European Security Review

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Number 20

December 2003

The Defence Deal in the IGC
The Defence Deal in the IGC The European armaments agency: a virtual reality Developing civilian crisis management capabilities

Operation Atlantia: A ficitonal test for Berlin Plus Iran: a test case in EU non-proliferation policy

The Italian EU Presidency submitted a revised proposal on the future of European defence to the Naples conclave on 29 November.1 This new draft prepared the ground for a deal, resolving several contentious issues by the big three -- Germany, France and the UK. While the other member states and accession countries agree with the compromise text regarding the creation of a ‘double-hatted’ Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and permanent structured co-operation on defence, the proposal for a mutual defence clause has met with stiff resistance from the neutral countries and a compromise text is still being negotiated. Agreement has, however, been reached on other issues that do not require Treaty change, such as the development of EU operational planning.

EU Foreign Minister
The position of a foreign minister was proposed by the Convention to promote coherence in EU foreign policy and provide an institutional bridge between the supranational European Commission and the inter-governmental Council. The Convention proposed that the position of EU Foreign Minister should merge the position of Commissioner for External Relations (1 st pillar) with the functions of the Council’s High Representative of CFSP (2 nd pillar).2 This was met with widespread agreement in principle but there was disagreement over institutional details. For instance, Britain and France wanted this minister to be more accountable to member states and less to the Commission and this has been reflected in a number of changes introduced to the text since October. At the Luxemburg and Brussels IGC meetings held in mid October the principle that the Foreign Minister’s CFSP responsibilities 'cannot be subject to the same obligation of independence as the other members of the Commission' was established. The Naples conclave 4 subsequently agreed that Article 25 on the European Commission would be amended to mention the exception that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is mandated by the Council in the area of CFSP. A further qualification was added to clarify that in the event that the European Parliament exercised a vote of censure, the Minister of Foreign Affairs would resign his duties regarding the exercise of the Commission’s external relations (only). Similarly, Article 26 was amended to make it explicit that unlike other Commissioners, the Foreign Minister would require the consent of the Council to resign, if asked to do so by the President of the Commission. The powers of the Foreign Minister have also been clarified. Article 27 on the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs now states that the Foreign Minister will chair the General Affairs and External Relations Council5 and that he/she will be tasked with

EU/member states pledge 5 Billion to tackle WMD proliferation

The revised European security strategy

ISIS Europe Rue Archim è de 5 1000 Brussels Belgium Tel: +32 2 230 7446 Fax: +32 2 230 6113 Website: www.isis-europe.org Email: info@isis -europe.org

ESR is edited by Catriona Gourlay

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ensuring coherence between CFSP and the external actions of the Commission (rather than simply ensuring coherence between the different aspects of Community external relations). Article III-197(3) confirms the intention that the Foreign Minister be assisted by a new European External Action Service, working in co-operation with the diplomatic services of the Member States. The decision on the organisation of the Service and how it relates to the Union's delegations has, however, been left to a later decision of the European Council and Commission (with the European Parliament offered the opportunity to offer its opinion).

Structured co-operation

The issue of structured co -operation proved to be one of the most contentious defence issues in the IGC. The Convention text proclaimed, ‘those member states whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another … shall establish structured cooperation within the Union framework.’( Article 40). Subsequent discussions revealed fears on the part of a number of member states that such co-operation would be exclusive, leading to a sub-group of member states forging ahead with defence integration, inevitably conducting exclusive missions in the name of the EU. Recommendations introduced to the Naples conclave by the Italian Presidency sought to make structured co -operation more inclusive and more closely aligned with the general provisions governing ESDP. To this end, a number of amendments to the Article governing the implementation of ESDP (Article III-213) were introduced that established more open mechanisms for joining or leaving permanent structures. Moreover, it was clarified that decisions to launch EU operations would be taken unanimously in accordance with the established provisions for ‘enhanced’ co-operation (articles III 325 and III 326) by all 25 member states. An additional Protocol will be attached to the Treaty to clarify the objectives of structured co -operation and outline under which conditions states will be able to engage in such co-operation. Both the criteria and objectives of membership are ‘capabilities driven’ where the participating states are required ‘to engage more intensively in the development of defence capabilities, including through the development of their national contributions and, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the European Military Capabilities Agency.’ Moreover, participating states ‘must have the capacity to provide by 2007 at the latest, either at the national level or as an essential part of multinational force packages, targeted combat units for the mission as planned, structured at a tactical level as combat formations, with support elements including transport and logistic, capable of carrying out the [Petersberg tasks] within a period of 5-30 days, particularly in response to requests from the United Nations, to be sustained for an initial period of 30 days with possible extensions to at least 120 days ’. Five objectives of structured co -operation are specified. They include: co -operation on objectives concerning the level of investments expenditure on defence equipment; bringing defence apparatus into line (by increased harmonization of military needs, pooling, specializing and co-operation in the field of logistics); undertaking concrete measures to enhance availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces; addressing capability shortfalls through the capability Development Mechanism; and developing, where appropriate, major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Capabilities Agency.

Mutual Defence Clause
The final Convention text contained a solidarity clause stating that member states would come to each other’s assistance in the event that a member state suffers a terrorist attack. It did not, however, go so far as to bring into the framework of the EU any Article 5 type collective defence commitments, previously agreed on by some member states in the context of an amended Brussels Treaty establishing the Western European Union (WEU). This issue has, however, been revisited in the IGC and at the Naples conclave; Britain, France and Germany agreed to the Italian proposal to incorporate Article 5 style language into Article 40 of the Treaty. The proposed mutual defence clause states that ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be

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with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those states which are member of it, remain the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’. This language accommodates the concerns of states such as the UK and Poland who wanted to enshrine complementarity with NATO, but met with strong resistance from the four neutral member states, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland. Such an Article would clearly compromise their neutrality and in many cases would undermine national public support for the Treaty. These states have demanded that the Article should constitute a voluntary commitment only. The compromise text proposed by the Presidency takes the position of the neutral countries into account in so far as it adds the clause that 'this does not affect the specific character of the defence and security policy of certain member states'. At the time of publication, Austria and Sweden had agreed to this formulation, but it was still not certain that this compromise would be accepted by Ireland and Finland at the Summit.

