm11 hav~ JCAIOI")'
illwioru been

&

<<intn'buliol\U)' l:ac1or1

"Th~ i.aet th3r :i'ciden11 oecur due

t-o WI•
m"'n to
autt.oritin or airline opi:r:awn ai 10 pllou
~y illusions iJ dianuWnc. Not

10

:a ~Meiencc, Wa~in~ 10 fellow pl·
l11u h.wc bun prodiiad.1'hi1 wu d·.c C011C

wM-1

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.
"A mo1t comprche1uive s!U(fy of ..!ii dif·
lcrt11l phenomena. of illuJtOl\ll ~ theif
COllu.qller.ut•" - "lrf'hm\ •lll iJ1~' ltUQ)' \Jt
. .111.0Cj
·-· "'Take dfective W.pt nt ~h fli;ht pe...
fimnc_l_t...-ato of.~ da11~r of nlusiew11." w~n Jaow ll!MY pilots hav~ teen c:apuin
Co~11rr~ inpct1

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Jnf.:>rmation Co,'1ce1:1iiJlg 'the .Accidental D\;!a th of
Dag HA:\J~1ARSKJOLD

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Tl<O f\les a.re kept on Dag HANMARSXJOLD at ClA:
one
; _;:
by C~S, t.h e other a 201 d oss ier in ~he DDO.• Neither o~ ~h-~se
;.;: :.~::~~:
pro v ides 3. CIA analysis of nor imp.lies any unusual · act;l.Y.ltles .. .. ~;.~
surrounding his d~ath:
.
..
·
·;
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. . .. . .. . . - .... - ·:,: ·_~:~~:,,·
2. The CRS file con sists primarily of neHspa.per clippings • ·:; .,~~f
State traffic, and biographi c al assessments. from various s o urce:;- •. -7i;,
Th.ere is only one docu.lllent dealing with his death ( a ttached CIA · .._- ~-..~~
telegra;o.)
It is simply a summa ry of ·the UN c omrais$io n 's repor't _. -.- .: ::..;
that the death was prob abl y d ue_ to pilot e r rot' (i.e . ,. ina ttenti:op; > - ~:~•.
to the ·alti.'!1eter.) .
·
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3.
Th~ 201 do ssi e r a lso con t.a:ins biog raphical data and a~ .:. ... :;:_?.';.\
s e:ssraen ts.
The primary cont en-~s of the £old er a re copies of .. ·. . :.;,' ;~.,:;
v a rio us FBI docurr.~n'ts of a routine nature; . INS .decumcnts_ gTant ... :· :..,;;'.-' t.:;:
.i.ng admissio n to the US , dest:;riptions of the identities and itin-: 'c· : ";· ~,
e raries of various delegati'.~ms visitin g Mr. Ha~wa1·skjolJ . and CIA '.::.-.
reporti n~ about is ~;>\es raised at the UN.
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Although they do not ne~essari1.y deal dir·e c.tly with his ·:.· ) J
death, the ZOl dossier does c o ntain a few . in.teresting docu111ertt s . .. .. ~'.."
They include•
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Che ck which st<..tes that- ~··. -: :.-~~ ~. -~-1~:~~ !:~
here is no positive d'-;uo-gator.r
~

Hammarskjold.

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· w«i~h alludes to irregulnrit1es: surrounding ~he death. bbi · d~~ I
:r.~t in'fQlvc the CIA i n any, way .f.c;opy at~ach·e~.J.

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Approved for Release : 2016/07/05 C00395104

CURRF.NT

WEEKLY SUMMARY

IN'l'ELLIGBNC~

4 August 1960

PART I
0

OF IMMEDIA'l'E INTEREST
------·-----REPUBLIC OF THE

Belgium, in agreeing to
withdraw its forces in Katanga .
Province to one base t here, appears to be moving s.l owly_toward a total mi l it ary evacuation
of the Congo. Brussels' crit.i ci sm of UN Secretary General
Hammarskjold's announcement that
UN troops will enter Katanga on
6 August and its characterization of the Katanga question as
an "internal" .matter subject to
discussion runong the Congolese
appear designed to support Katan~.!\. Premier Tshombl! without committing Belgium to his defense.
'l's·homb{i, in his convcrsr.tions with UN Under Secretary
Dr. Bunche, may seek UN support
for a compro~ise in which Katanga
would rejoin the Congo in return .
for . ~ reorganization of the Congo into a federation of semiautonornous pl·ovinces. ThP. UN
will rlmost certainly attempt
to awoi~ becoming further involved a~ mediator of an internal Congo , dispute, however, and
will probably seek morely to
dissuade Tshombe from forcibly
opposing the entry of UN troops.
Tshomb6'H angry opposition to
tho UN occupation may force a
delay in the entry; he probably
has no more than 500 trained
non-Bele;ian troops at his disposal, however, and would be
unable to offe r effective resistance to the UN forces, which
now number _ovor 11,000 mon.
Brussels appears determined
to retain its two Conf~o bases-Krunina in Katanga and ICi tona in
Leopoldville Pl'Ovince--until such
time as it can negotiate te1·111s
fOl' !l complo1;e withdrawal with

PART

~

~ONGO

the Lumumba government . Belgian
officials have declared that UN
e ntry does not e ntail the immediate evacuation of Belgian
troops from Kamina. In Brussels,
the Congo crisis has led to clis c ussions amone; gove rnment leaders of a possible cabinet reshuffle . Social Christian and
Liberal coalition partners, although agreeing to share rosponsi bi li ty for the Congo debacie, have urged the repJacement of Congo Ministers de
Schrijver and ~gheyven.
Meanwhile, the major effort
being made · by Ghana's Nkrumah
and Guinea's Sekou !l'ourll to influence ~remicr Lum\Uoba and
other. members of the Congolese
Gove1·nment may presae;e an early
announcement of s ome form of
association ainong the three
states.
Guinean political repres entatives, brought into Leopoldville under military cover, havo
b_e en obs erved along with Soviet
r·epresentatives denouncing the
UN to Congolese officials. The
Guinoans- - who appear to be wo1·king clo8ely with the Russians
in Loopoldvillo- - reportedly ~lso
have urged the Lumumba regime to
take strong measures a gainst
domestlc opponents and against
Beleians . At . least some Congol e se officials arc concerned ·
~bout Guinean activities in tho
Congo, as evidenced by Foreigu
Minister Bomboko' s suggc·stion to
nn American Embassy officer on
?. August that efforts be made
to bring in advisers from the
Federation of Mali ns a counte1·weight to the Guineans.

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
AI;Pl' O\'CU

i v•"

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l ~--.........ii·-..-..........-._.

'c0o395104

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CUHREN'l' IN'i'ELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUAfMAlW

4 August 1960

c~ -

CENTRAl AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SUDAN

LJ

\..1 ... . . . , . .• . •

..

L' ' ···

..

. ........

I

.• staule yville

UGANDA

~ Coquilh:itville

REPUBLIC

CONGO

I

Dukovu ·: RUANOA
.

THE

• · URUNOJ

CONGO

Brazz.J.ville®

®Leopoldville
CU\NDA

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Luluaburq

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TANGANYIKA

Ka mina.

ANGOLA

'I
Elisab othvillel

4 AUGUS T 1960
0

MI LE ,

FEDERATION O F RI IODESIA

2 00

'"'-- ··'----""

AND NYl\SAlAND

UNCll\SSlflED
31294

Lurnmnba 1 s departure from
New York on 2 August apparently

frustrated Soviet plans to request
a Security Council me e ting on
the issue of Belgian withdrawal
from Katanga. 'l'he 'fASS chief
at the UN told correspondents
on l August that the USSR would
ask for a i:nooting while Lumuruba
was in Now York, and a Soviet

PART I

delegat~ after conferring
with the Congolese premier, met
with the UN Scc1·etariat 1·ega1·ding tho need fol' a Sec\lrity
Council ses sion. · ~'ASS a1111ouuc ed
on 2 August that 20 Soviet medical workers, including experience<
doctors and s urgeons, would leave
for the Congo in a few dn.ys--pl'esmnably the medical aid p~· oniiscd
on 3i July.
·

UN

' OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

SU~MARY

4 August 1960
1-loscow ha s s teppecl up its
efforts to discredit the UN role
in the Congo, and Soviet .officials in Leopoldville and in the
UN arc actively encouraging
Congolese authorities in their
demands for totitl Belgian with-drawal,
Soviet moves appear
aimed at stimulating hostility
among the Congolese toward UN
efforta and at dividing the
Afro-Asian staten from West~rn
members of the organization.
Mos co w propaganda has been
!specially critical of Hammar;kjold, charging that he is
;upporting the NATO colonial
?Owers 'by his "more than con~il ia tory position" and aggravating the sit~ation with his
" demagoguery. rt Dr. Bunche has
been accused of "directly par-ticipating" in Belgian attempts
to hring about an economic
: risis "in the Cougo in order to
di~credi t the J.umumba government,
and UN troops. have been charged
with acting as a shield to cover
Western military aggression.
Moscow continues to stress
the USSR's support for the Congolese Govet•nme'n t and its readiness to "take resolute measures
to rebuff the aggressors"--re -iterated in a Soviet statement
of 31 July--but there is no indication i~ rec~nt statements
that dispatch of Soviet forces
is contemplated, Citing the
NATO conn ti•ies as a group, the
Soviet statement ~lso accused
the "agg1•cssors and their 1.;ac-

compliccs' of trying to strangle
the Congolese Republic ec.onomically and smother its .indepe ndence
by armed force. A TASS report
of Lumumba's 28 July Washington
.press conference noted his remarks concerning a possible
appeal for US military aid , and
referred to "provocative" ques·tions from US reporters regarding
a request for Soviet help--apparently to play down the s ub .
j e ct of unilateral intervention
by the USSR.
Moscow announced on l Auguat the appointment of M. K.
Yakolev, former foreign minister
of the Russian Republic (RSFSR),
as ambassador to the Con~o. A.
Fomin, who arrived in Leopoldville with a small party of officials on 21 July aboard a So~et
food plane, has been named charg~
cl'affaires.
UN Technical Assistance

Hammarskjold is formulating
plans for UN technical assistance
to the Congo. Implelllentation. depends on the UN's success in securing its recognit;ion as the
controllin~ channel for assistance
from various F,overnments
and private groups and in persuading the Lumumba government to make its requests for
aicl to the UN. Hamm~.rskjold is
reliably said to be firmly opp'osed to ' . "freewheeling" on
the part of any group, including
the UN specialized agencies.
(SECfiE'1' NOFORN)
.

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~-----

5 AUGUST 1961 CHECKLIST (COPY)

2.

CONGO.

UN OFFICIALS IN THE CoNGO HAVE AGAIHH STATED THAT

THE UN WILL ROT OPPOSE ANY MOVES BY THE CENTRAL GOVERRJIENT TO REDiTE-

rGRATE

L-

KATANG:A , I

(b)(1 )
(b)(3)
MEA1f11HILE, IR
- - --

STARLKYVILLE, GIZENGA IS llAIHTAIHIRG •IS PUBLI<; SILENCE ~

---,
(b)(1)

_____________(r3)
NR

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C00898012
.
..

,

I

'

I

:

· Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C00898012

THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

18 SEPTEMBER 1961

~

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C00898012

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LATE ITEM

The UN has declared Hammarskold's plane missing, and an
e x tensive air search with US participation is n ow underway . An
unconfirmed broadcast from Rhodesia reports that the wreckage

~~r~e~~1ne has been sighted neal ' the Congo-Northern Rhodesia

For The President Onl y ~

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(b)(3)

C00898012

l.

2.

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Katan~a

a) There is no firm word -on the ·
whereaboµts : of .Jlammarskjold. Be
flew out of Leopoldville yesterday ,.
but did not arrive in Northern
Rhodesia for a meeting with Tshomb~,
as alleged in press reports.
Our
Embassy in Leopoldv ille believes
that his plane was lost near Kdolo
(Rhodesia), possibly shot down by
the lone Katangan jet.
b) As of this morning, UN units in
Elisabethville and Kamina were still
under severe pressure fr.om .Katangan
forces. ;
c) in Jadotville , the impromptu
cease-fire reported · yesterday now
appears to have broken down; the
UN relief column has still not
succeeded in pushing through.

situation

Berlin developments

_I

a) No concrete new measures of significance on the part of the Communists
have been reported . The bloc is now
focussing its propaganda on the W.~ st
(b)(3)
German jets incident.
b) The East Germans have asked for
temporary custody bt the two pilots,
and Soviet planes were noted reconnoitering Tegel airfield where the
west German planes are located .
6 ) Yesterday's East German local
elec tions appear to have eo~_o1_f~~~~
in routine fashi on .
(b)(1)

For The Preside nt Onl y-~

A

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C00898 012

3.

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Soviet nuclear tests

There may have been another test
today at the Arctic testing · ground.
The thh tc Jat;A test in the current
series occu~a in the same area
on Saturday,!
I
!There was another
one y~:at..e.r.da~alatinsk
area,

I

~-------~
I A
~na ~y
-s
~S-0

(b )(3)
(b )(1)
(b )( 1)

the 1 , 13, and 16 September tests
in the Arctic indicate that· the
devices may have been delivered by
medium-or short-range surface-toallistic missiles .
(b )( 1)

..I

4.

Assessment of Canadian
foreign affairs debate

The chief features of the recent
debate in the Bouse of Commons, as
seen by our Embassy in Otta~a were:
a) the government firmly supported
(b)(3)
the Western position on Berlin and
identified Berl!~ as an instance
of the world~wide· confrontation ·
between Soviet aggressive tendencies
and the fr.ee world;
b) the government called for firmness
of pur.pose an.d recognized the possibility· of ~•ar while urging
negoti~ti'o·ns for an honorable
settlement;
·
c) the'.gov·ernment announced new
defense measures;
d) the Liberal Party opposition
endorsed the government's position
on Berlin and NATO;
e) the government and the Liberals
vigorously castigated the USSR for its
resumption of nuclear testing, while
mildly criticizing the US for lack of
consultation in our decision to
proceed with te.s ting.
(b)(1)

Fer The Preside nt Only~

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1'0TES

(b )(1)

B.

J

l

J

c.
D.

Turkish security officials have imposed a ban on any public
d i scussion of the trials just GOncluded. There have been
no serious incidents stemming f~CJLtion"l of Mender es
(and his two former associates) l_
_J
The Iraqi military action against dissident Kurds during the
past week was apparently fairly successful and has probably
diminished the threat of a major insurrection. I
J
Afghan Fo~eign Minister Naim is reportedly
Washington trip following his visit t
os

(b)(3)

(b )(3)
I

consideri~g
OW···

a
now underway.
(b )(3)

E.

Both Moscow and
second US test.
r esumption has been

For The President

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A~~rove d

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TO~RET

~

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
:elliize.n:::ln this publication is based on all sources, including

(b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARN ING
This <;locument contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
a n unauthorized person , as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United Sta te.s or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United Sta tes.

(b)(3)

,,..,,ti•·:a. •
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~SE~

(b)(3)

I

B February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BU.L LETIN

CONTENTS
(b )( 1)

1. Laos: [
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

I
2. Congo: Kasavubu opposes enlarging the mandate of the
UN forces in the Congo. ( Pq,ge t)

3. India: New Delhi. has reportedly.purchased1
ltwinengine IL-14 transport aircraft from USSR~)

4. Turkey: Soviet ambassador
arns government
leaders ·t hat Soviet-American re a ons are improving
rapidly and Turkey may soon be "outside .th,e club." JPage H)

(b)( 1)

(b )( 1)

5. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin
(?ituahon. (Page t t t)

(b )(3)

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-•

c

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H

0

I

N

A

CHINA

"

I:

,.

T H A ILA N D

LAOS
R T(IJMUAR"' l96 l

li•1\·~rni1w 11t

(b)(3)

fun·es

G O\'t!1'111tl.'1 11

Antii.:rl\'e rnm enl

' 7,

Kn11i: L<! ' PathCI La" !or ros

- - --

Main route number
Road

-

T r ail

-- -

A.

Chl nusc N.i..1t i:rnalis1 Crn~.: ulars

2_5

Js 56

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75

160 K
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.1

(b)(3)

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. -

-~-

- - - - - - ---~

-- - ·

--

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 February 1961

DAILY BRIEF
Laos:

I

Hanoi on 7Tebruary broadcast a reGent interview with
Kong Le in which he expressed his thanks for aid from "the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries." This is the second recent pul:>lic reference to Soviet assistance for proCommunist forces in Laos. On 2 February, Chen Yi, Communist China's foreign minister, commented that Soviet
"support" was a "righteous action." Chen Yi's remark may
have been intended to justify his own offer of Chinese Communist support~ - "if Uie lawful government of Laos headed

I:

:onvanna Phonma" asks for it.

I

. ion~o: £Yresident Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bomboko ave expressed strong opposition to any plan which
-----~ would enlarge the mandate of the UN force in .t he .Congo.
They reportedly believe that such a move would infringe
on the Congo's sovereignty and feel that a UN attempt to
neutralize the Congolese Army would interfere with .t heir
planned operation against Kivu Province, which Bomboko
stated was imminent, At the UN, Soviet delegate

Zor.!!!J

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T

.
. - - - - ---'[ ·reiterated Moscow's position that elimination of Belgian inuence and the ·r elease of Lumumba were prerequisites for
a solution of the situation in the ·Congo. He opposed a neutralization of the troops supporting Lumumba until these
--:c~- conditlons had been fulfilled:l Stepped-up political and military activity in Leopoldviife" is coinciding·with indications
that Katanga may take a more· strongly separatist line under
the influence of Tshombe's new French miJltary adviser, who
stat~d on 4 Fe ru
that he believed. a unified Con o state is
unrealizable.
(Backup,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ __ __ _ _

_J

Pag·~
e --..-.

lr.idia-VSSR: Wew Delhi's determination to build up its
airlift capability in the Himalayan frontier regions apparentlv h~ led Indian officials to arrange fo
s f
J
JI · L- 14 C a; e trans orts.

- -1

(b )( 1)

c'.£( bf(3)

These twin-engine piston transports wil~appa;ently
supplement th~ -119 "Flying Boxcars" and
· N~ 12
. (Cub) turboprop . transports purchased last year rom the
(b)(1)
Un~ted States and the Soviet Union, respectively. Like the
AN ... 12s, whlch. are sched,uled to arrive i n India before April,
(b )(3)
the IL-.l4s are probably being purchased at bargai1,.__..u...u..;,,c,::i.___~
and for ru ees rather than hard foreign currency.
_

_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __

_

_ __

_ _ _ _____J(b)(3)

USSR-Turkey: rAs part of Moscow's effo.rt to induce the
Turkish GovernmeiW-to adopt a friendlier policy. toward .the
· USSR, the Soviet ambassador has been,
!warning Turkish ·leaders that Soviet-American relations are improvlng very
rapidly to a point where agreement might be reached which
~------' would leave Turkey "outside the club." The ambassador also delivered a note on 3 February ~quiring if reports in the lo~

8 Feb 61

DAILY BRIEF

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·., l»ress that NATO ffiBM bases ~re being constructed in Tur,, key are correct, The ·n ote reaffirmed .t he USSR 's desire for
\"good nei~hborly relations" and warned against any steps
that might draw Tu~key 'nto "dangerous ventures." Soviet
Wplomats employed s.imilar ·tactics following. Khrushchev's
~lslt to the US in 1959, accusing smaller NATO countries,
lncluqing Greece and Turkey, of being out of step with .the
f~new trend" in East~West relations: }
i. !llirkish ·Foreign Minister ·sarper has described Premier
P\lrEJel as "furious" ~t the Soviet ambassador's action but he
~l!JO expressed some apprehension over the possible reaction
. ~o the latest f°tt'At.....Jra~ hv the "more naive" officials in the
governmenQ[
'(Backup, Pag:.:::e:--4:11)~-------._ _ _ __ __ __ __J

CJ

CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has approved the .following conclusions reached
by its Speci~l Berlin Subcommittee which .reviewed the situation for the period 17 January 1961 through .6 February 1961.

1. . We are currently in an interim period during which
.the USSR is intent on reaching an assessment ot the new ·us
administration ~d the pos~ibilities of negotiating with the
West on major issues. Therefore, for the next few months
the USSR is unUkely to increase tensions over Berlin. However, should the Soviet leaders at any time during this period
esthnat~ that additional pressure would be ·calculated to bring
.the West more quickly to high... level negotiations with .the USSR,
they m.aY .increase the threat ot unilateral action in an e:(fort to
expedite.talks. ·

2. The East German control practices on the Berlin intersector boundary have not softened to the extent that.West

8 Feb 61

DAILY. BRIEF

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Germany had. been led to expect as part of the price for reinf;Jtituting ·the Inte.r zonal Trade agreements. However, the
.West German Economic Ministry is "still not unhopeful" that
· action will occur soon in accord with earlier assurances.
3. There. are indications that East Germany has begun
.on some of the necessacy long-range moves in an effort to
ma,ke its economy independent of Western imports and thereby
deprive the West of this le_yera~i!Lfuture negotiations over
Betlln.

8 Feb 61

DAILY BRIEF

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iv

(b)(3

~,.,.

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'-"

Tbe Situation in the Congo

....,

.

l

fr.r~sident Kasavubu anb J:i'o'te1gn Minister Bomooko, m
a conversation with the American charg~ in Leopoldville on
·aFebruary, expressed the belief that events are moving in
their favor in the political and military fields and that a
neutralization of the Congolese Army would reverse this trend.
They also reportedly feel that the UN wou.ld use any additional powers to the disadvantage of their government and might
eventually impose a trusteeship over the Congo. The charg~
comments that Kasavubu is unlikely to consent to such a program so Jong as he feels time is on his side-j

-

/A._ccording to Bomboko, an attempt by the UN to bring the
Congolese Army under its control would thwart the Leopoldville government's plans to mount a military operation against
Ki.vu Province within ten days. Bomboko and Kasavubu apparently believe that their chances for regaining ·control of
eastern Congo are fairly good as a result of disaffection among
Gizenga's troops. At the same time, Kasavubu stated that
Congolese officials were attempting to form a "provisional"
government which could be installed immediate~7

·-

l~mmarskjold has scoffed at Western concern for Kasa:vubu s position, stating that the Congolese President "has no
prestige." He continues to believe that a military solution to
the Congolese situation is impossible, and he reportedly feels
~hat Mobutu and Bomboko are too closely tied to Belgium to
have any future in the Congo. Hammarskjold feels that if they
are removed, Ka.savubu can be persuaded to form a constitutional government.)
_,..

