North Hollywood Shootout

Somewhere there is a TRUE BELIEVER that is Training to kill you. He is training with minimum food or water, in austere conditions day and night. The only thing clean on him is his weapon. He doesn’t worry about what workouts to do—his rucksack weighs what it weighs and he runs until the enemy stops chasing him. The TRUE BELIEVER doesn’t care how hard it is; he either wins or dies. He doesn’t go home at 1700; he is home. He only knows the “CAUSE”.
http://www.urbanwarfarecenter.com/2008/11/north-hollywood-shootout.html Case Studies At 9:15 a.m. that morning Phillips and Matasareanu robbed the Bank of America branch office in North Hollywood, Los Angeles, California. They were armed with illegally-owned and illegally modified assault rifles and wore body armor covering their torsos, as well as home-made Kevlar protection wrapped around their arms and legs. The pair emerged from the bank and encountered responding LAPD patrol officers, and the firefight began. After five minutes, three civilians and nine police officers had been wounded, and a TAC (tactical) alert was issued. Ultimately, 370 LAPD officers, including SWAT team members, were present at the scene. The suspects fired approximately 1,500 rounds of ammunition in one of the most violent shootouts in U.S. law enforcement history. Weapons LAPD patrol officers and detective
  

Beretta 92FS 9mm pistols .38 Special revolvers Remington and Ithaca 12-gauge pump-action shotguns

LAPD SWAT
 

Colt M16A2 rifles Colt XM177E2 carbines

Bank Robbers
   

3 AKM rifles 1 G3A3 rifle 1 M16A1 rifle with 100 round C-Mag Beretta 92F pistol

Outcome
    

Larry Phillips was shot 11 times Emil Matasareanu was shot 29 times. Both Phillips and Matasareanu were weightlifters. Total amount stolen: USD $303,305. Approximately 370 LAPD officers were called to the scene.

Other than the LAPD, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and units of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) responded to the scene. In the MVP documentary film, the LAPD sergeant being interviewed discusses the roles of those agencies as well as LA Airport PD, Burbank PD and LA School PD. Off-duty LAPD officers came in prior to the announcement of city-wide TAC-ALERT, which activates all personnel on duty. Members of the LAPD training at the Valley area police academy as well as the main LA police academy located in Elysian Park also responded. SWAT officers also responded from the police academy. One response was from Chief Willie Williams, who came from either Parker Center or LAPD HQ located downtown. The following year, seventeen LAPD officers were awarded Medals of Valor from the department for their actions and bravery during the shootout. They were:
                

Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police Police

Sergeant I. Medina Detective T. Angeles Detective V. Bancroft Detective T. Culotta Detective K. Harley Officer Class III D. Anderson Officer E. Brentlinger Officer Class III A. Cabunoc Officer Class III J. Caprarelli Officer E. Dominguez Officer Class III S. Gomez Officer Class III R. Massa Officer C. Perriguey Officer T. Schmitz Officer C. Torrez Officer J. Zboravan Officer R. Zielinski

Aftermath The incident highlighted the growing divergence between the means available to the police and the offensive and defensive technologies employed by criminals. Video footage of the incident clearly shows police pistol bullets striking the suspects with little or no effect, largely due to the body armor worn by the suspects. Their body armor was able to stop the .38 caliber and 9mm projectiles fired by the officers' service handguns. The ineffectiveness of the pistol rounds in penetrating the suspects' body armor led to a trend in the United States towards arming selected police patrol officers with .223 caliber/5.56mm M16 Rifles altered to prevent automatic fire. This provided first responders with greater ability to effectively confront and neutralize heavily armed and armored criminals. Advocates of gun control in the United States cited the incident as evidence that U.S. gun control laws were inadequate to prevent military-class weaponry ending up in the hands of prior felons. They argue that without adequate gun regulation there is no gun enforcement, leading to easier access by criminals. They further argue that weapons move with money; and that without any deterrence against gun manufacturers and distributors, simple economics dictates that guns will be supplied to those with a demand for them, including those who wish to use them illegally, ultimately giving criminals an advantage over law enforcement in the street arms race. The LAPD patrol officers were not adequately armed or protected to deal with such criminals. The gunmen were firing rifle rounds from illegally-modified fully-automatic assault rifles while being protected by full body armor. The officers' handguns and shotguns could not penetrate through the suspects' armor, while the suspects' weapons were capable of severely wounding officers and bystanders even through cement walls and automobiles. Opponents of gun control counter that as the weapons had been obtained illegally; the incident did not indicate that criminal use of legally registered fully-automatic firearms was a problem. To date there has been no recorded commission of a crime with a legally-registered fully automatic firearm by the legal owner although a few stolen weapons have been used by criminals. They also point out that during the shootout, LAPD patrol officers acquired more powerful rifles and shotgun ammunition from a nearby gun shop, which had the potential to penetrate body armor or at least fracture bones through armor. The borrowed weapons and ammunition were never deployed, as SWAT had arrived on the scene first. In addition, the opponents of gun control argue that more and stricter gun control laws are not required, as these would mostly affect law-abiding citizens without reducing the illegal use of firearms by criminals (who, by definition, do not obey the law.) They state that what is required is more stringent enforcement of existing laws against possession of firearms by criminals. Also of note is that the incident happened during the 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban (since expired), which to some opponents of gun control,

is further proof that such bans don't work and instead show inherent flaws in gun control. Movies 44 Minutes: The North Hollywood Shoot-Out at The Internet Movie Database 2005 documentary Shootout! North Hollywood Shootout created by the History Channel describing the event in detail with interviews from the involved police officers. North Hollywood Shootout documentary by Music Video Productions (MVP) (mostly interviews). In the opening scenes of the action film S.W.A.T.. Weapons, location, events, TV footage, and dialog from LAPD radio communcations of this shootout were all closely mimicked. (A deleted scene in the movie also included police officers running into a gun store to purchase M16 assault rifles citing the ineffective weaponry they had been supplied). A video was produced by the POST training association that contained the entire video of the shootout; however this video is not available to the public.

SHOOT-OUT IN NORTH HOLLYWOOD
Command and Communications
http://www.9-1-1magazine.com/magazine/1997/0997/features/rigg.html by Nancy J. Rigg Requesting assistance. We have a possible 211 in progress at the Bank of America on Laurel Canyon north of Kittridge. We have shots fired. All units, officer needs help at the Bank of America, Laurel Canyon north of Kittridge. February 28, 1997, was a day of mayhem and miracles in North Hollywood. A pair of gunmen, clad in ski masks and full body armor, swaggered into the Bank of America shortly after it opened for business, spray-painted the lobby with bullets from AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles, and launched what was to become one of the most prolonged and shocking gun battles in the history of the Los Angeles Police Department. The 40minute firefight, much of which aired live on television, gripped the nation with its powerful images of heroism and horror.