Operational military planning
Although the issue of the development of EU operational military planning structures is not addressed in the IGC, it has been one of the most contested transatlantic issues linked to debates on the future of Europe’s defence structures (see previous issue of the European Security Review). At the Naples conclave, a compromise agreement was reached by the 'big three'. While there is no publicly available text associated with the agreement, it was reported that the deal consisted of an agreement to establish a permanent EU planning cell within NATO’s operational headquarters, SHAPE. This cell would consist of staff seconded from EU member states and would be responsible for operational planning in the case of any EU-led operation using NATO assets. In the case of autonomous operations, not using NATO assets, operational planning would take place in national headquarters, or, as a 'last resort', at the EU headquarters in Brussels. Member states agreed that some officials (aproximately 30) from member states would be attached to the EU Council Secretariat in the Council’s Cortenberg building in Brussels so that it could run a military operation in this event. The deal has not been openly criticized by the US, although it continues to assert the primacy of the Berlin Plus framework agreement between the EU and NATO, which covers the SHAPE and national headquarters operational planning options only. All for nought? Despite the fact that EU member states are close to agreement on most of the defence issues in the IGC, the chances of the IGC being concluded by the summit on the 12th and 13 th of December remain slim given that there is still no agreement on crucial issues such the voting system within the Council. The WEU Assembly has already seized upon the prospect of IGC failure, proposing that the defence provisions be pursued outside the Union framework in the context of the WEU and on the legal basis of the amended Treaty of Brussels.6 This is, however, unlikely and all hopes are still pinned on the prospects of a last minute deal being reached. Catriona Gourlay and Joshua Kleymeyer

1. 2.

3. 4.

5.

See 'The Convention: Conclusions without closure'. by Catriona Gourlay , European Security Review, Number 17, May 2003. COREPER document CIG 52/03, Brussels, 25 November 2003 ‘IGC 2003 – Naples Ministerial Conclave: Presidency Proposal http://www.euitaly2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/D3AF1BA8-3F8C-40AA-A8DDDBEC7C8C0251/0/ConclaveDoc52Add1.pdf . COREPER document CIG 2/03, Brussels, 2 October 2003 ‘IGC 2003 – The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs: Main Points http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg00002.en03.pdf . COREPER document CIG 57/03, Brussels, 2 December 2003 ‘IGC 2003 – Defence’ http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg00057.en03.pdf Bulletin Quotidien Europe – 9/12/2003 . COREPER document CIG 60/03 ADD 1, Brussels, 9 December 2003 http://www.ueitalia2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/B6D8B2AC-707C-4FC8-AA3412FD3C396EC8/0/1209Cig60Add1_en.pdf .

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6. Conclusions of the WEU Assembly [IV.1(b)90] http://www.assemblyweu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1841.html.

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The European Armaments Agency: A Virtual Reality
At the November 17 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in Brussels, agreement was reached on the principle to establish, under the authority of the Council, an intergovernmental Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments1 in the course of 2004. This decision helps maintain the momentum towards the creation of a European Armaments/Defence Capabilities Agency and provides a framework for further elaboration of the organisation of the Agency. However, it falls short of Italian Presidency ambitions to reach agreement on a Joint Action establishing the agency. An interim ‘Establishment Team’ has now been tasked with addressing the outstanding technical issues, and member states aim to agree a Joint Action to create the agency during the forthcoming Irish Presidency.

An ongoing process
The present Agency discussions follow up on the Thessaloniki European Council conclusions, which tasked the current Presidency with establishing an agency to: 1) develop defence capabilities in the field of crisis -management; 2) promote and enhance European armaments co -operation; 3) strengthen the European industrial and technological base; 4) create a competitive European defence equipment market as well as promoting, in liaison with the Community’s research activities where appropriate, research aimed at leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities. An Informal Advisory Group, composed of representatives of national Defence Ministries, was set up to take this work forward, and has subsequently been replaced, by a COREPER decision dated September 4 th , by an Ad Hoc Preparatory Group.2 On October 28, after five meetings, this Group submitted its final activities report to COREPER. The report included guidelines on the role and the function of the Agency, but legal, institutional and financial aspects were put to one side. The Council Working Group, Relex (Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors) was then tasked by COREPER to examine technical issues concerning the composition of the agency’s Steering Board, the legal status of the Agency and the modalities by which it would report to COREPER, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Military Committee (EUMC). Agreement on key issues examined by the preparatory group remained elusive, however, leading to the 17 November GAERC agreement to continue negotiations and set up the ‘Establishment Team’ in January to address outstanding technical (legal and financial) details. The Team would be composed of 12-15 experts from member states, the Council Secretariat and the Commission and is expected to submit its recommendations for a Joint Action establishing the Agency to COREPER in the spring of 2004.

The Agency's role
The mandate The November 17 GAERC conclusions refer to an Agency that shall be responsible for the development of European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and for the promotion of European armaments co -operation. To achieve these objectives, the Agency should be tasked with: identifying future defence capability requirements, both in quantitative and qualitative terms (forces, equipments, interoperability and training); continuing to work with NATO through the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM); encouraging member states to meet their capability commitments in the ECAP process; promoting the harmonisation of military requirements; pursuing collaborative activities to make up shortfalls, and defining financial priorities for capability development and acquisition. The Agency will also identify multilateral solutions for present and future requirements of ESDP capabilities, and will promote cost-effective and efficient procurement

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requirements of ESDP capabilities, and will promote cost-effective and efficient procurement through co -operation programmes to be managed by the WEAG/WEAO (Western European Armament Group/Western European Armament Organisation) and/or OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement) or by the Agency on the basis of their experience and the Letter of Intent (Framework Agreement) process. A phased and progressive approach The creation and development of the Agency will be an incremental process according to a timetable yet to be defined, whereby it will progressively manage core functions identified in the present framework until it reaches full operationality. Once established in 2004, the Agency will act as co-ordinating focus for the existing network of bodies and agreements with relevant competencies. It will work closely with the EU Military Committee (EUMC) that is responsible for the management of the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), as well as with the member states’ representatives in the Headline Task Force (HTF) that work on the ECAP process. It will also prepare the legal and operational framework for the management of collaborative projects through OCCAR, and the adoption, where necessary, of the Letter of Intent (Framework Agreement) procedures and WEAG/WEAO working principles and practices. Once the Agency reaches its full operational potential, it should have incorporated working practices and methods from all these existing arrangements and organisations (OCCAR, LoI Framework Agreement, WEAG/WEAO), although it may still subcontract aspects of procurement management to external bodies such as OCCAR. Organisational structure The Agency shall have the legal personality to carry out its functions under the authority of the Council. A Steering Board, composed of representatives of participating EU member states ‘authorised to commit their government’ 3 and a representative of the Commission, will be responsible for formulating the Agency’s policies and budget.4 The PSC will receive reports and provide guidelines on matters relating to CFSP and ESDP. The Steering Board will be chaired by the Head of the Agency, which points to the present SG/HR, Javier Solana. He/she will be assisted by a Chief Executive and supported by a permanent international staff mainly selected from member states. There will also be a small number of seconded Community officials who will be responsible for specific projects over a fixed period.

