21) Aldaba vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts:

This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare Unconstitutional,

R.A. 9591 which creates a Legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan.
Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986,
Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the
population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative
in Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos, Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos
has at least 250,000 actual or projected.
Held: THE MOTION IS DENIED WITH FINALITY. It was declared by the
Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by
the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with
this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional
Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the
following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel
V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are
declared official by the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not
stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only
249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that
this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population
and voting power among districts.

22) BANAT vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed
before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a Petition to proclaim the full
number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the
recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board
of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the
COMELEC en banc.
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution
of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution.
The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen
(13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC
announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would
determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through
Action,Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula.
COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus
andprohibition assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use
theVeterans formula.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in
Section5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
2) Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional

3) Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to
qualify for one seat is constitutional
4) How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
5) Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating
in the party-list elections?

HELD:
1) The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives.
2) Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats
that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
3) The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in
relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives."
4) In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section
11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:1. The parties,
organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.2. The parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seateach.3. Those garnering sufficient
number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3)seats.
5) Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections

as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the
major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of
8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

23) ANG LADLAD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of
men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation
of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made
misrepresentation in their application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed
to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted. COMELECs
citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation
of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution.
The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose
(that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or dangerous

to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The COMELEC failed to substantiate
their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested
rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor
by any international laws to which we adhere.

24) ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and
BANAT vs COMELEC. Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by
the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons
but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari
against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
disqualifying them.
ISSUE
: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD
: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the

COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned
some principles established in the two afore stated cases. The new guidelines are as
follows: I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
National parties or organizations, (2) Regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and
regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.3. Political
parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

25)

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs.

Mathay

G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966

FACTS:
Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to
permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the

increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding
year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec.
14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8
senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have
expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUES:
Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase
must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
HELD: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers
to all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence,
as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary
treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the
full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the
singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to
consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single
Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when combined with the
following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House, underscores that in
the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that
the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must
have

expired

before

the

increase

in

compensation

can

become

operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by
RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
26)

Benjamin Ligot vs Ismael Mathay

G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974

FACTS:
Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a
twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his
second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government
was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of
Congress (senators and congressmen) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00
to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall
take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968
which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or
elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are
continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest
rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. The
House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then
Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael
Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the
basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress
(which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30,
1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would
become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing
December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under
Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of

P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation
during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain
directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of
Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are
concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their
compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant
retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30,
1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which
they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office)
would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary
beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of
Ligots colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson, Such a scheme would contravene
the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling
administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.

27)

Pobre vs Defensor-Santiago

A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the senate floor. The following excerpts are the
ones in question x x x "I am not angry. " I am irate. "I am foaming in the mouth. "I
am homicidal. "I am suicidal. "I am humiliated debased degraded. And " am not only
that. I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. "I
am nauseated. " I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts
in the Supreme Court "I am no longer interested in the position of Chief Justice if I
was to be surrounded by idiots. would rather be in another environment but not in
the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. According to Pobre the words of the
lady senator were disrespectful and requested that the latter be disbarred or be
subjected to disciplinary action.
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statement she made were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity being part of a
speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. She claims to have made those comments to expose anomalies with regard
to the selection process of the Judicial and Bar Council for the next Chief Justice.
The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI," Section 11 which states that
A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session.
ISSUE:
WON Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the Judiciary
SUPREME COURT: NO.
The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of
Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint
for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. Despite

this the court feels that the lady senator has

gone beyond the limits of decency and good conduct for the statements made which
were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The court is not hesitant to
impose some form of disciplinar# sanctions on her$ but the factual and legal
circumstances of this case however deter the court from doing so even without a sign
of remorse from her. Petition is DISMISSED

28) Puyat vs De Guzman

G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
FACTS:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the
International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio
Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted hence he filed
a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25,
1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of
Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman,
Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao
Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued
that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before
any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal
owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation.
The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to
intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and
intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an
assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?

HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is
not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the
stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as
counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he
instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a workaround and is
clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the
litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

NOTE: Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear
as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality

thereof,

including

any

government-owned

or

controlled

corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene
in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office

29)

Avelino vs Cuenco

G.R. No. L-2821. March 4, 1949.

FACTS: Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the
Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00 A. M.), and the petitioner was already
in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall until about
11:35 A. M.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and
Cuenco that the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order.
Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in
the United States, all the Senators were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be
dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a
premeditated plan of petitioner and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to
prevent Senator Taada from delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator
Taada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege
speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuously ignored him; and when after
the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada insisted on being recognized by the Chair,

the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who
would speak without being previously recognizedby him, but all the
while, tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously
shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for
recognition of Senator Taada.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked
out of the session hall followed by Senators David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona
and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved, Gregorio Abad was appointed
Acting Secretary, because the Assistant Senator Taada, after being recognized by the
Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad
read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for
approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the
respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67,
entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate
and designating the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the
Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved. Senator Cuenco
took the oath.
Issue:
a.

Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

b.

If it has, were resolutions Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

c.

Should the petition be granted?

Held: As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the
petition. Without costs.

Ratio: In fine, all the four justices agree that the Court being confronted with the
practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support
Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most
injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office

being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amendable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence
of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve
senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and
thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one
(23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a
quorum.
The recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent makes it advisable,
more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in
matters of similar nature.

30)

Mabanag vs Lopez Veto

G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947

FACTS:
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in
the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators
and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in

order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been
considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into
the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have
been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary
three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the
furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the
said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each
House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by
the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in
the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated
copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness
advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in
conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses,
signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the
secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the

Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by
their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of
the journals.

31) US

vs Juan Pons

FACTS:
"The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the
crime of illegal importation of opium, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together
and plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer
Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of
the value of P62,400, Philippine currency.
On motion of counsel, Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto
Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two
years, to pay a fine of P1,000 to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same penalties
were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000.
Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has
become final.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day
of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of
February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty was
not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and
that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise
questioned.
ISSUE: Whether Act 2381 was passed on 28th of February or March 1 of that year.

HELD: For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with
costs. So ordered.

Ratio: Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authentic of laws should
rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights
acquired to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
memory of individuals."
In the case from which this last quotation is taken the court cited numerous decisions
of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down,
and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has been
in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal
Government and the various states we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that
country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned
at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not
err in declining to go behind these journals.
In view of when the Legislature adjourned
On the one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have
indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that
this allegation or alleged fact may be established by extraneous evidence; while,
on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are
conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to understand these
opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the
evidence thusi nvolved.

But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was
stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the
discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were
stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently
within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the
special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
In view of the probative value of the Journal
If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight
as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative
records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon entertain oral
evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the
treachery of memory.

32)

Duenas vs HRET

GR No. 185401, July 21, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Jun Dueas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito Jett P. Reyes
were rival candidates for the position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of
Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. After the
canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564
votes as opposed to private respondents 27,107 votes. Not conceding defeat, private
respondent filed an election protest, praying for a revision/recount, alleging that he
was cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts through insidious and wellorchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the systematic
reduction of his votes and the corresponding increase in petitioners votes.
In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the
revision and appreciation of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts
pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules. Instead of complying with the order,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counterprotested precincts on October 27, 2008. This was denied by the HRET, reiterating its
order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts and recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment his
cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its own funds for the revision of
the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET
Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss the
protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the revision if necessitated by
reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election. This was with
the end in view of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. It was the HRETs
position that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the unrevised precincts
did not automatically divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over the same. Moreover, it
ruled that its task of determining the true will of the electorate was not confined to the
examination of contested ballots. Under its plenary power, it could motu propio review
the validity of every ballot involved in a protest or counter-protest and the same could
not be frustrated by the mere expedient of filing a motion to withdraw/abandon the
remaining counter-protested precincts. Convinced that it could not determine the true
will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City on the basis alone of
the initial revision of the 100% protested precincts and the 25% counter-protested

precincts, it had no other recourse but to continue the revision and appreciation of all
the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Resolution, to continue the revision and
appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
(2) Whether or not HRETs assumption of the burden of the costs of the continued
revision amounted to an illegal and unconstitutional disbursement of public funds
nder Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction
shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Guided by this basic
principle, the Court will neither assume a power that belongs exclusively to the HRET
nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.
(1) HRETs Power to Deny the Motion to Withdraw / Abandon Counter-protest
First, there are 732 precincts in the 2nd Legislative District of Taguig City, where
respondent protested the election results in 170 precincts and petitioner counterprotested 560 precincts. All in all, therefore, 730 precincts were the subject of the
revision proceedings. While 100% of the protested precincts were already revised, only
25% or 140 of the counter-protested precincts (or a total of 310 precincts) were
actually done. Yet, with 420 more precincts to go had the HRET only been allowed to
continue its proceedings, petitioner claims that respondents were only speculating
that a sufficient number of fake/spurious ballots would be discovered in the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and that these fake/spurious ballots
would overturn the result of the election.
Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent
constitutional body require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that
body should be based on firm and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any
accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established
by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. But the Court finds no evidence
of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.

Second, the Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. By
employing the word sole, the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the
HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is exclusive and
exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its own full, complete and
unimpaired.

