ACTUS ME INVITO FACTUS NON EST MEUS ACTUS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,VS JOSELITO DEL
ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.G.R. No. 127755 April 14,
1999
Facts:At around 5:30 in the afternoon, the accused was hired for P120.00 by
a certain "Boy" Santos, his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he
would drive him to a cockpit, however despite their earlier arrangement Boy
Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez
and "Dodong" Bisaya. Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot
of Merced Drugstore at the public market. Subsequently, he was asked to
proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where
Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted
the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her
bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help "Dodong"
Bisaya. Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but "Boy Santos"
who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in
fact to shoot him.
Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before
boarding the tricycle "Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head
while she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting, "Dodong"
Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez rode behind
del Rosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma.
Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario
not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his
family would be harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat,
however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the
barangay captain and the police.
Issue: Whether or not Del Rosario is guilty with his co-accused.
Held:The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption
from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He was then
unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint
by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of
the robbery and killing, and was only forced to help them escape after the
commission of the crime.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who
acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is
exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus
me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is
not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the
actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is
not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, VS NELIDA DEQUINA
Y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC Y JAPITANA & NORA JINGABO Y
CRUZ,Accused-Appellants.
Facts:On 6:00 a.m., of September 29, 1999, Dequina with her co-accused
were caught by police officers in possession of 32,995 grams of marijuana.
For the defense, only Dequina made her testimony.
Sometime she joined the Kilosang Mayo Uno. On September 27, 1999, one
Sally told her that the movement had decided to send her to a mission which
would determine if she was really qualified to join the group. As agreed upon,
they met Sally at the designated place and time. Sally secretly told her that
the three of them would be going to Manila for a still undisclosed
mission. She was briefed that the three of them will temporarily stay in the
house of her [Dequina] relative in Manila. She was further instructed that
they will go to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in Avenida where they will be
met by members of their group who will also monitor their
movements. Afterwards, they will proceed to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga
where they will pick-up some bags. Thereat, somebody will meet and give
them instructions.
From Dau, they will return to Manila. They will alight at the first ShoeMart
Department Store which they will see along the way. A waiting tricycle would
bring them to a store where they could buy carton boxes for their
bags. Finally, a taxicab will fetch and bring them all the way to the pier.
[Dequina] received P3,000.00 from Sally for their expenses and plane tickets
for the three of them from Sally. However, she noticed that instead of their
true names, the tickets were in the names of other persons. Her plane ticket
was in the name of Sarah Ganje. That of [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] were in the
names of Rowenal Palma and Mary Grace Papa, respectively.Nervous, she
thought of backing out at the last minute but Sally assured her that she had

nothing to worry about. Sally culminated by saying that something will
happen to her child if ever she backed out from the plan.
Issue: Whether or not Dequina could avail Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code
as justifying circumstance.
Held: Not meritorious. A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he
does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act
done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be
so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must
be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or selfdefense in equal combat. Here, Dequinas version of events that culminated
with her and Jundoc and Jingabos arrests on September 29, 1999 is
implausible. Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and Jingabos assertion of blind trust
in Dequina and total ignorance of the transportation of marijuana.
While Dequina posits that she acted under compulsion and that a certain
Sally called all the shots, she nevertheless admitted that their
accommodations when they reached Manila was with her aunt in
Guadalupe. On cross examination, she said that it was she who told Sally
that they were going to stay with her aunt. More importantly, the alleged
threat on her daughter was unclear. At one point in her testimony, she
claimed that her daughter was to be under the custody of Sally while she
was away. However, during the trial her lawyer manifested that her daughter
was in fact in Manila and in the court room attending the hearing. Moreover,
accused-appellants themselves picture a very precise and elaborate scheme
in the transport of the huge shipment of marijuana. With this, it is simply
contrary to human experience that the people behind the shipment would
entrust the same to an unknowing and uncertain person such as [Dequina]
and her two stooges, unless they themselves were in on it. Furthermore, the
scheme or transport of the marijuana shipment was so exact that [Jundoc]
and [Jingabo] only had enough time to rest in the house of [Dequinas] aunt in
Guadalupe from the time they arrived in Manila in the morning to the time
they had to go to provincial bus station in the afternoon, negating their

purported desire to see Manila. Clearly, the defense story is riddled with
holes.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JUAN
SALVATIERRA, ENRIQUE CONSTANTINO, AGUSTIN TRINIDAD, WILLIE
TRINIDAD, and ALVIN SANTOS, accused, ENRIQUE CONSTANTINO,
accused-appellant
Facts:That on or about the 15th day of May 1988, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, while armed with handguns and
knives, with intent to gain, entered the house of HICHIRO KUBOTA and
ELIZABETH HAMMOND and once inside, the above-named accused, by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away the belonging to said Hichiro
Kubota and Elizabeth Hammond, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the aforementioned amount(s) of P800,000.00; 26,000.00 yen; US$2,4000.00
and P7,000.00; that on the occasion of the said robbery, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another by means of force, threats and intimidation and one after the other,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have
carnal knowledge of Hazel Arjona, Hichiro Kubota's maid, against her will and
consent.
By
his
own
account,
as
herein
summarized,
ENRIQUE
CONSTANTINOadmits having been with the group of Salvatierra which robbed
the house of spouses Hichiro Kubota and Elizabeth Hammond in the evening
of May 15, 1988. At the time of the incident, he was working as a driver for a
Japanese friend of Kubota and it was in fact the latter who recommended him
to that Japanese employer, a certain Kinawa. He recalls that he was invited
by the group of Salvatierra for a drinking spree in Cubao in the afternoon of
that day. Juan Salvatierra, Agustin Trinidad, Wilfredo Trinidad and Alvin
Santos were in his acquaintances whom he had met a few months earlier at
an auto repair shop. After consuming some bottles of liquor, Salvatierra
approached appellant and asked whether the latter could help him find
employment under Kubota. When appellant declined, Salvatierra lost his
temper and drew a knife which he pointed at appellant, saying, "Tarantado
ka, Eric. Marunong ka pa sa boss mo, basta samahan mo kami ngayon."
Fearing for his life, appellant acceded. They hailed a taxicab and all of
them proceeded to the residence of Kubota, with Salvatierra all the while
poking his knife at appellant who was then at the backseat along with
Salvatierra, Agustin Trinidad and Alvin Santos. When they reached the place,
it was appellant who rang the doorbell at the prodding of Salvatierra who