Sergeant Dean Haynes, of the LAPD North Hollywood Division, was one of the first supervisors on scene. As three civilians ran up to him to offer suspect descriptions, Haynes recognized the staccato sound of automatic weapons fire coming from the bank, and ordered everyone to get down behind his police vehicle. "I watched over the hood," he said, "as the suspects came walking out of the bank, dragging their money bag." Setting the loot next to their car, Haynes recalled a vivid, chilling moment when "the dye pack went off and red smoke came billowing out of the bag, and this guy walked around the parking lot shooting at everybody. Then he turned toward my car..." Haynes's 15-shot, 9-millimeter handgun paled in the shadow of the suspect's militarystyle assault rifle, with its 100 round magazine, but he added wryly, "I aimed my mighty Barretta at him and he just lit up my car. The whole car rocked. The tires were popping and glass and metal went flying. I felt an object go into my shoulder, and I saw that the three citizens were injured from rounds going through the car or skipping up off the ground." LAPD Officer John Goodman, positioned across the street behind a van, found himself staring down the barrel of the suspect's AK-47. "The van just started to explode," said Goodman. "Glass was everywhere. Bullets skipped by." Officers Stuart Guy and Jim Zboravan, along with detectives Tracy Angeles and William Krulac, returned fire, hoping to divert attention. The suspect "turned and started shooting at them," Goodman said during an emotional news conference, "and I saw all four of them get shot. I got up and started running towards a mini-van, and (the suspect) turned and started shooting at me again. One of my rounds hit him, but it didn't affect him. It was like throwing a rock at a wall." Haynes reassured the injured civilians that help was on the way as the suspect "sprayed my car a second time. I rose up to fire at him and saw that he was reloading. I also saw that he was covered with body armor." Haynes sprinted to a tree for better cover, but was struck again. Despite his injuries, he returned fire and "put the information out over the radio to let everyone know that the suspects were using armor-piercing ammunition." Communications In the LAPD Communications Division, four floors below City Hall East in downtown Los Angeles, Police Service Representative (PSR) Johanna Ramirez was working the North Hollywood Division frequency as a Radio Telephone Operator (RTO). Officers Loren Farrell and Martin Perello, who were on routine patrol, happened to observe the armorclad, weapons-toting suspects hauling a witness into the bank with them. Ramirez took their call. "Right away they set up a perimeter," Ramirez recounted. "When the suspects started coming out of the bank, I thought, okay, we're going into pursuit right now. I like pursuits, and I was ready to go." But there was no pursuit. As 9-1-1 calls poured in from citizens reporting the incident and radio traffic intensified with police units responding, PSR involvement escalated. Tonja Bellard, a 7-year veteran PSR who was nearly eight-months pregnant at the time,

moved from the 9-1-1 board to help Ramirez with the radio. "When something big happens," explained Bellard, "it's normal for us to help each other out. It was getting so involved that we didn't have time to bother with the computer. We both started writing notes and I ended up doing all the talking." Ramirez was stunned by the brutal tenacity of the suspects, who pumped more than 1100 rounds into citizens, officers, animals, buildings, automobiles, and anything else that happened to be in the line of fire. "As many officers as we got out there from other bureaus, it seemed like it wasn't enough," she said. "There were requests for help from everywhere." "It was very scary," Bellard added, "but I just went into my job mode, doing what I've been trained to do. We have guidelines, but there are times when they are only that: guidelines. You have to use your instincts. I knew that I had to be clear enough for everyone in the field to understand me, and that I couldn't let them know that I was stressed." Guadalupe De La Cruz, a trainee with only eight months experience, was relieving an RTO who had taken a meal break. Just as she plugged in, one of her units, "9L89" reported that he was en route to the bank. "9L89 is a one-man unit," De La Cruz explained. "It was just seconds later that he came in yelling, `Live shots fired!' And I could hear the shots in the background. So I immediately put out the information that he gave me, and after that, he started screaming for help, because he had been hit." Veteran PSR Robyn Frazier, who was sitting next to De La Cruz, offered support and guidance. "Usually there's immediate closure to one of our help calls," she said. "Our written procedures don't go past the initial request for help other than assigning units to respond. But this situation just kept happening, and officers were down who hadn't gotten any help." What Frazier and De La Cruz did not realize from their windowless vantage point fifteen miles from the scene was that the firefight was so intense and relentless it was impossible to mount rescue missions. According to Frazier, "One injured officer, Stuart Guy, just stopped broadcasting. He felt that he was going to be all right, since the suspects had moved past him, but because they kept spraying bullets, no one could approach him. When he stopped broadcasting, we almost forgot that he still needed someone to go to him." Although she continued to communicate the many rapid, sometimes garbled and confusing transmissions from the field, De La Cruz's primary focus was on Officer Martin Whitfield, "9L89", who was bleeding heavily and on the verge of losing consciousness. "I was really afraid," she said. "I was praying, please don't let him die. I am not going to be the last person he talks to." For one fleeting moment, De La Cruz felt tears stinging her eyes and choking her voice. "He was crying and he was asking when are they coming," she explained. "I kept telling him to stand by, someone's coming. And he would say thank-you on the air. Terminology was out the door. I just kept talking to him to make sure he was alive."

For Officer Ed Guzman, the heavy radio traffic was a problem. Without faulting anyone, he expressed concern that in an incident where "everybody was responding", too many transmissions were "unit responding" repeats, which blocked out critical information. And because so many reports poured in about the same wounded officers, "the dispatchers couldn't tell how many officers had actually been hit." Deborah Clayton and Karen Koukal were working as Bureau Command Coordinators (BCC), coordinating rescue ambulances (RA) with the fire department and assistance from other agencies. "Every other broadcast was an officer down at some new location, shots are still being fired, we need SWAT, we need RAs, we need more units," said Clayton. "One moment that sticks out in my mind was when one of the units in the field said he was taking 80-100 rounds." At one point, Robin Frazier started doing a roll call with one of the field lieutenants in an attempt to track everyone. "I just started shaking my head," she recalled, "because there were several units that weren't answering up. That's when it hit me what type of situation this was. It was really shocking that so many officers had been shot, and civilians as well." Pausing to reflect, she added, "I've been through the riots and the earthquake and the floods, but this was different. I kept waiting to hear `code four' to let everyone know that everything was okay, but it never came." Command in the Urban Battlefield: "This was really an extraordinary situation from a couple of perspectives," said San Fernando Valley Commander Royal Scott LeChasse, a 27-year LAPD veteran. "First, it wasn't pre-planned. When we have the opportunity to pre-plan events, we can reserve tactical frequencies and make assignments of personnel. We configure either into squads or mobile field forces, give them unit designations, and reserve radio frequencies for them. But this was a spontaneous event, with units from virtually all over the city coming in." LeChasse's first order of business was command and control. "I tried to do a little of that en route by using the radio," he said, "but there was so much traffic on the North Hollywood frequency, I couldn't get through. I tried the tactical frequency they were on to identify who the incident commander was, but there wasn't one at the time." The incident, which escalated at each turn, had drawn everyone into the fray, with no one trying to "pull all of the parts together." LeChasse almost got sucked into the action as well. "I stopped, put my vest on, and started to get involved in the tactical situation," he said. "Then finally I said, wait a minute, we have hundreds of people running around here and there's no incident commander." A local furniture store "worked beautifully" as an improvised command post, with it's dining room section abutting a row of television sets which crackled with live news broadcasts. With so many self-initiated responses coming from divisions citywide, personnel accountability was a problem. "All these people were operating on different frequencies," LeChasse explained. "It was exceedingly difficult to figure out who was

