You are on page 1of 6


Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land. On his death the property was
inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of his late brothers,
Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos. The heirs signed a document entitled, "Extrajudicial
Partition and Deed of Sale." Thereafter, another group of heirs also sold to the spouses Calaliman
their shares, rights, interest and participation in the same parcel of land. The petitioner heirs
Francisco, Paz and Maria filed against the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo for
legal redemption of the portion of the parcel of land inherited by the heirs from the late
Gelacio Garcia, which portion was sold by their co-heirs to the defendants. The defendants
alleged that due notices in writing have been sent to plaintiff Francisco Garcia in which plaintiff
was informed of his co-owners signified intention to sell their shares, and likewise, the other
plaintiffs Paz and Maria were personally notified,hence, they are now barred to claim legal
redemption of the land. Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Art. 1088 for
petitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption had already elapsed and that the
requirement of Art. 1088 that notice must be in writing is deemed satisfied because written
notice would be superfluous, the purpose of the law having been fully served when petitioner
went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and was for himself, read and understood the
contents of the Deeds of Sale.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners took all necessary steps to effectuate their exercise of the right
of legal redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088 of the Civil Code.
No notification in writing was received by petitioners about the sale of the hereditary interest of
some of the co-heirs, although in a letter petitioner Francisco wrote one of his co-heirs, Joaquin
Garcia, uncle of the petitioners, proposing to buy the hereditary interest of his co-heirs in their
unpartitioned inheritance, however he was not answered.
Petitioners came to know that their co-heirs were selling the property when one of the heirs,
Juantio Bertomo, asked petitioner Paz to sign a document. The document is the one entitled
Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale wherein the name of Paz, Maria and Amado were
Petitioners have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the
sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale as sufficient notice of sale
under the provision of Sec. 51 of Act No. 496 applies only to registered lands and has no
application whatsoever to a case where the property involved is unregistered land. If the
intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or nay other means of information as
sufficient to give the effect of this notice, there would have been no necessity or reasons to
specify in Art. 1088 that the said notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice
or information was sufficient. In the interpretation of a related provision (Art. 1623), written
notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the
redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice to remove all
uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is
not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative method of notifications remains

exclusive, though the Code does not prescribed any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption.

Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a parcel of land. The decedent mortgaged the
land to Rural Bank to secure payment of a loan. Francisco died without paying the debt. His
intestate heirs were his wife Antonia and children. The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but
before the redemption period expired, the children executed a deed of assignment of the right of
redemption in favor of Amparo. Amparo later on sold the entire property to defendant Leonardo
Mariano. It appears in the Deed of Sale that Amparo, Antonia, Carlos and Severino were
signatories thereto. Grace Gosiengfao learned of the sale by the defendants. She went to the
Barangay Captain and asked for a confrontation with the spouses Mariano to present her claim to
the property, however, no settlement have been reached. Plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery
of possession and legal redemption with damages against defendants spouses Mariano. They
alleged that as co-heirs and co-owners of the lot, they have the right to recover their respective
shares and the right of redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners sold to the
defendants. Defendants alleged that the plaintiffs has no cause of action against them as the
money used to redeem the lot was solely from the personal funds of defendant Amparo
Gosiengfao-Ibarra who validly sold the entire property to the defendants. They further alleged
that even granting that the plaintiffs are co-owners with the third-party defendants, their right of
redemption had already been barred by the Statute of Limitations, if not by laches.
Issue: Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds
becomes the sole owner of said property and terminated the existing state of co-ownership.
A co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds does not become the
sole owner of said property. Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the
decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the
foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole
ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will
not end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a coownership. Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written
notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
There is no written notice given to respondents. Although petitioners alleged that respondent
Grace Gosiengfao was given a copy of the deed of sale and shown a copy of the document at the
Office of the Barangay Captain, this was not supported by evidence. Petitioners adopted in their
argument respondents allegation in their complaint that they sought the redemption of the
property from spouses Mariano by tendering the repurchase money which the spouses rejected.
Private respondents exercised their right of redemption by tendering the repurchase price to
petitioners. The complaint they filed was necessary to assert their rights.

Emilio, now deceased, and Clarita were husband and wife with three children. Among the
properties left by Emilio is an undivided 1/3 portion of a parcel of land. Consolacion owns the 2/3.
The Hermoso Brothers offered to sell their respective shares to the land in dispute to Ben. This
transaction did not materialize for the reasons that Clarita subsequently offered to redeem the
shares sold by her children by returning the amount already received by her son. Ben accepted
the offer without suspiration. For the second time, the brothers offered to sell the property giving
assurance that Clarita had already consented to the transaction. The parties executed a "Deed of
Absolute Sale." The Hermoso brothers have not fulfilled the last condition the transfer of title.
Clarita and the sister of the brothers allegedly came to have known of the transaction.
Thereafter, they made arrangements to negotiate for the redemption of the shares sold by the
brothers. However, Ben declined for the value of the property in dispute had considerably
increased. Furthermore, they relied upon the assurances made by the Hermoso brothers that the
transaction is known to them.
Issue: Whether or not the property is still co-owned or has actually been partitioned theredby
terminating the co-ownership; Whether or not the plaintiffs-appellees could still exercise the
rights of redemption
The interpretation on the exercise of the right of legal redemption always tilts in favor of the
redemptioner and against the vendee. The purpose is to keep strangers to the family out of a
joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other
heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold. While there should no
question that an heir may dispose his right before partition, a co-heir would have had to pay only
the price for which the vendee acquired it.
In this case, the land has not been validly partitioned between Consolacion, who owns 2/3, and
the heirs of Emilio, who owns 1/3 regardless of the sentiments of Consolacion on the land in
dispute may later have been. There has been no subsequent distribution among the co-heirs of
their specific shares. But even granting that the heirs divided the properties owned in common,
the right of legal redemption would still subsist in their capacity as co-owners. For, if a co-owner
has offered to redeem the land within the period fixed by law, he has complied with the law. He
may bring the action to enforce the redemption after every offer has been rejected. It was error
for the CA to rule that the right of the petitioner to redeem the alienated share had long
prescribed. This finding fails to take into account that the period of legal redemption is not a
prescriptive period. It is a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of redemption. It is a
period set by law to restrict the right of the person exercising the right of legal redemption. It is
not one of prescription.
The petitioner-heirs, as winning parties, filed a motion for the execution of the decision in the
Mariano case. The clerk of court issued a writ of execution and a notice to vacate. The
respondent-buyers moved for reconsideration of the May 11, 1994 order arguing that the
dispositive portion of the decision to be executed merely declared and recognized the petitioner-