At this juncture Santos stood up and instantly brandished a gun at Elizabeth Hammond. He proceeded to Kubota's room upstairs and told him about Salvatierra wanting to get a job. Appellant talked to Elizabeth Hammond and thereafter he. in order that duress may be validly availed of by an accused as a defense. fanciful. Appellant could well have dissociated himself from the criminal escapade considering that when the group flagged down a taxicab. much as he wanted to prevent the robbery. however. Held:Verily. tirahin mo. duress has been held unavailing where the accused had every opportunity to run away if he has wanted to or to resist any possible aggression because he was also armed. Thus. They then went down and Kubota conversed with the group. as he claims." which translates to "An act done by me against my will is not my act. According to appellant. sufficient to conclusively establish his complicity in the crime and belie his claim of having acted under duress."Appellant nonetheless managed to plead with the three by saying. it should actually be anchored on a real. The positive declarations of eyewitnesses Elizabeth Hammond. Appellant's account of the supposed employment of duress upon him by his cohorts falls far short of the requirements under which the same could have substantial value in evidence. Epifania Hammond. imminent or reasonable fear for one's own life or limb and should not be speculative. Salvatierra and Santos went inside the house. "Huwag naman kayong manakit ng tao dito sa bahay. he could not do anything supposedly by reason of extreme fear on his part. For. drew an angry reaction from Salvatierra who threatened him once more with bodily harm." The compulsion employed upon the accused must have been of such character as to leave no opportunity for him to spring an escape or to himself foist any act of defense for self-preservation. He had earlier heard Salvatierra utter these threatening words: "Pag kumilos ng masama si Eric. Issue: Whether or not Eric be exonerate by reason of acting due to irresistible fear. or imagined.continued to poke the knife at his back. It is based on the complete absence of freedom on the part of the accused and has its roots in the Latin maxim "Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. just as the court below refused to conceded any evidentiary merit or probative value to such a defense. was once more subjected to . Diosa Hammond and Marilyn Juguilon as to his participation in the incident all unerringly point to an active role on his part in the incident. Salvatierra followed suit by pulling out a knife and directed that the couple be brought upstairs. there could not by any way for his Court to accord credence to appellant's asseverations. It was only when the group was already in the vehicle that appellant. it did not appear at that point that appellant was being threatened at all by Salvatierra." This.

in case the threat is speculative. or imagined. Same is true in the case of People Vs Enrique. and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. fear or intimidation must be present. But he did not or. the maxim is not applicable for the reason that the fear or threat is not clear upon the harm to her daughter. it was only Salvatierra who was actually armed with a knife and who had exhibited a threatening attitude towards him. (2) the physical force must be irresistible and (3) ant the force must come from third person. instead of resisting. of his four coaccused.intimidation by Salvatierra. imminent and impending. (1) compulsion by means of physical force. like a bare denial. In the case of People Vs. he chose not to do so. came . upon reaching the residence of the victims. A threat of future injury is not enough. fanciful. Dequina. it must be a force which acts upon him from outside and by third person. Again. The threat must be real. What is significant from the testimony of appellant is that.in order that duress may be validly availed of by an accused as a defense. Hence. Synthesis Actus me invito factus non est meus actustranslated as “An act done by me against my will is not my act”. it should actually be anchored on a real. Joselito. and especially thereafter. Appellant's defense is akin to a mere denial. the gun was pointed to him causing him under imminent danger and leaving him no choice but to obey Boy Santos(third person).[11] This fact should have sufficiently emboldened him to get hold of and rouse himself from the stupor of fear which supposedly gripped him. more plausibly. In the case of People Vs. Such force can never consist in anything which springs primarily from the man himself. The maxim would be applicable as exempting circumstance of which the person is compelled by means of violence to commit a crime. The force was considered irresistible one producing an effect upon him. The duress. imminent or reasonable fear for one's own life or limb and should not be speculative. No compulsion of irresistible force is present when the fear is unclear. a self-serving and negative device which judicial experience shows is conveniently conjured be felons to justify their participation in a crime. The fear or threat must be real and present so that the force is irresistible and compulsive. leading him to mere instrument and as such incapable of committing a crime. it must fail if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. There are three elements necessary. force. appellant had all the opportunity to escape from the time when he rang the doorbell and when they were allowed by Elizabeth Hammond to go inside the house. but in the absence of it.

the death penalty had been abolished and hence. The contention of the accused-appellant that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic Act No. the correct penalty should be in the medium period which is 17 years. 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. with no modifying circumstance present.from imagination or unclear. the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to death. to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Hence. (People Vs Joselito) DURA LEX SED LEX People of the Philippines vs. Indeed. The judges can only interpret and . is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question. The Court has reconsidered the above cases and come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III. since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and killing happened. the element of crime is incomplete to which it lacks complete freedom from the doer. The reason out of accused-appellant. the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from death penalty. 7659. The defense of “an act done by me against my will” is not meritorious. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. 116719 January 18. should be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years. The Court held in this case that the problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. there being no modifying circumstances present. Patricio Amigo GR No. 4 months and 1 day. The reason for the maxim as an exempting circumstance is that. Section 19 (1) of the Constitution. the appropriate penalty is deductible from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. the penalty should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying circumstances. The majority of the Court. 1996 Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruben Suriaga y Chavez G. 2009 Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. even if none of the circumstances were present in the commission of the crime. the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the victim is a minor. Applying the principle of DURA LEX SED LEX. disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity of the accused. applying the principle of DURA LEX SED LEX in the case at bar. both specifically alleged in the Information. Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel Isiderawith kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. were clearly established by the evidence for the prosecution free from any scintilla of doubt. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. 123779 April 17. while acquitting the other accused are hereby acquitted. The minority of the victim was alleged in the Information and was never disputed.R. OLYMPIO REVALDO vs. the accused-appellant claims that the penalty is too cruel and harsh but it is still a law. 267 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death.apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature.R. In the case at bar. The duty of courts is to apply the law. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Under the Revised Penal Code. People of the Philippines vs. 2002 Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court charging Ruben Suriaga. No. 170589 April 16. Thus. The lower court rendered judgment finding Ruben Suriaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Art. It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and appellants demand for ransom. the accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. No. . We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

6683 (2 December 1988) was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees as well as involuntary resignation to those affected due to reorganization. or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. Applying DURA LEX SED LEX. instead. filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which.e. No. R.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. EX NECESSITATE LEGIS. she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. The petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. . Those who may avail were regular.R. temporary or regular employment. 1992) Facts: In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy. because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with they’re requirements of the law. with rendered service minimum of two years. Held: It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates the crime. the court believes that the denial of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is unreasonable. 89-1. however.A. The trial court further stated that the Forestry Code is a special law where criminal intent is not necessary. unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law . i. citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec. which in this case. casual. was done by Linda Chua. emergency. denied the same. Civil Service Commission G. 88979 (February 7. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court and ruled that moyive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. On that note. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.The ruling of the Trial Court that the petitioner failed to present and attest to the fact that they sought prior DENR permission before cutting the trees and sawing them into lumber. Chua v. casual. the law may be harsh but that is the law. temporary and emergency employees. Petitioner Lydia Chua believe that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a coterminous employee.From the necessity of law.3. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results.