where. What we ended up doing, for lack of a more sophisticated system, was to send runners around trying to identify everyone." LeChasse credited the incident command system for allowing multiple agencies, to coordinate operations quickly and effectively. "This incident was very intense," he said. "I can never remember a firefight that lasted as long as this." Despite the many communications challenges, LeChasse was quick to laud the dispatch staff. "The RTOs performed exceedingly well," he said. "It showed in their professionalism and in the manner in which they were able to remain calm and keep people calm on the other end of the radio." Aftermath: A Time For Healing And Recognition Once the two obvious suspects had been killed, the incident still continued for several hours, compounded by reports that other involved individuals were hiding in the neighborhood. "I was on the radio for four straight hours," said RTO Tonja Bellard. "And for three nights, I didn't get any sleep. We were debriefed and all, but at night in my mind I was going back and forth over everything I had said." The PSRs who were most intensely involved in the incident experienced normal stress reactions, including replaying the mind-tape of the voices of wounded officers calling for help, with no one responding. Guadalupe De La Cruz, who was worried about Officer Martin Whitfield and the others who were injured, "cried all the way home. Everyone kept telling me that Martin was going to be okay, but it wasn't real to me. I needed to see for myself." The department arranged for Whitfield and De La Cruz to meet at the hospital. "He told everyone to `get that dispatcher in here'," laughed De La Cruz, explaining that the personal meeting helped expedite recovery for both of them. Three days after the incident, Lt. Nick Zingo, who had served as the incident commander, organized a recognition ceremony for the PSRs and arranged for them to meet the officers who had been on scene. "Too often we overlook the civilian employees in the department," he said. "We wanted to let the PSRs know we were thankful for what they did." With community support, including a fully-stocked limousine to transport the PSRs from the Communications Center to the North Hollywood Division, Tonja Bellard, Guadalupe De La Cruz, Robyn Frazier, Deborah Clayton, Johanna Ramirez and Karen Koukal were presented with plaques, flowers and angel pins as Lt. Zingo read a special poem comparing the PSRs to "guardian angels". Despite being off-duty to recover from their injuries, Officer James Zboravan and his wounded colleagues helped present the awards. Zboravan said, "I broke down when I was explaining how I felt about the RTOs. I was really grateful to them. It was wonderful to put a face and name to the voice. A lot of time officers take the RTOs for granted, but that's something I'll never do, because of this incident." For dispatchers and officers alike, meeting in person was a major step in their recovery. As Tonja Bellard explained, "This incident didn't end for me until I met those officers

and could touch and hug the actual people who had lived through this thing. After that I finally got to sleep again." A total of seven civilians and one dog were wounded. Eleven LAPD officers were injured, nine suffering gunshot wounds. Two of the eight damaged police vehicles were beyond repair. Sgt. Dean Haynes's gun-blasted police car was donated to the LAPD Museum. "The rounds went right in one side and out the other," he said, "but no rounds penetrated the engine block, which I'm here to testify to. It's absolutely a miracle, when you consider the number of rounds fired, that the suspects were the only people killed." According to Cmdr. LeChasse, "One of the best things we did was ask a City Councilman to introduce a motion to cover all the damage claims as quickly as possible. We didn't cause all the damage, but when you start making people whole again, paying for their cars, paying for the bullet holes in the side of the building, this means a lot to the community." LAPD representatives and crisis counselors launched community outreach programs within a day after the incident. "Our goal was to get things back to normal as quickly as possible," said LeChasse. With such a high-profile event, media attention was immediate and at times overwhelming, adding both a positive glow to the aftermath, and the stress of being abruptly thrust into the spotlight. PSRs Tonja Bellard and Guadalupe De La Cruz were named "Person of the Week" by the ABC Evening News and interviewed by dozens of television news organizations and newspapers. With so many media requests coming in, the department finally put a moratorium on access to personnel who were involved in the incident. "I never expected anything to come out of this," said Bellard, who is currently on maternity leave to care for her new son. "We have emergencies every day. We handle them and we move on." Honored by the outpouring of recognition, but wary of the spotlight, with its movie-of-the-week offers and other enticements, Bellard has remained philosophical: "Even though I was the person out front during this particular incident, my co-workers and supervisors were right there, too. We worked as a team. I hope that the recognition we've received is something that dispatchers everywhere will benefit from."

War zone: The North Hollywood Shootout,
10 years later: a decade ago, two gunmen robbed the North Hollywood branch of Bank of America and touched off a gunfight with the LAPD that remains one of the bloodiest days in U.S. law enforcement history. What lessons were learned from that terrible day, and how might a repeat of it be avoided? http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5332/is_3_54/ai_n29334106/?tag =content;col1 March, 2007 by Bill Coffin

February 28, 1997. Los Angeles policeman Loren Farell and his partner Martin Perello were minutes into their daytime patrol as they drove past the North Hollywood branch of the Bank of America on their way to one of the five calls they had received that morning. As they passed the bank, Perello instinctively looked over at it, as all police are trained to do whenever passing a business considered to be a high robbery risk. Calmly entering the bank were two men clad in black jumpsuits and ski masks, each carrying an AK-47 assault rifle. Their intent was clear. Perello swung the car around and Farell put out an "officer needs help" call that put the entire city on high alert as he and Perello parked their car in the bank's south parking lot. Within minutes, other police arrived on the scene in response, thanks in part to there being other patrol cars in the vicinity, and also to the fact that the North Hollywood police station was only two miles away. Farell and Perello immediately began directing their fellow officers to lock down the bank so the robbers could be contained, but that plan was complicated by the sound of automatic gunfire. "If you've ever heard an AK-47, they are so damned loud, we didn't even know if he was out in the streets. We didn't know where he was," recounts Farell, a veteran of the Vietnam War as well as the LAPD. He and Perello initially thought that the gunmen had begun to execute bank patrons, but what really happened was that moments after entering the bank, the gunmen fired into the ceiling to get the attention of the customers. They then shot their way into the bank tellers' secure area in order to gain access to the vault and blasted out the locks to the bank's ATM safe. One of the gunmen then went outside of the bank to look around and spotted the police officers cordoning off the area. The scene outside the bank--was one of sheer pandemonium, Farell says, since the sound of gunfire panicked every civilian in the area. The police at the bank were simultaneously trying to find cover for themselves--they knew a shootout with the

