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G.R. No.

193707, December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
Facts: Petitioner Norma and respondent Ernst Johan contracted marriage
in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo, who at the time of
the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to
the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
(which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in
Cebu City, and since then, have been residing thereat. Petitioner, through
her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit
with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of
Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner. Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information
for the crime charged against herein respondent with the RTC-Cebu.
The RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the
instant criminal
the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the respondent who is an alien,
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating
respondents obligation to support their child under Article 195 of the Family
Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which
"equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support
their minor children regardless of the obligors nationality."
The RTC-Cebu issued an Order denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under
our Philippine Law?
A foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child. Petitioner
cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from

respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect
to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as
to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
petitioners son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree). In
view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in
his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under
this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards
the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith. Such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

G.R. NO. 168852, September 30, 2008

and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents
Facts: On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan
(Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra
Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law,
Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8
otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."
Issue: Whether or not respondents-spouses Perfecto & Juanita, parents-in-law
of Sharica, maybe included in the petition for the issuance of a protective
order, in accordance with Republic Act No. 9262, Otherwise Known As The
"Anti-Violence Against Women And Their Children Act Of 2004".
Ruling: Yes. The SC ruled that while RA 9262 provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual
or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A.
No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47
that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of
the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
"Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals."
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent
must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language
of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction
as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its
true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and children.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened
of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a
victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on
why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would
be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the
issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of
the state to protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and

unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in
the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled
that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and
did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of
the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners
contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the
State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so
because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer
the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of

BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is

consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

The Case:
Daisy married Sgt. Charles, a soldier in 2003. Sgt. Charles retired from
military service in 2006. In 2006, Daisy filed a petition for temporary
protection order before the RTC against Charles, alleging physical abuse by
Charles. The RTc, in its order granting the petition for temporary petition
order, mandated Charles employer, the AFP Finance Center, to set aside to
withhold the salary and retirement benefits of Charles to insure a fair share
of spousal support to Daisy. Because of continued violation of the TPO by
Charles, the TPO became permanent. The RTC directed the AFP Finance
Center to withhold 50 per cent of the retirement benefits of Charles and give
it to Daisy.
The AFP Finance Center thereafter filed its special appearance before the
RTC. It argued that it is a stranger to the TPO between Daisy and Charles,
hence, execution could not issue against it as no proper service of summons
was served to it. The RTC denied the motion of the AFP. According to the RTC,
the order had long become final and executory. The AFP then filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Daisy on the other hand filed her
comment and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
stop the AFP from releasing the pension checks to Charles. The Court of
appeals denied the petition for certiorari filed by the AFP and granted the
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction by Daisy.
In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the AFP Finance Center argued that
they cannot be compelled to release half of the proceeds to Daisy due to the
following laws:
1.) Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, which states:
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided
herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or
any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to
any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted
man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money
and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not
more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due
such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be
withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.),

2.) R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997, which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien x x x
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits,
sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by
the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations
of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or
caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions
or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work
except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the
Morevoer, the AFP argues, the AFP cannot be forced to segregate the
pension benefits of Charles as they still remain public funds.
The Supreme Court:
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict
between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However,
if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the
later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should
be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated
that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares
that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or
salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically
remitted directly to the woman [n]otwithstanding other laws to the
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term employer, which
includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahons employer.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus,
Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.

It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is
a support enforcement legislation. In the United States, provisions of the
Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of certain federal funds
where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child
support. As these provisions were designed to avoid sovereign immunity
problems and provide that moneys payable by the Government to any
individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings, the law is
clearly intended to create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that
state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government agencies
attaching funds in their possession.
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not
violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon[ the issue of
constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an
injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection order
issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real
substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the
unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias
and prejudice against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of
the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.
9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and
other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically
address one form of violence committed against women economic abuse.

D. Economic abuse refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman

financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the
dignity of women who are victims of domestic violence and provide them
continued protection against threats to their personal safety and security.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody
of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.


