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PRELIMINARY TITLE
Chapter 1. Effect and Application of Laws
ART. 1. This Act shall be known as the Civil Code of the Philippines.

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
ART. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no on from compliance therewith.
ART. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
ART. 256 (FC). This code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

ART. 105(2)(FC). The provisions of this Chapter (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) shall also apply to conjugal
partnership of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws, as provided for in Art. 256.
Carolino vs. Senga
August 20, 2015
Petitioners husband, a retired member of the AFP was granted retirement pay by virtue of RA no. 340. The
AFP then withheld giving petitioner of his pension because pursuant to PD No. 1638, which was effective
1979, a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the list of pensioners.
Issue: Whether or not PD No. 1638 should be given retroactive effect.
Held: NO.
All statues are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect. These principles also apply to
amendment of statutes.
vested right
A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property for some particular person or persons
as a present interest. It is the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the
rights of property conferred by the existing law or some right or interest in property which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy.
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance or by a change
in the constitution of this state, except in a legitimate exercise of police power.
"A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of
the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened
free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny." "Vested rights include not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations
created after the right has vested." (Republic vs. Miller in relation to adoption)
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x.[11]
Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws. (Bernabe vs. Alejo in relation to
illegitimate children)

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Rotairo vs. Alcantara


September 29, 2014
PD No. 957 (Subdivision and Condominium buyers Protective Decree) has a retroactive application.
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed
of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the
subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in
the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the
Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Duenas vs. Santos
June 4, 2004
The retroactive application of PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1216 is only applicable to purchase
agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactments where there was non-payment of amortizations, and
failure to develop the subdivision. PD No. 957 does not provide for any retroactive application, nonetheless,
the intent of the law of protecting the helpless citizens from the manipulations and machinations of
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers justify its retroactive application to contracts entered
prior to its enactment.
Ablaza vs. Republic
August 11, 2010
AM 02-11-10 does not have retroactive application. It does not apply to those actions for declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage that are 1.
Those commenced before, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2.
Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those
celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to the effectivity date of A.M. 02-11-10 (March
3, 2003)
Guy vs. CA (relate to illegitimate children)
September 15, 2006
Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was
Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. (Emphasis
supplied)
Vis--vis the provision on recognition in the Family Code, whereby the prescriptive period for filing an action
for recognition is stated
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period
of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the
passage of the Family Code.

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Ty vs. CA
November 27, 2000
Retroactive application of Art. 40 of the Family Code, to wit
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Jurisprudence regarding the requirement of a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void for the
purpose of remarriage has been conflicting for those marriages celebrated during the Civil Code.
People vs. Aragon (1957) no judicial declaration required.
Odayat v. Amante (1977) no judicial declaration required.
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy, (1986) required
The conflict has been settled upon the enactment of the Family Code, on Art. 40.
However, in this case, the marriage of the petitioner was celebrated in 1979, where Odayat vs. Amante was
the prevailing jurisprudence. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case,
for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
Atienza vs. Brillantes
March 29, 1995
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that
his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent
has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA
Republic vs. Miller
April 21, 1999
The Child and Youth Welfare Code allowed aliens to adopt. However, upon the effectivity of the Family Code,
effective on August 3, 1988, aliens are no longer allowed to adopt.
The petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988.
Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of
respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing
of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force.
"As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the
case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches

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cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance."
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied
the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before
the Family Code.
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity. (4a)
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs,
or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. (5a)
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines. (n)
Stare Decisis
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases,
compels us to apply the rulings by the Court to these consolidated cases before us. Under the doctrine of
stare decisis, when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same;
regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. This is to provide stability in judicial decisions.
Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially
the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent
any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. (FBDC vs. CIR, November 19,
2014)
PLDT vs. Alvarez
March 5, 2014
Respondent was charged with qualified theft for rerouting international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae and/or wave frequencies which are connected directly to the domestic exchange facilities.
During the pendency of his case, a similar case (Laurel Case) which was decided prior to his, was acquitted by
the Supreme Court
Ting vs. Velez-Ting
March 31, 2009
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in
its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the
same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
Under American jurisprudence, two strains of stare decisishave been isolated by legal scholars. The first,
known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts

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to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts
must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed
as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a
command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare decisis and
statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while
statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more
flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding
effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated:
Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible.
Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is
again called upon to consider a question once decided. In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter
opined: the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about
it. In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As
Justice Stevens explains: after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of
decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial
gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need
to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse
to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional
holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy
for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule
has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to
a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to
the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old
rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or
come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should
not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same
argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these
cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as
of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view
is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on
the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit,
non respicit.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth
therein,
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws. (6)
Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail. (n)
Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. (n)
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. (n)
Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

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If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a)
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsem
December 10, 2014
A foreign national is obligated under Philippine Law to support his child. This is not, however in the basis of Art.
195 of the FC, because support falls under family rights and duties which is governed by the national law of the
person. He is required to give support because when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound
and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.
XPN: Processual Presumption
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
XPN to the XPN: When the foreign law, even though pleaded would be contrary to public policy.

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Even assuming arguendo that the [foreign] Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance
with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. SyGonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioners son.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioners
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to
the instant case. On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to
support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Osb vs. Suzuki
November 12, 2014
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or
state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property its immobility.
Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural
center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the
lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or
by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the
descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no
matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person
making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of
the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the
spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign
law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial
notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be

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under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law
while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law,
provided it is proven as a fact.
Ando vs. DFA
August 27, 2014
A petition for authority to marry (which is a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 is not the proper remedy
for recognition of her marriage to her second husband. The proper remedy is to file a petition for the judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce from his first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven and like any other fact.
Noveras vs. Noveras
August 20, 2014
A divorce decree is not a sufficient evidence in a petition for judicial declaration of divorce. It must also comply
with Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by:
(1) an official publication thereof or
(2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there
be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

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Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, we relaxed the requirement on certification where we held
that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree
duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it
appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect to the property
regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is
not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it
follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding
directly to liquidation.
Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna
July 23, 2014
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute
divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are
residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and
the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with
the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997
Republic vs. Olaybar
February 10, 2014
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry (RULE 108) cannot substitute for an action
to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
However, in this case, the respondent was able to prove that there had been no marriage at all between her
and the Korean National. Hence, Rule 108 is applicable, provided that all of the requirements provided for
under Rule 108 are present.
Fujiki vs. Marinay
June 26, 2013
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court
held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are
facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such

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as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph
of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" under the laws of his or her
country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce.
The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect
of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo which
declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served."
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file
a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while
the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on
how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the
status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,
Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii
expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with
an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry.

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The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes
a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.
Catalan vs. Catalan
February 8, 2012
Our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was
established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. Xxx
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was
no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be
a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. This is done under Sec. 24
and 25 of Rule 132.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence
to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful
party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
Bayot vs. CA
November 7, 2008
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in
this jurisdiction.
Republic vs. Orcibido
October 5, 2005
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.

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Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
June 30, 1989

A divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of
the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons.
Morigo vs. People
February 6, 2004
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied
by the provisions of this Code. (16a)

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CHAPTER 2: HUMAN RELATIONS
Alano vs. Magud-Logmao (kidney)
April 7, 2014

Article 2176 is not an all-encompassing enumeration of all actionable wrongs which can give rise to the liability for
damages. Under the Civil Code, acts done in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 will also give rise to damages. The
provisions state as follows:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Baksh v. Court of Appeals elaborates on the distinctions:
x x x. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an AngloAmerican or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence,
but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent
acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum.
It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope
of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
(Emphasis supplied)
Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation further elaborates on tort based on the concept of abuse of
right:
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones rights as well as in the
performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The
Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE
CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking
to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as
golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance
of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human

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relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarily, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an
actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleged
together with Article 20 or Article 21.
Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for an injury. It allows recovery should the act have been willful
or negligent. Willful may refer to the intention to do the act and the desire to achieve the outcome which is considered
by the plaintiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence may refer to a situation where the act was consciously done but
without intending the result which the plaintiff considers as injurious.
Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may be caused by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by
law. This article requires that the act be willful, that is, that there was an intention to do the act and a desire to achieve
the outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve around whether such outcome should be considered a
legal injury on the part of the plaintiff or whether the commission of the act was done in violation of the standards of
care required in Article 19.
Article 2176 covers situations where an injury happens through an act or omission of the defendant. When it involves
a positive act, the intention to commit the outcome is irrelevant. The act itself must not be a breach of an existing law
or a pre-existing contractual obligation. What will be considered is whether there is "fault or negligence" attending the
commission of the act which necessarily leads to the outcome considered as injurious by the plaintiff. The required
degree of diligence will then be assessed in relation to the circumstances of each and every case.
Article 2176 should not have been the basis for the cause of action in this case. Rather, it should have been Article 20,
which is applicable when there is a violation of law.
The law that is applicable is the third paragraph of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 349, as amended by Republic Act No.
1056, which provides for a way to determine substituted informed consent for deceased patients for purposes of organ
donation.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Sesbreno vs. CA
March 26, 2014
The concept of abuse of rights, the following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right
or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. There
is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to
be invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of each case.
Padalhin vs. Lavina
November 14, 2012
Test of Abuse of Right. Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, are antisocial.
There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another.
When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising
a right.
The principle does not permit acts which, without utility of legitimate purpose cause damage to another,
because they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. x x x.

