Compilation of

Digested Cases for
Remedial Law Review II

8 April 2015

Submitted by:
KRISHA MARIE T. BUELA
Wednesday Class | 3:00-7:00 p.m.

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA

Table of Contents
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES ................................................................................... 14
A. Preliminary Attachment (Rule 57) ................................................................ 14
ANITA MANGILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA ............ 14
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN .......................................... 15
ALEJANDRO NG WEE vs. MANUEL TANKIANSEE .................................... 18
SOFIA TORRES et al. vs. NICANOR SATSATIN et al. .................................... 19
B. Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58) .................................................................. 20
TERESITA V. IDOLOR vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS et. al ...................... 20
RIMEO S. GUSTILO vs. HON. RICARDO S. REAL, SR. ................................ 22
MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS vs. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.) et al. ...... 23
NELSON JENOSA et al. vs. REV. FR. JOSE RENE C. DELARIARTE, O.S.A.
et al. ...................................................................................................................... 24
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC. vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION (CBC) ..................................................... 25
SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA et al. vs. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA et. al. . 26
C. Receivership (Rule 59) .................................................................................... 28
SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. and VIRGINIA S. LARROBIS vs.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK ....................................................................... 28
EVELINA G. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ATTY. FIDELA Y. VARGAS .................................................... 29
ANA MARIA A. KORUGA vs. TEODORO O. ARCENAS et al. ..................... 30
D. Replevin (Rule 60) ........................................................................................... 31
JOSE S. OROSA and MARTHA P. OROSA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and FCP CREDIT CORPORATION ................................................................... 31
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. REGINA M. ASTORGA ................. 32
KENNETH HAO vs. ABE C. ANDRES ............................................................. 33
ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO and KAREN T. GO .. 34
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS
BANK, INC. ......................................................................................................... 36
E. Support (Rule 61) ............................................................................................ 37
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Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA
MANUEL DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS................................................. 37
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MANAHAN........................... 38
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM vs. MA. CHERYL S. LIM ..... 38
CHARLES GOTARDO vs. DIVINA BULING................................................... 39

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS .................................................................................... 41
A. Interpleader (Rule 62) .................................................................................... 41
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE E. WON and
BIENVENIDO A. TAN ....................................................................................... 41
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT .......................................................... 43
SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA vs. DON LUIS
DISON REALTY, INC. ....................................................................................... 44
BANK OF COMMERCE (BOC) vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
(PDB) and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS ............................................. 45
B. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (Rule 63) .................................... 47
EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA vs. BATHALA MARKETING
INDUSTRIES, INC. ............................................................................................. 47
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III ............... 49
CARMEN DANAO MALANA et al. vs. BENIGNO TAPPA et al. ................... 50
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR. ............... 51
SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M.
SABITSANA vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI.................................................... 53
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE et. al .. 54
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC vs. ANTITERRORISM COUNCIL et al ............................................................................. 56
C. Review of Judgments and Final Orders of COMELEC and COA (Rule 64)
57
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ....................................................................... 57
D. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (Rules 65) ..................................... 59
Certiorari
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Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA
OSCAR R. AMPIL vs. THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al. ... 59
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs. EMMA MONDEJAR..................................... 60
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) ............................................................ 62
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE JUANITO C.
CASTANEDA, JR., et al. ..................................................................................... 64
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON.
ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN ........................................................................................ 65
ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON vs. REGISTER OF
DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, et al. ....................................................................... 67
Prohibition
ALFEO D. VIVAS vs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION .................................................................................................. 68
ROSENDO R. CORALES vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES .................. 70
ROLANDO TAN, ELENA TAN and LAMBERTO TAN vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES ....................................................................................................... 71
Mandamus
NILO HIPOS vs. HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY ................ 73
EX-C1C JIMMY B. SANCHEZ and EX-C2C SALVADOR A. METEORO vs.
ROBERTO T. LASTIMOSO, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE ........................................................... 74
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) et al. vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.... 76
DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE
and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT .................................................................... 77
E. Quo Warranto (Rule 66) ................................................................................ 79
PEDRO MENDOZA vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES .............. 79
MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA et al. vs. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY et al. ... 80
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST
CORRUPTION (CIBAC) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ................................................................................... 81
EFREN RACEL ARA TEA vs. COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA
D. ANTlPOLO...................................................................................................... 83
EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO vs. EMERSON S. CARLOS ............................ 85
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Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA
F. Expropriation (Rule 67) ................................................................................. 87
CITY OF MANILA vs. OSCAR SERRANO et al. ............................................ 87
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ANTONINO POBRE ........................................................................................... 88
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DPWH) vs. ISMAEL ANDAYA ............ 91
ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS et al. .................................. 92
SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD et al. vs. FIL-HOMES REALTY
and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG REALTY
CORPORATION .................................................................................................. 94
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. YCLA SUGAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ................................................................... 96
G. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage (Rule 68) ........................................... 97
JOSE T. RAMIREZ vs. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION ............. 97
SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ vs. SPOUSES
CARLITO ALINDOG AND CARMEN ALINDOG ........................................... 98
RUSTICO A. ARDIENTE and ASUNCION PALOMARDIENTE vs.
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON and
PENINSULA DEVELOPMENT BANK ........................................................... 100
LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK .................................................................................. 101
GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION vs. EQUITABLE PCI
BANK ................................................................................................................. 103
H. Partition (Rule 69)......................................................................................... 105
CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS
VDA. DE CALUNOD ........................................................................................ 105
EUGENIO FELICIANO et al. vs. PEDRO CANOZA et al. ............................. 106
CARMELA BROBIO MANGAHAS vs. EUFROCINA A. BROBIO .............. 107
I.

