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Trilateral refers to the involvement of 3 parties

Zero sum a situation in which what is gained by one side is lost by the
other; indicates a direct trade-off

US/India relations are growinga coordinated stance on
China is key
Saurabh, 15 senior faculty member at International Centre for
Entrepreneurship & Career Development and researcher in the domain of
technology innovation management and International relations and has
handled government innovation programs in India in the past (Punit, 6/15.
Opinion: India and U.S. Grow Closer Against a Backdrop of An Expansionist
Indo-U.S. relations have been the subject of interest for many policy analysts
and with the emergence of an economic and military powerhouse in India,
they have major implications for the United States and rest of the world. The
divorced relationship that existed since the Cold war has gone beyond mutual
suspicion and emerged as trusted friends. The liberalization of the Indian
economy in 1991 brought new-found opportunities for both the nations.
Today, India-U.S. bilateral cooperation is broad-based, covering trade and
investment, defense and security, education, science and technology, cyber
security, high-technology and civil nuclear energy. Both nations enjoy vibrant
people-to-people contact and support cutting across the political spectrum,
which helps stimulate the relationship even further.
The bond of democracy is the largest similarity the nations share. The mutual
visits by the heads of state of both the nations have given a considerable
boost to the existing bond of friendship existing between them. Since the
exchange of visits of Indian Prime Minister Modi and President Obamas India
visit in 2014 and 2015, a sustained momentum to the bilateral relations
between the nations has been provided.
The last visit of Modi, in September 2014, had several visible outcomes with
mechanisms to enhance trade and investment, particularly in infrastructure;
new modalities to implement cooperation in energy, including nuclear and
renewable energy; new approaches to defense trade, security and counterterrorism collaboration; and new areas of cooperation between India and the
United States in third countries.
But of all the deals and agreements, what stuck the most was the
mutual convergence in the view of both nations with respect to the
Asia Pacific and South China Sea and the joint voicing for unrestricted
access and freedom of sea routes to conduct their businesses. In view of the
rapid movements of Chinas navy in the Spratly Islands and Chinas claim of
the entire IOR region as its own, it seems that the joint call by both nations is
directed rightly to call the Chinese bluff.

US/China/India relations are zero-sumstrengthening

relations with China tanks US/India relations
Varadarajan, 13 Editor, The Hindu. He covers a broad range of
international issues, such as the relationship between India and China in Asia
and India's foreign policy. Prior to joining The Hindu, he worked at The Times
of India for nine years. In May 2011, he was appointed editor in chief, as the
first non-family, professional editor (Siddharth, 3/28. India's Foreign and
Strategic Policy in Asia The India-China-U.S. Troika and Japan.
The India-U.S. relationship has recovered considerably in this past decade.
During the second term of the George W. Bush administration, the United
States made a decision to try and influence, or even limit, the kind of
strategic choices that India could make at a given moment in time. The
United States was conscious of the need to have India as a partner to hedge
against China's rise. And the nuclear deal it offered in July 2005 was
leveraged as a means to, in a way, accomplish this. There were other
calculations on the U.S. side too but it is not accidental that India-China
relations, which had recovered from the dip which happened after the 1998
nuclear tests, suffered as a consequence of the new India-U.S. relationship.
In the U.S. Congress, and among U.S. strategic analysts, this was a constant
theme -- that we are befriending India, we are building a partnership with
India, as a hedge against China. But such a framing was not healthy for India.
After all, if the American reaching out to India is a function of its relationship
with China and is contingent in some way on Washington's desire to hedge
against Beijing, what happens if tomorrow the United States decides for
reasons of its own that it now needs to strengthen its relationship
with China? The India relationship would be a casualty. And we
actually saw this happen in the first year of the Obama administration.

Strong US/India relations key to avert India-Pakistan

nuclear war
NYT, 2 the New York Times (Celia Dugger, 6/10, Wider Military Ties With
India Offer U.S. Diplomatic Leverage.
Military cooperation between India and the United States has remarkably
quickened since Sept. 11, with a burst of navy, air force and army joint
exercises, the revival of American military sales to India and a blur of highlevel visits by generals and admirals. The fledgling relationship between
American and Indian military leaders will be important to Mr. Rumsfeld in
talks intended to put to rest fears of war between India and Pakistan. "We
can hope this translates into some influence and trust, though I don't want to
overstate it," a senior American defense official said in an interview on
Thursday. "I don't want to predict this guarantees success." The American

diplomatic efforts yielded their first real gains on Saturday when India
welcomed a pledge by Pakistan's military ruler to stop permanently the
infiltration of militants into Kashmir. India indicated that it would soon take
steps to reduce tensions, but a million troops are still fully mobilized along
the border -- a situation likely to persist for months -- and the process of
resolving the crisis has just begun. India has linked the killing of civilians in
Kashmir to a Pakistan-backed insurgency there and has presented its
confrontation with Pakistan as part of the global campaign against terrorism.
India itself made an unstinting offer of support to the United States after
Sept. 11, and Washington responded by ending the sanctions placed on India
after its 1998 nuclear tests. With that, the estrangement that prevailed
between the world's two largest democracies during the cold war, when India
drew close to the Soviet Union and the United States allied with Pakistan, has
eased. India, for decades a champion of nonalignment, seeks warmer ties
with the United States in hopes of gaining access to sophisticated military
technology and help in dealing with Pakistan. From the start of President
Bush's term, some influential officials in his administration saw India as a
potential counterweight to that other Asian behemoth, China, whose growing
power was seen as a potential strategic threat. But since Sept. 11, the
priority has been terrorism. The United States is hoping its deeper military
and political ties with India will give it some measure of leverage to prevent a
war between India and Pakistan that could lead to a nuclear holocaust and
would play havoc with the hunt for Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The military
relationship has certainly accelerated in recent months. "We've moved from
crawling to walking and we're preparing to run," said an American military
official. American warships have been docking in the Indian cities of Bombay,
Cochin and Madras. The first major sale of military equipment to India -- $140
million of artillery-finding radar made by Raytheon -- has been approved by
Congress. Aircraft engines, submarine combat systems and helicopter parts
are in the pipeline. In the largest-ever joint ground and air operations,
American and Indian paratroopers jumped last month from the same aircraft
over the city of Agra. Later this year, for the first time, Indian troops will
venture to the United States for exercises in Alaska. American and Indian
naval ships are jointly patrolling the Strait of Malacca to protect commercial
shipping, while the number of Indian military officers training in the United
States has jumped to 150 this year from 25 in 1998. A parade of military
brass has been marching through each other's capitals. "The current level of
military to military cooperation between our nations is unprecedented," Gen.
Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said upon arriving in
New Delhi in February.

The impact is extinction.

Fai 01 Kashmiri American Council
Ghulam Nabi Fai, July 8, 2001, Washington Times

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned
with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex.

The most dangerous place on

the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and
sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the
estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear
volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe . The United States
would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central
intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir
at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like
thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their
defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending
Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.


India perceives strengthened cooperation with China as

Madan, 15 fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in
the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, and director of The
India Project (Tanvi, 1/20. The U.S.-India Relationship and China.
Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially uncertainty about its behavioris
partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there have been
three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for
supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of
China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers
recognize that American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are
responsible for some of the interest in India. New Delhis own China strategy
involves strengthening India both security-wise and economically (internal
balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it
envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight
another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously
because Washington does.
But India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it comes to
China. Both sides remain uncertain about the others willingness and capacity
to play a role in the Asia-Pacific.
Additionally, Indian policymakers worry both about a China-U.S. condominium
(or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There is concern about the
reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S. will end up choosing China
because of the more interdependent Sino-American economic relationship
and/or leave India in the lurch.
Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question
whether the quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to develop a truly
strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about the gap
between Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for
supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and
development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this
rationaleand Indias importancefades away.
As things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others
relationship with China being too hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For
New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S. relationship is seen as freezing India out and
impinging on its interests. It would also eliminate one of Washingtons

rationales for a stronger relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict,

on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing
India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any
deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the region and
perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the
other hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the
bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.

Steps to boost US/China relations without accounting for

Indian interests shatters US/Indian tiesempirics
Joshi et al., 13 Director of the Observer Research Foundation, M.A. in
Development Studies from the University of East Anglia, former Visiting
Associate at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London (Sunjoy,
4/26, with C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Ph.D.,
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors,
Ph.D. Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations.
Third, there have been genuine policy missteps in both New Delhi and
Washington with unintended negative consequences for the bilateral
relationship. The first year of the Obama Administration saw the United
States try to construct stronger relations with Pakistan and China without
reference to India's sensitivities and interests. The assumption in Washington
that the road to peace in Afghanistan demanded Indian political concessions
to Pakistan raised genuine concerns in New Delhi that President Obama was
abandoning President Bush's neutrality on the question of Kashmir. Similarly,
President Obama's attempt to accommodate China's rise through strategic
reassurance and collaboration on regional and global issues generated deep
apprehensions in New Delhi about the potential consequences of a SinoU.S.
duopoly in Asia.
To be sure, President Obama corrected the direction and reaffirmed the
importance of India in the American worldview. But there was no denying the
damage in New Delhi and the perceived need to hedge against significant
reversals in the U.S. policy toward India. In New Delhi, the Congress Party,
which returned triumphant in the 2009 elections, believed that economic
populism was the key to its political success. This, in turn, resulted in a deemphasis of economic reforms, and public discussion of some of the old
foreign policy approaches, such as non-alignment. There is some recognition
in New Delhi of the costs of these strategic errors, and the Indian government
is working on reviving economic reforms and rejuvenating its foreign policy.
Yet, there is no denying that the past three years generated many anxieties
among India's friends in the United States and beyond about New Delhi's
political commitment to the partnership. India's parliamentary management
of the nuclear-liability legislation also created difficulties for the U.S. nuclear
industry, which was hoping to make big investments after the historic civil

Mutual fears of Chinese revisionism drive the Indian

alliancethe aff reverses that
Sears, 16 Professor of International Relations at the Universidad de Las
Amricas, Quito-Ecuador. His research focuses mainly on strategic studies,
international security, and international relations theory (Nathan A., 4/27.
China, Russia, and the Long Unipolar Moment'.
However, instead of undermining U.S. influence and forcing states to
bandwagon with China, Chinese revisionism is actually strengthening the
U.S. alliance system in East Asia. The United States is in the process of
upgrading its strategic cooperation with several of its longstanding allies,
such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. The Obama Administrations
Pivot to Asia policy has sought to reassure U.S. allies of its enduring
political commitment and military presence in the region. Recent evidence of
the Pivot includes a number of port visits by the U.S. navy to its allies (e.g.
Manila in March 2016), some high profile arms sales (e.g. the $1.8 billion
arms deal with Taiwan in December 2015), and even new force deployments
to the region (e.g. the plans to deploy long-range bombers in Australia and to
gain access to five military bases in Philippines).
Second, the United States is developing new strategic partnerships in East
Asia, which could become full-fledged U.S. allies in the future. Anxiety about
Chinas rise is leading a number of ASEAN member statessuch as
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesiato increasingly look toward the United
States for security. Together, Singapore and Malaysia represent a geostrategic
pivot for exercising control over the Straits of Malacca and thus their entrance
into the U.S. alliance system would represent a major constraint on Chinese
power. Perhaps the most surprising of the United States new security
relationships is with Vietnam. In a manner consistent with the realpolitik
maxim that in international politics there are no permanent friends or
enemies, only permanent interests, the diplomatic rapprochement and
security dialogues between the United States and Vietnam demonstrates the
extent to which Chinese revisionism is pushing Chinas neighbors toward the
United States.
Yet the most important strategic development is the trilateral relationship
that is gaining steam between India, Japan, and the United States. A trilateral
alliance between India, Japan, and the United States would be for China what
the Grand Alliance was for Nazi Germanythe containment of China would
become, in the words of Winston Churchill, merely the proper application of
overwhelming force.
The U.S.-India relationship has grown in recent years, with the United States
de facto recognition of India as a legitimate nuclear power and the
agreement on a new U.S.-India Defense Framework. The India-Japan
relationship has also grown, with defense ministers agreeing to expand
strategic cooperation in 2014. Yet the clearest symbol to China of the

potential for a trilateral alliance is no doubt the Malabar naval exercises

between India, Japan, and the United States. In 2015, Japan became a
permanent member of the annual naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, which
had previously been a bilateral exercise between the U.S. and Indian navies.
The Malabar naval exercise was an overt attempt to blunt Chinas growing
naval capabilities and its presence in the Indian Ocean. Of course, the
movement toward a formal trilateral alliance will depend on the extent of
the perceived threat from Chinese revisionism.