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Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
UP vs. Philab
September 29, 2004
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant
has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is
without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract,
crime or quasi-delict.
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy
on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other
institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.
Loria vs. Munoz, Jr.
October 15, 2014
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money orproperty of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been benefited without a
real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another persons expense or damage.
Parties to an illegal contract may not recover what they gave under the contract. Under the doctrine of in pari
delicto, "no action arises, in equity or at law, from anillegal contract[.] No suit can be maintained for its
specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid,
or damages for its violation[.]" Nevertheless, the Court held that "the application of the doctrine of in pari
delictois not always rigid." An exception to the doctrine is "when its application contravenes well-established
public policy." In Gonzalo, this court ruled that "the prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public
policy of the State."
PTC vs. Legaspi
June 10, 2013
Unjust enrichment applies in Labor Cases.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property
or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them. To
be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust
enrichment is not itself a theory of reconveyance. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the
doctrine of restitution. There is unjust enrichment when:
1. A person is unjustly benefited; and
2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
Beumer vs. Amores
December 3, 1012
A foreigner who acquired lands in the country, contrary to Art, 12, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution is precluded to
be reimbursed with what he has paid.

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Art. 22 does not apply, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the
pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over
the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield
stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between
the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his
sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."
Cheng vs. Sy
July 7, 2009
The dismissal of the BP 22 cases was based on the error of the prosecutor. Although as a rule, the error of the
counsel is binding on the client, it entails some exceptions. The petitioner falls in the ambit of these
exceptions. Hence, it will not preclude the petitioner from obtaining the amount of the checks.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial courts observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in
Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature.
Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be
tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently evade payment of their
obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit
or enrich himself inequitably at anothers expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust
enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasidelict or any other provision of law.
Cheng vs. Donini
June 29, 2009
When there is a specific provision in the code that governs the relationship between the parties in terms of
reimbursement, (in this case, lessee-lessor), then the provisions on unjust enrichment is not to be applied.

Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.
Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant
for his protection.
Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or
emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution.
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect,
or other personal condition.
Hing vs. Choachuy, Jr.
June 26, 2013
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

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In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the
expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs,
community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of
privacy."
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
July 19, 2001 / May 12, 2000
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without
just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, without
prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
WPC vs. JMC
September 3, 2014
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not competitionper sebut the use of
unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business
or to earn a living. Plainly, what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means
usedare fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to
a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated
by unconscionable means.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is
due to that ground.
Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Freedom
Freedom
Freedom
Freedom
Freedom

of religion;
of speech;
to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
from arbitrary or illegal detention;
of suffrage;

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(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of
the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in
case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no
independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal
proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be
supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil
action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in
conflict with the provisions of this Code.

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TITLE I
MARRIAGE
Chapter 1. Requisites of Marriage
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (52a)
ART. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
On Legal Capacity (related provisions)
ART. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (54a)
Art. 37.Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public
policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)
Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous
marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the
requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their
marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of
them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party,
who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in
the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths.
The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the
affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a)
Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask
their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice,
or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months following the
completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the contracting
parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written advice given, if any,
shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to
give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. (62a)

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Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity
to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity
herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract
marriage. (66a)
ART. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or
religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written
authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting
parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter,
during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. (56a)
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or viceconsul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil
registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said
consular official. (75a)
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship
captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during
stopovers at ports of call. (74a)
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether
members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed
validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices. (78a)
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may
be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party
subsequently survives. (72a)
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a)
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage. (76a)

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Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with
Chapter 2 of this Title. (58a)
Art. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required
to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.
In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this
circumstance and his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse.
Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from
the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the
contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of
every license issued. (65a)

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall
be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age
that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the
marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and
attested by the solemnizing officer.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the
marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name
of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
ART. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

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TITLE II.
LEGAL SEPARATION
ART. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner;
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For the purposes of this article, the term child shall include a child by nature or by adoption.
Ong vs. Ong
October 23, 2006
abandonment
FACTS:
Lucitaa filed an action for legal separation against her husband on the ground of physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
For his defense, William alleges that the action was instituted because Lucita wants his share of their
conjugal properties. Moreover, since Luticia allegedly abandoned their conjugal abode with her children, legal
separation would not prosper because both of them have grounds for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for legal separation should be granted.
HELD: YES.
On the issue that Lucita abandoned the conjugal home in relation to Art. 56(4), we answer in the negative.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one
year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
SSS vs. Aguas
February 27, 2006
A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon
the husband, absent any showing to the contrary.
Pablo Aguas, a member of the SSS and a pensioner died in 1996. His wife, Rosanna and their children were
beneficiaries of the death benefits of Pablo.
Sometime after, the sister of Pablo, Leticia, contested that respondents should not receive any benefits as
Rosanna abandoned the conjugal abode six years before Pablo died. She also alleged that the children of
Rosanna were fathered by another man.
SSS suspended the payments of benefits to the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosanna is a valid beneficiary for the death benefits of Pablo.

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HELD: NO.
In order to qualify as a beneficiary, Rosanna must establish two qualifying factors: (1) That she is the
legitimate spouse; (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support.
A dependent is one who derived his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to,
someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power,
or aid of someone else.
A spouse who has abandoned the family until her husbands death, and lived with other men, during that
entire period is not dependent on her husband for support.
A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon
the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were
still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the
husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
Rosanna had the burden of proof to prove her dependency on her husband. The categorical and
straightforward testimonies of the Leticia and others disproved her claim that she was still living with Pablo.
ART. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied for the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for
legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain the decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
ART. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within 5 years from the time of the occurrence of the cause.
ART. 58. An action for legal separation shall be in no case filed before 6 months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition.
SEC. 19, RA 9262 (VAWC)
SEC. 19. Legal Separation Cases. In cases of legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act is alleged,
Art. 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main case and other incidents of the
case as soon as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order filed by the petitioner must be
conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act.
ART. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the court has taken steps towards reconciliation of the spouses
and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable.
ART. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or of a confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Pacete vs. Cariaga
March 17, 1994
Concepcion was married to Enrico Pacete. She filed an action for legal separation on the ground of sexual
infidelity as Enrico was already living with another woman named Clarita. She also alleged that during her
marriage with Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several
motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in
the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable
settlement.

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Enrico failed to file an answer and was declared in default. The trial court allowed Concepcion to present her
evidence ex parte. The court granted her petition for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be declared in default
HELD: NO.
Art. 60 of the Family Code is a reproduction of Art. 101 of the new civil code. It is explained that
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in
case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article
88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in
which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be made to
depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43 Phil. 43;
Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that
the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate
whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,"
obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the inclusion of the
following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by
no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter
within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
ART. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person
to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall
have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (Admin pendent lite)
COMPARE WITH:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
Sabalones vs. CA
February 14, 1994

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Petitioner was a member of our diplomatic services. Being such, he left his wife, respondent Remedios to
administer some of their conjugal properties.
Petitioner then retired as ambassador and returned in the Philippines. However, he did not reside with his
wife and children. Later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building in Greenhills, San Juan.
Respondent opposed the sale of the same by filing a petition for injunction on the ground that the rentals
collected from the building were used by her and her children as a way of subsistence as the petitioner no
longer supported them ever since he went back to the country. In addition, she filed an action for legal
separation. She alleged that ever since the petitioner came back to the country, he lived with one Thelma
Cumareng and never went back to their conjugal abode.
The court granted the injunction. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner alleged that ART. 124 provides for a joint administration of properties. In relation to this, petitioner
cites Art. 61, wherein he stated that since the court did not appoint any administrator, the administration of
the properties rests with the both of them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can continue administration of the conjugal properties.
HELD: YES.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided
in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between
the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit
in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals
when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now,
apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her
administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of
the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the
rentals.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.
5 Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the
complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a
share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the
apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the
detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the
meantime to participate in its management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator
of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the
meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in
accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.
ART. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Art. 49 shall likewise apply to the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children.
ART. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and custody and
support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material
welfare of said children and their choice of parent with whom they wish to remain as provided for in Title IX.
It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.