33)

Pimentel vs COMELEC

GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003

FACTS:
Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes
it mandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, to
undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the
2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.
ISSUE: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an
unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on candidates for Senator?

HELD: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office
whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government undergo a
mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution,
an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship,
(2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge
the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of
the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to
yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed.

34)

Sarmiento vs Mison

G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987

FACTS:
In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs by then President Corazon Aquino. Petitioners questioned the appointment of
Mison as it appears that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that under the new
Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmationd of COA. Sarmiento also
seeks to enjoin Guillermo Carague, then Secretary of the Department of Budget from
disbursing salary payments for Mison.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed the confirmation given
by the Commission on Appointments
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution framers removed heads of bureaus as one of those officers
needing confirmation by COA. There are four groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint. These groups are: 1) heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in

this Constitution; 2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law; 3) those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint; and 4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone. The first group are the only public officers appointed by
the president which requires the confirmation of COA. The position of Mison does not
belong to the first group, hence, his appointment need not be confirmed by the COA.

35)

Tatad vs Comission on Appointments

G.R. No. 183171, August 14, 2008

FACTS:
On May 4, 2005, respondent Commission on Appointments (Commission) issued a
Certification of Consent3 and confirmed the appointment of former Vice President
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the
Peoples Republic of China with concurrent jurisdiction over the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea and Mongolia. Petitioner Tatad challenged the consent before the
RTC in Quezon City via a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity. The case, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-05-55417, was raffled off to Branch 219 of said court, presided by
Judge Bayani V. Vargas.
Petitioner prayed that the Commissions consent be declared as void from the
beginning on the ground that the appointment of former Vice President Guingona to
the position was contrary to law and public policy because he was already beyond
seventy (70) years old at that time. Respondent opposed the motion and contended

that the complaint should be dismissed considering that the issue had been mooted
after Ambassador Guingona tendered his resignation from the position
ISSUE:
Whether a case can still be appealed even if it is declared moot and academic.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy. In such a case, there is no actual substantial relief
which a petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition.We have consistently held that courts will not determine a moot question
in a case in which no practical relief will be granted.
Petitioner insists that despite the resignation of former Vice President Guingona from
the position, a resolution of the issues presented is imperative so that the public may
know whether respondent Commission violated the law and public policy.
Petitioner is mistaken. Because the present case lacks an actual controversy, any
resolution of the issues presented would not result in an adjudication of the rights of
the parties, but would take the nature merely of an advisory opinion. As this Court
held in Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc.,courts are called upon to resolve actual cases
and controversies, not to render advisory opinions.

36)

Senate of the Philippines vs Ermita

G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation

which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine
elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress, valid and constitutional?
HELD:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation
to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever
it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on
the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
37)

Neri vs Senate Committees

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The

Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that
he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the
case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials
necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of
executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such
contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for
eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7
of Article III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
38) Belgica vs Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566 ,November 19, 2013
FACTS:

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3)
other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking
that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System"
be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in
the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives
lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse
of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:

1.

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks
and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations
of legislative power.
HELD:

1.

Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern
the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the
principle of separation of powers. Congressrole must be confined to mere oversight that
must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation
of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2.

Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.

39)

Francisco vs House of Representatives

G.R. NO. 160261, NOV. 10, 2003

FACTS:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first
complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss
it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of
the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."

ISSUE: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.
HELD: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power"
to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As
indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of
the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of
separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that
its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation
of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.

40) Gutierrez vs House of Representatives

February 15, 2011
FACTS:
July2010: 4 days before the 15 th Congress opened its first session, private respondents
Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an
impeachment

complaint

against

Gutierrez

upon

endorsement

of

Party-List

Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao

27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker

Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the
Order of Business

3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John

Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes
group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by
Representatives Colmenares, Casio, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment

Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to
House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business

11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House

Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both

complaints sufficient in form

2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the

15 Congress was published

th

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two

complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance

Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions

of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these violated
the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings
ISSUES:
1. Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy
2. Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due process to the Petitioner
3. Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the
Constitution
HELD: Petition DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1. 1.

NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary
the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar
on the impeachment of one and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
language of Baker v. Carr, judicially discoverable standards for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review
1. 2.

DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of promulgation the

Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?

(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the

impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJs, Rep.
Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the Sandiganbayan

Presumption of regularity

The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant of

rule-making power in the HOR

the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements

and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the
substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee

The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating

the Rules.

impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and

not for the punishment of the offender

1. 3.

THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint

against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the
15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second
impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking

initial action of said complaint (referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice)

IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

Rationale of the one-year bar: that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold:

1)to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do
its principal task [of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once
the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
(Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)