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DNV SERVICE SPECIFICATION

DNV-DSS-315

Verification of Onshore LNG and


Gas Facilities
OCTOBER 2010
This document has been amended since the main revision (October 2010), most recently in April 2012.
See Changes on page 3.

The electronic pdf version of this document found through http://www.dnv.com is the officially binding version

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FOREWORD
DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV) is an autonomous and independent foundation with the objectives of safeguarding life,
property and the environment, at sea and onshore. DNV undertakes classification, certification, and other verification and
consultancy services relating to quality of ships, offshore units and installations, and onshore industries worldwide, and
carries out research in relation to these functions.
DNV service documents consist of amongst other the following types of documents:
Service Specifications. Procedual requirements.
Standards. Technical requirements.
Recommended Practices. Guidance.
The Standards and Recommended Practices are offered within the following areas:
A) Qualification, Quality and Safety Methodology
B) Materials Technology
C) Structures
D) Systems
E) Special Facilities
F) Pipelines and Risers
G) Asset Operation
H) Marine Operations
J) Cleaner Energy
O) Subsea Systems

Det Norske Veritas AS October 2010


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This service document has been prepared based on available knowledge, technology and/or information at the time of issuance of this document, and is believed to reflect the best of
contemporary technology. The use of this document by others than DNV is at the user's sole risk. DNV does not accept any liability or responsibility for loss or damages resulting from
any use of this document.
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Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Changes Page 3

CHANGES
Background
The experience gained from past projects specific to onshore LNG and Gas installations is incorporated in this
Service Specification.

Introduction
The suit of inter-related DNV-OSS documents consist of a general description of the verification systematics
(DNV-OSS-300) and object specific documents. This DNV-OSS-315 offers the reader the application of the
common framework and overview of processes in risk verification, to process facilities.
This Service Specification:
Introduces a levelled description of verification involvement during all phases of an asset's life.
Facilitates a categorisation into risk levels High, Medium and Low, assisting in an evaluation of the risk
level.
Assists in planning the verification through the making of a Verification Plan, and describes the DNV
documentation of the process throughout.
Provides an international standard allowing transparent and predictable verification scope, as well as
defining terminology for verification involvement.

Changes
Two new DNV service document types have been introduced as from October 2010 to be used for services that
are not limited to offshore and/or not to be considered as DNV Rules for classification of Ships or HSLC/NSC.
The documents have been named; DNV Service Specifications (DSS) and DNV Standards (DS).
This service specification; DSS-315: Verification of Onshore LNG and Gas Facilities replaces the previous
version of the document with short name; DNV-OSS-315. There are no changes in content, only how the
document is referred to, as OSS now will be used for Service Specifications intended for Offshore use.

Amendments April 2012

The restricted use legal clause has been deleted from the front page.

Amendments October 2011

A restricted use legal clause has been added on the front page.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 4 Contents

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

CONTENTS
Sec. 1

General ............................................................................................................................................... 6

A.
A
A
A
A

General ............................................................................................................................................................................ 6
100 Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 6
200 Objectives ............................................................................................................................................................. 6
300 Scope of application for verification..................................................................................................................... 6
400 Structure of this document ................................................................................................................................... 7

B.
B
B
B
B

Risk Based Verification .................................................................................................................................................. 7


100 General.................................................................................................................................................................. 7
200 Verifications Role in Hazard Management ......................................................................................................... 7
300 Risk-based Verification Planning ......................................................................................................................... 7
400 Certificate of Conformity...................................................................................................................................... 8

C.
C
C
C
C

Definitions and Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 9


100 General.................................................................................................................................................................. 9
200 Abbreviations........................................................................................................................................................ 9
300 Verbal forms ......................................................................................................................................................... 9
400 Definitions ............................................................................................................................................................ 9

D.
D
D
D

References ..................................................................................................................................................................... 11
100 List of Internal References.................................................................................................................................. 11
200 List of External References................................................................................................................................. 11
300 List of Technical Specifications.......................................................................................................................... 11

Sec. 2

Principles of Risk Based Verification ............................................................................................. 12

B.
B
B
B

Verification Principles .................................................................................................................................................. 12


100 Purpose of Verification ....................................................................................................................................... 12
200 Verification as a Complementary Activity ......................................................................................................... 12
300 Risk-based Levels of Verification ...................................................................................................................... 12

C.
C
C
C
C
C

Selection of Level of Verification................................................................................................................................. 13


100 Selection Factors................................................................................................................................................. 13
200 Overall Verification Objective............................................................................................................................ 15
300 Assessment of Risk ............................................................................................................................................. 15
400 Technical Innovation and Contractor Experience............................................................................................... 15
500 Quality Management Systems ............................................................................................................................ 15

D. Communications ........................................................................................................................................................... 15
D 100 Notification of Verification Level ...................................................................................................................... 15
D 200 Obligations.......................................................................................................................................................... 16

Sec. 3

Service Overview .............................................................................................................................. 17

A. General .......................................................................................................................................................................... 17
A 100 Objectives ........................................................................................................................................................... 17
B.
B
B
B
B

Service Process ............................................................................................................................................................. 17


100 General Principles............................................................................................................................................... 17
200 Simplified verification planning ......................................................................................................................... 17
300 Selection of level of verification......................................................................................................................... 18
400 Codes, standards and reference documents ........................................................................................................ 18

C. Project Initiation............................................................................................................................................................ 18
C 100 Verification during conceptual design ................................................................................................................ 18
D.
D
D
D
D

Project Execution .......................................................................................................................................................... 18


100 General................................................................................................................................................................ 18
200 Verification of overall project management ....................................................................................................... 19
300 Verification during design .................................................................................................................................. 19
400 Verification during construction ......................................................................................................................... 20

E. Verification Documents ................................................................................................................................................ 23


E 100 General................................................................................................................................................................ 23
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A. Purpose of Section ........................................................................................................................................................ 12


A 100 Objectives ........................................................................................................................................................... 12

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Contents Page 5

App. A Selection of Verification Level ........................................................................................................ 24


A. General .......................................................................................................................................................................... 24
A 100 General principles ............................................................................................................................................... 24
B.
B
B
B
B
B

Trigger Questions.......................................................................................................................................................... 24
100 Overall project objective and goals..................................................................................................................... 24
200 Assessment of risk .............................................................................................................................................. 24
300 Technical innovation........................................................................................................................................... 25
400 Contractors experience ...................................................................................................................................... 25
500 Quality management systems ............................................................................................................................. 25

App. B Generic Detailed Verification Scopes of Work Tables ................................................................. 26


A. Purpose.......................................................................................................................................................................... 26
A 100 Introduction......................................................................................................................................................... 26
B. Critical Elements........................................................................................................................................................... 26
B 100 Critical Elements and Components..................................................................................................................... 26

App. C Examples of Verification Documents ............................................................................................. 69


A.
A
A
A
A
A
A

Verification Documents ................................................................................................................................................ 69


100 Validity of verification documents ..................................................................................................................... 69
200 Statement of Compliance ................................................................................................................................... 69
300 Verification Reports............................................................................................................................................ 69
400 Verification Comments ...................................................................................................................................... 69
500 Audit report......................................................................................................................................................... 69
600 Survey Reports.................................................................................................................................................... 70

B.
B
B
B
B

Use of quality management systems ............................................................................................................................. 70


100 General................................................................................................................................................................ 70
200 Quality plans ....................................................................................................................................................... 70
300 Inspection and test plans ..................................................................................................................................... 71
400 Review of quality management programme ....................................................................................................... 71

C.
C
C
C
C

Document forms............................................................................................................................................................ 71
100 Introduction......................................................................................................................................................... 71
200 Statement of Compliance.................................................................................................................................... 73
300 Verification comments sheet............................................................................................................................... 74
400 Survey report....................................................................................................................................................... 75

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 6 Sec.1

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

SECTION 1
GENERAL
A. General
A 100 Introduction
101 This Service Specification (DNV-DSS-315) gives the criteria for and guidance on verification of the
integrity (safety, environmental and reliability) of parts of onshore LNG (both import and export) and gas
receiving facilities during various phases of new developments and modifications.
102 This document is an object-specific Service Specification conforming to the philosophy defined in the
top level document DNV-OSS-300 Risk Based Verification.
A 200 Objectives
201 The objectives of this specification are to:
describe DNVs verification services for onshore LNG and gas receiving facilities during design,
construction, and commissioning,
provide guidance for the Client and other parties for the selection of the level of involvement of those
carrying out verification activities, whether quantitatively as a result of a quantitative risk assessment or
qualitatively by simple trigger questions.
provide a common platform for defining and manage the scope and extent of verification activities.
A 300 Scope of application for verification
301 This specification may be adopted for the verification of parts of onshore liquefied natural gas and gas
receiving facilities during the project development phase starting from detailed design up to and including
commissioning and start-up.
302 The LNG and gas facilities covered in this specification comprise the following critical systems:

support structures and foundations


non-cryogenic critical vessels, piping and equipment
cryogenic critical vessels, piping and equipment (including transfer piping)
LNG storage tanks
open hazardous drains
pressure relief systems
ignition prevention and control systems
emergency shutdown system
blowdown system
fire and gas detection system
fire and blast protection
emergency power supply
escape and evacuation means
emergency communication systems
environmental control.

which are applied in various configurations and tailored to each particular projects specific requirements.
The specification does not cover the following:

303 Compliance to CE Marking Directives such as Pressure Equipment Directive (PED/97/23/EC),


Machinery Equipment Directive 98/37/EC and Explosion Proof Devices ATEX 94/9/EC which are applicable
in the European Community are not covered in this specification.
304 This DSS describes the principle of a levelled verification involvement, where the extent of verification
involvement is linked to the risks associated with part or all of the facility.
305 The primary scope of DNVs verification work is the verification of the integrity of gas facilities and the
safety of its personnel and those in close proximity to it. Other aspects, such as the verification of the
environmental safety of the facility, or its ability to meet the Clients business objectives, may be included in
DNVs scope of work if desired by the Client.
306 Statutory verification (or certification) of onshore gas facilities to the requirements of National
Authorities is not included specifically in the scope of application of this DSS. Such verification (or
certification) shall be governed by the regulations of the relevant Authority. However, if detailed procedures
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Jetty, Mooring and Marine related facilities (with the exception of the shore based transfer systems and
associated safety equipment. Jetty structures are covered by DNV-OSS-304).
the import and export pipelines within plant battery limits (this is covered under DNV-OSS-301)

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Sec.1 Page 7

are not given by these Authorities, this DSS shall be used by DNV as a guideline for its work.
A 400 Structure of this document
This document consists of three sections and 3 appendices:
Section 1 explains the relationship between this document and DNVs overall risk-based verification
process.
Section 2 explains the principles of DNVs verification process with its risk-based levels of involvement,
and how the level of involvement for a particular project is defined.
Section 3 describes the verification process and the activities for each of the project phases.
Appendix A gives guidance on the selection of verification level, preferably as the result from a quantitative
risk assessment or alternatively, qualitatively as a result of the posing of trigger questions.
Appendix B gives a generic detailed scope of work tables for all phases and all levels of involvement. These
tables are the basis for the development of project-specific scopes of work tables.
Appendix C gives example verification documents and describes the documents issued during and as a
result of the verification process. The use of quality management systems is addressed here also.

B. Risk Based Verification

B 200 Verifications Role in Hazard Management


201 Major Accident Hazards are identified in a safety assessment by an analysis of the risks to the facilitys
personnel using suitable definitions of such accidents.
202 Critical Elements are those parts of the facilities and such parts of the facilities (both hardware and
software), or any part thereof:
the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to; or
a purpose of which is to prevent; or limit
the effect of a major accident and/or impact on project specific objectives.
203 Performance requirements are statements which can be expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, of
the performance required of a system, item of equipment, person or procedure, and which is used as the basis
for managing the risk e.g. planning, measuring, control or audit through the lifecycle of the facilities. It can
be:
a criterion or a standard of performance with which assessed performance may be compared
an availability/reliability standard; a probability that an HSE or Business Critical system will be available
for its required function under a defined load
an endurance period: a period of time over which an HSE or Business Critical function is stated to remain
functional under a defined load
an impairment criterion/threshold: a specified condition, which defines impairment of an HSE or Business
Critical function.
204 Verification Plan is a document describing the process and activities required for verifying that all
Critical Elements meet project objectives. This will form the scope of work for the Verifier.
205 Verification is the process whereby DNV as an independent and competent party assesses that a Critical
Element will be, has been, and will continue to be suitable to meet project performance requirements.
A graphical representation of this process is shown in Figure 1.
B 300 Risk-based Verification Planning
301 The selection of the level of verification shall depend on the level of risk a particular item adds to the
overall risk to the facility. The planning can be simplified or detailed. This is further described in DNV-OSS300.
302 This Service Specification addresses both approaches as input into the preparation of a verification plan.
Guidance note:
Risk can be evaluated based on safety, environmental impact, business, schedule, public relations, reputation or other
criteria set by the Client.
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B 100 General
101 This DSS describes the principles of verification of the safety and integrity of natural gas facilities for
all phases.
The risk based verification concept is described in DNV-OSS-300 and visualized in Figure 1 overleaf.
102 The Verification Plan is the pivot element, with the Asset Specification, Risk Assessment and Definition
of Involvement Level as input and the Verification Execution being the implementation.

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 8 Sec.1

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

The generic scopes of work tables are generated based on safety and integrity risks. Where other risks, such as
environment or business, are required by the Client to be considered during the verification process, the principles set
out in this document may be used to modify the generic scopes of work tables given in Appendix C.
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303 In view of the complexity of many gas facilities, DNV recommends strongly that the verification level
be derived from the results of risk assessments of the facility.
Guidance note:
Only for simple natural gas facilities, with consequently lower levels of risk would DNV consider that simplified
verification planning using the trigger questions and generic Verification scope set out in Appendices A and B to be
justifiable.
For novel technology for which there are no applicable standards to verify against, Technology Qualification
according to procedures as defined in "DNV-RP-A203 Qualification Procedures for new Technology" can be used as
input for Verification.
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As s e t Pla n n e d

As s e t S p ec ific a tio n
in clu d ing o ve ra ll co m p a n y ac c ep ta n c e c rite ria ,
p e rfo rm an ce re qu ire m e nts a n d
ve rific a tio n o b je cti ve s

R is k As s e s sm e n t
in c lu din g id e ntific a tio n o f h a za rd s an d
ra n king o f h a z ard s b a se d o n risk e valu a tio n

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D e finitio n o f V e rifica tio n In v o lve m e n t


in c lud in g de ta ilin g o f a c ce p ta n c e crite ria , an d
p e rfo rm a n ce re q u ire m e n ts

V erific a tio n P lan


inclu d in g list o f ve rifica tio n a c tiv itie s

Ve rific a tio n Ex e c u tio n


in c lu din g rep o rtin g o f co m plia n c e or
n o n-c o mp lia n ce

A s s e t C o m ple te d

Figure 1
DNV risk based verification Flow-Chart

B 400 Certificate of Conformity


401 A Certificate of Conformity may be issued by DNV to confirm compliance according to the scope of
work. An example is given in Appendix C.
402 The DNV Certificate of Conformity confirms that, after performing verification according to a DNV
defined scope of work, DNV has found the natural gas facility to conform to a given DNV Standard or
acceptable international standards.
403 Usually DNV performs the complete scope of work for all phases. However, in some circumstances,
DNV may accept external Independent Review Certificates, for example for pressure vessels. This shall be
reflected in the text of the Certificate.
404 A Statement of Compliance is issued in all other instances where Certificate of Conformity is not
applicable. See Appendix C for further details.
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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Sec.1 Page 9

C. Definitions and Abbreviations


C 100 General
101 Relevant definitions in EN 1473:2007 also apply to this DSS.
C 200 Abbreviations
ALARP
C&E
CFD
D&ID
EC
ESD
ESDV
ESSA
FERA
FGS
HAZID
HAZOP
HVAC
HIPPS
ICS
LNG
MPQT
MPS
NDT
OSS
PCS
PFD
PFP
PSD
QRA
RAM
SIL
UPS
VAR
WPS
WPQR

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

As Low as Reasonably Practicable


Cause and Effect
Computational Fluid Dynamics
Ducting and Instrumentation Diagram
European Community
Emergency Shutdown System
Emergency Shutdown Valve
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis
Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis
Fire and Gas System
Hazard Identification (Assessment)
Hazard Operability (Study)
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
High Integrity Pressure Protection System
Integrated Control System
Liquefied Natural Gas
Manufacturing Procedure Qualification Testing
Manufacturing Procedure Specification
Non-Destructive Testing
(Offshore) Service Specification
Process Control System
Process Flow Diagram
Passive Fire Protection
Process Shutdown System
Quantitative Risk Analysis
Reliability Availability Maintainability
Safety Integrity Level
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Verification Activity Report
Welding Procedure Specification
Welding Procedure Qualification Record

C 300 Verbal forms


301 Shall: Indicates requirements strictly to be followed in order to conform to this DSS and from which
no deviation is permitted.
302 Should: Indicates that among several possibilities, one is recommended as particularly suitable,
without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily
required. Other possibilities may be applied subject to agreement.
303 May: Verbal form used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the DSS.