Concerns over China key to the alliancethe plan

fractures US/India mutual interests
Economist, 16 (4/16, A suitable boy?
THEY seem such a promising pair, India and America. The two biggest and
noisiest democracies are linked by language and blood: 125m Indians speak
English, and over 3m Americans claim Indian descent. They share a belief in
the rule of law and (most of the time) in free enterprise, as well as common
regional concerns over such things as fighting Islamist extremism and
accommodating the rise of China. But as much as a match of American
wealth and know-how with Indian brawn and drive would make sense, and
ought to bolster global security, Indian pride and American prejudice have
repeatedly got in the way.
Yet with regional stars realigning, Indian pride has grown less prickly and
American prejudice less smug. Pivoting to Asia during Barack Obamas
presidency, America has sought new friendships just as Indias prime
minister, Narendra Modi, finds it lacks the punch to back his bigger ambitions
for India on the wider stage. There will be no flashy wedding between the two
in the near future. But what is emerging is a quiet, cautious meeting of
mutual interests. American officials call it a strategic handshake, Indian
ones a strategic partnership. Neither would utter the word alliance, but if
the relationship continues to thicken, that is what conceivably might take
shape somewhere down the road.
The latest development is small but significant. During a visit to India
between April 10th and 12th, his second in less than a year, the American
defence secretary, Ashton Carter, joined his Indian counterpart, Manohar
Parrikar, in promising quickly to sign a logistics agreement to enable
smoother mutual support between the two armed forces. Two other pacts,
covering communications and protocols for digital mapping, are also close to
conclusion. Together they will make it easier for the two countries forces to
co-operate, and allow India access to a bigger range of American equipment.
Indian logic rules
America has similar arrangements with dozens of countries. But in Indias
case it has taken a decade of haggling to get this far. Before concluding the

logistics deal, India insisted on a change of names to distinguish its own

version. It is to be a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement rather
than the usual Logistics Support Agreement. We changed the initials so we
dont seem to follow the same logic as US allies, says C. Uday Bhaskar, a
military analyst and former Indian naval officer. He added that there remain
strong views in our services about too close an embrace with America.
Those views have a long history. After independence, India prided itself on
being non-aligned, while turning to the Soviet Union for military supplies. It
has been wary of other countries causes, a wariness reinforced by watching
America bungle in Vietnam and later in Iraq and Afghanistan. Trounced by
China in a brief but bloody border war in 1962, India is also cautious about
provoking its big neighbour, or being seen as part of an American-led gangup. Most of all India resents the continued military support America gives to
Pakistan, even in the face of evidence that Pakistan has sponsored anti-Indian
terror attacks and worked to undermine American-led efforts to bring peace
to Afghanistan.
Yet disdain for America is weakening. The latest agreements come on top of a
growing pile of protocols that go beyond defence co-operation to include a
joint strategic vision for Asia signed in January 2015. American armed
forces now hold more joint exercises with India than with any other country.
And two years ago India overtook Pakistan as a buyer of American weaponry.
It helps that America has the kinds of goods that Indias armed forces want as
they seek to project power more widely in the Indian Ocean, including longrange patrol aircraft and drones, maritime helicopters, aircraft-carrier
technology and anti-submarine gear. America has also moved nimbly to
accommodate Indias plans (see article) for strengthening its own defence
industry. Aside from half-a-dozen existing partnerships involving such things
as jet-engine design and avionics, the two sides have suggested jointly
producing fighter aircraft, probably an Indian version of the F-18.
The trigger for all this is the growing boldness of China. With a GDP
that is now five times Indias, the regional heavyweight has courted Indias
smaller neighbours with aid. Chinese warships now regularly push into the
Indian Ocean, and the Chinese government has sought to build a network of
bases or, at the least, friendly ports extending from Myanmar to Pakistan to
Djibouti. India has mostly stayed aloof from troubles outside its immediate
waters. When American officials jumped the gun in February by claiming that
India would join patrols in the South China Sea, where China is pressing
maritime claims over the objections of everyone else, India issued a vigorous
denial. But Chinese pressure closer to home raises alarms.
It is over China that Indian and American interests converge most. Mr
Bhaskar says that Americans want India to become more capable and carry
a bigger load. They may seek more than that. Speaking last month in Delhi,
the Indian capital, Admiral Harry Harris, who heads Americas Pacific
Command (responsible, he said, for American military operations from

Hollywood to Bollywood), described expanded military co-operation with

India as arguably the defining partnership for America in the 21st century.

India views US relations as a strategic counterweight to

Chinathe plans engagement disrupts that
Chatterjee, 11 Sessional Lecturer, School of Continuing Education at
University of Oxford (Ananya, India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War
Evolution of a Strategic Triangle.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the United States remains a major factor
in the evolving India - China - U.S. triangle and both India and China seeks to
maximise the benefits from this bilateral relationship with the United States
in the context of the present international political system. On the other
hand, Washington's engagemen t of the world's two most populous nations,
each experiencing strong economic growth and a raised profile on the
international stage, is strategically significant. As the U.S. Government's
National Intelligence Council pointed out earlier in 2005 in its re port
Mapping the Global Future , the likely emergence of China and India as
new major global players will transform the geopolitical landscape in the
early 21st century (US National Intelligence Council [online]) . The Report
predicting a rising Asia by 2020 points out that China will continue to
strengthen its military through developing and acquiring modern weapons,
including advanced fighter aircraft, sophisticated submarines, and increasing
numbers of ballistic missiles. China will overtake Russia a nd others as the
second largest defence spender after the United States over the next two
decades and will be, by any measure, a first - rate military power. With
regards to India, the Report outlines that as Indias economy grows
governments in Southeast Asia Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and other
countries may move closer to India to help build a potential geopolitical
counterweight to China. At the same time, India will seek to strengthen
its ties with countries in the region without excluding China.
A new, dynamic pattern of interaction has, thus, begun between the United
States and Asia's two largest continental powers. The task for all three
is, therefore, to manage ties as a virtuous circle rather than a
competitive triangle (Inder furth and Sha mbaugh, 2005). Inderfurth and
Shambaugh in their article continue to argue that there are some geopolitical
thinkers in each capital who seek to use improved bilateral relations against
the third party. Some in Beijing and New Delhi see strengthened Sino - I
ndian ties as a constraint on American hegemony. Others in Washington
and New Delhi are suspicious of China and seek to build U.S. - India
relations (particularly military ties) as a strategic counterweight to
growing Chinese power. While the U.S. - India and China - India
relationships steadily improve, Sino - American relations seem to be
entering another strained and turbulent phase in their long, chequered
relationship. A new wave of anti - China acrimony is currently

gripping Washington, especially in the Congre ss, fuelled by assertions about

China's military build - up, threatened posture towards Taiwan, unfair trading
practices, product pirating, human rights violations and attempted buyouts
of U.S. companies. Despite these concerns, there is no turning back
from the growing interdependence of the three countries, including in the
vital area of energy supplies. Managing these expanding relations will
increasingly be a key challenge for Washington, Beijing and New Delhi.

AT: Relations Inevitable

Relations not inevitablemanaging perceptions key
Dhume, 16 Resident fellow, American Enterprise Institute
(Sadanand, 5/24. U.S.-India relations: Balancing progress and
managing expectations.
Nonetheless, neither country should take this continued progress for granted.
For one, recent gains notwithstanding, trade ties remain far below potential.
With an annual output of $2.1 trillion, India is the seventh largest economy in
the world. In purchasing power parity terms it is even largera $8 trillion
economy, or the worlds third largest. Yet, in 2015, with trade in goods of
$66.7 billion, India was only the U.S.s tenth largest trading partner in goods,
ranked below smaller economies such as Taiwan and South Korea. Without a
deeper trade relationship, and an India more deeply integrated into the global
economy, the relationship risks remaining unsustainably lopsided toward
shared geopolitical and security concerns.
The U.S. should also recognize that Indias history and domestic politics
preclude it from becoming a formal U.S. ally such as Japan or South Korea.
Keeping expectations sober will ensure that ties remain on even keel rather
than careening between unrealistic ambition and ensuing disappointment. At
its heart, the U.S. bet on India represents the hope that a large democratic,
pluralistic country, rooted in common law traditions, and home to an Englishspeaking elite, will succeed in Asia. At the same time, however, U.S. interest
in Indias future carries implicit expectations: of economic reforms and a
continued adherence to democratic values including pluralism, freedom of
speech and human rights.
In the absence of a formal alliance, the robustness of Indias economy,
strength of its military and quality of its democracy naturally become proxies
for the health of the U.S.-India relationship, and the amount of policy
attention New Delhi can sustainably attract from Washington. For this
relationship to fulfill its potential, the U.S. ought to continue to take the long
view, as it has during much of the past two decades, by playing a part in
helping India fulfill its own aspirations. At the same time, India must
recognize that the sustainability of U.S. commitment to its rise rests in large
part on the success of the so-called India model. This will require not just
continued strategic engagement with the U.S., but also continued reforms to
make India a more competitive economy.

Indias strategy is elasticlack of a formal alliance means

its leaders can change course at any time
Rehman, 15 Non-Resident Fellow for South Asia, Atlantic Council of the
United States (Iskander, 4/22. Would America Back India in a War?
And therein lies the rub. Even though the Indo-U.S. entente is perhaps this
centurys single most important bilateral relationship, with the greatest
potential to positively shape the Asian security environment, it is not-nor will
it ever be-a formalized alliance. The reasons for this singular state of affairs
are well known.
Indeed, since independence, New Delhis grand strategy has always been
coterminous with a quest for greater strategic autonomy, and with a solid
aversion for any form of partnership that could lead to entanglement. This
autonomy is perceived as a key enabler, allowing India to practice a multivectored diplomacy that maximizes freedom of maneuver, while minimizing
the risks of friction that could flow from more solidified alignments.
Historical studies have pointed to the inherent plasticity of any successful
grand strategy. This is something that Indias foremost strategists have fully
interiorized, with a much-discussed-and unfairly lampooned-2012 study
placing a strong emphasis on subtlety over narrow linear narratives about
what serves our (Indias) national interest, in a world which is described as
both fragmented and in flux. Indias grand strategy, the authors pursue, will
require a skillful management of complicated coalitions and opportunities in
environments that may be inherently unstable and volatile rather than
structurally settled.


US/India Relations Strong Now

Cooperation increasingfears of China are the basis
Dougherty, 15 senior international economics writer at the International
Business Times, where he reports on global economic developments with a
particular focus on government policy (Carter, 9/28. China's Rise and the
U.S. Trade War With India.
That bigger picture, for now and for the foreseeable future, is circumscribed
by China. Indeed, U.S.-India defense cooperation has accelerated in the past
three years, all with a wary eye toward Beijing. In June, U.S. Defense
Secretary Ashton Carter renewed the U.S.-India defense framework
agreement, the basis of security cooperation between the countries. That
accord solidified a partnership that has been in full swing since 2012 to
develop militarily useful technologies, with a focus on jet engines, unmanned
aerial vehicles, and aircraft carriers. The two countries may even one day
jointly patrol the Strait of Malacca (known in Beijing as Chinas windpipe
because its a vital shipping lane). A greater partnership with the United
States is now much more palatable in India than it was until very recently,
Richard Rossow, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, told me.