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TITLE IX, Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The court shall into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reason to order otherwise.
ART. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez
March 8, 2001
legal separation in relation to cohabitation (Art. 34).
FACTS:
Petitioner, the legal wife of the late David Manzano filed an administrative case against respondent judge for
gross ignorance of the law.
She alleged that Judge Sanchez solemnized the marriage between David and Luzviminda Payao, knowing that
both of them were previously married, as their marriage contract indicated that both were just separated.
For his defense, respondent judge stated that David and Payao had been living together as husband and wirfe
for seven years. Had he known that both were previously married, he would have told them the consequence
of their actions.
In the evaluation, judge Sanchez was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Sanchez is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
HELD: YES.
In order for Art. 34 to apply, the following requisites should be present:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years
[and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already
is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation
to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated,
legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds
true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
(2) The absolute community or conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which
shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Art. 43(2);
ART. 43(2). The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net

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profits of the community property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse.
ART. 99. The absolute
community terminates:

ART. 126. The conjugal


partnership terminates:

(2) When there is a decree


of legal separation;

(2) When there is a


decree of legal separation;

ART.
102
Liquidation)

ART. 129
Liquidation)

(Rules

on

(Rules

on

Quiao vs. Quiao


July 4, 2012
net profits
Petitioner contends that Art. 102 (4) [Liquidation of Absolute Community Assets and Liabilities] of the civil
code applies in the dissolution of their property as there is no other provision in the Family Code which
defined net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Petitioner and respondent were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, hence, the default property
regime is conjugal partnership of gains. Hence, Art. 129 (Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets and
Liabilities) shall apply.
As to the definition of net profits, we cannot but refer to Art. 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
provides that for purposes of computing net profits subject to forfeiture under Art. 43(2) and Art. 63(2), Article
102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at te time of
dissolution. Thus, without any iota of doubt, Art. 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute
community regime under 102 and 129.
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213
of this Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession.
Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by
operation of law.
ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname
employed before the legal separation.
ART. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by
him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the
registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in
good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The
revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification
thereof to the insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal
separation become final. (107a)
ART. 86(4). A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
ART. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be
filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n)

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ART. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share
of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a)
ART. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed
under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal
separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its
order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of
properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified,
unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a).
RELEVANT CASES:
Baez vs. Baez
January 23, 2002
Are multiple appeals allowed in legal separation cases? NO.
FACTS:
Petitioner Aida filed an action for legal separation against her husband Gabriel Baez on the ground of sexual infidelity.
The same was granted by the trial court.
Petitioner then filed a motion for execution pending appeal, in favor of their residential house. The same was granted by
the trial court.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari in order to contest the granting of the motion for execution. The same was
granted by the appellate court.
He also filed an appeal on the decision of the trial court in the legal separation case. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that Respondent husband had failed to file with the appellate court a record on appeal. The CA denied
her motion to dismiss. Petitioner wife also filed an appeal but later on withdrawn it.
ISSUE: Whether or not multiple appeals are allowed in legal separation cases.
HELD: NO.
Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for
partition of property with accounting, in special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The
rationale behind is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved
by the court and held to be final.
In legal separation, the issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same material relationship between the
parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.
They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the
decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation and thus they may not be subject of
multiple appeals.

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TITLE XI.
SEPARATION IN FACT
ART. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may
either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a)
ART. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the
family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is
highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a)

ART. 100/127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute
community/conjugal partnership except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to
be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be
obtained in a summary proceeding;
ART. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them
seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such
consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in
detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case,
the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court.
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for
the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial
authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds
thereof to satisfy the latter's share.

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TITLE III.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
ART. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. (109a)
Ilusorio vs. Blidner (MR)
January 19, 2001
can a wife compel his husband to live with her through a petition for habeas corpus? NO.
Erlinda (wife) states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code
support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care
for each other. We agree.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from
bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced
not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a
two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
Ilusorio vs. Blidner
May 12, 2000
can a wife compel his husband to live with her through a petition for habeas corpus? Marital rights including
coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where
the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally
valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about
86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of
mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
ART. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (110a)
Limbona vs. Comelec

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June 25, 2008

Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months
prior to the elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated.
Note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is
also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi
City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor
of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live
together in one legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on
November 11, 2006 by virtue of Art. 69, in relation with Art. 68, where the husband and wife are presumed
to live together.
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and
as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in
consonance with human experience.
ART. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other
conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income
or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such
obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a)
ART. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same
shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to
furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share
due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to
give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the
preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject
to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. (295a)
ART. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (296a)
ART. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
ART. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring
danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.
(116a)
Pilapil vs. Ibay Somera
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
ART. 73, as amended by RA 10572. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the
objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the community property. If the benefit
accrued thereafter, such obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has
not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.

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ART. 73 (FC, not yet amended). Either spouse may


exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business
or activity without the consent of the other. The latter
may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether
or not:
(1) The objection is proper; and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the
objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the spouse who has not
obtained consent.

ART. 117 (NCC). The wife may exercise any profession


or occupation or engage in business. However, the
husband may object, provided:
(1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to
its social standing, and
(2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid
grounds.
In case of disagreement on this question, the parents
and grandparents as well as the family council, if any,
shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the
court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best
interest of the family. (n)

The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of


creditors who acted in good faith.
Go vs. CA
May 29, 1997
Petitioner spouses were photographer / videographers. They were contracted by the private respondents to
record their wedding ceremony.
When respondents were claiming the video, petitioners stated that the video were erased. Hence, respondents
filed an action for specific performance and damages against the petitioners.
The trial court found the spouses to be jointly and severally liable to the respondents. Alex Go (husband), on
appeal alleged that he should not be liable with his wife as it was his wife who entered into the contract with
the petitioners. That she alone was acting in her sole interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alex is jointly and severally liable with his wife.
HELD: NO.
We find merit in this contention. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the
wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In
the instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with
private respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages
awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who
execute them.

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TITLE IV.
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
BEFORE MARRIAGE
PRE-NUPTIAL AGREEMNT

DURING MARRIAGE
PRE-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT or if
none, ACP

AFTER

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS


ART. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom. (118)
ART. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community,
conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence
of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute
community of property as established in this Code shall govern. (119a)
ART. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. (121)
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever
stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and
any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the
spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a)
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall
be executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same
proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After
due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such
order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or
not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim.
(195a, 108a)
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or
property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three

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months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a)
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that
power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against
the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of
property. (191a)
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their
common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the
personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The
court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a)
Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite
December 10, 2012
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;18
(b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property
regime;19 (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the
other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial
separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary
dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses were charged with murder. However, the trial court acquitted Efren (husband) of
the crime.
Respondents filed a motion for execution, which the court granted.
Petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that
the levied properties were conjugal assets and not paraphernal. The RTC denied the motion to quash
and held that the alleged conjugal assets executed. In addition, it held that although the marriage of
the petitioners were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions on ACP shall
govern since it is the default property regime today and there is no vested right that would be
prejudiced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal properties of the spouses may be levied and executed upon the
satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: YES.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except
prior to marriage.