Coverage— This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. a non-career civil servant. No. Shell and Petron filed separate applications with the Energy Regulatory Board for permission to increase the whole sale prices of petroleum products. Wherefore. in a joint order granted provisional relief and . The necessity of law is needed in order to prove that Lydia Chua is entitled for the retirement benefits which was stated in section 2 of the said act.A. Civil Service Commission In this case Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee. 96266 (July 18. In the interest of substantial justice. Chua v. her application must be granted. 1991) Facts: Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990. as well as the personnel of all local government units.The Court believes. regardless of age. casual and emergency employees. The Energy Regulatory Board. as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. and oppressive.Petroleum companies Caltex.because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. energy regulatory board (ERB) G. Ernesto Maceda vs. No. including government-owned or controlled corpora tions withoriginal charters.R. 2. the petition is granted. unjustified. that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R. and so holds. after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. for provisional authority to increase temporarily such prices pending further proceedings. and meanwhile. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authoruty (NIA) for over 15years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. Sec. like casual and emergency employees. who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. In four (4) governmental projects. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular. temporary. 6683 is unreasonable.

operate exclusively of the other. without need of a hearing. Pending that. 172. Maceda vs. ERB Provisions of Section 8 of Executive Order No. without prejudice to a final decision after hearing. or otherwise. paragraph (e). upon publication and notice to all affected parties.” especially on a matter as transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos. tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. which are given ex-parte. an authority to increase provisionally. subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. and has been issued with grave abuse of discretion. paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other. it does not preclude the Board from ordering a provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or not to make it permanent or to reduce or increase it further or to deny the application. Oliver Lozano submits that the same was issued without proper notice and hearing in violation of Section 3. despite its being a quasi-judicial body. it may order. of Executive Order No. Senator Ernesto Maceda and Atty. Section 3.” except that there is no law at present authorizing the same. No. 172. HELD: Pursuant to Section 8 of E. The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments that “the ERB is not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision. it is still “ an administrative body under the Office of the President whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court suggested that it will be under the scope of the legislative to allow the presidential review of the decisions of the ERB since. in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Provided. The petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board should be subject to presidential review. The provisional increase is akin to a temporary restraining order. . Hence. should the Board find that the documentary evidences substantially support the provisional order. That the Board shall immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days thereafter. under Section 8.O. this petition praying for injunctive relief. 172 which authorizes the Board to grant provisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative. to stop the Energy Regulatory Board from implementing its order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. however. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment.authorizes said applicants a provisional increase. while hearing is indispensable. subject to the requirements of notice and hearing.

Represented by Provincial Auditor ROY L. the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures of the SEF.D. Pursuant thereto.THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU. A. for the period January to June 1998. GARCIA. represented by its governor. 141386. The Special Education Fund was created by virtue of R. 5447. vs. Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province. petitioner. 2001) FACTS: The provincial governor of the province of Cebu. 1999. Consequently. as chairman of the local school board. it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF. Represented by Governor PABLO P. imposed an annual tax of 1% on real property which shall accrue to the SEF. In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu. HELD: The salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the provincial school board of Cebu in connection with the . 464. On December 13. also known as the Real Property Tax Code of the Philippines. defining the activities to be financed. G. filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court. PROVINCE OF CEBU. Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA. No. creating school boards for the purpose. No. and appropriating funds therefrom. the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu. URSAL. P. 1969. No.R. (November 29. be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned. which is An act creating a special education fund to be constituted from the proceeds of an additional real property tax and a certain portion of the taxes on Virginia-type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco. which took effect on January 1. respondent. saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF. appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that would accommodate students in the public schools. ISSUE: May the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants. under Section 98 of the Local Government Code. the province of Cebu.

Applying the principle ignorance of the law excuses no man “the great master of all things” an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice could not be administer in our tribunals. However. 2010 The accused was not criminally liable and exonerated. URSAL VS PROVINCE OF CEBU. and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Every statute is understood. the doing of certain acts. large or small.establishment and maintenance of extension classes. the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should. it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of . IGNORANTIA LEGIS NON EXCUSAT THE UNITED STATES vs. and therefore. Without discussing theses exceptional cases at length.R. to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose. including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Verily. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU Represented by Provincial Auditor ROY L. No. and compelled also by the doctrine of necessity. Represented by Governor PABLO P. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute. L-5272 March 19. the expenses incurred by the provincial government for the college scholarship grants should not be charged against the Special Education Fund. are declared chargeable against the Special Education Fund of the province. as a matter of course be compensated for their services. powers. there can be no crime. by implication. in a limited class of cases. Ex necessitate legis. or to make effective rights. but against the General Funds of the province of Cebu. the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. GARCIA Even under the doctrine of necessary implication. privileges or jurisdiction which it grants. without an evil mind. The Solicitor General claims that the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA to the respondent province amounted to a breach or violation. Under the legal maxims. the petition for declaratory relief should have been denied by the trial court. AH CHONG G. the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid.

and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids.” In the case at bar. Generaliaspecialibus non derogant. ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. The petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before. 2005 The Court ruled that there was no error of law committed. Also the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution and against good morals and interest and general welfare of society. MANUEL vs. because “the evil purpose need not to break the law. However. No. such defense negates malice or criminal intent. the intruder had been a robber as the defendant believed him to have acted in good faith. and would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability and that he cannot contend to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness. during and after his marriage. deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the complainant. Justice Fernando adopted these words: A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. As a general rule. And this is true although the . mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo. 165842 Nov.the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed and rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law’s fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault.R. without malice or criminal intent. REPUBLIC G. 29. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the privet complainant. by his and his parents assurance that he is single were wilful. GeneraliaSpecialibus Non Derogat Latin Maxim of interpretation: A General Law does not nullify a specific or special Law In Villegas vsSubido.

the specific provision controls unless the statute. the one specially designed for said case must prevail over the other. Justice Gancayco said in Commissioner of customsvs Hon. and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.. in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible. granting then that the two laws can not be reconciled. being a specific law.terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. the specific provision controls unless the statute. while a special act is one which .And if this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. the particular enactment must be operative. in so far as they are inconsistent with each other. in the event the harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible.. In the case of Rosario Valera vs Mariano Tuason Jr. Generaliaspecialibus non derogant. indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. At any rate.. considered in its entirety. 2 It is a principle in statutory construction that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case. . Generaliaspecialibus non derogant. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former. A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class. . considered in its entirely. a general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class.. indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. or considered as an exemption to. section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure. At any rate. Justice Tuason reasoned: A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Court of Tax Appeals: A special and specific provision prevails over a general provision irrespective of their relative position in the statute.. should prevail over. section 211 of the Administrative Code. which is a provision of general character.