gunmen was inevitable--as well as lock down the bank itself and get nearby civilians to safety before the real shooting started. They did not have to wait long. The gunman raised his AK-47 and sprayed the area in a 180-degree arc of gunfire that wounded at least two, possibly three, police officers immediately. The gunman then went back into the bank to regroup with his partner. Shortly afterwards, the two gunmen emerged from the bank and engaged the police in what would become one of the worst shootouts in U.S. law enforcement history. The gunmen were Larry Phillips Jr. and Emil Matasareanu, two longtime friends who had embarked on a career of violent crime together. Prior to this robbery, Phillips and Matasareanu had stolen nearly $2 million in various heists, including three attacks on armored cars and two previous bank holdups. Their specialty was paramilitary-style "takeover robberies" in which they dressed in full body armor, equipped themselves with military firearms and raided their targets using brute force. In their first robbery, these tactics resulted in the shooting of two Brinks armored car employees. Phillips and Matasareanu killed Brinks hopper (the person tasked with shuttling valuables from locations to the vehicle) Herman Cook and wounded the driver. In every other robbery, the pair never failed to threaten their victims with violence--a threat they were more than ready to make good on. Prior to raiding the North Hollywood bank, Phillips and Matasareanu took muscle relaxants, which left them moving in a slow and almost casual manner. Both were body builders in excellent shape. Clad in their armor, they cut a frightful appearance and right away, the police on site realized they were not up against ordinary opponents. Once Phillips and Matasareanu exited the bank, they opened fire on any policeman in sight as they intended to blast their way through the police cordon to escape. "It turned into a war zone," Farell says, noting that despite the LAPD's very fast response to his distress call, the police still needed time to secure the bank. If Phillips and Matasareanu had made a break for it after the initial barrage of gunfire, Farell says, they probably could have gotten away from the bank area. "Thank God they didn't, because if they did, the shootout could have continued God knows where." As it was, the fight quickly spilled over into the residential neighborhood that was adjacent to the bank. By the minute, additional LAPD forces were descending on the location. A police helicopter was en route, as were SWAT teams specially trained for these kinds of high-risk events. "Several divisions responded," says Farell. "Heck, the whole city responded. We locked down that bank so that they literally had nowhere to move." Even with an overwhelming police presence, Phillips and Matasareanu had the upper hand. Their heavy body armor protected them almost entirely from incoming police gunfire. Both gunmen received multiple direct hits from police pistols and shotgun blasts--one officer recalls hitting Phillips with nine pellets--but seemed virtually unphased. In comparison, the assault rifles used by Phillips and Matasareanu fired armor-piercing ammunition that could tear through a patrol car's engine block. Farell and Perello took cover behind the wheel wells of parked cars, hoping for the best. Other

officers were not so lucky. Some had taken up position behind a locksmith kiosk directly across from the bank entrance. When they engaged Phillips and Matasareanu, the gunmen's returning fire ripped through the flimsy wood of the kiosk so easily that the officers might as well have been out in the open. The volume of police fire eventually took its toll on Phillips, hitting him just above the neckline of his armored vest, severing his subclavian artery. This wound alone would eventually have bled him to death, but Phillips was not about to stop fighting. His left arm stopped working after the wound, however, and he seemed to consign himself to dying. He refused to get in the getaway car driven by Matasareanu and opted instead to concentrate on shooting at anything that moved. At one point, he even opened fire at a news helicopter passing overhead, which the camera crew broadcast live to a stunned audience. As he ran out of ammunition for one weapon, he calmly would go to the car's trunk and pick up a new one; he and Matasareanu had come prepared with a small arsenal of pistols, shotguns and assault rifles as well as ample ammunition. Firing his rifle with one hand, Phillips got separated from Matasareanu and ducked behind a parked tractortrailer to try to clear a jam in his weapon. When he could not, he ditched the rifle, drew a pistol and began shooting at the police once more. Seconds later, police fire shot the pistol from his hand. He bent over, picked it up and shot himself in the head at the same time an LAPD SWAT sniper bullet severed his spine at the base of his neck. Phillips died less than a block from the bank. Matasareanu did not get much farther. His car's tires were shot out, and while shooting at the police, he commandeered a Jeep pickup truck on the street. Before fleeing the vehicle with its keys, the Jeep's owner hit an electrical kill switch that disabled the vehicle. When Matasareanu realized this, he began transferring his remaining weapons to another car when SWAT officers quite literally almost ran into him with their own car. The officers were actually racing to aid shooting victims and did not expect to encounter Matasareanu, who promptly sprayed the SWAT car with gunfire. The SWAT officers, miraculously unhurt, ditched the car, flattened to the ground, aimed beneath the vehicle and shot Matasareanu's legs out from under him. By this time, Matasareanu had been hit so many times with police gunfire that his body simply stopped working. He bled to death on the pavement a short while later. In 44 minutes, the entire scene transformed a quiet, middle-class neighborhood into a war zone. Police kept the neighborhood locked down until 11 p.m. that night for fear that there might have been a third gunman on the loose (there was not). By then, the Bank of America shootout had made international headlines as well as earned a spot in the annals of law enforcement history. More than 350 police officers had responded to the incident. More than 2,000 rounds of ammunition had been fired--about half from Phillips and Matasareanu and about half from the LAPD. Amazingly, the only fatalities were Phillips and Matasareanu. Twelve police officers had been wounded--one seriously--and another eight civilians were hurt. Phillips had been shot 11 times before dying. Matasareanu, 29. The surrounding area was riddled with