(inriet UN representative Zarin told Ambassador Stevenson
on 6 February that the UN would not be able to deal with troops
which are subject to colonial dominatfon--presumably a reference to Mobutu's and Tshomb~'s forces--in the same manner
as those which support the "legitimate government." He questi-Oned ·whether the latter would lay down their arms until Lumumba·· is released and parliament is reconvened, Zarin also
reiterated the Soviet charge that Hammarskjold has failed to
carry out ~revious Security Council mandates:;'
{~.Colonel Roger Trinquier, the French officer who reportedly .ts to become the chief of Tshomb~'s Katanga armed forces,

...... _

8 Feb 61

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-...,_;
'..J
Cia.id a press conference on 4 February that a unified Congo
state is unrealizabl~. Pressure from Trinquier, whom previous reports had linked with separatist members of Tshomb~'s
government, may weaken Tshomb~'s willingness to maintain
his present tenuous contacts with Leopoldville and make it
even more difficult to bring Katamra into a federa.te.eLCon
(b)(3)

stat~

(b )( 1)

. 8 Feb 61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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India_'.'. ;,.rch;&se~ &lvlet IL-14 Transports [

' ,;

(b)(3)1

~jections by Indian military leaders to th
n:=e-:p=u=r=c"l:h=
as=e~o..,...
f _ _____
Soviet equipment appear to have been overruled recently by
econo~ic facto;rs, especially the gradually worsening foreign
exchange position, coupled with New Delhi's desire to demonstrate .its cordial relations with Moscow as a hedge against
Peiping in the ..Sino-Indian border dispute, These same factors, plus the desire for a high-altitude capability, led New
Delhi to seek MI-4 (Hound) helicopters from the Soviet Union
in late 1960. The failure of the demonstrator on its first
pr.oving fllgllts in the Ladakh area. has apparently stalled further negotiations for helicopteiij

__J

fihe reported purchase of IL-14.s reflects also the Defense
· Mintsfry's desire to relieve the mounting pressure on its fleet
of aging C-47 (Dakota) transports, which have borne the brunt
of New Delhi's logistic support of road-building crews and military for~es in the sensitive and remote Indo-Tibetan frontier
region] _

{ipe IL-14 is capable of operating at a·l titudes some 7,000-

8, 000 feet higher and carries about 2, 000 pounds more cargo than
the C-47. The USSR has substantial numbers of IL-14s in
civil air. service, but they are expected to be largely replaced
by the newer , higher performance TU-124 and AN-24. Nearly
100 otthese aircraft have been. furnished by the bloc to nonbloc countries. The purchase of IL-14s wi ll provide New Delhi
with, a stopgap aircraft until it decides on a more suitable C-47
replacement to be manufactured. in India. The cabinet is now
considering proto es desi ned b Lockheed and AVRO, a
British fi:_m.}

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S{>viet Attitude Toward Turkey
lince the overthrow of the
n eres regime last May,
the USSR has maintained a cautious but friendly attitude toward the Gursel government and sought to encourage the
Turkish. leaders to adopt a more independent foreign policy.
Khru,,hchev invited General Gursel to make the trip to Moscow which had been scheduled for last July by his predeces- ·
. sor but Gursel refused. While expressing disappointment
: that the ·new regime was not going to return to Ataturk's policy
of neutrality but was planning to remain in NA TO and CENTO,
Khrushchev indicated there was no reason why Soviet-Turkish
relations could not be gradually improve2)

~viet officials on a number of occasions have offered
Turkey economic aid, including credits of up to $500,000,000.
In a talk with Turkish Foreign Minister &trper in New York
last October, Khrushchev reiterated offers of Soviet assistance
and asserted that Turkey's membership in Western alliances
is not a major obstacle to better relations. He suggested that
the two countries establish a demilitarized zone along their
common frontier by withdrawing their forces "several hundred
kilometers," and observed that the Black Sea could be turned
into a "sea of peace. " Shortly thereafter, the Soviet ambassador in Ankar~ told a key Turkish government figure that the
USSR .is willing to demonstrate. its good will toward Turkey by
reducing its Black ·Sea Fleet and naval installations in the
area and by guaranteeing to respect the present Soviet-Turkish
bordei}
Gome members of the ruling military Committee of National Unity reportedly favor accepting economic aid from, and
improving relations with, the Soviet bloc, but such action would
run counter to popular feeling in Turkey. Both Gursel and
Sarper are co~mitted to maintenance of Turkev's drn~e t.iP.i:i j
with the We~ ---------------~·
I
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PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of state
The Under Secretary of state
The Deputy Under Secretary of state for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of staif
The Director, The Joint Staif
Chief of staff, United states Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United states Navy
Chief of Staff, United states Air Force
Commandant, United states Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint staif
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of staff, Inte lligence, Department of the Air Force
b'upreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Dep~rtment of Justice
The Attorney General
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
. The Director
National Security Age ncy
The Direc tor
National Indications Cente r
The Director

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TOP"1iECRET
~

-

,.

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary conce.rn is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with ari asterisk.
I Intelligencl in this publication is based on all sources, including

(b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-ls:now basis.

WARNIN.G
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person , as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3)

TOP

SE6RFT

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r

20 February 1961
CENTRAL IN.TELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Congo: Situation of Gizenga regime. remains chaotic;
Nkrum3.h calls Casablanca .Conference countries to
Accra to study .Con o uestion and ossibility of African high command.
(Page t)

2. Laos:. King's speech reaffirms Laotian neutrality and
sets stage for invitation to unonal.i gned neighbors" to
form neutral nations commission. (Page t)

3.

4.

5.

6.

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DAILY BRIEF
· Congo:. The situation of the Gizenga regime in Stanleyvill
continues to be chaotlc. ..Press sources hint that Chief of
/8-taff Lundula mav be about to negotiate with Mobutu. r--- -- L

.

(b)(31
(b)(1 )
(b)(3)

.

*Laos: King Savang's speech on 19 February reaffirmed Laotian neutrality and Galled for an end .to foreign intervention. The
~ng expressed the hope that C;;tmbodia, Burma, and Malaya woul
form a com.mission to come to Laos and ·"establish that the country.____ _
threatens no one and aspires solely to peace. " Although lt 'is too .
early for ·reports of International reaction to have been received,
the Pathet Lao radio, in an anticipatory denunciation of the ne~tral

1

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natlons commission proposal, on 1.8 February termed it
merely another US device to avoid reconvening the 19·54
(b)( )
3
ce._Sibi:tnOllk!i
Geneva Conference or holding Cambodia
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Situation in the Congo :
The internal situation in the Congo continues to preoccupy other African governments • .Ghana President
Nkrumah's ro osed an-African com and
!obtai1,-n...,,i_n_g _,,l..,..ts_ e_n-=
d-o_r s_e___ _.
~...,....,........,.__,........,.'i'i7i'cwp>TOe'e"'ar
i'ii'TyU"t"n---..aiYnwu;-;;ar;:;;Tiy;--;a;;itfithe C as ablane a conference of chiefs of state of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco,
and the UAR. Ceylon and Libya were represented by ob- ·
servers at Casablanca. .The five so-called Casablanca powers
have all recognized the Gizenga regime and, except for Ghana,
have withdrawn their troops from the UN Comm din the
Congo~

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::::===-===========~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-----r

Meanwhile, Moscow is continuing to a-yoid direct criticism or comment on US policy on the Congo question--an apparent attempt to cushion the impact on US-Soviet relations ·
of the USSR's extreme demands for a Congo solution. Soviet
propaganda treatment of both the President's press conference statement on the Congo and Ambassador Stevenson's
speech at the UN acknowledges that the US and Soviet positions are sharply opposed. Moscow refrains, however, from

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implicating. the US by name in its attacks against Belgium,
Hammarskjold, and the Congolese leaders. Implied crit.icisms of the US are conveyed only in references to Belgium's
NATO al,es and hv some n:uota.t.ioru:..trom foreign press
sources.
_J
.

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. J __,____

Unrest May Be Spreading in Portuguese Africa
Portugal's East African province of Mozambique is not
now experiencing unrest similar to that in Angola, but nationalist-inspired disorders occurred last summer in the northern part of the province, bordering on Tanganyil\a. Tribes~
men reportedly attacked Portuguese administrative posts and
staged large demonstrations in several areas . While most of
the tribesmen .were armed with their traditional weapo s . _ _ ____,
some of them may have been.carrying modern firearms

(b)(1)

The Mozambique government has been particularly con~
cerned over the inflammatory effect of foreign radiobroad~
casts. Radio Peiping announced last October that it was scheduling seven hours of Portqguese=language broadcasts per week
to Africa and described the Portuguese provinces as "the darkest areas" of Africa. Furthermore, there is fear that thous~
ands of Africans returni~g from work in the Rhodesias and
South Africa might spark extremi~t n~tionalist movements .
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Racial Disorders Threaten Northern Rhodesia
CTbe breaku.p of the conference on 19 February was
brought about by the inability of the British, Africans, and
Rhodesian whites to reconcile their differences over the
terms of the new constitution for Northern Rhodesia. African leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda, president of the United
National Independence party, and Harry Nkumbula, leader
of the rival African National Congress, have demanded that
Britain give the Africans a majority of the seats in both the
Legislative and Executive Councils. There are over 2,000,000 Africans as compared with some 75,000 Europeans in the
country, but the Africans have only nine members out of 30
on the Legislatiye Council and two of 10 on the Executive
Councif}
tw.hite settlers, on the other hand, have strenuously opposed any such increase of African influence. Prime Minister Welensky of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
has stated .that Southern . Rhodesia~~ a self~ governing colony
under settler control~- might secede from the federation if
Britain granted the Africans' demanct:9

(b)(1)

LAI

!fra nchise is envisaged for Southern Rho~
desia, where it has received support from moderate Afri~av

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~ationalist groups. However, the nationalists are better or-

ga,nized and more extremist in the protectorate of Northern
Rhodesia, where native leaders ar~ greatly influenced by the
recent political advances of African giroups in Nyasala.I!_<!)
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Hanoi Expands Subversive Appa.ratus in South Vietnam
The~ast

(b )(1)

h~

Diem could be overthrown in J·961- -has also been made by
high-ranking North Vietnamese officials.

I

I

(b )( 1 )

Ifeel that the presidential electionsI The
Communists evidently
scheduled for April will .

(b)(1)

provide excellent opportunities for stepped- up political and
paramilitary action.
The Communist strategy for the moment is apparently
to emphasize propaganda activities, inspire popular demonstrations, and promote small-scale violence, but to avoid
tests of strength with South Vietnamese regular military
units. Si11ce the end of December, Communist-initiated
clashes have.generally been confin~d to small-scale hit-andrun terrorist attacks, harassment of village offices and security posts, kidnapings, and murders. "Tax" collections from
the peasants du.r ing the current rice harvest are helping to finance much of the Communist program.
(b )( 1)
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• THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Execu t ive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Coope ration Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretory of the Novy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Ope rations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army ·
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commande r in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The J oint Staff
The Dire ctor for Intelligence, The Jo int Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Inte lligence, Department of Army
The Dire ctor of Naval Intel I igence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intell igence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
the Federal Bureau of Investigat ion
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Di rector
The United States Informat ion Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director

CONFIDENTIAL_

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I

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.

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C02001976
i

.

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
L
elligencJ n this publication is based on all sources, including

(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b )(3)

-,I OP SECRET
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5 April 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS

2. Congo: Relations still tense between Tshombe's farces
and UN in Elisabethville. (Page u)

4.

USSR ~India: Soviet. presidium member Suslov to.attend
Indian Communist party congress. (Page ttt)

5. Ceylon ~ Communist China: Annual
agreement renewed. (Page ttt)

rice~ rubber

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5 April 1961
,-~~~~~~~~~~~.l!!!LJ_L_.J__D.RJ,_.__._~~~~~~~~~~~~~----'

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.
;

Scatters .,fo rce
MOBUTU
3,.400

t

Coqullhatvllle

• Boende

ETHIOPIA
200

Scattered Forces

KiIona
INOONESIA
300
,~ ~ ­

®

Approximate area nominally controlled by:
D Kasavubu-Mobutu
Luanda
D Gize nga
D Kalonji
D Tshombii
~ United Nations Forces
- - Selected road
::;;.;;: Selected railroa d
Selected ai rfield

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STATU T E MILE$

400

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Cong_o: ·An agreement to return to the status quo at
Ellsabethvllle airport, with Katangan troops and a ~wedish
UN contingent exercising joint control, apparently has
(JI I<
papered over the immediate cause of the 3 April confronta- d,J.;..;t:;_j 17> :i.tion between UN and Katangan forces. The i.n cldent seems (..'j- ~../' 7P ~
to have .b een set off by the Katangans, who attempted to
o-1- -t... ~
block the airport runway and were apprehended and disarmed tJ
-o..
'
by the Swedes. TshomW's regime remains apprehensive that <¥- A~ ·3
the UN will attempt to airlift Indian troops into southern Ka- II 1 :f
tanga from Kamina. This distrust has been communicated
--t.. ().. ~
to the civilian population and the armed forces, and civilian
demonstrations against the UN occurred on 4 April.
fin a discussion in New York with··American and British
offiCrals, Hammarskjold indicated that he is hopeful relations between the UN and the Leopoldville regime will im~---~ prove. He remains adamant, however, that UN military
units must be readmitted to the port of Matadi in the near
future. He disclosed that in an effort to meet Congolese objections, his representative in Leopoldvllle was being in----~ structed to suggest that the force in the port might be limited to 100 Nigerian police for the time being. He said he
was asking for an early answer and stated that if no favorable reply were receiv~ed he would bring the question before the Security Council.
Soviet presidium
mber Brezhnev told the Swiss
ambassador recently that the USSR has little interest or
hopes in the Congo but is going to use the issue as a means
of obtaining its objectives concerning the UN Secretariat,
including the removal of Secretary Gereral Hammarskjold.
~Backup, Page 3)

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USSR-India: ~· A. Suslov, member of the .Soviet party
presidium and ·secretariat in charge of lia.ison with .f oreign
Communist par.ties, is reportedly scheduled to atte~d the
Indian Communist party's sixth congress which opens on 7
April. The decision to send Suslov, who has played a central role in the Sino-Soviet d1spute and particularly in the
drafting of the resolution at .the November 1960 conference
~---__,of Communist parties, is probably related to the deepening
split between those elements of the Indian party oriented toward Mos·cow and the group wnich generally follows the Peiping line. Suslov may also be bringing new instructions· to
- - - - - - 'the Indian party, reflecting the Soviet Union's concern that
India's foreign policy has been shifting toward the West in
the past few months. Soviet Ambassador to India Benediktov
r ·e cently commented to Indian Foreign Secretary Dutt on the
growing rapport between the Indian and US governments and
bluntly inquired if this renresented a change in India's policy
toward the USSB.l I

I

I

I

Ceylon - Communist China: Colombo and Peiping on 4
April signed the annual protocol to their second five-year
rice-rubber barter agreement (1958- 62). The 1961 protocol calls for a rE;lturn to the higher level of trade which obtained from 1953 through 1959. The resumption of previous
trade levels stems more from Ceylonese economic necessity
than from the neutralist Ceylonese Government's policy of
increasing the bloc's small share of the island's trade. Last
year Colombo eventually had to buy considerably more rice
from China than the reduced amount specified in the annual
contract. The Chinese rice commitment to Ceylon- ~ set at
200,000 tons for 1961 ~ ~ is to be met by re~ exports of the
rice Peiping is purchasing from Burma./

I

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Situation in Laos
A Soviet broadcast in Vietnamese on 4 April contended
that convening of the conference should not be made conditional on a prior cease-fire verified by·the ICC as proposed
by the British. Moscow ·radio also acknowledged that an
early truce in Laos would help create a favorable atmosphere
for negotiations. The broadcast, however, repeated the position taken in the Soviet note of 1 April that a cease- fire
should be concluded by the Laotian "parties" themselves. The
broadcast also urged that a "coalition government representative of a united Laotian peopleu be·formed prior to the international conferenc~ but "with the help of the member countries of that conference."
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Sltuation in the Congo
fi'he tension in Elisabethville is un e y o
er er
reported plans to move on Ka.halo in the northern
part of Katanga althou h the· operation may be delayed somewhat.
w i e and African units have been airlifted to Kon' - ----=------:-:-'
golo, north of Kabala, and a move southward is imminent.
l{ammarskjold stated on 3 April that in his opinion, the presence of Indian troops at Kamina had brought Tshomb~'s offensive to a halt and a resumption of the operation was unlikely.
However, the commanders in northern Katanga are likely to
base their estimate of UN military effectiveness on the refusal of the Nigerian troops at Manono to intervene in the battle there. The operation thus may be undertaken despite the
enlarged UN force in Ka.tang~
Tshomb~'s

~mmarskjold said_he believed that the Congolese in Leopoldville were becoming apprehensive of Tshomb~'s ambitions
and are happy to see the UN exerting pressure on Katanga. The
24-hour time limit set by Hammarskjold for a reply from Leopoldville probably is a bargaining position and subject to modification. Hammarskjold does feel, however, tha~ ;a prompt
. settlement~f the Matadi dispute is a prerequisite for an im..:
n .. n ..omont in relations between the UN and Leopoldvi110'7 [
.-- - - =1
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. USSR. Reportedly Will [ end llC Top Leader to IDdian"
Party Congress
·

{§_uslov, ·a leading Soviet ideologist, led delegations to the
French Communist party congresses in 1956 and 1959 and to
the Italian Communist party congresses. in 1956 and 1960.
He also visited Great Britain as a guest of the British Parliament in 1947, toured the Brussels World Fair in 1958,
and revisited England "informally" at the invitation of the
British Labor party to promote Anglo-Soviet relations . His
prospective trip to India, the first he has made to an Asian
country, points up the seriousness with which the Soviet
leaders view the inroads Chinese concepts have made in a
party in which USSR .h as long had the predominant influenc.51
(b )( 1)

there will be no Chinese delegates at
t:nepartycongress.
he Chinese had apparently intended to
have the delegation to the just concluded World Peace Council meeting in New Delhi. remain in India to represent them
at the congress. The Indian Government- -apparently de~
liberately discriminating against Peiping--reportedly turned
down the delegation's requests for visa extensions while approving visas for other foreign delegates. Nehru's government, while highly critical of any foreign influence in Indian
political affair s, may hope that the Soviet Communist party,
in contrast to the Chinese party, will exer cise a moderating
influence on the Indian partl:}
[Ihe last Indian Communist party congress was held in
April 1958 at Amritsar , where the par ty formally adopted a
"peaceful, parliamentary approach to power." Chronic factionalism among the Indian Communist leaders soon led to a
renewed struggle over party policy, and the dissension was
accentuated by the recent Sino-Soviet ideological dispute . A
series of ·executive meetings in February failed to br eak the
deadlock between the moderate and extremist groups . Leaders of the various factions are preparing for a showdown fight
at the national congress in Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, but
the final outcome is more likely to take the form of a compromise designed to 'hold the party together for the elections!

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next year. Suslov's presence will increase the pressure
on rival leaders to compromise their differencei!J
lfu.recent months, Indian policies on the Congo, on the
reorganization of the UN Secretariat, and on J.,aos have re(b )( 1)
(b )( 1)

_a.LU.U::.LL.JL.LLjCL_Uletetloratlon_o.Lindo- Soviet relations.

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'-' t:ONPtDENTlA I

-~

Colombo and Peiping Sign 1961 Rice-Rubber Contract
The first five-year barter agreement was negotiated in
late 1952. The conservative, pro-Western United National
party government then in office was motivated solely by economic factors : at that time rice was difficult to obtain and
world rubber prices were low.
Colombo has continued the exchange during the past eight
years because the arrangem·ent has provided a reliable source
of nearly half the: island's annual rice Jmport requirements and
a steady market for one of its three exports . . Since 1953 all
the annual contracts except last year's have involved a minimum
exchange of about 200,000 tons of rice for 30,000 tons of Ceylon's rubber.
Negotiation of the yearly contract takes place alternately
in Colombo and Peiping and normally is a routine process, although there occasionally have been protracted dispute.a over
prices ~ The lengthy discussions on the 1960 contract marked
the only occasion when the talks have taken a somewhat political turn; a few officials in the conservative caretaker regime
in power in Ceylon at that t~me hoped to reduce the island's
dependence on the pact, as well aa to free for sale at better
prices some of the rubber committed to Chin~ at fixed prices.
(b )(3)

ports.

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assi stant for Notional Security Affairs
The Scientific Advi ser to the President
The Director of the Budge t
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretory of State
The Director, Internationa l Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State fo r Politi cal Affairs
The Deputy Unde r Secretary of State for Administration
The Counse lor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intellige nce and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretory of De fense
The Secretory of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Se cretary of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chie f of Nava l Operations, United States No vy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U. S . Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commande r in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The J o int Staff
The Director for Inte lligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Inte lligence, Departme nt of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Na vy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intellige nce , Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General'
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commi ssion
The Chairman
The National Secu rity Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National lndi cations Center
The Director

CONF lfJENTIA 1

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SE~REI

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:

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including

(b)(3)

I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3)

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21 February
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS

4.

Iran-Iraq: Dispute over Shatt-al-·Arab River approaches
to Abadan refinery has again broken out. (Page it)

5.