Outstanding issues
In addition to legal and financial details to be addressed by the Establishment Team and the final outcome of IGC in relation to the role of the EU Foreign Minister and the future of ‘defence ’ in the common market,5 key organisational issues remain unresolved. With regard to the composition of the Steering Board, traditional tensions at the national level between Foreign and Defence Ministers were once more exposed, with internal resistance in some countries to the proposal that member states should be represented by their Defence Ministers. Moreover the modalities of decision-making within the Agency’s Steering Board (unanimity or qualified majority voting) have yet to be decided and the relationship between the Agency and existing Council bodies remains unclear. For example, the Military Committee is currently responsible for the elaboration, assessment and the review of capability objectives, and its future relationship with the Agency's role in this area requires further negotiation. Similarly, it is not clear to what extent the Commission’s developing role in defence R&D6 will relate to the Agency’s role in generating member state defence capabilities. Fundamental to the on-going debate is the fact that France and Britain hold diverging visions on the Agency’s core competencies. Britain wants to maintain a focus upon capabilities development and therefore stresses the central role of Defence Ministers in the agency’s decision-making process. France prefers that the Agency focus on all four functions included in the Thessaloniki mandate and insists that the final decision on the creation of the Agency should only be taken after all technical and legal implications have been explored. Moreover, France stresses that the multi-functional nature of the Agency should be taken into account in the composition of the Steering Board. Unlike Britain, France would like to ensure that the views of other ministries were represented where this is relevant, namely in debating industrial or research questions. Germany has supported the French position although it stressed the key importance of bringing member states’ Defence Ministers and National Armaments Directors into the institutional framework of the Union. The uncertainty over the exact title for the agency reflects this ongoing debate on the

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The uncertainty over the exact title for the agency reflects this ongoing debate on the functional priorities of the agency.

Moving beyond virtual reality
The November 17 announcement to establish an agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments in the course of 2004 has created an Agency framework but not yet an Agency, as key issues have not been resolved. The creation of an Establishment Team, a timeline that consciously enables key decisions in the IGC to be built-in, and the avoidance of key discussions about the end-state of the Agency in relation to the existing bodies such as OCCAR, WEAG/WEAO and the LoI process, represent the framework within which the Agency will develop rather than a meaningful final decision. Over the coming months member states will need to reconcile their different visions about how the agency will relate to other existing organisations and how it will be managed. Moreover, member states also need to address the issue of how the Agency will link with the work of the ECAP Project Groups and follow-up the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal II’ process, reflecting the capability needs of the expanded Petersberg Tasks, and to be agreed by June 2004. Sustained political will is required if the Agency is to be equipped with a mandate and structure that will enable it to generate ‘real’ solutions to short-term capability shortfalls and generate capabilities suitable for longer term requirements. Daniela Manca and Gerrard Quille

1.

2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

As yet no agreement has been reached on a name for the agency. The names mentioned here are commonly used and are based on the original Franco-German proposal for an Armaments Agency and the UK preference for a Defence Capabilities Agency. This group met within the Council structures and was composed of senior representatives of the Ministries of Defence of the member states and was chaired by the Italian Ltn Gen. Gianni Botondi. The question is particularly sensitive, especially for France who seeks to give the Steering Board a multi-ministerial character. See below for more details. The budget has represented another sticking point during negotiations. The original Ad Hoc group proposal to provide the Agency with its own budget made up of national contributions whilst member states would bear operational costs has been rejected. The GAERC conclusions revert the issue to the establishment phase. It is envisaged that the Joint Action establishing the Agency will be revised where necessary according to the final outcome of the IGC. The commission is opening Community research and development funding to the defence sector for the first time with a Preparatory Action with a budget of 65 million Euros over three years. A ‘group of personalities’ has been appointed and will meet twice and report in the spring of 2004 to advise on priority projects. See MEMO/03/192, Brussels, 7 October 2003.

Developing Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities
There is widespread acknowledgment from within the EU institutions and member states that the EU needs to strengthen its civilian crisis management capabilities and this is reflected in the revised European Security Strategy, which states that ‘we need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations’. A number of initiatives are currently being undertaken to address capability shortfalls. This article reflects, in particular, on recent attempts to bolster planning and mission support and develop new procedures for training and recruitment for EU civilian operations.