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Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made
before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and
Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that
marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal
separation;18 (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former
property regime;19 (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse
abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family;20 (d)
there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for
the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.21 None of
these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code,
the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their
work or industry in the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their
separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who
got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family
Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses loose admission that absolute community of
property governed their property relation since the record shows that they had been insistent that
their property regime is one of conjugal partnership of gains. No evidence of a prenuptial agreement
between them has been presented.
What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law
on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married
under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code thus provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede
the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of the Family
Code states:
"x x x x
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256."
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the
conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on
Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides:

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Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either
spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or
if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be
charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own,
the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be
enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
Family Code have been covered. Those responsibilities are as follows:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other
activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course
or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities
imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed,
it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered." No prior liquidation of those
assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of
liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for
the purposes above-mentioned."
ART. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and
executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are
registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper
registries of properties. (122a)
ART. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage
settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the
marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code. (120a)
ART. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil
interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable
for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto. (123a)

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ART. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the
spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the
marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and
executed in the country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property
situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity. (124a)
ART. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in
consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made
therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not
depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid. (125a)
CHAPTER 2. DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
Valencia vs. Locquiao
March 11, 2003
Donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those made before its celebration,
in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.The distinction is
crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially
as regards the formal essential requisites.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which
the property donated must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code
provides that acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts. In other words, the celebration
of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed
form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of
donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which
contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing
only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance is not necessary for
the validity of these donations. Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.
The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements should be applied with respect to the
donation propter nuptias at hand. Those under the Old Civil Code or the New Civil Code?
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and
not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently,
in this case, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was
executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.
Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of
the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. (126)
Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of
the Civil Code, insofar as they are not modified by the following articles. (127a)
Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they
cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present
property. Any excess shall be considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the
formalities of wills. (130a)

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Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of
foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the
obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more
than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. (131a)
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the
marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code
on donations in general. (132a)
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage. (133a)
Arcaba vs. Tabancura
November 22, 2001
FACTS:
Francisco and his wife Zosima were owners of a certain parcel of land. When his wife Zosima died,
Francisco and his mother in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition on the said land.
Because Francisco and Zosima did not have children, he had her niece and a certain Cirila to take
care of her. Before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated as Deed of Donation
Inter vivos, where he donated his share of the lot and the house erected thereon to Cirila.
Respondents then filed a complaint against petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation
inter vivos. They alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco, which was void under
Art. 87 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation made to Cirila was valid.
HELD: NO.
Cohabitation or living together as husband and wife means not only residing under one roof, but also
having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very
least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and
dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret
meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as
sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties,[30] a conviction of
concubinage,[31] or the existence of illegitimate children.[32]
Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco
resided under one roof for a long time. It is very possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same
bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of
caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made
by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

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Agapay vs. Palang


July 28, 1997
FACTS:
Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina (respondent) on October 1949. After a few months after
the wedding, he went to Hawaii to work. When he returned in the Philippines for good, he refused to
live with the respondents.
Years later, he contacted a second marriage with Erlinda Agapay (petitioner). They then jointly
purchased an agricultural land in Pangasinan.
Carlina filed a case against Miguel. In order to put a stop into the case, Miguel and Carlina executed
a deed of donation, as a form of compromise, and donated their conjugal properties to their only
child.
In 1981, Miguel died. Respondents then instituted an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the agricultural land subject of the case is conjugal property of Miguel
and Carlina; (2) Whether or not the deed of donation is valid.
HELD:
(1) YES.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of
law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and
Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not
proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.[9]
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of
buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money
to buy the subject riceland.
In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of
co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
(2) NO.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal
property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding that the
decision adopting their compromise agreement in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation
of the separation of property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership.
Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial
order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

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With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September
23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed
of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified
that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone
be placed as the vendee.[14]
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,
for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
Section 1. General Provisions
Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise
moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement
of the community regime at any other time shall be void. (145a)
Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the
marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property.
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been
dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as
provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to
rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. (146a)
Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between
the spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. (n)
Section 2. What Constitutes Community Property
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community
property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a)
Quiao vs. Quiao
July 4, 2012
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And
when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as
well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or
grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of
the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a)

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Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is
proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. (160)
Nobleza vs. Nuega
March 11, 2015
FACTS:
Shirley and Eugelio were married in 1990. While still engaged, Eugelio asked some money
from Shirley, who was working in Israel, for the acquisition of their conjugal abode.
Eventually, they got married in 1990 and they resided in the said house. Shirley then
returned to Israel to work. She then found out that Eugelio brought another woman in the
conjugal abode. He also sold their conjugal abode to the petitioner without Shirleys
consent. Hence, she filed an action for legal separation and a criminal action of
concubinage against Eugelio.
The trial court granted the action for legal separation and ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of their conjugal properties in accordance with Art. 102, in relation to Art. 63(2)
and Art. 99(2) of the Family Code.
Shirley then filed an action to Rescission of Sale and Recovery of Property against petitioner
and Rogelio. The trial court granted the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a buyer in good faith.
HELD: NO.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right or interest in the property, for which a full and fair price
is paid by the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any notice of claims or
interest of some other person in the property.
The contention of the petitioner that she relied on the face of the title when it stated that
seller Eugelio was single deserves scant consideration.
The trial court held that while the TCT shows that the owner of the subject property is
Rogelio alone, respondent was able to prove at the trial court that she contributed in the
payment of the purchase price of the subject property.
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent's
financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is not
relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community property for the law itself
defines what constitutes community property.
Relying on Art. 91, in relation to Art. 92 of the Family Code, the subject property does not
fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the
absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective
contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's
name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley
and Rogelio.
On the question on who should be liable for reimbursement, it must be noted that Rogelio
is solely liable for the same.
The sale of the conjugal abode was done without the consent of Shirley. It is clear under
Article 96 of the Family Code that Rogelio could not sell the subject property without the
written consent of respondent or the authority of the court. Without such consent or
authority, the entire sale is void.

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Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of sale with
petitioner and acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the contract under the
Deed of Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to petitioner for the
reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the subject property. Under Article 94 of
the Family Code, the absolute community of property shall only be "liable for x x x [d]ebts
and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited x x x." As correctly stated by the appellate court,
there being no evidence on record that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the
benefit of the family, respondent cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.
Section 3. Charges and Obligations of the Absolute Community
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code
on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administratorspouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited;
Sunga-Chan vs. CA
June 25, 2008
FACTS:
Norberto Chan and Jacinto were business partners engaged in the sale of liquefied
petroleum gas. When Jacinto died, the business was managed by his wife and daughter
(petitioners) without the consent of Chan.
Chan then asked for accounting and winding up of the partnership affairs from the
petitioners but the same were unheeded. Hence, he filed a Complaint for Winding Up of a
Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ
of Preliminary Attachment. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Chan and ordered
the petitioners to give Chan his part on the partnership.
Chan filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the court. The court ordered the
levy on execution of the absolute community property of spouses petitioner Sunga-Chan
and Norberto Chan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the community property is liable for obligation to Chan.
HELD: YES.
Under the circumstances surrounding the case, we hold that the obligation of petitioners is
solidary for several reasons.
For one, the complaint of Chua for winding up of partnership affairs, accounting, appraisal,
and recovery of shares and damages is clearly a suit to enforce a solidary or joint and
several obligation on the part of petitioners. As it were, the continuance of the business and
management of Shellite by petitioners against the will of Chua gave rise to a solidary
obligation, the acts complained of not being severable in nature. Indeed, it is well-nigh
impossible to draw the line between when the liability of one petitioner ends and the
liability of the other starts. In this kind of situation, the law itself imposes solidary
obligation. Art. 1207 of the Civil Code thus provides:
Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and
the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or
that each of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestation. There is

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solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature
of the obligation requires solidarity. (Emphasis ours.)
Any suggestion that the obligation to undertake an inventory, render an accounting of
partnership assets, and to wind up the partnership affairs is divisible ought to be
dismissed.
For the other, the duty of petitioners to remit to Chua his half interest and share of the total
partnership assets proceeds from petitioners indivisible obligation to render an accounting
and inventory of such assets. The need for the imposition of a solidary liability becomes all
the more pronounced considering the impossibility of quantifying how much of the
partnership assets or profits was misappropriated by each petitioner.
And for a third, petitioners obligation for the payment of damages and attorneys and
litigation fees ought to be solidary in nature, they having resisted in bad faith a legitimate
claim and thus compelled Chua to litigate.
Third Issue: Community Property Liable
Primarily anchored as the last issue is the erroneous theory of divisibility of petitioners
obligation and their joint liability therefor. The Court needs to dwell on it lengthily.
Given the solidary liability of petitioners to satisfy the judgment award, respondent sheriff
cannot really be faulted for levying upon and then selling at public auction the property of
petitioner Sunga-Chan to answer for the whole obligation of petitioners. The fact that the
levied parcel of land is a conjugal or community property, as the case may be, of spouses
Norberto and Sunga-Chan does not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of the
property. Verily, said property is not among those exempted from execution under Section
13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Parenthetically, the records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married on
February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Withal,
their absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by
either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94(2),(3)
Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of
the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may
reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husbands benefit.
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community
property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse used by the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational
course, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the
family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational
course or other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this
Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as
advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the
community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.

