GUIANG v.

COURT OF APPEALS
June 26, 1998 (291 SCRA 372)
NOC: Petition for review of the Judgement rendered by CA. Amendment Complaint
FACTS:
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking
employment (with the consent of her husband), her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence
and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and
went back to the subject property. Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was
an amicable settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain,
respondent filed an Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said Complaint
sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private
respondent and her husband, null and void.
ISSUE: WON contract without the consent of wife is void
HELD:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it
merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
Yes. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.
Respondent’s consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or
absent. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent’s
consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following
elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the
case at bar.
A void contract cannot be ratified.
Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent
events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private
respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an “amicable settlement” and
petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not
mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its
tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
RELUCIO VS LOPEZ (legal wife)

FACTS
1.Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
“APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.,” against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio.
2. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is
legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate
children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of
theconjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the
totalexclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez,
after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein
petitioner since 1976.3. A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the
ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her.
.4. Respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the
subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her
name.
.5. Petitioner Relucio filed for a motion for consideration but was denied . Petitioner filed with CA
a petition for certiorari assailing RTC’s denial to of her motion to dismiss.
. CA likewise denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N respondent’s petition for appointment as sole administrix of the conjugal property,
accounting etc against her husband established a cause of action.
W/N petitioner’s inclusion as party defendant is essential in preceedings for a complete
adjudication of the controversy.
RULING: GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of CA. The courts dismisses Special
proceedings against petitioner.
HELD: NO The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix
of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto
J. Lopez.Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action.
The administration of the property of themarriage is entirely between them, to the
exclusion of all other persons. Respondent allegesthat Alberto J. Lopez is
her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J.Lopez. There
is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possiblysupport
a cause of action.
The second cause of action is for an accounting “by respondent husband.”
The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has
nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action
can exist against petitioner on this ground.
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property co

-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership
between Alberto J.Lopez and petitioner.The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be
compelled from a stranger.
Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent’s claim for moral damages is against Alberto J.
Lopez,not petitioner.If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable
party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an
action.
Petitioner’s participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial
court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his
conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and
dissolve Alberto J. Lopez’ conjugal partnership with respondent, andforfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share
in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would beperfectly valid and
enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary
party asone who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete
relief is to beaccorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subjectof the action.
In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded
complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal
partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children,
turn over his share in theco-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal
partnership or absolute community property with respondent. WHEREFORE, the Court
GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals.
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVT CORP. And ABELARDO MAGSAJO v. CA and SPOUSES CHING
February 12, 1998 (286 SCRA 272)
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable
with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against
PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of
execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon
respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982.
Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court
from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses
conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was
registered on July 1982.
ISSUE:
What debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered “for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership” which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership?

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money
and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within
the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual benefit
may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing
of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to
benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed.
Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership
Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his
employer within the contemplation of the said provision?
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized
as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety
or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of
surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof
must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. petitioner should
have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching’s acting as surety redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
The petitioners claim that the benefits were: employment of Ching would be prolonged, his
shares would appreciate, and it would enhance his career. However, these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from
the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that acting as surety is part
of the business or profession of the respondent-husband.
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession . The court are
likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted or was persuaded to act, as a
surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in
the business of suretyship or guaranty.
*We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms “redounded to the
benefit of” or “benefited from” on the one hand; and “for the benefit of” on the other. They mean
one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code
are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term “for the benefit of.” On the other hand, Article 122 of
the Family Code provides that “The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.” As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review of Certiorai.

FACTS:
Petitioner came acroos by the ad placed by the respondents spouses in a newspaper. She made
a definite offer to buy the properties with the conformity of the wife of Edilberto. Petitioner,
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents from the husband
of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner
and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The agreement
handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would
secure his wife’s consent. A formal typewritten of Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by
the petitioner. After signing of the contract 2 checks were delivered. Contract was given to
Edilberto for affixing his wife’s signature. Peitoner received a call from the respondent to clarify
some provisions of the contract. After incorporating notations, contracts were sent to Edilberto’s
office for signature. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that respondent
spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written
consent.
RULING: Petiton is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED
A summary judgement is one granted by the court by court upon motion by a party for an
expeditious settlemet of a case, there appearing from the pleadings, dispositions, admissions,
and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact involved and that the
moving party is entitled to judgement as matte of law. Both parties how no genuine controversy
as to facts involved.
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: “In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.”
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell
to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma
Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her
written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to
demonstrate consent.
Petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signature to the
contracts to sell, court authorization under the FC is warranted. It should be stressed that court
authorization under Art 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse does not give consent
is incapacitated. Petitioner failed to prove that Norma was incapacitated.