US/India cooperation strong nowcountering China is a

key motivating factor
Lamothe, 16 covers national security for The Washington Post and
anchors its military blog, Checkpoint (Dan, 3/2. The U.S. and India are
deepening military ties and China is watching.
The U.S. militarys top officer in the Pacific urged Indian officials Wednesday
to pursue even closer military ties with the United States part of a broader
effort by the Pentagon to strengthen a relatively new partnership in the
region, as China expands its military footprint in ways that alarm its
Adm. Harry Harris, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, said that expanded
cooperation between the United States and India will not only be critical to
Washingtons re-balance toward the Pacific, but will arguably be the defining
partnership for America in the 21st century. He said he shared a vision with
U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma that Indian and U.S. naval vessels
will soon steam together as we work together to maintain freedom of the
seas for all nations.
The comments came as India has moved to strengthen partnerships not only
with the United States, but with Australia, Japan and other U.S. allies in the

region. India also has voiced opposition to some of Chinas actions in the East
and South China seas, where Beijing has attempted to assert its sovereignty.
This is ambition in action, Harris said, speaking at the Raisina Dialogue, a
conference in New Delhi focused on geopolitics and geo-economics. It
ensures the vision of our countrys leaders by strengthening military-tomilitary collaboration and in the process, it will improve the security and
prosperity of the entire region.
Harriss comments also came as the Obama administrations ability to curb
Chinas ambitions have been called into question by analysts. China has
installed military radar, HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles and fighter jets on
several atolls in the South China Sea in recent months. Defense Secretary
Ashton B. Carter and other U.S. officials have said repeatedly that Chinas rise
is not a problem, but the way it is exercising its power can be.
Carter and Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition,
technology and logistics, are expected to visit India next month as the two
countries continue to deeper relations. It will mark Carters second trip to
India in a year, and comes after the Navys top officer, Adm. John Richardson,
visited last month along with the heads of other navies, including Chinas,
Russias and Irans.
Harris did not mention China directly in his latest remarks, but clearly seemed
to call the country out.
While some countries seek to bully smaller nations through intimidation and
coercion, I note with admiration Indias example of peaceful resolution of
disputes with your neighbors in the waters of the Indian Ocean, Harris said.
India, indeed, stands like a beacon on a hill, building a future on the power
of ideas not on castles of sand that threaten the rules-based architecture
that has served us all so very well.

Modi and Obama are working on strengthening ties

Indias motivated by a hawkish stance on China
Tankel, 15 assistant professor in the School of International Service at
American University, where he specializes in international security with a
focus on political and military affairs in South Asia, transnational threats,
Islamist militancy, and U.S. foreign and defense policies (Stephen, 1/27.
U.S.-India Relations Three Questions for Stephen Tankel.
Q: Why did President Obama visit India, and what was the significance of the
A: President Obama attended Indias Republic Day celebrations as the chief
guest of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This is the first time India has
invited an American president to be chief guest at its Republic Day. It is also

the first time that an American president visited India twice while in office.
Those facts alone speak to the importance both governments place on
building the bilateral relationship. In the United States, there is bipartisan
support for building the relationship with India, which is viewed as a possible
net security provider in South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean Region, a
potential balance against China, an attractive economic market, and a
natural partner given that it is the worlds largest democracy.
Q: Why has Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made improved U.S.-Indian
relations a priority since his landslide election victory last May?
A: Prime Minister Modi has stressed, since before he was elected, that he
believes India and the United States have a fundamental stake in one
anothers success. Strong bilateral relations are beneficial to India in various
ways, and Id note several of them here.
First, Modi has made revitalizing the Indian economy the centerpiece of his
administration, and that requires boosting investment and manufacturing in
India. The United States is an important partner in this regard.
Second, the conventional wisdom is that India does not view security through
a realist lens, but that may be changing under Modi, who is more hawkish
on China than his predecessor and appears to view strengthening U.S.
relations as a critical component of his foreign policy.
Third, and related to the first observations, India views the defense
relationship with the United States as a way to procure technology that India
lacks. Thats necessary both from a defense perspective, and as a way to
build the Indian economy, which helps explain why New Delhi is so insistent
that the United States agrees to technology transfers as part of defense trade

Relations on the upswingmutual distrust of China is key

Dhume, 15 resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a
columnist for (Sadanand, 1/26. Its Springtime for U.S.-India
On Monday President Barack Obama becomes the first American president to
preside as the chief guest at Indias Republic Day parade, an annual
spectacle that celebrates the countrys democracy by showcasing its cultural
diversity and military might. Before Mr. Obama leaves New Delhi Tuesday, the
U.S. and India will have announced a slew of agreements spanning
everything from nuclear energy and weapons manufacturing to intelligence
sharing. In short, its springtime for U.S-India relations.
But credit for the dramatic upswing in bilateral relations goes more to Indias
Prime Minister Narendra Modi than to his American counterpart. Mr. Obama

has responded positively to Mr. Modis overtures, but the presidents own
record is decidedly mixed.
For much of Mr. Obamas tenure, U.S.-India relations have been marked more
by drift than dynamism. Unlike George W. Bush, Mr. Obama failed to
designate an influential point-person to shepherd the India file. (Mr. Bush had
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns.) The appointment of a special U.S.
representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan diminished the State
Departments South Asia bureau and robbed top officials of a say in policies
crucial to the bilateral relationship.
The Obama administration was also slow to acknowledge Mr. Modis
emergence as Indias most popular politician. Following the 2002 Gujarat
riots, which happened on Mr. Modis watch and claimed more than 1,000 lives
about three-fourths of them Muslimmost Western democracies cooled to
Gujarats then-chief minister. But as evidence of Mr. Modis culpability in the
violence failed to emerge, and as he built a reputation for personal probity,
sensible economics and sound administration, European diplomats began to
warm to him and recognize his national popularity. By January 2013, British
and European Union diplomats ended their boycott of Mr. Modi. Yet it took the
Obama administration more than another year to follow suit.
Mr. Obamas broader foreign policy hasnt reassured Indians. During his
tenure, China has grown ever more assertive in its territorial disputesnot
just with India, but with Japan, Vietnam and others. U.S. military cuts have
deepened doubts about the seriousness of the so-called pivot to Asia. Mr.
Obama virtually abdicated his responsibility to lead what used to be called
the war on terror. New Delhi has watched with quiet alarm as U.S. troops
have drawn down from Afghanistan and U.S.-led airstrikes have failed to
thwart Islamic State. Terrorist groups have thrived in Pakistan, threatening
regional stability.
Barely a year ago, the U.S.-India relationship was on the rocks. The arrest of
an Indian diplomat in New York over a dispute with her nanny escalated into a
full-blown crisis, complete with diplomatic expulsions and public
recriminations. A series of trade and commercial disputes spanning
intellectual-property rights, immigrant visas and market access drained
goodwill on both sides. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2009 76% of
Indians held a favorable view of the U.S. By 2014, this had shrunk to 55%.
To be sure, the populist Manmohan Singh government, which preceded Mr.
Modis, did more than its share of damage, crash landing the once-soaring
Indian economy and quietly reviving a strain of anti-Americanism that harked
back to the Cold War. Mr. Singhs defense minister, A.K. Antony, stonewalled
the Pentagons best efforts to deepen cooperation with India. Mr. Obamas
administration certainly displayed no antipathy toward India. Four years ago
Mr. Obama became the first U.S. president to back Indias longstanding bid
for a permanent seat on an expanded United Nations Security Council.

Yet credit for the dramatic turnaround in bilateral ties belongs largely to Mr.
Modi. Ignoring advice from hardliners within his party, the prime minister
chose not to bear a grudge either for the Bush administrations 2005
revocation of his U.S. visa or by Mr. Obamas slowness to make amends after
Mr. Modi had been cleared of culpability, both by the Indian courts and
indirectly by the voters of Gujarat.
After his overwhelming election victory in May, Mr. Modi quickly accepted an
invitation from Mr. Obama to visit Washington. There he made it clear that he
regards the U.S. as a critical partner in his effort to revive Indias economy
and modernize its large but creaky military.


Indo-Pak WarUS/India Relations Key

US/India ties key to South Asian stabilityessential to
Indian modernization
Dhume, 16 Resident fellow, American Enterprise Institute
(Sadanand, 5/24. U.S.-India relations: Balancing progress and
managing expectations.
Over the past two decades, both Democratic and Republican administrations
have pursued closer relations with India. A strong bipartisan consensus in
Congress has boosted this effort to build ties with the worlds most populous
democracy. At a time of great flux in Asia, India occupies a pivotal place in
the region, wedged between a rapidly rising China and the turmoil of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. U.S. hopes of fostering peace and prosperity in
Asiaand of preventing any single power from dominating this regionrest in
no small measure on deepening the U.S.-India relationship and supporting
ongoing Indian efforts at economic and military modernization.

Strong US/India relations key to de-escalate Indo-Pak

conflicttrust and communication are vital to mediation
Perkovich, 14 vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. (George, with Toby Dalton, 6/3. India and Pakistan: A
Thin Line Between War and Peace.
Thus, the challenge for Indians and Pakistanisand for the U.S. government,
which inevitably would be impelled to mediate a new conflictis to take
steps now to prevent major terrorist attacks on India and to prepare
modalities to manage consequences if prevention fails.
The United States needs to be more forthcoming than it has been in the past
in sharing intelligence with India on possible threats and holding Pakistan to
account for its ambivalent counterterrorism performance concerning India.
Indian leaders need to correct longstanding inadequacies in their intelligence
and counterterrorism organizations, and prepare contingencies for
responding to attacks that take full account of the risks of escalation.
Pakistani leaders, especially in the Army and Inter-Services Intelligence, need
to open genuine lines of communication with their Indian counterparts and
demonstrate that they are doing everything they can to prevent future
Mumbai-like attacks.
Cooperation like this must occur before an attack if there will be any chance
of mitigating risks of escalation after one occurs. The stakes could not be

higher. The United States cannot publicly orchestrate such cooperation, but it
can (and should) work behind the scenes at high levels to facilitate it.

Strong US/India relations avert South Asian nuclear war

Schaffer 2 (Teresita, Dir South Asia Progam, CSIS, Washington Quarterly,
Spring, Lexis)
Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's
economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi,
for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant
democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages
include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing
rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in
the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a
prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to
assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its
people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the U nited S tates.