USSR: · Gromyko says Khrushchev will not attend UN
Gene.ral Assembly session resuming 7 March. (Page tit)

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21 February 1961

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1

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Iran-Iraci: The long-smoldering dispute between Iraq and
Iran over navigation rights on the Shatt-al-Arab River, which
21 Feb 61

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2___ _ _ _ __ _ __.
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controls the approaches to the oil refinery of Abadan, has
again broken out. Iranian insistence on 17 February that hence·forth its personnel, rather than Iraqi pilots, handle tankers
calling at the refinery has halted tanker traffic, Heretofore,
only Iraqi pilots have worked on the run to Abaqan. As many
as two dozen tankers, chartered by the consortium of Western
oil companies .which operates· Iran's oil industry, are probably
already involved. Meanwhile a shortage of storage space has
forced the Abadan refinery to cut back production irom the normal 350,000 barrels a day to less than a third of this figure on
20 February. Output probably will be cut further-.-perhaps to
50,000 barrels a day--in an effort to avert a complete shutdown,
which would fUrthe..r.....weaken Iran's already strained economy,
I
!Page 7) (Map)
.

fussR: Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Finnish foreign ~r recently that neither he nor Khrushchev will
attend the UN General Assembly session, which resumes on
7 March. He stated, however, that Khrushc hev was still willing to come to the US for talks with the President. Gromyko's fL-0
remarks suggest that Khrushchev has reversed his decision
since First Deputy Premier Kosygin's assertion to the West
German ambassador in early February that Khrushchev would
attend the UN meeting. The Soviet premier probably recognizes that his decision to exploit Lumumba's death to the maximum and renew his attacks on Hammarskjold will make a s harp
US-Soviet clash unavoidable, and that his personal participation in such a debate would undermine the prospects of a meet[ g with the President during the ~ sesslon:r \

CJ

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Situation in the Congo
The conciliation commission is subordinate to Hammarskjold's Congo advisory committee, and its members
are nominally divorced from the policies of their governments. On it are represented those African and Asian
nations which have had troops in the Congo-- with the exception <;>f Guinea, Mali,. Indonesia, and the UAR, which
refused to participate because the commission refused to
recommend outright the reinstatement of Lumumba's
"legitimate government." As a rest4t of the absence of
these neutralist states, the commission has definite moderate and pro-Western leanings.
Since its recomm,endations use the Ileo government as
a starting point for re-establishing a national regime, the
report is likely to be pleasing to Kasavubu. However,
Tshomt>e, who is now almost completely isolaJ:ed inte~­
nationally and who is currently pushing a military campaign to consolidate his position, will probably be unwilling to accept it; in .fact, recent reports indicate that
Tshombe and his entourage are unlikely to accept any
·reconciliation proposals in .their presep.t mood.
The reaction of the Gizenga regime wUl probably depend
on the dissidents' estimate of their ability to resist continued
economic, political, and military pressure from a broadly
based Leopoldville government. Although Gizenga's position
apparently i~ weakening, he has little to hope for ~n a rap·prochement with Kasavubu and would be reluctant to accept
a political solution imposed by the UN q.nless assured of sigL
icanUnfluence
the .L eopoldville government. ~j-----~

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The S'natt-al-Arab Question
Between the Persian Gulf and a point a few miles north
of Khorramshahr the Iranian-Iraqi_frontier runs along the
low-water mark on the Iranian shore of the Shatt-al-Arab except for two short stretches opposite the major Iranian ports
of Khorramshahr and Abadan, where it follows the thalweg
--the middle of the river--so as to leave these two ports in
Iranian waters. Sea-going vessels bound for these Iranian
ports thus have to pass through Iraqi waters. Navigation
on the river is governed by the Iranian-Iraqi treaty of 4 July
1937.
For several years Iran has periodically agitated for a
commission to negotiate changes in the 1937. treaty and has
threatened to take unilateral action if Iraq refuses to co-operate. This treaty recognizes mo st of the Shatt as Iraqi territorial waters. Tehran has complained that the treaty was
inva~id ·· because it was signed under British pressure. Despite this view, Iran was willing to leave control of the Shatt
to Iraq as long as the Basra Port Authority was, for practical
purposes, under British control.
An important change in the Iranian position took place
following the July 1958 coup in Iraq whicb brought Qasim to
power. Viewing the Qasim regime as .basically unfriendly
and wary of the presence of Soviet technicians in Basra,
Iran began to demand a greater voice in control of the Shatt,
including adoption of the thalweg principle along the entire
length of the river. Since 1958 there has been a series of
incidents between the two cruntries. Iran's present insistence
on use of its pilots· is its most ambitious effort thus far to
pressure Iraq to begin negotiating. However, fully a third
of Iran's ·oil production of more tban 1,000,000 barrels a .
day is refined at Aba.d an, and with an already shaky economy
~ent c ould i II afford m re than a token shutdown.

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CON/i'ID£VTIAL
21 Feb 61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to t he President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, Natrona! Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, Notional Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
Th!3 Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State 'for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Di rector of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defe nse
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Se cretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Nava l Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Eu rope
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Di rector, The Joint St~ff
The Director for Inte lligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The qirector of Naval Intelligence , Department of Navy
The Assistant Chi ef of Staff, Intelligence, Deportment of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
lhe Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The Nati onal Security ,Aeency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indicati ons Center
The Director

CONfilDENTJA L.

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including

I

I

.

(b )(3)
I

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionag·e
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
forei _n
b.e.J:if.triment oLthe United Stat. =-- - - - - -- - ---,

TOP SEGREL
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02026615

(b)(3)

C02026 6 1 5.

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I

=1
3 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS

1.

Congo:· I
!concerned over the
explosive atmosphere developing between the UN command and Congolese for ces. (Page t )

2.

France-Algeria: Bourguiba reportedly convinced ·
Abbas should respond to De Gaulle's overtures; some
rebel leaders still distrustful of negotiations with
France. (Page tt)

· ~";,i\\i

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4.

Laos. (Pags tt)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 March 1961

DAILY BRIEF
*1ongo: Ambassador Timberlake ls extremely concerned ( ' k
overt e explosive atmosphere developing between the UN com-.·- . x3~
mand and Congolese forces. He says the UN command seems ..._,_... L.!f:u
increasingly likely to use a display of force which he fears would fl-L
complicate rather than solve the problem and could spell dis- .;J.,.L:.__.4..t ..-~
aster for the UN effort in the Congo. Press reports that Ham-"///,;z ;, ;
marskjold has asked UN special representative Dayal to remail.{"~ &
for "some months," if confirmed, will exacerbate the situation,i -t.L~
in view of the alrea~y ac_ute antipathy between Da al and the ·c
,,.:±,
ConP.9lese government.
;) -i...tl • .~
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(.aelglum's ·announcement that lt will withdraw its troops I )J..t ,j ~,,.;.,~,•..o
from the Kamina and Kitona bases by 15 March and "invite"
/- ;/> .
Belgian mercenaries to return home will probably be regarded /" 3
by pro-Gizenga states in the UN as only token acceptance by
Belgium of demands that all Belgian military personnel and advisers be removed from the Congo. Hammarskjold has indicated
he hoped the Belgian announcement would meet Indian conditions
for fUrnishing more troops to the UN Command. The Belgian
action will not necessarily influence the numerous Belgian advisers to Tshomb~ in Katanga, or the nearly 1,000 non-Belgian
Euro eans re ortedl servin in Tshomb~'s arm hl

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C:::020 2 66 1 5

France-Algeria: lTunisian President Bourguiba now seems
convinced that D~ Ga~e has dee ided all aspects of colonialism
must dis.;:i.ppear from .Algeria, even to the point of full independence. Bourguiba reportedly went from .Paris to Rabat determined to induce rebel premier Ferhat Abbas to respond to De
Gaullets overtures. Bourguiba is presumably aware that some
rebel ieaders are distrustful of negotiations with France.
~
.Previous reports have raised the question whether all rebel
military commanders would comply with orders to end the
fighting, should such orders be given by the provisional Algerian
government in the course of negotiations with De Gaulle. The 1
March joint communiqu~ issued by Abbas, Bourguiba, and King
Hassan of Morocco declaring that the way is now open to direct
negotiations for :Algerian independenc·e in a North African framework suggests that Tunisia and Morocco desire to have some role
.in French-rebel negotiation8;j
[
~Backup, Page 3.--..-- - - -- - - - - -- --'

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*Laos: @ouvanna Phouma, who returned to ~hnom Penh on ~
1 March after a week in northern .Laos, is reported to have reac
a decision with his supporters in Pathet Lao - held territory tha
a 14-power conference is the only means to a peaceful solution

·°2__

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Ghe Laotian crisis.

,--- - --

_
_
_
_
_
_ __
_
_
_ __j General Phouml, meanwhile,
says he still hopes to confer with Souvanna, but is proceeding
with separate plans to .revamp the Boun Oum government regardless of Souvanna's attitude toward accepting a post\
lSouvanna is reported to have found the Kong Le - Pathet
Lao troops "extremely well organized," with high morale, and
actively recruiting new personnel. The Plaine des Jarres area
held by these troops ls said to have been completely brought
under the Communist way of life; Communist slogans,--and -leftist outh roups are prominent t,h oughout the area.

l __

1

REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Probable Communist Reactions ~o Certain US Courses
of Action With Respect to Laos. U.S. I. B. SNIE 58-61.21 ·
·February 1961. 0036778. (TOP SECRET)
Prospects for Iran : Stability of the Shah's .Regime, the Role
of the Mllitary, the Economy, and Foreign Policy Toward US
and USSR. U.S. I. B. NIE 34-61. 28 February 1961. -(SECRET)
Comparison of Capital Investment in the US and the USSR,
1950-59. Bibliography, graphs, tables. 0. R.R. CIA/RR ER
61-7. 57pp. February 1961. (UNCLASSIFIED) ·

3 Mar 61

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Situation in the Congo

.~----.,.-----0----_j~elieves that Hammarskjold
and his staff have been so conditioned by Dayal's reporting
that they might consider any incident to be the ''final st a . ._
" _ __
Iond. fpp] tbot the I
me for a display of force.

Although Congolese soldiers lack tne wn1 to ngm eacu ou1er-as illustrated by the recent Luluabourg inctdent--they would
probably fight UN troops, especially in the present atmosphere
of Congolese suspicion and distrust of the UN. Kasavubu's
speech of 27 February "mobilizing" the country against UN
"tutelage" and calling for volunteers has, according to a Brussels broadcast of 2 March, already produced over 12,000 .' reservists and volunteers--probably more than the Leopoldv,ille
government can arm. I
Jfeels that· UN
troops would win any actual battle with cong01e e forces--but
that Congolese troops elsewhere would retaliate against Europ~ans and isolated UN personnel.

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De-Gaulle - Boorguiba-Ta.!Ks-

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(9ne of De Gaulle's major objectives in inviting Bourguiba
to visit Paris was to convince the Tunisian President of his
w~llingness to negotiate a settlement of the Algerian war and
to have this impression conveyed to the leaders of the provisional Algerian government. De Gaulle probably hoped thereby
to strengthen the moderate wing of the rebel movement and encourage steps toward negotiations on terms acceptable to France.
De Gaulle has in the past indicated that he will insist on guarantees for the Europeans in Algeria and for certain French economic interests and military base rightSJ
Uollowing his Paris conversation with De Gaulle, Bourguiba told Ambassador Averill Harriman in Rabat he believed
there was no longer any real difficulty on the French side. He
said De Gaulle understood the necessity of preventing a recurrence of the stalemate last June when preliminary talks failed
to settle .even matters of protocol. Bourguiba is optimistic
that De Gaulle will free rebel leader Ben Bella and give sympathetic consideration to the release of political prisoners detained by the French in Algeria;J
G.n an ·effort to move the rebels to negotiations, Bourguiba
has broadcast to the Algerians in Tunisia stressing his conviction of the. genuineness of De Gaulle's intentions. Bourguiba
apparently has in mind, however, that negotiations could fail
because of the inability of the moderate leaders to control all
factions of the rebel movement. Some 15,0QO to 20,000 rebel
fighters operate in Algeria with only a minimum of coordination and control by the rebel government in Tunis. If these
forces object to a moderate. settlement and continue military
and terrorist activities,.De Gaulle might halt political negotiations:)
·

[In another report on the Bourguiba - De Gaulle conversation,
Habib Bourguiba, Jr. , recently nominated as Tunisian ambassador to the US, said that De Gaulle "silenced" French Premier
Debre, whose statements had nearly prevented the Bourguiba De Gaulle meeting. Debre, while on a visit to the Sahara, said
in a public statement that France intended to remain there:J

3 Mar 61

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·
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meeting".
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Politi cal Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Polley Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defensti (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint StaH
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel I igence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of lnvesti"gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
.
The National Indications Center
The Director

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C02'415912

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I V r
4::11 £..'-'--ns..a.__

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
IntelliP-ence
this publication is based on all sources, including

r

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

.

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4 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS

1.

Situation in Laos. (Page t)

2. Congo: TshomM's position in Ma.nono apparently
not yet secure. (Page t t)

3.

France-Portupl: Maneuvering against US on UN
Cuban issue. L

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PHO N G SAL Y

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I
SAYABOURY f.

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M
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SAM NEU A

e Xicng Kho•,ong"

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V I ENTI A N E

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Kam Keut

• •

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KHAMMOUANE

\

NORTHERN LAOS

:

~·~~~'~:·~ ;~THET

LAO

t F~~~~::;

·1. •

KONG LE - PATH ET LAO AREAS


I

ROAD
TRAIL

-..

.... _,,,

0
50
JOO
L..............._._...._...._...._.._.._.......,
STATUIE MILES

ROUTE NUM BER , . - - - - - -- --

... L•I

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 April 1961

DAILY BRIEF

Laos: Vientiane has adopted an official position of "no
comment" pending study of the Soviet reply to the British
proposal; privately, however, General Phoumi and Premier
Boun C>.im are taking a gloomy line over prospects, stressing . the weak military situation. A country team appraisal
of the military situation in Laos underscores the defensive
psychology of the Laotian Army which is enabling the aggressive enemy forces to fight at a tempo of their own choosing,
and to build up strength for attack on any point. According
to this appraisal, General Phoumi appears increasingly to
feel that the Laotian Army alone will be unable to control
the military situation and is increasingly anxious for outside
help.
Major elements of the government force which withdrew
from Tha Thom have reached Borikhane, and some control
over them has been established. Other government units in the
area have been ordered farther north to make contact with the enemv
in an effort to stabilize the situation. I

i

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TOP--sEbR.EI

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~--~~~;;~•.APP.E9Y.~~J9f..~~!-~-~-~-~- ; _?._01 ~I0?.!9.?..99.?.~1__5~-~ ~.,{~~ff;j~!,~tf~ ·1,~¥%~~~~

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l t ¥emen a

..

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MOB UTU
800

-t'- Coquilhatville

.

Basoko

• Boende

ETHIOPIA
1,500

ETHIOPIA

200

Ike la _-

GIZENGA

~
7.000
--r.....___..

+
~.

'

•' I

I '

-r-

B ukavu
Kindu r - - - - .
NIGERIA
500

Scattered Forces
.;

-

r--.--~ncqui
GHANAl
1600

~

~sumbura

Kl\LONJI
l,500

Ki Iona
NIGERIA
900

•Manono

IN DO NES IA
300

®
Lu an d ~

Approximate area nominally controlled by:
D Kasavubu·Mobutu
D G1zenga
D Kalonji
D Tshombe
[][] United Nations Forces
- - Se lected road
Selected railroad
Selected airfield

"tz

0

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Congo: Tshomb~'s position in Manono apparently is not
yet secure, although the reinforcements sent there on 1 April
will make a Baluba counterattack difficult. Baluba snipers
reportedly are infiltrating the Ka.tanga army lines and are
inflicting casualties on Tshombe's white mercenaries. The
mercenaries, who seem to be the only reliable and aggressive elements of Tshom~'s forces, apparently are becoming increasingly nervous. Further operations by Tshombe
will also be hampered by the 1, 700-man Indjan UN contineent
which is being flown to netrby Kamina.
J (Map)

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Laos
The apparently growing number of North Vietnamese involved on the enemy side is particu~rly discoul_"aging to General
Phouml, according to American officials in Vientiane. American military personnel formerly stationed at Tha Thom describe the actions taken by the enemy forces during the six
weeks preceding the town's capture on 31 March as "professional" and not of a type that could be executed by the average
Pathet Lao. Three Soviet IL-14s on apparent air-drop missions in the Tha Thom area were seen by reliable observers .
on 31 March, and additional drops in the same general vicinity
reportedly occurred on 30 March. So sudden and furious was
the enemy action at Tha Thom that it appears that all the government's crew-served weapons, including two 105-mm. howitzers, were captured intact.
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Senior American officials in Vientiane believe that the
leadership of both the Laotian Army and government is "terribly uncertain" and vulnerable to factors and forces over
which the leaders feel they have little control. One such factor is the enemy's military potential, which General Phoumi
feels is greater than his own at this time. A second crucial
factor is US political, economic, and military support; if this
appears to weaken or waver, a further loss of confidence can
be expected, and with rapidity.
In his recent discussions with Admiral Felt, Phoumi revealed that he has a standing agreement with South Vietnam
for a Vietnamese division to enter southern Laos as an intervention force in case he asks for assistance. He stated that
he has not yet called for entry of this division since the__situation does not warrant intervention .

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Soviet propaganda has underscored Moscow's contention
that the way ls now .open for a peaceful solution in Laos. President Kennedy's remarks on the 1 April Soviet reply to the British proposals on Laos have been widely circulated. Moscow
radio carried the text of the President's statement and reported
that it ls carried in full in the 3 April issue of Pravda. Soviet
broadcasts have also reported· an article in the Peiping People's
Daily of 1 April which called for an enlarged Geneva conference
as the "only way" to solve the Laotian problem. Moscow, in
broadcasting the remarks made by Chen Yi in Djakarta, omitted
any reference to his threat to send Chinese troops to Laos. The
Soviet broadcast quoted Chen Yi as saying that Peiping "will not
remain indifferent in the event SEATO launches direct military
intervention in Laos."
Terming the Soviet reply to the British note "practical and
correct," Hanoi's official newspaper Nhan Dan on 3 April called
for prompt convocation of an international conference. The
conference also was endorsed by Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong and by the Xieng Khouang "government." Souphannouvong, in a 1 April statement, and Souvanna Phouma's Xieng
Khouang "representative'' Qulnim Pholsena, in a statement of 2
April, both demanded withdrawal of "US, Thal, South Vieblamese,
and Kuomintang military personnel." The emphasis on this withdrawal suggests it is a point which may be used to prolong any
cease-fire negotiations such as the USSR s d
ld be held be.._,,.=-~
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tween the "interested partle s of Laos."
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Situation in the Congo
Tshomb~'s white mercenaries from South Africa reportedly are annoyed by the Belgians in command of the African units
at Manono. The Belgian officers apparently are taking credit
for the capture of the town, although their .A frican troops reportedly refused to fight and the brunt of the fighting was borne
by the white legionnaires .
.
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In Belgium, Paul-Henri Spaak, who apparently expects to
be named the next foreign minister as a result of the 26 March
elections, reportedly believes that Brussels has been helping
Katanga too extensively and that more effort should be expended
in support of the Leopoldville regime. The Belgian caretaker
government reportedly agreed on 24 March to make available
to Leopoldville $4,000,000, but the actual turnover of the funds
is likely to be delayed.
In New Delhi yesterday, Nehru took note of the "campaign
against Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal" and made public his opposition
to the replacement of Dayal now "or in the near future." He
said removal of Dayal "would also have some effect on the maintaining of our forces" in the Congo. Dayal, the Indian diplomat
who has served as Hammarskjold's personal representative in

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the Congo, is now in New York for consultations and is not expected to return to the Congo for several weeks. Dayal alienated
many Congolese official~ and there has been apprehension in Leopoldville that his return may generate new tensions and nossthlv
touch off new anti- UN disorders. !.___ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___,

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France May Use Cuban Issue in UN to Press US
France has continually opposed what it considers the
United states' indiscriminate efforts to win the political support of the Afro-Asian states in the UN. Paris is motivated
partly by fear of establishing precedents which will pave the
way for increased UN activity in Africa to the detriment of
French interests, particularly in Algeria. Principally, however, De Gaulle views the UN as a heterogeneous mixture
numerically dominated by new states ~ fundamentally incapable of action but increasingly tending to assume the responsibility of the large powers for the maintenance of peace.
The US vote in the Security Council on 15 March in favor
of the Liberian resolution calling for UN consideration of the
Angolan question probably was the immediate occasion for
the French suggestion to the Portuguese. Various French
political commentators have recently berated the US for
failure to "stand with its allies"" The influential and usually
pro-American Raymond Aron said in an article on 22 March
in Le Figaro that the US "double standard" will backfire when
"the Marxists train their guns on US 'imperialism' in Latin
America." Paris can be expected to continue to urge the other
colonial powers to utilize the Cuban resolution or any similar
resolutions, particularly those critical of US policy in Latin
America, as an opportunity to make this point forcefully .
Lisbon's sharply hostile reaction to the recent US vote
suggests that it will give serious consideration to the French
tactic. Portuguese officials believe the US position has encouraged Afro-Asian attacks on the colonial powers, and Lisbon has been seeking ways to induce the US to change its African policies. The vitriolic anti-American press campaign
and demonstrations in Portugal have linked the US stand with
that of the Soviet Union and have singled out Ambassador
Stevenson as the chief villain. A leading editorial on 29 March
in the government-controlled newspaper Diario de Noticias
stressed that the US bases in the Azores had been granted with
the understanding that Portuguese sovereignty would be respected in all of the Portuguese colonies, that Portugal had

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only joined the UN on the insistence of the US and :Britain, and
that the loyalty and solidarity Lfsbon had given the NATO alliance had been forgotten.
The Cuban request for UN General Assembly consideration of "the clear threat to international peace and security"
posed by "the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention" of the United states against the Cuban Government was
originally submitted last October. Cuba has subsequently
further detai~ed its c~rges against the U: i:~:ver:l f:~mal
complaints circulated m the UN. I
__ __ . __ _ ._
j
jindonesia and uumea 1 t su mi a resolution in the General Assembly recommending that the US
and Cuba make every effort to settle their differences b eaceL ful means... in bilateral discussions,"

(b )( 1)
(b )( 1)

(b)(1)

vernment is actively pushing such a resolution.
For some weeks, Cuba's public position has been that it
is willing and anxious to engage in bilateral discussions with
the US, provided such discussions are on a ''basis of equality
and with an open agenda," but that the present US attitude prevents such discussions. In its note of 8 March rejecting the
Argentine offer of good offices toward easing US- Cuban ''differences," Havana reiterated these views but added, "The
conduct of the US Government and the statements of its officials" would make anr effort toward bilateral discussions
this time "useless."

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Ntobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Deportment
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretory of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defens~ (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Stoff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U. S. Rep., Mili tary Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intel Iigence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligen ce, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chie f of Stoff, Intelligence , Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Securi ty ~ency
The Dire ctor
The United States Information ~ency
The Director
The Nat ional Indications Center
The Di rector

-CONFI9ENTLAL
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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415921
1ur~

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
wi.th as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence_in_trs publication is based on all sources, including

(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in th e light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligen ce items
may be c:tisseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting th e national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an un authorized person , as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b )(3)

~ ....... ~--

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415921

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COZ4 1 5921

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0241 5921
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2B April 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS

1. Laos. ( Page t )
2. Congo: Hammarskjold sees Congo problem as in
"most hopeful" new phase. (Page i tt )
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

4. Nepal: Plans of exiled le ade r in India to ous t King
Mahendra. ( Page t ti)
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)
A pproved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0241 5921

c o 2·4 15 921

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28 Apr 61

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C02415921
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 April 1961

DAILY BRIEF
Laos: The Pathet Lao reportedly have rejected General
Phoumi's proposal that cease-fire negotiations begin today in
Luang Prabang, and have repeated their suggestion that the
talks be held in Xieng Khouang town. Vientiane subsequently
issued a declaration calling for a cease-fire to become effective at noon on the same date. In an effort at compromise, the
Boun Oum government plans today to attempt an informal contact with the Pathet Lao in the Vang Vieng area to establish the
time and place for future discussions. Meanwhile, Laotian and
foreign dignitaries, including Prince Sihanouk, are converging
on Luang Prabang for the funeral ceremonies for the late King.
Thus far, there has been no definite word as to whether Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao representatives will attend.
*No major military developments have been reported,~b_u~t--~
Communist pressure on government positions continues.I

The Watch .Committee in a special meeting on 27 April examined the statii'S";;i 516'C-iii'.iiTiarfforc.es in relation to a possible
ove:::-t bloc military intervention in Laos, and issued the following
statement;
We have re-examined the ~~Y-..S_li.\l!!-ti~n-~~--"S!'!-2.'\ No,rth
Vietnam, an~££p,~m!:'.J.~l3l.¢.h\.'!~.~E,_re!a,t12n,. fc03_e .rece~t Communist militar}'. ov.eratlons in Laos and see no devefopment whiCh
would suggest anv~C!CfecF"Glte"r've'nhcin bv outside Communist forces
at this time. I

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b )( 1)

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~~Pe<;-vedj~ ~~!~~s.e: 2016101105 co241 5921

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No other
military movements related to Laos by either Communist
growid or naval forces outside of Laos have been discerned.
It is to be noted, however, that Commwiist forces have a
ca11ability of intervention with little or no warning. I

J

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DAILY BRIEF

ii

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ETHIOPIA

UDO

, + .isaa
S1.. ,11tered for c.n

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3 ,400

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Bukavu
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:ysville

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Matadi
Kilona

INOONE SI A

8 70
Approxi mate area nomi nally controlled by:
D Kasavubu- Mobulu
D G1zenea

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Kalon11
Tshombe

[QQ] Uml•?d Nations Forces ( Service For ces
Sele1;ted road
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CENTRAL IN'T'F.T.T.Tn RNrH' "QTTLLETIN

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C02 41 592 1
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Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold, noting signs
of improved relations between the UN and the Kasavubu government, has characterized the Congo problem as in a "most
hopeful" new phase. Commenting on the political difficulties
besetting President Tshombe, Hammarskjold observed that the
UN's task would be "keeping Kasavubu close and Tshombe low."
He indicated that while Dayal would have to return to the Congo,
be might shortly be removed by substituting a five-man commission for the post of senior UN representative.
The circumstances surrounding Tshomoo's detention at
Coquilhatville continue obscure, with spokesmen for the Leopoldville government denying that he is under arrest. Reports
that Interior Min~ster Munongo has seiz~wer in Kat~
/__'
are unconfirmed.
(Backup, Page 4r1 Map)
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Nepal: Following recent conversations in New Delhi with
Nehru and Defense Minister Menon, Nepali Con_gress party resistance leader Subarna ShumshereC
__

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iii

DAILY BRIEF

~I

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,.'" ", a" 'lj·~-.t~tt~'.?~~~t~~~~;~*(~~~i~~: ~y ~ ~· '·'.?~~i:~ f1i::'ii f;;~~~~trJt~'~l~~'iZ;:,. t.:~A~)b~q;\t~f -

· ··· , .,...