Strengthening Planning and Mission Support

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The Council recognizes that EU planning and mission support for civilian operations are clearly inadequate and need reinforcement. The EU’s experience with its first ESDP mission, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia Herzegovina, first exposed capability shortfalls in all aspects of administrative and logistical planning. These are set to become more acute now that the Council has agreed that operation Concordia will be followed-up with the police training mission Proxima in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Council is also actively considering a further mission to establish an integrated police unit in Kinshasa (DRC) to be carried out concurrently, and other potential operations have also been proposed. Indeed, the short history of ESDP suggests that the EU will most frequently be called on to conduct civilian operations rather than high-end military ones. This civilian capabilities gap is not surprising, however, given the procedures and staff of the Council Secretariat have not yet been adapted to meet the needs of increasing pro active, planning and mission support functions. Whereas the Council Secretariat has been augmented with some 150 Military staff to enable strategic-level planning for military operations, there are only 15 staff working within the Council Secretariat that can take on new tasks with regard to civilian operations. Moreover, while military operations rely on national level or NATO headquarters for operational planning, EU staff working on civilian operations in Brussels are responsible for strategic and operational planning as well as mission support, and have no recourse to external planning entities. They deal with this by delegating much of the detailed planning of missions to the head of mission and an advance party. Moreover, some important elements of the planning and administration of civilian missions are shared with the Commission (which notably has responsibility for legal issues, budgetary management and procurement). To address this gap, in November 2002 the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) was tasked by the Council to take forward work ‘as soon as possible ’ on establishing an appropriate EU planning and mission support capability. This was to be based within the Council General Secretariat (CGS), and build on synergies with the Commission. In July 2003 the SG/HR’s presented concrete recommendations to strengthen the mission support within the CGS.1 The SG/HR identified shortages of personnel in all four priority areas in civilian crisis management (police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection) and horizontal mission support tasks, including operational back-up/communications, security and safety management, and information and best practices/lessons learned. To fill this gap, the SG/HR proposed that 27 new posts should be created within the CGS, with a balance between permanent officials and seconded experts. These proposals were followed up in mid October, when the Presidency responded to the SG/HR report with recommendations regarding staffing solutions to address the most urgent shortfalls in planning and mission support. Given that there are no provisions for employing additional personnel in the 2004 budget, the Presidency’s proposals were limited and argued for the creation of 18 new posts through the reallocation of existing resources within the CGS and the request that member states and the Commission second additional staff to the CGS. The Presidency’s proposals for an interim solution paid little heed to the Commission’s response to the Council’s initial report. These were presented to the Council in September. While the Commission shares the underlying objective of improving planning and mission support for civilian operations, it disagreed that these capabilities should be developed exclusively within the Council framework. The Commission argued that the SG/HR’s proposals would effectively duplicate existing capacities within the Commission. It highlighted its experience in managing electoral observation missions, the civil protection mechanism and providing personnel and support to UN, OSCE and operations of other partners in the fields of rule of law, civilian administration and police, and pointed to the vital support that could be provided by the Commission’s 129 delegations and offices across the world. It argued furthermore that strengthening the Commission’s mission support capabilities with regard ESDP operations would effectively strengthen cross-pillar integration in this area. Moreover, the Commission argued that this solution was also more consistent with current budgetary arrangements (under which the Commission remains responsible for the budgetary management of ESDP operations), stating that the operational support requirements are the same for EC funded election monitoring, border management and police operations as those to be conducted within the ESDP framework. Given the current institutional architecture, and the operational need to bring budgetary management and mission planning within the same structure, the Commission argues that a joint service would be the most effective solution.

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The contrasting views of the Council and Commission on how planning and mission support for civilian missions should be strengthened is based on the fact that both institutions claim competence in this area. The Commission has long been engaged in post-conflict institution building and has developed mechanisms to expedite the delivery of support for crisis management and post-conflict peace-building activities under the rapid reaction mechanism. It does not, however, have experience in planning and supporting large-scale crisis management operations, involving the deployment of EU personnel. The Council argues that in order to develop an integrated civil-military approach to crisis management, civilian operations must be managed from the Council, under the authority and control of member states and, where possible, with their direct involvement. The question of competence is further complicated by the fact that the term ‘civilian crisis management’ means different things to different people. The Commission notes that while EU civilian missions are a politically important tool, there are a whole range of tools for civilian crisis management, the bulk of which are organised under the first pillar. While the first ‘crisis management’ operation was launched in Bosnia, eight years after the Dayton accords, first pillar assistance has been used to support the political stabilisation of the country since the end of the conflict. Given the bureaucratic and structural obstacles to developing an integrated planning and support capability within the current institutional framework, both the SG/HR’s report and the Commission’s response to it are relatively open to new institutional solutions. The SG/HR cites one option as the creation of a flexible Mission Support Service, independent from the CGS but under the SG/HR’s operational direction, while the Commission proposes the establishment of an inter-institutional agency or service which would be compatible with the future institutional architecture, in particular the proposed Joint External Service and the EU Foreign Minister. Such an agency or service would provide a common platform for all EU civilian missions, irrespective of the funding source, and could be tasked by the Council or the Commission according to their respective mandates, and, in the future by the Foreign Minister. Unlike parallel discussions on proposals to develop military operational planning structures or an EU Armaments Agency, these proposals have received little to no press attention and there is no formal process for their development.

Co-ordinating recruitment and training
Improving the quality and deployability of civilian personnel is evidently crucial for the development of EU civilian crisis management capabilities. The de-centralised recruitment process is currently very slow and it has proved difficult to find suitable, qualified personnel for on-going civilian missions. Problematic features of the current system include the fact that recruitment, which is a responsibility of member states, is procedurally diverse and, in the absence of an efficient co -ordinating mechanism to help manage inputs from member states, this can lead to delays and shortfalls. Moreover, while some member states recruitment procedures include experts outside the civil service, many national systems are geared to internal recruitment of civil servants and therefore non-governmental experts are currently under-represented. More generally, the pool of potential personnel is still too limited given the generic problems associated with extracting civilian experts from their domestic duties and providing sufficient incentives for them to leave on foreign missions. This also applies to selecting individuals to attend training courses. More specifically with regard to training, it is widely agreed that civilian personnel should all have common core skills and training background to improve co -ordination between national experts in EU operations. While this may be necessary, it is hardly sufficient, and the EU also needs to encourage member states to recognise the relevance of alternative practical experiences and academic courses in their selection processes. Moroever, there is currently no link between training courses and deployment, and mechanisms need to be introduced to ensure that those trained are also willing and able to take part in EU operations. Some of these issues are being addressed within the context of current EU training initiatives. Two years ago the Commission launched an initiative on training for civilian aspects of crisis management in order to improve the preparation and readiness of civilian personnel. The initiative has now gone through its third phase. In its first phase, a network of EU-wide training bodies developed proposals for a common approaches and harmonised training programmes. In the second phase, these programmes started to be implemented by an informal “EU Group on Training”, composed of project partners from 12

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implemented by an informal “EU Group on Training”, composed of project partners from 12 member states. The second phase was evaluated at a conference in Rome 20-21 October 2003 and a broadly positive evaluation means that more resources will now be available for training courses. Other outcomes of the evaluation include the recognition that EU training should be better co -ordinated with that of the UN, OSCE and other international organisations and that it should also be more closely integrated with military training for EU operations. The Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy will launch the first training course in which both civilian and military representatives will participate. A follow-on meeting in Berlin has also been planned for February, at which the issue of more closely integrating civilian and military training will be explored further.