Forcible entry and Unlawful Detainer (Rule 70) ....................................... 108
CARMENCITA SUAREZ vs. MR. AND MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. AND
MARILOU P. EMBOY–DELANTAR .............................................................. 108
ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA vs. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN ............... 111
TEODORO S. TEODORO vs. DANILO ESPINO et al. ................................... 113
LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ vs. JUDGE
ROMEO A. RABACA ....................................................................................... 115
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Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA
CGR CORPORATION vs. ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR. .................................. 116
J.

Contempt (Rule 71) ....................................................................................... 118
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN PERFECTO R.
YASAY, JR., et al vs. MANUEL D. RECTO et al. ........................................... 118
SALVADOR SISON vs. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., Presiding Judge, and
TEODORO S. ALVAREZ, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City,
Branch 253 .......................................................................................................... 120
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and
SPOUSES BENITO SEE and MARLY SEE ..................................................... 121
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and
MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O ....................................................................... 122
CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B. ROMAN,
JR. vs. MANUEL O. SANCHEZ ....................................................................... 124

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS .................................................................................... 126
A. Settlement of Estate (Rules 73 to 90) ........................................................... 126
TERESITA N. DE LEON et al. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
PABLO P. INVENTOR and RAMON NICOLAS ............................................ 126
EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS ............................................. 128
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP vs. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO
............................................................................................................................ 130
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY ............... 132
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO et al. vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 et al. ............................................................ 134
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS ...................................................................................... 136
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA ............................................................. 137
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON ........................................................................... 139
PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES vs. HEIRS OF
MAXIMINO R. BRIONES ................................................................................ 141
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG vs. NICOLASITO S. SOLAS............................... 143