bullets. One squad car had been hit 57 times. The locksmith kiosk that some of Farell's fellow officers tried to hide behind had been perforated by 150 bullets. For officers like Loren Farell, it was a day impossible to forget. Even though he never got a chance to return fire--by the time he could emerge from cover, the gunmen had left the scene and he was ordered to remain put--Farell still remembers the adrenaline rush of the day, and the stresses it carried with it. "When I heard a tape of me calling this in on the radio later, I started to cry," he says. But despite everything that happened at the Bank of America, Farell says, in the end, the North Hollywood shootout brought about a lot more good than bad. The North Hollywood shootout has been extensively studied and analyzed by law enforcement experts to see what was done right that day and what needed to be done differently so that should another such robbery occur, it can be contained even faster and with less fighting. As it turned out, the LAPD reacted as quickly as could be expected to the event. Farell and Perello lucked into being able to call in the event the moment it began, and the citywide response was very swift. Despite being outgunned by Phillips and Matasareanu, Farell notes that the police presence is what drove the gunmen back into the bank after their initial burst of gunfire. Those additional moments of pause gave the LAPD enough time to further block off the area and try to control the incident. Farell insists that had there been fewer police on the scene when the gunmen made their break for freedom, the gunfight would have certainly ranged over a much larger area of the city, exposing many more civilians to danger. The problem many have identified with the LAPD's response was their inadequate weaponry for the situation. "If we could have put these guys down on the deck, that would have been the end of the problem. But we couldn't do it. It just wasn't working," Farell says. At the time, the LAPD did equip departments with a certain number of slugequipped shotguns for taking down armored criminals but these weapons were locked at the station, and few officers were trained in their use. Following North Hollywood, the police have more of these weapons actively deployed among officers on patrol, and more officers are trained to use them. Moreover, the entire department upgraded their side arms from .38 to .45 caliber--a major increase in what firearms experts term "stopping power." And the LAPD equipped its units with the "urban police rifle," a semiautomatic variant of the U.S. military's M-16. Because Phillips and Matasareanu had hit numerous banks in the area prior to North Hollywood, the LAPD was already on alert for them. They knew that the pair wore body armor, and officers had been given specific instructions on how to engage the criminals, if need be--namely, by shooting them in the head. However, going for a head shot is easier than it sounds, Farell says. It is one thing to hit a target like that on a shooting range. It is something else to do it when being fired upon by an AK-47. "You can only aim like that on television." Still, the level of training on display at North Hollywood spelled the difference between tragedy and victory, Farell says. Thanks to intense departmental training on the team,

partner and individual level, officers were able to react to the situation with minimal confusion or hesitation. When an officer gave an order, it was followed, and as a result, the number of police officers exposed to danger was kept to a bare minimum without compromising the department's ability to engage Phillips and Matasareanu. Farell credits this training with saving him from getting shot. As he watched his fellow officers taking fire at the locksmith kiosk, his first instinct was to run to them. But thanks to his training, he knew that once out of cover, he would be helpless against any gunman who drew a bead on him. "Running across the street to try to save these officers made no sense," Farell says. "If you get hurt while responding, you don't do anybody any good. If I had gone down out there, I would have added to the problem immensely." It was not just the law enforcement community that took notice of North Hollywood. The banking industry also was put on high alert by the Bank of America shootout. The North Hollywood branch was an unusual target in that it was one of the busiest banks in all of Los Angeles, with more than half a dozen ATMs on the premises, and positioned next to a large shopping center and residential district. Still, any bank manager can appreciate how a similar robbery could take place at his or her own facility, and shortly after the event, the industry itself opened a dialogue on bank robbery risk management and what, if anything, needed to be improved. The upshot of the North Hollywood robbery, says Jeff Spivey, the head of the Security Officers Association and president of Spivey Security Consulting, is that it made banks look at their security measures. Banks could look at the North Hollywood incident, apply it to their own security and see how it would measure up. For some banks, North Hollywood was a verification that they were doing all that could be done. For others, it was a chilling wake-up call to prepare for a more violent and more dangerous breed of bank robber. As for the Bank of America itself, Spivey says, it did everything it could to minimize its risk before, during and after the robbery and shootout. Before Phillips and Matasareanu walked through the front doors, the branch--as well as the rest of the bank was fully compliant with the Bank Protection Act, a federal law requiring banks to provide a reasonable level of premises security. The bank was fully covered by closed circuit television, and its tellers were secured behind Plexiglas "bandit barriers." Even when those barriers were broken, the staffs bank robbery training allowed it to remain calm. It should be noted that because Phillips and Matasareanu hit two other Bank of America branches before North Hollywood, all branches in the area began keeping less cash on hand to limit their exposure. This enraged the robbers, who expected much more money from the bank than they actually received. This led to two interesting developments. The first is that Phillips and Matasareanu spent much more time in the bank looking for money than they ordinarily would have, allowing the police the time they needed to secure the bank. In the end, the bank's restricted cash policy played an integral role in stopping the robbers. It also put the staffs training on display. Despite the robbers increasing distress over the money,

branch personnel were able to manage the robbers' demands in a way that kept any staff or customers from getting hurt. This, perhaps more than anything else, is a testament to the bank's high degree of readiness. The branch also inserted three dye packs into the money that was stolen. These exploded shortly after the robbers exited the bank, so they left the cash behind. After the gunfight, the money--nearly $300,000--was fully recovered. Interestingly, the bank's public relations team was in full effect after the robbery as well. The next morning at a press conference held outside of the branch, Farell noticed that there were no bullet holes anywhere on the building. The bank had workers going nonstop overnight to patch every hole and resurface the bank to erase any signs of the previous day's violence. This helped project the image that the bank was in control of the situation and even after a major robbery event, everything was back to business as usual by the next day. But could more have been done? Spivey notes that for any bank looking to protect itself, there are other measures to employ in addition to what was present at the Bank of America. Some banks will install metal detectors at their entrances that will alarm against any large piece of metal. Another common practice is to station uniformed police officers at bank locations as security guards. These officers typically are off-duty and paid by the bank for their services, but in many cities, the local police department allows its officers to remain in uniform to increase their security presence. Spivey says that any bank hiring police officers should be careful to hire them as independent contractors and to check with the local police department to see if the officers will be covered by the department's workers compensation policy. Some departments extend their coverage to off-duty officers working bank security while others leave that to the banks themselves. Having patrolmen on site is just one way to cooperate with local authorities, Spivey says. Since the Columbine High School massacre of 1999, police departments across the country have adopted "active shooter" tactics and training. This means that if police think that gunfire is being directed at hostages, they will enter the building and engage the shooters rather than wait for SWAT teams to do so. This is a prime example of how the banks can cross-train with the police, Spivey says. If the banks know that local police practice active shooter tactics, it can train its staff in this as well, so if and when police enter the building under "hot" circumstances (i.e., with weapons drawn) the staff will know how to react appropriately. Likewise, the bank can inform the police that its staff has been trained to be aware of active shooting tactics, which the police can then take into account themselves. Finally, Spivey points out that all of the security measures mentioned above should be approached as parts of a holistic or enterprisewide security approach. Implementing security as part of an ERM program is the best way for banks to integrate security technology, operations and policies into everything the bank does, making security as reflexive and instinctive an operation as helping customers open an account.