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C 400 Definitions
401 Client: DNVs contractual partner. It may be the purchaser, the owner or the contractor.
402 Construction phase: All phases during construction, including fabrication, installation, testing and precommissioning, up until the installation or system is mechanically complete and safe to receive and/or export
gas or LNG. In relation to onshore facilities, this include both onsite and offsite fabrication, site assembly and
integration, tie-in, pressure testing, pre-commissioning and repair.
403 Commissioning phase: Activities after pre-commissioning when gas or LNG are introduced into the
installation up until the complete installation is rendered safe and operable for intended operations.
404 Critical Element: Parts of an installation which prevent, control or mitigate identified major hazards and
the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to impairment of the defined safety objectives.
Safety Critical Elements represent the barriers which prevent, control or mitigate the major accident scenarios.
405 Critical Equipment: Item of equipment or component or assembly the failure of which could cause or
contribute substantially to impairment of the defined safety objectives.
406 Design: All related engineering to design of the onshore facilities, including structural supports, pressure
containment, safety systems, as well as material and corrosion aspects.
407 Design phase: An initial phase that takes a systematic approach to the production of specifications,
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Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

drawings and other documents to ensure that the onshore installation meets specified requirements (including
design reviews to ensure that design output is verified against design input requirements).
408 Fabrication: Activities related to the assembly of objects with a defined purpose. In relation to the
onshore facilities, fabrication typically refers to the process of assembly or transformation of e.g. plates,
profiles and pipes etc into production equipment and facilities. These may be built fully on-site or built offsite
in parts and transferred to site for assembly or integration.
409 Hazard: A deviation (departure from the design and operating intention) which could cause damage, injury
or other form of loss (Chemical Industries Association HAZOP Guide).
410 HAZID (HAZard Identification): A technique for the identification of all significant hazards associated
with the particular activity under consideration. (ISO-31010 Risk Management - Risk Assessment
Techniques).
411 HAZOP (HAZard OPerability study): The application of a formal systematic critical examination to the
process and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities to assess the hazard potential of mal-operation or
mal-function of individual items of equipment and their consequential effects on the facility as a whole (Chemical
Industries Association HAZOP Guide).
412 Manufacture: Making of articles or materials, often in bulk. In relation to onshore facilities, this typically
refers to activities for the production of various components under contracts from one or more contractor or
supplier.
413 Major Hazard: A deviation (departure from the design and operating intention) which could cause
unacceptable damage, injury or other form of loss.
414 Onshore Gas facilities: Onshore process plants for regasification of LNG or receiving, treatment and/or
liquefaction of natural gas
415 Operations (phase): The phase when the gas facilities are being used for the purpose for which it was
designed.
416 Performance Requirement: A description (qualitative or quantitative statement) of the essential
requirements to be met, maintained or provide on demand by a system or item of equipment in order for it to
satisfactorily fulfil its purpose.
417 Risk: The qualitative or quantitative likelihood of an accident or unplanned event occurring, considered
in conjunction with the potential consequences of such a failure. In quantitative terms, risk is the quantified
probability of a defined failure mode times its quantified consequence.
Guidance note:
Risk is not only related to physical failure modes, but also to operational errors, human errors and so on. For some
risks the functional failures or physical failure modes contributes less than 20% while more than 80% of the risk
relates to other devices.
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418 Risk Reduction Measures: Those measures taken to reduce the risks to the operation of onshore facilities
and to the health and safety of personnel associated with it or in its vicinity by:
reduction in the probability of failure
mitigation of the consequences of failure.
Guidance note:
The usual order of preference of risk reduction measures is:

inherent safety
prevention
detection
control
mitigation
emergency response.
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419 Project Objectives: The safety, integrity and business goals for the design, construction, operation and
decommissioning of the gas facilities including acceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the Client.
420 Safety Objectives: The safety goals in terms of functionality, reliability/availability and survivability for
the design, construction and operation of the natural gas facility including acceptance criteria for the level of
risk acceptable to the Client.
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Sec.1 Page 11

421 Statement of Compliance: A statement or report signed by a qualified party affirming that, at the time of
assessment, the defined onshore installation phase, or collection of activities, met the requirements stated by
the Client.
422 Verification: An examination to confirm that an activity, a product or a service is in accordance with
specified requirements.
Guidance note:
The examination shall be based on information, which can be proved true, based on facts obtained through
observation, measurement, test or other means.
It should be noted that there is a distinct difference between verification and certification.
The scope of work for verification is ultimately decided by the customer, while the scope of work for certification is
ultimately decided by DNV (or the national authorities when DNV issues certificates on their behalf).
ISO 8402: 1994 definition: Verification: Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that
specified requirements have been fulfilled.
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423 Verification Plan: A plan which defines the scope of the work (sow) for verification. It includes;
verification objectives, elements to be verified, performance requirements, level of involvement by party and
type of verification activity. (ref. DNV-OSS-300 Sec.2 C)

D. References
D 100 List of Internal References

DNV-OSS-300 Risk Based Verification, 2004, Det Norske Veritas


DNV-OSS-301 Certification and Verification of Pipelines, 2000, Det Norske Veritas
DNV-OSS-304 Risk Based Verification of Offshore Structures, 2006, Det Norske Veritas
DNV-OSS-307 Verification of Process Facilities, 2004, Det Norske Veritas
DNV-OSS-309 Verification, Certification and Classification of gas export and receiving terminals, 2009,
Det Norske Veritas
DNV-RP-A203 Qualification Procedures for New Technology
D 200 List of External References
A Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies, 1979, Chemical Industries Association Limited, London
ISO 8402 Quality Vocabulary, 1994, International Organization for Standardization, Geneva
BS 4778 Quality Vocabulary, Part 2 Quality Concepts and Related Definitions, 1991, British Standards
Institute, London
EN 45011 General Criteria for Certification Bodies Operating Product Certification, 1998, European
Committee for Standardization, Brussels
D 300 List of Technical Specifications
Relevant technical specifications which can be used as references are given in Appendix B.
The main standards for LNG facilities addressed in this document are:
EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design of Onshore Installations
NFPA 59A Standard for Production, Storage and handling of Liquefied Natural Gas.

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Page 12 Sec.2

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see note on front cover

SECTION 2
PRINCIPLES OF RISK BASED VERIFICATION
A. Purpose of Section
A 100 Objectives
101 The objectives of this section are to provide:
an introduction to the principles of verification the safety and integrity of onshore LNG and gas receiving
facilities
an introduction to the principles of risk-based levels of verification activity and
guidance on the selection of levels of verification.

B. Verification Principles
B 100 Purpose of Verification
101 Verification constitutes a systematic and independent examination of the various phases in the life of a
natural gas facility to determine whether it has sufficient integrity to meet its safety objectives.
102 Verification activities are expected to identify errors or failures or non-compliance to agreed
performance requirements in the safety and integrity-related work associated with the natural gas facility and
to contribute to reducing the risks to its operation and to the health and safety of personnel associated with it
or in its vicinity.
103 Verification is primarily focused on integrity and human safety, but business risk (cost and schedule)
may be addressed also if required by the Client.
B 200 Verification as a Complementary Activity
201 Verification shall be complementary to routine design, construction and operations activities and not a
substitute for them. Therefore, although verification will take into account the work, and the assurance of that
work, carried out by the Client and its contractors, it is possible that verification will duplicate some work that
has been carried out previously by other parties involved in the natural gas facility.
202 The verification plan shall be developed and implemented in such a way as to minimise additional work,
and cost, to maximise its effectiveness. The development of the verification plan shall depend on the findings
from the examination of quality management systems, the examination of documents and the examination of
project activities.

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B 300 Risk-based Levels of Verification


301 To achieve a DNV Certificate of Conformity for a natural gas facility a verification of the activities
described by the scope of work defined within this DSS first shall take place.
302 The level of verification activity is differentiated according to the overall risk to the facility and to
individual parts of it. If the risk to the facility (or a particular part) is higher, the level of verification
involvement is higher. Conversely, if the risk to the facility (or a particular part) is lower, the level of
verification activities can be reduced, without any reduction in their effectiveness.
303 The extent of verification of gas facilities is categorised into Low, Medium and High. A summary of the
levels of involvement is given in Table 2-1.
304 It is the prerogative of the Client of the natural gas facility to decide the level of verification. The
selection should consider the factors given in Sec.2 C. The selection of the most suitable verification level may
be guided by using the information gained from a Quantitative Risk Assessment, or alternatively qualitatively
by trigger questions, as described in Appendix A. Further guidance is provided in DNV-OSS-300 Risk Based
Verification.
305 Where DNV is issuing the Certificate of Conformity for the facility, DNV will decide on the appropriate
scope and use the same type of questions to evaluate the suitability of the selected level.
306 Different levels of verification can be chosen for different phases of the natural gas facilitys design,
construction or commissioning, or even within the same phase if necessary. For example, the design of a
particular component or unit may be innovative and considered high risk whereas the construction and
installation methods are well-known and considered low risk. The converse might be true also.
307 The level of verification can be reduced or increased during a phase if the originally chosen level is
considered too rigorous or too lenient, as new information on the risks to the natural gas facility becomes
available.
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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Sec.2 Page 13

308 Verification should be planned in close co-operation with the Client and each of its contractors, to
provide a scope of work that is tailor-made to the schedule of each production process or activity, i.e. to make
the verification activities, surveillance and hold points, an integrated activity and not a delaying activity.
Guidance note:
Many contractors have adequate quality control systems and quality control departments, with competent personnel
to perform, for example, inspection at pressure vessel manufacturers.
In that case, not all verification work need be done by DNV personnel. Where applicable, the various inspections may
be carried out by competent persons other than DNV personnel.
In that situation DNVs verification activities may comprise:
reviewing the competence of the contractors personnel
auditing their working methods and their performance of that work
reviewing the documents produced by them.
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309 Verification will direct greatest effort at those elements of the natural gas facility whose failure or
reduced performance will have the most significant impact on safety and integrity.
310 The degree of confidence placed in a certificate by its users depends on their degree of confidence in the
verification carried out. Therefore, the level of verification will be stated on the Certificate of Conformity for
the facility.
311 If more than one verification level has been used for a phase, then the lowest level will be reported on
the facilitys certificate, and the additional verification activities will be identified and described in the
verification report.

C. Selection of Level of Verification


C 100 Selection Factors
101 The selection of the level of verification shall depend on the criticality of each of the elements that have
an impact on the management of hazards and associated risk levels of the facility. This is illustrated by Figure
1 below.
102 The contribution of each element shall be judged qualitatively and/or quantitatively and shall use, where
possible, quantified risk assessment data to provide a justifiable basis for any decisions made.
103 Selection factors are the:

overall safety objectives for the facility


assessment of the risks associated with the facility and the measures taken to reduce these risks
degree of technical innovation in the facility
experience of the contractors in carrying out similar work
quality management systems of the Client and its contractors.

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Page 14 Sec.2

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see note on front cover

Table 2-1 Levels of Verification - Summary of Involvement


Level
Low

Mediu
m

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High

Description of involvement
Review of general principles and production
systems during design, construction and
commissioning
Review of principal design documents,
construction and commissioning procedures and
qualification reports
Site attendance only during system testing
Less comprehensive involvement than level
Medium
Review of general principles and production
systems during design, construction and
commissioning
Detailed review of principal and other selected
design documents with support of simplified
independent analyses
Detailed review of construction and
commissioning procedures
Full time attendance during (procedure)
qualification and review of the resulting reports
Audit-based or intermittent presence at site
Review of general principles and production
systems during design, construction and
commissioning
Detailed review of most design documents with
support of simplified and advanced independent
analyses
Detailed review of construction and
commissioning procedures
Full-time attendance during (procedure)
qualification and review of the resulting reports
Full time presence at site for most activities
More comprehensive involvement than level
Medium

Guidance for application on the level of involvement


Proven facility designs with relatively harmless
contents and/or installed in benign environmental
conditions
Established design; manufacturing and
installation by experienced contractors
Low consequences of failure from a safety point
of view (or environmental or commercial, if
required)
Relaxed to normal completion schedule
Facilities in moderate or well-controlled
environmental conditions
Facilities with a moderate degree of novelty
Medium consequences of failure from a safety
point of view, (or environmental or commercial,
if required
Ordinary completion schedule

Facilities with a high degree of novelty or large


leaps in technology
Extreme environmental conditions
Inexperienced contractors or exceptionally tight
completion schedule
Very high consequences of failure from a safety
point of view (or environmental or commercial, if
required

Note:
High, Medium Low Verification Involvement refers to the degree or intensity of verification involvement.
Completion schedules affect verification involvement in an indirect but important way. The effect of a tight completion
schedule is pressure on the project team to take less time to carry out the various tasks. Tight completion schedules are
more prone to run late, thus adding more pressure on the project team. Problems which have been encountered in this
situation in the past have included:

design reviews not carried out


incomplete welding
non-destructive testing incomplete
missing structural members
commissioning incomplete.
Inc re as ing

High

R isk
HIGH

Probability
of Failure

M EDIUM

L OW

Low
Consequence of Failure

High

Figure 1
Selection of the Required Level of Verification

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Sec.2 Page 15

C 200 Overall Verification Objective


201 An overall verification objective covering all phases of the natural gas facility from design to operation
shall be defined by the Client. The objective should address the main integrity goals as well as establishing
acceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the Client. Depending on the facility and its location, the
risk could be measured in terms of human injuries as well as environmental, political and economic
consequences.
C 300 Assessment of Risk
301 A systematic review should be carried out to identify and evaluate the probabilities and consequences of
failures in the natural gas facility. The extent of the review shall reflect the criticality of the facility, the planned
operation and previous experience with similar facilities. This review shall identify the risk to the operation of
the facility and to the health and safety of personnel associated with it or in its vicinity.
Once the risks have been identified, their extent can be reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable by
means of one or both of:

302 The result of the systematic review of these risks is measured against the safety objectives and used in
the selection of the appropriate verification activity level.
The result of the systematic review of these risks is measured against the safety objectives and used in the
selection of the appropriate verification activity level.
C 400 Technical Innovation and Contractor Experience
401 The degree of technical innovation in the natural gas facility system shall be considered. Risks to the
facility are likely to be greater for a facility with a high degree of technical innovation than with a facility
designed, manufactured and installed to well-known criteria in well-known locations.
Similarly, the degree of risk to the facility should be considered where contractors are inexperienced or the
work schedule is tight.
402 Factors to be considered in the selection of the appropriate verification level include:

degree of difficulty in achieving technical requirements


knowledge of similar facilities
knowledge of contractors general experience
knowledge of contractors experience in similar work.

C 500 Quality Management Systems


501 Adequate quality management systems shall be implemented to ensure that gross errors in the work for
facility design, construction and operations are limited.
502 Factors to be considered when evaluating the adequacy of the quality management system include:

whether or not an ISO 9001 or equivalent certified system is in place


results from external audits
results from internal audits
experience with contractors previous work
project work-force familiarity with the quality management system, e.g. has there been a rapid expansion
of the work force or are all parties of a joint venture familiar with the same system.

D. Communications
D 100 Notification of Verification Level
101 An assessment of the required level of verification for a project should be made by the Client before
preparing tender documents for design and construction activities. The Client can then specify this level in
Invitations to Tender. This will give contractors clear guidance and reference when estimating the extent and
cost of efforts associated with verification activities.
102 The required level of verification can be assessed by the Client using this DSS. However, if the Client
requires the Contractor to carry out this assessment as part of his response to an Invitation to Tender the Client
should provide the necessary information to enable the Contractor to carry out this work. This information
should include overall safety objectives for the natural gas facility as well as particulars, such as temperatures,
pressures, contents and environmental criteria, commonly contained in a design brief.
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reduction in the probability of failure,


mitigation of the consequences of failure.

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Page 16 Sec.2

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see note on front cover

D 200 Obligations
201 To achieve the purpose and benefits of verification the involved parties shall be mutually obliged to share
and act upon all relevant information pertaining to the verification scope.
202 The Client shall be obliged to:
Inform DNV about the basis for selecting the level of verification and the investigations and assumptions
made in this context.
Give DNV full access to all information concerning the verification scope for the natural gas facility and
ensure that clauses to this effect are included in contracts for parties acting on behalf of the Client and
parties providing products, processes and services covered by the verification scope. If information is
proprietary and not available, exclusion from verification shall be mutually agreed with DNV.
Ensure that DNV is involved in the handling of deviations from specified requirements within the
verification scope.
Act upon information provided by DNV with respect to events or circumstances that may jeopardise the
safety or integrity of the facility and/or the purpose and benefit of verification.
Ensure that the Safety Objective established for the facility is known and pursued by parties acting on
behalf of the Client and parties providing products, processes and services covered by the verification
scope.
203

Second parties shall be obliged to:

Perform their assigned tasks in accordance with the safety objectives established for the project.
Provide the Client and DNV with all relevant information pertaining to the verification scope.
204

DNV will be obliged to:

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Inform the Client if, in the opinion of DNV, the basis for selecting the level of verification or the
assumptions made in this respect are found to be in error or assessed incorrectly.
Inform the Client of events or circumstances that, in the opinion of DNV, may jeopardise the safety or
integrity of the facility and/or the purpose and benefit of verification.
Effectively perform all verification work and adjust the level of involvement according to the actual
performance of parties providing products, processes and services covered by the verification scope.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Sec.3 Page 17

SECTION 3
SERVICE OVERVIEW
A. General
A 100 Objectives
101 The objectives of this section are to provide:
an overview of the verification activities
details of DNVs verification services for onshore LNG and Gas facilities during design, construction and
commissioning phases.

B 100 General Principles


101 The description of the process of DNVs verification of LNG and gas receiving onshore facilities is based
on distinct project phases and the recognition of key milestones.
102 Verification performed by DNV normally progresses through one or more of these project phases and
may include all or selected aspects of the project. Prior to commencement of work, the scope shall be defined
in terms of the facilities to be verified (battery limits to be specified), applicable codes and standards and
performance requirements, the agreed verification levels and phases to be covered in the Verification Plan.
103 Credit may be given in the Verification Plan, in terms of reduction in the Verification scope, for
compliance to National regulations for example EC Pressure Equipment, Machinery Directive and ATEX
Directives certified by a Notified Body. This is relevant for projects in the European Union in which the EC
Directives are applicable.
104 The risk based verification process is described in relation to the normal project phases:
Project initiation:
conceptual design.
Project Execution:

project Management
detail design
construction
manufacturing of process facilities
manufacturing and fabrication of process facilities components and assemblies
site assembly and integration
project completion (pre-commissioning)
commissioning
issue of as-built and as-installed documentation,
issue of operation manuals.

B 200 Simplified verification planning


201 The steps in the simplified verification planning are as follows:
Use trigger questions to assess the overall risk level of the project (or manageable elements thereof).
Evaluate the risk against the relevant project acceptance criteria (often this can be directly tied to the
Clients core values, objectives or a sub-set of these) and decide whether the general verification
involvement shall be Low, Medium or High.
Use the example detailed scope of work tables in Appendix B to make a first draft of a Verification Plan.
Generate the project specific Verification Plan by including a project specific engineering judgment or risk
analysis to adjust the table to suit the project.
Perform the verification execution according to the Verification Plan, making revision to the plan if and
when necessary.
Report the verification.
202
203

The trigger questions are included in Appendix A.


Generic scopes of work for verification are suggested at the three levels of verification:

low (L)
medium (M)
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B. Service Process

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 18 Sec.3

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see note on front cover

high (H).
These are given in the tables in this section.
204 Project specific detailed scope of work descriptions should be made identifying all relevant activities to
be verified. Examples of the level of detail are given in Appendix B.
205 It is the tables in this Sec.3 that give the principle difference between the levels of verification
involvement. The detailed example tables in Appendix B are to be treated as examples only. They shall not be
used without a project specific confirmation of their completeness based on an assessment of the prioritised
risks.
206 The project specific scope of work definition, derived from the tables in Appendix B (or similar), shall
be part of the final DNV verification report.
B 300 Selection of level of verification
301 The selection of the level of verification for the simplified verification planning is facilitated by the
trigger questions included in Appendix A.
B 400 Codes, standards and reference documents
401 The verification process described in this DNV-DSS is not tailored to a specific technical standard, code
or reference document.
402 It is recommended to use internationally recognised codes or standards. Where combinations of
standards and external criteria are used the exact terms of reference and documents to be issued shall be agreed
at the beginning of the project and formally defined in the contract.
403 It is strongly recommended not to mix standards due to the possible differences in safety philosophies.
The use of European standards (EN) is required for compliance to EC directives.
Guidance note:
Most standards are a coherent collection of requirements for all the relevant aspects of a process system. These
aspects, e.g. load and resistance, are normally among themselves adjusted to give an overall acceptable safety level.
To pick requirements from different standards can then easily result in unpredictable (low) levels of safety and nonuniform level of safety.
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C. Project Initiation
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C 100 Verification during conceptual design


101 Verification during the conceptual and or feasibility studies of a project and in the early stages of a
project can reduce the need for verification during the design and construction phases, and can reduce costs
during the long term operation, inspection and maintenance phases.
Table 3-1 Scope of work for initial verification plan
Verification activity
L
Review of the project conceptual design
Review of initial design
Review of environmental aspects
Review of project schedule risks
Review of business risk

Level
M H
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

D. Project Execution
D 100 General
101 All design, construction and commissioning aspects, relevant to an onshore LNG and Gas Facility, shall
be covered by a verification process.
102 In this specification the split in the scope of work between design and construction is made between sets
of performance requirements developed during design and a description of the steps necessary to satisfy the
specification (procedures) showing how construction verification activities will be implemented.
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Sec.3 Page 19

Guidance note:
The split between design and construction phases may vary, but it is useful to spend some time on the definition to
reduce interface problems later.