are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other. it is held that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein. both are to be construed that effect is given to every provision of each.) PariMateria [Latin. Judge Callejo Sr. although in apparent conflict. 2645. thus: On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. the new provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes. when not inconsistent with its purpose. explained in Tan Co vs The Civil Register of Manila that: Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system. later statutes are supplementary or complimentary (sic) to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Statutes in pari materia. on the same subject. and they all should be construed together. Crawford.] The phrase used in connec tion with two laws relating to the same subject matter that mustbe analyzed with each other. p. it is held that . and if possible by reasonable construction. Justice Angeles reasoned in the case of C & C Commercial vs National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority that: On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. (Statutory Construction.relates to particular persons or things of a class. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act. Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy. Of the same matter. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions.

when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative will. and if possible by reasonable construction. it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together. that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Statutes in parimateria although in apparent conflict.in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein. when not inconsistent with its purpose. the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together. Justice Martin expressed in the case of City of Naga vsAgna that: When statutes are in parimateria. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system. 9 In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction. both are to be construed that effect is given to every provision of each. whenever the legislature enacts a new law. But the appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service Commission under Commissioner AbelardoSubido. Subido refused to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual labor is . are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act. 8 Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. However. Case Digests: Villegas vsSubido Facts: Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street sweepers in the City of Manila. both should be so construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. the new provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions. and they all should be construed together.

ISSUE: WON the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by the Civil Service Commissioner. the vessel SS " NORMAN. " arrived at the port of Manila carrying. Smith Bell & Co Facts: On July 20. Subido pointed out that putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. In the absence of a valid grant.400 Multiwall Paper Bags. Commissioner of customsvs Hon. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. Court of Tax Appeals. Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the President hence the same is no longer in effect. they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Such an eventuality. we must take all pains to avoid.against Memorandum Circular No. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. There must be a delegation of such authority. The vessel's cargo manifest shows that the gross weight of said articles was . 18 series of 1964. 1966. not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. among others. in this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. either express or implied. a shipment of 1. Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. The basis of Subido was not on any law or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue. HELD: Yes. A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority. the appointments must be confirmed.

was charged for violation of Section 1005. the SS "NORMAN. the actual and correct weight thereof was 36. further stating therein the required contents of each manifest intended to be submitted to the customs authorities. to wit: 1) the actual gross weight of any article or package described in the manifest exceeds by more than twenty per centum the gross weight as declared in the manifest or of lading thereof.00 for violation of Section 1005. but based on the bill of lading and customs appraisal. 1971. owner or employee of the vessel or aircraft. 1971.620 kilos. counsel for the Bureau of Customs sought the amendment of the charge to one for violation of Section 1005. 2521 and 2523 provide for the corresponding penalties in case Sec. in its capacity as ship agent. in relation to Section 2523.197 kilos. and 2) The Collector shall be of opinion that such discrepancy was due to the carelessness or incompetency of the master or pilot in command. 1005 is violated. Section 1005 lays down the indispensable requirement that every vessel coming from a foreign part must have on board a complete manifest of all her cargo. 1966. after hearing.Both Secs. The legal provisions involved in this case are Sections 1005. filed an amendment on July 27. ISSUE: WON private respondent be held responsible under Section 2523 HELD: No. and 2523 of the Tariff and Customs Code. in relation to Section 2521. to correct the weight declared in the manifest. ." represented by herein petitioner. of the Tariff and Customs Code.3. In order to be liable under Section 2523. on March 16. two requisites must be satisfied. which amendment was approved by the Bureau of Customs without prejudice to any administrative action which might be taken against the vessel In 1969. the Collector of Customs rendered a decision imposing upon the vessel and/or petitioner herein a fine of P7. in relation to Section 2521 of the Code. petitioner.000. However. 2521. of the Tariff and Customs Code. On June 11.This must be answered in the negative. Consequently.

Rev. Facts: Justice of Pease of court of Lagayan. A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest.' (Section 211. The Lagayan justice's ground for unvalidating the decision of the justice of the peace of La Paz is that "the designation of another justice of the peace to hear. It demonstrates the diligence and good faith of private respondent. was replaced and absorbed in Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code. he should transmit. .But the history of the two laws gives positive indication that they were designed to complement each other. without notifying the district judge. The private respondent filed on amendment to the manifest to correct the weight declared on July 27. try and decide the same disqualifies himself. he should transmit. one independent of the other. transferred the case to the justice of peace of La Paz. 1940. in pursuance of which the case was transferred. 1966 which amendment was approved the Bureau of Customs. when the justice having jurisdiction to hear. and have been intended to operate side by side. without notifying the district judge. Adm. the second requirement is not. HELD: No. No evidence to that effect may be found in the records. Judge Paredes. try and decide a given case. Code). is not in law given to the disqualifying justice but 'to the judge of the district' who 'shall designate the nearest justice of the peace." He believes that the circular of the Secretary of Justice of January 17. the record thereof to the justice of the peace is merely disqualified to try a certain case. (The circular states that "when a justice of the peace is merely disqualified to try a certain case.From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger.While the first requirement is present. the record thereof to the justice of the peace of the nearest municipality in accordance with section 73 of the Code of the Civil Procedure". is legally wrong. the nearest municipality to Lagayan on the ground that one of the party is affiliated with him.) ISSUE: WON section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure was repealed by the Rules of court. This history reveals that the two enactments have different origins. Rosario Valera vs Mariano Tuason Jr.

His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD 1055. grounds: a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter. On August 27. His sister.It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father. c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270. 1998. 1974. material allegations in their petition: 1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng. CO BOON PENG filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no. it is stated that their parents CO BOON PENG AND LOURDES VIHONG K. they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15. In their respective certificates of birth. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS. 270. d) Application of “pari material” rule of construction is misplaced. was born May 19. 2) They were born in the Philippines. HELD: No. 3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen. b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only. They are likewise mandated to prove the ff.Tan Co vs The Civil Register of Manila FACTS: HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23. 1977. ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on account of the naturalization of their Father Co Boon Peng. to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. . they filed with the RTC Manila a petition under Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on the ff. ARLENE TAN CO. 1975.

its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in . 1970. the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No.And the two provisions can be reconciled by applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code when the problem refers to the effectivity of an ordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in existence. But where the problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new tax.City of Naga vsAgna Facts: On June 15. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on gross sales provided for in Section 2 thereof. ISSUE: WON the respondents should be refunded of the excess taxes paid when municipal taxes as provided by Section 2309 provides the date of enforcement of such which is the following year. 1970. 1970 to September 30. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly repealing Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) govern. 360 declared effective only in the year following the year of its approval. private respondents paid to the City of Naga the following taxes on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned? An examination of Republic Act No. Is not Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of Republic Act No. seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 changing and amending the graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. let Section 2 of Republic Act No. in 1971. Noscitur a sociis The maxim states that where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings. that is. Pursuant to said ordinance. So private respondents filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga. HELD: Yes.