Indo-Pak WarExtinction
Indo-pak risks extinction comprehensive study
Telegraph 13 [India-Pakistan nuclear war could 'end human civilisation',]

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would set off a global famine that
could kill two billion people and effectively end human civilization, a study said Tuesday.
Even if limited in scope, a conflict with nuclear weapons would wreak havoc in the
atmosphere and devastate crop yields, with the effects multiplied as global food
markets went into turmoil, the report said. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility released an
initial peer-reviewed study in April 2012 that predicted a nuclear famine could kill more than a
billion people. In a second edition, the groups said they widely underestimated the
impact in China and calculated that the world's most populous country would face severe food
insecurity. "A billion people dead in the developing world is obviously a catastrophe unparalleled in human
history. But then if you add to that the possibility of another 1.3 billion people in China being at risk, we are
entering something that is clearly the end of civilization," said Ira Helfand, the report's author. Helfand said
that the study looked at India and Pakistan due to the longstanding tensions between the nuclear-armed
states, which have fought three full-fledged wars since independence and partition in 1947. But Helfand
said that the planet would expect a similar apocalyptic impact from any limited nuclear war. Modern
nuclear weapons are far more powerful than the US bombs that killed more than 200,000 people in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. "With a large war between the United States and Russia, we are talking
about the possible - not certain, but possible - extinction of the human race. "In this kind of war,
biologically there are going to be people surviving somewhere on the planet but the chaos that would

the black
carbon aerosol particles kicked into the atmosphere by a South Asian nuclear
war would reduce US corn and soybean production by around 10 percent over a decade. The
result from this will dwarf anything we've ever seen," Helfand said. The study said that

particles would also reduce China's rice production by an average of 21 percent over four years and by
another 10 percent over the following six years. The updated study also found severe effects on China's
wheat, which is vital to the country despite its association with rice. China's wheat production would
plunge by 50 percent the first year after the nuclear war and would still be 31 percent below baseline a
decade later, it said. The study said it was impossible to estimate the exact impact of nuclear war. He
called for further research, voicing alarm that policymakers in nuclear powers were not looking more
thoroughly at the idea of a nuclear famine. But he said, ultimately, the only answer was the abolition of
nuclear weapons. "This

is a disaster so massive in scale that really no preparation

is possible. We must prevent this," he said.

Indo-Pak WarLikely
Escalation likely recent changes
Montgomery & Edelman 15 - Senior Fellow at the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Distinguished
Fellow at CSBA, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-inResidence at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies [Evan Braden Montgomery & Evan Braden
Montgomery, Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the
Competition for Escalation Dominance, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume
38, Issue 1-2, 2015, pages 159-182]

attitudes toward the IndiaPakistan rivalry are generally characterized by a mixture of fatalism and
complacence. That is, observers often assume that both sides will remain locked in a
perpetual stand-off, but are also confident that low-level hostilities will not
escalate to full-scale conventional or nuclear war. Unfortunately, current trends on the subcontinent
suggest that these attitudes should be revised . India and Pakistan are now engaged in a
competition for escalation dominance, one that is deeply rooted in enduring structural
Consistent with the logic of the stability-instability paradox,

factors, such as Islamabads attempt to preserve one of the only coercive strategies available to it as the
weaker side, as well as New Delhis efforts to exploit its advantages as the stronger actor.


Indias pursuit of a limited conventional warfare capability to deter or retaliate

against Pakistan, along with Pakistans pursuit of limited nuclear options to deter or retaliate
against India, is increasing the likelihood of a conflict between them potentially even a
nuclear war.

Indo-pak conflict likely, escalates worse than other

conflicts & problems
Barno & Bensahel 11 5 15 distinguished practitioner &
scholar in residence at the School of International Service
at American University. Both are nonresident senior
fellows at the Brent Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic
Council. Retired Army Lt., & PhD [David Barno & Nora Bensahel, A
nuclear war between India and Pakistan is a very real possibility,]

A pink flamingo is a term recently coined by Frank Hoffman to describe predictable

but ignored events that can yield disastrous results. Hoffman argues that these
situations are fully visible, but almost entirely ignored by policymakers. Pink flamingos stand in stark
contrast to black swansthe unpredictable, even unforeseeable shocks whose outcomes may be entirely

The tense nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan may be the
most dangerous pink flamingo in todays world. The Indian subcontinenthome to both India
and Pakistanremains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and
continues to pose a deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their
1,800-mile border is the only place in the world where two hostile, nuclear-armed
states face off every day. And the risk of nuclear conflict has only continued to
rise in the past few years, to the point that it is now a very real possibility. India and Pakistan

have fought three wars since they gained independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with
Pakistan losing approximately half its territory (present-day Bangladesh). Today, the disputed Line of

Both the
Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistansupported militants brought both nations once again to the brink of war. Yet, unlike earlier major
Control that divides the disputed Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flashpoint.

wars, these two crises occurred after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick and
forceful diplomatic intervention played a pivotal role in preventing a larger conflict from erupting during

These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today. Since 2004,
India has been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start , a limited war
option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It
each crisis.

involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armoured
assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistans
nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilise half a million

The problem is, unlike its neighbours India and China, Pakistan has
not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have stated that they
troops in less than 72 hours.

may have to use nuclear weapons first in order to defend against a conventional attack from India.

to counter Cold Start and help to offset Indias growing conventional

superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its nuclear weapons programmeand
begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons. Some observers now judge
Therefore, both

this nuclear programme to be the fastest growing in the world. Pakistan will reportedly have enough fissile
material by 2020 to build more than 200 nuclear warheadsmore than the UK plans to have by that time.

Pakistans arsenal of short-range

tactical nuclear weapons is a game changer in other ways. Pakistan clearly intends to use
these weaponson its own soil if necessaryto counter Cold Starts plan for sudden Indian
armoured thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered the longstanding geometry between the two nuclear powers and increases the risk of
escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis. Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear
It is not simply the pace of the build-up that should cause concern.

escalation, Pakistans growing tactical nuclear weapons programme also brings a wide array of other
destabilising characteristics to this already unstable mix:

the necessity to position these short-

range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the
need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signalling a nuclear threat;
and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralised control of the weapons
a use it or lose it danger if facing an Indian armoured offensive . Furthermore,
large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increase the risk that some will fall
into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of
the most frightening potential spin-offs of the current arms race. Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that
could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists
launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security
forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers
were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation
were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the US and immense
restraint exerted by then-Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted.

The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are
unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former US
ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian prime minister
Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors.
Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised
by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But

there remains no meaningful senior-

level dialogue between the two stateslast Augusts planned meeting between the two national
security advisers was cancelled after disagreements about Kashmiri separatists. There may be little the US
or the world can do to forestall this conflict still looming just over the horizon. Nevertheless, the
tremendous dangers of this situation require US policymakers to devote more time and energy in trying to
do so, and some small steps may help. The US should work hard to catalyse confidence-building measures
between the two sides, seeking to open more peacetime channels to create dialogue and potential conflict
mediation options for the future. Neither nations military currently has any direct communications. Quiet,
off-the-record meetings between senior military leaders would help lessen tensions and establish some
degree of mutual dialogue and understanding before a crisis erupts. The US should also sponsor unofficial
tabletop exercises involving representatives of each side to explore how escalation in a nuclear conflict
could unfold. The US should also reach out to current (and former) civil and military decision-makers on
both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove vital in the next crisis. And the US
should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and keep them
under tight central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible
results from the US governments recent outreach to Pakistan on this topic should only encourage renewed

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would dramatically alter the
world as we know it. The damage from fallout and blast, the deaths of potentially millions,
and the environmental devastation of even a few weapons detonations would suddenly
dwarf any other global problem. There is no shortage of conflicts and crises around the world
demanding the attention of policymakers in Washington and other capitals. But the stakes of a war
between two of the worlds most hostile nuclear powers deserves attention
before the next inevitable flare-up. Taking a series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst

outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well worth making.

ImpactGlobal Warming
Strong US/Indian relations key to solve climate change
Armitage et al., 10 President of Armitage International. He has served
in a number of senior national security posts in government, most recently as
Deputy Secretary of State (Richard L., with R. Nicholas Burns and Richard
Fontaine, October. Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India
Indias emergence as a key actor at the Copenhagen summit on climate
change in December 2009 rep - resented a turning point in its global
activism. The Copenhagen talks put new stresses on the bilateral
relationship when India sided with the BASIC (i.e., Brazil, South Africa, India,
and China) bloc rather than with the United States and its other partners. At
the same time, direct Indian engagement in these global negotiations
demonstrated that it is essential to any international solution to this press ing problem. While real differences exist and will likely con - tinue on the
best methods for reducing carbon emissions, this effort should not be seen
as a competition between developed and developing countries. On the
contrary, any meaningful reduc - tion in carbon emissions will require the
active collaboration of the worlds largest energy consum - ers. India, one of
the two fastest-growing energy markets in the world today, is critical to this

The impact is extinction.

Bushnell 10 - Chief scientist at the NASA Langley Research Center [Dennis Bushnell (MS in
mechanical engineering. He won the Lawrence A. Sperry Award, AIAA Fluid and Plasma
Dynamics Award, the AIAA Dryden Lectureship, and is the recipient of many NASA Medals for
outstanding Scientific Achievement and Leadership.) Conquering Climate Change, The
Futurist, May-June, 2010
During the Permian extinction, a number of chain reaction events, or positive feedbacks,
resulted in oxygen-depleted oceans, enabling overgrowth of certain bacteria, producing copious
amounts of hydrogen sulfide, making the atmosphere toxic, and decimating the ozone layer, all
producing species die-off. The positive feedbacks not yet fully included in the IPCC projections
include the release of the massive amounts of fossil methane, some 20 times worse than CO2 as
an accelerator of warming, fossil CO2 from the tundra and oceans, reduced oceanic CO2 uptake
due to higher temperatures, acidification and algae changes, changes in the earths ability to
reflect the suns light back into space due to loss of glacier ice, changes in land use, and extensive
water evaporation (a greenhouse gas) from temperature increases. The additional effects of these
feedbacks increase the projections from a 4C6C temperature rise by 2100 to a 10C12C
rise , according to some estimates. At those temperatures, beyond 2100, essentially all the ice
would melt and the ocean would rise by as much as 75 meters, flooding the homes of one-third of
the global population. Between now and then, ocean methane hydrate release could cause major

tidal waves, and glacier melting could affect major rivers upon which a large percentage of the
population depends. Well see increases in flooding, storms, disease, droughts, species
extinctions, ocean acidification, and a litany of other impacts, all as a consequence of man-made
climate change. Arctic ice melting, CO2 increases, and ocean warming are all occurring much
faster than previous IPCC forecasts, so, as dire as the forecasts sound, theyre actually
conservative . Pg. 7-8

Relations are key to the economy.
Tellis, 05 Senior Associate @ the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Served in US Department of State as Senior Adviser to the
Ambassador @ the Embassy of the US in India (Ashley, US-India
Partnership, House International Relations Committee Testimony, 11/16)
If I am permitted to digress a bit, let me say parenthetically, that advancing
the growth of Indian power, as the Administration currently intends, is not
directed, as many critics have alleged, at "containing" China. I do not believe
that a policy of containing China is either feasible or necessary at this point in
time. (India too, currently, has no interest in becoming part of any coalition
aimed at containing China.) Rather, the Administration's strategy of assisting
India to become a major world power in the twenty-first century is directed,
first and foremost, towards constructing a stable geopolitical order in Asia
that is conducive to peace and prosperity. There is little doubt today that the
Asian continent is poised to become the new center of gravity in international politics . Although
lower growth in the labor force, reduced export performance, diminishing
returns to capital, changes in demographic structure, and the maturation of
the economy all suggest that national growth rates in several key Asian
states in particular Japan, South Korea, and possibly China are likely to
decline in comparison to the latter half of the Cold War period, the spurt in Indian
growth rates, coupled with the relatively high though still marginally declining
growth rates in China, will propel Asia's share of the global economy to some 43% by 2025, thus
making the continent the largest single locus of economic power worldwide. An Asia that hosts economic
power of such magnitude, along with its strong and growing connectivity to the American economy, will
become an arena vital to the United States in much the same way that Europe was the
grand prize during the Cold War. In such circumstances, the Administration's policy
of developing a new global partnership with India represents a considered effort at "shaping" the
emerging Asian environment to suit American interests in the twenty-first century. Even as

the United States focuses on developing good relations with all the major
Asian states, it is eminently reasonable for Washington not only to invest additional
resources in strengthening the continent's democratic powers but also to deepen
the bilateral relationship enjoyed with each of these countries on the assumption
that the proliferation of strong democratic states in Asia represents the best
insurance against intra-continental instability as well as threats that may
emerge against the United States and its regional presence. Strengthening
New Delhi and transforming U.S- Indian ties, therefore, has everything to do
with American confidence in Indian democracy and the conviction that its
growing strength, tempered by its liberal values, brings only benefits for
Asian stability and American security. As Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns succinctly stated in his testimony before this Committee, " By cooperating
with India now, we accelerate the arrival of the benefits that India's rise brings to the region and the

Growth solves nuclear war

Cook, 7 21-Year Veteran of the US Treasury Department, Retired Federal
Analyst, Washington-Based Writer & Consultant (6/23, Richard C., Global
Research, Its Official: The Crash of the U.S. Economy has
Times of economic crisis produce international tension and politicians tend to go to war rather than face the
economic music. The classic example is the worldwide depression of the 1930s leading to World War II.
Conditions in the coming years could be as bad as they were then. We could have a really big war if the
U.S. decides once and for all to haul off and let China, or whomever, have it in the chops. If they dont
want our dollars or our debt any more, how about a few nukes?