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................................................... . 156 EDWARD C....................... 154 D....... represented by her legal guardian............. 147 PILAR Y.. 161 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs........ 158 E. 153 EDUARDO T.......................... vs....................... BUELA B. ABAD vs............ ALCANTARA ............................................................................... LAMBERTO C............ et al.............. T......... CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO ............................................... 148 NAPOLEON D... et al. 168 Page | 7 ..... MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F............162 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs..................................... 160 CANG vs............. EDWARD SERAPIO vs........... vs............ HON.................... SOLA ..... THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ................................... Guardians and Guardianship (Rules 92 to 97). Trustees (Rule 98) ...................................... COURT OF APPEALS......... et al................ LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A... COURT OF APPEALS......................... et al............................. as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. HERNANDEZ........... CIRILO OROPESA ........................... COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V........... 167 ATTY......... ................ THE COURT OF APPEALS............. 147 The Incompetent. 165 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA ..... HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY ........................................................................ M..... REYES.... 167 ERLINDA K. ERLINDA I............... CARMEN CAÑIZA........ 145 C................ 155 ADVENT CAPITAL AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs........ BILDNER and SYLVIA K...................................................................................................... PEREZ................ et al....... ONG vs................... Habeas Corpuz (Rule 102) ............................ JOSE R...... MAGNO ............................. AMPARO EVANGELISTA vs.. NICASIO I..... 166 F... 164 EUGENIO R... Adoption and Custody of Minors (Rules 99 to 100)... CARANTO .............. CARANTO............................ MAURICIO ....................... GOYENA vs.............Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.... ILUSORIO vs................................. AMELITA L............. JAIME B............. ........ Escheat (Rule 91)... 145 CASTORIO ALVARICO vs.. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO ........ 160 TOMASA VDA.............................. NERI.. and ZENAIDA P............ LIBRADA F.... ALCANTARA and EDITHA I... JOHN DOE and JANE DOE ....... et al... 155 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs............................... DE JACOB.. 150 NILO OROPESA vs..... ILUSORIO........ et al..... SANDIGANBAYAN.... Jacob vs....

. 196 Page | 8 ...... ... vs.................. 189 P/SUPT.. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY............. BUELA PANFILO LACSON..... .. et al........ MERLINDA L..... 175 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs..... 182 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs... 180 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs..... 183 MINORU FUJIKI vs...... THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY.... THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY .... HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO....... HON........... ROXAS vs.. CRUZ..... JUDGE HERIBERTO M... 179 ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs............. MELISSA C.............. vs... 172 ANITA MANGILA vs.............. RAZON vs........................ 176 IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG .... 187 ARMANDO Q.. RAMON PAJE (DENR) ... CARLITO I. CAGANDAHAN ...... et al...... CANLAS. KHO....... .................... vs....................... GEN.... .................. vs...................... MARY JEAN B....... 192 EDITA T................ GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO et al....... M...... 184 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.................................................. Rule 108)175 MA...... NEGROS OCCIDENTAL........ ROXAS.............. DR........ DOLOT vs......................... 186 H............. et al..... I – XIII... PANGILINAN......... et al.. 177 MA................................ NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N............................... et al.... MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY.. ........ et al.. et al.... and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON ....... 187 DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ et al...... and FERDINAND T... AMANDA T.................. .... 191 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C...... .................. CRUZ .................... TAGITIS.. HERMOGENES ESPERON et al.... 194 MARICRIS D... INC.. Change of Name v..... OLAYBAR ................ Correction/Cancellation of Entries (Rule 103 v.............. LUGSANAY UY .... NIXON T. vs... DR.... ............. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA.......................................... T.................. Prerogative Writs ........ et al . et al....... CRUZ... FELIXBERTO CASTILLO et al......... LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA vs............................. 171 ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA vs................ et al.................. JENNIFER B............... 173 G. AVELINO I.... REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ...... 190 GEN............... NORMA S.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.. BURGOS vs..... SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ.