The second pillarisation of civilian crisis management?
The current trend appears to be in the direction of the ‘second pillarisation’ of civilian crisis management with the Council declaring its ambitions for greater control over the development of a co -ordinated EU Training Policy, encompassing both civilian and military dimensions of ESDP. Member States already have control over the recruitment process and the suggestion is that the Civilian Committee in the Council (CIVCOM) oversees both training and recruitment. While the Commission continues to hold the purse strings and fund common training activities, it appears to be loosing ground regarding the control of the preparation and support of as well as training and recruitment for civilian crisis management operations. This trend risks undermining the link between short-term crisis management operations and other external relations activities including longer-term post-conflict reconstruction efforts managed by the Commission. The political focus on th deployment of EU civilian mission may also risk a 'one size fits all' approach, where alternatives (such as working through a UN framework, or a regional organisation such as the OSCE) are not fully taken into account. Finally, there an important efficiency and accountability argument that has not been addressed in the current debate: whereas the Commission has a high degree of autonomy in making decisions about first pillar operations, second pillar operations are subject to lengthy discussion in Council working groups with votes taken on the basis of unanimity. How efficient is it for operational details to be discussed by 25 ambassadors? Moreover, how will these member states be held to account for spending on these activities and operations, if this is managed in the second pillar framework? It remains to be seen, however, if the post-IGC joint external service will provide a better institutional solution to the development and effecient management of civilian crisis management. Malin Tappert
1. Council of the European Union General Secretariat ‘Planning and Mission Support capability for Civilian Crisis Management’ 22 July 2003.

Operation Atlantia: A Fictional Test for Berlin Plus
From 19-29 November, the EU and NATO carried out their first joint crisis management exercise to test EU planning procedures developed in the framework of ESDP and the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO. This article offers an overview of the conduct of the exercise and reports some preliminary observations, although the formal evaluation process has not yet been completed.1 The scenario and the players The scenario for the CMX/CME 03 exercise was not new, but was initially elaborated by the EU on the basis of the first CME 02 exercise, carried out in May 20022 . The crisis was situated in fictitious Atlantic island, named ‘Atlantia’ which was experiencing growing friction between two ethnic groups over a contested area. Given the geostrategic importance of the island for the EU and the risk of escalation of violence and spillover, the Union had an interest in ensuring, through its diplomatic and economic instruments, that a cease-fire was agreed between the parties. The deployment of both military and civil personnel was envisaged to ensure the implementation of the

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both military and civil personnel was envisaged to ensure the implementation of the agreement and deter renewed hostility. The exercise was carried out both in Brussels, with participants from member states’ delegations and EU/NATO relevant bodies, and in national capitals. In particular, on the EU side the Political and Security Committee (PSC) had the overall responsibility for the planning, conduct, evaluation and reporting of CME/CMX 03, while a core planning team, composed of officials from the Presidency, the Council General Secretariat (including the EU Military Staff) and the Commission, co-ordinated the activities of the PSC and the working bodies (Civcom, Relex, Politico-Military Group). The Policy Unit, the Military Committee, the Satellite Centre, the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission also participated, whilst EU acceding states had an 'active observers' status. On the NATO side, the exercise involved all Allies plus all 19 national delegations, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Secretary General3 , the Military Committee (MC), the Strategic Commanders’ Headquarters (SHAPE), the International Staff (IS) and the Policy co-ordination Group (PCG). The planning procedures for the exercise also envisaged consultations with third countries, namely with non-European NATO Members, to inform them of the EU’s intentions. Similarly, consultations were conducted with Canada, Russia and Ukraine as potential contributors. Representatives from the UN and the OSCE were also invited to observe the exercise. Testing Berlin Plus The CME/CMX 03 exercise was elaborated within the framework of the EU Council’s five-year Exercise Programme. The overall aim of the exercise was to: 1) test the interaction between the EU and NATO at the highest political-military level on the basis of the ‘Berlin Plus’ standing arrangements for consultation and cooperation in crisis management; 2) test the EU’s crisis management procedures and structures at the pre-decisional phase of the decision-making process leading to the appointment of an Operation Commander and EU tasking for military operational planning; 3) test the ability of the EU to mobilise in a comprehensive and co-ordinated manner both military and civilian instruments. Limited in its ambition and scope, CME/CMX focused on how the EU plans at the strategic political level for an operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, where NATO as a whole is not engaged. Therefore, no troops were deployed on the ground and the overall costs were confined to incremental (personnel travel and communication) costs4 . The exercise began when the EU Political and Security Committee tasked the Military Committee to evaluate options for a EU-led operation in ‘Atlantia’, under a UN Security Council mandate. Consultations with NATO were promptly established at different levels in the event of an EU operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities in the framework of the Berlin Plus agreements. A joint meeting of the two Military Committees took place on Thursday 20 to evaluate practical modalities for the transfer of NATO capabilities to the EU, and was followed by joint meetings at the political level (PSC-NAC and PMG-PCG). On Monday 24, the PSC approved the draft Joint Action authorising the launching of the civil-military ‘Operation ATLANTIA’. The exercise ended just before DSACEUR was due to formulate the operational requirements and convene a 'force generating conference' and a 'Committee of contributors' for countries that