Strong US/India relations key to preventing terrorism
facilitates effective cooperation
Ayoob, 2000 - Professor of International Relations @ Michigan State
University(Mohammed, India Matters, Washington Quarterly, Winter)
Indian and U.S. concerns do not coincide merely on the issue of maintaining a
stable and secure order in Asia in general and in South Asia in particular. A
major threat to both regional and global stability and security comes from a
particular variety of terrorism that has targeted both India and the United States. This is the threat
posed by Islamic extremists who have found a safe haven in Talibanized Afghanistan.
The August 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
drove this point home to Washington with great force. The retaliatory U.S.
bombing of terrorist bases in Afghanistan exposed the fact that terrorist cadres
were being trained in these camps not merely to indulge in anti-American ventures but also to infiltrate
Indian Kashmir to create further mayhem in the Valley. India had been warning Washington of the
nexus between anti-American terrorist groups and the foreign militants -- Afghans, Pakistanis,
and Arabs -- being trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan for terrorist attacks in Kashmir.
Indeed, by the mid-1990s the nature of the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley
had changed from a largely indigenous operation, albeit armed and trained
by Pakistan to a substantial extent, to one primarily conducted by foreign
mercenaries trained in the killing fields of Afghanistan and paid and supplied
by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Pakistan's connection with the
Taliban was no secret. Had it not been for Pakistan's material help, extended
primarily for domestic political reasons, the predominantly Pushtun Taliban
would not have been able to overwhelm decisively and speedily the better
trained and largely Tajik and Uzbek forces of their opponents then ruling
Kabul. In the context of these connections, it appears that the network of
terror comprises not merely the Taliban and the terrorist elements under their
protection but also segments of the Pakistani military establishment. India and
the United States have a major shared interest in foiling the designs of this terrorist network , and it is
becoming increasingly clear to both that they must cooperate with each other toward this
end. This cooperation has started in earnest, indicated by the fact that for the
first time, high-level discussions have taken place between Indian and U.S. officials specifically focused on
Afghanistan and the terrorist threat emanating from there. Held in Washington in
early September 1999, this meeting is seen as the harbinger of a more coordinated strategy
on the issue of counterterrorism. Such coordination has taken on greater urgency

because of the recent coup in Pakistan that has brought to power a military
establishment suspected of close links with the Taliban.

Terrorism causes nuclear war.

Speice, 06 JD 2006, College of William & Mary (Patrick, 47 Wm and Mary L.
Rev. 1427, lexis)

and Minatom are now operating in circumstances of great stress. Money is in short
supply, paychecks are irregular, living conditions unpleasant ... [D]isorder
within Russia and the resulting strains within the military could easily cause a lapse or a breakdown in the Russian military's guardianship
of nuclear weapons. 38 Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a
nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era
nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods,
including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given
one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had
obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists
will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material
is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon . 41 Although nuclear devices are
extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant.
42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the
Organizations such as the Russian military

United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built.

43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists

from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective
means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold
War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia , and the
nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming
unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat,
there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and
who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted
to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear
ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction
in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in
terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United
States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a
full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of

nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that
states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation
of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear
attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as
well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United
States and escalte to the use of nuclear weapons. 53

US/India ties key to effective democracy promotion
Ayoob, 00 Professor of International Relations @ Michigan State University
(Mohammed, India Matters, Washington Quarterly, Winter)
The military coup in Pakistan has also highlighted a major political affinity between India and the United States,
namely, a firm commitment to a democratic form of government. The swearing in of the new postelection government in New
Delhi on the day after the overthrow of civilian rule in Islamabad in October 1999 may have been a coincidence, but the two events

India's ability to function as a vibrant, if sometimes

democracy in the face of great social, economic, and political challenges has begun to count for much more in
Washington, especially in congressional circles, than it did during the Cold War era. The increasing emphasis on using the
"democracy" yardstick to measure political affinity between the United States and other countries should provide
India with a massive built-in advantage. It also means that members of Congress as well as the executive branch in Washington
epitomized the different traditions and trajectories of the neighboring polities.

are likely to exhibit greater appreciation of the complexity of the Indian decisionmaking process based as it is on the need to create a
democratic consensus before major decisions are made. Political players in Washington are extremely familiar with this process. Furthermore,
the recent emphasis in U.S. rhetoric on creation of a "democratic community of states," itself based on a popularized version of the

The two states crucial to legitimizing the

a global democratic community are obviously the world's largest democracy (India) and the world's
most powerful democracy (the United States), and their partnership is essential for the idea to be taken seriously. n3
If democracy and human rights are to inform U.S. foreign policy making in any substantial fashion in the coming
decade, Washington's relations with New Delhi must inevitably move to a higher plane of understanding and
"democratic peace" thesis, can be expected to aid in improving Indian-U.S. relations.
idea of

Democratization prevents global nuclear war.

Muravchik, 01 Resident Scholar @ American Enterprise Institute (Joshua,
Democracy and Nuclear Peace, 7/11,
The greatest impetus for world peace -- and perforce of nuclear peace -- is the spread of
democracy. In a famous article, and subsequent book, Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy's
extension was leading to "the end of history." By this he meant the conclusion of man's quest for the right social order,
but he also meant the "diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between
states." (1) Fukuyama's phrase was intentionally provocative, even tongue-in-cheek, but he was pointing to two down-to-earth historical
observations: that democracies are more peaceful than other kinds of government and that the world is growing more democratic. Neither
point has gone unchallenged. Only a few decades ago, as distinguished an observer of international relations as George Kennan made a claim
quite contrary to the first of these assertions. Democracies, he said, were slow to anger, but once aroused "a democracy . . . . fights in
anger . . . . to the bitter end." (2) Kennan's view was strongly influenced by the policy of "unconditional surrender" pursued in World War II. But
subsequent experience, such as the negotiated settlements America sought in Korea and Vietnam proved him wrong. Democracies are not
only slow to anger but also quick to compromise. And to forgive. Notwithstanding the insistence on unconditional surrender, America treated
Japan and that part of Germany that it occupied with extraordinary generosity. In recent years a burgeoning literature has discussed the

the proposition that democracies do not go to war with

one another has been described by one political scientist as being "as close as anything
we have to an empirical law in international relations." (
peacefulness of democracies. Indeed

3) Some of those who find enthusiasm for democracy off-

putting have challenged this proposition, but their challenges have only served as empirical tests that have confirmed its robustness. For example, the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnist-turned-politician
Patrick J. Buchanan have both instanced democratic England's declaration of war against democratic Finland during World War II. (4) In fact, after much procrastination, England did accede to the pressure of its
Soviet ally to declare war against Finland which was allied with Germany. But the declaration was purely formal: no fighting ensued between England and Finland. Surely this is an exception that proves the rule. The
strongest exception I can think of is the war between the nascent state of Israel and the Arabs in 1948. Israel was an embryonic democracy and Lebanon, one of the Arab belligerents, was also democratic within the
confines of its peculiar confessional division of power. Lebanon, however, was a reluctant party to the fight. Within the councils of the Arab League, it opposed the war but went along with its larger confreres when
they opted to attack. Even so, Lebanon did little fighting and soon sued for peace. Thus, in the case of Lebanon against Israel, as in the case of England against Finland, democracies nominally went to war against
democracies when they were dragged into conflicts by authoritarian allies. The political scientist Bruce Russett offers a different challenge to the notion that democracies are more peaceful. "That democracies are in
general, in dealing with all kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other nondemocratically constituted states . . . .is a much more controversial proposition than 'merely' that democracies are
peaceful in their dealings with each other, and one for which there is little systematic evidence," he says. (5) Russett cites his own and other statistical explorations which show that while democracies rarely fight
one another they often fight against others. The trouble with such studies, however, is that they rarely examine the question of who started or caused a war. To reduce the data to a form that is quantitatively
measurable, it is easier to determine whether a conflict has occurred between two states than whose fault it was. But the latter question is all important. Democracies may often go to war against dictatorships
because the dictators see them as prey or underestimate their resolve. Indeed, such examples abound. Germany might have behaved more cautiously in the summer of 1914 had it realized that England would fight
to vindicate Belgian neutrality and to support France. Later, Hitler was emboldened by his notorious contempt for the flabbiness of the democracies. North Korea almost surely discounted the likelihood of an
American military response to its invasion of the South after Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly defined America's defense perimeter to exclude the Korean peninsula (a declaration which merely confirmed
existing U.S. policy). In 1990, Saddam Hussein's decision to swallow Kuwait was probably encouraged by the inference he must have taken from the statements and actions of American officials that Washington
would offer no forceful resistance. Russett says that those who claim democracies are in general more peaceful "would have us believe that the United States was regularly on the defensive, rarely on the offensive,
during the Cold War." But that is not quite right: the word "regularly" distorts the issue. A victim can sometimes turn the tables on an aggressor, but that does not make the victim equally bellicose. None would
dispute that Napoleon was responsible for the Napoleonic wars or Hitler for World War II in Europe, but after a time their victims seized the offensive. So in the Cold War, the United States may have initiated some
skirmishes (although in fact it rarely did), but the struggle as a whole was driven one-sidedly. The Soviet policy was "class warfare"; the American policy was "containment." The so-called revisionist historians argued
that America bore an equal or larger share of responsibility for the conflict. But Mikhail Gorbachev made nonsense of their theories when, in the name of glasnost and perestroika, he turned the Soviet Union away
from its historic course. The Cold War ended almost instantly--as he no doubt knew it would. "We would have been able to avoid many . . . difficulties if the democratic process had developed normally in our