D 200 Verification of overall project management


201 Verification of the overall project management is the examination of the means of controlling the entire
onshore LNG and Gas Facilities development project, or the phase for which verification is undertaken.
202 This verification should confirm that the necessary controls are in place to ensure adequate information
flow across the various interfaces. It is especially important where separate contractors have been employed
for different phases of the project such as design and installation.
203 Typically, the documentation produced is expected to be in line with ISO 9000 requirements.
Table 3-2 Scope of work for verification of overall project management
Verification activity

Level
L
M
H

Review of the project management process by:


Review of project quality management
documentation.
Audit of project quality management system
Review of sub-contractor control
Review of interface controls
Review of methods of information flow including document control

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

204 The verification of the overall project management quality system and documentation is optional. The
reviews and audits should typically be performed if an extensive verification of a project is performed, while
may be omitted for smaller sub-phase verifications.
D 300 Verification during design
301 Design verification is the examination of the assumptions, methods and results of the design process and
is performed at the specified level of verification to ensure that the specified requirements of the onshore
facilities will be achieved.
302 Design verification should consist of one, or more, of the following:

review of specifications for design (asset specifications)


review of design reports and drawings
review of technology qualification program and associated results (for new technology)
performing independent calculations
audit of project quality management system
review of specifications for construction, installation and operations, resulting from design.

303 The documents that shall be produced in the project should as a minimum satisfy the requirements of the
selected code applicable for the project.
304 Definition of scope of work for verification of design should follow Table 3-3.
Table 3-3 Scope of work for verification of design
Verification activity
L
Review of specifications for design by:
Review of the design basis with emphasis on the design criteria
Review of design reports and drawings by:
Review of the main documentation to ensure that the main load conditions have been
accounted for in design, that the governing conditions are identified, and that the
chosen design philosophies are in accordance with specified codes and standards
Evaluation of the main methods used and spot checks of the input data and the
calculation results
Detailed review of main design reports
Performing independent calculations by:
Check of pressure containment or overall integrity
Simplified independent analysis and calculation(s) performed by spot checks
Advanced independent analysis and calculation(s) performed by spot checks
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Level
M
H

x
x

x
x

x
x
x

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Page 20 Sec.3

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Review of specifications for construction and operation by:


Spot check of critical aspects
Review of main specifications
Thorough review of main specifications
Review of specific operational challenges (e.g. flow assurance etc.)
general principles
Review of main documents supported by simplified analyses

x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

Guidance note:
Design verification activities may be split up between Basic Design and Detailed Design, or other sub-phases,
depending on type of contract.
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D 400 Verification during construction


401 The construction phase comprises procurement, fabrication, manufacturing, sub-unit and unit integration
testing, assembly, erection and commissioning. An important element is to ensure that the contractual design
requirements are incorporated in the purchase documentation, and that correct materials, joining and corrosion
control, have been applied, and that pressure rating, capacity and function are meeting the requirements as per
approved specifications and procedures. It is imperative that relevant preparations for this is started as early as
possible, e.g. by the appointment of a vendor supply verification co-ordinator.
402 Verification during construction is carried out by means of full time attendance, audits, inspection or spot
checks of the work, as appropriate, in sufficient detail to ensure that the specified requirements of the facility
will be achieved.
403 Verification of these activities relates not only to the contractors work but also to the monitoring of this
work carried out by others.
404 Construction verification should consist of one, or some, of the following:

reviewing the construction process


reviewing construction procedures
reviewing qualification process
surveillance during construction activities
reviewing final documentation.

405 The documents that should be produced in the project and submitted for review prior to start up are
typically:
Manufacturing Procedure Specification (MPS)
manufacturing procedures and method statements, including test requirements, test procedures and
acceptance criteria, repairs, personnel qualification records etc.
material specifications and data sheets
quality plans including Inspection and Test Plans (ITP)
Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS) and Welding Procedure Qualification Record (WPQR)
NDT procedures
Manufacturing Procedure Qualification Test (MPQT) results.
manufacturers and fabricators quality system manual.
406

The as-built documentation to be submitted after manufacturing should include but not be limited to:

manufacturing procedures including test requirements and acceptance criteria, repairs, personnel
qualification records etc.
Material certificates
production test records (visual, NDT, test samples, dimensional, heat treatment etc.)
hydrostatic test report
FAT (Final Acceptance Test) report
commissioning report.
as-built drawings
relevant statistics of chemical composition, mechanical properties and dimensions for the deliveries.
relevant logs.
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407 Definition of scope of work for verification of construction should follow Table 3-4 for manufacturing
and fabrication of critical (high-risk) components, Table 3-5 for manufacturing and fabrication of components
not considered critical, Table 3-6 for verification of site construction and Tables 3-7 and 3-8 for final testing,
pre-commissioning and completion.
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Guidance note:
Materials may be ordered with certificates of varying degrees of independent 3rd party verification (e.g. 3.2 according
to EN 10204). This can this be integrated in the overall verification activities, so as not to duplicate work.
---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e---

Verification activity

Level
M

x
x

x
x

L
Review of the manufacturing and fabrication process
Review of manufacturing and fabrication management systems
Audit of the quality management system
Review of manufacturing and fabrication procedures
Review manufacturing, fabrication and inspection procedures for confirmation of compliance with
the manufacturing specification
Review method statements
Review of qualification process
Review the Manufacturing Procedure Specification, (MPS), Manufacturing Procedure
Qualification Test (MPQT), as applicable
Full time attendance during MPQT, as applicable, or first day production
Surveillance during manufacturing and fabrication activities
Visit-based attendance during testing, to ensure, based on spot checks, that the delivered products
have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specification
Visit-based or full-time attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, based on spot
checks, that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing
specification
Full-time attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, based on spot checks, that the
delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specification
Review of final documentation

x
x

Table 3-5 Scope of work for verification of manufacturing and fabrication of non-critical components
Verification activity
L
Review of the manufacturing & fabrication process
Review of manufacturing and fabrication management systems
Review of manufacturing & fabrication procedures
Review manufacturing, fabrication and inspection procedures for confirmation of compliance
with the manufacturing specification
Review of qualification process
Review the Manufacturing Procedure Specification, (MPS), Manufacturing Procedure
Qualification Test (MPQT), if applicable
Full time attendance during MPQT, if applicable, or first day production
Surveillance during manufacturing and fabrication activities
Visit-based attendance during testing, to ensure, based on spot checks, that the delivered
products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specification
Visit-based attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, based on spot checks,
that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing
specification
Review of final documentation

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Level
M

x
x

x
x

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Table 3-4 Scope of work for verification of manufacturing and fabrication of critical equipment

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 22 Sec.3

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Table 3-6 Scope of work for verification of site construction


Verification activity

Level
M

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x

Level
M

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x

L
Review of the construction process
Review of construction management systems
Audit of the quality management system
Review of construction procedures
Spot check of construction procedures, including erection procedures
For critical operations (identified from the FMEA and HAZOP studies or QRA) review the method
statements
Review of qualification process
For critical operations, review the qualification process, e.g.
- welding
- non-destructive testing
- site heat treatment
Full time attendance during qualification tests
Surveillance during construction activities
Visit-based attendance during start of each critical operation
Full time attendance during each critical operation
Full time attendance for all construction operations
Review of final documentation

Table 3-7 Scope of work for verification of site commissioning and start-up
Verification activity
Review of the commissioning process
Review of commissioning management systems
Audit of the quality management system
Review of commissioning procedures
Spot check of commissioning procedures
For critical operations (identified from the FMEA and HAZOP studies or QRA) review the method
statements
Surveillance during commissioning activities
Visit-based attendance during start of each critical operation
Full time attendance during each critical operation
Full time attendance for all commissioning operations
Review of final documentation
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Table 3-8 Scope of work for verification of final testing for operation, including as-built survey and
project completion
Verification activity

Review of procedures
Review of the procedures for commissioning tests to ensure that the procedure adequately covers the
system in accordance with the design requirements

Level
M

Surveillance during testing and completion activities


Full time attendance during commissioning
Full time attendance during specific tests testing and audit based attendance during ongoing testing
Review of test results
Review of final documentation
Spot check of as-built documentation
Review of as-built documentation

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x
x

x
x

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Sec.3 Page 23

E. Verification Documents
E 100 General
The hierarchy of verification document is given in DNV-OSS-300 Appendix C. The descriptions of the content
of these documents as well as examples of Reporting templates are given in Appendix C to this specification.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 24 App.A

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

APPENDIX A
SELECTION OF VERIFICATION LEVEL
A. General
A 100 General principles
101 The selection of the level of verification depends on the risk level of each of the elements that have an
impact on the management of risks to the asset.
102 Verification shall direct greatest effort at those elements of the asset where the risk is highest and whose
failure or reduced performance will have the most significant impact on the project objective and goals, e.g.:
safety risks
environmental risks
business risks.
103

Suitable selection factors include, but are not limited to, the:
overall safety and other objectives for the asset
risks associated with the asset and the measures taken to reduce these risks
degree of technical innovation in the asset
experience of the contractors
quality management systems for the Project and its contractors.

104 Due to the diversity of various installation facilities, their contents, their degree of innovation, the
geographic location, etc, it is not possible to give precise guidelines on how to decide what level of verification
is appropriate for each particular LNG and gas receiving onshore facility.
105 Therefore, guidance is given as a series of questions that should be answered when deciding the
appropriate level of verification for an onshore gas facility. This list is not exhaustive and other questions
should be added to the list if appropriate for a particular onshore gas facility.
106 It must be emphasised that the contribution of each element should be judged qualitatively and/or
quantitatively. Wherever possible quantified risk assessment data should be used to provide a justifiable basis
for any decisions made.
107 Depending of the stage of the project, the activities may not have taken place yet in which case the
questions can also be posed in another form, i.e. Is . planned to be?

B. Trigger Questions
B 100 Overall project objective and goals
a) Does the overall verification objective address the main project objectives?
b) Does the verification objective establish acceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the Client?
c) Is this risk (depending on the onshore LNG and gas facility and its location) measured in terms of safety,
as well as environmental, economic and reputation consequences?
B 200 Assessment of risk
a) Has a systematic review been carried out to identify and evaluate the probabilities and consequences of
failures in the onshore gas facilities?
b) Has this review judged the contribution of each element qualitatively and or quantitatively and used, where
possible, quantified risk assessment data to provide a justifiable basis for any decisions made?
c) Does the extent of the review reflect the risk level of the (onsite and offsite) onshore gas installation, the
planned operation and previous experience with similar facilities?
d) Does this review identify the risk to the operation of the onshore gas facilities and to the health and safety
of personnel associated with it or in its vicinity?
e) Has the extent of the identified risks been reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable by means of
one or both of:
reduction in the probability of failure?
mitigation of the consequences of failure?
f) Has the result of the systematic review of the risks been measured against the Clients safety (or other)
objective?
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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.A Page 25

g) Has the result of this review been used in the selection of the appropriate verification activity level?
B 300 Technical innovation
a) Has the degree of technical innovation in the onshore gas facilities been considered?
b) Has it been considered that risks to the onshore gas facilities are likely to be greater with a high degree of
technical innovation than with an onshore gas facility designed, manufactured and installed to well-known
criteria in well-known locations?
c) Have factors been considered in the selection of the appropriate verification level such as:
Degree of difficulty in achieving technical requirements.
Knowledge of similar onshore LNG and gas facilities
Effect of the new onshore LNG and gas facility on the surrounding area.
B 400 Contractors experience

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a) Has the degree of risk to the onshore LNG and gas facilities been considered where design, construction or
installation contractors are inexperienced?
b) Has the degree of risk been considered where the contractors are experienced but not in similar work?
c) Has the degree of risk been considered where the work schedule is tight?
B 500 Quality management systems
a) Have all parties involved in the onshore LNG and gas facilities implemented an adequate quality
management system to ensure that gross errors in the work are limited?
b) Do these parties include the:

client?
design contractor?
construction contractors?
installation contractor?
operator?

c) Do the factors being considered when evaluating the adequacy of the quality management system include:

Whether or not an ISO 9000 or equivalent certified system is in place?


Results from external audits?
Results from internal audits?
Experience with contractors previous work?
Project work force familiarity with the quality management system?

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Page 26 App.B

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

APPENDIX B
GENERIC DETAILED VERIFICATION SCOPES OF WORK TABLES
A. Purpose
A 100 Introduction
101 This appendix gives the format of the generic detailed scope of work tables for onshore LNG and Gas
facilities.
102 The Verification Plan shall be developed based on the tables provided in this Appendix. The Tables shall
be supplemented and updated by input from Project Risk Assessments when developing the Plan.
103 The appropriate level of verification involvement based on the principles outlined in Sec.3, is further
defined in the Verification Plan.
104 For gas facilities with aspects or components not covered in this Appendix, similar tables, with the same
degree of detail, shall be developed.

B. Critical Elements
B 100 Critical Elements and Components
101 Based on the results of the HAZID, HAZOP or other risk assessments, gas facilities are likely to have
many or most of the critical elements listed in 104 below.
102 Verification of design is broken down into consideration of these critical elements and components in
isolation but the many interactions between them must not be forgotten.
103 Typical Critical Elements for an onshore LNG and gas facilities are shown in Table B-1. These Critical
Elements shall be modified to suit a specific facility and the Project Objectives.
Table B-1 Onshore LNG and Gas facilities - Typical Critical Elements and associated components
Critical Elements
Layout

Inherent Safety
Hydrocarbon Inventory/
Measures
Leak Source Minimisation
Offloading and Loading
Facilities Integrity

Hazard
Prevention
Measures

Process Facilities Integrity

Dropped Object and Impact


Protection

Control of Ignition
Hazard
Detection and
Control
Measures

Fire and Gas Detection


Control Room
HVAC

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Component
Area classification
All
Ship-Shore Interface
Loading Arms and Transfer Facilities
LNG Transfer Pipelines
Jetty and Moorings
Support Structures and Foundations
Relief Valves and Relief System
Process Systems
Cryogenic Pressure Vessels, Piping and Equipment
Non-Cryogenic Pressure Vessels, Piping and Equipment
LNG Storage Tanks
Critical components
Bunding and Drains
Fired Heaters, Hot Surfaces and Exhaust
Electrical items (explosion proof rating, electromagnetic
compatibility,
ingress protection)
Lightning Protection, Static and Earthing
Smoke and Gas Detection for Site Buildings
Fire and Gas Detection - External Areas
Fire and Gas Detection - Machinery Enclosures
Fire and Gas Control System
Control Systems
Ventilation System, Fire Dampers pressurised enclosures
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Function

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 27

Table B-1 Onshore LNG and Gas facilities - Typical Critical Elements and associated components
Function

Hazard
Mitigation
Measures

Emergency
Response
Measures

Environmental
Protection

Critical Elements

Component
Fire Water Storage
Firewater Pumps
Firewater Distribution Ring main
Active Fire Fighting Systems
Firewater and Foam Supply
Gaseous Fire Fighting Systems
Fire-fighting Vehicles
Blast and Passive Fire Protection Critical components
Bunding and Drainage
Closed drains, open drains, tank bunds
Blowdown & Flare System
Flare, Blowdown valves, knock-out drum, relief valves
ESD
Control System
Emergency Shutdown System
(ESD)
Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)
Personnel Protection, Breathing Apparatus
Egress and Evacuation System
Escape Routes
Muster Area
Emergency Lighting
Emergency Services
Emergency Power, uninterruptible power supply
Emergency Communications and Alarms
Emission and Waste Control
Emission and Discharge Controls
Systems
Waste Heat Recovery
Waste Heat Recovery Units

104 The following Tables P1 to P7, C1 to C4, M1, E1 to E3 and N1 provide a template of verification
activities which can be used for Verification activity planning. These give generic performance requirements
and verification activities for typical Critical Elements:

P1 Support Structures and Foundations


P2 Installation Layout
P2 Non-Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and Equipment
P4 Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and Equipment
P5 LNG Tanks
P6 Open Hazardous Drains
P7 Pressure Relief Systems
C1 Ignition Prevention and Control System
C2 Emergency Shutdown System
C3 Blowdown System
C4 Fire and Gas System
M1 Fire and Blast Protection Systems
E1 Emergency Power System Supply
E2 Emergency Escape and Evacuation
E3 Emergency Communications
N1 Environmental Protection

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Page 28 App.B

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Table P1 Support Structures


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY
Support Structures

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: The objectives of the Structural Integrity performance requirement are:


1) To ensure that foundations will adequate support of surface structures and equipment
2) To ensure that surface structures are able to support the weight of the installation facilities and equipment and transfer
all operating and environmental loads to the foundations;
- support escape routes to allow personnel to escape from the process Installation to the muster areas and then evacuate
to a place of safety;
- prevent escalation following a major accident by maintaining the integrity of equipment supports;
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Foundations of support structures include the following major items of equipment:
a) Slug catcher b) Storage tanks (Condensate, LPG, LNG) c) Major Rotating Equipment d) Buildings (local and central
control room),
e) Critical Utility Systems (electricity, heating and cooling, fuel gas) f) Flare Stack g) Pipe rack in process area
h) Firewater retention pond bund i) Scrubbers j) Columns (distillation, contactors, wash) k) Vaporizers
l) Major Heat Exchangers (cold box) m) Condensors n) Stair towers and escape routes
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design of Onshore Installations
EN1992 Design of Concrete Structures
EN1993 Design of Steel Structures
EN1994 Design of Composite Steel and Concrete Structures
NFPA 59A Standard for Production, Storage and handling of Liquefied Natural Gas
EN14620-1, Design and Manufacture of Site Built Vertical Cylindrical Flat bottomed Steel Tanks for the Storage of
Refrigerated Liquefied Gases with operating temperatures between 0C and -165C Part 1 General

Foundations to be designed
such that they adequately
support the structures under all
realistic loading conditions as
per code requirements for:

Document Types: Phase

Verification Activity

- Basis of Design
- Detail design
calculations
(including
computer input/
slug catcher
output if
storage tanks (condensate, applicable)
Design
LPG, LNG)
- Soil or
major rotating equipment Geotechnical
buildings
reports
critical utility systems
- AFC
flare stack
foundation
pipe-racks/supports
drawings
firewater retention pond
bund
scrubbers
columns
vaporizers
re-condensors
major heat exchangers
(cold box)
Method
stair towers and escape
Statements
routes
ITP
Material
Construction
Guidance: Heat tracing
Certificates
system to prevent frost heave of Concrete
LNG Tank foundations is a
Strength Test
critical system which requires Records
sufficient reliability.

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Confirm by review of civil foundation design that the


foundation will adequately support the structure
under all realistic loading conditions. Including the
following as relevant to the specific foundation
design:
Review foundation piling design for a given soil
condition for the maximum and minimum governing
loading cases. Check:
Resistance to differential settlement
Sliding resistance if relevant
Frost heave of tank foundations to be avoided if
relevant
Seismic/earthquake
Review design of concrete foundation base,
reinforcement requirements and check that the
material specified is suitable
Review foundation construction drawings for
compliance with the design
Design of tank connections to foundation base.
Review construction procedures for piling, pile caps
and rafts to confirm compatibility with industry
practice
Confirm by audit that the properties and origin of
materials for piles, pile caps and rafts (steel,
reinforcement, aggregates, concrete mixes) are
according to specifications and/or as specified on
drawings.
Review records and monitor construction to:
Confirm that pile layout, position, dimensions and
depths are in accordance with design;
Confirm by sampling review of test results that
strength of concrete piles, pile-caps, rafts meet
minimum requirements.