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'force generating conference' and a 'Committee of contributors' for countries that pledged forces. Provisions governing the consultations were based on a series of standing arrangements completed between December 2002 and March 2003 that comprise the Berlin Plus agreements. In line with these arrangements, the Operation Headquarters were provided by NATO and based at SHAPE, which was also involved in the conduct of the exercise. Similarly, DSACEUR was appointed the Operation Commander. Assessment In a statement released before the exercise, the EU SG/HR, Javier Solana, stated 'The joint exercise is another important step in the close and concrete co-operation between the EU and NATO' 5. Some EU officials similarly stressed the exercise’s success regarding the work of the two organization’s Secretariats, whose level of coordination contributed to the overall success of the exercise. According to a joint pre-exercise press release, CME/CMX was also intended to complement the lessons learned from the actual co-operation on the EU-led Operation Concordia, conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. However, the conduct of the exercise differs from that of Concordia since it concerns the full decision-making process previous to the launching of the mission, whilst in FYROM the EU took over a mission already begun by NATO. However, EU and NATO officials have reportedly confirmed that CME/CMX 03, along with Operation Concordia, validated the Berlin plus arrangements, at least as 'lignes directrices' for the EU-NATO interplay in crisis management. It is in the EU Presidency’s and Council Secretariat’s responsibility to implement them in the most appropriate way, according to contingent needs. While there is general satisfaction that the exercise achieved its objectives, some EU officials pointed out some outstanding obstacles revealed by the exercise that still need to be worked on, particularly regarding the co-ordination of the EU civil and military instruments, the EU-NATO consultation and communication procedures and their security provisions. Some officials also made the point that the exercise, which did not involve the operational planning phase, stopped short of testing the whole range of consultation procedures. Moreover, the smooth conduct of the operation was seen, in part, as due to the unrealistic fact that decision-makers were not required to respond to unforeseen events. Next steps The EU is conducting a comprehensive evaluation process to guide the further development of EU crisis management structures, procedures and arrangements, whilst the EU-NATO aspects of the exercise will be evaluated first separately and then jointly by the two organizations’ relevant bodies (PSC-NAC). The whole process may take a few months. Meanwhile, the EU has already started planning the next CME 04 exercise, scheduled for next year and based on a scenario for an EU-led operation without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities (on the Operation Artemis-type, in Democratic Republic of Congo). This will complete the EU's testing programme of the full range of procedures available for ESDP operations. Daniela Manca
1. 2. 3. See article by Annalisa Monaco in the forthcoming NATO Notes for analysis of the NATO perspective on this operation and the lessons learned from it. See ESR 13, July 2002 NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, was represented by a colleague, while Javier Solana, the EU SG/HR did take part in the exercise.

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4. 5. Costs for CME/CMX are currently estimated at no more than 50.000 Euros. See Javier Solana press release, Brussels, 19 November 2003.

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Iran: A test case for EU Non Proliferation Policy
In response to Iran’s recent disclosure of its nuclear programme, European governments have followed-up their renewed commitment to non-proliferation, elaborated at the Thessaloniki European Council1 with the common, pro-active and swift engagement with Iran at the highest political level. The EU stance throughout the recent crisis was consistent and builds on a policy of constructive engagement, using both negative and positive incentives to promote cooperation and compliance. Britain, France and Germany took the lead in negotiating a solution with Teheran and in rallying the US behind it, but it is likely that US pressure within the IAEA also played a role in Iran’s climbdown. Between September 2002 and February 2003, Iran disclosed to the International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAEA) details of its undeclared nuclear-enrichment program, active for the past 18 years. This contravened Iran’s obligations under the Non Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) Safeguards Agreements.2 In the following months, Iran opened some of its sites to IAEA’s inspections to prove the peaceful nature of the programme. However, IAEA investigations found evidence of uranium enrichment activities and of plutonium generation, igniting major concerns in the international community over Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions and threatening to escalate the crisis. The US 'hard-cop' approach Since the Clinton Administration, the United States have consistently adopted a containment approach towards Iran, refusing to co -operate on its civilian nuclear programme, even under IAEA safeguards, whilst exerting pressure on third parties to do the same. US administration concerns about Russian technical assistance to the Bushehr nuclear power plant program3 led Congress to pass the Iran Non-Proliferation Act in 2000, which authorised sanctions against states or private companies that provided Iran with missile or Weapons of Mass Destruction technology.4 Although Teheran has always stressed the peaceful nature of its programme and argued that it is necessary to meet increased energy needs, for the US, its concealment for almost two decades is evidence of more ominous nuclear ambitions. It therefore called for a tough response, arguing that the UN Security Council should address the issue and respond with sanctions. EU conditional engagement: the 'soft-cop' approach Since 2000, the EU has progressively distanced itself from the US policy, rather choosing to pursue an active policy of engagement, involving, inter alia, new negotiations in 2002 between the European Commission and Teheran on a Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA). The EU approach is predicated on the belief that the US-advocated hard -line position serves to reinforce intransigent positions inside Iran with unpredictable consequences. In contrast the EU approach, with its emphasis on conditional engagement, aims to secure co operation and compliance through a mix of positive and negative incentives. Thus, the EU position envisages tighter economic and commercial ties contingent on Iran achieving progress in key areas of concern, namely terrorism, human rights, support to the Middle East Peace process and non-proliferation. The three Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and United Kingdom – who, since June, have been at the forefront in pursuing a diplomatic deal with Teheran - have consistently reminded Teheran that trade talks and the nuclear issue are interdependent. In his visit to Teheran in August 2003, the High Representative Javier Solana was even tougher in warning of unwelcome effects on EU-Iran relations, should Teheran fail to meet the IAEA demands. Moreover, the European Council Conclusions of September 29 assertively reiterated the EU expectations that “more intense [EU-Iran] economic relations can be achieved only if progress is reached in the four areas of concern”.5