country," he wrote. (7) To render judgment about the relative peacefulness of states or systems, we must ask not only who started a war but why. In particular we should consider what in Catholic Just War doctrine is
called "right intention," which means roughly: what did they hope to get out of it? In the few cases in recent times in which wars were initiated by democracies, there were often motives other than aggrandizement,
for example, when America invaded Grenada. To be sure, Washington was impelled by self-interest more than altruism, primarily its concern for the well-being of American nationals and its desire to remove a chip,
however tiny, from the Soviet game board. But America had no designs upon Grenada, and the invaders were greeted with joy by the Grenadan citizenry. After organizing an election, America pulled out. In other
cases, democracies have turned to war in the face of provocation, such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out an enemy sworn to its destruction or Turkey's invasion of Cyprus to rebuff a power-grab by
Greek nationalists. In contrast, the wars launched by dictators, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, North Korea's of South Korea, the Soviet Union's of Hungary and Afghanistan, often have aimed at conquest or
subjugation. The big exception to this rule is colonialism. The European powers conquered most of Africa and Asia, and continued to hold their prizes as Europe democratized. No doubt many of the instances of
democracies at war that enter into the statistical calculations of researchers like Russett stem from the colonial era. But colonialism was a legacy of Europe's pre-democratic times, and it was abandoned after World
War II. Since then, I know of no case where a democracy has initiated warfare without significant provocation or for reasons of sheer aggrandizement, but there are several cases where dictators have done so. One
interesting piece of Russett's research should help to point him away from his doubts that democracies are more peaceful in general. He aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward each other.
Immanuel Kant was the first to observe, or rather to forecast, the pacific inclination of democracies. He reasoned that "citizens . . . will have a great hesitation in . . . . calling down on themselves all the miseries of
war." (8) But this valid insight is incomplete. There is a deeper explanation. Democracy is not just a mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and self-restraint. At bottom, democracy is the willingness to resolve
civil disputes without recourse to violence. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct of their domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings with other nations. Russett aimed to
explain why democracies are more peaceful toward one another. To do this, he constructed two models. One hypothesized that the cause lay in the mechanics of democratic decision-making (the
"structural/institutional model"), the other that it lay in the democratic ethos (the "cultural/normative model"). His statistical assessments led him to conclude that: "almost always the cultural/normative model
shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. The structural/institutional model sometimes provides a significant relationship but often does not." (9) If it is the ethos that makes democratic states more
peaceful toward each other, would not that ethos also make them more peaceful in general? Russett implies that the answer is no, because to his mind a critical element in the peaceful behavior of democracies
toward other democracies is their anticipation of a conciliatory attitude by their counterpart. But this is too pat. The attitude of live-and-let-live cannot be turned on and off like a spigot. The citizens and officials of
democracies recognize that other states, however governed, have legitimate interests, and they are disposed to try to accommodate those interests except when the other party's behavior seems threatening or
outrageous. A different kind of challenge to the thesis that democracies are more peaceful has been posed by the political scientists Edward G. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. They claim statistical support for the
proposition that while fully fledged democracies may be pacific, Ain th[e] transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less." (10) However, like others, they measure
a state's likelihood of becoming involved in a war but do not report attempting to determine the cause or fault. Moreover, they acknowledge that their research revealed not only an increased likelihood for a state to
become involved in a war when it was growing more democratic, but an almost equal increase for states growing less democratic. This raises the possibility that the effects they were observing were caused simply
by political change per se, rather than by democratization. Finally, they implicitly acknowledge that the relationship of democratization and peacefulness may change over historical periods. There is no reason to
suppose that any such relationship is governed by an immutable law. Since their empirical base reaches back to 1811, any effect they report, even if accurately interpreted, may not hold in the contemporary world.
They note that "in [some] recent cases, in contrast to some of our historical results, the rule seems to be: go fully democratic, or don't go at all." But according to Freedom House, some 62.5 percent of extant
governments were chosen in legitimate elections. (12) (This is a much larger proportion than are adjudged by Freedom House to be "free states," a more demanding criterion, and it includes many weakly
democratic states.) Of the remaining 37.5 percent, a large number are experiencing some degree of democratization or heavy pressure in that direction. So the choice "don't go at all" (11) is rarely realistic in the
contemporary world. These statistics also contain the answer to those who doubt the second proposition behind Fukuyama's forecast, namely, that the world is growing more democratic. Skeptics have drawn upon
Samuel Huntington's fine book, TheThird Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Huntington says that the democratization trend that began in the mid-1970s in Portugal, Greece and Spain is the third
such episode. The first "wave" of democratization began with the American revolution and lasted through the aftermath of World War I, coming to an end in the interwar years when much of Europe regressed back
to fascist or military dictatorship. The second wave, in this telling, followed World War II when wholesale decolonization gave rise to a raft of new democracies. Most of these, notably in Africa, collapsed into
dictatorship by the 1960s, bringing the second wave to its end. Those who follow Huntington's argument may take the failure of democracy in several of the former Soviet republics and some other instances of
backsliding since 1989 to signal the end of the third wave. Such an impression, however, would be misleading. One unsatisfying thing about Huntington's "waves" is their unevenness. The first lasted about 150
years, the second about 20. How long should we expect the third to endure? If it is like the second, it will ebb any day now, but if it is like the first, it will run until the around the year 2125. And by then--who
knows?--perhaps mankind will have incinerated itself, moved to another planet, or even devised a better political system. Further, Huntington's metaphor implies a lack of overall progress or direction. Waves rise
and fall. But each of the reverses that followed Huntington's two waves was brief, and each new wave raised the number of democracies higher than before. Huntington does, however, present a statistic that seems
to weigh heavily against any unidirectional interpretation of democratic progress. The proportion of states that were democratic in 1990 (45%), he says, was identical to the proportion in 1922. (13) But there are two
answers to this. In 1922 there were only 64 states; in 1990 there were 165. But the number of peoples had not grown appreciably. The difference was that in 1922 most peoples lived in colonies, and they were not
counted as states. The 64 states of that time were mostly the advanced countries. Of those, two thirds had become democratic by 1990, which was a significant gain. The additional 101 states counted in 1990 were
mostly former colonies. Only a minority, albeit a substantial one, were democratic in 1990, but since virtually none of those were democratic in 1922, that was also a significant gain. In short, there was progress all
around, but this was obscured by asking what percentage of states were democratic. Asking the question this way means that a people who were subjected to a domestic dictator counted as a non-democracy, but a
people who were subjected to a foreign dictator did not count at all. Moreover, while the criteria for judging a state democratic vary, the statistic that 45 percent of states were democratic in 1990 corresponds with
Freedom House's count of "democratic" polities (as opposed to its smaller count of "free" countries, a more demanding criterion). But by this same count, Freedom House now says that the proportion of

That Freedom House could count 120 freely

elected governments by early 2001 (out of a total of 192 independent states) bespeaks a vast
transformation in human governance within the span of 225 years. In 1775, the number of democracies was
democracies has grown to 62.5 percent. In other words, the "third wave" has not abated.

zero. In 1776, the birth of the United States of America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace,

That this momentum

has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be
remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was
inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there
was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts
rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend
remains powerful and clear. Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today
than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace.
The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when
Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous
corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or
growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the
greatest cause for worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear
arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still
more remote.
most of the growth having occurred within the twentieth century, with greatest momentum since 1974.


Relations Down Now/Alt Causes

Relations decliningconcerns over human rights
PTI, 16 (The Indian Express, 5/25. Ahead of PM Modis visit, top US
Senators voice concern over religious freedom in India .
Ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modis visit, top US Senators have
expressed deep concern over religious freedom, increasing attack on civil
society and human rights in India with the Obama Administration saying it
was having a dialogue with the country on these issues.
The situation does raise concern about religious freedom in India, Colorado
Senator Cory Gardner said during a Congressional hearing on India convened
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Virginia Senator Tim Kaine, while expressing his concern on recent incidents
of religious intolerance when artists returned their awards, said he is hoping
to raise this issue with Prime Minister Modi when he travels to Washington DC
next month.
Describing the anti-conversion laws in some states as problematic, Maryland
Senator Ben Cardin, a Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, expressed concern over religious freedom in India.
Some of the members also raised the issue of denying visas to the members
of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom.
Agreeing with the concerns of the Senators, Assistant Secretary of State for
South and Central Asia Nisha Desai Biswal said while the Obama
Administration has been raising these issues and concerns at the highest
level and is having a dialogue with India on this issue, it is the vibrant civil
society of India which is itself the most robust and string voice on this.
There has been fairly vigorous and vociferous debate within India with
respect to religious freedom and religious tolerance, Biswal said, adding that
there is no more robust voice than the voice of the Indian people that is
taking up these issues with increasing vigour and public debate.
It is on the headlines of Indian newspapers that you are seeing a very active
engagement on this issue. I think, these are issues, these are values that we
hold very dear, that we bring into the conversation. But we try to do it in a
constructive way possible to not take away the fact that these are issues that
Indian must grapple with and get right for their own country, for their own
democracy, for their own society, Biswal said in response to a question.

And that we in the United States have experiences to share, lessons to

share, best practices to share. But we seek to do that in a way that respects
and honours the fact that this democracy has a very vibrant and a very vocal
civil society and media and political party system that is also trying to get
this right, she said.
Cardin alleged that India has inconsistent record in the manner in which they
treat women and girls.
So tell us the progress being made in dealing with slavery in our relationship
with India. This is democratically, a friend. Are we being candid with them
with regard to trafficking, he asked.
Absolutely we are being candid. Its an issue of Indian capacity to address
the very large, Biswal said, adding that there is increasing awareness in
commitment at the national level to try to deal with these issues.
But there is a long way to go. It would be increasingly incumbent upon India
to advance the rule of law to all aspect of the society, she added.
Senator Kaine said the heartening aspect of India today has a vibrant civil
society that is not shy at all raising these issues.
Citing a recent report of the International Religious Freedom, the Republican
Senator said the situation of religious freedom has deteriorated in India.
One of the concerns that we have raised with our counterparts in India is the
regulatory and legal framework that seeks to constrain the activities of the
civil society organisations, whether they be Indian or international
organisations. This is a continuing area of concern, Biswal said.
Gardner alleged that foreign non-governmental organisations are being
harassed by the Indian government.
Its deeply concerning to me, he said, citing the example of Colorado-based
Compassion International.
In India Compassion International has been sued by the Income Tax four
times. Their assets have been seized. They have had their employees and
church pastors interrogated for hours by intelligence bureau. Twelve separate
visa applications have been denied, Gardner said.
We are concerned about the attack on civil society within India. They have to
be effectively be able to speak. (But) it does not relieve us from developing
and working with leaders in India that recognise that these are not western
values, these are universal issues that India needs to make progress on,
Cardin said.
In a massive country like India it is a huge challenge to deal with issues of
uniform capacity and capability to address the rights of every individual
citizen, said Biswal in response to concerns being expressed by the Senators.

We do think that there is a lot more that can and should be done to address
issues of trafficking and child labour, she said.
In all of our interactions, we raise issues particularly if we have specific
instances or cases of concern to seek Indian responses and actions, she
India has 12-14 million slaves. There are 27 million slaves in the world. How
does a country like this has 12-14 million slave in the year 2016? How does
that happen? Senator Bob Corker Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations
Committee asked.
Responding to a question on denying visa to members of USCIRF, Biswal said
the Administration has tried to impress the Indian government to provide
them with visas.
She also noted that the successive Indian governments have denied the visa.