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Performance Requirement
Specification
Foundations

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Performance Requirement
Specification
Support Structures

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 29

Document Types: Phase

Design

Support against all loading


anticipated through the design
life of the installation:
flare structure
process equipment
pipe-work supports
firewater retention pond bund

Basis of Design
Load analysis
Detail design
calculations
(including
computer input
& output if
applicable)
Drawings

Guidance: Loads include


environmental, dead loads, live
loads, accidental loads as
specified in the risk
assessment, seismic and
operational loads

Method
Statements
ITP
WPQR and NDT
Records
Fabrication
Dossiers

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Verification Activity

Confirm by review of design basis that all relevant


design conditions are being considered, the correct
loads have been combined for each load case, and the
load combinations and allowable limits conform to
the requirements of an applicable and recognised
code.
Review Mooring Analysis to ensure that the loads for
the range of vessels anticipated to berth at the Jetty are
considered for design.
Confirm by review of the structural analyses, weight
reports and environmental data or by independent
analysis that:

the loads and load cases identified in the design


basis for all the design conditions have been
correctly incorporated
the thermal loads induced by the flare radiation
have been correctly assessed and included in the
Design
load combinations
in conjunction with the structural drawings that
the structural and material properties have been
correctly assessed and incorporated
the response to the applied loads has been
correctly assessed and stresses do not exceed the
values specified in the code specified in the
design basis
suitable materials have been specified.
Review fabrication specification for the support
Construction structures to confirm that it is compatible with the
relevant industry practice
Confirm by surveillance that the properties and origin
all materials within this CE are assured and that
Construction of
material properties are at least equivalent to those
specified in the fabrication drawings.
Review records and monitor fabrication to:
Confirm compliance with the design and
fabrication specification with any deviation
documented & justified and that dimensions are
within tolerances defined in the specification.
Construction Confirm that welding procedures are in
accordance with the fabrication specification.
Confirm by document review that NDT and
inspections are being carried out in accordance
with the requirements of the fabrication
specification and design requirements.

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Page 30 App.B

Performance Requirement
Specification

Document Types: Phase

Design
Support structures for
enclosures with critical
functions or containing critical
equipment or normally
occupied by people shall
maintain integrity for the time QRA
required to complete their
FERA
safety critical actions under:
Fire and Blast
Structural
(a) fire loading and following analyses
PFP
a design explosion [as
Specifications
defined in the FERA].
Plastic deformation is
acceptable providing
integrity is maintained
(b) other accidental events as
specified in the design
basis or as required in
code requirements.
(c) accidental spillage of
LNG and cryogenic
liquids causing brittle
Method
fracture
Statements
ITP
Specifications
Product
Certificates

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Verification Activity
Review the FERA (or other appropriate study) to
confirm that fire and blast scenarios and fire and blast
loads are appropriate. Confirm that these scenarios
have been incorporated into the design basis.

Confirm by review of safety studies that the time


required for essential safety equipment to complete
Design
safety critical actions has
a) been identified; and
b) been considered in the design
Confirm by review of the fire and blast structural
analyses that the structure is adequate or has adequate
Design
PFP to withstand the scenarios identified in the
FERA, for the required period, and conforms to the
requirements of a recognised code.
Confirm by review of PFP specification and reports
Design
(type approval certificates, test reports etc) that PFP
specified is adequate and sufficient.
Confirm that support structures and escape ways that
maybe exposed to accidental spillage of LNG (if
considered a credible event) are protected against
Design
brittle failure if failure of such structures can result in
escalation. e.g.
water curtain, drip trays, thermal protection of steel
structures.
Confirm by monitoring and review of records that
measures to provide protection from blast
Construction overpressure, fire (PFP) and LNG spillage have been
implemented and conform to the structural drawings.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 31

Table P2 - Installation Layout


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS
CONTAINMENT
Installation Layout

Prevention

OBJECTIVES: The layout of facilities in the Installation shall:

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

Ensure safe working conditions and access for personnel and equipment for operation and maintenance.
Prevent ignition by separation of ignition sources from fuel sources and non hazardous area from hazardous area
(Note: Hazardous area classification is addressed in HSE Critical Element P7 Ignition Prevention and Control).
Minimise the consequence of fire and explosion, in particular with respect to escalation and ease of access for fire
fighting personnel and equipment.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
All equipment and unit layouts within installation battery limits.
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
NFPA 59A
EN1473
IP part 15

Fire Zone limits shall be


selected such that the
consequences of a fire, a
flammable gas leak or an
explosion corresponding to the
credible event likely to occur
in the concerned fire zone shall
not impact other fire zones to
an extent where their integrity
could be put at risk.
Areas affected permanently by
normal operation of the
facility or exceptionally by the
consequences of an
emergency situation caused by
a major failure shall be
designated as Restricted
Areas which shall be
confined to within the
boundaries and control of the
Installation.
Guidance: Areas affected
permanently implies areas
defined by flare and vent
dispersion and radiation by
Hazardous Area
Classification or by
legislation.

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Document Types:

Phase

HAZID Study
Safety Concept
Impacted, Restricted Design
Area and Fire Zone
Layout
HAZID Study
Safety Concept
Impacted, Restricted Design
Area and Fire Zone
Layout
HAZID/HAZOP
Study
Safety Concept
Impacted, Restricted
Area and Fire Zone Design
Layout
Installation and
Equipment Plot
Plans
HAZID Study
Safety Concept
Impacted, Restricted
Area and Fire Zone Design
Layout
Installation and
Equipment Plot
Plans

Verification Activity
Confirm by review of the scenarios taken in the
HAZID Study that all worst case and fire zone limit
defining cases have been correctly selected and
modelled as required.
Confirm by review of the HAZID Study results
against the fire zone layout plots and fire zone
safety distance layouts that all appropriate fire zone
safety distances have been complied with, unless
deviations are noted and approved. Compliance
shall be confirmed with respect to the above
relevant Project Specifications.
Confirm by review of the scenarios considered in
the HAZID Study that all worst case and restricted
area defining cases have been correctly selected
and modelled as required.
Confirm by review that simultaneous operations
(e.g. maintenance activities, truck loading) cannot
cause additional unacceptable situations.
Confirm by review that all buildings and
equipment located within the Restricted Areas are
correctly identified as being suitable for the
applicable Restricted Area requirements.
Restricted areas extending beyond the Installation
boundary shall be adequately addressed through
Risk Assessment.
The criteria for equipment and buildings design
when located inside the restricted areas are
provided in the relevant project specifications.

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Performance Requirement
Specification

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 32 App.B

Performance Requirement
Specification

Document Types:

Safety Concept
Installation and
Facility, equipment and
equipment Plot
building layout shall meet the Plans
general requirements of the
Safety Concept
Client.
Building Layouts
Plot Plans
Safety Concept
Working
environment
Installation and
equipment
Building Layouts
Plot Plans
Working platforms,
walkways, stairs, step-ladders,
guard-rails and fixed ladders
shall meet the safety
requirements of the Client and
local regulations.
Construction
drawings

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Phase

Design

Design

Design

Verification Activity
Confirm by review of Installation equipment
layouts that minimum spacing requirement with
respect to the project requirements are complied
with.
Confirm by review of building area layouts that
general spacing and equipment locations comply
with the minimum project requirements.
Confirm by review of Installation equipment and
building area layouts that minimum fixed means of
access requirement with respect to the project and
regulatory requirements are complied with.

Review Specification for Fabrication and


Construction of the Installation and building area
and confirm that it is in compliance with
specifications or compatible with industry practice.
satisfactory level of inspection and possible
Construction measurement will be performed by all parties;
fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance
with Specification for Fabrication and Installation
Confirm by review of Installation equipment and
buildings that Hazardous layout on site complies
with all project requirements.

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Table P3 Non-cryogenic pressure vessels, piping & equipment


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS
HAZARD MANAGEMENT
CONTAINMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment
Non-Cryogenic Pressure Vessels, Piping and Equipment

OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective pressure containment systems and process equipment that shall
eliminate or minimise likelihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Pressure vessels, storage tanks, equipment and pipe-work where significant levels of hydrocarbon are present or could
be present during normal operations. Significant is defined as those vessels, pipe-work or equipment requiring active
mitigation in the event of loss of containment.
The process installation equipment including pressure vessels heat exchangers and process equipment are those
associated with the following systems: Slug-catcher, Pig Launcher / Receivers, Inlet Separator, Gas Conditioning, Gas
Compression, Condensate Stabilisation and Storage, LPG Storage, Chemical Storage, Fuel Gas, Produced Water, Closed
Drains and Hot Oil System
- Safety Critical Rotating Equipment are as follows: Condensate Pumps, Gas Compressors, Flare Liquid Pumps, Diesel
/ Hydraulic / Lube Oil Pumps, Methanol Pumps, Produced Water and Closed Drains Pumps.
- The Safety Critical Pressure Vessels are those associated with the following systems: Scrubbers, Gas Coolers, Gas
Conditioning (Amine unit, Molecular Sieve unit, Sulphur recovery unit)
- The Safety Critical Tanks are those associated with the following systems: Condensate Storage Tanks, Closed Drains
Collection Tank, Methanol Storage & Diesel (large volumes).
- Piping systems refers to all pipe-work, fittings, flanges, manual valves, tubing, flexible hoses, etc. downstream of the
inlet isolation valve associated with the following systems:
- Process Gas, Fuel Gas, Relief, Vent and Flare, Diesel, Hydraulic and Lube Oil, Chemicals, Hot-oil Systems, Cooling
Medium System, Produced Water and Closed Drains.
Notes: Piping Systems in high-pressure utility systems (e.g. Utility Air) are considered Safety Critical if their failure is
likely to damage the hydrocarbon envelope in the immediate vicinity.
For the ESD Valves the process containment is covered in C1 Emergency Shutdown Systems

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 33

RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
- project specific documents
- Regulatory requirements
- International standards
Pressure Vessels:
ASME VIII
PD5500
Heat Exchangers:

API 660 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service
API 661 Air Cooled Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service
API 662 Plate Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service
ASME VIII
TEMA

Rotating Equipment:

API 610 Centrifugal Pumps for Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries
API 611 General Purpose Steam Turbines for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Industry Services
API 616 Gas Turbines for the Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries
API 617 Centrifugal Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries
API 618 Reciprocating Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries
API 672 Packaged Integrally Geared Centrifugal Air Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service
Industries

Tanks:
API 620 Design and Construction of Large, welded, Low pressure storage tanks
API 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage
API RP 686 Recommended Practices for Machinery Installation and Installation Design
API 2510 Design and Construction of LPG Installations
Piping Systems: ASME B31.3
Relief Systems: API 14C
ASME B31 Standards of Pressure Piping
EN13480 Metallic Industrial Piping

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Page 34 App.B

Performance
Requirement
Specification
The process facilities
shall safely contain all
hydrocarbons at the
maximum and minimum
foreseeable pressures,
design temperatures and
operating forces.

- Materials

Document Types: Phase

Design Basis
PFDs
P&IDS
Line List

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Verification Activity
Confirm by review of process basis of design, PFDs, line
lists and P&IDs that specified design conditions are
correct for all lines and equipment.

Design

P&IDs
Piping Class
Specification
Material
Design
Selection Report
Material
Specifications

Review material selection and corrosion control


philosophies and coating specifications to confirm that
piping class is suitable for the worst case conditions, that
suitable allowance for internal corrosion is specified and
that significant external corrosion is prevented by
suitable protective coatings.
Review piping design to confirm that:

- Piping

Stress Analysis
Reports
Design
ISOs
Critical Line List

- Critical Equipment
Packages

Supplier Data
FAT Reports
Manufacturer
Dossiers

Procurement

- Bulk Items

Supplier Data

Procurement

the correct design conditions are considered


suitable criteria are set for identifying which
systems/lines require calculations of stresses
the criteria has been correctly applied in accordance
with the appropriate design codes
there is sufficient piping flexibility inherent in the
design.
Review of recognised Independent Third Party
Certification and design data to confirm that all procured
safety critical equipment have been designed,
constructed and tested in accordance with a recognised
international code or standard.
Review manufacturing records and quality certification
to confirm all bulk items (fittings, flanges etc) have been
designed and fabricated to a recognised international
code or standard.

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Performance
Requirement
Specification

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 35

Document Types: Phase

Method
Statements
Procedures
ITPs

- Storage Tanks
(Non-Cryogenic)

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Systems shall be
provided with adequate
and appropriate safety
devices to prevent
overpressure or other
process deviations
which may result in
unsafe operation
(including exposure to
excessive temperatures
and fire).

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Method
Statements
ITPs
WPQR
Material
Certificates
Test Packs
Commissioning
reports

Design Basis
Design Reports
Material
Specifications
P&IDs
Method
Statements
ITPs
WPQR
Material
Certificates
HAZOP
HAZID
Thermal Relief
Study
Surge Analysis
Report
PSV Data Sheets
P&IDs
P&IDs
ITPs
Test Procedures

Construction

Construction

Design

Construction

Design

Verification Activity
Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation and
Testing of the Installation and confirm that it is in
compliance with specifications or compatible with
industry practice.
satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by all
parties;
fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with
Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing of
Piping
Survey to confirm that:
the equipment nozzles are installed in
accordance with design, and any deviations
documented and justified
the piping system is installed in accordance with the
design and any deviations have been documented
and justified including stress analysis where
necessary
all piping systems are fabricated and pressure tested
in accordance with the design, and any deviations
documented and justified
piping spools are installed and that field welds are
completed and tested in accordance with the design,
and any deviations documented and justified
hydrocarbon containment systems installed are leak
tested and proof tested satisfactorily.
Confirm by review of design documentation that any
hydrocarbon containing storage tanks have been
designed in accordance with a recognised code or
standard.
Confirm by survey that any hydrocarbon containing
storage tanks have been fabricated in accordance with the
design documentation and fabrication is to the required
project specification.
Confirm by review of P&IDs and HAZOP Study that
adequate and appropriate safety devices to prevent
overpressure resulting from process upsets (including
blocked outlet, excessive temperature or fire exposure)
which may result in unsafe operation are specified and
comply with specifications.

Confirm by inspection that all piping components and


Commissioning safety devices are correctly installed in accordance with
P&IDs, correctly calibrated and set points are correct.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 36 App.B

Performance
Requirement
Specification
Rotating equipment to
be provided with
adequate seal system to
prevent loss of
containment of
hydrocarbon.

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Document Types: Phase

Supplier Data
Vendor P&IDs

All hydrocarbon
containment noncryogenic equipment
and piping with the
potential to give rise to
significant escalation
hazards are to withstand
the effects of an
explosion followed by
fire impingement with
no loss of containment
before the Installation
Safety Studies
inventory has been
reduced to a safe level
(blowdown is complete)
and personnel have
escaped to a place of
safety.
.
Guidance: plastic
deformation is
acceptable providing
there is no loss of
integrity and no low
cycle fatigue failure.

Verification Activity

Confirm by review of specifications that rotating


equipment has adequate seal systems provided and that
Design
appropriate monitoring is provided with necessary
executive actions specified.
Confirm by review of commissioning records that
rotating equipment have adequate seal systems provided
Commissioning
and appropriate monitoring is provided and executive
actions are undertaken as specified by design.
Review the safety studies to confirm that the proposed
Design
fire and explosion loadings are justified.
Confirm by design review of equipment details, layout
drawings and details of passive fire protection that
specified equipment will survive specified explosion
Design
overpressure and fire impingement with no loss of
containment in the period while the Installation
inventory is being reduced to a safe level (blowdown is
complete) and personnel are escaping.
Confirm by inspection and review of records that any
required passive fire protection has been installed as per
the design.

Testing &
Commissioning

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 37

Table P4 Cryogenic vessels, equipment and piping


HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective cryogenic fluid containment systems and equipment that shall
eliminate or minimise likelihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment.
(Cryogenic vessels, storage tanks, equipment and pipe-work where significant levels of LNG are present or could be
present during normal operations.)
Significant is defined as those vessels, pipe-work or equipment requiring active mitigation in the event of loss of
containment.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
LNG Loading Arms
Heat Exchangers (Vaporisers, Re-condensors, shell and tube- plate fin, spiral wound)
Process Vessels (Scrubbers, Separators, Columns)
Piping and valves
Cold Boxes
Rotating Equipment (Pumps, Turbo compressors and expanders)
Refrigerant and liquid Nitrogen Storage
Note: LNG Storage Tanks are covered by separate Table P5
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
EN1160 Installations and equipment for liquefied natural gas General characteristics of liquefied natural gas
EN1474-1 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design and testing of loading/unloading arms
EN1532 Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas ship to shore interface
EN1473
NFPA 59A
EN12567 Industrial Valves Isolating Valves for LNG Specification for suitability and approval verification test
(EN1626 Cryogenic Vessels, valves for cryogenic service, EN12300 Cryogenic vessels, cleanliness for cryogenic
service, BS6364 Valves for cryogenic service)
EN ISO 10497 Testing of valves Fire type-testing requirements
ASME VIII div 2
ASME B31.3
Pressure Equipment Directive (only applicable in the EU)
API520 and API521

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HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS


CONTAINMENT
Cryogenic Vessels, Equipment and Piping

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 38 App.B

Performance Requirement
Specification
LNG Loading Facilities

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Document Types Phase

Verification Activity

Confirm by review of design basis and hazard studies


that the design philosophy is in compliance with the
requirements prescribed in a recognized design
standard (EN 1474-1, SIGGTO or relevant code)
Design basis
Hazard studies

Confirm by Technology qualification or for proven


design a review of design documentations (reports,
design basis, material specifications) that marine
transfer arms are designed in accordance with a
recognized design standard (EN 1474-1 or relevant
code)
The review should comprise:

Design code
Design reports
(calculations
and analysis for
all components Design
of marine
transfer system)
Material
specification
Drawings
Critical
Equipment list

Marine transfer arms


Marine transfer arms shall
load or unload the LNG and
the vapour return in a safe and
controlled manner between
LNG carrier and the onshore
LNG Installation

structural design
pressure containment, including thermal and
hydraulic loads
- swivel joints
- valves, connectors
- materials, fittings, piping.

Purchase
requisitions
Supplier Data
FAT Reports
Manufacturer
Dossiers
ITPs

Method
Statements
Procedures
ITPs

Procurement

Construction

motion envelope
ESD and Safety system, including the ship shore
interface
hydraulic and electric control system
electrical systems, cables
accessories.
Review of purchase requisitions for compliance with
the design basis.
Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation
and Testing of the Marine transfer arms and confirm
that it is in compliance with specifications or
compatible with industry practice.
Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by
all involved parties; review of recognised
Independent Third Party Certification and design
data to confirm that the Marine transfer arms have
been designed, constructed and tested in accordance
with a recognised international code or standard.
Monitoring, fabrication, assembly and testing of
loading arms for compliance with the design basis.
Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation
and Testing of the Marine transfer arms and confirm
that it is in compliance with specifications or
compatible with industry practice.
satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by
all parties;
fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with
Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing
Survey to confirm that:

the equipment is installed in accordance with


design, and any deviations documented and
justified.
all piping is fabricated and pressure tested in
accordance with the design, and any deviations
documented and justified.
all safety systems are installed inspected and
tested.
Confirm
by review of test protocols and acceptance
Test protocols
criteria that these are in accordance with the protocols
and acceptances
criteria
Commissioning and acceptance criteria specified in a recognized
design standard (EN 1474 -1 or relevant code)
Commissioning
Witness SAT in accordance with the relevant design
reports
code.
ITPs
WPQR
Material
Construction
Certificates
Commissioning
reports

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Performance Requirement
Specification
Vaporisers

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 39

Document Types Phase

Supplier data/
Data Sheets
Design Code

For all types of vaporizers


(water stream open rack/
closed, intermediate fluid
atmospheric water bath/forced
flow condenser vaporizer,
submerged combustion and
atmospheric vaporizer);
systems shall be provided to
control the vaporisers
operational process
parameters in a safe and
controlled manner.