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If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling
under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a)
Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or
any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the
loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form
part of the community property. (164a)
Section 4. Ownership, Administrative,
Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community Property
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a)
Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property. (n)
Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other.
However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations
from the community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family
distress. (n)
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (in relation to Art. 63(2)
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(175a)
Noveras vs. Noveras
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute
community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause,
shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial
authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon
proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for

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judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute
community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or
property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a)
Section 6. Liquidation of the Absolute Community
Assets and Liabilities
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
Romero vs. CA
April 18, 2012
Determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of
inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court
Petitioners and Respondents were children of the deceased Judge Romero and his
wife. Upon the death of their father, respondent was assigned as the administrator
of the conjugal properties of their parents.
Sometime later, petitioners found out that some of the conjugal properties of their
parents were transferred into the name of their brother through fraud. They
alleged that their brother took advantage of their weak mother and made her sign
a deed of sale.
Petitioners then filed an action for Annulment of Sale and Nullification of Title. The
trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is the probate court which
has jurisdiction over the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction over the said case.
HELD: YES.
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in
the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a
separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by
expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece
of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule
that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.

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While it is true that a probate courts determination of ownership over properties
which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is
applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and strangers thereto.
In the case of In re Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa
Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et al., 67 Phil., 353, this court held:
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or
excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right
of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the
determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of
inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court:
xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person
regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been
recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an
administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the
residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the
assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled
to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which
each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has
in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties
may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the
heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the
court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents
necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of
third parties are affected.
In addition, Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action, to
wit:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an executor or
administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover
the title or possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall
be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of
the court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time
allowed for paying debts has expired.
Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain exceptions. They invoke
the doctrine that while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the recovery of
property of the estate represented by an administrator, these heirs may maintain
such action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the suit, or has allegedly
participated in the act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners theory must again fail. There is nothing on the
record that would prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or
entered into sale agreements in violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really
accusing a co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain properties
which they allege to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate, Aurora
Romeros acts as the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole jurisdiction
of the probate court. In Acebedo v. Abesamis,[21] the Court stated:
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that
it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of

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a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is
error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action.
Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of property under
administration is the recognition that the probate court has the power to rescind
or nullify the disposition of a property under administration that was effected
without its authority.
(T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited jurisdiction,
as a probate court over the estate of deceased individual, is not a trifling thing.
The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective, cannot be treated with
indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by the very parties invoking its
authority.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case
of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of
Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject
to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in
no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said
children. (n)
Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community
property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted
by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective
capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be
considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing
properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the
capital and duration of each.

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CHAPTER 4. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS


Section 5. Administration of the CPG
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (165a)
Aggabao vs. Parulan
September 1, 2010
The vendees were not buyers in good faith, because they did not exercise the necessary prudence to inquire into
the wifes authority to sell. We hold that the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the husband was
not merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.
A lot owned by spouses Maria Elena and Dionisio Parulan was sold by a real estate broker to the petitioners.
Upon full payment of the purchase price, a new TCT was issued in the name of the petitioners. However,
Maria Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners copy of the land.
Petitioners learned that the duplicate copy was in possession of Atty. Jeremy Parulan, brother of Dionisio,
who appeared to have SPA authorizing him to sell the lots.
Petitioners met with Atty. Jeremy Parulan to get the duplicate copy of the TCT. However, the former stated that
he will need 800,000 pesos in exchange for the TCT. Later on, Atty. Parulan found out that the petitioners
already paid in full to Maria Elena.
Hence, Dionisio filed an action of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Maria Elena on the
ground of lack of consent in the sale of the same. The RTC granted the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were buyers in good faith.
HELD: NO.
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 254 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among them the entire
Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are
found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code.
The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of
the Family Code.
Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively
provided no vested rights are impaired xxx. Herein, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the
property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the
Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration
over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering
that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.

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Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance,
which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to
administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions
on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty.
Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did not include or
extend to the power to administer the property.
Lastly, the petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991
meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction
executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not
occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.
On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and
Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or
both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family
Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouses consent, the transaction should be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
2. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time of such purchase
or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property
with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the
property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he
acted in good faith. The status of a buyer in good faith is never presumed but must be proven by the person
invoking it. xxx
The buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in
verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of
the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
It is true that a buyer of registered land needs only to show that he has relied on the face of the certificate of
title to the property, for he is not required to explore beyond what the certificate indicates on its face. In this
respect, the petitioners sufficiently proved that they had checked on the authenticity of TCT No. 63376 and
TCT No. 63377 xxx.
Yet, it ought to be plain enough to the petitioners that the issue was whether or not they had diligently
inquired into the authority of Ma. Elena to convey the property, not whether or not the TCT had been valid
and authentic, as to which there was no doubt xxx.
Ravina vs. Villa Abrille
October 16, 2009
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a)
without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of
the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is
explicit. xxx
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or
encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the
conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent
of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the
approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife
who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute
the case.

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To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of
and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the sellers certificate of title. But for a
person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is
restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code , he must
show that he inquired into the latters capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good
faith.
Dela Cruz vs. Segovia
June 26, 2008
xxx While Florindas husband did not affix his signature to the above-mentioned Agreement, xxx Renato, by
his actuations, agreed and gave his conformity to the Agreement. As found by the courts below, Renatos
consent to the Agreement was drawn from the fact that he was present at the time it was signed by the sisters
and their witnesses; he had knowledge of the Agreement as it was presented to him for his signature,
although he did not sign the same because his wife Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that
of her husband; Renato witnessed the fact that Leonila contributed her hard earned savings in the amount of
P36,000.00 to complete their share in the purchase price of the properties in question in the total amount of
P180,000.00. xxx

Villanueva vs. Chiong


June 5, 2008
Anent the first issue, xxx respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor
prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between
husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature.
Likewise, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. xxx
We held that without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173
of the Civil Code 23 provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date
of this Code.
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent,
when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,
she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal
property to be valid.
In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., xxx it was held that the alienation
must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is
concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable, the rationale
for the annulment of the whole transaction is the same. Thus:

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The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by
the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such
annulment in so far as the contract shall "prejudice" the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in
the statute. xxx
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. Article 1398 of the
Civil Code provides:
An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each other the things
which have been the subject matter of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest,
except in cases provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to restore the parties, insofar as
legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was entered into.
Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa
January 23, 2002
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate
cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied,
her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that
Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for
the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
It should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse
who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent
Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wifes
incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
Jardaleza vs. Jardaleza
December 5, 2000

Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other. However,
either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal
partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (174a)

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TITLE V. THE FAMILY HOME
CHAPTER 1. The Family as an Institution

Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (216a, 218a)
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (217a)
Silva vs. CA
July 17, 1997
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited
without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not
very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume
her acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that
she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted
ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent
contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a
petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court.
The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which
she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated to Holland with Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales; it held:
"In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration" not the welfare of the parents (Art. 8, PD 603).
With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in mind, We find it to the best interest of the minor children, to deny visitorial
and/or temporary custodial rights to the father, even at the expense of hurting said parent
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not visitation rights should be awarded to the father.
HELD: YES.
There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the inherent and natural right of
parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those . . . (2)
(b)etween parents and children; . . . ."
Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those
exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and
affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the
"natural and primary rights" of parents in the rearing of the youth. 4 There is nothing conclusive to indicate that
these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying
degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate
members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. 5 Then, too, and most
importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage,
Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of
their children.