US/India relations fractured over Afghanistan

Kaye et al., 15 Co-Chief Executive Officer, Warburg Pincus, and Joseph
S. Nye Jr., Distinguished Service Professor, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University (Charles R., November. Working With a
Rising India. CFR Task Force Report.
In addition, the Task Force finds that U.S. policy toward Afghan- istan has
created particular difficulties in the U.S.-India bilateral relationship due to the
increasing threat of greater instability result- ing from internal Afghan
divisions, the many violent threats to the countrys stability, and the
drawdown of U.S. and other external forces. New Delhi also fears what it
perceives as American eager- ness to extricate itself from the region could
lead to more influence on the part of China and Pakistan. To New Delhi, that
combination appears poised to result in an endgame deal that will seal off
Afghani- stan from India at the expense of Indian geostrategic equities. Given
the increased instability in Afghanistan since the end of the formal international mission there in December 2014, the United States too should worry
about Afghanistan returning to a state of chaos, especially in light of
developments in Iraq after the departure of U.S. forcesnamely, the rise of
the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The Task Force recommends that the United
States extend its commitment to Afghanistan even beyond President
Obamas decision to slow the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and
retain a force of some 5,000 U.S. troops in the country into 2017. The United
States should commit to a doctrine stating that future decisions regarding the
size, scope, and timeline for deployment of U.S. forces will be determined by
on-the-ground realities and not arti cially imposed schedules, and without a
declared date of departure. Such a move would help assure India and others
that U.S. actions will not undermine the goal of long-term regional stability.
The United States should also continue to reinforce Indias helpful role in
development, infra- structure, and diplomacy with Afghanistan, ensuring that

India is a standing member of regional consultative mechanisms focused on


US/India relations strainedPakistan is a recurring

Sibal, 15 distinguished career diplomat who retired as Foreign Secretary
to the Government of India, the First Grand Doctor of Philosophy in India
(Kanwal, 10/30. The Pakistani Shadow on Indo-US Relations.
US policies towards Pakistan have always been a source of serious strategic
concern to us. Even with the visible improvement of India-US ties, now
elevated to a strategic partnership, we have to be watchful of US dealings
with Pakistan and their impact on our security interests. Pakistan has always
been, and remains, a US blindspot in its relationship with India.
This has been proved again with Nawaz Sharifs just concluded visit to the US.
Prior to the visit, US sources leaked to the media that Washington was
contemplating some sort of a nuclear deal with Pakistan that would legitimise
its nuclear status despite its known proliferation activities, the rapid
expansion of its nuclear arsenal, its development of tactical nuclear weapons
and open threats to use them against India. While Sharifs visit did not
produce such a deal, the US ignored all these Pakistani nuclear provocations
and transgressions and preferred to focus self-servingly on the success of the
Nuclear Security Summit to be hosted by Obama next year and welcomed
Pakistans constructive engagement with the Nuclear Security Summit
process and its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and
other international forums. Obama also noted Pakistans efforts to improve
its strategic trade controls and enhance its engagement with multilateral
export control regimes. All these were approving chits of Pakistans nuclear
policies, unfortunately at the cost of Indias security, given that a day prior to
Nawaz Sharifs Washington visit, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary publicly
brandished the tactical nuclear threat to India, spoke of full spectrum
deterrence and dismissed any talk of Pakistan accepting any restraint on its
nuclear arsenal. The un-named US officials categorical declaration that the
US was not contemplating any 123 type agreement with Pakistan or an NSG
exemption has come after Sharifs visit and in the wake of Pakistani defiance.
The recognition by Obama and Sharif in their joint statement of their shared
interest in strategic stability in South Asia is seriously objectionable from our
point of view, even if similar language figured in the Obama-Sharif joint
statement in 2013. Such a stance is inconsistent with the import of the IndiaUS nuclear deal which was intended to free India from some strategic
constraints while also bringing large parts of its nuclear program, present and
future, under IAEA safeguards in a bid to restrict its scope. There are no such
constraints on Chinas nuclear program, or on Chinas nuclear cooperation
with Pakistan in both civilian and military areas. There can therefore be no

strategic stability in South Asia unless China and its cooperation with Pakistan
is brought into the equation and Indias strategic needs vis a vis China are
recognised. Until the India-US nuclear deal, the US has viewed the nuclear
equation in the sub-continent as a purely India-Pakistan affair. Even before
India and Pakistan became overtly nuclear the US pressed for strategic
stability with a view to curbing Indias nuclear program, in the belief that this
would deprive Pakistan of the argument that it must match Indias nuclear
capabilities to ensure its security.
The tenacity of such US thinking surfaced during discussions on the Next
Steps in the Strategic Partnership when the US tried to introduce the
concept of strategic stability to offset Pakistani concerns about US tilting in
favor of India on strategic matters. Why after the nuclear compromise
inherent in the India-US nuclear deal the US continues to stress strategic
stability in South Asia and wants all sides to continuously act with maximum
restraint and work jointly toward strengthening strategic stability in South
Asia, is difficult to understand. So is the reference to the importance of
regional balance and stability in South Asia which unreasonably equates
India with Pakistan, including in the sphere of their security interests.
Even if we ignored the reference to strategic stability in 2013, we have less
reason to ignore it today. India and the US have in 2015 greatly widened the
scope of their geopolitical engagement by releasing a US-India Joint Strategic
Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region and upgrading the
trilateral India-US-Japan relationship relationship in a certain strategic
perspective. In this context it makes little sense for the US to still talk of
strategic balancing India and Pakistan. This merely sends confusing signals
about the depth of Indias strategic commitment to India.
Likewise, in January 2015, on the occasion of Obamas January 2015 visit, the
US-India Delhi Declaration of Friendship was issued, which proclaimed a
higher level of trust and coordination between the two countries.
Furthermore, in the joint statement issued then, Obama and Modi committed
to undertake efforts to make the U.S.-India partnership a defining
counterterrorism relationship for the 21st Century by deepening collaboration
to combat the full spectrum of terrorist threats. It called for eliminating
terrorist safe havens and infrastructure, disrupting terrorist networks and
their financing, and stopping cross-border movement of terrorists, besides
asking Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist
attack in Mumbai to justice. In September 2015, as part of the inaugural
India-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a U.S.-India Joint Declaration on
Combating Terrorism was issued with expansive provisions.

Relations Not Zero-Sum

The DA is wrongchange in bilateral relations with China
has no effect on relations with India
Liu, 12 Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Strategic Studies
and Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International
Studies (Dr. Liu Zongyi, 4/17. The China-India-US Relationship: Where Will It
Although the first three requirements of a strategic triangle are met, we
cannot say that, between China, India, and the US, each bilateral relationship
has significant effects on the third party. The China - India - US relationship is
not like the China - Sovie t - US strategic triangle formed during the Cold War
, because, at that time, both the Sino - Soviet and Soviet - American bilateral
relationships were actually in situations of cold or hot military
confrontation. A change in any one of the bilateral relationship s would have
had a material influence on the national security or national economic
interest of the third party.
The China - India - US triangle is, however, no copy of the China - Soviet - US
strategic triangle. The reason is that each of the bilateral relations hips has
only weak implications for the third party. For a long time, the core issue
between China and the United States has been the Taiwan issue, but India
has no interest in Taiwan. Now, though, with more and more global issues
intruding on the bilatera l relations of China and the United States, some of
Indias national interests have also become involved.
As for China - India relations, the most important aspects are the
border problem, Sino - Pakistani relations and the Dalai Lama issue ; but
these issues only have indirect connections with the United States.
In Indo - US relations, the focuses are nuclear co - operation and anti terrorism. T he India - US nuclear agreement drew some attention from
China , because India claimed that it tested nuclear weapons to pr otect
itself from the so - called China threat in 1998 . T he India - US nuclear
agreement , however, is only a small part of the interest taken by
China in Indo - US relations.
If there is any significant connection among the three countries, it is
that both China and India take their relationship with the United States
as the most important in their external affairs. But it is obvious that
there is no evident linkage mechanism a mong the three bilateral
relationships. Thus, we can say that the relationship between China,
India and the United States has some characteristics of a strategic
triangle, but is, in essence, more a trilateral relationship.

Officials agreeties dont trade off

Indian Express, 12 (2/4, Ties with India, China not zero-sum game:
Seeking strong ties with both India and China, the US has said that its
relations with the two Asian giants are not a zero-sum game.
"We have a strong bilateral relationship with India. The United States is in the
midst of our Asia pivot, we are strengthening our interactions with Asian
nations, especially with emerging powers like India and China," State
Department spokesman Mark Toner said.
These are the kinds of ties that are going to set the framework for the US
engagement with Asia throughout the next century, he said.
"This is not a zero-sum game. We need strong relations with both countries,
and we need all of us working together," Toner said in response to a question.
"There are always going to be matters on which we disagree, but we also
have significant areas of common interest," he said when asked about a
column written by Robert Burns, former under secretary of state for political
affairs, in The Boston Globe saying that India is a strategic partner for the US
to limit the influence of China in Asia.

Relations Inevitable
Relations inevitable and Chinas irrelevantthe US is
committed to Indian growth and cooperation
Nye, 15 University Professor at Harvard University and a member of the
World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on the Future of Government
(Joseph S., 8/11. Whats the future of US-India relations?
It would be a mistake to cast the prospects for an improved US-India
relationship solely in terms of Chinas rising power. Indian economic success
is an American interest on its own. So is the open approach taken by India
and Brazil on issues such as governance of the Internet, at a time when
Russia and China are seeking more authoritarian control.
No one should expect an Indian-American alliance any time soon, given
historical Indian public opinion. But one can predict a relationship in the
coming years that will be both sui generis and stronger.

AT: Indo-Pak War Impact

No Indo-Pak warPakistan has achieved escalation
Montgomery & Edelman 15 - Senior Fellow at the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Distinguished
Fellow at CSBA, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-inResidence at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies [Evan Braden Montgomery & Evan Braden
Montgomery, Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the
Competition for Escalation Dominance, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume
38, Issue 1-2, 2015, pages 159-182]
attitudes toward the IndiaPakistan rivalry are generally characterized by a mixture of fatalism and
complacence. That is, observers often assume that both sides will remain locked in a
perpetual stand-off, but are also confident that low-level hostilities will not
escalate to full-scale conventional or nuclear war. Unfortunately, current trends on the subcontinent
Consistent with the logic of the stability-instability paradox,

suggest that these attitudes should be revised. India and Pakistan are now engaged in a competition for
escalation dominance, one that is deeply rooted in enduring structural factors, such as Islamabads
attempt to preserve one of the only coercive strategies available to it as the weaker side, as well as New
Delhis efforts to exploit its advantages as the stronger actor. Specifically, Indias pursuit of a limited
conventional warfare capability to deter or retaliate against Pakistan, along with Pakistans pursuit of
limited nuclear options to deter or retaliate against India, is increasing the likelihood of a conflict between

the stalemate on the

subcontinent is likely to persist. Given the obstacles to implementing Cold Start and the
growing nuclear threat to its ground forces, New Delhi is unlikely to launch a cross-border
military campaign in response to a major provocation, although the temptation to do so could grow
if Cold Start moves closer to reality. In short, Islamabad currently appears to have the
edge in the escalation dominance competition . Moreover, it is unclear that India
can gain an advantage over its rival. Even if New Delhi does put Cold Start into practice, the
prospect of battlefield nuclear strikes could still discourage any conventional
retaliation for a terrorist attack, particularly because India does not have
proportional response options for credible intra-war deterrence. Despite its commitment to
them potentially even a nuclear war. For the moment, however,

countervalue targeting, therefore, New Delhi might find that it cannot rely on its army to retaliate against
Pakistan (and thus to deter Islamabad from supporting proxies) without major changes to its own nuclear
doctrine and force structure.

No conflict new governments, building relations

Soherwordi December 15 Prof at University of Peshawar
[Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, University of Peshawar, Peshawar.
Reena Abbasi, University of Peshawar, Peshawar. Tabassum Javed,
University of Peshawar, Peshawar. Structuralism and the Indo-Pak Rivalry:

Responsible Politico Economic Factors and Policy Analysis, South Asian

Studies, Vol. 30, No.2, July December 2015, pp. 25 41]
Ever since the partition of Indian subcontinent in 1947, India and Pakistan have marched on the path of
mutual animosity. Both the countries are struggling to clear out their relation clouded by the debris of
partition. Not only are Indo-Pakistani relations tremendously explosive, intertwined as they are with
communal relations and internal power struggles in both countries. With their inherently linked foreign

both countries have used the Indo-Pak segregation to muster support of

their conjugal hard-liners against each other . The historic rivalry is further heightened by

the efforts of the ruling government of both the nations. They play an eminent role to ignite antagonistic
feelings against each other to suffice their agendas such as winning public support and to divert the
attention of the masses from real issues especially economic turbulences. Hence, they have been both the

With the advent of new

governments in Pakistan and India headed by Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Narinder
Moudi, it seems that Indo-Pakistan relations might turn a corner. Measures have
been taken to move towards a less antagonistic and more cooperative
equilibrium; aiming to extinguish the decades old conflagration of mistrust and
animosity. Both nations are interested in strengthening trade ties, exchange of
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, share gas and oil pipelines from Iran and Central Asia, and
follow the path of peace and conflict resolution. While this may not end the intractable rivalry
victims and the perpetrators of violence and extremism.

between India and Pakistan, its imperative for the stability and prosperity of both the regions that
opportunities for mutual cooperation be pursued further. Simultaneous conflict over territory, national
identity and power position in region, makes Indo-Pak rivalry an enduring one. (Paul, 2005). Therefore, it
might result in a yawning hiatus between rhetoric and reality.