This is a critical point, when considering the risk of robbery faced by banks in general. There has been a nationwide spike in bank robberies over the last year, and a number of major cities, including Atlanta and Dallas, experienced record numbers of robberies in 2006. Spivey credits drug abuse and gang activity for the number of bank heists; drug addicts often consider hitting banks to feed their habit and gangs are becoming increasingly brazen and violent in their criminal enterprises. This rise in violent robbery could not have come at a worse time. According to a recent federal report, the FBI has reduced its number of criminal case agents substantially in order to reassign personnel to anti-terrorism efforts. Meanwhile, state and local law enforcement has seen a sharp drop in federal aid, which means that groups like the LAPD are on their own. The situation is even harder for police in smaller cities without the kinds of resources (namely, manpower) that the LAPD brought to bear on the North Hollywood situation. Should another similar robbery happen, smaller departments will need to have been trained for this with other local police departments in order to bring the equivalent of large-agency assets to bear on the situation. This is no small task, requiring a great deal of planning, rehearsal and training. But Spivey says that this is where the training and participation of the industry itself can play a key role in both deterring robbers from hitting banks in the first place and helping to support the police when robberies happen. After all, another North Hollywood is probably a foregone conclusion. The question is where will it happen, when will it happen, and when things go horribly wrong, will the police on the scene and the business being robbed have learned the lessons of North Hollywood? Bill Coffin is the publisher and editorial director of Risk Management Magazine. COPYRIGHT 2007 Risk Management Society Publishing, Inc. COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning

North Hollywood shootout
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Hollywood_shootout This article is about the real-life incident. For the Blues Traveler album, see North Hollywood Shootout.

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (April 2010)

North Hollywood shootout Location North Hollywood, Los Angeles, California, U.S. February 28, 1997 9:17 a.m. – 10:01 a.m. (UTC8) A branch of Bank of America. Bank robbery two AK-47's, two 9 mm Beretta 92Fs, 1 HK-91, 1 AR-15 2 (both perpetrators) 17[1] Larry Eugene Phillips, Jr. Emil Decebal Matasareanu

Date Target Attack type Weapon(s) Death(s) Injured Belligerent(s)

The North Hollywood shootout was an armed confrontation between two heavily armed bank robbers, Larry Phillips, Jr. and Emil Matasareanu, and patrol and SWAT officers of the Los Angeles Police Department in North Hollywood, California on February 28, 1997. It happened when responding patrol officers engaged Phillips, 26 and Matasareanu, 30 leaving a bank which the two men had just robbed. Twelve officers and seven civilians sustained injuries before both robbers were killed.[2] Phillips and Matasareanu had robbed several armored vehicles prior to their attempt in North Hollywood and were notorious for their heavy armament, which included automatic rifles.

Local patrol officers at the time were typically armed with 9 mm or .38 Special pistols on their person, with some having a 12-gauge shotgun available in their cars. Phillips and Matasareanu carried fully automatic rifles, with ammunition capable of penetrating police body armor, and wore military grade body armor of their own. Since the police handguns could not penetrate the bank robbers' body armor, the patrol officers' efforts were ineffective. SWAT eventually arrived with weapons that could penetrate and several officers also appropriated AR-15 rifles from a nearby firearms dealer. The incident sparked debate on the appropriate firepower for patrol officers to have available in similar situations in the future.[3] Contents
     

1 2 3 4 5 6

Backgrounds Shootout Aftermath and controversy See also References Sources

Backgrounds Larry Eugene Phillips, Jr. (born 20 September 1970) and Emil Decebal Mătăsăreanu (born 19 July 1966) first met at Gold's Gym in Venice, Los Angeles, California in 1989. They had a mutual interest in weightlifting and bodybuilding. Phillips imported steelcore ammunition for his illegally modified assault rifles, and acquired Aramid body armor.[4] In October 1993, Phillips and Matasareanu were arrested in Glendale, northeast of Los Angeles, California, for speeding.[5] A subsequent search of their vehicle—after Phillips surrendered with a concealed weapon—found two semi-automatic rifles, two handguns, more than 1,600 rounds of 7.62x39mm rifle ammunition, 1,200 rounds of 9x19mm Parabellum and .45 ACP handgun ammunition, radio scanners, smoke bombs, improvised explosive devices, body armor vests, and three different California license plates.[6] Initially charged with conspiracy to commit robbery,[7] both served 100 days in jail and were placed on three years' probation.[8] After their release, most of their seized property was returned to them.[9] On June 14, 1995, the pair ambushed a Brinks armored car, killing one guard, Herman Cook, in the robbery. In May 1996, they robbed two branches of Bank of America in San Fernando, stealing approximately US$1.5 million.[10] Phillips and Matasareanu were dubbed the "High Incident Bandits" by investigators due to the heavy weaponry they had used in three robberies prior to their attempt in North Hollywood.[11]

Shootout

Larry Phillips, Jr. (left) and Emil Matasareanu (right) engaged LAPD officers in a firefight after robbing a branch of Bank of America. On the morning of Feb. 28, 1997, after months of preparation, including extensive reconnoitering of their intended target—the Bank of America branch on Laurel Canyon Boulevard—Phillips and Matasareanu loaded five illegally modified, fully automatic rifles: three Romanian AIM rifles (an AKM copy), a modified HK91 and an AR-15. They also possessed two 9 mm Beretta 92F pistols, a .38-caliber revolver, and approximately 3,300 rounds of ammunition in box and drum magazines, and made their way from their apartment to the bank in a white Chevrolet Celebrity.[12] They wore their full-suit body armor, as well as metal trauma plates to protect vital organs, and they took the barbiturate phenobarbital to calm their nerves.[13] Phillips and Matasareanu arrived at the Bank of America branch office at the intersection of Laurel Canyon Boulevard and Archwood Street in North Hollywood around 9:30 a.m., and set their watch alarms for 8 minutes, which was the length of time they estimated it would take law enforcement officials to respond. Phillips had been using a radio scanner to listen to police transmissions to determine this timeframe.[13] However, as they walked into the bank they were spotted by officers in an LAPD patrol car driving down Laurel Canyon, and the officers radioed in a possible 211, code for an armed robbery.[14] Inside the bank, Phillips and Matasareanu forced the assistant manager to open the vault after firing at least 100 rounds to scare the approximately 30 bank staff and customers[2] and to discourage resistance.[15] They were only able to get $303,305, instead of the expected $750,000 because the bank had altered the delivery schedule.[11] At 9:38 a.m. Phillips exited the bank through its north doorway and Matasareanu through its south doorway. Both encountered dozens of LAPD patrol officers, who had arrived after the first-responding officers radioed a "shots fired" call.[16] Television news helicopters responding to the "shots fired" LAPD dispatch arrived minutes later, and, despite being shot at by the gunmen, broadcast throughout. SWAT commanders used the live helicopter broadcasts to pass critical, time-sensitive information to the officers on the scene. Phillips and Matasareanu engaged the officers, firing armor-piercing rounds into the patrol cars that had been positioned on Laurel Canyon in front of the bank.[12] The patrol officers were armed with standard Beretta 92-type 9-mm pistols and .38-caliber revolvers, and some also carried 12-gauge pump-action shotguns, but the body armor