IRISH SAGUD G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
Complainant Irish Sagud and accused Rustan Ang were sweethearts.
However, Irish broke up with him when she learned he had taken a live-in
partner whom he had gotten pregnant. Rustan convinced her to elope with
him for he did not love the woman whom he was about to marry, but Irish
rejected the proposal. She changed her cellphone number but Rustan
managed to get hold of it and send her text messages.
Irish received through multimedia message a picture of a naked woman
with spread legs and with her face superimposed on the figure. The senders
cellphone number, stated in the message, was one of the numbers used by
Rustan. After she got the obscene picture, she received text messages from
Rustan threatening her that he will spread the picture he sent through the
Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone
number he used in sending the picture and text message. She asked him to
meet her at a resort and he did. Upon parking his motorcycle and walking
towards Irish, the police intercepted and arrested him. The police seized his
cellphone and several SIM cards.
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture
presented in the case.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Electronic Evidence.
The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of
the pictures on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should
be deemed to have waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The
Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial
proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
Petition denied.

G.R. No. 182367, December 15, 2010, CHERRYL




To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of
In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a
temporary protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged
woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl
added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such prayer
on the latters certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera s employer, to
withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially
one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child
abuses, that he was not the childs father and that the signature in the birth
certificate was not here. He also added that the petition is a harassment suit
intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give
financial support.
RTC dismissed petition.
Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary
protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child?
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The
object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and
safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although
the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes

that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case
neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based on her
claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him. The childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial
action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate
children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation
must be duly proved.
Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then
demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support,
where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.

G.R. No. 193960, January 07, 2013, KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
Orders of the (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 which denied petitioner's
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information. Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262
before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information: x x x the abovenamed accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence [on] the
complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant's back, shoulder and
left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth
and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act
9262. RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of
arrest. The latter posted a cash bond and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July
13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent;
hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable. In her affidavit, private respondent
admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject
incident. She narrated that she sought payment of the money she had lent to
petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he
was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted.
Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict
on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information. The RTC denied
petitioner's motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties'
dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident.
W/n the act of petitioner which resulted in physical injuries to private
respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not
their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed was
only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The petition has no merit.

The Court is not persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: SEC. 3. Definition of
Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children"
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act
or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her
child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has
or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child;
and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime
of violence against women through harassment, to wit: 1. The offender has
or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The
offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.6rl1
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule
on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether
the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the
offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to
the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the
rule of lenity7 because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would
necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA
9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is
sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly,
the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the

offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have
or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in
view of promoting the protection of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary
elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner
and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner;
and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered
by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with
Sec. 7 of the said law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner, vs.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional
Rosanna married Ralph in 1998. They have three children. On May 20, 2005,
Rosanna filed a verified petition for issuance of protection order for herself
and her children, against his husband Ralph. According to her, there was a
time when Ralph pointed a gun at her and cocked it to convince her not to
proceed with the legal separation case she filed against him; there was also
an instance when Ralph fed her children with chicken which her youngest
child spat out; to make his children stop crying, he would threaten them with
a belt; when she told him to stop coming to the house as she and her
children were afraid of him, he threatened to cut off financial support to
them, among others. Acting on the verified petition, the trial court issued a
Temporary Protection Order good for 30 days and required Ralph to comment
on the petition. In his comment questioning the propriety of the temporary
protection order, he maintained that Rosanna had been staying with another
man; she surreptitiously moved her children out of their abode despite their
written agreement; and Rosanna is psychologically, emotionally and mentally
unfit to keep the children in her custody.
Without waiting for his Comment to be resolved by the trial court, Ralph filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, with a prayer for issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. In order
not to render the petition moot, the CA issued a temporary restraining order
for the parties to enjoin them implementing the temporary protection order.
Ralph later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, to restrain the RTC from conducting proceedings therein.
The CA later dismissed his petition for certiorari. It ruled that the petition is
still pending with the RTC, hence the factual matters could be raised thereon.
The RTC validly issued the TPO; As to Ralphs contention that RA 9262 is
unconstitutional, since the issue raised in the CA was the alleged grave
abuse of disruption by the RTC in issuing the TPO, the issue could be
resolved without ruling on the constitutionality of Republic Act 9262, which is
not the very lis mota of the petition.
Whether or not, RA 9262, particularly Section 15 thereof which allows the
grant of protection orders, is unconstitutional, since it deprives the
respondent of due process before issuance. It is also an invalid delegation of
powers by Congress to the courts.
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders

(TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing
of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be
issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned
in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule
a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or
on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate
personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may
obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO
shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance
of a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon,wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA
9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck
down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and to
grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody
of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented, the court is authorized to issue
ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate
and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to
issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses affidavits to the
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of
the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is

issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests, among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall
likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing
him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the
court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially
effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring
him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The
date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise
be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must
be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. To be heard does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Congress
shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence, the primary judge of the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is
primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us
with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are

enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of

wrongs for violations of such rights.

People vs. Lalli G.R. No. 195419

The complainant here was approached by one of the accused asking her if
she wanted a job in Malaysia as a restaurant entertainer. However, she didnt
have a passport and was chided by the accused to use her sisters passport
instead. One of the accused assured that it will not be a problem as they
have a contact in the DFA who will arrange it. Upon arrival in Malaysia, she
and her companions were brought to a restaurant where they found out from
another Filipino worker that it is a prostitution den and that the women there
are prostitutes. She eventually worked as a prostitute there and was
subjected to sexual intercourse with different men. One day she was able to
contact her other sister and informed her about her situation. One day her
sisters husband came to the restaurant and helped her escape.
W/N the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment and trafficking in persons
Yes. It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement
activities without the requisite authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), whether for profit or not, is engaged in illegal
recruitment. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), an
agency under DOLE created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the
duties of the Overseas Employment Development Board, issues the authority
to recruit under the Labor Code. The commission of illegal recruitment by
three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another is
deemed committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage.
In People v. Gallo, the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated illegal
recruitment, to wit:
the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code;
he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another.
Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job
opportunities to Malaysia. Such act of referring, whether for profit or not, in
connivance with someone without a POEA license, is already considered

illegal recruitment, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement

in the Labor Code.
In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not for the
concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos. First, it was Aringoy who
knew Lolita, since Aringoy was a neighbor of Lolitas grandfather. It was
Aringoy who referred Lolita to Lalli, a fact clearly admitted by Aringoy.
Second, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if Lalli had not
purchased Lolitas boat ticket to Malaysia.
It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a
prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be
deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated each of the
accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment,
and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
The crime of Trafficking in Persons is qualified when committed by a
syndicate, as provided in Section 6(c) of RA 9208:
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking
is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited
to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of
victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven
beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all
the three accused (Aringoy,Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and
confederated with one another to illegally recruit Lolita to become a
prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a
syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution
also constitutes trafficking.