The vaporizer shall safely


contain all hydrocarbons at
the maximum and minimum
foreseeable pressures, design
temperatures and operating
forces.

Confirm by review of design basis and specifications


that the design philosophy is in compliance with the
requirements prescribed in a recognized design
standard (e.g. EN1473)
Confirm by review of specifications that the
vaporiser has appropriate monitoring and executive
actions are undertaken as specified
The review should comprise:

Design

Vaporiser gas outlet temperature and water flow


rate (open rack type)
Flow rate and temperature of the water (closed
type, forced flow type)
-Methods
Design
Water bath temperature and heat supply
-HSE
(atmospheric water bath)
-Operation
Intermediate flow rate and LNG temp at outlet
Manuals
(condenser/vaporiser type)
Bath water temperature and level, gas outlet
temperature, extinction of flame, gas detection in
incoming air, air fan tripping (submerged
combustion type vaporiser),
Confirm by review of commissioning records that the
specific vaporiser has appropriate monitoring and
executive actions are undertaken as specified by
- ITP
design.
For example with respect to Submerged combustion
Commissioning
Commissioning
type vaporisers that the water pH is regularly
reports
monitored, safety devices that initiate shutdown are
implemented and a program for testing of legionella
and a plan to avoid bacterial growth is in place.
Review of purchase requisitions for compliance with
the design basis.
Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation
and Testing of the Vaporiser and confirm that it is in
compliance with specifications or compatible with
industry practice.
-Supplier Data
Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by
-Data Sheets
Procurement
all involved parties; Review of recognised
-Procurement
Independent Third Party Certification and design
specifications
data to confirm that the Vaporiser will be designed,
constructed and tested in accordance with a
recognised international code or standard.
Monitoring fabrication, assembly and testing of
loading arms for compliance with the design basis.
Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation
and Testing of the Vaporiser and confirm that it is in
-FAT
compliance with specifications or compatible with
-ITP
industry practice.
-Drawings
Design
Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by
-Material
all parties;
Certificates
fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with
-WPQR
Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing
Survey to confirm that:
P&IDs
Specifications

-Fabrication
Dossiers

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Verification Activity

Construction

the equipment is installed in accordance with


design, and any deviations documented and
justified.
all piping and components are fabricated and
pressure tested in accordance with the design,
and any deviations documented and justified.
all safety systems are installed inspected and
tested.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 40 App.B

Performance Requirement
Specification
To avoid over-pressure, any
vaporiser that could be
isolated shall be served with
sufficient, adequately sized,
relief devices such that the
system may not be overpressured.
Cold Boxes

Document Types Phase

Verification Activity
See verification activity P7 Pressure Relief Systems

-Drawings
-Insulation
specifications
Cold Box are to be designed
and fabricated to contain the
equipment and provide
containment of insulation

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Review specifications and drawings from supplier


covering insulation material and insulation
containment
Review Cold Box fabrication to confirm:

Design

-Material
Certificates
-Drawings
-ITP
-FAT
-Fabrication
dossier

--`,,,,``,`,``,`,,,,,`````,,,,,`-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

Verify the identity of the components being


installed within the Cold box
Suitable materials have been used
Construction
Compliance with the design and fabrication
specification with any deviation documented and
justified and that dimensions are within
tolerances defined in the specification
Review
Cold Box design to ensure:
Cold box to be provided with
-Drawings
Design
That appropriate safety relief (e.g. burst disc or vent
adequate and appropriate
panels) is installed
safety devises to prevent
overpressure within Cold Box
Verify that appropriate safety relief (e.g. burst disc or
-Drawings
Construction
enclosure
vent panels) is installed
Rotating equipment (Pumps and Turbo compressors/expanders)
Review purchase requisitions for Rotating equipment
Review mechanical interface with connected
-Design code
equipment and support
-Drawings
Review control and safety system
-Data sheets
Design
Confirm by review of specifications that rotating
-Critical
equipment has adequate seal systems provided and
Equipment List
that appropriate monitoring is provided with
necessary executive actions specified
Review Rotating equipment manufacturing dossiers
to confirm:
Rotating equipment are to be
according to manufacturers
code and requirements and
provided with adequate seal
system (where relevant) to
prevent loss of containment of
hydrocarbon.

-Material
Certificates
-Drawings
-FAT
-Fabrication
dossier

Construction

Supplier Data
Vendor P&IDs

Specified materials have been used


Compliance with the design and fabrication
specification with any deviation documented and
justified and that dimensions are within
tolerances defined in the specification
FAT are performed and fulfil project
specifications
Where relevant, CE mark certificates are
available

Guidance: DNV CMC procedures to be followed


where relevant.
Confirm by review of commissioning records that
rotating equipment have adequate seal systems
Commissioning provided and appropriate monitoring is provided and
executive actions are undertaken as specified by
design.

Valves
The cryogenic valves shall
safely contain all
hydrocarbons at the maximum
and minimum foreseeable
pressures, design
temperatures and operating
forces.

Design code
Supplier Data

Procurement

Method
Statements
Procedures
ITPs

Design

Review manufacturing records and quality


certification to confirm that the valves have been
designed and fabricated to a recognised international
code or standard.
Review valve design to confirm that:
the correct design conditions are considered
the criteria has been correctly applied in
accordance with the appropriate design codes.

Relief valves

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 41

Performance Requirement
Document Types Phase
Specification
Thermal relief valves for the
protection of equipment,
piping and hoses from overpressure resulting from
Material
ambient heat input to blocked Specifications
in LNG or other light
hydrocarbon liquids shall be
installed.
Re-condensors
Design code
Supplier Data
The Re-condensors shall
safely contain all
hydrocarbons at the maximum Drawings
and minimum foreseeable
pressures, design
temperatures and operating
-Material
forces.
Certificates
-Drawings
-FAT
-Fabrication
dossier(s)

Verification Activity
Ensure material compatibility for low temperature
application.
In addition, see verification activity P7 Pressure
Relief Systems

Procurement

Review of recognised Independent Third Party


Certification and design data to confirm that the Recondensors have been designed, constructed and
tested in accordance with a recognised international
code or standard.
Review re-condenser design to confirm that:
the correct design conditions are considered
the criteria has been correctly applied in
accordance with the appropriate design codes.
Review Re-condensors fabrication to confirm:

Design

Construction

Suitable materials have been used


Compliance with the design and fabrication
specification with any deviation documented and
justified and that dimensions are within
tolerances defined in the specification.

Heat Exchangers

Design

Suitable materials are specified including


cryogenic temperatures
Design calculations including thermal stresses
Review mechanical interface with connected
equipment and support
Review pressure relief system.
Review Heat Exchanger manufacturing dossiers to
confirm:
Material
certificates
Drawings
FAT
Fabrication
Dossier

Construction

Specified materials have been used


That compliance with design and fabrication
specification with any deviation documented and
justified and that dimensions are within
tolerances defined in the specification
FAT are performed and fulfil project
specifications
Where relevant, CE mark certificates are
available.

Pressure Vessels (for refrigerants)

Design
Specifications

Design

See verification activity P3 Non Cryogenic


Pressure Vessels and Equipment
Confirm by review of design basis that all relevant
design conditions are being considered:
Thermal stresses
Mechanical properties at low temperatures.

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Design
Specifications
Drawings

For Shell and Tube heat exchangers - See verification


activity P3 Non Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and
Equipment
For other Heat exchangers that are not regulated by
codes and standards, a process to be developed to
ensure the equipment is delivered according to
project specifications. Review design basis that the
following is considered:

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 42 App.B

Performance Requirement
Specification
Piping

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Document Types Phase

Material
specifications
Design
specifications
Isometric
drawings

The cryogenic process piping


facilities shall safely contain
all hydrocarbons at the
maximum and minimum
foreseeable pressures, design
temperatures and operating
Isometric
forces.
drawings
ITP

ITP

Verification Activity

Design

Construction

Check that materials for piping, flanges, fittings and


bolting etc are suitable for low temperature
applications.
Piping flexibility analysis shall take into account
large temperature variations and mechanical
properties at low temperatures.
Check water-hammer effects arising from emergency
shutdown of LNG transfer pipeline.
Note: See verification activity P3 Non Cryogenic
Pressure Vessels and Equipment
Check that required expansion joints are installed
according to project specifications.
Survey to confirm cryogenic containing piping
installed are leak tested and proof tested as
satisfactory.

Guidance:
Preference is for pneumatic test if approved by local
Authorities
Confirm by inspection and review of records that
Commissioning required insulation has been installed as per the
design

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 43

Table P5 LNG storage tanks


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS
CONTAINMENT
LNG Storage Tanks

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective cryogenic fluid containment systems and equipment that shall
eliminate or minimise likelihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment.

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LIMITS and BOUNDARY:


LNG Storage Tanks (does not include tanks covered by the Pressure Equipment Directive EU)
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
EN1160 Installations and equipment for liquefied natural gas General characteristics of liquefied natural gas
EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas Design of onshore installations
EN 14620-1 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0C and -165C General
EN 14620-2 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0C and -165C Metallic components
EN 14620-3 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0C and -165C Concrete components
EN 14620-4 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0C and -165C Insulation components
EN 14620-5 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of
refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0C and -165C Testing, drying, purging, and cooldown
API Standard 620 Design and construction of Large, Welded, Low-pressure Storage Tanks
NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
EN12567 Industrial Valves Isolating Valves for LNG Specification for suitability and approval verification test
EN1626 Cryogenic Vessels, valves for cryogenic service
EN12300 Cryogenic vessels, cleanliness for cryogenic service
BS6364 Valves for cryogenic service
EN ISO 10497 Testing of valves Fire type-testing requirements
ASME Section VIII-DIV 2 Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
Pressure Equipment Directive (only applicable in the EU)
API 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure - Relieving Devices in Refineries
API 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and De-pressuring Systems
ASME B31.3 Standards of pressure piping Process piping

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Document Types:

Phase

Site characterization
documentation
(weather conditions,
topography of the
ground, site soil
conditions and geology,
Hazard
natural (lightning,
flooding, earthquakes, Assessment
tsunamis, etc) and manmade (projectile
impact, collisions, etc)
hazard potential, etc.
Preliminary design
documents

Hazard assessment shall be carried out during the design of the facility and it is also recommended if a major
modification takes place. Methodologies (deterministic and/or probabilistic), hazard identification (external
and internal origin), estimation of probabilities, and estimation of consequences shall be done in accordance
to the applicable and recognised code or standard for the project.

Confirm by review of design basis, reports, and drawings that all relevant design conditions and phases are
being considered and the load combinations and allowable limits conform to the requirements of the applicable
and recognised code or standard for the project.
Adequacy of following items shall be checked:
Materials:
General for all materials: Strength, fire resistance, behaviour at cryogenic temperature if relevant,
durability
Loads and load combinations for normal and abnormal loading condition: It shall be checked that
following loads are considered:

Design

Dead and Live Loads


Fire loads
Other hazards
Structural analysis: Containment structure shall be analysed as an integrated structure (foundation, wall,
roof, contained liquid, liner (if acting as structural element) with due consideration of different
construction stages and corresponding loading and discontinuities. Following aspects shall be checked:
Material models and parameters shall reflect behaviour at cryogenic and ambient temperatures. Most
critical parameter shall be used in design.
Boundary conditions shall reflect the different stages of the structure, friction coefficients for sliding
connections shall be at cryogenic temperatures if this is more critical
Loads, to be combined in accordance with applicable standards
Reliability of analysis tools shall be documented
Analysis simplifications shall be conservative related to actual behaviour
Seismic analysis: Methodology, effects of soil-structure interaction (if relevant), damping, response
spectra reflecting site conditions, load combination. Check of sloshing and adequacy of freeboard.

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App.B Page 44

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The LNG storage tanks


shall safely contain all
hydrocarbons at the
maximum and minimum
foreseeable pressures (as
defined for this type of
tanks), design
temperatures, normal and Design basis/
specifications
abnormal loading
Material specifications
conditions
Design reports
(including computer
input & output if
applicable)
Test reports
Drawings
Construction
procedures

Verification Activity

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

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Performance
Requirement
Specification

Document Types:

Phase

Verification Activity
Design:

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Foundation: Covered in a separate checklist.


Wall: Access openings, closure pours between precast elements (if relevant), connection to
foundation, pre-stressing (losses, anchorages, etc), liquid/vapour tightness, embedment loads, design
for heat flux loadings due to fires, construction joints, and wall penetrations shall be checked. Walls
shall be designed for missile impact. Requirements for liquid/vapour tightness are different for
primary and secondary containments, if applicable. Buckling resistance considering pressure from the
insulation when tank is emptied/heated shall be checked.
Roof: Composite members, liner, sufficient thickness to provide adequate buckling resistance, design
for missile impact, and thermal resistance to heat flux due to fire
Floor: Heating system shall be designed to avoid permafrost.
Insulation: Shall be designed to avoid permafrost and to meet boil-off requirements
Special considerations for earthquake design: Secondary containment structure shall be designed for
1) SSE 2) SSE aft and spill, and 3) OBE
Special considerations for steel design: The elephants foot should be checked for earthquake
loadings. When non-linear analyses methods are used to determine the ultimate strength of a structure
the following shall be considered:

The software used shall be documented and tested for the purpose;
The finite elements and the modelling techniques (element type, mesh, material
parameters, imperfections etc.) should be calibrated against a known case (e.g. from the
design code) in order to show that the failure mechanisms are adequately represented.
The calibration should be documented. All factors that influence the resistance shall be
addressed. Such factors are material non-linearity, imperfections, residual stresses,
external pressure etc.;
The loading sequence in the analyses should be selected such that the result represents
the conditions to be analysed in a safe way;

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 45 App.B

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Performance
Requirement
Specification

Detailing:
Metal components
Liners and coatings
Anchorage details to concrete base, if required
Amended April 2012
see note on front cover

Instrumentation: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: liquid level
indicators and/or switches, pressure indicators and/or switches, temperature indicators and/or switches,
density indicator.
Pressure and vacuum protection: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards:
pressure relief valves, rupture disc, gas injection system, vacuum relief valves, etc.
Safety equipment: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: anti-roll-over
devices, protection against lightning, sensors to monitor temperature, heating system control, foundation
settlement, leaks.
Piping: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: Cool down piping, filling piping.

Document Types:

Verification Activity
Confirm by review of relevant documentation that constructions procedures are in compliance with the
requirements of the applicable and recognised code or standard for the project. LNG storage tanks shall be
installed in accordance with design and any deviations shall be duly documented and approved.
Confirm that a satisfactory level of inspection for all systems is performed by relevant/competent parties.
Confirm that fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with the specification for fabrication,
installation and testing.
Adequacy of following items shall be checked:

Construction

Design basis/
specifications
Drawings
Commissioning
Testing, commissioning
records

dimensions and tolerances (should be within design assumptions)


material specification compliance
pre-stressing and post-tensioning systems (anchorages, forces, sequence of stressing), if relevant
forming and forming removal, if relevant
construction joints, if relevant
embedments, if relevant
coatings (liquid/vapour barrier for concrete)
corrosion protection (steel outer tank and roof)
welding qualification
non-destructive testing (NDT) of welds.
Confirm that following operations are performed according to the requirements of the applicable and
recognised code or standard for the project and the design basis:
Testing including: hydrostatic testing, liquid tightness testing, pneumatic testing, pressure and vacuum testing.
Purging into service, cool-down operation, and LNG tank filling.
Purging out of service and warm up.
Records of all the previously mentioned operations shall be kept.

Note:
If needed during the course of the project and evaluation, DNV has an extensive database containing data, formulae, etc pertaining to the risk and evaluation of different types of LNG
tanks and configurations.

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App.B Page 46

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Construction
procedures
Specification for
fabrication
Inspection and testing
plans and reports
Design basis/
specifications
Material specifications
Design reports
Drawings
Qualification of
welding procedures

Phase

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

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Performance
Requirement
Specification

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 47

Table P6 Open hazardous drains


HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: PROCESS
CONTAINMENT
Open Hazardous Drains

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To remove hydrocarbon and hazardous spillage from process and utility areas and to prevent the spread
of hydrocarbon spilled inventory to adjacent areas.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Open Hazardous Drains System.
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
NFPA 59
EN1473
Drainage Systems
Performance Requirement
Specification

Document
Types:

Phase

Verification Activity

Design
Hazardous
Drains Design
Open drainage system to
Specifications
remove deluge, rainwater and Hazardous
spills from all open areas
Drains Dwgs.
where hydrocarbons may be P&IDs
present, terminating either at Plot Plans
an open drains tank or the
contaminated fire water pond.

Impounding basins shall


prevent cryogenic liquid from
damaging important
equipment, structures or
flammable fluids entering the
surface water drainage
system.
An LNG spill within the
process and transfer areas
shall be confined in the
vicinity of or remote from the
spill collection area. The spill
collection area and the
impounding basin shall be
connected by open channel(s)

Design

Design

P&IDs

Construction

Plot Plans
GA Drawings
Hazardous
Drains Dwgs.

Design

Design
P&IDs
Plot Plans

Segregate hazardous and non


hazardous open and closed
drains to prevent migration of P&IDs
vapour between systems.

Construction

Design

Confirm by review of the project studies that the


hazardous drains system is consistent with the project
requirements and fire zone layout philosophy
Review utility P&IDs to confirm that open drains are
specified for all open areas where hydrocarbons may be
present, and that the drains terminate either at an open
drains tank or the contaminated fire water pond.
Review open drain system design to confirm that it is
sized to remove spills, deluge water and rainwater from
all open areas and drain lines are sloping as specified
with no pockets.
Confirm by survey that the bunds are installed where
required and have connections to the open drainage
system in accordance with the P&IDs.
Confirm by survey that impoundment basin(s) are
consistent with project requirements. Areas of concern
are:
process areas
vaporization areas
transfer areas for LNG, flammable refrigerants and
flammable liquids
areas immediately surrounding flammable
refrigerant and flammable liquid storage tanks.
Review project documentation that the spill collection
area and the impounding basin is connected by open
channel(s)
Confirm by survey that the impoundment basins are
installed where required and have connections to
channels in accordance with the P&IDs/Plot Plans.
Confirm by review of P&IDs that the design of
hazardous and non hazardous open and closed drains
prevents the migration of vapour between systems.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 48 App.B

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Table P7 Pressure relief systems


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS
CONTAINMENT
Pressure Relief Systems

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: The role of relief systems is to protect process systems from over-pressurisation.
To reduce to ALARP the probability that a pressure vessel or associated pipe-work will fail under excess pressure owing
to pressure control device failure, isolated and locked in equipment, overheating or fire impingement. To safely dispose
of hydrocarbons released from the process as a result of operation of certain pressure control valves, lifting of relief
valves, draining and maintenance depressurisation.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Relief/ safety valves
Relief system network (included in relief system activities)
Flare header and flare system are not part of this HSE Critical System
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
API RP 520 Sizing, selection and installation of pressure-relieving devices in refineries
API 521 Pressuring relieving and de-pressuring systems (equivalent to ISO 23251 Petroleum and natural gas industry
Pressure-relieving and de-pressuring systems
Guidance note: The following specifications can be useful:
ISO10418 Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Offshore production installations -- Analysis, design, installation and
testing of basic surface process safety systems
API 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for
Offshore Production Platforms

Performance Requirement
Specification
The maximum allowable back
pressure and minimum design
temperature of the relief
system shall be suitable for the
highest identified flow rate.