worn by Phillips and Matasareanu was strong enough to resist penetration.[11] Multiple officers and civilians were wounded in the seven to eight minutes from when the shooting began to when Matasareanu entered the robbers' white sedan to make a getaway; Phillips remained outside the vehicle and continued firing on officers and police and news helicopters with an HK91, which uses a longer cartridge than their modified AIMs. After a couple of minutes he reslung it and switched back to the AIM.[11] A tactical alert was issued, and 18 minutes after the shooting had begun, a SWAT team armed with MP-5s and AR-15s arrived. They had just started an exercise run when they received the call and had no time to change, and were thus wearing running shoes and shorts under their body armor. Officers then commandeered an armored truck, which they used to extract wounded civilians and officers.[11]

Scale map of the area around Bank of America ($), final locations of Phillips (P) and Matasareanu (M). StreetsA: Laurel Canyon Boulevard - B: Agnes Avenue - C: Ben Avenue - D: Gentry Avenue E: Radford Avenue - F: Morella Avenue 1: Archwood Street - 2: Lemay Street - 3: Kittridge Street At 9:51 Phillips, who had been using the getaway vehicle as cover, split from Matasareanu, turned east on Archwood Street, and continued to fire at the police with his AIM.[17] He reloaded the assault rifle with a 100-round drum magazine, but the gun jammed. He promptly discarded the AIM rather than removing the shell casing that had caused the "stovepipe" malfunction due to an officer's bullet penetrating his wrist bone.[11] He drew a Beretta pistol and continued firing at police. He was then shot in the right hand again, briefly dropped the pistol, retrieved it, and placed the muzzle of his pistol under his chin and shot himself; a round from a police officer's AR-15 simultaneously severed his spine. After Phillips fell to the ground, a police officer shot him again to make sure he was down and out. After the firing stopped, officers in the area surrounded Phillips, stripped him of his armour and cuffed him. Due to a large amount of bleeding coming from his AR-15 shoulder wound, police tried to prevent it by wrapping the body sheet over it.[18] However, Phillips died of blood loss. Matasareanu's vehicle was rendered nearly inoperable after its tires were shot out.[11] At 9:56 he attempted to carjack a pickup truck on Archwood, three blocks east of where Phillips died, and transferred all of his weapons and ammunition from the getaway car to the truck.[19] However, Matasareanu was unable to start the truck since the fleeing owner had taken the keys.[11] As KCBS and KCAL helicopters hovered overhead, a patrol car driven by SWAT officers quickly arrived. Matasareanu left the truck, took cover

behind the original getaway car, and engaged them in a six-minute gun battle. At least one SWAT officer fired his M16 rifle below the cars and wounded Matasareanu in his unprotected lower legs; he was soon unable to continue and desperately put his hands up twice to show surrender.[11] The police radioed for an ambulance, but Matasareanu, cursing, died before the ambulance reached the scene. Phillips, who was dead for at least 10 minutes, was left bloodied and lifeless on the street until the ambulance arrived to take him away. Most of the incident, including the death of Phillips and the capture of Matasareanu, was broadcast live by news helicopters, which hovered over the scene and televised the action as events unfolded.[12] Over 300 law enforcement officers from various forces had responded to the city-wide TAC alert.[20] By the time the shooting had stopped, Phillips and Matasareanu had fired about 1,300 rounds.[11] Aftermath and controversy

The illegally modified automatic AR-15 with a drum magazine, shortened barrel and retractable stock used by Matasareanu, photographed at the location he was shot down. The dark item in the background marked "25" is the mask he wore. Phillips and Matasareanu were firing fully automatic rifles loaded with armor-piercing ammunition.[21][22][11] The robbers were protected by body armor which could not be penetrated by the officers' handgun and shotgun ammunition. While Phillips was shot in the hand and shortly afterward committed suicide, a SWAT officer reported during the final gunfire exchange that his M16 rounds could not penetrate Matasareanu's armor suggesting that the outcome could have been different had both robbers been wearing leg protection.[11] The ineffectiveness of the pistol rounds and shotgun pellets in penetrating the robbers' body armor led to a trend in the United States toward arming selected police patrol officers with semi-automatic 5.56 mm AR-15 type rifles.[11] Seven months after the incident, The Pentagon gave 600 surplus M16s to the LAPD, which were issued to each patrol sergeant;[23] other cities, such as Miami, also moved to supply patrol officers, not just SWAT teams, with heavier firepower.[24] LAPD patrol vehicles now carry AR-15s as standard issue, with bullet-resistant Kevlar plating in their doors as well.[25]

In this case, approximately 650 rounds were fired at two heavily armed and heavily armored men, who had fired 1,100 rounds.[2] The responding police officers directed their fire at the "center of mass," or torsos, of Matasareanu and Phillips. Each man was shot and penetrated by at least ten bullets, yet both continued to attack officers. The LAPD did not allow Matasareanu to receive medical attention, stating that ambulance personnel were following standard procedure in hostile situations by refusing to enter "the hot zone," as Matasareanu was still considered to be dangerous.[11] Some reports indicate that he was lying on the pavement with no weapons for approximately an hour before ambulances arrived.[26] A lawsuit on behalf of Matasareanu's children was filed against members of the LAPD, claiming that Matasareanu's civil rights had been violated and that he was allowed to bleed to death.[27] The lawsuit was tried in United States District Court in February and March 2000, and ended in a mistrial with the jury deadlocked.[28] The suit was later dropped when Matasareanu's family agreed to dismiss the action with a waiver of malicious prosecution.[29] The year following the shootout, 19 officers of the LAPD received the departmental LAPD Medal of Valor for their actions,[30] and met President Bill Clinton.[31] In 2003, a film about the incident was produced, titled 44 Minutes: The North Hollywood ShootOut. In 2004, the Los Angeles Police Department Museum opened an exhibit featuring two life-size mannequins of Phillips and Matasareanu fitted with the armor they wore and the weaponry they used. Some photographs of Larry Phillips' corpse were taken, most of them taken from across the street; however, they were intended to be used as extensive research or evidence. [32] The actual getaway vehicle and some of the LAPD patrol cars involved in the shootout are now on display at the Los Angeles Police Historical Society Museum in Highland Park. It has been speculated that the perpetrators were heavily influenced by the Michael Mann film Heat which had been released a few years earlier, in 1995. In the movie, several men battle their way out of a bank robbery using firepower with a ruthless attitude. There have been some reports that a VHS copy of the movie was found in the VCR in the home of one of the gunmen. This has never been confirmed. It is also believed that Phillips was inspired to purchase the HK91 Marksman Rifle because of the film as well. In the film, a HK91 is briefly used in a gun battle.[33] See also Los Angeles portal
    