................ T...Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K................. BUELA EVIDENCE ... POWER MASTER.........................et al.................. .................... 200 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.............................................. ............................... 215 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.................................... 205 B............................ 209 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs............ SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL ....................................................... ......... THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.............. Preliminary Consideration .................................... COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS..... .... JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT ............................ 199 CECILIA ZULUETA vs.... REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS ............ 199 ONG CHIA vs...... .................... 220 WILGEN LOON et al. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM ............... PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ...................... 209 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs............. EFREN S.. vs..................................................................... 219 Documentary Evidence CITIBANK........ COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN .............. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED.... 202 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 207 MENANDRO B. et al.................... What Need Not Be Proved ............. JAILON KULAIS et al....................................... 206 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.. plaintiff-appellee............... 212 Object/Real Evidence JUNIE MALILLIN Y...... 221 Page | 9 ...... et al..................................... et al... 208 CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs...................................................... 201 NENA LAZALITA* TATING vs........ Rules of Admissibility ................... FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO ............................................... 206 LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs......................................... MASTERCARD vs........................................................................................ N.. TEODORO .......... INC........................................ 217 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs..................... RODRIGO SALAFRANCA Y BELLO 203 SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs........... LOPEZ vs.......... RUPER POSING Y ALAYON ............................... 211 C.... M............................... LAUREANO vs........ KHADDAFY JANJALANI ............ 214 NARCISO SALAS vs..................... FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA........................................... ............................................ vs....... 212 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.............................. 199 A...........A...................................... SANDIGANBAYAN et al........... ASIR GANI y ALIH and NORMINA GANI y GALOS ...

............. 231 Testimonial Evidence LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS* vs..................... ANDRES NAVARRO........... THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR.......................... ALBERTO C........................................................................... SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ "BADONG" ............ VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS ... ATTY.......... vs.............. 225 MODESTO LEOVERAS vs........... and BENJAMIN F.... INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B................... 240 JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs.......................................... LAMBERTO T........................................ VALENCIA ........... THE COURT OF APPEALS.. M.................. CHUA ................... HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME ................. 232 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs......................... 244 OSCAR CONSTANTINO et al........ JACOBA and ATTY..... vs...................... COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORP.................... 223 RAFAEL S............. HON........... PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) ...... 224 LAPULAPU FOUNDATION......... JR... MARIANO C................................................. 246 CONRADO C....... INC..................................... PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. CHAN ....... CHUIDIAN ......... ALMONTE et al........... JOHNNY T...... 234 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs..... CASTAÑEDA... SAMALA vs.......................................... and ELIAS Q... .......................... BORDALBA vs............... OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA ............................................... 236 LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs..................... 238 TERESITA P........ MONTEIRO .......................... DOLDOL vs.. 242 CLARITA J................... COURT OF APPEALS............................................ CASIMERO VALDEZ ... LUCIANO D....... 233 MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs......... 227 HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs................. ORTAÑEZ vs................. vs...... TAN vs........... COMORPOSA et al..................................... ............................ 241 JUDGE UBALDINO A..... TORRES vs........................................... 229 RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs.. 228 ELLERY MARCH G............. ATTY......... JR ..... BUELA THERESITA DIMAGUILA et al................................................................................. ELLIS F............................................................ T................. 235 ENRIQUE RAZON vs.................. HONORABLE CONRADO M....... HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO . JOSE and SONIA A...Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K............................................... THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD ............................. SUSAN RAMIREZ .. et al....................... 243 COMMISSIONER JOSE T. MANALOTO . LACUROM v. ......... 247 Page | 10 .

. 254 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.... PETITIONER..................... vs.......... INC... ....... et al............... COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORENCIO LIBREA ......... LADIANA....... 270 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs....... vs.... PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES .. JISON vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE .. 265 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. EMILIANO DURANAN ..................... BUELA JOSUE R....................................... PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ............... 278 Page | 11 ...... INC.. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY...................................... Petitioner...... 272 HARRY L................ EDWIN IBAÑEZ Y ALBANTE and ALFREDO NULLA Y IBAÑEZ ....... 267 RUDY LAO vs...... JAIME J......... GILBERTO VILLARICO et al... M....... PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL et al..... THEODORE BERNAL et al.... 277 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs...... 260 FRANCISCO L............. 255 ANNA LERIMA PATULA.. et al................... TANENGGEE vs.. 253 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON .... 256 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.......................................................... CESARIO MONTAÑEZ .............. .......... 275 LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA vs...... GO.................. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO .............. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO MORELOS ........ 262 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v......................... ............... 264 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 273 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA et al....................... 259 CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R....................... 248 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.................... T............... vs............... vs............................ HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR.............. LTD............... DEZOLLER vs...............Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.. ....................... STANDARD INSURANCE CO............. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY .... MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY ... 249 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ... RAUL SANTOS y NARCISO .............................. 252 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs................ RAMOS et al. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES ............ vs... 276 BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO Y BULAWAN vs................. .................. FRANK LOBRIGAS et al. ............................... 258 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES......................... .................. 250 CARLOS L..... 268 MEYNARDO SABILI........ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES .............................. HON................ 269 Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING vs....................................... 274 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.......... .................