In view of opposition coming from different civic organizations. Inc. where a particular word is obscure or of doubtful meaning. . joined by PAGCOR acting as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.R. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO. flush with its tremendous success in several cities. The petitioners argued that when the LGC expressly authorized local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance. G. it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation. INC. as shown by massive protest and demonstrations the Sangguniang Panglunsod of CDO enacted Ordinance No. PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. On March 23. it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. the obscurity or doubt may be removed by reference to the meaning of associated or companion words. 1993. assailed the said ordinances before the Court of Appeals. Pryce. And taken by itself and in the abstract. For a word or phrases. 1994 MAYOR PABLO P. 111097 July 20. a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated.3353 and Ordinance No.respondents. FACTS:In 1992. Stated differently.3375-93 to prevent the operation of casino in the said province.. renovated and equipped the same. and its meaning may thus be modified or restricted by the latter. CA declared the ordinances invalid and issued the wit prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. taken by itself. To this end. one of the herein private respondents. No. and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was filed by the petitioners averring that the CA erred in its decision to invalidate the aforementioned ordinances.which it is found or with which it is associated. it will be construed as having a meaning similar to that of words associated with or accompanied by it. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION. And where the law does not define a word used therein. petitioners. vs. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION.

The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories. since she was just a few months old. Decision of respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed. 3355 and Ordinance No. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinace No. much less reverse. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid. cockfighting and horseracing.R. FACTS: AAA lived with her adoptive mother. even mentioning it at all. No. including the operation of casinos. Plaintiff-Appellee. it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries. from which they have derived their power in the first place. In making such choices. 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Petition was denied. who was working abroad for six (6) years. the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. it would have expressly excluded casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law from the scope of their power. RULING: NO. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. In the exercise of its own discretion. 188315 August 25. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Accused-Appellant. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. which this Court has no authority to review. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA. there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or. Congress has consulted its own wisdom. vs. as it could have easily done. BBB was . Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.BBB is married to appellant. BBB. Gambling is not illegal per se. and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. G.Otherwise. Thus. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress. for that matter.

AAA struggled and hit appellant’s shoulders. as well as AAA’s pajamas. On 29 January 2009. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least three (3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October 2002. for six (6) days a week. AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened that he will kill her and BBB.working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p. and while BBB was at work.m. appellant removed his shorts. at around the same time. the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant. appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. Appellant was able to penetrate her twice before he got out of the house. then 11 years old. Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his ward. RULING: To justify the death penalty. Dela Cruz which held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on Civil Procedure. While pointing the knife at AAA’s neck. In February 1999 at around 9:30 p. the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender. the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even without court authority Whether that the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of relationship is applicable. The following day. He slowly parted AAA’s legs and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina.. On 27 August 2004.m. appellant again raped her by inserting his organ into AAA’s vagina.m. AAA. to 2:00 a. when she was 14 years old. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People vs. Two (2) days after. Meanwhile. was sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. Two (2) weeks after the incident. . but it did so only on two (2) counts.

and not qualified rape. 1998 OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION. that is. INC. No. COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY.300 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award. Malhotra. we cannot impose death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the “adopting father” of AAA. The appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by RA 7659. respondents. FACTS: Oil and Natural Gas Commission (petitioner) is a government owned company under the government of India. it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil . vs. The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent to deliver 4.Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian. it entered a contract with the Pacific Cement Company (private respondent). For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship. this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Information.N. a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that the venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun The chosen arbitrator. one Shri N. appellant could only be convicted for two counts of simple rape. 114323 July 23. G.R.The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish. Be that as it may.. a privately owned company registered under the Philippines. since he does not fit into that category. petitioner. resolved the dispute in favor of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award.

design.. This was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent’s objections for failure to pay the required fi ling fees. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affi rmed the dismissal of the complaint. the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. In its decision. Public . the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties. drawings and instructions as other descriptions that could have ambiguities. This argument was affirmed by the court. petitioner argued that although it be assumed that such failure to carry out the contract was not under the provisions of clause 16. The petitioner fi led a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. This the court reasoned was not covered by the provisions of clause 16 of the contract which the petitioner shrewdly edited with the insertion of a comma (.) between the words supply order/contract and design which should have properly read supply order/contract design instead of supply contract/order. The reason for this important distinction is that without the comma it is clear that what is being referred to byClause 16 are disputes and ambiguities with regards to the SUPPLY CONTRACT/ORDER taking its design. the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner. the attempt of private respondent to replace the undelivered goods with a certain class “G” cement which did not meet the specifications of petitioner was clearly covered by the said clause. thus.300 metric tons of oil well cement to the specific places settled. Notwithstanding this however. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. ISSUES: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under clause 16 of the contract RULING: The court explained that the origin of the dispute is the failure of private respondent to deliver the agreed 4.Judge in Dehra Dun. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India.

& PAGCOR Under Sec. Synthesis In the case of MAGTAJAS vs." Obviously. namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant. local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress. among others. 458 of the Local Government Code. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION.A. we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance. must be prevented or suppressed. parent. like the other prohibited games of chance. the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. The court rejected this claim saying that their failure to deliver the goods albeit the fact that they had already received payment already obliged them to make compensations for their breach of the contract to deliver the goods agreed upon. or given the same meaning of. words with which it is associated." the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which. No. From this description we may safely deduce that .respondent however argued that its resolution to replace the undelivered cement was not covered by the said clause because such decision by the private respondent was not part of the contract. In People vs Flores Further. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. Private respondent claims that it was not part of its duty to replace such goods but offered in good faith. guardian." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. but instead of its good faith in maintaining good business relationship with petitioner. Accordingly. In fact it does. according to the maxim noscitur a sociis. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty. this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to. "gambling and other prohibited games of chance. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity.87 Section 31(c) of R. INC.

its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associated words. (1) all questions and disputes. in any way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design. In OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION vs. In the third category. This relationship may be established either by being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered. right or thing whatsoever. instructions. drawing. relating to the meaning of the specification designs. or (3) otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof. as being limited only to the design. According to the maxim noscitur a sociis. or stated differently. The . instructions. specification. this reference to the supply order/contract must be construed in the light of the preceding words with which it is associated. although a rule in the construction of statutes. such as the aforementioned phrase. instruction or these conditions. where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings. claim. may be read as "execution or failure to execute the supply order/contract". But in accordance with the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. "execution or failure to execute the same". specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis. drawing. The first and second categories unmistakably refer to questions and disputes relating to the design. appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. is equally applicable in the ascertainment of the meaning and scope of vague contractual stipulations. drawing. or (2) any other question.the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. the clause. INC. meaning to say. Clearly. specifications or quality of the materials of the supply/order contract.COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY. its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of the words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Appellant is neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. 13 A close examination of Clause 16 reveals that it covers three matters which may be submitted to arbitration namely.