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 c o2415921 ·

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i· ·. ··

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!~lans an "all-out" effort against King Mahendra in mid~JWle .

-

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Subarna, who has been in India i:;lnce the King's takeover in
Katmandu in December, recognizes that his plans are dependent on. the success of his efforts during the coming month to obtain arms and additional financing. Nehru, who has been disturbed by the King's autocratic actions, reportedly again assured
Subarna of his "sympathy," but the degree of sunnort which New
Delhi will give Subarna is at present WlClear. j
(Backup, Page 5)
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t ,··

SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Soviet C~abilitiesJn__Q~_
_ · Hes. U.S. I. B . NIE 11- 5-61.
25 April 1961.[
I

(b )(3)

Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany.
U.S . I . B. NIE 11_- 7- 61. 25 April 1961. I

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Possibility of Soviet Nuclear T-esting During the Moratorium.
U.S. I. B. NIE 11-9~61. 25 April 1961.

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28 Apr 61

. .

DAILY BRIEF

iv

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Situation in Laos
North of Phou Khoun junction, on Route 13, enemy artillery and mortar fire continues to harass government troops
occupying blocking positions on the southern approach to Luang
Prabang. However, ground r econnaissance revealed the arrival in this area by 26 April of a 20-truck enemy convoy, and
the local government commander is expecting an imminent attack. On 25 April, aerial reconnaissance had spotted probably
the same convoy of 20 vehicles--including two-and-one-half-ton
trucks and armored cars--heading west along Route 7 from the
Plaine des Jarres. Below Vang Vieng, shelling of the government battalion just north of the Nam Lik continues, and there
are some indications that the enemy will attempt a flanking
movement.
North of Luang Prabang, the former garrison force at Muong
Sal is withdrawing southwest from that post without apparent

enemy pursuit. However, the enemy force , estimated at three
battalions with artillery and mortar support, is considered capable of advancing virtually unopposed toward Luang Prabang at
any time of its choosing. MAAG personnel evacuated from Muong
Sai report that the accuracy and timing of the enemy artillery ,
mortars , and heavy weapons during the attack indicated that
highly trained troops were involved. In the Pak Sane area, the
enemy has undertaken small-scale probing attacks on Borikhane .
(SECRET NOFORN)
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Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin on 25 April indicated the USSR 's displeasure with the UK's announcement following the joint cease- fire appeal that it would not attend the
conference without prior verification of an effective cease-fire.
Pushkin's remarks apparently were designed to lay the groundwork for placing the blame on the West for any postponement
or collapse of the Geneva conference· scheduled to begin on 12
May. The Soviet official reiterated Moscow's position that only
the Laotians themselves could work out cease-fire arrangements
and that this was not the responsibility of either the UK or the
Soviet Union.
Communist propaganda is already seeking to place on the
US and Vientiane the onus for any failure to reach a truce in
Laos. Hanoi on 27 April quoted a Pathet Lao radio charge that
the Phoumi - Boun Oum forces have "launched new attacks" and
that the Vientiane government does not really want a cease-fire.
Hanoi also quoted Khamsouk Keola, acting premier of the Xieng
Khouang "government: ' as warning that in the face of defeat the
"US and its followers" have called for negotiations to gain time
to "consolidate their forces and launch a new attack."
Enlarging on the Peiping government's statement of 26 April,
a People's Daily editorial commented on the "aspects" involved
in 11bringingaoout" a cease-fire. The Chinese called for a "check"
on assistance to Phoumi, the withdrawal by the US and its allies
of all military personnel and equipment in Laos, and the expulsion of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars. Insisting that a ceasef.i re can "only" be achieved through negotiation between the "par~
ties concerned," the Chinese indicated that the prospects for a
cease-fire would depend on the attitude of the Vientiane authorities.
Although Chinese Communists did not label these "aspects"
as explicit conditions for a cease-fire, they clearly regard them
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as legitimate points for consideration in cease- fire negotiations.
They afford the Communists excellent gambits for delaying an
effective truce while the military situation continues to develop
in their favor.
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The Situation in the Congo
Hammarskjold's characterization of the Congo as in a
"most hopeful" phase stems 1n part from his satisfaction at
the return of the UN to Matadi and at Tshombe's failing polit ~
ical fortunes . Hammarskjold expressed the belief that Kasavubu's ascendancy over Tshomhe will improve prospects for
agreement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville, adding that
he had received confirmation of the .e xistence of a military
agreement between the Mobutu and Gizenga forces .
Hammarskjold's expressed optimism may be in part intended to prepare the way for a retreat on Dayal. When the
intention to remove Dayal is communicated to Kasavubu, this
should diminish the danger of demonstrations when Dayal returns to the Congo. It is not certain, however, whether Dayal's
return to the Congo will be under sufficiently harmonious conditions to permit Hammarskjold to remove him without seeming
to bow to Congolese pressure.
The director of the Katanga Information Service has urged
Hammarskjold to use his good offices to secure Tshombe's release from detention in Coquilhatville. He also asked the United
States to m~e representations to Hammarskjold, urging that
Tshombe's immediate release was required to prevent a ·cou in
Katan ab "more intractable elements." I

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Nepali Congress Exiles Planning stepped-up Campaign Against
King
Following Nehru's initial public criticism of the King's
actions in December, hi;: appeared willing to adopt a wait-andsee attitude, maintaining normal relations with the King while
affording the exiles a haven in India. I

Nehru's recent meetings with Subarna suggest that he
may be moving toward more direct suµport of the Nepali
Congress party. I
(at their meeting
early in April, Neliru interposed no obstacles to Su]J_ayna's
Qlans to Qromote non-violent agitation from India.
==1 suggests Nehru did not express disae.p~r_o_v_a_l~~
of resort~iolence as well. In addition,
I
lKrishna Menon gave no indicatio~n-h~e_w_o_u_Ia-keep
Sllbarna f"rom importing arms, although Menon refused any
direct assistance. Subarna, who has long financed the Nepali
Congress party, has been in touch with Socialist leaders
abroad, and has already reportedly arranged an arms purchase
from representatives of the Israeli Mapai party.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(1)

L

There is little doubt that at this time only active Indian
support would ensure the success of a Nepali Congress party
effort to return to power. Unless there is a threat of a
. Communist takeover, however, New Delhi is unlikely to
intervene directly as it did in 1950 when the Nepali Congress
party overthrew the Rana oligarchy. The Indian leaders are
more likely to encourage the exiles covertly while hoping
that time, combined with Nepali Congress party agitation,
will so erode the King's positi.p-n_i!l_at the need for active Indian
intervention will be obviated. I

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TOP SECRE'[
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( l

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offi ces of the White House
The Special Assistant for NoHonol Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense M>bilization
The Director, Notional Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Boord of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Deportment of State
The Secretory of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairmen of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treosury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretory of the Novy
The Secretory of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretory of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs o f Stoff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Stoff, United States Air Force
Chief of Stoff, United States Army
Commandant, United States N.arine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The J oint Stoff
The Director for Inte ll igence, The Jo int Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Inte lligence, Deportment of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence , Department of Navy
The Assistant Chi ef of Stoff, Intellige nce, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigati on
The Di rector
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Choi rman
The National Security Agency
The Di rector
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indi cations Center
The Director

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CG2 44~3 08

Approv;Jtor Release: ~Oj~~ C02444308

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in thi J publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated fUrther, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meanin g of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to t he detriment of the United States.

-


. (b)(3)

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. (b)(3)


-.

-,.nP

.
lll:'CDl:'T

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2 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

.11. .

t.'
:~ '
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1.
{.

J~~
~':

Congo :· Luluabourg under UN control; Gizenga reneats
demands for aid from UAR and bloc. j
(IWJe t)
. ~~~~~~~
~

~h

(b)(3~~\:
(b)(3)
!'.>~

~;:...

2.

India-Congo : Nehru warns Khrushchev solution to Congo
problem impossible unless the issues of Hammarskjold's
status and the Congo are separate.ti. (Page t)