Tinitigan vs Tinitigan
Facts: Payuran and her 3 children leased to United Elec Corp a factory building with the land.
The consent of Tinitigan Sr. (husband of Payuran) was not secured. Consequently he filed a
complaint for Annulment of Ownership & Contract of Lease at CFI Rizal. The complaint was later
amended to include “restrain defendants from encumbering or disposing property in the name of
Molave Development Corp & those in their name as husband and wife. Te court enjoined Payuran
from doing any act to dispose the property. The case was then set for hearing primarily on the
the issue of preliminary injunction. The contract of lease was settled amicably. However Tinitigan
Sr. sought judicial approval of sale of 2 rented house and lot which are conjugal which was
tenanted by Quintin Lim. The court granted. An MR was filed by Payuran because allegedly the
Loring property is suitable for condo site therefore command a higher price. Two days thereafter,
Payuran filed a legal separation case at CFI Pasay. The parties agreed to the continuation of the
administration of the conjugal property by Payuran subject to certain conditions, one of which
the Loring property shall be subject to the decision of CFI Rizal. Meanwhile Judge of CFI Rizal
denied petitioners MR for lack of merit. They appealed but was denied on the ground that the
order appealed from is merely interlocutory. Payuran and children then filed a petition for
certiorari at the CA which affirmed the same, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the court where respondent Judge (judge of CFI Rizal) sits did not acquire
jurisdiction over the Loring property hence cannot grant authority to sell.
Held: CFI Rizal did acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property. The amended complaint prayed
among others to restrain defendant from encumbering or disposing of the property. This in effect
brings the Loring property under the jurisdiction of the court (CFI Rizal). Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. It cannot be made dependent upon the defenses. The Filing of the legal
separation case after the order of denial is a tactical maneuver to frustrate the order. The
administration of property is given to Payuran but such is not absolute. It was subject to a
condition. The CFI Pasay even recognized the jurisdiction primarily acquired by CFI Rizal.
Jurisdiction once acquired continue until the case is finally terminated.

SANTERO v. CFI OF CAVITEG.R. 61700-03Sept. 14, 1987
NATURE OF CASE: Review for Certiorari
Facts
1.Princesita Santos-Morales, Frederico Santero and Willie Santero (Petitioners) are children of the
late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel Santero
(Respondents) are the of children Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the
natural children of the late Pablo since neither of their "mothers was "married to their father.
Pablo was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Instant petition was filed by respondent of another Motion for Allowance including Juanita,
Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero children of late Pablo Santero with Amselma Diaz
praying gthat order granted directing the Adminstrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo to deliver 6,000.00
to each of seven children as allowance.

Amended Order was issued by respondent court directing Anselma Diaz to submit clarification or
explanation of the motion filed. Anselma complied with the clarification.
Petitioners filed their Motion to Admit Supplemental Petition opposing the inclusion of the 3
children of Anselma Diaz. Motion was denied that motion for exclusion of time to file their
supplemental peitition.
Order was issued directing administrator of the estate to give allowance of 3 additional
recipients.
ISSUE: W/N respondent court acted with discretion amounting of lack of jurisprudence in granting
allowance to the 3 respondents.
W/N court acted with discretion in granting allowance based on the allegation of the said
respondents when they are not actually schooling.
W/N respondent court acted with discretion granting the motion for allowance w/o conducting a
hearing.
RULING:
Instant Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed judgement is AFFIRMED.
The fact that respondents are of age, gainfully employed or married is of no moment and should
not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art 188. When the
Rules of the Courtlimit allowance to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased, New CC gibves the surviving spouse and his/her children w/o distinction.
It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted by respondent Court w/o hearing. Record
shows that the motion for allowance was addressed to the lawyers for the petitioners and setting
the hearing therof on July, 8, 1982 at 9:00 in the morning. A copy of the said motion was duly
received by the lawyer, atty. Beltran as he filed am opposition thereto on the same date of the
hearing.

DBP V. CA – G.R. NO. 28774
Facts:
DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of 159 lots, in the proposed Diliman
Estate Subdivision of the PHHC. However, the sale of the lots to DBP, Lots 2 and 4, which form
part of said 159 lots, were still sold by PHHC to the spouses Nicandro, for which 2 deeds of sale
were issued to them by PHHC. Upon learning of PHHC’s previous transaction with DBP, the
spouses filed a complaint against DBP and the PHHC to rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC
in favor of DBP. The CFI held that the sale of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is null and void, for being in
violation of Section 13 of the DBP Charter.
Issue:
Do the spouses possess the legal personality to question the legality of the sale?
Held:

Yes. The spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their payment in full of the purchase price
for the same lots which had been sold to DBP by virtue of the transaction in question.The general
rule is that the action for the annulment of contracts can only be maintained by those who are
bound either principally or subsidiarily by virtue thereof. However, a person who is not obliged
principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is
prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the
detriment which could positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention.
Carlos vs Abelardo
Carlos vs. Abelardo
GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002

FACTS:

Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the
$25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989
when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their
married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment.
In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the
spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter,
respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against
petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the
obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the
complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was
never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the
construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in
the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial
court’s decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000
paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the
spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.

ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the
conjugal partnership.

HELD:

Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as
their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally
liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share
in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the
stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.

Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of
$25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Felipe v Heirs of Aldon
Felipe v Heirs of Aldon
120 SCRA 628
Facts: During the marriage of Maximo Aldon and Gemina Almorasa, they bought several pieces of
land. The lands were divided into three lots. Subsequently, Gemina sold the lots to the spouses
Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena Felipe without the consent of her husband. Maximo died.
Afterwhich, his heirs, namely Gemina and their children Sofia and Salvador filed a complaint
against the Felipes alleging that they are the owners of the lots. The Felipes asserted that they
had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The trial
court sustained the claim of the defendants. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: WON the sale of the lots by Gemina without the consent of the husband is defective.
Held: The sale made by Gemina is certainly a defective conract, that is, a voidable contract.
According to Article 1390 of the NCC, among the voidable contracts are “Those where one of the
parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract.” In the instant case Gemina had no
capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even
to the husband alone but to both spouses.

CASE NO. 97 PETRONA JAVIER VS. LAZARO OSMENA (as administrator of the estate of
the deceased Tomas Osmena)CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (with consent)PONENTE:
ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS:
1.)

Petrona Javier, the only daughter of Felix Javier and Matea Corunan, is the wife of Florentino
Collantes.2.)

Matea Corunan died in 1901 and Felix in 1908.3.)

In 1890, Florentino and Petrona were married. And after the death of Matea, Felix married
Pascuala Santos.4.)

At the death of Feliz and Matea, they left as an inheritance to Petrona TWO URBAN PROPERTIES
situated on CalleCarriedo and Calle San Sebastian.5.)

In order to gain her absolute ownership of the properties, Petrona acquired the usufructuary right
of Pascuala to theestate of Felix for the sum of 3000 PHP.6.)

This 3000 PHP was obtained through the mortgage of the property she had inherited.7.)

Side Story:
In 1891, Florentino was employed by Petrona’s father, Felix, in a commission business in Manila.
In 1902,
Felix retired from the business and was succeeded by Florentino. He was able to handle the
business for 6 years(1908).8.)

One of the major clients of the Felix and Florentino was Tomas Osmena, a merchant from
Cebu.9.)

Felix and Florentino represented Tomas in Manila for the sale of tobacco consigned to them by
Tomas. The profits
were to be invested in Tomas’ name.
10.)

When Felix retired in 1902, he was indebted to Tomas Osmena in the sum of 4K-5K PHP.11.)

In 1908, Florentino gave a statement to Tomas stating that their debt amounted to 14K-15K PHP.
Tomas did not doanything about this.12.)

In June of 1913, upon the death of Tomas, his administrator, Lazaro Osmena, took the step to
collect the debt.Florentino admitted the debt with an interest of 12% per annum. Total debt was
26plus thousand.13.)

So, on June 15, 1913, the judgement was rendered and the sheriff executed it by selling at public
auction all theright, title, interest of Florentino over the 2 parcels of improved real estate,
including the usufructuary interest of Pascuala which was acquired by Petrona.14.)

Despite her protest, the sale was carried out. The successful bidder was Lazaro Osmena who paid
P500 for eachparcel.15.)

Petrona asserted that her husband had no rights over the land or in the usufructuary interest
that she acquired.Thus, she filed claim of intervention to recover her ownership and the right of
usufruct upon the annulment of thesale.16.)

Osmena said that he admits the fact that Petrona actually owned the 2 parcels of land and the
usufructuary right of Pascuala. However, he said, that the money used to purchase the
usufructuary right belonged to the conjugalpartnership, thus making the right conjugal. So he
prays that:a)

The revenues from both parcels of land are conjugal partnership propertyb)

That the revenues be made liable for the paymentc)

That a receiver be appointed to take charge of the 2 properties and manage them so that the
revenues may begiven as payment to the debt.17.)

RTC annulled the sale of the 2 properties. So he appealed.
ISSUE:
WON the sum owed by Florentino to the Osmena estate can and should be paid out of the fruits
and revenues of the 2 parcels of land which exclusively belong to Petrona