7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. just as it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true . INC. JANIOLA and FAMINI. It bears stressing that the law must be considered as a whole. INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS To interpret and harmonize laws is the best method of interpretation. however. The clause “before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed” in Art. every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws.non-delivery of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature of a dispute arising from the failure to execute the supply order/contract design. In other words. 36 of the Civil Code may. Art. In the case of DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. the Petitioner’s interpretation that the term “any person” in the first paragraph of section 1 could mean that even one person can be indicted for syndicated estafa is contrary to the provision of the law. drawing. specifications or quality of the materials. instructions. or during the trial with the court hearing the case. That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the contract is but a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of a referral to arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person possessed with the required skill and expertise which may be otherwise absent in the regular courts. interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. While in CATIIS v CA. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply. be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation. V. et al. the principle is consistent with the maxim. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. The phrase “previously instituted civil action” in Sec.

In fact. GR NO 184861. VS CLEOFE JANIOLA AND HON.D. there is no need for any construction or interpretation of P. the Court’s function. Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms. Thereafter. INC. as well as for damages. No. together with her husband. private respondent. LP-06-0197. Section 1 of PD No. JUNE 30. . 1689 has defined what constitutes a syndicate and such definition is controlling. is to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government Code. In so far with MORENO v COMELEC. The Court does not agree with private respondent’s argument that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action and that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case. no discretion is left to the judiciary. It is a dangerous practie to base construction upon only a part of a section since one portion may be qualified by the other portion. 55554-61 on the basis of “prejudicial question” in Civil Case No. It must see to it that is mandate is obeyed. ARTHUR FAMINI FACTS: Petitioner. as well as for damages. filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. 2009 DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION.meaning. private respondent filed for a Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties. 1689 since the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity. RULING: Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. filed a complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties. Afterwards. ISSUE: WON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the inferior court when the latter ruled to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. in the face of this seeming dissonance.

” was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. did then and there willfully. enterprise or scheme. that the civil action must precede the criminal action. the phrase.”In the instant case. the abovenamed accused. Lopez. 2006 CATIIS VS. in a transaction or series of . to wit: by falsely or fraudulently pretending or representing. it is a principle in statutory construction that “a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter. coherent and intelligible system. G. That on or about the 3rd week of January 2000 or subsequent thereto in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. as to form a complete. Enrico D. Luzviminda A. Additionally. 153979 February 6. every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. 315. “previously instituted. A Resolution with a probable cause for syndicated Estafa against private respondents and Tafalla with no bail recommended and was approved by City Prosecutor. Portuguez and a certain Margielyn Tafalla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. NO. conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of “subsequent” directly before the term criminal action. with intent to gain and by means of fraud and deceit. unlawfully and feloniously defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and several other persons in the following manner.[17]In other words. for violation of Art.It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a “change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No.R.” This principle is consistent with the maxim. 1689 (syndicated estafa) and other related offenses. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions. Patacsil. No. transaction. CA FACTS: Petitioner filed a letter-complaint against private respondents Reynaldo A.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime charged is bailable despite that the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua? . 2001. private respondents. 2001. Incorporation. Bersamin issued an Order finding probable cause against all the accused and approved the recommendation of the City Prosecutor that the charge be non-bailable. PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. all other accused were already detained at the Makati City Jail. Quezon City. 2001. 2001. which they made with the Complainant and the public in general to the effect that they were in a legitimate business of foreign exchange trading successively or simultaneously operating under the following name and style of Asia Profits Philippines.14 or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos on the strength of said manifestations and representations. the latter and said persons gave and delivered to said accused the amount of at least US$ 123. Judge Lucas P. In finding that the accused are entitled to bail. A return on the warrant of arrest was made by PO3 Joselito M. and/or Belkin Profits Limited or other unregistered foreign entities induced and succeeded in inducing complainant and several other persons to give and deliver and in fact. 2001. when arraigned. who remained at large. The Prosecution was required to file their comment/opposition on private respondents’ motion to fix bail which they did through the Private Prosecutor with the conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O.461. On November 12. Malabaguio. with the information that except for Margielyn Tafalla. Camp Crame. On November 20. the accused knowing fully well that the above-named corporations registered with the SEC and/or those unregistered foreign entities are not licensed nor authorized to engage in foreign exchange trading corporations and that such manifestations and representations to transact in foreign exchange were false and fraudulent that resulted to the damage and prejudice of the complainant and other persons and that the defraudation pertains to funds solicited from the public in general by such corporations/associations. The corresponding warrants of arrest were issued. 2001 by declaring that the offense charged is bailable. On December 18. On November 7. entered pleas of not guilty.transactions. Winggold Management Philippines Incorporated. Private respondents on the same day filed an urgent motion to fix bail. Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his earlier Order of November 7. Belkin Management Consultancy. Inc. Coronel. a notice of hearing was issued by Judge Bersamin setting the case for arraignment on November 20.

00. It bears stressing that the law must be considered as a whole. reclusion temporal. Where a . the penalty of life imprisonment to death cannot be imposed on private respondents. reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. which took effect on December 1. 1689 since the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity. thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found that the lesser penalty. 8. just as it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true meaning. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. there is no need for any construction or interpretation of P. D. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute. 2000. Section 1 of P.. If there is no designation of the offense. Judge Bersamin is correct when he ruled that private respondents could only be punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua in case of conviction since the amount of the fraud exceeds P100.16 It is a dangerous practice to base construction upon only a part of a section since one portion may be qualified by the other portion. and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Sec. Hence.000. if they are subsequently proved during trial.D. they cannot be considered by the trial court in their judgment. i. Cause of the accusations. The Court further held that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clearly. even.e. Petitioner’s interpretation that the term "any person" in the first paragraph of section 1 could mean that even one person can be indicted for syndicated estafa is contrary to the provision of the law. it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. is imposable in case of conviction. 1689 has defined what constitutes a syndicate and such definition is controlling. provide: Sec. No. No. Otherwise. Designation of the offense. 9.HELD: The Court held that since the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate as defined under the law. aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense.17 In fact. A reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating circumstance.

requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms. MORENO vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. 1998. FACTS: Norma L. based on the definition of syndicate under the law. no discretion is left to the judiciary. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude. 40(a) of the Local Government Code? RULING: The petition is GRANTED. the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" should have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. ET AL. G.18 In this case. The grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 168550 URBANO M. The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary hearing where Moreno was disqualified from running for Punong Barangay. the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate. Samar on August 27.) in the provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. the Information specifically charged only four persons without specifying any other person who had participated in the commission of the crime charged. . a circumstance which does not obtain in this case. The placing of the comma (. ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court. thus. Branch 28 of Catbalogan. No.R. At any rate. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Urbano M.