l''· ~

~~~ ~:

i~'
:;~··
:.·/'
·.'"!'

.;.,

(b)( 1v ~.
(b)(3) . :

4.

France: New nuclear test will coincide with resumed
US-UK-USSR test ban talks in Geneva. ( Page ttt)

5.

Communist China: Peiping revives "100 flowers" concept; calls for limited increase in scientific freedom of
expression. (IWJe ttt)

~·­
j

(b)(1).:
(b)(3)."~

... .>

...

7.

Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga t hreatens to resign;
opposes President Velasco's increasingly favorable policy
toward Cuba. (Rzge tv)

8.

Watch Committee conclusions. ( RJ,g11 tv)

IOP S~CREI

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terms of sending a brigade-size unit (about 3 ,000 men) of Indian soldiers to the Congo. A final decision, however, awaits
assurances from Hammarskjold that Belgian personnel are in
fact being withdrawn from the Congo. In addition, Nehru is
awaiting a reply from Nasir to a letter sent on 26 February in
which the lndti!l1l~i9~1~,~tt§iwittiW.U~,.9~§~
ability ol rel"iiFordng1Jie·tfitioriPJi.!..L1!.~ ,£?IJ:~o. Furthermore,
Nehru is reported especially concernedabout avoiding clashes
between Indian troops and any African troops which might be
sent unilaterally to....sllilport the Gizenga regime. I
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~th~a~t!""P'o~~~ehru and Defense Minister Menon are thinking

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France: The fourth French nuclear weapons test in the
Sahara is expected to be a tower shot in late March or April.
The test will coincide with US-UK-USSR test ban talks which
are to be resumed in Geneva be innin 21 March. De Gaulle,
e ermine o o
mem. ers 1p m t e afomic club,"
continues to maintain that France would not agree to a test ban
unless it were bound up with agreements on the destruction of
nuclear weapons stockpiles. Paris is apparently willing t o face
the increasingly hostile reaction which is expected from African
and Middle Eastern states, including a censure move in the
United Nations. The announcement that later French tests will
l e underground is unllkely to caliii this hostile reaction. \
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Communist China: Peiping appears to feel the need for a
limited Uberatization of scientific o
t
Jn
ree om o e ression amon the co r • ·
&,luals. An
February issue of the party journal,
e itoria pu ished in the
Red Flag, reviving the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom," states
that the findings of scientists should be welcomed even if they
lack a "Marxist-Leninist viewpoint." The Chinese Communists
have recently released and allowed to appear in public several
prominent intellectuals who were arrested in the aftermath of
the 1957 liberalization fiasco. Remembering the campaign
against those who had expressed themselves too freely before,
the intellectuals will be extremely warv about th_e_new_inritat.i. .o,....n~-~
to "bloom and contend." LI- - -- - - -- -- - - - - - - - - -

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Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiribog~
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stand is directly related to the return from Havana of the proCuban, pro-Soviet former minister of government, Manuel
Araujo, a key .lieutenant of Velasco who publicly denounced
Chiriboga on 21 February as a "State Department servant."
Araujo reportedly plans to promote mass unrest and may have
gained a dominant influence over Velasco in regard to policies
toward both Cuba and the Soviet bloc. j

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
A.

No change from last week.

B.

No change from last week.

C. No significant military activity has occurred in Laos during the last week. There are ng iQ.c;l~~iJ,ijQma ,tbit ~Olll­
munist forces in the Plaine des Jarres intend to lal!Q.£!1
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ey ave e capa
y to o so.
ere is an unconfirmed report that the Communists have a plan to
initiate operations at an unspecified time in the south
of Laos. They have the capability to initiate such action on a small diversionary basis using Pathet Lao ~
Kong Le resources. Large-scale action woqJd regui[~
outside resources such .as Viet Minh~ we consider this to
be µplikely at tbi!!J time. ~eanwhite,, the Communist bloc
continues its build- up of Souvanna Phouma as the "legal"
prime minister and persists in its refusal to negotiate
except on its terms .

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Situation in the Congo
The threat the Gizengist incursion into Luluabourg appeared
to pose to Leopoldville reportedly aroused many leaders of
Kasavubu's government to the point of being willlng,for the first
time, to take forceful action. These leaders are said to be
urging Mobutu, who is now near Bumba with about 1, 500 men,
to attack Orientale Province "even if the troops must open
fire ." It ls questionable, however, whether Mobutu's forces
would fight even if such an order were given, especially since
the threat to Leopoldville has at least temporarily been reduced.
Hammarskjold said that the Luluabourg ep~sode was not a
military victory for Stanleyville but that it did show the disintegration of the Congolese Army. He implied that a parallel situation
is now shaping up in Equateur Province , where Stanleyville troops
easily disarmed the garrison at Ikela and are now moving toward
Coquilhatville, which is virtually unguarded by troops of the
Leopoldville governtrelt because Mobutu has taken most of its
garrison to the Bumba area. Press reports on 1 March say
that .Mobutu forces in Coquilhatville are defecting to Gizenga.
Hammarskjold also questioned where Mobutu stood in relation
to recent events, pointing out that he was not particularly loyal
to Ka.savubu or Ileo, and that he had never broken personally with
Lumumba. The secretary general pointed out that Mobutu had
started toward Stanleyville with "the most publicized--and
slowest- -military offensive in history" and then last week told
UN Commander McKeown that he was taking up positions only
for defense against infiltrators from Stanl~yvllle. Hammarskjold
felt there was a chance, although not a probability, that Mobutu
and Lundula, Gizenga's chief of staff, might bf nlannin p= a military grouping directed against all politicians. _

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Yugoslavia's first serious effort to broaden its economic
and political relations with Latin America came in mid-1959
when a Yugoslav cabinet officer led a good-will mission to seven
Latin American capitals. Several months later, another high regime official visited four other Latin American states, resulting
in rumors that Tito would tour the area the following year.
Yugoslavia's relations with the West are generally good; the
West is Belgrade's primary source of developmental capital and
provides roughly 65 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade. In
January, Yugoslavia put into effect a foreign trade and exchange
reform which brings its foreign trade practices into closer accord with those of the West. Tito has long wanted to make an
official state visit to the United States, but his regime continues
publicly to view the West as the chief villain in international affairs.
Tito is currently in Ghan~, the first stop on a two-month
African tour that will include official visits to Togo, Liberia,
Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia and an unofficial call on UAR

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President Nasir. Thi s is the third tour Tito has made to increase Yugoslavia's ties with the uncommitted and underdeveloped countries; trips through the Middle and Far East were
made in 1954-55 and 1958-59. Belgrade believes that close
identification with the uncommitted states is its best defense
~ainst possible future political and economic pressure from
East or West and the best possible platform from which to
voice its views on international affairs. At the UN session
last fall, the UAR's Nasir--long Yugoslavia's closest collaborator--Ghana's Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and India's
Nehru worked closely with Tito in an effort to ease EastWest tensions. Since then, Belgrade has advocated that the
neutrals confer more often, collaborate mor e closely, and
act in concert more frequently.
In contrast to virtually nonexistent party-to-party relations, Belgrade has gener;;illy satisfactory relations with the
Communist world at the state level, except for Albania and
Communist China. Tito and Khrushchev held conversations
in New York last fall, one result of which was an agreement
to exchange visits by their foreign µiinisters . Moscow and Belgrade hold similar views on most international issues, such as
disarmament and colonialism. Albania and Communist China
disapprove of close state relations with Yu oslavia and maintain
them at a minimal level.

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Violence May Break Out in Ecuador Over the Cuban Issue
Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaum in early February
that he was greatly concerned over the Ecuadorean political
situation, and predicted another postponement of the eleventh
Inter-American Conference now set for Quito on 24 May. He
noted President Velasco's desire for closer relations with
Cuba, his friendship for Araujo, and his refusal to take action
against Communist or Cuban activities in Ecuador.
The potential for violence over the Cuban issue was indicated recently by Communist-backed student unrest in both
Quito and Guayaquil which caused demonstrations against
Chiriboga and the incumbent minister of government. The
Castro regime has cultivated relations with Velasco, particularly by expressing support for Ecuador in its long-standing
boundary dispute with Peru.
Chiriboga also stated to an American official on 28 February that a military coup was being planned in Guayaquil. Such
an attempt has been considered by a group of about 50 highranking officers, under the leadership of the former army commander, who were retired soon after Velasco was inaugurated
last September. As minister of government, Araujo accused
these officials of treason--a move which touched off a political
controversy and helped precipitate his resignation. Although
Velasco has a substantial following among the office r corps, he
might alienate it if he reappoints Araujo to a top government
position and follows a pro-Castro, pro-Soviet policy. Chiriboga
said he had information that at a cabinet meeting last Saturday
Velasco agreed to repudiate Araujo and threaten him with jail
if he continued his activities; but Chiriboga also said he was
certain Velasco will not follow through on this.
Araujo recently spent about three weeks in Cuba, and he
has reportedly maintained close contact with the Cuban Embassy
in Quito. An advocate of close relations with the bloc, he posi l
t cted one or more bloc missions while in Havana.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Di rector of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense iV.obi Ii zation
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Politi col Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Di rector of Intel Iigence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretory of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretory of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretory of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense:: (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Specia l Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Stoff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States fv4.arine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al 1i ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joi nt Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The J oint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel ligence , Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Inte lligence, Deportment of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Informa tion Agency
The Director
The National lndi cations Center
The Director

CONhDENTJAI.
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C02444315

Approved fo_!" ~e!eas~: ~Oj £?/~710_5 C02444315

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern ls not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including

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I

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.





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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Khrushchev's conversation with Ambassador Thomps·o n.
( Page t)

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2. Situation in Laos. (Page t)

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3 . Congolese reportedly believe Indian troops are coming
to enforce ''Dayal's plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo."
(Pa_ge ti)
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DAILY BRIEF

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USSR: In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson
on 9 March, Khrushchev raised the Berlin and German question and stated his desire not to worsen but to improve USSoviet relations. He refrained from proposing resumption of
negotiations or setting a deadline for action, but did reiterate
his warning that the USSR would si a se arate eace treat
·-w
ast ermany if. the wartime allies did not ~~!'.!~.~?...a
treaty with both Q~rm&l.a.t»-tes.
On the disarmament issue, Khrushchev again tied Soviet
agreement to general disarmament with the proposal to reorganize the UN secretariat, and used the Congo situation to
reoeatedlv the ne_e_d for revision o_Lihe__UNJ

Ltn_SB

*Laos: Vientiane re resentati ves and Souvanna Phouma
ected to meet t is we.e
e~~'":..
era program annowice Y ene,r Phoumi nan • ouvanna .~fl- ..
their talks at Phnom Pel}h. Souyanna's departure from Pfmom
Penh on a world tour is still scheduled for 15 March.
Moscow characterized the Phnom Penh discussions as a
diplomatic defeat for the Phoumi forces and emphasized that
Souvanna stood firm on the need to convene an international
conference to settle the Laotian problem. Both Peiping and
Hanoi have indicated that they are interested in the vaguely
worded communique, only as a depwure point fof.H9.J2!S.3.!1~­
dizing the deteriorating position of the Boun QJil!!l r_egim.~:
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces in both the Phou Khoun and
Muong Kassy sectors apparently are consolidating their positions. Their patrols continue to maintain contact with overnment forces. lL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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~ The expected iifiXil! .Qf ~ litst ~ntiggept
of InCIIi'Stroo s on 16 March will confron the N with its
·
r
_n
o.mto .. a&~ording to Amb'!ss;Wst:J'J.mberlake. He feels that ther~ is widespread belief among the
Congolese that India's troops are coming to enforce ''Dayal's
plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo."
Khrushchev, in his recent talk with Ambassador Thompson, showed little interest in the possibilities of a Congo settlement and used the occasion to reiterate Soviet char es of
the ineffectiveness of the llN..Jlolicies in the Co

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Khrushchev Spells Out Soviet Position on Germany,
Disarmament, and the UN
At the end of his conversation with Ambassador Thompson,
Khrushchev spelled out the Soviet position on Germany and
Berlin along the lines of the recent memorandum to Bonn. He
stressed the necessity of a peace settlement with both Germanys
in order to confirm postwar developments and provide a legal
foundation for the postwar borders. He denied that the bloc had
any desire to expand to the West and offered to make a statement to this effect if the US was prepared to begin peace treaty
negotiations.
In connection with his threat to sign a separate treaty with
East Germany, Khrushchev was careful. to evade any response
to the ambassador's question on how a separate treaty would
affect the Allied position in West Berlin. Khrushchev reaffirmed that a peace treaty would include a clause providing
creation of a free city for West Berlin, but urged that the US
and USSR join in working out a new status for West Berlin.
Khrushchev showed some flexibility in his discussion of
the Berlin problem in asserting that the USSR would provide
any guarantees necessary to preserve the internal situation in
West Berlin and to assure the United States that its prestige
would not suffer. As examples of guarantees, he mentioned
a joint police force, presumably composed of the four powers,
and he repeated a previous Soviet proposal to permit stationing
of symbolic forces of the four powers in West Berlin. He made
it clear that East Berlin was excluded from a settlement on the
grounds that it was the capital of East Germany, but he committed Ulbricht to sign any guarantees for West Berlin.
The Soviet leader concluded his remarks by repeating that
if the US and USSR could sign a treaty on Germany, it would
mark great progress in their relations and establish an atmosphere of trust. He added that a treaty could be implemented by
installments and provide for a gradual withdrawal of Soviet and
American troops from Germany, which would aid in negotiations
and disarmament.
The most notable aspect of Khrushchev's statements was his
failure to stress the urgency of early negotiations on Berlin, as

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he has in his recent conversations with Western diplomats
and the Soviet memorandum to Bonn. This suggests that the
USSR will continue to hold the Berlin question in reserve until the Soviet leaders assess more fully the US position on
major East- West questions. Khrushchev's remarks on Ade~
nauer's role and references to the memorandum to Bonn also
suggest that he may be awaiting a reply as a pretext for presenting a more exact demand on negotiations. A French Foreign Ministry official was recently told by his Soviet counterpart that Moscow was considering a foreign ministers'
conference on Berlin and Germany.
On the disarmament question Khrushchev implied that the
Western powers were attempting to defer negotiations. His
insistence that Soviet acceptance of general disarmament was
linked to UN revision was the same position he took last fall
at the UN General Assembly. At that time, however, he explained that the reorganization scheme was not a prerequisite
for negotiations.
In his statements to Ambassador Thompson on the Congo,
Khrushchev labeled UN policy as "colonialist" and stressed that
the USSR would oppose it "with all its means." He emphasized
that a reorganization of the UN was necessary t o prevent another
situation such as that in the Congo, and argued that the US should
have an interest in reorganization, since it might be in a minority position some time in the future. Khrushchev's revival of the
link between UN revision and disarmament, which has been
played down in recent Soviet statements, probably foreshadows
a more intensive eff9rt to use the appeal of disarmament to gain
support for at least Hammarskjold's resignation or progress toward a greater Soviet role in the UN executive organs.
Khrushchev showed considerable satisfaction when informed
by Thompson that the US hoped shortly to lift its ban on Soviet
crabmeat imports, although he expressed some disappointment
at the recent canceling of a license for precision grinding machines. Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position that trade
relations must be normalized and again emphasized that the USSR

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trades with other Western powers. In addition, he pointed out
that the USSR does not compete with the US in trade and could
be a very good customer for American exports. Khrushchev
avoided mentioning Mosc<jl~s nr.eYi.o.us_reauest_for credits to _ _
finance Soviet purchases.

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General Phoumi has told Ambassador Brown that during
his recent visit to Phnom Penh, he was able to clear up the
misconceptions of the Cambodian foreign minister over King
Savang's proposal for a neutral nations commission--composed of Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya-:..and that Souvanna
himself now would attempt to persuade Sihanouk to reconsider
his rejection of the commission's chairmanship.
Although Phoumi and his aides returned to Vientiane apparently convinced of Souvanna's acquiescence to an investigative commission prior to a full- scale international conference,
there is already some indication that Souvanna may have been
temporizing. Souvanna is reported to have stated publicly on
11 March that the three·- nation commission should meet "about
the same time" as the 14- power conference proposed by Sihanouk, in order to enable the conference to give directives
to the commission.
Phoumi also reports that he and Souvanna, in their discussion of the question of a coalition government including the
Pathet Lao, agreed that Communists should hold no posts.
Phoumi, however, apparently did not rule out the possibility
that "non-Communist" members of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS),
the Pathet Lao's political arm, might be included. A long..
standing argument of Souvanna, which has found favor among
many Laotian officials, is that Prince Souphannouvong--hea~
of the NLHS--and many other party members are nationalists
rat~er than Communists.
c:1
Moscow's initial reaction to the discussions between Phoumi
and Souvanna Phouma indicates that the USSR will claim that the
general compromised his own position as a result of his visit to
Phnom Penh and that Souvanna will accept no solution in Laos
which does not make the convening of an international conference
the first order of business.
A Pathet Lao statement, rebroadcast by both Peiping and
Hanoi, vigorously attacked Phou.mi's mission.to Phnom Penh as
an effort to "use the name of Premier Souvanna Phouma" to split

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the Laotian people. The Pathet Lao radio claimed it was
only because of military reverses that Phoumi "attempted to
compel Prince Phouma to negotiate with and make concessions to the traitors' clique." The statement clearly indicated
that the Communists do not re.c ognize the Phnom Penh commu~
nique as in any way restricting their freedom of action.
Reflecting some uneasiness over the possibility that Souvanna may have made some deal with Phoumi, the Pathet Lao
radio stressed the unflinching support of the Pathet Lao forces
for Souvanna. It pointed out that Souvarina's speeches and
statements made in Xieng Khouang during his visit there prove
that he would refuse "to knuckle under in any circumstances
before the traitors' clique in Vientiane." The statement reiterated the bloc contention that an international conference must
be held, to be followed by an international commission to work
in Laos in accordance with the specific powers granted to it
by the conference.
The recent successes of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces
appear to have been due less to aggressive action on their part
than to withdrawal by the Vientiane forces in the face of such a
threat. Vientiane troops north of Phou Khoun junction are reported in a state of low morale and unlikely to put up much resistance to any further Pathet Lao advance. All supplies that
had been stockpiled by these troops at the junction wer T__.,,_le=f=t--~
intact when the withdrew and now are in enemy hands .

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Situation in the Congo
Hammarskjold recently sent a conciliatory letter to
Kasavubu, who is attending the Tananarive conference of
Congolese leaders, in an attempt to lessen the likelihood of
a conflict between Indian and Congolese troops. He tried
to reassure Kasavubu that the arrival of these troops was not
part of a planned military build-up to be used against the
Congolese Army, explaining that the Security Council had not
authorized such action in connection with the proposed reorganization of the army .
In a discussion with an American official, Hammarskjold
indicated a belief that "some kind of political game was going
on in Leopoldville" between two rival acting prime ministers
in the absence of Ileo, who accompanied Kasavubu to Tananarive.
He noted that acting Prime Minister Delvaux modified his earlier
hostile attitude toward the UN and became willing to negotiate
after Massa suddenly "took over" that office. Hammarskjold
remarked that "there are too many untutored people with guns
who become involved in political moves" in the Congo .

Tshombe's apparent success in dominating the proceedings
at Tananarive has been complemented by another success in
Katanga. Before leaving for the conference, Tshombe--apparently fearing that his deputy Kibwe and French Colonel Trinquier
were plotting to oust him--ordered Trinquier to leave the country by 10 March. The American Consul in Elisabethvllle reported
that Trinquier, under pressure from Katangan authorities and
possibly the UN, departed for Brussels on 11 March.
When informed that Brussels intended to remove some 30
Belgian military technicians from Katanga, Tshomoo indicated
he would oppose this action by all means possible and that he
might close the Belgian Consulate General in Elisabethville .
In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev
said it was clear that the US and the Soviet Union were in complete disagreement on the Congo. Khrushchev failed to respond
to Ambassador Thompson's remark that there was nothing in the

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Congo situation basic to US or Soviet interests. The ambassador noted that the Soviet premier refrained from mentioning any new approach to a solution of the Congo problem and
referred t~ the internal Congo situation only in terms of the
past .
Khrushchev used the Congo question to launch a vigorous
attack on UN policies; he told the ambassador that the US and
the Soviet Union had different positions on this question and
prospects were not bright. He reiterated the standard charges
that
UN and Hammarskjold were responsible for Lumumba's
death.

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offi ces of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Deportment of State
The Secretory of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intell igence and Research
The Treosury Deportment
The Secretory of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretory of Defense
The Deputy Secretory of Defense
The Secretory of the Army
The Secretary of the Novy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretory of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretory of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Ai r Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee ond Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Stoff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intell igence, Deportment of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Stoff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of lnvesti"gation
The Di rector
The Atomic Energy Commissi on
The Chairman
The Notional Security Age ncy
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director

CONFIDENTJA l.
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IU~
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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-µp material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
this publication is based on all sources, including

II

.

(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 December 1960

DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*Communist China - Taiwan: Communist shelling of
. the off shore islands has· almost ceased for the past month.
Only one firing of 33 propaganda rounds has occurred since
27 November--the lowest ebb since the odd~ day firing pattern was established-in October 1958. In addition, the "liberate Taiwru'.\," theme has been a negligible ingredient in mainland propaganda since mid-1960. On th.e few occasions when
the Taiwan issue is mentioned, however, Peiping continues
to underscore its determination to use force if necessary while
expressing hope for a peaceful solution .
. In contrast to the Communist behavior, Chinese National.1st -b atteries have increased the number of high-·explosive
shells fired against the mainland since mid-November. Tai. pei apparent.l y believes it is politically advantageous to keep
a state of tension .i n the strait. [
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*Co£f?O: Hammarskjold has sent a letter to Kasavubu implying . _at he will ask the Security Council to take the UN out
of the Co.ngo if Mobutu uses force in an attempt to take Orientale· Proyince- -still nominally controlled by Antoine Gizenga's
"government." Hammarskjold told US officials, however, that
he does not expect civil war in the Stanleyville area, since he
believes neither Gizenga nor Mobutu is strong enough to force
a fight. Hammarskjold plans to be in the Congo on 3 and 4 January. Khrushchev, after a delay of ten Clays, responded to
Gizenga's appeal for support by .reiterating Soviet promises
of suppQrt and sympathy but avoiding any specific commitment
o~ assistance. Sudan continues to refuse transit to UAR planes
bound for Stanleyville, but Pres.ident Abboud admits that flights
over remote areas of the country could probably be made without
. Sudanese knQwledge.J

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· *Ethioeia~ Although ·the leaders of the attempted coup
against Emperor Haile Selassie are now reported to have been
killed or captured,. considerable synip~thy for the coup ~ffort
persists, and the Imperial Go.v ernment's position may still. be
·precarious. Because of the elaborate precautions considered
. necessary for the Emperor's safety, .t he royal family has not
. attended the funerals of the government ministers killed by the
rebels. The Emperor reportedly decided on 21 December to reconstitute the Royal Bpdyguard, . and some junior officers and
men have already been re.leased from custody. This action co4ld
seriously antagonize the army, which crushed the revolt. Offi~
cials of .the government claim to have captured documents which
.they say clearly indicate Soviet and Czech· involvement in the
COUp ~ttempt, but tl;i'e offiCials.Jla.YfLDOt nroduced the evidence
they claim to have. I
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for. National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Off~e. of ,Civil and Defe~se Mobllizatlon
Dir~~tor, ,1 Nati1;m~_ 1Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assist~t for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
. Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary! National Security Cou·n cll
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International .Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
·
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
·The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staf~
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Ope rations
Direc tor for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Inte lligel}ce, Department of Army .
Director of Naval Inte lligence, Departme nt of Navy
As sis tant Chief of Staff, Inte lligence, Department of the Air F or ce
. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Di rec tor
National Security Agency
The Direc tor
National Indications Center
The Direc tor

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including

I

(b)(3)

I

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publica tion represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically
no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

for

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law .prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person , as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of t he United States or for the ben efit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

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29 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East Germany: The number of East Germans registering
at the West Berlin refugee ce1'ter durii:ig. the week ending 23
August was 4,034-- 1,791 more than during the corresponding
1959 period, and the fifth highest weekly total since 1955.
Since the regime began forced agricultural collectivization
last winter, refugee flow to W~st Berlin has been consistently
higher than during 1959, Although the peak in defections is
usually reached in late August and September, the present
greatly increased flow of refugees reflects growing popular
fear that further repressive measures may be impendiI~g and .
that tighter controls may be imposed on travel to Berlin. Re~
gime pressure during the harvest period may have led many
farmers to flee immediately a;fter selling their last privately
owned crops. j - - - - i

II. ASIA-AFRICA

DJ6

D~

Indonesia: Political tensions are increasipg .in Indonesia
.. over ffie army's ban on 24 August of the Communist party and
its front groups in South Borneo. Although South Borneo is not
an area of Communist strength, the ban is a s_ignificant act of
(lefiance against President Sukarno and is presumably a retaliatory move for the .Pre$ident's dissolutiori on 17 August of the anti =
--------, Communist Masjumi ctnd Sociali~t part~es. (§ukarno is reported
"very angry" over the army's ban and undoubtedly will take some
counteraction, which could lead to a showdown wjth army chief
of sta;ff General NasutionJ I -- -

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.. . ..rfingo: Premier Lumumba's success against the secessionist" ning State" i n Kas~ Province may encourage him to plan
an early invasion of neighboring Katanga Province .. Katanga
President Tshombe has already started defensive military measures. In an effort to forestall UN intervention,. Lumumba may
soon press his demand that UN troops leave the Congo as soon as
Belgian troops complete their withdrawal--expected .in early Sep- ~
tember.
·
(b) 1 ~
Secretary General Hammarskjold indicate
26 August that he would regard such a demand by Lumumba a8
a "formal request" and would.call an emergency session of the
Security Council. He would tell the council that the Congolese
Army could not maintain order and that a UN withdrawal would
:Jead to fo~eign intervention. ~ammarskjold believes the Congo
crisis will come to a head within the next week. The mood of the
Congolese Army was demonstrated when it made widespread attacks on Europeans--including American and UN personnel--at
Stanleyville on 27 August.
The American ambassador in Leopoldville believes that the
USSR has selected "foodlifts" as an easy way to introduce men
and materials into the Congo without the usual customs inspection. He reports that "over 100 Caucasians" have arrived in the
Congo via Soviet aircraft since 1 August and expects that a sub(b)(3 )
stantial number will arrive soon aboar{l_lO large Soviet a.lx:craft
understood to be en route. I,_____ _ _ __________~~

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*Laos: Delegations from .Savannakhet and Vientiane, led respectively by General Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma, are arriving in the ·r oyal capital of Luang Prabang to mediate differences
before a reunited National Assembly in sessions now scheduled