G.R. No. 194255 : June 13, 2012

(AL) a.k.a. "MACKY," a certain "TAS," and a certain "JUN," Accused,
BERNADETTE PANSACALA a.k.a. "Neneng Awid," Accused-Appellant.
On 10 March 2004, accused-appellant was charged for illegal recruitment
after she promised overseas employment, particularly in Brunei and
Malaysia, to AAA and BBB without having any license or authority to enage in
the recruitment and deployment of overseas workers from the POEA.
Only accused-appellant and Nurfrasir Hashim were arrested, and both
entered a plea of "not guilty" when arraigned.
Private complainants AAA and BBB, Police Chief Inspector Ronald Aonuevo,
and police officers Edmond Ranel Villareal and Renato Rabuya dela Pea were
presented by the prosecution as witnesses.
Based on their testimonies, accused-appellant encouraged AAA to work in
Malaysia, as accused-appellant knew certain persons who would soon be
leaving for that country. The next day, BBB was visited by accused-appellant
and invited her to work as a saleslady in Brunei. Both accepted the
Later, AAA and BBB, Cristy and a certain CCC (both recruits) met with coaccused Makdul Amad y Bukin a.k.a. "Macky" (Macky) and a certain "Jun," at
Paseo de Zamboanga. Thereafter, they boarded the M/V Grand Flora and
were given pieces of paper containing a name. Franz, accused-appellant
Bernadette and a certain Titing did not board the boat.
On June 17, 2003, at 6:00 olock in the morning, they arrived at Lahad Datu
and soon boarded a van going to Samporna, Malaysia where they met
accused Macky cousin named Pat. Accused Franz then distributed to AAA,
BBB, CCC and Cristy their respective passports.
Upon reaching Labuan, Malaysia on June 21, 2003, accused Franz instructed
BBB, AAA, CCC and Cristy to wear "sexy clothes" because they were going to
meet their supposed boss named Bunso at Cape Imperial located at Labuan,
The prosecution alleged that while the group was staying at the Classic Hotel
in Labuan, BBB was forced on numerous occasions to have sexual

intercourse with Franz at his bidding, even in the presence of other people.
She followed his orders for fear that he would inflict physical harm on her.
At first, private complainants were not aware of the circumstances
surrounding their employment at the Golden Lotus. It was only after they
agreed to stay there for employment that they were forced to become sex
workers to earn money and pay off the debts they incurred from their travel
from Zamboanga City to Labuan, Malaysia. Thus, from 21 June 2003 to 13
July 2003, AAA and BBB worked as prostituted women.
On 12 July 2003, BBB had a customer who was a law enforcer at Kota
Kinabalu, Malaysia. She sought his help for her return to the Philippines, and
he agreed. The following day, the Golden Lotus was raided by the
Immigration Officers of Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and the prostituted Filipino
women, including AAA and BBB, were detained at the Balay Polis (Police
Department) in Labuan until all the women were deported to the Philippines.
Accused-appellant denied having offered BBB a job in Malaysia, a denial
corroborated by Majujie Jailya Misuari. Accused-appellant also denied
knowing AAA and Franz. She claimed that she only met AAA when the latter,
together with BBB, visited her in jail and offered to withdraw the case if
accused-appellant would give them money. Co-accused Franz merely denied
knowing AAA, BBB or accused-appellant.
On 27 June 2008, after trial on the merits, the RTC of Zamboanga City
rendered a Decision finding both accused Nurfrasir Hashim and Bernadette
Pansacala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment
as principals by direct participation, committed by a syndicate. Each of said
accused were sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P 1,000,000.00 each;and to pay each of the above victims P
50,000.00 as moral damages; P 300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to
pay the costs.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the trial court in the former
assailed Decision, but modified the award of damages by reducing the
exemplary damages to P 25,000.00 each.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hashim and Pansacala are guilty of illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate?
HELD: The appeal is unmeritorious.
To be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate,
the following elements must occur:

1. The accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable

them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
2. The accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by
actually recruiting, deploying and transporting.
3. Illegal recruitment was committed by three persons conspiring and
confederating with one another.
As to the first element, accused-appellant admitted that she did not have a
valid license to recruit persons for overseas employment, consistent with her
defense that she did not engage in the recruitment of persons for
Anent the second element, both victims, AAA and BBB, narrated in great
detail how they were induced by accused-appellant to accept an
employment opportunity, and how they were successfully transported from
Zamboanga City to Malaysia where they eventually worked as prostituted
On the third element, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution failed to
prove that there were more than two persons involved in the alleged crime of
illegal recruitment, since the trial court held only two of the accused liable
for the crime. The prosecution, she alleges, failed to establish that the other
accused Macky, Jun, and Tas also had no license or authority to recruit
workers for overseas employment.
In the recent case People v. Lalli,the Court affirmed the trial court findings in
which 2 of the 3 accused were convicted of illegal recruitment committed by
a syndicate, even though the third accused was at-large. In so ruling, the
Court took note of the fact that the victim would not have been able to go to
Malaysia were it not for the concerted efforts of the three accused. It was
thus held:
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily
withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of an accused
person may as a general rule be taken into consideration as evidence having
a tendency to establish his guilt. Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused
Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes
he has been charged.
It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a
prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be
deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated each of the
accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment,