15 Thus.17 Argumentum a contrario What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. Examples . In logic. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. is to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government Code. It is the opposite of the analogy. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. In spite of this. The disqualification under Sec. general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute. Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege. the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. Although it might be used as a logical fallacy.The Court's function. an argumentum a contrario (Latin: "appeal from the contrary" or "argument based on the contrary") denotes any proposition that is argued to be correct because it is not disproven by a certain case. the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification. the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials. an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state. which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted. Arguments a contrario are often used in the legal system as a way to solve problems not currently covered by a certain system of laws. in the face of this seeming dissonance. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi. The Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. arguments a contrario are not by definition fallacies.

L-30375. Here the interpretation that the lawmaker consciously did not mention fax machines is less valid than the assumption that fax machines did not exist at this time and that. 1969 ruled that he had the power to conduct the preliminary investigation. On April 18 Escribano filed a supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila's order of March 29. which was broadcasted on a radio station. The city fiscal filed an information for libel against Escribano. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live in this province. which do not empower the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of written defamations. As such. praying that the said orders of Judge Avila be set aside. filed directly with the Court of First Instance of that province a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong. this example: • "§ 456 of the Y-Law says that it's irrelevant whether a message is sent by letter or by telegraph. the governorelect of Cotabato.R. 1968 Congressman Salipada K. that "Mr. 4363." As with the example above. Petitioner invokes the provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. 1969.” Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. messages cannot be sent by fax machines. 1978 FACTS: On September 25. Pendatun. Here the argument a contrario is used fallaciously since it places the letter of the law above its intent Escribano v. On the other hand. No. were the law passed today. the argument is based on the fact that the law does not mention fax machines and they must therefore not be used. This requires the law to be interpreted to determine which solution would have been desired if the lawmaker had considered red cars. Cotabato. Avila G. In this case it's probably safe to assume that they only wanted to regulate green cars and not regulate cars of other colors. Judge Avila in his orders of March 5. they would have been mentioned. . 20 and 27. which were inserted by Republic Act No. In that complaint Escribano was charged with having said in a speech. 12. As such. 1969 Escribano filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition. red cars don't have to have blue tires. In that order he found that Pendatun's evidence had "established a probable cause to believe that" libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano "probably committed the same"." Here the argument is based on the fact that red cars are not green cars and as such § 123 of the X-Law cannot be applied to them. On April 1. Sep.• "§ 123 of the X-Law says that green cars need to have blue tires.

has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a law. Province of Ilocos Norte. Acosta v. The fact that the Court of First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct the preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it cannot conduct such preliminary investigation. the plaintiff and the defendant were candidates for the office of municipal president of the said town.) However. 5 Phil.ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. in the town of Laoag. by means of that amendment of Art. or the purpose to be subserved. The silence of article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct an investigation of criminal actions for written defamations does not preclude a judge of that court from holding such investigation. 18 It is alleged in the complaint that at the municipal elections held on the 1st day of December. the evils and mischief sought to be remedied. 2122. No. and it should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which win best effect its purpose rather than one which win defeat it. 1903. as being empowered to conduct a preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation. that as a result of the said election the plaintiff . as shown above. The lawmaking body. the court must look to the object to be accomplished. “preliminary investigations of criminal actions for written defamation xxx shall be conducted by the city fiscal of province or city or by municipal court of city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted precludes all other municipal courts from conducting such preliminary investigations G. The amendment merely sought to strip the ordinary municipal court of its power to hold a preliminary investigation of written defamations. HELD: Yes. 360. STATUTE: for libel. never intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in this case because. following the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another or the enumeration of particular things excludes the Idea of something else not mentioned. Flor. the fact that the Court of First Instance is not mention in the amendment.R.

and thereafter brought the case to this court for review. The plaintiff excepted to his ruling of the court. the court. however. There is no dispute upon this question. The complaint further sets out other acts in regard to illegalities alleged to have been committed during the election. was entitled to the office of municipal president of Laoag. excluding him from the exercise of such office and that the plaintiff be declared to be entitled to the same and that he be given possession thereof. nor can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the plaintiff that he. and for such other and further relief as the facts in the case would warrant in favor of the plaintiff. would more or less gravely affect the legality of the election. acquitted the defendant. the plaintiff introduced various witnesses. clearly admitted that he had failed to establish his right to the exercise of the office in question.was elected to the said office by a majority of 100 votes. shape. himself. and before the defendant had presented his. The case having proceeded to trial. to the effect that the plaintiff had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. imposing the costs upon the plaintiff. or for any other reason. (Page 17 of the bill of exceptions. moved for a new trial. he also assumes that he had been unable to establish his alleged right to the office in question. and from the decision of which he appealed to this court. An examination of the evidence of record supports the finding of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff has failed to prove in any way. or form that he was entitled to the office in question. as a result of the said election. and for the further reason that the presumption is that a person holding a public office was duly appointed or elected thereto. . as alleged by him in his complaint. confirmed the allegations contained in the complaint. The prayer of the complaint is to the effect that judgment be entered against the defendant. and (2) that there was no necessity to inquire into the right of the defendant to hold the said office for the reason that this question had already been determined by the provincial board after a consideration of the various protests presented to it in regard to irregularities committed during the last election held at Laoag for the office of municipal president and other municipal officials. when the motion of the defendant to dismiss was argued. The court based its action upon the following grounds: (1) That the plaintiff could not maintain the action brought by him because he had failed to establish his alleged right to the exercise of the office in question. The appellant. all and each of whom testified to facts which. now held by the defendant. In view of the evidence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff. on the latter's motion.) And on page 52 of his brief. Not a single witness. if true. and that notwithstanding this fact the defendant has usurped said office and unlawfully held the same since the plaintiff was the person entitled to the exercise of said office.

or the fiscal of any province. the legislator has on the contrary especially and specifically provided in sections 199. bring such an action. The code. after enumerating in sections 197 and 198 the cases in which such an action may be brought and the persons against whom they may be brought. and when upon the complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the two preceding sections can be established by proof. may bring an action therefor." Section 200 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands or the fiscal for a province. must commence any such action. or a judge thereof in vacation. under the heading "An individual may commence such action. when directed by the Chief Executive of the Islands. Section 199 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands. to be given to him by the party at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought. A simple provision would have sufficed for this purpose. and 201 who must and who may bring such actions.The question that we have to decide." Finally." provides as follows: "A person claiming to be entitled to a public office. therefore. he can maintain an action such as this for the purpose of excluding the defendant from the exercise of said office on account of illegalities alleged to have been committed in the elections. the provincial . bring the action upon the relation of and at the request of another person. he must commence such action. the officer bringing it may require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the action. or he may. 200. Far from it. may. if the action is brought at the request of and upon the relation of another person. he would have plainly said so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance." If the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office. but. notwithstanding what has already been said. unlawfully held and exercised by another. on leave of the court in which the action is to be commenced. before commencing it. following the well-known rule of law "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. goes on to determine with careful distinction those who have the right to maintain such action. The right to maintain such an action is especially and expressly governed by the provisions of sections 197 to 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure. section 201." It has been noticed that the above referred to three sections only mention the Attorney-General. and notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has failed to show that he had any right to the office of municipal president of Laoag. is whether. at his own instance. and it is very clear that it was his intention to give such right to those expressly mentioned in the above-cited sections and to no other.