to start on 30 August. Mutual sUS,.picion and personal antagonisms are still running high but there -l.s. cautious optimism
among American observers that a compromise settlement can
be reached. Although overt mllltary command in Vientiane is
passing increasingly into the hands of Laotian Army commander
General Ouane, Captain Kong Le is app~rently stlµ.Jn a nosltion___, (b)(3)
to lnfluence the formation of e new government. L_
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*Cuba: Cuba's defiant walkout from the OAS foreign
minls~rs' meeting on 28 August further 1solates the
Castro regime from other hemisphere nations and emp.~a­
sizes to them that the Cuban Government has rejected thelnter-Amerlcan system in favor of greater dependence on
(J/L
support from the Sino-Soviet bloc.· Cuban Foreign Minister
Roa, whose position was based on the alleged "imminent
threat" of US military intervention, hinted that Cuba . may
take its case back to the UN Security Council. His speeches
clearly tmp.l led that the Castro regime continues to regard
itself as the vanguard of "the antiimperlalist re~tiQn' '
that will event.uallv_swe_en.J:h~tlre continent.
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Increased Political Tensions in Indonesia
Political. tensions are .i ncreasing in Indonesia over the
army's ban on 24 August of ~he Communist party and its front
groups in South Borneo. These devefopments will further aggravate the strai~ between the army and ·President Sukarno
and could culminate in a showdown.between the two.

~resident. Sukarno is reported "very angry" ove~ the army's
ban and has questioned army chief of staff General Nasution concernhl.g the local commander's authority to take such action. The
army, however, intends to extend the ban, on a staggered basis,
to South Celebes, South Sumatra, and.the Lesser SWldas. The
Gommun.i st party has protested to the attorney general's office
.that the South Borneo comi:nander has no right to ban the party,
and has asked the War Administration Office, which is headed by
·Sukarno, to review his ac.t io10

(b)(3)

The South. Borneo commander banned the party :within the
broad powers he holds as regional war administrator under the
·prevailing state of emergency in .most areas of Indonesia. Although-the Communist party is active in South Borneo, it is not
an area of Communist strength, and any overt resistance to the
·ban can be easily ~ontained. The ban is a significant act of defiance against Sukarno and is presumably a retaliatory move for the
President's dissolution on 17 August of the anti- Communist Masi"t))(1)
and Socialist parties.
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The Situation in the Congo
Premier Lumumba's success in capturing the capital of the
secessionist "Mining State" in Kasai Province may encourage him
to p~an an early invasion of provincial President Tshombe's rebellious Katanga Province. Tshombe's forces have already begun
preparing defensive installations, and UN Ethiopian troops have
reportedly taken up positions along the Kasai-Katanga border, presumably to discourage attacks from either si.d e. Lumumba's desire to avoid possib~e intervention by UN troops in his invasion
plans may cause him to press for rapid compliance with his renewed demand of 26 August that UN troops leave the Congo as soon
as Belgian troops complete their withdrawal--now expected .within
a week.

G

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seAcretary General Hammarskjold, I
on 2 6 ugust, stated that Lumumba muSt."oe- 1.'broken."- He
plied this might be ac~omplished by discrediting Lumumba in the
UN should the African leader persist in his demand for withdrawal
of UN troops from the Congo. The secretary general indicated he
would regard this as a "formal request" and would. call an emergency
session of the Security Council for instructions. He added that his
intention in this event is to inform the cowicil that the Congolese Army could under no circumstances maintain peace and order in the
Congo and.that a withdrawal of UN troops would undoubtedly lead to
~oreign intervention and therefore to a breach of the peac~
(!Iammarskjold b~lieves the Congo crisis will come to a head
following the end of the current meeting of African leaders in Leopoldville- - expected on 30 August- ~e,articularly if Lumumba believes
he has the support of these leaders;)
'

The conferees, however, reportedly have advised Lumumba
against taking any move to weaken UN influence in the Congo and
indicated further that any aid given by their countries must be chan··
neled through the UN.
The mood of the Congolese Army was demonstrated on 27 August
when it :µiade widespread attacks on Europeans---including the crew

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of an American transport aircraft as well as Swedish and Canadian ·members of. the local UN headquarte.r s- - in the Stan.l eyville
area. The army has repeatedly used strong- arm tactics against
numerous "white" UN personnel as well as against Caucasian
members of the press throughout the Congo crisis.
Meanwhi,le the Communist bloc continues to make significant
gains in .t he Congo. The American ambassador in Leopoldville
reported .t hat "over 100 Caucasians" had arrived on Soviet aircraft since 1. August and a "substantial number" was expected soon
aboard 10 large. Sovlet aircraft understood to be en route--ostensibly carrying food. The ambassador believes the USSR has se- .
lected."foodlifts . .. as an easy way to introduce men and materials
with impunity," since these Soviet aircraft are permitted to dispense with normal customs procedures. In addition, an undisclosed
number of bloc tee
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vessel on 22 August.

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Situation in Laos

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{$ey members of the two contending political factions in
Laos, headed by General Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma, are
converging on the royal capital of Luang Prabang to resolve
their differences before a reunited National Assembly, now
scheduled to open sessions on 30 August. Phoumi, accompanied
by 22 assembly deputies and other principal supporters, a.r rived
from Savannakhet on 28 August. Premier-designate Souvanna
and 34 fellow deputies from Vientiane are scheduled ·to arrive
on 29 August. Both Phouml and Souvanna are anxious to have
private discussions with King Savang prior to the assembly
deliberations, since his attitude could be a decisive factor;]
\§pokesmen for both factions claim the loyalty of a majority .
of the deputies, but the attitude of many :.is open to question
since party affiliations have been severely shaken by the 9 Au- ·
gu:stco1:1p.. Mutual suspicion and personal antagonisms are still
running high between the principal leaders of the two groups,
but there is cautious optimism among American observers in
Laos that a compromise settlement is in the making. The
assembly apparently will vote again on the motion of nonconfidence in the pi;-evious Somsanith government and on the investiture
of the Souvanna cabinet which Phoumi asserts were originally
voted under duress in Vientiane;)
·
(formation of a new government' will be influenced by the fact
that Captain Kong Le still retains considerable authority in the
Vientiane area, despite the passing of overt control to General
Ouane, commander of the Laotian Army. Kong Le has relinquished
command of the 2nd Paratroop Battalion to a subordinate officer,
apparently in order to concentrate on his position as Ouane's
deputy_)
.
\}lost of the paratroops are positioned on strategic approach
routes several miles outside Vientiane where they reportedly
are actlng as cadres for irregular forces assisting ln the
capital's defense. r
Ouane also places the total forces in the
Vientiane area at about 6, 000, but the American mllltary attach6
believes this figure is too high, even if police elements are include~

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-SECRET. [puane stated on 27 August that he assumed that the 3, 800
arms issued to civilians would not be collected until Phoumi's
countercou forces withdrew or a olttlcal reement was
reached.

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Sec retary of State
The Under Sec retary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director , The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United State s Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special 0}lerations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Inte lligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Paciflc
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Comme rce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Cen.tral Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
[In.t.ellie:ence_iJthis publication is based on all sources, including

(b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law.prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
30 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Finland: Khrushchev may use. his visit to Helsinki
beginning on :2 September to exploit Soviet claims .of Scandinavian
involvem·e nt in the U-2 incident. T,he-visit was arranged at Soviet
initiative. Since there are. no pressing bilateral problems, the
main purpose of the trip may be to ·provide an opportunity for the
Soviet premier to reinforce his warnings of the dangers of American po_licy for the Scandinavian countdes and to expand his recent statements in Austria designed to intimidate neutral states
into supporting the bloc campaign against US overseas bases. He
also can be e,Xpected to reaffirm his peaceful coexistence policy
and his continuing interest in high- level exchanges with free~world
leaders.

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firan: The resignation of Premier Eqbal on .28 August is
pafrOrtlie Shah's effort to salvage some of his seriously damaged prestige. The Shah is insisting -that others must make
"sacrifices" in order to relieve him of blame .for the rigged
and grossly mismanaged elections which are still going on in
Iran. Sh~rif Emami, the newly app<?inted acting premier, has
been min,lster of industry a.p.d mines. While the· Shah's plan
appa:rent.l y 'ls to aUow the new parliament to convene on the basis
of the current electiol).s, amend the electoral law, and then.hold
,.--------- ----' new elections, he may come to .feel that outright nullification of
the present elections is necessa even thou h not as "le al" a
course as he would refer.

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I II. THE WEST

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Italy: l!ialian Premier Fanfani has told the US ambassador
in Rome that he hopes to hold the long-postponed nationwide lo~
cal elections--involving more than 32 million voters- - ea~ly in
November. Prior. to the elections he expects passage of a re~
vised electoral law, an aim of which would be. to force a separa~
tion.between.the· Nenni Socialists and the Communists. Although
Fanfani insisted that his party has "bounced back" in public es_ _ __ __, teem and that the June-July disorders _in Italy have boomeranged

against the Communists, his estimate seems over! opti!!l!sticl

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--- DAILY BRlEF

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LATE JTEMS

~epublic of the Congo:

Secretary General Hammarskjold

ap~s liopeful that firm UN resistance to Lumumba's pro-,

jected seizure of the Leopoldville airport will discredit Lumumba and. bring about his downfall. On 27 August, a UN official stated that Hammarskjold had received a communication
from Lumumba warning that.he· planned to take over Leopold----~ ville airport "within a week." On the same day, Hammarskjold
affirmed that the UN· would not' yield con~rol of the airport, which
it has administered since the first of a series of assaults on UN
personnel there on 18 August.
----~
Elsewhere, open resentment in the Col)go Senate of Lumumba's authoritarian measures may lead to the arrest of opposition leaders. The premier has alleged that "loyal elements"
esire.the arrest of one oooosiUQil_fil)okesman. Jean Bolikango,(b)(1)

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e-ctencate process ot ettectmg a ponncaI

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setne~

ment ·between the Souvanna Phouma- Kong Le group and General
Pho':1m.i 's countercoup force~ has begun with the opening of the
111•
National Af;;sembly session m Luang Prabang. . The King's re~
designation of Souvanna to form a new government is a gesture
/C:...,
in support of Phoumi 's contention that Souvanna's original desig- {ti
nation in mid-August was illegal because the predecessor Somsanith government ~1¢, 'b een forced to resign under duress. Souvanna must next negotiate th~ composition of his new cabinet, which
--·
could present serious difficulties. If he tries to win a new vote of
approval fo~ the small and weak cabinet he organized in Vientiane
two wee.k s ~o, his compromise agreement with Phoumi will almost
certai~ly breal,t down. If, on the other hand, he is too liberal in
granµng. cabine~ portfolios to Phoumi followers, he is likely to invite the wrath of Captain Kong Le, whose military influence in Vientiane.has diminished little, if any. IJ'he American embassy in Vientiane notes that Kong is still in a co~ky mood .a nd consider~ it entir~ly possible·~at he may tollow the lead of the Pathet Lao in op(b)( 3,
posing any settlement with the "Phoumi. clique." A Pathet Lao
broadc~st of 28 August stated that whatever the assem~l oes ih
Luan Prab
it will be a ainst the will of the eo le.
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Khrushchev

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Khrushchev may use his visit to Helsinki on 2-5 Septemb~r ,
in honor of Finnish President Kekkonen's 60th birthday, to exploit statements in the Powers trial involving Finland, Sweden,
and Norway in the U-2 incident. The visit was arranged on Soviet initiative and, since there are no critical bilateral problems, its main purpose may be to provide an opportunity for
the Soviet premier to reiterate his warnings of the dangers of
American policy for the Scandinavian countries. He may also
expand on his statements in Austria designed to intimidate
neutral states into supporting the bloc campaign against
US overseas bases. Khrushchev would hope that a repetition
of this line, together with a. warning that the USSR would not
"remain idle" in the face of a violation of neutrality, will
generate Scandinavian .p.ressure on Norway to adopt a more
restrictive policy on US bases.
The Soviet announcement appears to have come as a complete surprise to high Finnish off~Cials. While some of them
interpreted the coming visit as a. sign of Soviet good will, the
fact that its scheduling appears to have been accomplished with
little or no coordination with the Finns appears to have caused
some uneasiness in Helsinki. Foreign Minister Toerngren has
stated that no preparations had been made .in Finland for the
visit nor did he know what matters Khrushchev wished to discuss.
One question which might be raised is that of Finland's relations with the European. Free Trade Association (EFTA). Although the matter has been under cons.i deration for several
months, the Finnish Government has hesitated to proceed on
grounds that there is some ilncertainty regarding Moscow's attitude toward Finnish me.tnbership in EFTA.
President Kekkonen is reported to be pessimistic about the
prospects for the West in the political and economic strgggle
with the bloc. Fearful that there is a real danger of war, partioularJ.y over Berlin, he regards it as imperative that Finland
conduct a fore ign policy having as its basic aim the development
of "trustful" relations between the two countries. With this goal
in mind, Kekkonen has actively encouraged increased trade, military, and cultura l contacts with the USSR. This has been evident most recently in Finnish moves to purchase increased
quantities of Soviet military equipment and in a growing number of exchan e visits b military official
the t o co tr
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~~~ ~schar~:s Pr~~i~r .to Sbift Blame for Rigged

Iranian Elections

L Premier Eqbal's. resignation on 28 August, after the Shah
had publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of the
parliamentary elections in progress since early August, is
part of the Shah's Ian to resto

_e.r_elY_damal?.e
prestige.

(b)( 1)
(b )( 1)

The 9lah ·has been under considerable pressure from some
of his principal adviser13 to declare the elections void and to
dismiss Eqbal as the scapegoat. Eqbal, since he became premier in early 1957, has been a faithful executor of the Shah's
will. Because of .this, . he has become unpopular and has created enemies among the Shah's closest associates. Sharif
Emami, the 51-year-old pro-Western minister of industry
and mines, has been appointed act~ng prem~er.
Apparently the Shah now plans to allow the new parliament
to convene, to dema.nd the passage of a new election law, and
then. dismiss it to hold new elections. The need for strong
steps by the Shah to re-establish. his authority and prestige,
however, could convince him to take illegal measures, such
as annulllng the elect~ons and assumin direct control of affairs endin elections.

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(Italian P ·rehiier Wants
·

·'lJn ·November

N~tionwide

..,,,

Local Elections

~arly

.

In a talk with the American ambassador on 24 August, Premier Fanfani stated confidentially that his Christian Democratic
party has agreed on the desirability of holding nationwide local
election~ early in November. These elections have already been
postponed twice, and Fanfani said his ·party now must show the
country it has confidence in its own strength. He claims that his
party has come back in public esteem and is more popular now
than in the recent past, and says--with apparent overoptimism- tl:lat the Communists have lost strength because of the degenera~
tion. of the June-July demonstrations against the neo-Fascists into
Communist-led disorders.
Parliament reconvenes on 5 September, and Fanfani believes
that by early October he can secure passage of an electoral reform law which would tlforce" the Nenni Socialists to run separate
lists from the Communists,and the Monarchists to run separate
from the neo-Fascists. Both Socialists and Monarchists have
urged passage of the new law' which would drop the present majority requirement and adopt a modified proportional system for
.the provincial elections .. Both parties indicated a degree. of approval of the present Christian Democratic government by abstain~
ing rather than voting against it in. the confidence vote on. 18 July
n

Fanfani said Nenni "would get his .t hroat cut" if he returned
to his alliance with the Com~uni~ts. The premier believes that
60 percent of the· Socialist party hierarchy and an even larger pro- (b )( )
3
portion of the party's electorate su ort Nenni's stand favorin
.----l"""""""'"'o~.Y~fr_o_m_the

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affal_r s
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelltgence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secre tary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operaticms, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Sec retary of Defense for Special Operations .
-Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, bepartment of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Sec retary of Commerce
Feder.al Bureau of Investigation
The Di rec tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
·The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

CONF'iDENTJA I
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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
l c l h i s publication is based on all sources, including

(b}(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publicati.on represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized pei·son, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit; of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF
I. TIIE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - Japan: Peiping. has moved to dispel
any impression that it is willing·to resume full-scale trade
w.i th Japan in the ~bsence of a government-level trade agree- o K--ment. In late August a Japanese visitor q~oted Chou En-lai
as saying that even in the absence of su~h a pact, trade could
be resumed under. contracts between industrial interests. The
Japanese Government received this report with caution, ·but
hopes were revived among Japanese ·bus1nessmen that trade
might be resumed. On 12 September, however, Peiping released the minutes of the late A\lgUst conversation, and quoted
Chou·as having asserted that Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda,
instead of meeting China's preconditions for government-togovernment agree:rnents, had made statements which were "not
good," and that China must therefore "w~t and see." Chou indicated that no significant trade with Japan is possible without
a government.~ 1eve1 trade pact. I
'--~~~~~~~~~~~~~

*Communist China-· Guinea: Peiping signed.aid, trade, and
friendship agreements with Guinea during P r esident Sekou Toure's
visit in Communist China this week. The joint communique re-~
leased on 13 Septembe r states China has extended an interest--·
c:J A:::.
free $25,000,000 credit to Guinea and signed a trade pact calling for almost $10,000,000 in annual exchanges. During Toure's
visit to Moscow last.week, the USSR agreed to increase its economic support to Guinea by participating in the construction of
the Konkoure River aluminum -~hydroelectric development project.

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II. ASIA- AFRICA
. Indonesia: President Sukarno's "temporary suspension" on
13 September of all political activity in Indonesia frees him from
the necessity of making a direct choice between the army and
the Communists. It also frees U>.e army from having. to decide
0
at this time on.whether to oppose Suka:r;-no further by extending
its anti-Communist ban . . Sukarno's action will permit him to
proceed more easily with organization of hls N~tlonali}i'~ont, a mass
organ!
n hich he ex ects all arties and roups to coop---~lr-'-<--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

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*Congo: \fudependent African st ates are wavering in their support for Hammarskjold's Congo policy. Many of the current proposals being informally considered by UN members , including
- - - - - . Ghana's suggestion of a good offices commission of Afro-Asian
members of the UN Command to mediate differences between
KasaV1,1bu .and Lumumba, wowd have the effect of helping Lurnum'}lAJ
ba. Khrushchev, in bis strongest attack on Hammarskjo,l d's handling
of the Congo crisis, charged on 13 September that the UN secr~taty
general is "consciously working in the interests of the imperiaJjsts8
_ _ ____,
tin Leopoldville, Kasavubu moved to ·gain t)le upper hand by
surrounding the radio station--released from UN control og

14 Sept 60

DAILY f3RIEF

ii

Gsm_inlster
September along with alrfielde- -wlth loyal troops, while his
of informatloij broadcast an appeal for popular support
and announced that Lu~umba was being sought for arrest. Relaxation of the UN ban cm air acttvity will probably enable Lumumba to utilize Soviet transport aircraft to re.i nforce hls troops
in the Kasai region..:.] I
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Pe~ping

SECREZ_

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Indicates Extensive Trade With Japan Not Imminent

Communist China has moved to dispel any impression in
J apan that Chou En-lai's recent remarks to a Japanese visitor
foreshadowed an imminent resumption of full-scale. trade. AccordiJ1g to the visitor, Chou told him on 27 August that even in
the absence of a government-level agreement, trade could be
resumed on a fairly extensive scale through contracts between
industrial interests.
On ~2 September, Peiping released its version of the conversation. According to this, Chou s~d the embargo imposed in
1958 would be relaxed to permit private trade contracts. He implied, however, that extensive trade was impossible in the absence of a _government-to-government agreement, which Tokyo
has resisted. Chou further emphasized that China stands firm
on its preconditions for such an agreement--that Japan end its
hostile attitude, stop supporting the "two Chinas" concept, and
refrain from impeding normalization of relations. He added
that, instead of meeting China's conditions, Prime Minister Ikeda
had made statements which were "not good;' and China must therefore pursue its "wait and see" attitude.
Hoping that a taste of direct trade will increase pressure in
Japan for meeting Chinese terms, an official Chinese Communist
trading concern recently placed three orders for heavy machinery
from Japan. Perhaps to make c1e·a r that there is no alternative to
direct trade, Chinese Communist authorities in Hong Kong have reportedly tightened up the poorly enforced prohibition against indirect trade through that colony and have again urged Hong Kong merchants to boycott Japanese goods.
The Ikeda government has adopted a cautious attitude and has
indicated that in no case would measures to improve relations with
Communist China be taken until after the Japanese elections expected in November. Although Japanese businessmen's hopes for
resumption of trade with Communist China have been stimulated
by Peiping's recent statements and action, widespread awareness
in Japan that Peiping has manipulated the trade issue for political
purposes has created. consid
le_ausnicion. esoecial.4.,L__......"""""'....._-~
some lar e Ja anese firms .

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Communist China Strengthens Its Ties With Guinea .·
Peiping has announced that it will pro-vide Guidea with·economic aid .amounting.to $25,000,000 during the next. three years,

under. an agreement concluded during Sekou: Toure's. visit to Com. munlst China. A trade agreement. calling for an annual exchange
of almost $10,000,000 in goods also was negotiated during. the
Guinean president's stay in Peiping. The. joint commbnique on
Toure's visit, released on.13 September, reveals that ln addition to the economic ·a gl'eements a Chinese-Guinean friendship
t;featy was signed by Chou . En~ Lai and Toure.
Although the· $25,000,000 interest-free credit represents the
first formal "economic and technical cooperation" agreement be~·
tween ·P eiping and Conakry, 60 Chinese "~rlculturallsts" have
been working on rice cultivation proj~cts. in Guinea since.the spring
of this year. The new agreement presumably allo~s for additional
Chinese technicians to enter ·Guinea to assist in the projects to be
implemented under the crec:Ut.
.
. Chinese trade with Guinea thus far has been slight. However,
if the goals r;Jet by the ·commercial agreement are reached, Peiping
may account for about ten percent of Guinea's ~ual. foreign trade.

Prior to .vlsiting China, Toure spent a few days in Moscow wh~re
he was assured of receiving additional Soviet economlc aid. The So~
vlet Union ag:reed to extend its $35,000,000 long=term crec:Ut to in~
clude ·assistance for Guinea's Konkoure River hydroelectdc dam and
aluminum development scheme. Moscow also announced that it plans
to extend the Conakry-Mamou rai road Soviet en neers are to build
to Kankan in eastern Guinea.

cONFIDEJ'l!TlA L_
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President Sukarno Bans Activities of All Political Parties
President Sukarno issued a temporary ban .on the activities Of all political parties on 13 September, apparently after
having gone through the motions of submitting it for discussion
at an emergency meeting of regional and national officials·. He
apparently plans to decide by 30 November ·which. parties may
operate legally.
·
The ban reportedly was drafted by the army at Sukarno's
request as a compromise solution to the problem posed by the
army's. proscription of Communist activity in three .military
commands .last month. The army's move in August was a direct challenge to Sukarno, who has conciliated the Commun~sts
and who, on 17 August, had dissolved the anti-Communist
Masjumi and Socialist parties. The new all-party ban frees .
Sukarno from the necessity of making a direct choice between
the army and the Communists and obviates an army decision
on whether to oppose Sukarno further by extending its anticommunist ban.
.
.
(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

The ban will permit Sukarno to proceed more easily with
his Na tional Front, a mass organization in ·which he expects
all parties and groups to cooperate . He installed the 63-member centrai board of the National Front on 8 SepteII)ber ; at
least 18 membe rs--28 percent of the membership--are susceptible to Communist direction. Should the front become a
viable organization, it could be a considerable asset to the
Communists by provi d henLaJr.OYe.rn1rumt orlranizatil..... ..__ _ _~
within_which to w.ork.

(b )(3)

(b )( 1)

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·The Co:ngo Situation

(b )(3)

Jjvobbling support .by Jp.dependent African states, at least in
part a result of Soviet pressure, ls frustrating.Secretary General
Hammars~jQld's efforts to gain.the. backing of the UN Security
Council for st-rengthening.- hls hand in dealing w~th - the Congo situation]
.
.
·
~t the 12 September Security ·council session, all proposals
which were under informal.consideration. seemed to be disadvanta-

geous to Kasavubu, and the session was postponed when it appeared
that any ·early action by the council would almost certainly help
Lumumba. Tunisia was already feeling Soviet .pressure; exerted
.through such Afro-Asian states as Guinea, ~ndonesia, the UAR,
Morocco, and Ghanf]

~ile the British Government h~s so far ·been reluctant to
comm.i t itself to supporting either Lumumba or Kasa'Vl,lbu ·.until
. the situation is clarified, its UN delegation takes the position that
Lumumba.is more likely to win out. The delegation is th_e refore
encouraging Ghana's plan to propose that. a .good offices committee
. composed of the Afro-Asian members of the UN Command in the ·
Congo (UNOC) be established by the. Security Council. to resolve the
crisis through mediat.lon~

I

~rushchev, in_. the strongest Soviet attack on Hammarskjold
to date, charged on.13 September·that the UN secretary general. ls
"consciously work~ng in the interests of the imperialists" in the
Congo and that his actions "dovetail with the policies of the countries whi~h. have always esp~used the positions of colonialism."
Answering questions aboard the Baltika, the Soviet premier -denounced Hammarskjold's insistence that all. aid to the Congo Government be chan11eled thro~gh the UN as a .f urther effort to uphold
colonialist interests, and indicated that he· may press ther-C;=...o=n~g'"""o:....___---. (b)(3)
issue at the forthcomiiuz ~ General Assembly meetin~
.

.

J

.

(b)(3)

cJn Leopoldville, President Kasavubu quickly sent loyal. troops
to surround the radio station after.the UN on 13 Sept.ember.lifted
its ban on air trafilc and radiobroadcastlng. In an effort to gain
· .the upper,hand in the fight against Premier Lumumba, Kasavubu's
minister."of information, Jean Bolikango, broadcast a promise to
make an il.11-out effort to relieve hunger and unemployment and :J

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~
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. l'a.nnounced that Kasavubu had signed a new arrest warrant for
Premier Lumumba and six of his cabinet ministers=.]
.

.

~resident Nkrumah of Gha.n a warned Hammarskjold on 13
September that if Lumumba were not allowed to use Radio Leopoldville, Ghana would withdraw its 2,300 troops from the UN
Comman4 and reserve the right to place them entirr-e-'1.- ~
at-'--'th_e_ _ _----,
,.................cv:sal of the 111.e.f!itlmate Lumumba government."

(b )( 1)

(b)(1)

[)luring this struggle for power between Kasavubu and Lumumba,
1 oseph Ileo, the premier-designate of Kasavubu, remains ln Brazza-

ville where he ls under the protection of President Youlou--tribally
related to Kasavubu--of the Congo Republic ·(the former French
Congo) . Youlou has glven all possible support to Kasavubu, and
now plans to provide him wlth small arms and financial asststanc·e
to organize demonstratlons1
t:Although the UN wlll retain control of main airport installations
and approaches, relaxation of the UN ban on non- UN a:tr flights will
probably permit Lumumba to utilize Soviet transport aircraft to airlift ·reinforcements and additional supplies to the Ka.s at. During the UN
ban, these planes have been groundedJ

~.he Congolese parliament on 13 September reaffirmed its support
of Lumumba and granted him virtually unlimited powers. Most opposition members were absent, however, and it is questionable whether
the assembly mustered a quorum. Nevertheless, the vote ·reflects
the Kasavubu group's contlnuiruLbt ii
brin he
sitlon to
Lumumba into the open.

14 Sept 60

CEl'JTDAI INTFI 11r,FNCE BULLETIN

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(b )( 1)

C02 99 75 33
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign lntelltgence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Polley
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Sl;lcretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Sec retary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter.national Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air· Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff , United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chair man
National Security Agenc y
The Di rec tor
National Indications Center
The Director

ThJiVFH>ENTIAk_
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~-

-- - - --

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or ag·ency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including

I

(b)(3)

I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prej udicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

T~
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CENTRAL INTELLIG~EN--=-c=e=----cs=--=-u--=-o-L-=-=LE"""""l~IN-o------

--'

3 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF
•• i'

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

I I. ASIA-AFRICA

*Republic of the Congo: UN Secretary General Hammarsk)old announced ln Leopoldville late on 2 August that UN
. troops w,111 enter Katan:ga Province on 6 August. Dr. Bunche
reportedly will go to Elisabethville on 5 August to lay the
groundwork for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the

f1. o

province.
The threat by the ·Lumumba government to expropriate
all Belgian firms which do not reopen for business by 10 Au. gust may stimulate new anti-European iIJ,cidents in the Congo.
The security situati9n remains uncertain; tdbal warfare has
flared up once again in Kasai Province. The UN forces appear
hesitant about becoming involved in the tribal warfare, and official statements have characterized it as "an internal matter"
beyond UN j':1risqiction.
(Page 1)
Pe.r sian Gulf Oil: A sharp break in the posted prices of Persian GUlf c.rude oil appears imminent. For the past several