Document
Types:
P&IDs
Relief System
Design Basis
Relief Sizing
Calcs.
P&IDs
Relief Valve
Sizing Calcs.
Relief Valve
Data Sheets

The hydrocarbon containing


system shall be served with
sufficient, adequately sized,
relief devices such that the
system may not be overpressured.

Vendor Data

ITPs

ITPs
It shall not be possible to
simultaneously obstruct all
relief routes from any
protected equipment to the
disposal system (e.g. by
locking off both isolation
valves at once)

P&IDs

ITPs

Phase

Verification Activity

Confirm by review of the relief study and process


simulations that the maximum allowable back
Design
pressure and minimum design temperature of the
relief system shall be suitable for the highest
identified flow rate.
Confirm by review of P&IDs that sufficient relief
Design
devices have been provided such that the system may
not be over-pressurised.
Confirm by review of process calculations and data
sheets that PSVs capacity sizing basis and inlet
Design
pressure drops are such that they will relieve
pressures in excess of system design pressure, with
reference to applicable specifications.
Confirm by review of manufacturers data sheet and
calculations that PSVs have adequate capacity for the
required flow rate to ensure that they will relieve
Design
pressures in excess of system design pressure and that
selection of device is appropriate for the specified
conditions (suitable for flow, fluid phase, back
pressure, etc.)
Confirm by inspection and review of mechanical
Construction
completion records that the PSVs are of the correct
type and sizing as per the P&IDs/data sheets.
Confirm by inspection that inlet pipe-work to
relieving devices is located satisfactorily in relation
Construction
to potential restrictions (e.g. above liquid levels,
vessel internals, etc.).
Confirm by review of P&IDs that isolation valves for
relieving devices are specified as per the project
Design
specifications and that no protected equipment may
be isolated from the disposal system.
Confirm by sample inspection that all isolation valves
Commissioning for relieving devices are installed as verified in the
above activity.

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P&IDs
Equipment
Plant Layouts
Piping
Hydrocarbon liquids shall not Isometrics
be discharged from relieving Relief Sizing
devices or vents such that they Calculations
Data Sheets
are a hazard to personnel.
P&IDs
P&IDs
Equipment
Plant Layouts
Piping
Isometrics

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 49

Confirm by review of all vent locations (atmospheric


vent from drums or equipment seals) that they vent to
safe location and in the event of liquid carry over will
not discharge to areas that may cause a hazard to
personnel.
Relief drum sizing shall be sufficient to ensure no
liquid carry over to the flare system under highest
identified flow rate conditions

Design

Design

Confirm by visual inspection that vent locations are


in safe locations.
Construction

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Page 50 App.B

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see note on front cover

Table C1 - Ignition prevention and control system


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: IGNITION CONTROL
Ignition Prevention and Control Systems

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To reduce to ALARP, the probability that a release of flammable gas will encounter a source of ignition
by:

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applying hazardous area classification and specifying the degree of protection required for electrical apparatus to be
used in hazardous areas.
providing adequate ventilation
isolating electric power supplies to apparatus which might provide a source of ignition.
preventing hot surfaces causing ignition.
providing earthing continuity.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
All electrical equipment and instrumentation which must function within a potentially flammable atmosphere;
All exposed surfaces;
Earthing continuity for all equipment, structures and piping;
Fire dampers in all rated fire divisions and boundaries.
RELEVANT CODES AND SPECIFICATIONS
IP Code Part 15 (Area Classification of Petroleum Installations)
IEC 60079 -10-1, Classification of Areas Explosive Gas Atmospheres
IEC 60529 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP Code)
API RP 500 Recommended Practice for Classification for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities
ISO13732-1 Ergonomics of the thermal environment Methods for the assessment of human responses to contact with
surfaces Part 1:Hot surfaces
Building Safety Regulations
Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation
Certified Electrical Equipment
Cargo Tank Inert Gas System
Earthing and Bonding Systems
Ignition Control Components
ATEX 99/92 (for EU projects only)
ATEX 94/9 (for EU projects only)

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Performance Requirement
Specification

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 51

Document
Types:

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Table of
Hazardous
Sources
Hazardous
Area
Classification
Areas where potentially
Layouts
hazardous concentrations of
Hazardous
flammable gas may occur shall Area
be an electrically classified
Classification
Hazardous area, in accordance Criteria
with specifications.

Mechanical & Electrical


equipment installed in areas
where an accumulation of
accidentally released
hazardous flammable gas or
vapours can occur shall be
appropriate for the area
classification.

Guidance: For compliance to


IP Code Part 15 (Area
Classification of Petroleum
Installations), all fire and gas
detection equipment, ESD
Process Field Devices and
ESD Driven actuating devices
shall be certified for use in a
Zone 1, Gas Group IIA
temperature class T3
Hazardous Area

Phase

Verification Activity
Review the area classification layouts and associated
studies to confirm that:
all possible Hazards have been appropriately
considered, (including possible migration)
the hazardous area drawings correctly account for
the actual location of the sources of release
the hazardous areas have been appropriately defined
and all areas have sufficient ACPH in accordance
with the chosen design code.
Vent inlets and outlets are correctly located in
accordance with code requirements.

Design

Hazardous
Area
Classification Construction
Layouts
Equipment
Layouts
Hazardous area
equipment
register
Hazardous area
layout
drawings
Design
Equipment
Hazardous
Area
Certification
Schedule of
hazardous
releases
Hazardous area
equipment
register
Hazardous area Construction
layout
drawings
ITPs

Guidance:
Design documentation relevant to the review will
include but not limited to: Gas release and
dispersion study; Schedule of hazardous releases;
FERA study; and CFD study as applicable
Confirm by Survey:
the hazardous area drawings correctly account for
the actual location of the sources of release
vent inlets and outlets are correctly located in
accordance with design documents

Confirm by review of appropriate data that electrical


and mechanical equipment is correctly certified for
the hazardous area in which it is to be located and
that a complete Hazardous Area Equipment Register
has been developed.
Guidance: Appropriate documentation will include
independent third party Hazardous Area
Certification, compliance review reports
Engineering & Procurement Contractors.
Confirm by review of independent third party ATEX
or equivalent compliance review reports
(Construction Contractors) that instrument &
electrical equipment is correctly certified for the
hazardous area in which it is installed and it has been
installed in accordance with any special conditions
of use. Confirm that a complete and accurate as built
ATEX Register has been developed (for EU
projects).

Confirm by review of independent third party


Ingress protection compliance review reports
(Engineering & Procurement Contractors) that
Vendor Data
Design
instrument & electrical equipment is correctly
certified for the minimum project requirement e.g.
IP Rating 56. or NEMA 4/4X.
Hazardous area
Confirm by review of the philosophy that all
All equipment shall be isolated equipment
external electrical equipment that is to remain live
on confirmed gas detection.
register
Design
following a confirmed gas release is suitable for
All external electrical
Shutdown
Zone 1 hazardous area use and that all other
equipment that is to remain
Philosophy
equipment is isolated on confirmed gas detection
live shall be suitable for Zone
Confirm by survey and function test that the
1 hazardous area use.
ITPs
Commissioning installed equipment is either appropriate for zone 1
use or isolated on confirmed gas detection.
All externally located
Instrument and Electrical
equipment is compliant with
the project requirements in
meeting specifications.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 52 App.B

Performance Requirement
Specification

Document
Types:
Earthing
philosophy for
All structures, equipment and all production
piping shall be suitably
equipment
earthed to prevent a potential including
ignition source, by build up of piping.
a differential potential
Frame/
between adjacent equipment structure
and/or structures
drawings

Surface temperatures of
exposed equipment and pipework where flammable
vapours or gas may
accumulate shall be less than
the minimum temperature as
defined by the hazardous area
temperature classification in
accordance with
specifications.

Verification Activity
Confirm by sample design review that equipment
and structures are suitably earthed and comply with
requirements of specifications. Review to include
but not be limited to:

Design

electrical earthing specification


electrical earthing drawings
electrical earthing typical detail drawings.

Construction

P&IDs
Piping
Isometrics

Design

Insulation
Specification
P&IDs

Design

D&IDs
HVAC systems shall provide
F&G Cause
positive air pressure within
each enclosed area to inhibit and Effects
D&IDs
gas ingress; a reduction in
differential pressure below 50
Pa shall alarm in a normally
manned area or agreed for the
project.
ITPs

Construction

Design

Design

F&G Cause
and Effects
Vendor Data
D&IDs
ITPs

Confirm by sample survey that the installed


equipment and structures are correctly earthed
Confirm by design review of the equipment data
sheets, piping schedule / list; piping lagging
schedule and P&IDs that equipment and pipe-work
located where flammable vapours or gas may
accumulate shall have exposed surface temperatures
lower than the hazardous area temperature
classification.
Confirm by review of the insulation specification
and P&IDs that appropriate equipment and piping
protection is specified and meets specifications.
Confirm by survey that all equipment or pipe-work
which is expected to have a high surface temperature
is correctly lagged such that the exposed surface
temperature meets design and specifications.

Confirm by review of D&IDs that HVAC is


provided to enclosed areas and that it is specified to
provide positive air pressure.
Review Cause and Effects to confirm that there is an
alarm in a normally manned area on reduction of the
differential pressure below the threshold pressure.

Guidance: threshold pressure should be 50 Pa.


Confirm by survey and witness Function tests, that
the HVAC systems provides positive air pressure
within each enclosed area and that a reduction in
Commissioning differential pressure below the threshold pressure,
alarms in a normally manned area.

Safety Concept
Vendor Data
F&G Detection Design
Criteria

ITPs

HVAC dampers to close and


all HVAC fans to trip within
the specified maximum
duration of confirmed smoke
or gas detection at the
ventilation inlet to enclosed
areas.

Phase

ITPs

Guidance: All exposed parts


of equipment or surfaces
having surface temperatures
of more than 70C or less than ITPs
-10C shall be protected to
avoid direct contact with
personnel.

Fire dampers to close on fire


detection and be fail safe on
loss of control signal

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Guidance: threshold pressure should be 50 Pa.


Confirm by review of safety studies and detector
specifications that temperature set point specified
for each damper is appropriate

Note: all dampers in rated fire divisions and


boundaries
Confirm by sample witness function test, that fire
dampers automatically close on fire activation of the
Commissioning frangible bulb / fusible loop or similar and fail safe
on loss of control signal
Review Cause and Effects to confirm that HVAC
dampers
are specified to close within the specified
Design
maximum duration on confirmed detection of smoke
or gas at the ventilation inlet
Confirm by witness function test that the HVAC
close and all HVAC fans trip within the
Commissioning dampers
specified duration or less on confirmed detection of
smoke or gas at the ventilation inlet.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 53

Table C2 - Emergency shutdown system


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS
HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Emergency Shutdown System
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To provide facilities which detect abnormal conditions and initiate appropriate shutdown and isolation
actions to minimise the likelihood of escalation into a major hazardous event and to minimise the duration of any such
event.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
ESD System (including field initiation devices and output driven executive action safety function devices)
ESD Valves Incoming and recirculation piping and other ESD valves considered critical
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
EN1532 Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas ship to shore interface (move to control and ESD)
IEC-61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems
IEC 61511 Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector
ANSI/ISA-91.00.01-2001 Identification of Emergency Shutdown Systems and Controls that are Critical to Maintaining
Safety in Process Industries
SIGTTO ESD Systems & Linked Ship/Shore Systems on Liquefied Gas Carriers (for Marine Transfer Facilities)
Performance Requirement
Specification

The ESD System shall


continuously monitor all
instrumentation and devices
associated with the system to
provide a systematic means of
processing the signals and
carrying out necessary
automatic alarm and executive
actions.
The system shall be resistant to
single fault failure, and the
system as a direct consequence
of any single accident or fault
shall not be disabled and shall
remain capable of identifying
the hazard for which it has
been provided.

Document
Types:

Phase

ESD Shutdown
Philosophy
ESSA
ESD and F&G
Design
Cause and
Effect
Safety Concept
HAZOPs
P&IDs

Verification Activity
Confirm by review of the ESD system hierarchy and
project Safety Concept that all types of scenarios,
associated hazardous conditions and required
executive actions have been identified correctly.
Initiators and shutdown levels shall be in
compliance with project requirements.

Guidance: In the case of LNG facilities,


consideration shall be given to combined shutdown
operations of LNG vessel during loading/unloading
and the shore based facilities.
Confirm by review of P&IDs and system
architecture that appropriate process and utility
inputs are specified for the appropriate hazards
P&IDs
Design
identified in the ESD system hierarchy and Safety
Safety Concept
Concept. Confirm the compliance of process and
utility causes for ESD shutdown according to project
requirements.
ESD and F&G
Confirm by review of ESD and F&G Cause & Effect
Cause and
diagrams that the appropriate executive actions are
Effects
Design
undertaken by the ESD system in response to the
ESD Hierarchy
detected hazard. Consideration should be taken of
Logic
the conclusion identified in preceding activities.
Confirm by witness of function testing that the ESD
control system undertakes appropriate executive
ITPs
Commissioning actions in response to the detected hazard in
accordance with the ESD and F&G Cause & Effect
diagrams
Ship to Control
Confirm by design review of the ESD control
Schematic
system, jetty control panel arrangement drawing and
ESD Cause &
Ship to Control schematic that the means of
Design
Effect
manually initiating an ESD from a normally manned
There shall be means of
ESD pushbutton
area has been specified.
manually initiating an ESD
from a normally manned area. layout
Confirm by Survey and function test, that the means
ITPs
Commissioning of manually initiating an ESD from a normally
manned area has been provided
Confirm by design review of ESDV hydraulic &
Instrument P&IDs that all ESD devices move to
P&IDs
Design
their safe condition (fail safe) on loss of system
All ESD devices shall move to Function testing
output or electrical / hydraulic power or instrument
their safe condition on loss of
air.
system output, hydraulic
Confirm by witness sample of function tests and
power or instrument air.
ITPs
Commissioning review of records that all ESD devices move to their
safe condition (fail safe) on loss of system output or
electrical / hydraulic power or instrument air.
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Page 54 App.B

Document
Types:
Vendor data
HAZID
Equipment
Layouts
P&IDs

Phase

Verification Activity
For ESDVs specified on the PIDs, review the safety
studies and layouts to confirm that the fire and
explosion scenarios which may affect the ESDVs or
their actuators have been identified and confirm
which ESDVs and actuators will require protection.
Review the design and fabrication data for ESDVs
which require protection to ensure that they are
suitably protected against relevant hazards

Design

All ESDVs and actuators shall


remain functional following an
explosion or under fire
conditions for a sufficient time Vendor data and Design
calculations
period to perform their
intended function.

ITPs

Construction

Safety Concept
Cable
specification
ESD system cables shall be fire Cable schedule
resistant to Specifications. As Cable
far as is reasonably practical, requisition and
ESD system cables shall be
vendor data
protected from mechanical
damage.
Cable
specification
Cable
Certification

ESD panels and associated


equipment shall be protected
against fire, blast and dropped
objects, such that its ability to
function is not impaired until
ESD is complete.

The ESD System shall have a


minimum SIL rating and meet
the requirements of the SIL
Classification Study.
Guidance: Hazard Studies are
used to decide SIL rating

Construction

HAZID
FERA
Design
Equipment
layouts
HAZID
FERA
Building
structural
calculations
Design
JCR, SS and
ITR equipment
room(s) heat
rise study
Equipment
layouts
Safety Concept
SIL Assessment
Study
SIL
Classification
Design
Study
SIL Verification
Report
Vendor
Verification
Report

Hydraulic / Pneumatic vent


lines from ESDV valve
actuators to be located so they
are not (as far as practicable) ITPs
vulnerable to mechanical
damage

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Design

Guidance: Where protection or PFP or other


protection is required for either valves or actuators
then review vendor drawings, calculations, test data
and relevant certificates [including explosion
survivability calculations for the actuators]
provided by vendor to confirm that the specified
protection is suitable and sufficient for the
applicable fire and explosion scenarios.
Survey all ESDVs and actuators to confirm that they
are installed in the correct location and protected as
required
Confirm by review of the cable specification, cable
requisition, vendor data sheets and cable schedule
that all cables associated with the ESD system are
fire resistant.
Cable supports / racks shall offer equal rating as a
minimum to maintain availability of the system.
Confirm by sample survey that the cables installed
are fire resistant. Cable markings and certification
shall be verified as being compliant.
Routing of cables shall also confirm they are, as far
as is possible, protected from mechanical damage.
Review the safety studies to determine that credible
event scenarios which may affect the ESD Panel and
associated equipment along with the time required to
complete ESD have been clearly identified.
Confirm by documentation review that the ESD
panel and associated equipment is protected from
the identified credible event scenarios.
All aspects of the building design relevant to
maintaining the integrity of the ESD system (to fulfil
its function in an emergency situation for the
required duration) shall be confirmed as being
acceptable for the identified hazard conditions.

Confirm by review of vendor data and SIL


Assessment Study that the ESD System and
associated loops are based on a probability of failure
on demand as defined in the relevant specifications.

Construction

Confirm by Inspection that the Hydraulic /


Pneumatic vent lines from ESDV actuators have
been located so they are not (as far as practicable)
vulnerable to mechanical damage.

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Performance Requirement
Specification

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 55

Table C3 Blowdown system


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: SHUTDOWN
SYSTEMS
Blowdown System

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To enable rapid depressurisation of the gas inventory so as to minimise the potential for escalation of the
initiating event. To reduce the probability that a pressure vessel or associated pipe-work will fail under excess pressure
owing to pressure control device failure, isolated and locked in equipment, overheating or fire impingement. To safely
dispose of hydrocarbons released from the process as a result of operation of certain pressure control valves, lifting of
relief valves, opening of emergency blow-down valves and manual purging, draining and maintenance depressurisation.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Functionality of relief valves / blow-down valves; Knock out drum; HP & LP system
Note, hydrocarbon containment of relief, flare and vent lines is covered by the hydrocarbon containment performance
requirement
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
ISO 4126 Safety devices for protection against excessive pressure
EN 764-7 Pressure equipment Safety systems for unfired pressure equipment
API 521/ISO2351 Pressure relieving and de-pressuring systems
API520 PT 1&2 Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure Relieving Devices in Refineries Sizing and Section and
Installation
Document
Types:

Phase

Design

Inventory shall be blowndown to a sufficiently low


pressure within a time period
suitable to ensure that no
significant escalation of the
incident occurs.

Blow down
study to
Design
incorporate
results of
FERA
HAZOP Report
Design
Design

Verification Activity
Confirm by review of the safety studies and HAZOP
Report that a suitable blow down time has been
derived accounting for, but not limited to, the balance
between potential for escalation, PFP requirements
and material selection.
Confirm by review of the blow-down study and
process simulations that the inventory shall be blown
down within a time period suitable to ensure that
escalation of the incident does not occur.
Confirm by review of the PIDs that isolatable
sections are specified in accordance with the blow
down requirements
Review blow-down orifice data sheets and sizing
calculations and confirm these comply with
appropriate codes and process design data.
Confirm by witness of blow-down tests that the
process inventory is to blow-down to a sufficiently
low pressure within the correct time period, in the
correct valve sequence and without exceeding the
minimum design temperature

Commissioning Guidance: This is achieved by a full blow-down from


operating pressures then making a comparison of the
field data obtained with the process models and
calculations developed for the design case to confirm
the suitability of the latter. Special consideration is
given to blow-down of liquid containers in LNG
facilities.
Confirm
by review of the blow-down study and
Design of relief
process
simulations
that the maximum allowable
system
Design
back pressure and minimum design temperature of
The maximum allowable back Blow down
the relief system shall be suitable for the highest
pressure and minimum design study
identified flow rate.
temperature of the relief
system shall be suitable for
Confirm by review of records that the blow-down
the highest identified flow
valves, blow-down restriction orifice and blowrate.
Construction
down/cold vent piping (including sizing and
approximate routing) has been installed in
accordance with the design.