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These moves are consistent with the identification, in the new European Security Strategy, that WMD proliferation is one of the principal threats facing the EU and international security and complements new policy initiatives in the area agreed at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. These are described in two documents, - the Basic Principles for an EU strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and an Action Plan for their implementation. The EU’s stated approach for tackling the threat of the proliferation of WMD, combines political and diplomatic preventive measures (including positive and negative security assurances) while explicitly sanctioning the ultimate recourse to coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in the case of non-compliance. Brokering a deal with Iran Despite the US pressures to immediately seize the Security Council, the September 12 IAEA Governing Board’s resolution opted for granting Teheran an October 31 deadline to duly sign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocols to the Non Proliferation Treaty and to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities and any reprocessing activities, as a confidence -building measure. These Protocols would establish a short-notice highlyintrusive inspection process for IAEA experts, and Iranian conservatives responded by rejecting the proposals, stating that such conditions were “extraordinary humiliating” and undermined national sovereignty.6 In late September, despite US criticism, Britain, France and Germany made a first, concerted approach to Teheran offering, in a joint letter, technical help to Iran’s civilian nuclear project in return for full co-operation and transparency with the IAEA. These three Ministers travelled to Teheran on October 21 and successfully brokered an agreement. In the jointly agreed statement, Iran pledged to sign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and to suspend its nuclear-enrichment program in exchange for Europe providing technical assistance to Iran’s civilian nuclear programme and co-operating with Iran to eliminate the causes of its security concerns in the Middle East region (read Israel and Pakistan), ideally with a view to establishing a nuclear weapons-free region. The US welcomed the initiative, but differences in approach were again revealed in the negotiation, at the November 20 IAEA Board meeting, of a new resolution. Washington promptly rejected a first draft drawn up by Britain, France and Germany, on the grounds that it was too loose, and reaffirmed US intentions to refer Iran’s non-compliance to the Security Council, recommending sanctions. The compromise IAEA resolution agreed on November 26, expressed deep concern for Iran’s past failures and breaches in disclosing its nuclear programme, while recognizing Iran’s shift towards a more co -operative and open stance. It calls on Teheran to 'undertake and complete the taking of all necessary corrective measures on an urgent basis ' 7 and establishes a fast-track procedure for the Board of Governors to seize the Security Council, should any further serious Iranian failures come to light. Lessons learned The Iran crisis has been major test for the EU nascent strategy against WMD proliferation. The EU’s concerted diplomatic efforts and combined use of incentives (European assistance in Iran’s civil nuclear program) and disincentives (halt of TCA negotiations and Iran’s isolation) appear to have affected positive policy change within Iran and led to its agreement to the new IAEA protocols. However, the role played by the US calls for negative sanctions in influencing Iran’s climbdown should not be underestimated and it remains likely that both approaches have had a significant impact. While both the EU and the US remain convinced of the effectiveness of their respective good-cop/bad-cop approaches, it is perhaps the combination of the two that is most effective. It is, in any case, premature to draw any conclusions. The true test of these policies is whether Iran abides by its commitment to sign the NPT’s additional protocols and, in practice, suspends all nuclear related activities. Daniela Manca
1. See the Action Plan for the implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003.

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of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003. With the NPT’s Safeguards Agreements, parties have committed to promptly declare to the agency the starting of a nuclear program, before the conduct of nuclear-enrichment related activities, in order for the Agency to establish procedures for the timely detection of facilities being diverted from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 1995, Russia had signed a contract under which it provided $ 800 millon to complete one unit of the Bushehr project. Later, Russian co-operation to Iran nuclear program included as well the supply of uranium enrichment centrifuge plant. On 29 October 2003, Russia and Iran agreed to sign a protocol providing for the return of spent nuclear fuel to Russia. See 'Dealing with Iran’s nuclear program', ICG report, 27 October 2003. External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 29 September 2003. See Dan De Luce, ‘Europeans fail to end Iranian nuclear crisis’, The Guardian, 20th September 2003 See 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', Resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 26 November 2003.

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2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

EU/Member States Pledge 5 Billion Euro to Tackle WMD Proliferation
Although the issue of WMD non-proliferation and disarmament in Iraq has caused strains within Europe and in transatlantic relations, a multilateral approach to tackling the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction from Russia and the New Independent States (NIS) is proving highly effective. The “G8 Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction” is illustrative of this co-operation. In this framework, the European Commission co-hosted a G8 Inter-Parliamentary Conference with the European Parliament, in Strasbourg on November 20-21 2003, to bring to the attention of G8 members’ legislators the important work being done on threat reduction and to introduce them to the new role of the European Union in this field. The conference was attended by over 200 senior government officials from the EU ‘25’ and the remaining non-EU G8, their parliamentarians, members of the European Parliament, representatives of twenty-one think tanks, and the media. Over two days presentations were given by high level government officials from the US, European Commission, the Council, the member states, and third parties such as the International Science and Technology Centres (ISTC), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA). Keynote speakers included US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton and the father of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Senator Sam Nunn. The Commission's work is carried out on the basis of an EU 1999 Joint Action to support Co-operative WMD non-proliferation and disarmament programmes in the Russian Federation.1 This Joint Action has recently been extended for one year to run until mid-2004. Presentations at the conference focussed on the work carried out on the basis of the Joint Action, the implementation of which falls under the Commission’s competence but is often conducted through member states, for instance: · With Germany: to destroy Lewisite in Gorny and Kambarka; · With the UK: to destroy chemical weapons nerve agents at Schuschye; · With France: to support the nuclear weapons plutonium disposition projects. The Commission also funds the non-proliferation of expertise under its TACIS programme in its support to the International Science and Technology Centres (ISTC) in Moscow and Kiev. Current and future funding The US has pledged 10 billion dollars over 10 years to the G8 global partnership for the

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The US has pledged 10 billion dollars over 10 years to the G8 global partnership for the non-proliferation of WMD. The EU G8 member states (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) have pledged a total of 4 billion Euros (approximately 1 billion each) in the same context and timeframe and the European Commission has committed a further 1 billion Euros. However, confusion reigns as to how much the Commission actually spends on non-proliferation due to the fact that relevant projects fall under diverse budget lines. Global figures for the EC contributions, including the TACIS nuclear environmental projects, amount 150 million euros per year between 2003-2006. This would total 450 million over three years, and if continued at the same level, would mean that the Commission exceeded its 1 billion pledge. However, a senior Commission official highlighted that the real figure on ‘non-proliferation and disarmament programmes’ may be far lower. Discounting nuclear environmental projects, EC spending over the period 2003-2006 is made up of the EU Joint Action and TACIS contributions to the Nordic Dimension Environmental Plan, to bilateral projects in North West Russia, to nuclear safeguards projects and to the ISTCs. The sum of this spending is around 140 million euros over the three years. If funding continues at the same levels, this would amount to less than half of the 1 billion Community commitment made to the G8 at Kananaskis. How to make up the shortfall? The idea of establishing a Community CFSP budget line that includes ‘non-proliferation and disarmament only’ projects was floated at the conference by a number of participants. This would add stability and provide follow-on funding to the present Joint Action which has only been extended for one year until mid-2004. The idea received vocal support from some parliamentarians, who saw such a concrete initiative as a measure of European commitment to this important issue. One parliamentarian called for the idea to be incorporated into the manifestos of the European Parliament’s political groups in order for the issue to be taken up as a priority with the new parliament in the fall of 2004. A single CFSP budget line would help the Community meet its G8 commitment to the Global Partnership and serve as a measure of progress towards achieving this objective. Practical disarmament is about more than money, however. Creating a single CFSP budget line for ‘non-proliferation and disarmament’ would also serve to clarify and improve the transparency of project priorities, and enable the assessment of projects against stated European and G8 priorities. Making EU commitments concrete Making progress in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament is clearly a priority for the member states and the EU institutions as expressed in the newly emerging EU Strategy on WMD defined in the EU Security Strategy and the two documents mentioned in the Thessaloniki conclusions: the ‘Basic Principles’ and the ‘Action Plan to implement the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.’ Achieving a single CFSP budget line on ‘non-proliferation and disarmament’ would be an important measure of this commitment and serve to build on the achievements of the Community in this area. As one senior Commission stated at the conference, ‘we can not afford to stall in our political commitment because … what is at stake is the credibility and the visibility of the EU and, in particular the European Community, in a field which, after the dramatic events of the 11 September 2001, has become central to the security of our people.’ Gerrard Quille
1. See previous articles in issues 16 and 18 of the European Security Review, at www.isis-europe.org.