44 Minutes: The North Hollywood Shoot-Out – the movie based on this event Endgame – an album from metal band Megadeth, containing a song titled "44 Minutes" which details the event Shootout Newhall massacre Norco shootout

 

1986 FBI Miami shootout 2009 shooting of Oakland police officers

References 1. ^ Macko, Steve. "Los Angeles Turned Into a War Zone". http://emernet.emergency.com/lapdbank.htm. Retrieved 2007-10-08. 2. ^ a b c Shootout!; The History Channel; Viewed July 8, 2008. 3. ^ Cynthia Fuchs (2003-06-01). "44 Minutes: The North Hollywood Shootout". PopMatters. http://www.popmatters.com/pm/tv/reviews/44893/44-minutes/. Retrieved 2007-09-29. "The legal and cultural fallout of the crime had to do with just how much firepower the cops should be carrying, if outlaws find it so easy to purchase AK-47s at gun shows." 4. ^ Critical Situation, "North Hollywood Shoot-out"; Robinson, 10. 5. ^ Robinson, 3. 6. ^ Rehder and Dillow, 255–256; Robinson, 4–5. 7. ^ Robinson, 11–12. 8. ^ Rehder and Dillow, 257. 9. ^ Rehder and Dillow, 257; Robinson, 12. 10.^ Rehder and Dillow, 258–259; Robinson, 12. 11.^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Critical Situation, "North Hollywood Shoot-out". 12.^ a b c Critical Situation, "North Hollywood Shoot-out"; Shootout!, "North Hollywood Shootout". 13.^ a b Critical Situation, "North Hollywood Shoot-out"; Robinson, 13. 14.^ Critical Situation, "North Hollywood Shoot-out"; Hays and Sjoquist, 124. 15.^ Critical Situation, "North Hollywood Shoot-out"; Stunned police, residents cope with aftermath. 16.^ Critical Situation, "North Hollywood Shoot-out"; LAPD Shoot-Out With Bank Robbers. 17.^ LAPD Shoot-Out With Bank Robbers. 18.^ Prengaman, 1; Shootout!, "North Hollywood Shootout". 19.^ Critical Situation, "North Hollywood Shoot-out"; LAPD Shoot-Out With Bank Robbers. 20.^ Hays and Sjoquist, 124; Shootout!, "North Hollywood Shootout". 21.^ "Botched L.A. bank heist turns into bloody shootout". CNN. http://www.cnn.com/US/9702/28/shootout.update/. Retrieved 2007-10-25. 22.^ "North Hollywood Shootout". http://www.student.oulu.fi/~hmikkola/shootout.html. Retrieved 2007-10-25. 23.^ LAPD gets M-16s. 24.^ LAPD gets M16s; LAPD museum showcases department's good, bad, ugly. 25.^ Prengaman, 2. 26.^ Critical Situation, "North Hollywood Shoot-out"; Jury Unsure If Cops Let Shooter Die. 27.^ Lawsuit accuses L.A. police of letting wounded gunman die; Prengaman, 2. 28.^ Jury Unsure If Cops Let Shooter Die; Mistrial Declared in Case Stemming From Shootout. 29.^ Law Offices of Goldberg and Gage, North Hollywood Shootout. 30.^ 1998 Medal of Valor Recipients.

31.^ Prengaman, 3. 32.^ Dalton, 2–3; LAPD museum showcases department's good, bad, ugly. 33.^ Hernandez, Daniel NORTH HOLLYWOOD BIZARRO. Sources

 

  

 

  

"1998 Medal of Valor Recipients". City of Los Angeles. http://www.lapdonline.org/inside_the_lapd/content_basic_view/27320. Retrieved 2007-08-14. "North Hollywood Shoot-out". Critical Situation. National Geographic Channel. 2007-06-12. No. 1, season 1. Dalton, C. David (March 2004). "LAPD Museum Exhibit Development: North Hollywood Bank Shootout". Los Angeles Police Historical Society Bi-monthly Newsletter. http://www.laphs.com/news_march_04.html. "Jury Unsure If Cops Let Shooter Die". CBS News. 2000. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/03/15/national/main172527.shtml. Retrieved 2007-06-21. "LAPD Shoot-Out With Bank Robbers". ENN. 1997-02-28. http://emernet.emergency.com/lapdbank.htm. Retrieved 2007-06-19. "LAPD gets M-16s". CNN. 1997-09-22. http://www.cnn.com/US/9709/22/m16s/. Retrieved 2007-08-14. "LAPD museum showcases department's good, bad, ugly". USATODAY.com. 2004-07-06. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-06-07-lapdmuseum_x.htm. Retrieved 2007-08-14. "Lawsuit accuses L.A. police of letting wounded gunman die". CNN. 2000-02-28. http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/02/28/shootout.death/index.html. Retrieved 2007-06-20. Hays, Thomas; Arthur Sjoquist (2005). Los Angeles Police Department. Arcadia Publishing. ISBN 0-7385-3025-5. "Mistrial Declared in Case Stemming From Shootout". The New York Times. 2000-03-17. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E5DE143AF934A25750C0A 9669C8B63. Retrieved 2007-06-21. "North Hollywood Shootout". Law Offices of Goldberg and Gage. 2005. http://www.goldbergandgage.com/important_cases_north.html. Retrieved 200706-21. Prengaman, Peter (2007-03-01). "LA Marks 10th Anniversary of Shootout". ABC News. http://abcnews.go.com/US/WireStory?id=2914265&page=1. Retrieved 2007-08-17. Rehder, William; Gordon Dillow (2003). Where the Money Is: True Tales from the Bank Robbery Capital of the World. Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc. ISBN 03930-5156-0. Robinson, Paul (1999). Would You Convict?: Seventeen Cases That Challenged the Law. New York: New York University Press. ISBN 0-8147-7531-4. "North Hollywood Shootout". Shootout!. History Channel. 2005-09-13. "Stunned police, residents cope with aftermath of L.A. shootout". CNN. 1997-0301. http://www.cnn.com/US/9703/01/bank.shootout/. Retrieved 2007-06-19.

"Family of robber killed in L.A. shootout sues". CNN. 1997-04-12. http://www.cnn.com/US/9704/12/bank.shootout.lawsuit/index.html. Retrieved 2008-03-25.