The appellant contends that the court below should have first inquired into the right of the defendant to the office in question and that no other question can be raised or investigated until this point has been determined.fiscal. the right to bring such action. Why should this be required as an essential requisite if it were not necessary that the individual bringing the action should claim the right to exercise the office in question? Our opinion is that the law has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals. whether or not he has the right to the office alleged to have been usurped by another were to be permitted to maintain such an action. This inference is supported by the provisions of section 202 which says that when the action is against a person for usurping an office. and the individual claiming to be entitled to the office unlawfully held and exercised by another. it was found. and alleges that the question of the right of the plaintiff to the said office does not arise until it has been determined that the defendant is not entitled to the exercise of such office. shape. an in but one case does the law authorize an individual to bring such an action. In support of his contention he relies upon the provisions of section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Aside from this case an individual can not maintain such action. the action may be dismissed because there is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such action is destroyed as is the case here. The law. or form that he had any right to the office of municipal president of the town of Laoag as he had alleged in his complaint without foundation for such allegation. As a consequence of what has been said no individual can bring a civil action relating to the usurpation of a public office without averring that he has a right to the same. If an individual. to wit. and he himself so admitted that he had failed to establish in any way. with an averment of his right to the same. does not allow of any other construction. as the case may be. and at any stage of the proceedings. After all of the evidence presented by the plaintiff had been introduced. in our opinion. . It would be a useless and redundant provision of the code. if it be shown that such individual has no such right. the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto. Consequently the judge very properly acquitted the defendant of the complaint. it would serve no purpose and section 201 would be evidently superfluous. This is what actually happened in this case. It is to be inferred from this last provision that the individual who does not claim to have such a right can not bring an action for usurpation of public office. when that person claims to have the right to the exercise of the office unlawfully held and exercised by another.

The manner in which judgment should be rendered according to section 202 perfectly meets the various cases provided for in the three preceding sections. of course. presupposes that the plaintiff had a right to maintain his action upon the evidence submitted by him at the trial. It is impossible to prosecute a suit without a cause of action. the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto. this procedure would not vitiate the judgment. and the right of the defendant afterwards. at the same time. as the case may be. with an averment of his right to the same. It may be said that under section 202 the court may only pass upon the right of the defendant when the justice of the case so demands. and also upon the right of the person so averred to be entitled. provided the court does not fail to state therein what the rights of the contending parties to the office are. . his complaint should be dismissed and it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who has a perfect right to the undisturbed possession of his office. something which only happens where the AttorneyGeneral or the fiscal of any province brings the action against the usurper. Therefore. It is immaterial what method the court may follow in the statement and determination of the questions in the rendition of his judgment because even though the court may pass upon the right of the plaintiff first. unless action is brought by a person having a right to maintain the same under the law. presupposes that the action has been properly brought and duly prosecuted to a judgment. and judgment may be rendered upon the right of the defendant.This section provides as follows: "When the action is against a person for usurping an office. and it becomes the duty of the court to pass upon the rights of the defendants only whenever it is not an essential requisite for the due prosecution of the action that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office thus usurped. In such cases it is not necessary that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office alleged to have been usurped. but this only refers to cases where the action is brought by the Attorney-General or by the provincial fiscal. But all of this. because although there be no such person. or only upon the right of the defendant. This. as the case may be. as in the case of a vacant office. for instance. and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession of the same. This is true. In our opinion this should be done at the same time and in the same judgment." From the words above italicized the appellant infers that the court below should have first passed upon the right of the defendant and afterwards upon the right of the plaintiff. respectively. whenever before judgment it is conclusively proven that the plaintiff has no right to maintain the action since he has not the essential conditions required by law in order to bring and maintain such action. the fiscal could and even should bring such action against the person usurping the office in accordance with the provisions of sections 200 and 199. or vice versa. as justice requires.

must be filed within the time limited in the notice. neglect or omission of government officials entrusted with the . we can not here pass upon the validity or nullity of the election of the defendant. did not sit in this case. FERNANDEZ GR No. that the defendant has no right to maintain such an action as this. Upon taxation depends the Government ability to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected. concur. Pineda. Flor STATUTE: specifically designates the persons who may bring actions for quo warranto.As a result of the foregoing. C. among others which it is not necessary to state here.. Torres. Willard.. ISSUE: Does the statute of non-claims of the Rules of Court bar the claim of the government for unpaid taxes? HELD: No. JJ. or contingent. and Carson. The administrator opposed arguing that the claim was already barred by the statute of limitation. L-31364 March 30. Arellano. 1969 a motion for allowance of claim and for payment of taxes representing the estate's tax deficiencies in 1963 to 1964 in the intestate proceedings of Luis Tongoy. So ordered. (CIR vs. Johnson. ________________ Acosta v. To safeguard such interest.J. excludes others from bringing such actions. whether the same be due. J. not due. otherwise they are barred forever. 21 SCRA 105). and judgment for money against the decedent. express or implied. The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from the application of the statute of non-claims. The order of the court below appealed from. is not hard to find. arising from contracts. all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent. Section 2 and Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court which provides that all claims for money against the decedent. for the reason. Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability are imperious need. VERA v. is hereby affirmed. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for further proceedings in accordance with the law. 1979 89 SCRA 199 FACTS: The BIR filed on July 29..

collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or detriment to the people. ________________ STATUTE: All claims for money against the decedent. must be filled within the time limit of the notice. or contingent. not being mentioned in the rule are excluded from the operation of the rule. . in the same manner as private persons may be made to suffer individually on account of his own negligence. all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent. whether the same be due. HELD: The taxes due to the government. This is the philosophy behind the government's exception. This should not hold true to government officials with respect to matters not of their own personal concern. express or implied. otherwise barred forever. the presumption being that they take good care of their personal affairs. arising from contracts. from the operation of the principle of estoppel. as a general rule. and judgment for money against decedent. not due.