The Revised European Security Strategy
The European Council on 12-13 is set to approve the second draft of the European Security Strategy

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The European Council on 12-13 is set to approve the second draft of the European Security Strategy document 'A secure Europe in a Better World' drafted by the High Representative/Secretary General, Javier Solana. The first draft was presented to the Thessaloniki European Council on 19-20 June 2004 (and was reviewed in issue 18 of this publication) and the revised draft, draws on inputs from member and acceding states as well as independent experts provided in the intervening months. The principal changes from the first draft are described below. The security environment: global challenges and key threats The first section of the paper sets out the global challenges and key threats in the security environment. Additions to the description of todays global challenges include the observation that 'internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked', that some 'have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice' and that 'in much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns.' The subsection on 'new threats' has been renamed key threats. As before, these include 'terrorism' and the 'proliferation of weapons of mass destruction', which is now 'potentially' the greatest threat to our security rather than 'the single most important threat'. The dangers of attacks using biological, chemical and radiological materials are also spelled out further. Whereas in the first draft the third threat was 'failed states and organised crime', the new version deal elaborates on these issues and deals with them separately, identifying key threats as 'regional conflicts', 'state failure' and 'organised crime'. Nevertheless, the links between these threats are explained in more detail, with new mention made of how criminal activities can 'fuel the weakening of state structures' and how 'revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world'. Moreover, regional conflicts and new threats are linked with sentences such as 'The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats wil sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.' Strategic Objectives The second section on strategic objectives, begins (rather than ends) with the objective of addressing the threats. It elaborates on the relevance of the EU's current work and, in the case of non-proliferation, includes the statement that 'the EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions'. The second objective of building security in our neighbourhood, includes the statement that 'Europeanisation [of the Balkans] is both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform'. With regard to the Arab/Israeli conflict, it reaffirms its commitment to 'remain engaged and ready to the problem until it is solved [by] the two state solution'. The third strategic, objective, an international order based on effective multlateralism, remains unchanged in substance with the exception that the sentence 'We are committed to upholding and developing International Law' has been inserted, and the controversial sentence of the first draft 'Pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future' has been taken out. Policy Implications for Europe The third and final section on policy implications for Europe, additional language is introduced in the section describing how the EU should become more active. It is made explicit that being more active 'applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities'. Moreover, the preventive dimension of such engagement is given greater prominance. The subsection concludes 'We need to be able to act before countries around us deterioriate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.' When describing ways in which the Union can become more capable, mention is made of the fact that the establishment of a defence agency 'takes us in the right direction'. The EU-NATO permanent (Berlin Plus) arrangements are also mentioned as enhancing the EU's operational capability and providing 'the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management.' In regard to identifying how the Union should become more coherent, the revised draft mentions that this also has a regional dimension. It states that 'coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing

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regional dimension. It states that 'coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa has shown'. Finally, the paper explores the policy implications of working with partners. With regard to the transatlantic relationship, the new draft states that 'our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA [and] for this reason as well, the EU must further build up capabilities and increase coherence'. It is acknowledged that 'Russia is a major factor in our security and prosperity' and that 'respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.' For those regions that were not specifically mentioned in the first draft, the second draft has something for everybody in the recognition that 'our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, Latin America and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on'. In conclusion Unlike the first draft, the new version has a brief conclusion which ends by stating that 'an active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.' This positive tone reflects a slight change in emphasis between the first and second drafts of the strategy. The revised version leans slightly more towards the traditional EU (and UN) approaches to tackling global security challenges, with more emphasis on preventive engagement to address old and new challenges and threats using the entire spectrum of the EU's external instruments. While little new text has been added, much has been rearranged, and the overrall impression is of a more coherent document, with something for everyone, and which the European Council is bound to endorse. The real challenge, however, will be its follow-up. While the strategy contains noble aspirations which all will subscribe to, it is unclear whether the IGC will equip the EU, operating in pursuit of 25 national interests, with the institutional means and the political will to realise these objectives through concrete, coherent and common actions. Catriona Gourlay

News in Brief
Euro-Mediterranean countries take partnership forward The VI Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers took place in Naples on 2-3 December. Three major initiatives resulted from the meeting: the creation of a Euro-Med Foundation for Dialogue and Culture; the establishment of a EuroMediterranean bank; and the setting up of a Euro-Med Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, to meet at least once a year as a consultative body in the framework of the Barcelona process. This followed recommendations from the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum to increase visibility and transparency of the Barcelona Process. The need to ratify all the Association Agreements by the next EU enlargement (May 2004) was also stressed as a further step towards regional integration and the creation of a free-trade area. In the Political and Security pillar of the Euro-Med Partnership, Ministers underlined the need to tackle the new security challenges through a concerted approach. Beyond the existing political and security dialogues, Ministers agreed further complementary measures in the fields of maritime safety, environment, civilian crisis management training, and co-operation among civil protection authorities. Senior officials were charged with taking this work forward. Annual report on Arms Exports agreed The Council approved the fifth annual report on the implementation of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports on 8 December 2003.

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