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There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the paramount
consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has recommended due course to the
petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all be that detrimental to the
children.
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for the children;
nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parent's
natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any
case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take
out the children without the written consent of the mother."
Ining vs. Vega
August 12, 2013
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner
of the decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was
formed among the decedents heirs.
Leon Roldan was married to Rafaela Menez. They are the owners of a parcel of land in Aklan. Both died without
issue. Leon was survived by his siblings, Romana and Gregoria. Both siblings are also deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter and grandson (Leonardo). Both are also deceased. Leonardo was survived
by his wife and children. They are the substituted respondents.
Gregoria was survived by her children, the petitioners.
Before his death, Romanas grandson, Leonardo filed an action claiming that one-half of the subject property
belonged to him. That In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him, Leonardo
filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages,
against Gregorias heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregorias heirs claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them;
that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good
faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware
of this fact.
ISSUE: Whether or not Leonardo is entitled to the property.
HELD: YES.
HELD:
Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject property. No prescription shall run in favor of one of
the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held that prescription began to
run against Leonardo only in 1979 or even in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that
Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus
concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly
within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-inlaw, being married to Antipolos daughter Teodora.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a coowner of the decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate
that was formed among the decedents heirs.
Tiggangay vs. Wacas

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April 1, 2013

An electoral contest was filed with the court of the respondent judge. Petitioner lost to his opponent (Dagadag) for
mayoralty by a slim margin of 158 votes. When the case was filed with the respondent judge, the same ruled in
favor of his opponent, claiming that the margin of which he lost is 97 votes.
Learning that Judge Wacas is Dagadag's second cousin by affinity, the former's aunt is married to an uncle of
Dagadag, petitioner filed an administrative case for Impropriety and Partiality against respondent judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Wacas may be held administratively liable.
HELD: NO.
We can grant arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag. But such reality is not
a ground for the mandatory inhibition of a Judge as required under Sec. 118 of Rule 137, Revised Rules of
Procedure, since there is actually no relation of affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag.
Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse." It is a relationship
by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.
Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity,
therefore, are those commonly referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like.
Affinity may also be defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the
other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred
of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife
one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and
vice versa."
Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A
husband is related by affinity to his wife's brother, but not to the wife of his wife's brother. There is no affinity
between the husband's brother and the wife's sister; this is called affinitas affinitatis."
In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it
follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of
the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity
to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to
Dagadag.

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Hontiveros vs. RTC Iloilo
June 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents
Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land
in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration
case.
In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower
while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land.
On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had

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already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioners
motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were
made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 151 is applicable in this case.
HELD: NO.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not
exclusively among family members.Citing several cases[18] decided by this Court, petitioners claim that
whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family members, the requisite showing of earnest efforts to
compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger
to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision,
the phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants
and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood.[19] As this Court held in Guerrero v.
RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI:[20]
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of brothers and
sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case, then Chief Justice
Concepcion emphasized that sisters-in-law (hence, also brothers-in-law) are not listed under Art. 217 of the
New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the
same enumeration of members of the family, we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the mater.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present
suit.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.[21]
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent
Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros,
are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect
amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in favor
of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure.Considering the conclusion
we have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon this question.
Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis mota of the case.
CHAPTER 2. The Family Home
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the
dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family
home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)
Fortaleza vs. Lapitan
August 15, 2012
Spouses Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan. As security, spouses
Fortaleza executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house. When spouses Fortaleza
failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial
foreclosure
At the sale, the creditors spouses Lapitan emerged as the highest bidders. The one-year redemption period
expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage.
RTC- Issues a Writ of Possession explaining that it is their ministerial duty. CA-Affirmed.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.


HELD: NO.
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the
Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily
executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even
notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale,
spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold
at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such
claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in
Gomez v. Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is,
nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor
and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within
a reasonable period thereafter.
Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of
the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property.
Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of the property, we
cannot apply the privilege of liberality to accommodate the spouses Forteza due to their negligence or
omission to exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed period without justifiable cause.
Olivia de Mesa vs. Acero
January 16, 2012
This involves a parcel of land situated at Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan. The petitioners jointly purchased the
subject property on April 17, 1984 while they were still merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was
later constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their family home
after they got married sometime in January 1987.
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Claudio) which was
secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China
Banking Corporation payable to Claudio. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored as
the account from which it was drawn had already been closed. The petitioners failed to heed Claudios
subsequent demand for payment. A BP 22 case was instituted by the creditors against the debtors.
RTC rendered a Decisiona cquitting the petitioners. A writ of execution was issued and Sheriff levied upon
the subject property. On March 9, 1994, the subject property was sold on public auction; Claudio was the
highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him.
Claudio leased the subject property to the petitioners and a certain JuanitoOliva (Juanito), the petitioners
and Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent.
Unable to collect the aforementioned rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina filed a complaint for
ejectment. In their defense, the petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the subject
property. The petitioners deny that they are mere lessors; on the contrary, they are the lawful owners of the
subject property and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom.
The petitioners filed against the respondents a complaint to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) and other
documents with damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted that the
subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could
not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the said property is exempt from execution.
HELD: NO.

The family homes exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction.
We agree with the CA that the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home and
its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. As the CA
aptly pointed out:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such
claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in
Gomez v. Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is,
nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor
and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within
a reasonable period thereafter;
In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be made at the
time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable time, or promptly, or before
the creditor has taken any step involving further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time before
sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale, or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there
is contrary authority.
In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that appellants did not assert their claim of
exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does
not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory
final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of executionto put an end to litigation. We said
before, and We repeat it now, that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now rule that claims for
exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented
before its sale on execution by the sheriff.
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by
the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set
up and proved to the Sheriff. xxx.
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the
sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop
them from later claiming the said exemption.

Ramos vs. Pangilinan


July 20, 2010
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos). The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos
and the company to pay the aggregate amount of P1,661,490.30 representing their backwages, separation
pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay.

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Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution which the Deputy Sheriff implemented by levying a property in
Ramos name.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the
judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents, however,
averred that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the
Pandacan property in fact served as the companys business address as borne by the companys letterhead.
ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution
HELD:
Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and
his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. lays down the rules relative to the levy on execution over the family
home, viz:
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There
must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an
unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on
which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the
property of the unmarried head of the family.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it
must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and
233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before
the courts and the registration of the courts order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property
is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and
involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property.
Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing
of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154actually resides therein. Moreover, the
family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one
spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is located.
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set
up and proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or
as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code.

Cabang vs. Basay


March 20, 2009
Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot located Zamboanga del Sur. However, Felix Odong and
his heirs never occupied nor took possession of the lot. Plaintiff-appellants bought said real property from the
heirs of Felix Odong and did not occupy the said property also.

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Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of
the same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. During the said cadastral proceedings, defendantappellees claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were actually occupying was Lot No. 7778. As
it turned out, however, when the Municipality of Molave relocated the townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a
big portion of Lot No. 7778 was used by the government as a public road and as there were many
discrepancies in the areas occupied, it was then discovered that defendant-appellees were actually occupying
Lot No. 7777.
Plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property against defendant-appellees.
RTC- in favor of the defendants. CA- Reversed
Petitioners insist that the property subject of the controversy is a duly constituted family home which is not
subject to execution, thus, they argue that the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the judgment of the trial
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the improvements introduced by petitioners are family homes into a mere
afterthought.
HELD:
As defined, "[T]he family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories
that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where the husband and wife, or an unmarried head of
a family reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife
or by an unmarried head of a family." Article 153 of the Family Code provides that
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent
of the value allowed by law.
Under the afore-quoted provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.
There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it was duly
constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property owned by the
persons constituting it. Indeed as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. "[T]he family home must
be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties
of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family." In other
words: The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the
conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be
established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on
community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the
consent of the latter.
If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it
can be constituted only on his or her own property.
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary, the stark and
immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by respondents and
the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate courts judgment in CAG.R. CV No. 55207. Thus, petitioners continued stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance of
respondents.
All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue. Without doubt, the instant case where the
family home issue has been vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut ploy meant to forestall the
enforcement of an otherwise final and executory decision. The execution of a final judgment is a matter of
right on the part of the prevailing party whose implementation is mandatory and ministerial on the court or
tribunal issuing the judgment.
Josef vs Santos
Nov. 27, 2008