months the Western-owned oil companies have fourid it necessary
to· grant substantial discounts to sell this oil. The drop is ex,pected to be more .t han 10 percent--a somewhat larger cut than
the.18-cents-pera·barrel. reduction made in early 1959. The 1959
reduction-"."'the first in.the Persian Gulf--cost the oil-producing .
states there an estimated $140,000,000 in expected 1959 revenues.
Reaction to the prospect of an additional drop is ~xpected to be
even more severe than in 1959 and will add to frictions between
. the Ar~bian-.,American Oil Company and Saudi Arabia, betWeen
the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company and the UAR, and .between
the Iraq Petroleum Company and Iraq. Arab governments are
almost certain.to step up their pressures for a ~reater voice in
management of Western-owned oil concerns.

lthe

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...

. . Aden: {iritain is planning a showdown with Nasir-controlled
labor unions in Aden whose activities are disrupting the colony's
~------, conomy and threaten eventually to challenge British control.
egislation is to be passed which will outlaw strikes, make ar~
itration compulsory, and provide for unusually severe penal.___ _ _ _ ~ies for strike leaders. The proposed legislation may lead to a
general strike and violent demonstrations which could paralyze
all port activity. The British appear confident that ~uritv
precautions they have taken can contain the situatio~1
I
.
~~
Indonesia: Political maneuvering among major power elements is increasing. The army, which apparently instigated
last week's anti-Communist demonstration in South Sumatra and
plans others, is testing how far it can go without incurring strong
reaction from Sukarno. The ·Communists, who recently indulged
in open criticism of the government, are apprehensive over Sukarno's failure to prevent the ·army from harassing them. Sukarno
thus far has employed his usual tactic of maintaining the uneasy
balance between the ~rm and the Communists withmrt_,compromising his own position. j
I
L---------------~

3 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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~TOP~

Sltuation in the Congo Continues Critical

I

.,. ,;
1.,"

1,

'· '

t ) , } !'.. .
\

UN Se.c·retary General Hammarskjold announced late on 2 August that UN troops will move.into Katanga Province on 6 August.
Dr. Bunche reportedly· will go to Elisabethville on 5 Au.g ust to lay
the groundwork for Belgian evacuation of the province. ffiammarJ skjold had been under growing pressure from the Congolese cabinet which had threatened to appeal to the UN Security Council to
hasten the entrance of UN forces into Kat~ga.:J The Secretary Gen~
eral has apparently postponed his scheduled trip to South Africa
until next week in case Katangan Premier Tshombe should carry
. out his threat to oppose UN military intervention. CThere has been
no official Belgian announcement as to the status of Belgian. troops
in Katanga although it is reported that Brussels has apparently accepted the inevitability of an early withdrawa!J

I

The threat by the Lumumba government to expropriate all
Belgian firms which have not reopened for business by 10 August
may stimulate new anti- European disorders in the Congo. The
Belgian Government has estimated that between 30,000 and 35,000
Europeans remain in the Congo, compared with about 115,000
shortly before independence.
The security situation there remains precarious, with inter· Province.
I (b)(1)
officers of the UN force
ave yet o receive any instructions concerning the rehabilitation
of the once- effective Force Publique] Nonetheless, the UN forces
appear unwilling to take action to contain intertribal warfare; statements by the UN. Command haye characterized the tribal clashes as (b)(3)
"an internal roatter" t o he handJed hv the "C1ngo Army." j
l(b)( )

C::

,......._.L.u.LJ.......__.,._,,._~ax:eJlaJl.inll...il.ared aP-ain

{ ··
,.

..( . ..l •. ,.
'1

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3

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(b)(3)

3 Aug 60

rC"-.JTD A I

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-

( British Crackdown on Adeni Nationalists May Lead to Violence
The colonial governmentts announcement on 1 August that
it intends to obtain legislation which. will enable it to crack·

down on Nasir-controlled unions in Aden may lead.to a general
strike and violent demonstrations which. could paralyze all port
activity. The British move is likely to close the ranks of the
feuding leadersrof the Aden Trade Union Congress and increase
the possibility of violence. Cairo is likely to make a big propaganda play over the "imperialist repression.''

'

I

l

I

I
!'

I

(b)( 3 )

Britain regards this as a showdown with Arab nationalists
.led from Cairo who are using domination of the~ labor movement
--the strongest political force in the colony--to challenge continued British control. The British feel that the unions have
been given every chance to develop responsibility but are interested only in nationalist politics, not labor benefits. Politically
motivated strikes, which the new legislation will outlaw, are
damaging Aden's economy and have· convinced U:>ndon that strong
action. is necessary . There. were over 70 strikes in 1959, and
a 70-day refinery strike. this spring just recently was brought
to final settlement. The new legislation to be voted about 15
August by the colonyts legislative council Will provide for compulsory arbitration except in certain limited circumstances.
Instigators of "political" strikes disguised as industrial disputes will be tried as felons under the criminal code.
The British apparently believe the extra security precautions they have taken can contain the situation. They now have
4, 700 troops--including a commando unit--in Aden to ensure
maintenance of essential services in the event of a eneral
strike as :well as rovide internal security.

Page 3

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_,.

~

.I ntensified Maneuvering in Indonesia
Indonesia's major power elements are once again intensively maneuvering against one another.
The Communist party, which triggered the latest round
of maneuvering by Severely criticizing the government in an
8 July statement, now appears apprehensive over President
(b )(3)
.------------, Sukarno's permitting an army investigation of party leaders.
The army has interrogated five members of the politburo
since 16 July, planned to begin a more intensive "second
phase" interrogation on 30 July, §id allegedly hopes ulti- ·
mately to br4J.g thE~ . politburo to trial on charges of violating
the criminal code. An emergenc'y meeting of Communist
provincial leaders was reported scheduled for' 20 to 23 July.
Depending on Sukarno's reaction, the Communist leadership
L------~~ is reported making plans to go underground for an indefinite
period] _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _I (b)(1)
~_:__-=:::L__

Sukarno is angry over the army's activities among nonCommunist political parties and reportedly has decided to
displace .Colonel ~Ukendro, who has served as the army~
liaison.with political parties. I
t__-----------~1

Although Sukarno at first interfered with the army's interrogation of Communist party. leaders, he now seems inclined to wait and see how far the army is prepared to go and

3 Aug 60

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~

what resources the Communists can muster. Several times
during the past two weeks, however, he has, in effect, ~eas­
sured the Commw1ists by stating publicly that his views. coincide in many areas with those of the party. &ikarno undoubtedly desires to preserve the party as a balance against army
ower in. order to maintain his own re""e
ent
i
(b )( 1)

3 Aug 60

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CU1'¥F1V"L1'\' l J A

1, _

-....,.;

" THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Moblll.zation
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Sec retary of State
The Under Sec r e tary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Sec retary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Sec retary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inte rnational Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air F o r ce
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Direc tor , The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operatio ns, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United State s Marine Corps
Assistant to Sec r etary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Ass istant Chief of Staff, · Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Direc tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

l".ONF'Jf)gNTIA I .

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.

I

i::..
1 -"IL..._._•. _ , , I

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c~13oo i377 1'/////////////////////////////////////////////////
• ~ _ •

._;pprovi\~;;:1ea~300:,7
~(3)

~

~

~(3)
~

1 March 1961

"(b)(3)

~

Copy No.

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C0'3007 377

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r.._;

I

TUP~ET

,..._

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as m uch consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including

I

.

(b )( 1)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain in telligence ite~s in this pu blication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for th e benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b )( 1)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03007377

'Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03007377

'-'

s~~

...,

1 March

~961

CENTRAL INTELIJGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS

2. USSR- UN: Contrary to previous report, Gromyko
will attend resumed General Assembly session in
March. (Page H)

3. Mali: Bloc offers to purchase entire 1960-61 peanut crop. (Pa.ge tt)

5. Israel - Arab States! Forthcoming Israeli test mobilization may be used by Nasir as occasion to denounce Israel. (Page tt t)
6. USSR: Comment on Kalchenko's dismissal. (Page ttt)

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~USSR:-UN:(jhe designation of Foreign Minister Gromyko
to head the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly which
· resumes on 7 March apparently marks a change in Soviet plans .
. Khrushchev may wi~h to. show that despite his harsh attacks on
Hammarskjold and Western policy in the Congo, he has not lost

interest in im:proved relations with the US and a meeting with the
President. Gromyko told the Finnish foreign minister in mid~
- - - ------. February that neither he nor Khrushchev would return to New
York for this session of the UN but indicated that Khrushchev
was still willing to come to the US for talks with the President.
One of Gromyko's purposes may be the arrangement of such a
-----~ meeting. The decision to send Gromyko coincides with an intensive effort by the Soviet UN delegates to confine General Assembly debate to a few items so as not to hinder restoration of "norr·
mal" US~Soviet i:;elationS:-}-\ l\i;[ali~Bloc:CMali is reportedly engaged in negotiations based\

oh a joint Soviet~ Czech offer to purchase Mali's entire 1960- 6 /

:peanut crop- -about 50,000 metric tons--for approximately
$20,000,000. Since this single commodity accounts for about
90 percent of the country's export earnings, consummation of th

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toward the bloc. France has offered to continue taking Mali's
peanuts at premium prices, but Mali's leaders are apparently - - -- -------~ attracted by the willingness of the bloc countries to make a 25percent payment i~ US dollars and by the prospect of shar 1 reducing Mali's economic dependence on France) I

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Israel - Arab States : A surprise test mobilization of Israel's
armed forces is scheduled to take place shortly after 2 March.
Jordan has been informed of the impending test through UN armistice commission channels. Nasir, who will probably also learn
of the test, is nevertheless likely to use it as an occasion to denounce Israel during his current campaign to generate more enthusiasm in Syria for the union with Egypt. The scheduling of the
test at this time is probably designed by the Tel Aviv.'government
to unify the country following the disruption caused by a government crisis over the Lavon affair and to stren then Ben-Gurion's
Mapai party in new elec.ti.Q

L

6K

*USSR: The dismissal oruKraiman Premier KaicnenRo tor-a~ cultural failures emphasizes Khrushchev's determination to achieve
a sharp improvement in Sovie~ agriculture this year, and serves
notice on officials responsible for agricultural performance at all
levels that they stand to lose their jobs if they fail to get results.
Numerous lesser officials have been fired on similar grounds since(] IC
January, when the party central committee aired the agricultural
problem. Kalchenko, who has been government chief in the Ukraine
since 1954, has been replaced by Vladimir Scherbitsky, one of the
Ukrainian party secretaries. Many more members of the party
central committee may be involved in the weeding out process before a new co'mmittee is elected by the next party congress i.n October. [
jCBackup, Page 6)

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Mali
In the five months of its existence Mali has established
diplomatic relations with six bloc countries, including the
USSR and Communist China, received a large number of
visiting bloc delegations, and sent a number of special missions to bloc countries. Except for one rather vague economic agreement with Czechoslovakia signed last Novembei:;
these contacts have so far produced few overt results.
Nevertheless, the way seems to be open for the bloc to penetrate Mali as it has done in neighboring Guinea. The USSR
is !mown to have been developing a comprehensive plan for
the industrial development of Mali, while the Czechs have ,
evinced interest in Mali's civil aviation, industrial development, and geol<?gical surveys. Malian Minister of Commerce
Ndour~ stated last week that he was "inundated" with bloc
economic proposals, adding that he was under heavy political pressure to accept such offers without delay.

Mali's Marxist-influenced one-party regime is moving
to reduce French influence. The regime, motivated by a
militant anticolonialism, considers such a reduction a
necessary prerequisite to the attainment of its proclaimed
goal of "total" political and economic independence. Atthe
same time Malians continue to resent the part ijiey believe
French elements played in neighboring Senegal's secession
from its former federation with Mall last summer. After
finally acceptirig the federation's demise , Mali's leaders
declared their country's dissociation from the French Community and .began to institute measures aimed at undercutting French commercial interests.
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g me spo esmen nave rett ur e CIOurn- tnat tur tner
es to reduce
French influence--especially in the economic sphere-..__ _ __.. would be forthcoming. A decision to shift the bulk of Mall'.51

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CHI NA

...·......
·······.

CHINA

*New Delhi

INDIA


0

AREAS CLAIMED llY .
CHINA IN BHUTAN
MILES

BURMA

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export trade to the bloc would suggest a

pos~ible

early break

with the French franc currenc zone.
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High Soviet Official Dismissed for Agriculture Failures
Khrushchev showed strong dissatisfaction with the condition of
Ukrainian agriculture early in the central committee meeting in midJ anuary when he interrupted the speech of Ukrainian party chief
Podgorny, a member of the ruling party presidium, with sharp
criticism. The first sign that Kalchenko was personally in trouble,
ca~e only a few days later when Khrushchev, ln hls own speech,
accused the Ukrainian Premier of panicking with disastrous results, during_a drought in 1956. ''There he sits," said Khrushchev,
"a member of the central committee and everything.rolls off him
as water does off a duck's back. lt doesn't matter to him that he
made a mistake."
Vladimir Matskevich, like Kalchenko a former subordinate
of Khrushchev's in the Ukraine, was fired as Soviet agriculture
minister in December. Their ousters and Podgorny's precarious
· position are further signs that the Ukraine and Khrushchev's old
associates can no longer expect special tre_a tment from Moscow
The new premier, Vladimir Shcherbitsky has been a secretary of the Ukrainian party organization since late 1957, specializing in industrial matters. He is one of several younger party
administrators who have been brought recently into prominence.
A party member only since World War II, Shcherbitsky got
started in the Ukrainian party organization during the early 1950's
and became party boss in the industrial center of Dnepropetrovsk
in 1954. He attracted the attention of the Moscow leadership, and
was given a seat on the party's Central Auditing Commission at the
Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow in 1956. ~
I --------~

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CONF}BE,~TlA L_

"fl

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Advise r to the President
The Di rector of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, Notional Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Deportment of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Coope.ration Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretory of De fense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Nava l Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant , United States Mari ne Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chi ef, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Stoff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Stoff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence , Department of Novy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel I igence, Deportment of the Air Force
The Departm.ent of Justice
The Attorney Gene ral
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National lndi cations Center
The Director

-CulVFIDENTlAl:_

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TOrsEGRD:__ _..

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departmen ts and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in thij publication is based on all sources, including

I

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Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate.and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793 , 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

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.....,
6 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation .in the Congo. (Pa.ge t)

2. Laos: Souvanna Phouma reported planning to leave on
world tour this week. · (Page t)
3. Pakistan and USSR sign agreement on oil exploration.
(Page H)

4. West Germany revalues the ma;rk. (Page H)

6.

P~namanian

delegate to "peace conference" may ·intro(Page tH)

duce resolution. on Canal Zone sovereignty.

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6 March 1961

*Con110: The

3

sl:::~:ln~:~ E:anana-Matadl-Kltona area :--- - ----'] )

r.emat.ns tense, and the 120-man Sudanese garrison at Matadl
has withdrawn to avert further c~ashes. Congoles·e. forces ap
parently have ignored a cease -fire negotlated earlier by UN ·
.special representative Dayal and Congolese .Foreign _M inister
Bomoko. UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, following a
two and a half hour· emergency meeti'ng of the UN's 18-nation
Congo advisory committee, ls reported to have ordered the UN
commander to meet today with Congolese military leaders in
an effort to restore UN control in the area. Dayal confirmed
on 4 March that he had orders from Hammarskjold to hold
Banana and Kltona at all costs, and to retake them if lost,by
force if necessary.
Brussels radio has announced that Gizenga and Kashamura
wlll attend the roun.d -table conference called by Tshomb6 which
ls to begin on 6 March ln Tananarive ~ .Tshomb~ , Kalonji, and
lleo arrived in Tananarive on 4 March, and Kasavubu reportedly
will join them on 6 March, following a plea from Tshomb6 that
the conference would not succeed without hlm. The conference
i's unlikely to result ln more than broad agreements to cooperate
on ''unlfylng" the Congo. The proclamation on 4 March of the
State of Maniema, in Klvu Province, by Antoine Omarl is probably' an effort on his part to align himself with the anti-Communist
grouping. of Tshomb6, Kalonji, and lleo announced on 28 February.
It is doubtful that Omar t c ontrols enaueh of Kivu Province to make
this move significant. I

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__J

Laos : &ormer Laotian premier Souvanna Phouma is reportedly plarining to leave Cambodia between 7 and 11 March on his
: - - - - world tour seeking support for his "legal" government. Former
finance minister lnpeng Suradhay is still trying to .a rrange talks
between Souvanna fl,nd General Phoum,i. Inpeng, who arrived in
,.----~ Vientl.ane and i.uang Prabang durlng Souvanna's re cent vlsl.t t()_)
i

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Gebel- held territory, planned an eai:-ly return to Phnom Penh
to convey Phoumi's willingness to meet Souvanna,. possibly in
Rangoon:-)
(}. team from Taipei was expected to arr! ve in Bangkok by
6 March to negotiate arrangements for the repatriation of Chinese
Nationalist irregular troops from the Thai-Burma-Laotian border·
area. The team plans to visit villages in Laos and Thailand, where
irregulars crossing over from Burma have concentrated, to persuade as many as possible to return.to Taiwan. Although a Lao~
tian government spokesman has stated that Kuomintang elements
in Laos are now being disarmed,/
~ in the border
area has re orted seeing a well-armed uniCmfils village. /
I
· bout 1,000 ir~~:.r.:;~'"v;-;;~=--...,~~'""''"""..,......,..YTr...,..-.....nnr,,..,...,~.~

tSSJ~_ba~
ck
..._~~-

· Pak1stan~ USSR: v:t'he agreement on oil exploration signed in \
Karachi on 4 March after several months of bargaining is the first
major Soviet aid program accepted by the Pakistani Government.
The agreement provides for a credit of $30,000,000 to finance a
five-year program of technical assistance in oil prospecting and
surveying. The credit carries the usual favorable terms--repay-"1'====~
. ment over 12 years at 2.5- percent interest. Pakistani officials,
impressed by the discoveries of Soviet teams in India and Afghanistan, hope that the Soviets will succeed where Western oil companies have failed. Leaders of the military government probably
are also motivated by po.itical considerations. WhHe maintaining
J>akistan's commitment to its Western alliances and continuing to
rely strongly on US aid, President Ayub and his associates have
sought in recent months to demonstrate a greater "independence"
in. foreign policy as a reminder that Pakistan's cooperation shou.l d
not be taken for granted.
]<Backup, P~ge 3)
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West Germany:Qn a sudden move, Bonn has raised the exchange value of the West German mark 5 percent in an effort to
({) t:halt the steady influx of for~ign exchange--chiefly dollars- - which
has contributed to US balance=of=payments difficulties. The:Netherlands
---~ has announced tha~ the guilder is being similarly revalued. Althoug~
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[Ger.man government an4 banking.efflclals-..;;~nd~r. strong pres-

·:: )
~~,'it

SU1'es fr.om ·industrial and··commerclal interests...:·-·had re.,. .. .

peatedly rejected revaluation, the failure of Bonn's recent
· easin,g in its tight monetary policy to correct West Germany's
chroriic billion-dollar payments surplus and the threat of
another wave of speculation apparently convinced Bonn offi----~ cials that a more realistic pegging of the mark was unavoid~ble . This action~~w~ich applies a 'bi'aka on inflation but
also makes Germane orts more ex ensive' - - - - - -- , - - - - - - '
ay be
intended to demonstrate Chanc~llor Adenauer's willingness to
take additional ste s to ease ressure on the dolla~ [

~~

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:.'···

Latin America:0 demand for full Panamani;µi sovereignty
in. the Canal Zone is likely to be one of the propaganda high_lights
of the Communist-backed "Latin American Conference on National
Sovereignty, Economic· Emancipation, and Peace," meeting in
Mexico City from 5 to 8 March. Pro-Castro deputy Thelma King,
head of the Panamanian .delegation, reportedly will introduce the
_ _ ____,·resolution on th~ CanaJ Zo.n e and another coridemlling US "aggression against Cuba." . The conference is sponsored pr_incipally by
(/) /:'former Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas, a Stalin Peace
Prize winner ·whose prestige .as a revolutionary is high in Latin
America, although he has allowed himself to be .us d increasin ly
. l.b.Y..:.b__o.1lLCami and the Communists.

-=

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Conqo
MALAYA
150

Gemcna

, .-,

.

~

Scattered Forcer -8
~

~

'"'M""'o,.,..a'""
ur-u""
1;500

TUNISIA
2,600

MALAYA.
610 .

·,

'
GHANA

1,900
SUDAN

390

.

-

:1

.. ...
-

,! i -·· - •

,...e Luanda

Approxlmale area controlled by:

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'

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htonji

D

00

- - Selected road
Selected railroad

( ) f1 "*:n

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United Nations Forces

Selected airtield

Cut railroad
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Situation in the Congo
The fighting around Banana has resulted in casualties
on both sldes--which will make it even more difficult for
either UN or Congolese forces in Leopoldville to control the
situation. !
jC ongolese troops have used
artillery, mortars, and even as 11 m hibious o eratlon
against the Sudanese UN forces.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _!the incident co._ul
-=-=
d__,t,--o_u_
c-=-h-o--=f=
f -=f_,....
ig-=h~t~
in
_g
_
e~s
-e--__J
where.

e g um w no ms s on
'"--;;Je
"'p
.-.a
"-r
=
ur
~
e•o
=<n=."'e~""
e r.9't.,.
an
---....-.-~ ry, par a military, and ·p oli tlcal personnel who are under contract to the Katanga government. Military technicians not under contract- -probably
about 40 in various ministries of the Katanga government-apparently will be recalled, however. Tshomb~ would react
strongly to such a move.

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Glzenga, after having indicated several times that he
would not attend the Tananarive conference, informed UN officials on 4 March that he was eager to participate and asked
the UN to furnish transportation. The conference, originally
planned for Geneva, was suddenly .reset for Tananarive on 1
March- -apparently without the M~agasy governme".n t's having
been consulted. The r e is no known agenda, but some .reports
indicate that the conference will last for six days. Malagasy
President Tslranama, who apparently will take no part in the
meetlngs1 on 3 March broadcast advice to the population to
receive the Congolese as brothers but not to take sides with
any faction. j
I

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Meanwhile, Gizenga continues to explore ways of getting
outside help for .his hard-pressed regime. /

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Pakistan and USSR Sign Agreement on. Soviet Aid in Oil Exploration
·
Agreement in principle on the Soviet credit was reached
in Moscow in December during the visit of the Pakistani min.ister of fuel, power, and natural resources, but consummation of the deal was delayed pending further negotiations in
Karachi. Pakistani officials had originally hoped that Moscow
would agree to share the expense. of exploration if oil is not
found--Pakistan paid only 25 percent of the cost of exploration undertaken by Western oil companies--but this idea was
promptly dismissed by Soviet negotiators. Pakistani officials
also pressed for even more favorable credit terms than they
received, including repayment in nonconvertible rupees. In
the end Pakistan apparently conceded its main points, although the Soviets, in agre.eingtorupee repayment, probably
assl,lred Pakistani officials that Moscow·would not demand
conversion to hard currency unless acceptable exports were
not available .
. The Soviet ambassador recently discussed publicly the
possibility of additional assistance in such areas as atomicenergy development for peaceful purposes, medical training,
and agrarian problems. He. also expressed hope that a cultural agreement would be signed. Pakistani officials have
shown some reluctance with regard to further aid programs,
but conclusion of the oil deal may make it difficult for them
to turn down publicized offers in the. social welfare field,
because these are keyed to popular demands and have stirred
considerable public interest.
Despite President Ayub's repeated reaffirmation of
Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy and commitment to
the CENTO and SEA TO alliances, neutralist tendencies have
been increasingly evident in government circles since mid1960 . A number of top officials, sharing the view held by
many intellectuals and large sections of the public, question
the value of a rigid commitment to the West, noting that

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neutralist countries often gain more by exploiting the competing
interests of both major power blocs. The military government
since early this year has permitted much of the press to carry
on a sustained ·editorial campaign calling for "gradual disengagement from the role of a committed nation" and for improved
relations with the bloc. The line taken by the press presumably has reinforced the latent neutralist sentiment of the bulk
of the population, especially in East Pakistan.

Cm his latest conversation with Amb~ssador Rountree, Ayub

explained that in. view of Pakistants "extremely difficult strategic p.o sition"--with enemies or potential enemies on all sides,,
excepting Iran--it was essential to avoid trouble with Communist China. Ayub felt he could not secure a border settlement
from Peiping--which would ease the threat to Pakistan's security from that direction--without modifying his governmentts
~-------, position on Chinese representation in the UN and specialized
agencies. Ayub indicated that Pakistani delegations would
abstain on procedural questions involving the seating of Chinese
Communist representatives, and would have to vote for ac'--------~ ceptance should a substantive resolution coine to a voty
(},..yub and his associates also calculate that an accommodation with Peiping will increase pr.essure on India in connection
with the Kashmir dispute, and that better relations with ¥oscow
will put Afghanistan at a disadvantage in its dispute with--'P_a _k;..'_. · ----.
.istan over the: Pushtoonstan issue...

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Bonn Raises Value of West German J

k

£Foreign exchange trading in West Germany was briefly
interrupt'ed on 4 March and· then resumed at a new rate of four
German marks to the dollar, compared with the old rate of
4.23. Later, Economics Minister Erhard confirmed that Bonn
has revalued the mark and described himself as the "initiator
and driving force behind the action." He explaine.d the move as
a necessary step to maintain the stability of the German currency and price levels in West Germany, as well as to stem the speculat.i ve influx of dollars into the country. International financial
circles have long been concerned over Bonn's chronic balance-ofpayments surplus, which increased another $2 billion in 1960 for
a total. gold and foreign exchange reserve of more than ·$ 7. 5 bi~­
lion. Revaluation is intended to help correct this imbalance.
Although the move .benefits German consumers through lower
or stable prices, German businessmen and labor leaders are
critical because of .the resultant reduction of Bonn's competitive
price edge in.world mark;ets, which they fear m.ay put a damper
on Bonn's continuing boom~
[Wh.ile praising the move, some Western o.fficials have questioned whether a 5-percent revaluation is ·sufficient to reverse the
imbalance. These officials suggest that instead of an immediate
flow of dollars back to the United States, speculators might stand
pat iil anticipation of. fu~ther changes not only in the mark but in
other curre.n cies as well' )

Un

a press interview on 5 March, Erhard gave assurances that
in addition to revaluing the mark, Bonn intends to go ahead wi.th
plans for a billion dollar aid program for underdeveloped .~c=
oun
=---~
tries as a fu~her ineans of easing the US financial. burder>:~

cONFlDE.NTlA~

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Hostility to Trujillo Intensifying
Arrests. and tortures have increased markedly in recent
weeks, particularly in traditionally anti-Trujillo cities in the
interior, according to information reaching the Americ~ Consu_Iate from a number· of independent sources. Although opposition to Trujillo e21;tends to all social and economic levels except the generally politically inert peasantry, it has long been
led by middle class and professional elements who are moderate
and friendly 'to the United States. It is these groups that have
been most. gravely weakened by :the government's ·repression and
.by ~he econom,ic difficulties of the past two years. Dissident
leaders fear that un.Iess Trujillo is soon ousted, there win be
.l ittle hope of a moderate successor.
·
The military and police organizations, which remain the
key to Trujillo's survival, show no sign of disaffection. How ~
ever, relatives of certain key officers have been victims of
Trujillo in the pa.s t year, and these and othel'.' offfoers may well
desert- him if they become convinced that his end is near.
The American Consulate noted on .3 Ma:rc.h that Trujillo,
who is probably aware of the gravity of the current political and
economic situations., may be planning a simulated coup. Under
such a plan, the government would be turned over to a military
junta composed ·Of ojficers ostensibly opposed to Trujillo but
actually controlled by him. After OAS sanctions against the
Dominican Republic had . 'been lifted and the governm,ent a,ssured
of a market for Dominican .sugar in.the US, Trujillo would be
recalled. Such a .st rategy is consistent with TruUllo's mentality
and with tactics he has used in :the past.

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l.ommmnst ana-.::astro-.ntlu=:rant in Latin American
Peace Congress
/in attack on the US position in the Ca,nal Zone would be enthusiastically supported by delegates to the.conference; as well
. as by observers who are attending·from most Communist countries, including China. The Panamanian demand for sovereignty
may be used as part of a campaign against us retention of the
naval base at Guantanamd:J
[Thelma King has a long record of involvement in~subversive
political activity, and her current plotting with other
Panamanian politicans has contributed to the instability of the
Chiari government. Reportedly subsidized by Castro, she has
been .successful in arousing support for him among student and
other groups3
·

(b )( 1)