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Performance Requirement
Specification

Prevention

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 56 App.B

Document
Types:

Confirm by review of Cause & Effect Diagrams that


blow-down shall be primarily manually operated and
if no operator intervention within a project specified
time period then will be automatically initiated on:

Cause and
Effects
Diagrams

Construction
Design
calculations
P&IDs

Liquid accumulation shall be P&IDs


prevented in the relief and
disposal system such that the
route from protected
equipment to the flare tip or
vent shall not be impaired.
P&IDs

Operating
philosophy;
Flare tip
selection
Flare vendor
calculations

Guidance: Typical allowable Specifications


limits are:
Drawings
(i) short term heat radiation
6.31 kW/m2
(ii) continuous radiation not
more than 1.58 kW/m2.

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Verification Activity

Design

P&IDs
Guidance: Scenarios to be
ITP
considered should include the
potential for loss of actuating
media and / or loss of signal
from the ESD System.

Flare tip or the vent shall be


located such that:
It limits the risk of an unignited release from forming a
flammable cloud in areas of
the Installation where ignition
may occur
An ignited release in the
vicinity of the flare or vent
does not exceed maximum
allowable radiation limits in
normally manned areas and
on escape routes.

Phase

- confirmed fire detection in a hazardous area


- confirmed gas detection
- signal from the installation control room
- manual push-buttons in control room.
Confirm by witness of test that blow-down is initiated
in accordance with the Cause & Effect Diagrams.

Review to confirm that blow-down system has been


designed such that the risk of significant escalation
due to failure to achieve blow down is ALARP.
Confirm by witness test and review of records that
blow-down valves function as required by design.

Design

Construction

Design

Construction

Design

Design

Confirm by review P&IDs and piping drawings that


all flare, relief and blowdown lines are self draining,
and where low points are unavoidable these have an
appropriate drain connection with locked open
isolation valve.
Confirm by sample inspection and review of records
that all flare, relief and blowdown lines are self
draining, and where low points are unavoidable these
have an appropriate drain connection with locked
open isolation valve.
Confirm by review of the Flare Design Report and
Ventilation Studies that the flare tip positions have
been selected such that the risk of an un-ignited gas
release resulting in a flammable cloud over the
Installation is minimised.
Confirm by review of the Flare Design Report and
Flare Radiation Study that the radiation levels as
specified in the performance requirement are not
exceeded or that protection is provided.
Confirm by inspection that the flare tips are located in
accordance with the design

Construction

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Performance Requirement
Specification
Blow down will be primarily
manually operated and if no
operator intervention within
the 3 minutes time period then
will be automatically initiated
on:
- confirmed fire detection in
a hazardous area
- confirmed gas detection
- signal from the installation
control room
- manual push-buttons in
control room.
The blow down system shall
be designed and fabricated
such that the risk of
significant escalation due to
failure to achieve blow down
is according to the defined
safety objectives.

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Performance Requirement
Specification

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 57

Document
Types:

Phase

Verification Activity

--`,,,,``,`,``,`,,,,,`````,,,,,`-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

Confirm by review of P&IDs that a gas purge is


specified for the flare system, and by review of
Design
calculations; confirm it is capable of preventing air
ingress into the system.
Flare system
Confirm by review of P&IDs that any valves in the
design
Design
purge gas supply are specified as either locked open
P&IDs
or normally open.
Air ingress to the disposal
Confirm by review of P&IDs that instrumentation is
system shall be prevented in
Design
specified to alert the operator in the event of a loss of
order to prevent an explosion
purge gas (low pressure or low flow)
hazard in the system.
Confirm by review of records that the gas purge
P&IDs
Construction
system is installed in accordance with the design.
Confirm by review of commissioning records that the
Commissioning
purge system functions in accordance with the design
Commissioning
reports
requirements, including means of alerting the
operator of loss of purge gas.
By reviewing the blow-down study in conjunction
with the P&IDs and the purchase order data, confirm
Design
Blow-down valves, including Blow-down
that all BDVs and actuators have sufficient protection
those with a time delay
measures specified for their intended purpose
study
specified prior to opening
Purchase
Confirm by review of calculations, certification or
shall remain functional
requisitions
type test data that all blow-down valve and actuator
following an explosion and
Vendor data
Design
assemblies will open following the maximum
under fire loading for a
specified blast overpressure and under the
sufficient time to perform
appropriate fire loading.
their intended function
Confirm by survey that all specified protection
Drawings
Construction
measures are correctly provided

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 58 App.B

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Table C4 - Fire and gas detection system


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: DETECTION
SYSTEMS
Fire and Gas Detection System

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To detect flammable gas releases, fires and smoke in designated areas of the gas installation and initiate
the appropriate emergency response.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
All fire and gas detection, logic and outputs to ESD System
Includes executive actions driven directly from the F&G system
Excludes: Control devices initiated by the ESD System as a result of outputs from the fire and gas detection system
Including High Sensitivity Smoke Detection System in Control and Switch Gear Rooms.
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
IEC 60331 Tests for electric cables under fire conditions
NFPA 72: National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code
Performance Requirement
Specification
The F&G system shall
continually monitor for fire,
smoke and flammable gas in all
areas of the berth where a risk
of flammable gas accumulation
may occur (including HVAC
inlets and airlocks) and initiate
appropriate status and alarm
signals.
Detectors shall be located,
spaced and voted such that a
hazardous condition is detected
before significant damage or
escalation occurs
Alarm signals shall be relayed
to a normally manned area and
appropriate actions taken.

Document
Types:

Phase

F&G Detection
Layout
F&G
Philosophy
ESD and F&G
Cause & Effect
HAZID
Design
FERA study
Schedule of
hazardous
releases
Hazardous area
drawings /
layouts

Verification Activity
Confirm by review of the safety studies that all
hazardous conditions which are required to be
detected by the fire & gas system have been
identified and dimensioned.

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Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 59

Performance Requirement
Specification

Document
Phase
Types:
F&G Detection
Layouts
Detector
Vendor
performance
data
Schedule of
hazardous
Design
releases
Hazardous area
drawings /
Guidance:
layouts
FERA study
distribute appropriate
output signals to the ESD Gas release and
system for implementation dispersion
study
of shutdown actions
Installation and Jetty
general alarm (GA) on
F&G Detection
confirmed fire or gas
Layout
detection
Fire and Gas
Design
fire-pump start on
Philosophy
confirmed fire detection in ESD and F&G
open areas
Cause & Effect
Fire and Gas detection
placement to be in
accordance with project
specifications
Design
Drawings
Construction
ITPs

Design
Drawings
ITPs

Verification Activity
Confirm by design review that the type and location,
spacing and voting of detection devices is
appropriate to the identified and dimensioned
hazardous conditions.
Type and location of all detection devices (including
MACs, all Fire and Smoke detection (both indoor
and outdoor) and hydrocarbon gas detection,
including battery room) shall comply with the
project requirements

Confirm by review of the Cause and Effect


diagrams, in conjunction with the detector layouts
that the appropriate executive actions and status /
alarm signals are undertaken by the F&G control
system in response to the detected hazard.

Guidance: Check interactions with ESD are


appropriate and confirm logic for the F&G actions
is in compliance with the project requirements.
Confirm by Survey, that the detector coverage as
installed meets the intent of the conclusions
identified in design.
All deviations from the accepted detector layouts to
be justified.
Confirm by witness function test, that the F&G
control system undertakes appropriate executive
actions and status / alarm signals in response to the
Commissioning detected hazard in accordance with the Cause &
Effect diagrams and within the time periods
stipulated by the design [time to closure of ESDVs
shall be confirmed through this activity].

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 60 App.B

Performance Requirement
Specification

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Document
Phase
Types:
Safety Concept
Cable
specification
Fire and Gas Detector cables
shall be fire resistant to project Cable schedule Design
Cable
specifications
requisition and
As far as is reasonably
practical, Fire and Gas Detector vendor data
cables shall be protected from
Cable
mechanical damage.
specification
Construction
Cable
Certification
Safety Concept
SIL
Assessment
Study
The Fire and Gas Control
System shall have a minimum SIL
SIL rating as specified for the Classification
Design
Study
Project.
SIL
Guidance: Hazard Studies are Verification
used to decide SIL rating
Report
Vendor
Verification
Report
The F&G system shall be
protected against fire, blast and
dropped objects, such that its
ability to function is not
impaired either during a major
accident event and/or for a
specified minimum duration
thereafter.
Control System shall include all
status monitoring and actions to
and from the Control Rooms.

Safety Concept
HAZID
Fire & Blast
study
Building
Structural
Design
Design
Equipment
room(s) heat
rise study
Equipment
layouts

Verification Activity
Confirm by review of the cable specification, cable
requisition, vendor data sheets and cable schedule
that all cables associated with the F&G detectors are
fire resistant.
Cable supports / racks shall offer equal rating as a
minimum to maintain availability of the system.
Confirm by sample survey that the cables installed
are fire resistant. Cable markings and certification
shall be verified as being compliant.
Routing of cables shall also confirm they are, as far
as is possible, protected from mechanical damage.
Confirm by review of vendor data and SIL
Assessment Study that the F&G System and
associated loops are based on a probability of failure
on demand as defined in IEC-61508 and IEC 61511,
and meets Performance requirements.

Confirm by design review that the Fire and Gas


Control System is appropriately protected [by
location or otherwise].
Review to include but not be limited to:

HAZID
fire & blast study
building structural design
equipment room(s) heat rise study
equipment layouts.

This activity shall, if possible, be combined with


similar activities where the protection of the ESD
System is assessed.

Table M1 Fire and blast protection systems


HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: PROTECTION SYSTEMS
HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Fire and Blast Protection Systems
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To protect key items of the Installation or structure against fire and explosion, where failure of these items
could result in major escalation of an initial event.
To provide and aid in fire recovery by provision of equipment and devices allowing application of fire fighting agents for
control or extinguishing by automatically or manually controlled methods.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
To cover fighting of fire hazards at the Installation facilities including the following fire protection systems:
Passive Fire Protection, Firewater Pumps, Deluge System, Foam and Water System, Water Curtains, Total Gaseous
Extinguishing System
(if provided for Building protection)
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
Fire-Zone Layout
Hazardous Area classification
Fire-Water systems
Fire Extinguishing systems
Passive Fire Protection
NFPA 2001
NFPA 20 Fire Water Pumps

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Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 61

--`,,,,``,`,``,`,,,,,`````,,,,,`-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

Performance Requirement Document Types:


Specification
Basis of Design
Safety Philosophy
HAZID
QRA / FERA
ESSA
Fire Protection
Philosophy
Fire System Basis
of Design
PFP Specifications
Material
Certificates
Calculations
application
schedule
Design Drawings
Approved Design
Coating Records
ITP
Fire Protection
Philosophy
Fire System Basis
of Design
Calculations
amount required
and storage
All hydrocarbon
sizing calcs.
containment equipment
Hydraulic analysis
and piping with the
P&IDs
potential to give rise to
Layouts &
significant escalation
Calculations
hazards are to withstand
the effects of an explosion Material
Specifications
followed by fire
impingement with no loss Fabrication Specs
of containment before the Fabrication
Installation inventory has specifications
been reduced to a safe level Corrosion
(blowdown is complete)
Protection
and personnel have
DO study
escaped to a place of
ISO Drawings
safety.
Piping GAs
Surge Analysis
P&IDs
Fire zone location
plot plans
Equipment layouts
Pipe stress
Analysis

Approved Design
Documentation
ITPs

Phase

Confirm that accident scenarios with the potential to


cause escalation have been identified and
dimensioned correctly.
Review the safety studies to confirm that the
proposed fire and explosion loadings are justified
Review the fire protection philosophy (or similar) to
ensure that all the identified accident scenarios are
correctly mitigated by an appropriate combination
of active and passive fire protection
Ensure that correctly dimensioned PFP is specified
for equipment and structures as required
commensurate with the hazards.

Design

Design

Design

Construction

Design

Design

Design

Construction

F&G / ESD C&Es


F&G / ESD
Specifications
Design
Active Fire
Fighting
Philosophy

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Verification Activity

Survey to ensure that PFP is installed in line with the


design.
Ensure that deluge coverage and rates are
appropriately specified for the relevant hazards
using appropriate extinguishing medium (water/
foam).
Design review to ensure the fire water supply chain
supply and distribution is adequate:
Sufficient firewater and foam available
Firewater pumps sized correctly
Firewater system sized adequately
Firewater system routed correctly and adequately
(proven by hydraulic analysis)
Confirm the correct number, location and type of
deluge nozzles (or other firewater application
systems as specified)
Suitable materials and fabrication process specified
Design review to ensure firewater system is
designed to survive foreseeable loadings and
accidental events
Corrosion
Supply routed to avoid or be protected from dropped
objects.
Supplied by duplicated feeds from separated
isolatable section of firewater ring main.
Deluge valve sets located as far as practicable from
the fire areas they serve
Firewater system suitably design to be capable for
withstanding all foreseeable extremes of operating,
pressure and temperate (including water hammer
and transient effects from surge or water hammer).
Survey to ensure the firewater system is fabricated
and installed as specified in the design:
Pumps
Routing
Sections/isolation
Nozzle layout
Fabrication and workmanship
Materials
Deluge Valve set locations
Pipe supports
Mechanical completion records
Design review to confirm the correct initiators, for
active fire protection systems, are specified and
included in the ESD executive actions:
F&G/ESD initiation
Manual initiation
Fusible loop initiation
Fail safe initiation (loss of IA or hydraulic pressure)
Time from initiation to supply specified in design

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 62 App.B

Performance Requirement Document Types:


Specification
ITPs
Firewater and
Foam Protection
Layouts
P&IDs
Visual Inspection
Commissioning
Test Reports
The reliability / availability
of fire water system shall
be commensurate with the
identified hazards and in
accordance with project
requirements and fire
protection philosophy
Specified critical buildings
and control rooms
normally occupied by
personnel shall survive
blast loads defined by the
project
Specified critical building
and enclosure boundaries
shall prevent passage of
Fire & Smoke and
maintain an acceptable
temperature on the inner
surface when subject to fire
load exposure for the time
specified

Phase

Verification Activity

Commissioning

Commissioning

Commissioning

Active Fire
Design
Protection
Philosophy
Fire Water System
Design Basis
Design
DALS (design
accidental load
specification)

Design

ITP

Construction

Building structural
design
Design
documentation

ITPs

Building and
Enclosure
Extinguishing
Specifications
Buildings and enclosures
shall be protected by total
flooding systems where
required at concentration
levels and flow-rates in
accordance with project
requirements. The follow
up flow shall be sufficient
to compensate for leakage.

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Construction

Design

Vendor Drawings
and Discharge
Calculations
Equipment and
Design
Building Layouts
System Schematics
System Logic and
Control Drawings
ITP

Construction

Survey and witness test to ensure firewater/foam is


supplied when initiated (check each initiator in
every fire zone including fusible loop).
Survey to confirm the required coverage is achieved
in each fire zone.
Confirm the firewater is supplied within the time
specified in the design.
Confirm by review of the Fire Protection
philosophy [or other relevant documents] that the
hazards have been identified and the appropriate
Reliability and Availability has been specified
commensurate with the identified hazards.
Confirm the reliability and availability of fire water
system in accordance with the project requirements.
Confirm by review of the DALS that critical
buildings and control rooms are in accordance with
the project requirements.
Confirm by visual inspection that construction
complies with the requirements of the design
Confirm by review of building design that internal
boundary rated divisions comply with the project
requirements.
Confirm by visual inspection that rated divisions
comply with the requirements of the design. All
penetrations through rated divisions shall maintain
the rating of the division certification shall be
reviewed for compliance.
Confirm by review that all building areas and
enclosures requiring protection have been correctly
identified and that the correct extinguishing system
has been selected.
Review area protection plans and vendor data, and
confirm that enclosures have been specified to be
equipped with an appropriate flooding system as
appropriately defined in the project specifications
and that total flooding extinguishing systems
provided meet the specific discharge requirements
(volumes, rates, type, etc.) of each protected area
and the system requirements (interlock, discharge
alarms, systems control, feedback, 100% back-up,
etc) of the applicable Flooding System
Specification
Confirm by survey that the flooding systems have
been provided as specified in design.

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Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 63

Table E1 Emergency power system supply


HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: EMERGENCY
RESPONSE
Emergency Power System Supply

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To maintain power to the ESD and F&G Systems as well as the telecoms systems that requires power to
function in an emergency and to allow the plant to be safely shut down and evacuated. The system shall be from a reliable
source of electrical power and shall be available after the identified major hazard events.
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Includes emergency battery power supply for ESD system, FGS system, PA/GA audible and visual alarms and power to
all other identified end users which must function under an emergency condition.
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
Cable Specifications (e.g. IEC60331)
NFPA 110 Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems
EN 50091 Uninterruptable Power Systems
Performance Requirement
Specification
There shall be sufficient
emergency battery power
supplied to support all safety
critical systems for the time
required for each system to
perform its intended function as
noted below.
F&G Control system duration
of the event (see guidance)
ESD Control System duration
to be determined as long
enough to complete all ESD
actions (see guidance)
PA/GA System duration of
the event
Guidance: 1hr to be
considered as minimum
For emergency and escape
lighting systems

Prevention

Document
Types:
UPS Load
Schedule
Load
Calculations
Vendor Battery
Calculations

Phase

Verification Activity

Design

Confirm by design review that the UPS emergency


power system type is capable of supplying UPS
emergency power to all identified emergency
systems for the required durations.
Review FAT Load & Discharge tests to confirm
that UPS is of sufficient capacity to supply the
specified equipment.
Confirm by survey and witness test that sufficient
UPS capacity for the required duration periods has
been provided and that it supports the equipment as
required by their normal operations mode.

FAT Reports

Design

ITPs

Commissioning

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Guidance: 1hr to be
considered as minimum for
other Safety Critical Systems
duration required to function
correctly.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 64 App.B

Performance Requirement
Specification

Document
Types:

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Phase

Verification Activity
Review the design documents (safety studies etc)
and layouts to confirm that all scenarios which may
affect the emergency power system have been
identified.
Confirm by design review that the emergency
power systems (UPS) is appropriately protected [by
location or otherwise].
Review to include but not be limited to:
FERA
Fire & Blast study
TR / SCE equipment room(s) heat rise study
Equipment layouts

Design
Safety Concept
HAZID
Fire & Blast
study
Building
All emergency power systems Structural
are to be protected from fire,
Design
blast and accidental events such TR/Critical
that the function is not impaired equipment
Design
while there is a requirement for room(s) heat rise
emergency power.
study
Equipment
layouts

Construction
Safety Concept
Cable
UPS field cabling to all Safety specification
Cable schedule Design
Critical Systems (as listed
Cable requisition
above) should be segregated
and vendor data
from main power cables and
shall be fire resistant according Cable
to specifications.
specification
Construction
Cable
certification

Guidance: This activity shall, if possible, be


combined with similar activities where the
protection of the ESD and FGS Systems are
assessed. Main and emergency distribution
equipment should be located in separate rooms.
Confirm by Survey that the emergency power
system is appropriately protected [by location or
otherwise]
Confirm by review of the cable specification, cable
requisition, vendor data sheets and cable schedule
that all cables associated with UPS feed to HSE
Critical Systems are fire resistant.
Confirm by sample Survey that the cables actually
installed are fire resistant. Cable markings and
certification to be verified for compliance.