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Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant in a case for collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent
Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from
respondent on various dates.
RTC found petitioner liable to respondent. CA- Affirmed
A writ of execution was issued and certain personal properties subject of the writ of execution were auctioned
off. Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction and Respondent
emerged as the winning bidder.
Petitioner, in his opposition to respondents motion for issuance of a writ of execution, claimed that he was
insolvent; that he had no property to answer for the judgment credit; that the house and lot in which he was
residing at the time was his family home thus exempt from execution; that the household furniture and
appliances found therein are likewise exempt from execution; and that these furniture and appliances
belonged to his children Jasmin Josef and Jean Josef Isidro. Thus, as early as during proceedings prior to the
issuance of the writ of execution, petitioner brought to the fore the issue of exemption from execution of his
home, which he claimed to be a family home in contemplation of the civil law.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that petitioners alleged family home has not been shown to have been
judicially or extrajudicially constituted, obviously referring to the provisions on family home of the Civil Code
not those of the Family Code which should apply in this case; that petitioner has not shown to the courts
satisfaction that the personal properties executed upon and sold belonged to his children. Respondent argues
that he is entitled to satisfaction of judgment considering the length of time it took for the parties to litigate
and the various remedies petitioner availed of which have delayed the case.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LEVY AND SALE OF THE PERSONAL BELONGINGS OF THE PETITIONERS
CHILDREN AS WELL AS THE ATTACHMENT AND SALE ON PUBLIC AUCTION OF HIS FAMILY HOME TO
SATISFY THE JUDGMENT AWARD IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT IS LEGAL.
HELD:
Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly constitutes petitioners family home, the
trial court should have observed the following procedure:
1. Determine if petitioners obligation to respondent falls under either of the exceptions under Article 155 of
the Family Code;
2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioners claim that the property was his family home; conduct an
ocular inspection of the premises; an examination of the title; an interview of members of the community
where the alleged family home is located, At the same time, the respondent is given the opportunity to crossexamine and present evidence to the contrary;
3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioners family home, the court should determine:
a) if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity of the Family Code;
b) if petitioners spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other beneficiaries of the family home;
c) if the petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of determining which of them, if any, is his
family home; and
d) its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the provisions of Articles 157and 160 of the
Family Code.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite petitioners
allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same,
whether the items were exempt from executionor not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to someone
else.
Respondent moved for issuance of a writ of execution on February 17, 2003 while petitioner filed his
opposition on June 23, 2003. The trial court granted the motion on July 16, 2003, and the writ of execution
was issued on August 20, 2003. Clearly, the trial court had enough time to conduct the crucial inquiry that
would have spared petitioner the trouble of having to seek relief all the way to this Court.
Being void, the July 16, 2003 Order could not have conferred any right to respondent. Any writ of execution
based on it is likewise void. Although we have held in several cases that a claim for exemption from execution

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of the family home should be set up and proved before the sale of the property at public auction, and failure
to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption since the right of exemption is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor which must be claimed by the judgment debtor himself at the time
of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter, the circumstances of the instant case are different.
Petitioner claimed exemption from execution of his family home soon after respondent filed the motion for
issuance of a writ of execution, thus giving notice to the trial court and respondent that a property exempt
from execution may be in danger of being subjected to levy and sale. Thereupon, the trial court is called to
observe the procedure as herein laid out; on the other hand, the respondent should observe the procedure
prescribed in Article 160 of the Family Code, that is, to obtain an order for the sale on execution of the
petitioners family home, if so, and apply the proceeds less the maximum amount allowed by law under
Article 157 of the Code which should remain with the petitioner for the rebuilding of his family home to his
judgment credit. Instead, both the trial court and respondent completely ignored petitioners argument that
the properties subject of the writ are exempt from execution.
Arriola vs. Arriola
Jan, 28, 2008
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola. Respondent is the son of
decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel
with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
RTC rendered a Decision on the partition of the properties. As the parties failed to agree on how to partition
among them the land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought its sale through public
auction, and petitioners acceded to it. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land.
The public auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to
include in the auction the house (subject house) standing on the subject land. This prompted respondent to
file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court. The RTC denied the motion
and said that petitioners are correct in holding that the house or improvement erected on the property
should not be included in the auction sale. A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the
evidence adduced during the ex-parte hearing clearly show that nothing was mentioned about the house
existing on the land subject matter of the case.
CA granted the Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners contends that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments
on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of The
Family Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Whether the subject house should be included in the public auction of the subject land.
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family
home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or
extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the
Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just
to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying
these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are
deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the
deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code,
viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

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The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To
this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing
the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period
of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer
period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially
partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling
reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition
of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale
as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home
regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family
home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the
individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to
the beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands
-- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties
herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013,
or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted
cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the
restriction and order the partition of the property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a claim for exception from execution or forced sale
under Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house although for a different
reason.
Honrdovs CA
Nov. 25, 2005
Premium filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business
under the name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. For failure of Honrado, as well as his counsel, to
appear at the pre-trial conference, he was declared in default. Premium was, thus, allowed to present evidence
ex parte.
It turned out that the Spouses Jose and AndreritaHonrado had filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba for
the judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrados name and the house thereon, as their
family house. In his petition, Honrado declared that his creditors were Atty. Domingo Luciano, P & J
Agriculture Trading, Inc., and Mr. Tito Dela Merced.
Honrado filed a Notice of Appeal. However, appeal was dismissed for his failure to file his brief as appellant.
Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The Sheriff levied on the parcel of land . The Notice
of Levy was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title on April 4, 2001. The Sheriff set the sale of the
property at public auction and was sold to Premium, the highest bidder.
In the meantime, the RTC of Calamba City rendered a Decision declaring the property a family home.
Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution. It was alleged therein that the property
is exempt from execution because it is a family home which had been constituted as such before he incurred
his indebtedness with Premium. He also alleged that he and his family had no other real property except the
land which was levied upon and sold on execution. Premium opposed the motion on the ground that
Honrado was already estopped or barred by laches from claiming the exemption, and that said claim has
been mooted by the lapse of the redemption period for Honrado to redeem the property. Premium averred
that, after the sale at public auction, Honrado and his family even vacated the property. Honrado reoccupied the property only in April or May 2002. It further averred that the law does not automatically
exempt a family home from levy or execution and there was no showing that its present value does not
exceed the amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Honrado can still claim the exemption from execution of family home
HELD:

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In this case, the RTC acted in accord with case law when it issued the assailed order. The petitioner admits
to having been notified of the levy of his property and of its sale at public auction at 9:30 a.m. on May 17,
2001 at the Municipal Hall of Calamba, Laguna. However, he did not bother to object to the levy and the
projected sale on the ground that the property and the house thereon was a family home. The petitioner
allowed the sale at public auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale over the property
in favor of the private respondent for P650,204.10. He even vacated the property after the said sale. The
petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff or the court until May 3, 2002, when he
filed his motion to declare the property exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code and
Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Even then, there was no showing that, during the
hearing of said motion, the petitioner adduced evidence to prove the value of the property and that it is,
indeed, a family home.
Moreover, the petitioner set the hearing of his motion on May 10, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. The private respondent
opposed the motion, but the petitioner did not file any reply thereto. Moreover, the petitioner never informed
the Court that the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, had rendered judgment in SP Case No. 489-1998-C earlier on
April 29, 2002. It was only on November 25, 2002 that the petitioner revealed to the RTC of Quezon City
that there was such a case and a decision had already been rendered. The petitioner has not justified why he
concealed such matters for such considerable period of time.
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such
claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Taneovs CA
March 09, 1999
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case (For recovery of property) in favor of private respondent, two (2)
petitioner's properties were levied to satisfy the judgment: one was a parcel of land located in Misamis
Oriental and the other was the family home. The subject properties were sold at public auction to the
private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners failure to redeem the same, a final
deed of conveyance was executed.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet
title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that
petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and NarcisaValaceras. Upon their death, they left the
subject property. Considering that said property has been acquired through free patent, such property is
therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act. No. 141.
Petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as family home is exempt from execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
HELD: While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are
exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 (Modequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, .Since
petitioners debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Family Code.
His property is therefore not exempt from attachment
The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of
a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is
not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Article 243 reads:
The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except:

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(1) For nonpayment of taxes;


(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of the declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the
land of PlutarcoVacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered
only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964.
Thus, at that time when the debt was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered.
Clearly, petitioners alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the
exception of Article 243(2).
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
(226a)
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a)
Kelly vs Planters Products
July 09, 2008
Petitioner Auther acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent Planters
Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Authers failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of
money. After trial on the merits, the RTC decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. Pursuant
thereto, respondent sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution real property and PPI emerged as the
highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his Doris filed a motion to dissolve or
set aside the notice of levy in the RTC on the ground that the subject property was their family home which
was exempt from execution. Petitioners motion was denied for failure to comply with the three-day notice
requirement. The dismissal was upheld by the CA.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family
homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by
operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to
August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions
under Art. 155.
Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in
his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the
maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order
directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of
the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the
increased actual value exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law in Article 157 and results from

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subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by
the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of
the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried
head of a family on his or her own property.
Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the
vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home. (227a, 228a)
Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three
hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts
as may hereafter be fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the
constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual
income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. (231a)
Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof
with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the
beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (235a)
Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. (238a)
Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor,
and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum
amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the
sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family
home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual
value exceeds the maximum allowed in
Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the
family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be
applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The
excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (247a, 248a)
Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may
constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. (n)
Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. (n)

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TITILE VI. PATERNITY AND FILIATION


CHAPTER 1: LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Labagala vs. Santiago
December 4, 2001
A careful reading of the chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed
a mans child by his wife, and the husband (or in proper cases, his heirs) denies the childs filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.
Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.
(n)
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or
both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified
such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument
shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)
There is a presumption that a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate.
However, the presumption of legitimacy is not conclusive and consequently may be overthrown by evidence to
the contrary. Hence, Art. 166 of the Family Code provides
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the
husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification
of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3)
If
the
child
was
born
after
the
death
of
the
husband.