~~~----

lrhe conference seems to be the fruition of Communist efforts to convene a Latin Amer.l ean "people's .·congress," originally
set for Apdl 1959 when Castro's prestige .was at lts height. Designed to promote anti- US and pro- Castro sentiment, its agenda
includes such topics as anti- imperialism, antlcolonialism, defense of national resources, and disarmament, as well as support
of ~e Cuban revolution]
·
fA secretariat drawn from Communist front peace groups in
sev\i~al Latin American countries has been in Me~iCo since December:working out details of the meeting. Programs to arouse
interest have .been held rece~tly. among student, labor, and cultural groups in various countries, particularly in Mexico. Car~
denas--whose widespread popularity in Mexico g.i ves him some
influence in the Lopez Mateos government- - and other conference
organizers have met several times recently with the Soviet ambassador to Me~co, Bazykin, and two Venezuelan delegates called
on the envoy soon after their arrival on 16 Februari:)
0

li3azykin plans to leave soon on a Latin American tour probably designed to explore possibilities for increasing Soviet diplomatic and economic ties. Several countries, including Panama,
have delayed issuing visas requested by him, and Colombia has
actually refused to grant a visa, ~a,.~in ·the "time is not approriate for such a visietj

___]

-s
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretory of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Poll cy Planning Counci I
The Director of lntell igence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretory of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretory of Defense (Special Operations)
· The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Stoff, United States Air Force
Chief of Sta.f f, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
· U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Iied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, lntell igence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security ~ency
The Director·
The United States Information ~ency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director

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TO~T
,....---,

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including

I

'

,

(b)(1 )i
I

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and prellminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelli~ence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
I

(b )( 1)
i

t

(b )( 1)
i

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CON'l'ENTS

1. Situation in the Congo. (Pa.gs t)

·i··.'$

...,.~~-

-;

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jj·.
3. Argentma: Frondtzi moves to mediate between US and
Cuba, (Page ft)
4• . Bolivia plans arrest of Communist union leaders if
teachers' strike cont~nues; requests arms from US
for use ln case of violence. (Page tt )

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 March 1961

DAILY BRIEF
.Cobgo: The Tananarive round-tabie conference, sched') k
uied to egin on 5 March, has been delayed to await the ar.~
rival of Kasavubu and Gizenga. There has been no further
fighting between UN forces and the Congolese troops in Matadi ~ ~ J°l':;,
and Banana, ·and both UN and Congolese authorities have refJ"f ~
portedly agreed, for the t~e being, not to send reinforcementso
to the Lower Congo regi.on. Further clashes seem likely, how~
ever, since Hammarskjold has insisted that UN forces must
reoccupy Matadi, while Kasavubu's Foreign Minister Bomboko
stated on 6 March that Matadi would not be returned to the UN
pending a full investigation. Khartoum has announced that
Sudanese troops will be withdrawn from the Congo because
of allegep "e:rave_misiakes~ by UN officials during the recent
clashes. L
_L(Backuo ,__Eag_e~
l_._
) _.(.M
._.a.a.,.>£<._ _ _ _ __ _~

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Argentina-Cuba: Argentina has decided to send special
envoys to the United States and Cuban governments to seek
means of alleviating "tension" between the two countries, decpite its previous skepticism regarding the value of single<:ountry mediation efforts. This action ls probably intended
;;o counter the apparent bid of Brazilian President Quadros for ·
Latin American leadership through a play to leftist sentiment. .
.!'....!though officials have denied that domestic political considerations are responsible for the move, it is probably also influenced in part by the recent electoral triumph in Buenos Aires
of a Soci3.lli;J.-di!J>Jll who campaigned on a pro-Castro platform.
Backup, Page 2)
·
Bollvla: President Victor Paz Estenssoro told American·
Ambassador Strom on 5 March that his government plans extensive arrests of Comm•Jn1 ~t U-ade union leaders lf the Confederation of Urb:m Teachers ... -which ls reported under strong Communist lnfluence-...conUna.es its strike for higher wages after the
morning of rz March. Anticipating possible violence, Paz ls
asking for tear-gas grenades, machine-gun ammunltton, and
small bombs for use ln P-51 air.craft, from the United States.
-A substantial wage increase for teachers would strengthen
· Via~e demands from other g~ernment employees and lmpede
the Paz government's di"lve to Increase the cowitey's production.
The powerful unions of the natlonallzed tin mlnes are threaten ...
I lng to strike betlnnllng ·B March..1 ---------~

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.. u

DAILY BRIEF

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·A rgentlna to Se.nd Speclal Envoys to US and Cuba
In tts reply to Cuba's circular note of late February
sollcltlng sympathy from the varlous Latin American governments, Argentina announced Its Intention to send special en. voys to tha US and Cuban governments. Argentina apparently
acted without consulting any of the other countries ln advanc~.

A Foreign Ministry official said on ·4 March that Argen·
tina's lnlUatlve was based on the following conslderatlons:
1) the ·Cuban sltuatlon remains a dlsturblng influence on the
relations of other countries witll lhe US; 2) a solution to
tbs problem must be one which will ellmlnate Soviet and Com-

....... . ..
,.;.

munist Influence In Cuba and, without arousing leftist elements
in the hemisphere, stop Cuba's efforts to spread .Its revolution
aoroad; and 3) the ove·r throw of Castro by anti-Castro Cubans
from the US o~ Guatemala would probably prompt criticism
which would worsen Inter-American relations.
Argentina's action, however, ls probably intended primarily for ~ts efiect on public oplnton both at houie and
abroad. Heretofore, Argentina has .been the strongest
crltlc of Cuba among the large Latin American countries and
has matntalned that the Cuban problem should be handled only
through the OAS. Recently, however, President Frondlzl
expressed doubt that a vote for collective action would get
even a slim majority.·
Brazlllan President Quadros' statements on Cuba Increase pressure on Frondlzl to make a gesture of his own on
Cuba. A Br azlllan press report on 4 March quoted Quadros
as stating that "even supposing that there ls Communist lnflltratlon In the Cuban Government, the Castro revolution baa ·
our sympathies and we are not In any manner disposed to uphold any action contrary to the prlnclple of nonintervention
ln Internal ailalrs of other countries so long as Castro does
not .try to export Fldelismo~" \

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Pqe
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defe nse Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretory of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counse lor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intel Iigence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army ·
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretory of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep. , Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intel Iigence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intel I ige nce, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Stoff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Di rector
The United States Info rmation Agency
The Director
The Nat ional Indi cations Ce nter
The Director

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1

7 December 1960

MSC .BRIEFING
CONGO

I.

Immediate question in Congo is whether Lumumba supporters in

Orien~ale

Province can obtain sufficient foreign aid to make good their
"s'e cession. 11

A.

Mobutu's threat to move Congo

~rmy

against Orientale poses threat

of civil war.
II.

Pro-Lumumba official has indicated 'to Embassy Leopoldville that
proclamation of independent Orientale Province had been decided even
I

prior to

A.

~umumba's

capture 2 December..

However, Lumumbist position appears vulnerable in absence of a
leader with Lumumba's rabble-rousing capacity. In · addition, they

~

1..

face serious problem in
l,

gain~ng

outside material aid.

Although at least two emissaries have sought Soviet bloc aid
in past two months, geography likely to preclude any large-

scale supply effort.
(b )( 1 )

III.

Recent Mobutu · action•, however, likely to increase international
pressures :tor political solution o:t Congo crisi• which will give
some status to Lumumba forcea.

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A.

(b) (3)

Rough treatment of Lumumba after arre•t, together with Mobutut•
indefinite exten•ion of his interim government beyond 31 December,
made bad impression.
1.

The USSR immediately reaponded to Lumumba'• capture with official statement on 3 December calling for UN protection of
depo•ed premier.

Another government •tatement on 5 December

demanded in acathing terms that Lumumba be relea•ed and restored to authority and that Mobututs forces

B.

~e,

disarmed.

UN faced with problem of possible large-scale Afro-Asian defections from UN force.

Ceylon announced on 7 December the withdrawal

of its token mis•ion, and UAR expected momentarily to announce
withdrawal it• 500-man battalion.
1.

Nasir believed to have communicated with Afro-Asian nation•
regarding ConiO•

~ther

nations, including Ghana and Guinea.

may withdraw from U'.N force.

c.

Hammarskjold likely to •tep up pr essure for a roundtable political
conference of

~ongo

partie• or for reconvening of parliament.

Ei t her one could be fir st step tows.rd• "regularization" of Congo
g~v_prnmeut .•

1.

Once first flush of hi• victory past Mobutu may be willing
diacuaa •uch alternative•.

Situa·t"ion in Katania po&es pr oblem• on both diplomatic and military
tronta.
A.

Neither Tahomb6 nor Ka•avubu have

made move• neceaaary to

reach agreement on a Congo confederation.
-2-

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1.

·Tshomb~'s

(b)(3)

current trip to Brussels--reportedly the first

move in a campaign to obtain. diplomatic recognition wherever
poasible--not likely enhance his prestige in Africa or elsewhere.
B.

In northern Katanga, depredations by
men show no sign o! letup.
stepped-up UN .operation

anti-Tshomb~

Baluba tribes-

UN officials Elisabethville !ear that

~e~uired

if order to be re•tored.

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security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code, Title 18, ~ections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unautho~ized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO~160556

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligenc.e_in] this p~blication is based on all sources, including

(b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may ·be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3)

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C03160556

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
· 28 July 1960

DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR: A revislo

..._,,__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

of estimated characteristics and capabilitles of. the Soviet W-class submarines has resulted .in a
reduction by one third in the estimated range capabilities. . This
reduced range would preclude W-class ·submarine wartime operations off US coasts unless the submarine.s are refueled en
Toute. Of the USSR's submarine force of ~13 units, approximately half are W-class types. About 40 Soviet snorkelequipped ·submarines of other classes haye an operational radius--wlthout refueling- -adequate for wartime · operations along
US coasts. These include 13 units probably" equipped to launch
surface-to-surface guided missiles. ~I-----------~

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ASIA~AFRICA

o:
Secretary General Hammarskjold,"
en route to the Congo, intended to take a "very strong line" with the Belgians by asking
them to withdraw from their bases arid to acquiesce in moving UN
.·7/0,.J troops into Katanga.. The Belgian Government is opposed to the UN
;
resolution calling for Belgium's evacuation of Congo bases and hopes
by stalling on the issue eventually to be able to retain them. Brussels
also hopes to gain sUfficient time to strengthen Tshomb~ in Katanga
and to win llraduallv broader recoP"nl H otL.OLJ:ha..Ka.tira.___p'overnment. [
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[. Turkex: General Gursel and Colonel Turkes indicated to
Ambassador Warren on 24 July that they are determined to go
ahe.a d with the forced retirement of many of Turkey's senior
~----, military officers even though they would not receive American
financial support for the program . The Turks insisted they
would "find· that money somewhere:' While the ambassador warns
that he would not be surprised "by any move" Gursel may make,
it is not believed that Tur~ey
·
he
necessarv funds at this time.

.
.

~'··

· .;.·

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·III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

D

[With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions to
initiate hostilities. the Watch Com_mittee conclusiona..r..emain nea:atin.

L

28 July 60

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DAILY BRIEF

ii

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C03 1 60556

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Qeerating Range of W-class Submarines

Sharpl~

Reduced

A revision of estimates on characteristics and capabilities of the Soviet W-cla s u
s resulted in a
... arp re uc on-- y one third--in the estimate of range-capabilities. This reduced range would preclude wartime operations by W-class submarines off US coasts unless the sub..:
marines were refueled en route. The USSR's 223 W-class
submarines constitute approximately half of its total submarine force of 413 units. Approximately 40 Soviet snorkelequipped submarines of other classes have an operating range- without refueling- -adequate for wartime operations along US
coasts. These include 13 units probably equipped to launch
surface-to-surface bruided missiles.

(b)(1)

Estimated W-class wartime operating radii
1 day on patrol station

(revised)
(previous
estimate)

10 days on patrol station

290.0 n. m.

2500 n. m.

4100 n. m.

3700 n. rn.

W-class submarines are estimated to be 247 feet long;
they have diesel engines, snorkels, and six torpedo tubes
which are also suitable for minelaying operations.
From 1950 to 1957, the USSR constructed about 235 W-class
submarines in four ma· or hi
1g , manne an con rolled by Soviet
personne , opera e out of th~ Soviet submarine base in Valona
Bay, Albania. The remainder are based in four major Soviet
fleet areas.

Communist China, with Soviet assistance, has been constructing W-class submarines since 1955 and has completed
about
I

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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[ Belgians Opeose UN Resolution on the Congo

~

J

.1__.Belgium is opposed to the UN resolution calling for the
evacuation of Belgian. bases in the Congo and will attempt to stall
its implementation. Prime Minister Eyskens has lodged protests
with. Secretary General Hammarskjold and Under Secretary Bunche
against political statements attributed to UN General.von Horn regarding the dispatch of UN troops to Katanga and the withdrawal of
Belgian forces from the Congo and Belgian bases. Belgian officials
maintain that Belgium's right to occupy the Kam~na ~nd Kitona military bases was obtained in the friendship treaty signed with the
Congo Government. 1
·
(!3russels. hopes that the passage of time will strengthen the
position of Premier Tshomb6:· in Katanga and enable him to negotiate with Congolese Premier Lumumba the conditions under which
Katanga might rejoin a loose_ly formed Congo federation. J

(b )(3)
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I'

:..On the other hand, reports from the US Embassy in Brussels
indicate that the UK is cautioning both Hammarskjold and the Belgians, advising the secretary general to "go slow" regarding the
Belgian base issue. and Ka.tanga, and warning the Belgians of the
. dangers their stand on these issues could pose for the UN effort.
The French ambassador in Brus·s els apparently has agreed to approach Hammarskjold in. support of the Belgian interpretation of.
the ~ resolution. · France continues to justify Belgian troop movements to the. Congo and, because of the implications for French
. bases in West Africa, will probabl o ose an effort to force Belian.trooQ..urom their. bas

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[ Turkish Lea~s Determined to Implement Co.npulsory
RfJtirement Program _1
( General Gursel, the interim chief of state, and Jtis adviser
Colonel Turkes, in their recent discussion with Ambassador
Warren, left no doubt that they intend to go ahead with the compulsory retirement program for senior military officers. Disregarding ·warren 'a suggestion for an "effective moderate plan,"
they concentrated almost exclusively on the question of the American financial support they .had requested for the program. Gursel
askeq, in effect, ''Do we or do we not get the money?" Turkes
commented that the funds were needed quickly and 'We shall find
the money somewhere."

J

·_The retirement plan .as originally presented to American diplomatic and military representatives in Ankara two weeks ago
would result in the compulsory retirement of from 2,000 to 3,000
senior military officers, and could be .used by the National Unity
Committee to purge the military establishment of potential sources
of opposition. Of the 32 generals and 52 colonels and lieutenant
colonels retired on 15 July, at least one is known to be a case of
compulsory early retirement. ]

(b)(3)

(b )( 1)

r Accordin to Warren G r el

(b )( 1)
(b )( 1)

cou no ave een more Tur ish in his unyielding at ~
provincial in his interest in getting the money re ~
. quested. The ambassador warns that he would not be surprised at
any move Gursel may make. Turkes, who is rumored as a possible
replacement for Gursel "some day," apparently showed more emotion and as much determination as Gursel and indicated neither in~
terest in nor understanding of the US position. J

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!_Th[
~ttitude of the Turkish. leaders in
this matter is further indication of the probable difficulties ahead,
both within Turkey and in Turkish~ American relations. Although
Turkey is not likely to alter. its basically pro~Western orientation
and alignment, its present leaders win be particularly sensitive in
matters involving .prestige and soverei n
and concessions will
be ranted onl
t
·
r1?ain1

28 July 60

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CU1Yr1Ubi¥J .fAk_

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Di rec tor of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Moblllzation
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Sec retary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Sec retary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelllgence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Fo rce
The Chairman, The Jo int Chiefs of Staff
The Direc to r, The Joint Staff
·
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations , United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United State s Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence , The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelltgence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
·
Commande r tn Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commer ce
The Secretary of Co mmerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commis sion
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Direc tor

- COlffi~DENTlA L
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C03160558
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.....

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
ntelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
( b )(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

~R~T

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160558

C03160558
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30 July 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Republic of the Congo: Tension is mounting in Elisabethville,
the capital of Katanga, according to the American Consulate. The
African populace is said to fear violence stemming from Katanga's
secession. Its pro-B~lgian premier, Moise Tshombe, is making
an effort to ensure the loyalty of the Katanga Army and the police.
Although Belgian troops have been largely successful in restoring
order in Katanga, its claim to independence has been disavowed
by Tshombe's parliamentary opposition, the Balubakat party. The
consulate believes that the Lumumba government may encourage
(b)( )
3
!l11 Incident In Katanga to dramatize "popular OpPositlon" to an lnde endent Katan a d the need for UN troops. LL_ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ l (b)(3)
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i
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1 a an: ·
e gn
n s er os a mp ie o m a a t>r
Mac rthur on 27 July that MY move toward accommodation
with Peiping would be delayed until·after the general election
expected this fall . Kosaka stressed1 however, the government's
need to maintain a public posture ot "reasonableness and de ...
·sire" to improve relations with Japan's Communist neighbors;
~---~this might initially be limited to the negotiation of a series of
technical agreements on such matters as postal affairs and meteorological exchanges. He expressed his personal view that the
issue of Okinawa's reversion to Japanese control should be avoided
during the coming election campaign. Kosaka also appeared per~
'-----~ sonally more willing to compromise with South Korea~ -within the
limits imnosed bv· nubli.c ooinion--than did his predecessor.

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Katanga Situation Approaching Cr.itical Stage
. Tension .is mounting in Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga, in the absence of any agreement among tl)e Belgians, the .
United Nations, and the Congolese concerning Katanga's political
future. Africans in Elisabethville reportedly fear violence, and
many have sent their families out of the city. Premier Tshomb~
has strengthened his personal security measures and has announced-that all membets of the Force Publlque and police who
have demonstrated their loyalty to his government are td be
given an extra month's pay.
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, who reportedly was
invited to visit Katanga by Tsho~ , has rejected suggestions
that he go there. · His refusal to meet with Tshomb~ reflects
Hammarskjold's tough stand in favor of Congo unity and his insistence on a complete Belgian troop withdrawal. Brussels'
announcement that it will withdraw to Belgium 1,500 of its
10,000 troops in the Congo appears designed as a gesture in
the. directjon of compliance with the UN resolution for the
evacuation of Belgian forces. Brussels apparently hopes that
Tshomb~ will be able to negotiate with Lumumba conditions
under. which Katanga could rejoin the Congo; Belgian Premier
Eyskens declared on 28 July that the question is "no longer"
the unity of the Congo but the form which a unified Congo should
take. Tshomb~'is opposed to the highly centralized form of
government espoused by Lumumba, but is prepared to accept a
loosely joined Congo federation.
Despite some support in Brussels, Tshombt1s ·position appears tenuous. Not even Belgium has formally recognized
Katanga's independence, and Tshomb~'s parliamentary opposition walked out of the assembly on 27 July in protest over the
premier's "arbitrary" declaration of Katanga's independence .
The US Consulate observes that the Lumumba government may
encourage an incident in Katanga to dramatize "popular opposition" to an independent Katamra and the .need for UN tr.oons,_ __

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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[ ~New · Japane~vernm~~t'V~ •F;r-;ign

Pctlky

·- ._t

CJapanese. Foreign Minister· Kosaka implied to Ambassador
MacArthur on 27 July that Japan's new government would delay in seeking any accommodation with Communist China until after th13 general election expected this fall. However, he
emphasized the government's need to maintain a public posture
of "i:easonableness and desire" to improve relations with Japan's Communist neighbors; this might initially be limited to
.t he negotiation of a series of agreements relating to postal af. fairs, exchange of meteorological information; and other technical matters. ]
.
lKosaka flatly rejected a neutralist course for Japan and
said that a decisive Liberal-Democratic party victory in the
election must be the new government's first step in restoring
free-world confidence in Japan. He indicated his personal intent to avoid pressing the US to retur.n Okinawa as long as the
American civil administration does not try to alienate· the
Okinawans from Japan and continues to cooperate with the
Japanese in long-term economic development projects on
Okinawa. Kosaka complained, however, of the US x-efusal to
allow the Okinawans to fly Japanese flags. · He added that he
hoped Tokyo would be permitted to introduce on Okinawa a
family registratiop system along Japanese line