and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was similarly able to establish that
accused-appellant Bernadette and Franz were not the only ones who had
conspired to bring the victims to Malaysia. It was also able to establish at the
very least, through the credible testimonies of the witnesses, that (1) Jun and
Macky were the escorts of the women to Malaysia; (2) a certain Tash was
their financier; (3) a certain Bunso negotiated with Macky for the price the
former would pay for the expenses incurred in transporting the victims to
Malaysia; and (4) Mommy Cindy owned the prostitution house where the
victims worked. The concerted efforts of all these persons resulted in the
oppression of the victims.
Clearly, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant,
together with at least two other persons, came to an agreement to commit
the felony and decided to commit it. It is not necessary to show that two or
more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement laying
down the details of how an unlawful scheme or objective is to be carried out.
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated; or from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
The Court increased the award of moral damages from P 50,000.00 to
P500,000 each and also that of the exemplary damages from P 25,000.00
each to P100,000.00 when it found that the crime of Trafficking in Persons as
a prostitute was committed.
On 12 May 2003, Congress passed R.A. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act. This law was approved on 26 May 2003. Ironically, only a few days after,
private complainants found themselves in a situation that this law had
sought to prevent.
In Lalli, the Court increased the amount of moral and exemplary damages
from P 50,000 to P 500,000 and from P 50,000 to P 100,000, respectively,
having convicted the accused therein of the crime of trafficking in persons.
The payment of P 500,000 as moral damages and P 100,000 as exemplary
damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous
case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In
fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without one consent and to
be sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers is
horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was
trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons
was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary
damages is likewise justified.
There is no legal impediment to increasing the award of moral and
exemplary damages in the case at bar. Neither is there any logical reason to
differentiate between the victims herein and those in that case, when the
circumstances are frighteningly similar. To do so would be to say that we
discriminate one from the other, when all of these women have been the
victims of unscrupulous people who capitalized on the poverty of others.
While it is true that accused-appellant was not tried and convicted of the
crime of trafficking in persons, this Court based its award of damages on the
Civil Code, and not on the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, as clearly explained
in Lalli.

People vs. Shirley Casio G.R. No. 211465

Applicable SPL: RA 9208 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
DOCTRINE: As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9208,
trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.
FACTS: Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act
No. 9208, Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a). The said accused, with
deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit
AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and
sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different customers, for
money, profit or any other consideration. On May 2, 2008, International
Justice Mission (IJM), a non-governmental organization, coordinated with the
police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City.
IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24
was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the
police team. AAA was then met by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development personnel who informed her that she was rescued and not
arrested. AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display
herself, along with other girls and receives P400.00 for every customer who
selected her.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and held that the accused had consummated the act of
trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined under paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A.
9208 for the purpose of letting her engage in prostitution as defined under
paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of sexual intercourse need not
have been consummated for the mere transaction i.e. the solicitation for
sex and the handing over of the bust money of Php1,000.00 already
consummated the said act.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the
fine and awarded moral damages
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was
instigated into committing the crime.46 The police did not conduct prior
surveillance and did not even know who their subject was.47Neither did the
police know the identities of the alleged victims.
Accused further argues that AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute.
Thus, it was her decision to display herself to solicit customers
ISSUE: Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons,
considering that AAA admitted that she works as a prostitute.

RATIO: Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be

trafficked, we affirm the text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their
adolescence moulding their character in environments free of the vilest
motives and the worse of other human beings. The evidence and the law
compel us to affirm the conviction of accused in this case. For liability under
our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be committed even if
the victim gives consent.