(262a)

Babiera vs. Catotal


June 15, 2000
An action to claim inheritance as legal heirs is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child.
A careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code will show that they do not contemplate
a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.
Liyao vs. Tanhoti-Liyao
March 7, 2002
Can a child impugn his own legitimacy? NO.

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The grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 166, Family Code (then Art. 225,
Civil Code) may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under conditions set forth
under Article 171, Family Code (Article 262, New Civil Code)
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is strictly a personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his
heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn
the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of
his mothers alleged paramour.
Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after
such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred
days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred
days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a)
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the
marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a)
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the
birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in
the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or
where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad.
If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be
counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is
earlier. (263a)
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)
CHAPTER 2. PROOF OF FILIATION
Tayag vs. Tayag-Gollor
March 24, 2008
Filiation may be established through voluntary or compulsory recognition.
Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil registrar, a final
judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The voluntary
recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further court action and is, therefore, not subject to
the limitation that the action for recognition be brought during the lifetime of the putative parent.

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Note: Voluntary recognition of the childs filiation by the alleged parents brother before the MTC does not qualify
as a statement in a court of record. Under the law, this statement must be personally be made by the parent
himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary
declaration by the parent, or if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of
children born outside wedlock. (Cenido vs. Apacionado, November 19, 1999)
Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and
must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Salas vs. Matusalem
September 11, 2013
The court considers the totality of evidence which establishes beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner was indeed the father of the child. Such pieces of evidence must be overwhelming,
documentary or testimonial.
Peria vs. Baring
November 12, 2012
A single instance that the putative father allegedly hugged and promised to support the child cannot be
considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of the child.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity.
Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.
xxx
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
said certificate. Hence, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by
the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetence evidence of paternity.
Gotardo vs. Buling
August 15, 2012
We have held that proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation representing his pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had
sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative
father. We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2)
the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

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When the father does not deny that he had sexual relations with the mother, and failed to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore,
cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the
wifes clear and categorical assertions.
When filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Heirs of Cabais vs. CA
October 8, 1999
Presentation of the baptismal certificate instead of the birth certificate to prove filiation by any of the
means recognized by law weigh heavily against the respondents.
A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation and a high degree
of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such public document. This is
pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The evidentiary nature of such document
must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity.
On the contrary, a baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being hearsay, is not a
conclusive proof of filiation. It does not have the same probative value as a record of birth, an official
or public document.
In Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court declared that a baptismal certificate is
evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not
the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to his kinsfolk. The same is conclusive
only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who
baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized. It is indispensable
that such declarations and statements are shown by proof recognized by law.

Lucas vs. Lucas


June 6, 2011
Estate of Ong vs. Diaz
December 17, 2007
The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
Sec. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order The appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
Based on the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exists appropriate biological samples of the DNA.

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A biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in
inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other bodily
fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Thus, even if Rogelio already dies, any of the biological samples, may be used for DNA testing.
Bernabe vs. Alejo
January 21, 2001
Solinap vs. Locsin Jr.
December 10, 2001
Tijing vs. CA
March 8, 2001
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It
may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather,
it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It must be stressed
too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to
the usual presumptions including those as the identity of the person.
In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it
must be resolved first whether the child is really the child of the petitioners. Evidence must be
adduced to determine whose parents the child is.
Note: Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The
certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.
David vs. CA
November 16, 1995
The determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the
parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not
follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case ofSalvaa v.
Gaela, 1 it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free
will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.
Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who,
by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family
Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of
her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own
since they were born. xxx It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able
to support her children according to her means.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted
to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have
a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
Surnames;

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(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in
conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. (264a)
CHAPTER 3. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this
Code.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
(289a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 172 (2): In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Cenido vs. Apacionado
November 19, 1999
The illegitimate child can file an action for compulsory recognition only during the lifetime of the presumed
parent. After the parents death, the child cannot bring such action, except, however, in only two instances:
(1) When the supposed parent died during the minority of the child; and
(2) A document should be discovered in which the parent recognized the child was his.
The action must be brought within four years from the attainment of majority in the first case, and from the
discovery of the document in the second case.
Uy vs. Chua
September 18, 2009
A compromise agreement to settle the question of petitioners status and filiation, is not allowed. An action for
acknowledgement, affecting a persons civil status cannot be subject of a compromise. Hence, it does not bar a
subsequent filing of a separate complaint to prove the petitioners status and filiation. Such action cannot be
barred by res judicata
ART. 2035: No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of
persons; (2) The validity of a marriage of a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4)
future support; (5) Jurisdiction of courts; (6) future legitime.
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil
Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)
Art. 895(3): The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the free
disposal of the testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate
children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully
satisfied.
Grande vs. Antonio
February 18, 2014

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RA 9225 amended Art. 176 of the Family Code to wit:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate
child may use the surname of the father.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It
is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children.
A change of name may be properly done through a petition under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Tonog vs. CA
February 7, 2002
A father is allowed to have temporary custody of the minor if the guardianship proceedings before the trial court
have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor.
Parents rights to custody over their children is enshrined in Art. 220 of the Civil Code.
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline,
self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation
and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or
patria potestas is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the latters needs.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in
a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.

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Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate
children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code
provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in
favor of the mother.
De la Cruz vs. Garcia
July 31, 2009
An autobiography which states that his wife is pregnant, though unsigned by the parent, substantially
satisfies the requirement of the law- private handwritten instrument
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument
wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
People vs. Magtibay
August 6, 2002
Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b)
acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to
support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural
children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and
considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his
children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status.
Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victims child. However, the
amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in
accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.
Aruego vs. CA
March 13, 1996
The right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime
of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case
of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.[7] where we held that the fact of filing of the petition
already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
xxx xxx
xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will
ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she
represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court.
CHAPTER 4. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. (269a)
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable
marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (270a)

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Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (272a)
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (273a)
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.
(274)
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the
time their cause of action accrues. (275a)
TITLE VII
ADOPTION
Art. 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights may adopt, provided he is in a position
to support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with the means of the family.
Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption of a person of majority age is allowed in this Title.
In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to be adopted, unless the adopter is the
parent by nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of the legitimate parent of the person to be adopted. (27a, E. O. 91
and PD 603)
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of
their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity
of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on intercountry adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)
Art. 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. (29a, E. O. and PD 603)
Art. 187. The following may not be adopted:
(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to the
adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child
during minority.
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and
(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded. (30a, E. O.
91 and PD 603)
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over,
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent, if living with said parent and the latter's
spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (31a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:

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(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters,
except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the
adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives. (39(1)a, (3)a, PD 603)
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit from the
adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession;
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter,
they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by
the adopters;
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the
entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted
and the other half, by the adopters.
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they shall divide
the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third by the
surviving spouse, and one-third by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession
shall apply. (39(4)a, PD 603)
Art. 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially rescinded upon petition of
any person authorized by the court or proper government instrumental acting on his behalf, on the same
grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority. If the adopted is at least eighteen years of
age, he may petition for judicial rescission of the adoption on the same grounds prescribed for disinheriting
an ascendant. (40a, PD 603)
Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases:
(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting ground for disinheriting a descendant; or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for at least one year, or, by some other
acts, has definitely repudiated the adoption. (41a, PD 603)
Art. 193. If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption,
the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature, unless the
latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the person and
property of the minor. If the adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in
the same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both.
Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the
adopted arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the
surnames of the adopters and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption.
The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries. (42a, PD 603)