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No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

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Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 65

Table E2 Escape and Evacuation


HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: EMERGENCY
RESPONSE
Escape and Evacuation

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To provide reliable, secure and effective systems for alerting personnel to the existence of an emergency
and for communicating additional information to personnel during, or after, a major hazard incident.
To provide routes and facilities which personnel can use to move away safely from the effects of a hazardous event in
their vicinity and to continue their movement in safety along readily identifiable access routes to the Muster Areas and
evacuation points.
To provide reliable facilities which allow communication both internally and to external locations in the event of an
emergency condition at the facility.
To provide rescue of injured personnel
LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Emergency Lighting
Escape routes
Personal protective equipment
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
Temporary Refuge/Muster Area
Emergency Lighting and signage
Personal Survival Equipment
EN1838 Lighting applications Emergency lighting, EN50171 Central Power Supply Systems, EN50172 Emergency
Escape Lighting Systems, EN60598-2-22 Luminaries, Particular requirements Luminaries for emergency lighting
Performance Requirement
Specification
At least two unobstructed
diverse escape routes shall be
provided from all potentially
manned working areas to the
muster areas. All escape routes
shall be provided to ensure that
any area can be rapidly and
safely evacuated in the event of
an emergency. Escape route
width and provision shall be as
defined in project
specifications.

Document Types:

Safety Concept
Building Escape
Route Layouts
Plant Layouts

Design

Building Escape
Route Layouts
Plant Layouts

Construction

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Guidance: Escape routes


should be greater than 1m
wide.
All escape and access routes
shall remain clear of
obstructions.
All escape routes including
Building Escape
emergency exit doors to be
Route Layouts
readily accessible, non-slip,
Plant Layouts
marked and signposted.
Markings and signs to be
clearly visible if there is loss of
artificial lighting outside
daylight hours.

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Phase

Verification Activity
Confirm by design review that escape route
drawings show two correctly dimensioned
escape routes from all normally manned areas
and that the escape routes do not run through
process areas containing hydrocarbons. Escape
route widths and provision shall be confirmed as
being compliant with project or national
specifications.
Survey the primary and secondary escape routes
to confirm the actual dimensions meet the
specified requirements.

Survey the primary and secondary escape routes


to confirm that they are non slip and free from
obstruction and that marking, and signposts are
acceptable.
Commissioning Guidance: This only applies to routes to muster
areas.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 66 App.B

All escape doors shall be of a


type that can easily be opened
in an emergency situation.

Building Escape
Route Layouts
Door Schedule
Security Door
System Spec

Safety Concept
Building Escape
Route Layouts
Installation Safety
Equipment
Layouts
Building Escape
Emergency lighting shall be
provided to permit safe egress route Layouts
during escape and evacuation Installation Safety
in the event of loss of normal Equipment
power, by means of emergency Layouts
power generation and integral Lighting Layout
Drawings
battery backed fluorescent
Lighting Vendor
fittings, located on/at:
Data
- main escape and evacuation
routes,
- main access points
- muster area
ITPs
- first aid station(s)
- fire fighting area
- stairways and landings.
Rescue breathing apparatus
sets and other equipment
necessary shall be located at
strategic locations around the
facilities to allow prompt
rescue of personnel.

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Confirm by design review that all escape route


doors have been identified correctly and can be
easily opened in the event of an emergency
Design

Guidance: e.g. panic bar, fail safe for electrical


locking systems, integral key on egress side etc.
Escape route doors which normally open
outwards should be fitted with panic bars,
Review Safety Equipment Layouts to confirm
that breathing apparatus is provided in sufficient
quantities and at locations appropriate to hazards
envisaged.

Design

Confirm by design review that provision of


emergency lighting and illumination levels are
sufficient to allow safe egress from building and
installation locations. Minimum provision and
lighting levels shall comply with project or
national requirements.

Design

Guidance: Emergency lighting should have a


minimum capacity of 30 60 minutes
Survey the escape route lighting by night to
confirm the battery endurance period and
measure the lux at ground level to ensure the
Commissioning escape routes are sufficiently lit or alternatively
the testing of part of the Installation lighting may
be extrapolated to other areas based on lighting
layouts and analysis.

HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: EMERGENCY


RESPONSE
Emergency Communications

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To maintain an uninterrupted and reliable means of indicating alarm and implementing effective
communication with personnel working on or around process equipment during a major incident
SCE LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Emergency Communication to/from Control Room
PA/GA System
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
Project Standards
ISO 7240-19 Fire Detection and alarm systems
Performance Requirement
Specification
Effective communication, both internal
and external shall be provided for
emergency situations.
The systems shall be protected by,
location of equipment, spatial diversity
and equipment redundancy.
Internal and external
telecommunications in order to perform
the emergency function defined by
project requirements shall be confirmed
between the Control Room, vessel/s and
storage / pumping locations and Muster
area

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No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

Document Types:

Phase

Safety Concept/EERS
Telecommunications
System Philosophy
Design
Telecommunications
Equipment Layouts
Telecommunications
Schematics /
Diagrams
Telecommunications
Specification

Design

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Verification Activity
Confirm by design review that
emergency communication systems
equipment shall provide both normal
and emergency communications
between the emergency response
team and the team managing the
situation
Confirm by design review of telecoms
block diagram and specification that
the telecommunications systems
meets the project requirements in
terms of protection, location, diversity
and redundancy.

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Table E3 Emergency Communications

PA/GA system shall provide a means of


alerting all personnel to the existence of
an emergency situation, provide the
means to communicate additional
information to personnel during an
emergency and shall be capable of
operating without impairment for the
minimum time required to escape to
muster locations and then to evacuate to
a place of safety after the start of a major
accident.
The provision and minimum alarm
noise level above local ambient shall be
in accordance with project
requirements. In areas with greater
ambient noise levels, visual alarms shall
also be provided.
Guidance: Audible alarms should be
provided in all areas with minimum of
+6dBA above local ambient and visual
alarms in high noise areas (>85 dBA)

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.B Page 67

Telecommunications
Schematics /
Diagrams
Telecommunications
Specification

PA/GA Layouts /
Arrangement
drawings
System architectural
drawings
System block
diagrams
System specification
Noise study and
Layouts
ITPs

Design

Confirm by witness test that the GA


System provides clear communication
between the Control Room and all
Installation areas to alert personnel of
potential hazardous or emergency
conditions.
The PA/GA system shall be in
accordance with the project
Commissioning requirements. The minimum alarm
noise level above local ambient shall
meet the project requirements.

Confirm by review of the vendor data


pertaining to the GA system that it
will not be adversely affected by, nor
adversely affect, the operation of
nearby equipment.

Emergency communications equipment


shall not be adversely affected by the
operation of other devices/equipment in
close proximity (electromagnetic
compatibility).

Design

Emergency communications equipment


shall not create additional hazards
during an emergency situation

Design

GA control systems to be protected


against fire, blast and credible accident
events, by location or otherwise, such
that its ability to function is not
impaired for the time taken to muster
after a major accident event.

Design

PA / GA cables should be located so


that they are protected against
accidental loads as far as possible and
shall be fire resistant to specifications

Safety Concept
Cable specification
Cable schedule
Design
Cable requisition and
vendor data

Cable specification
Cable certification

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Review amplifier loading to ensure


that the number of speakers on a
speaker ring does not exceed the
amount which the amplifier can drive,

Construction

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Guidance: Review of vendor


technical file, EC Declarations of
Conformity and associated technical
file for individual equipment as well
as data pertaining to the compatibility
of all nearby equipment
Confirm by review of the vendor data
pertaining to the emergency
communication system that it can be
operated in situations where a
flammable gas mixture is present.
Confirm by design review that GA
Control System shall be protected by
location or otherwise, such that its
ability to function is not impaired.
Note: Secondary method is hand held
radios or fixed intercom system.
Confirm by review of the cable
specification, cable requisition,
vendor data sheets and cable schedule
that all cables associated with the PA
/ GA system are fire resistant.
Cable supports / racks shall offer
equal rating as a minimum to maintain
availability of the system.
Confirm by sample survey that the
cables installed are fire resistant and
are protected against accidental loads
as far as possible. Cable markings and
certification shall be verified as being
compliant.

Not for Resale, 07/11/2013 11:01:30 MDT

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Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 68 App.B

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

Table N1 Environment
HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: ENVIRONMENT
Environmental Control Systems

HAZARD MANAGEMENT
Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: To limit the emissions to the air, limit the discharge to water, limit the generation of waste and spill
prevention.
SCE LIMITS and BOUNDARY:
Complete Gas Installation or Process Plant
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS
Project and National Regulations
ISO 14001 (environmental management system)
Council Directive 96/61/EC (Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control)
NORSOK S-003
Document
Types:

Environmental
Management
System

Phase

Review project documentation pertaining to the


following:

Environmental
Management
System
Project and
national
regulations

Design

Water conservation
programs should be
implemented in conjunction
wit the magnitude and cost of
water use.

Environmental
Management
System
Project and
National
Regulations

Design

Plans shall be developed to


minimize or reduce
emissions as far as
reasonably practicable,
resulting from
commissioning and testing
activities

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Waste
Management
Plan
National
Regulations

Environmental
Management
System
HSE (Health
Safety and
Environmental)
System
Environmental
Management
System

Review project documentation that takes into account


options such as energy efficiency/conservation (e.g.
combined heat and power and waste heat recovery) use
of alternative energy resources, alterations of project
and system design, reduction of VOCs (Volatile
Organic Compound) and reduction of gas flaring.

Design

Facilities with the potential


to generate e.g. process
waste water, sanitary sewage
or storm water should
incorporate necessary
precautions to avoid,
minimize and control
adverse impacts to health,
safety or the environment

Plans shall be developed that


considers prevention,
reduction, reuse, recovery,
recycling, removal and
disposal of wastes (including
hazardous waste)
generated during all project
phases and modes of
operation.
The project to address
potential environmental
impacts on
existing conditions such as
surface, groundwater and
soils.

Verification Activity

discharge to surface water


discharge to Sanitary Sewer Systems
discharge to Storm Water
cooling water discharge.

to ensure that impacts to health, safety and the


environment are as low as possible.
Confirm by review that measures have been addressed
and taken to reduce water consumption e.g.:
Water monitoring and management
Process water recycling
Sanitary Water conservation
Confirm by review that operations have developed a
Waste Management Plan to define categories of all
types of waste and plans for treatment, disposal and
shipment.

Design

Review project documentation of existing land


conditions, the proximity to ecologically sensitive or
protected areas, check if strategies are in place that
contribute to improvement of local conditions and
evaluate project location alternatives.

Design

Construction

Confirm by review of the vendor data pertaining to


emissions that they will be according to project or
regulatory levels.
Review to include but not limited to:
Air emissions (SO2, NOx, Particulate Matter (PM),
Ozone, Ozone Depleting Substances)
Noise and vibration emissions (traffic, turbines,
compressors and other major equipment

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Performance Requirement
Specification
During the development of
the project, technically and
financially feasible and cost
effective options should be
evaluated to reduce or offset
project related GHG (Green
House Gas)
emissions during the design
of the project.

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.C Page 69

APPENDIX C
EXAMPLES OF VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS
A. Verification Documents

A 200 Statement of Compliance


201 A Statement of Compliance can be issued on completion of each particular project phase, or natural part
thereof, and shall be based on a dedicated verification report.
202 A Statement of Compliance shall be issued as a formal statement confirming that verification of
documents and or activities, has found that the onshore gas installation, a part thereof, or a verification activity,
complies with the requirements applicable for that particular project phase.
203 The technical information on a Statement of Compliance shall contain:

onshore gas installation description and item number, if relevant


application (operational limitations and conditions of use) for which the onshore gas installation is intended
codes and standards with which the onshore installation has been found to comply
level of verification
an appendix containing the accompanying dedicated verification report.

204 A Statement of Compliance shall be signed by the DNV Project Manager.


An example of a typical Statement of Compliance is shown at the end of this appendix.
A 300 Verification Reports
301 Verification Reports are issued to confirm that the relevant product or service has been completed in
accordance with specified requirements.
302 The report shall include information such as:

product or service description and item number, if relevant


application (operational limitations and conditions of use) for which the product or service is intended
codes and standards with which the product or service has been verified against
safety objectives and performance requirements
clear statement of the conclusion from the verification (does it or does it not meet the specified
requirements)
codes and standards used as reference
documentation on which the verification report is based (documents, drawings, correspondence, including
revision numbers)
project-specific scope of work tables
any comments
identification of any non-conformances.

303 The Verification Report shall always be dated and have two signatures, the originator and the DNV
internal verifier.
A 400 Verification Comments
401 Reviews of documents shall be reported using Verification Comment Sheets (often called VerComs).
These documents give details to the client of aspects of onshore installation design and construction that DNV:
considers do not meet the specified requirements
does not have enough information to make a decision
offers advice based on its own experience.
402
403

Only in the first two instances does DNV expect a response from the Client or its contractors.
An example of a typical Verification Comment sheet is shown at the end of this appendix.

A 500 Audit report


501 Audit reports are issued to confirm that a companys quality management system has been reviewed to
confirm compliance (or not) with the nominated standard and project requirements. In addition, the audit
reports confirm compliance with the documented procedures and that these procedures are effective.
502 Audit reports shall contain information such as whether:
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A 100 Validity of verification documents


101 Verification documents are, in principle, documents confirming that an examination has been carried out,
and are valid only at the time of issue.

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 70 App.C

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

The company has a documented quality system.


This quality system been certified by an accredited Certification Body for the product (or service) in
question.
The quality system covers the following quality assurance elements adequately for the product:

organisation
authority and responsibility
job descriptions for key persons
internal quality audits
documentation change control
job instructions and procedures
non-conformance and corrective action.

There are adequate procedures for activities such as:

calibration of equipment
material identification and marking
control of special processes such as welding, NDT PWHT
non-conformance identification and handling
inspection status
final inspection.

The companys facilities are, in general, considered adequate for the scope of supply.
A quality plan been prepared for the order concerned.
The purchaser or their appointed inspection agency are planned to attend the works.
There are any problem areas identified.

A 600 Survey Reports


601 Survey reports are documentation and recording of attendance activity by DNV.
Guidance note:
Survey reports are and may be called by different names. Examples are Inspection Release Note, Visit Report,
Inspection Certificate, Site Report, etc.

602 A survey report shall contain enough information to identify clearly the product or service that has been
examined, the operating conditions or specifications to which it has been examined and the conclusion reached
by DNV.
603 The survey report shall be printed on the relevant form and shall contain as much information as possible
in accordance with the standard headings in the form. In addition, the report number shall be shown.
604 An example of a typical Survey Report is shown at the end of this appendix.

B. Use of quality management systems


B 100 General
101 The assurance of onshore gas installation integrity and function requires that gross errors during design,
construction and operation be minimised. The likelihood of gross errors shall be reduced in a systematic
manner by the operation of a quality management system adequate for the work being carried out.
102 Quality management systems frequently are documented at three levels:
The quality manual and related procedures document how the organisation, as a whole, manages the quality
of all its products and services.
The quality plan documents the specific procedures related to a particular project.
The inspection and test plan documents how the quality control activities for a particular project shall be
carried out and recorded.
B 200 Quality plans
201 The basic function of a quality plan is to be a memory aid in the management of a project. In an
organisation with many quality procedures for a variety of functions the quality plan states those that are
applicable to that particular project. The quality plan acts as a route map through the complexities of
management of the project and highlights those activities relevant to quality management.
202 The project quality plan normally consists of two parts; firstly, a narrative description of the means of
controlling the project, and secondly, a tabular description of the inspections and tests to be carried out during
the work.
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Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

The quality plan should address:

organisational details of the project


authorities and responsibilities of key personnel
interfaces between, the client, contractors, sub-contractors and third parties
quality assurance activities placed on sub-contractors
cross references to existing company procedures.

204

The narrative part of the quality plan should include a description of:

the applicable standards


project organisation and responsibilities
review of the contractual requirements
project planning and progress reporting
procedures for such activities as design control, purchasing, construction, installation, commissioning,
interface control and auditing
procedures for inspection and maintenance as well as normal operation
emergency response issues.

205 Additionally, the narrative part of the plan should describe the documentation requirements. It should be
specified:

what documents are required


at what stage these documents are required
who is responsible for preparing the documents
relevant parties to whom documents are submitted
how any necessary approvals are acquired
who has originals and who has copies
if copies have to be certified copies
the length of time documents are to be retained and by whom.

B 300 Inspection and test plans


301 The tabular description of the inspections and tests to be carried out during the work is frequently known
as the inspection and test plan.
302 The following items should be checked for inclusion within the inspection and test plan:
each inspection and test point and its relative location in the production cycle should be shown
the characteristics to be inspected and tested at each point should be identified
the use of sub-contractors should be indicated and details of how the verification of sub-contractors quality
shall be carried out should be shown
hold points established by the constructor, the operator or a third party, where witness or review of the
selected inspection or test is required, should be shown.
B 400 Review of quality management programme
401 The contractors quality manual shall be reviewed for compliance with ISO 9001 or 9002 as appropriate.
The contractors operations should be audited to establish compliance with the documented system.
402 If the contractor has a quality system certified by an accredited third party certification body, this may
be taken as evidence of a satisfactory quality system provided the certificate is relevant to the contractors scope
of work for the project. However, the last two years periodical audit reports shall be reviewed to identify if
any recurring non-conformities have been revealed.
403 Any weaknesses revealed during this audit, or review of periodical audit reports, shall be considered
when planning the contractor monitoring activities.
404 Surveillance of the continuing acceptability of the contractors quality management system is carried out
by observing a selection of audits carried out by the contractor as part of its internal audit system. The audits
to be observed should be selected over the length of the project at suitable intervals and should cover as wide
a selection of activities as possible.
405 Contractors inspection and test plans for the various activities undertaken during their scope of work for
the pipeline shall be reviewed and accepted, if adequate.

C. Document forms
C 100 Introduction
101 The end of this appendix includes example forms for use by DNV in verification.
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203

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.C Page 71

DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 72 App.C

102

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

The following forms are included:

a) Statement of Compliance.
b) Verification Comments Sheet.
c) Survey Report.

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.C Page 73

C 200 Statement of Compliance

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


Page 74 App.C

Amended April 2012


see note on front cover

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C 300 Verification comments sheet

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DNV Service Specification DNV-DSS-315, October 2010


App.C Page 75

C 400 Survey report


Folder:
Cert. No.:

DET NORSKE VERITAS


SURVEY REPORT
Client

Order/Project. No.
Item Description
Survey Location
Date:

:
:
:
:
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SURVEY SCOPE
Verification Activity No.:
Description of Verification Activities:
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
Specifications:
Drawings:

VERIFICATION COMMENTS

NON-CONFORMITIES
Report Ends

Signed for Det Norske Veritas


Signature:
Name:
Title:
Date:
If any person suffers loss or damage which is proved to have been caused by any negli
gent act or omission of Det Norske Veritas, then Det Norske Veritas shall pay compensation to such person for his proved direct loss or
damage. However, the compensation shall not exceed an amount equal to ten times the fee charged for the service in quest
ion, provided that the maximum compensation shall never exceed USD 2 million.
In this provision "Det Norske Veritas" shall mean the Foundation Det Norske Veritas as well as all its subsidiaries, directors, officers, employees, agents and any other actingn obehalf of Det Norske Veritas.

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS, Veritasveien 1, NO-1322 Hvik, Norway, Telephone: +47 67 57 99 00, Telefax: +47 67 57 99 11, Org.No. NO
945 748 931 MVA

Form No.: 40.91a

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Issue: January 2008

Page 1 of 1

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