heirs as co-owners of the lot and did not authorize the sheriff to remove their houses from the
Petitioner-heirs filed a notice of redemption for the shares of Amparo, Antonia, Carlos and
Severino and tendered the redemption price. The sheriff issued a certificate of redemption after
the first and second buyers refused to sign the notice and accept the tender and after the
aggrieved heirs deposited the redemption money with the court.
The respondent buyers filed a motion to declare the petitioner-heirs to have lost their right of
legal redemption.
Issue: Whether or not the final and executor Decsion of the Supremee Court constitutes written
notice to plaintiffs-appellants.
Pursuant to the Mariano Decision and based on the subsequent pleaded developments that the
petitioner-heirs have effectively exercised their right of redemption and are now the owners of
the redeemed property. Under the Mariano case, a written notice must be served by the vendor.
Petitioner-heirs have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of
the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run. The computation of the
30-day period to exercise the legal right of redemption did not start to run from the finality of the
Mariano Decision, and that the petitioner-heirs seasonably filed, via a writ of execution, their
notice of redemption, although they applied for the issuance of the writ some 8 months after the
finality of the Decision.
Samson prays for the rescission of the agreement of partition of the property of his father Roque
upon the grounds that it is not in accordance with the will of his father. As a result of said
agreement of partition the share he is entitled to receive under his father's will has been reduced
by more than one-fourth. He also prays that Araneta be ordered to prepare and present
immediately a complete inventory of all the property, real and personal, of his deceased father,
nd that she be ordered to prepare and present another project of partition of said property in
which an equitable division of the same shall be made between the parties. Araneta contends
that the action has prescribed and that said agreement has been approved by a final order of the
lower court. Roque died and his widow presented his will for probate.
It has been held that in case of a judicial partition, the four-year period begins to run not from
the time of the project of partition but from the time there is court approval, for had it been
disapproved by the court, it would have been void. The agreement of partition was approved by
the court on Aug. 31, 1928. The four years should commence to run from that date. This case
was filed on Aug. 23, 1932.
DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO vs. CA Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in
the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that said four years prescriptive period expired on
November 9,1957. Hence, the present action filed on September 8, 1960 and which has for one

of its objects the rescission of the agreement of partition among the petitioners, as approved by
the intestate court, is already barred by prescription. That an action for rescission is also the
proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith
or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case alleges in
substance, is indicated in Art. 1104. The four years period It has also been ruled by this Court
that the four years period. Thus, in the case at bar, it is evident that the action to rescind the
Agreement of Partition which was approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had already
prescribed when respondent filed the complaint in the case at bar on September 8, 1960. While
as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the coownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, petitioners herein had never recognized
respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on nonprescription of action for partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar
Respondents set up the defense of ownership and questioned the title of AZNAR to the lot,
alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its
title is null and void for being fraudulently made. Respondents claim that not all the known heirs
of Maloloy-on participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated
were not heirs of Crisanta.
This claim, even if true, would not warrant rescission of the deed. Under Art. 1104, a partition
made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved
that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the latter shall be
proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him." In the
present case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the two parties to
the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Art. 1105 is in point; it provides: "A partition which
includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person." In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void in its
entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them. The Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of
Absolute Sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity,
and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.


Teodoro died intestate. Respondents Maxima, the surviving spouse of the deceased, and
Severino, representing himself as "the only forced heir and descendant" of the deceased,
executed an "extra-judicial agreement of partition" adjudicating between themselves the
properties of the deceased. Petitioners, the Landayans, filed a complaint seeking a judicial
declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased and that the extra-judicial agreement is null
and void. Petitioners alleged that they are the legitimate children of the deceased's only child
while respondent Severino is the illegitimate child of their petitioners' mother. Respondents
denied petitioner's allegation claiming that Severino is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased and that petitioners' mother is the spurious child of the deceased. Respondents also

alleged that petitioners' cause of action had prescribed 18 years having already elapsed from the
time of execution of the document of partition to the time of filing of the complaint
Should it be proved that Severino is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro, the portion of the deed
of extra-judicial partition adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro in his favor shall be deemed
inexistent and void from the beginning in accordance with Arts. 1409, par. (7) and 1105. By the
express provision of Art. 1410, the action to seek a declaration of the nullity of the same does not