Escalation Unlikely deterrence

Montgomery & Edelman 15 - Senior Fellow at the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Distinguished
Fellow at CSBA, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-inResidence at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies [Evan Braden Montgomery & Evan Braden
Montgomery, Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the
Competition for Escalation Dominance, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume
38, Issue 1-2, 2015, pages 159-182]

India and Pakistan are currently engaged in a competition for escalation

dominance. While New Delhi is preparing for a limited conventional campaign
against Pakistan, Islamabad is pursuing limited nuclear options to deter India.
Together, these trends could increase the likelihood of nuclear conflict. India , for
example, might conclude that it can launch an invasion without provoking a
nuclear reprisal, while Pakistan might believe that it can employ nuclear
weapons without triggering a nuclear exchange . Even if war can be avoided, these
trends could eventually compel India to develop its own limited nuclear options in an effort to enhance
deterrence and gain coercive leverage over Pakistan.

Despite persistent tensions, recurring crises, and one minor war, South Asia has
arguably been less volatile than many observers anticipated when India and Pakistan
became nuclear-armed powers. Consistent with the logic of the stability-instability

paradox, the possibility that a direct confrontation might lead to a nuclear

exchange has seemingly reduced incentives on both sides to initiate large-scale
conflicts or escalate small-scale clashes, even though a nuclear deterrent has also emboldened
Islamabad to support militant groups engaged in terrorism, subversion, and insurgency against New Delhi.
Nevertheless, two interrelated trends are undermining this fragile equilibrium: Indias efforts to extend its
conventional military advantage over Pakistan, and Pakistans growing reliance on nuclear weapons to
counter India.1

AT: Global Warming Impact

No catastrophic impacts from warmingadaptation
Kenny 12 [April 9, 2012, Charles, senior fellow at the Center for Global
Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, and author,
most recently, of Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and
How We Can Improve the World Even More., Not Too Hot to Handle,
But for all international diplomats appear desperate to affirm the self-worth of pessimists and doomsayers
worldwide, it is important to put climate change in a broader context. It is a vital
global issue -- one that threatens to slow the worldwide march toward improved quality of life. Climate
change is already responsible for more extreme weather and an accelerating rate of species extinction --

it is also a problem that

we know how to tackle, and one to which we have some time to respond
before it is likely to completely derail progress. And that's good news, because the fact
and may ultimately kill off as many as 40 percent of all living species. But

that it's manageable is the best reason to try to tackle it rather than abandon all hope like a steerage class
passenger in the bowels of the Titanic.
Start with the economy. The Stern Review, led by the distinguished British economist Nicholas Stern, is the

in terms of
income, greenhouse gasses are a threat to global growth, but hardly an
immediate or catastrophic one. Take the impact of climate change on the developing world.
most comprehensive look to date at the economics of climate change. It suggests that,

The most depressing forecast in terms of developing country growth in Stern's paper is the "AT: scenario" -one of a series of economic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts created for the U.N.'s
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It's a model that predicts slow global growth and

even under this model,

Afghanistan's GDP per capita climbs sixfold over the next 90 years, India and
China ninefold, and Ethiopia's income increases by a factor of 10. Knock off a third
income convergence (poor countries catching up to rich countries). But

for the most pessimistic simulation of the economic impact of climate change suggested by the Stern
report, and people in those countries are still markedly
for Afghanistan, a little more than six times as rich for Ethiopia.

better off -- four times as rich

the Stern report suggests that the costs of dramatically

reducing greenhouse-gas emissions is closer to 1 (or maybe 2) percent of world
GDP -- in the region of $600 billion to $1.2 trillion today. The economic case for responding to climate
It's worth emphasizing that

change by pricing carbon and investing in alternate energy sources is a slam dunk. But for all the likelihood
that the world will be a poorer, denuded place than it would be if we responded rapidly to reduce

the global economy is probably not going to collapse over the

next century even if we are idiotic enough to delay our response to climate change by a
few years. For all the flooding, the drought, and the skyrocketing bills for air conditioning, the
economy would keep on expanding, according to the data that Stern uses.
greenhouse gases,

And what about the impact on global health? Suggestions that malaria has already spread as a result of
climate change and that malaria deaths will expand dramatically as a result of warming in the future don't
fit the evidence of declining deaths and reduced malarial spread over the last century. The authors of a
recent study published in the journal Nature conclude that the forecasted future effects of rising
temperatures on malaria "are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the changes observed since
about 1900 and about two orders of magnitude smaller than those that can be achieved by the effective

scale-up of key control measures." In other words, climate change is and will likely remain a small factor in
the toll of malaria deaths into the foreseeable future.

Zimmermann at the University of Connecticut and Douglas

Gollin at Williams evaluate the likely impact of a 3-degree rise in temperatures
on tropical diseases like dengue fever, which causes half a million cases of hemorrhagic fever and
What about other diseases? Christian

22,000 deaths each year. Most of the vectors for such diseases -- mosquitoes, biting flies, and so on -- do
poorly in frost. So if the weather stays warmer, these diseases are likely to spread. At the same time,

there are existing tools to prevent or treat most tropical diseases, and Zimmerman
and Gollin suggest "rather modest improvements in protection efficacy could
compensate for the consequences of climate change." We can deal with this one.
It's the same with agriculture.

Global warming will have many negative (and a few positive)

other impacts -- both positive, including

technological change, and negative, like the exhaustion of aquifers-- will have far bigger
effects. The 2001 IPCC report suggested that climate change over the long term could reduce
impacts on food supply, but it is likely that

agricultural yields by as much as 30 percent. Compare that with the 90 percent increase in rice yields in
Indonesia between 1970 and 2006, for example.

while climate change will make extreme weather events and natural
disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect on global
quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow. That's because, as
Matthew Kahn from Tufts University has shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster
is in a rich country. The more money that people and governments have, the more they can both

afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like flood defenses that
lower death tolls.

with climate change will take immediate and radical retooling of the global economy. It won't. It is
affordable, practical, and wouldn't take a revolution. Giving out the message that the
Let's also not forget how human psychology works. Too many environmentalists suggest that

only path to sustainability will require medieval standards of living only puts everyone else off. And once
you've convinced yourself the world is on an inevitable course to disaster if some corner of the U.S.
Midwest is fracked once more or India builds another three coal-fueled power plants, the only logical thing
to do when the fracking or the building occurs is to sit back, put your Toms shoes on the couch, and drink
micro-brewed herbal tea until civilization collapses. Climate change isn't like that -- or at the very least,
isn't like that yet.

if you're really just looking for a reason to strap on the "end of the world is
nigh" placards and go for a walk, you can find better excuses -- like, say, the
threat of global thermonuclear war or a rogue asteroid. The fight to curb
greenhouse gas emissions is one for the hard-nosed optimist.

AT: Economy Impact

Economic decline doesnt cause warnational self interest
Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and
School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December
2011, Force in Our Times, Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest
were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the
community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a

a worsening of the current economic difficulties,

could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back oldfashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is
hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the
members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that
economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed states
steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be

that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars.

Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and
economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on
a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that
their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that
problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be

While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as
outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my
view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn
without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad
times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war
solved by war?

AT: Terrorism Impact

Major terror attacks unlikelytheir impact is political
Walt 13

- Professor of international relations @ Harvard University [Stephen M. Walt, The

Embarrassing Debate Over the 'War on Terror' Foreign Policy, DECEMBER 4, 2013, pg.
I raise this question because our leaders don't seem to be able to get their stories straight on this one. A

the "war on terror" is mostly won -- in the sense that we've

defanged the most dangerous anti-American types -- and that what's left are
various copycats in various places that ultimately don't matter that much to the United
States and are best dealt with by local authorities. If this view is correct, then President
Barack Obama was right to suggest that the "war on terror" is over and to try to
shift our attention back to other foreign-policy priorities. To say that is not to say the
danger is zero -- indeed, there will be terrorist attacks in the future - it is just to say that it is more of
a tragic nuisance than a Major Threat.
good case can be made that


we're being told by Sen. Dianne Feinstein and Rep. Mike Rogers, the heads of the
Senate and House Intelligence committees, that the terrorist threat is back and worse than

it was a few years ago. In particular, they point to the growing jihadi role in places like Syria and to selfcongratulatory statements from al Qaeda leaders like Ayman al-Zawahiri. The implication, as this New York
Times story makes clear, is that the United States needs to get more directly involved in defeating this
ever-expanding set of terrorist copycats.
I understand that terrorist groups like al Qaeda do operate in secret (to the extent that they can), and that

riskaverse politicians prefer to err on the side of caution . If you issue lots of scary warnings
gauging the actual level of the threat they pose is not an exact science. And I recognize that

and nothing happens, you can take credit for having been prudent. But if you tell people the danger isn't
that great and then an attack takes place, you sound nave, credulous, and insufficiently devoted to
national security. So when in doubt, politicians are inclined to oversell the danger.
Still, it really is important to get this right: Just how serious is the threat, some 12 years after the 9/11

In terms of the direct harm to Americans in the United States, the danger
appears to be quite modest. So why are Feinstein and Rogers so animated by this latest set of

developments? And doesn't Boston's defiant and resolute reaction to the city's marathon bombing in April
suggest that the American population isn't nearly as querulous as politicians fear: If you explain to them
that there is no such thing as 100 percent security, they don't go all wobbly. Instead, they display precisely
the sort of calm resolution that causes terrorist campaigns to fail.
It is even more important to figure out how best to respond. If Islamic extremists using terrorist methods
are trying to gain power in various countries, does it make sense for the United States to insert itself in
these conflicts and inevitably invite their attention? Or is the country better off remaining aloof or just
backing local authorities (if it can find any who seem reasonably competent)?

My larger concern is that we have also created a vast counterterrorism industry

that has a vested interest in continuing this campaign . Those in the industry
are the most prominent and visible experts, but fighting terrorists is also a
meal ticket for many of them and self-interest might naturally incline them to
hype the threat. The danger is that the United States will devote too much effort
and energy to chasing relatively weak and obscure bad guys in various not-very-

Afghanistan, Pakistan's frontier provinces, Somalia, etc., etc.,)

while other problems get short shrift.
important places (see under:

AT: Democracy Impact

Democracy doesnt solve warother factors outweigh
Taner 2 (Binner, PhD Candidate Syracuse U., Alternatives: Turkish Journal of
Intl Relations, 1(3), p. 43-44,
The discussion above suggests that the most important drawback of the
democratic peace theory is the essentialization of the political regime as
the only factor contributing to international peace and war. The democratic
peace theory underemphasizes, and most often neglects, the importance of
other domestic factors such as political culture ,35 degree of development,
socio-economic and military considerations ,36 the role of interest-groups and
other domestic constituencies,37 strategic culture38 among others in
decision-making. In other words, it is easily the case that the democratic
peace theory lacks sensitivity to context and decisionmaking process.
Although one should not dispute the fact that domestic political
structure/regime type is an important component of any analysis of war and
peace, this should be seen as only one of domestic variables, not necessarily
the variable. Devoid of an analysis that gives respect to a number of other
factors, superficial and sweeping generalizations will leave many details in
decision-making unaccounted for. Consequently, although democratic
peace theory should not be discarded entirely, current emphasis on the
importance of democracy in eliminating bloody conflicts in the world should
not blind scholars and policy circles alike to the fact that democratic peace
is theoretically and empirically overdetermined.