... JR................... vs............................... T........ vs...... 293 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.............................................. SUERTE.... LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE.... PHILAM INSURANCE CO......................................... JAIME CASTILLANO............... 296 ROSELLA D............... 280 IBAAN RURAL BANK INC...... 304 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.. 288 FILOMENA G...... RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN . and MRS......................................... RAMON TARNATE .. INC. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION .... DELGADO et al.. Presentation of Evidence .... THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION ................... AMOS P.. 294 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs....... et al. CANQUE vs. INC.............................. 285 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.................................. deceased.. 297 YASUO IWASAWA vs. SR........................... ................... M...... LUCILA LABORTE SORIA et al........... 303 F................................. 304 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs................................................. TANGGA-AN et al............................ vs............................ ............. JESUS EDUALINO..... 295 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE ....................... 284 HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA vs.......................... JOHNNY M...........Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.............. 289 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs......... 279 D......................................... ROSAROSO et al...................... 280 FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) vs.....T.................................. ................... Burden of Proof and Presumptions ..... ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO ... COMMISSION ON AUDIT .................... FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA ..................................................... EDDIE V.... COURT OF APPEALS and G...... ............................ DELOS SANTOS vs................. 287 METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs.................... substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs..................... 281 SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ PEDRO M............ ...... .... FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY ...... 298 ASIAN TERMINALS.. 290 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.................... 306 SUPREME COURT vs........ 301 WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs... FRANCIA..................... 307 Page | 12 ... 300 LOMISES ALUDOS... Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence ..............P......................... JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA ........ DELFIN CALISO ........................................... 283 HOSPICIO D. ROBERT MAR CHANTE .... 291 E....... THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR................... HEIRS OF DIONISIO CAÑADA .......... et al............... HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA ....................................... BUELA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs...... 293 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.................

.. EFREN DEOCAMPO et al.......... JESUS S..............Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K............... .... JR.... et al.. ... vs...... 323 Page | 13 . HON.......... 312 ZACARIA A.......................................... FELIXBERTO T.......................... REYES ..... RAMOS vs............................. ANTONIO T.................. LUCAS .......... REBECCA BIONG ....... and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ ........ 320 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.......................... ANTONIO B................... CANDAO..... 314 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs........ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN .................... ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO ...... 315 XAVIER C.......... JR... 319 RUBEN DEL CASTILLO vs. OLALIA..................... BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N......... 318 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs........ LEILA A..................... BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC.................. 322 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.... 311 DRA............ ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO et al............ 310 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs......... PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ....... SALCEDO........... LUCAS vs.......................... M......................................... and/or ALFONSO L.................. T....... 316 JESSE U.. . BUELA GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs... RAMOS ........................................... AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE .............. DELA LLANA vs.................................... 308 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.. vs....................

The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service. Trial court rendered a decision against the petitioner. On appeal. M. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. Construing petitioner’s departure from the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her creditors. Sheriff’s return shown that summons was not served on the petitioner as the latter had transferred her residence and left the Philippines for Guam. Subsequently. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service. substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. Affidavit and Bond.R. petitioner claims that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person and thus the service of the writ is void. Private respondent. was served on petitioner’s household. claims that the prior or contemporaneous service of summons contemplated in Section 5 of Rule 57 provides for exceptions. Petitioner’s arguments rests on the question of the validity of the writ of attachment. Among such exceptions are "where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts or where the defendant is a resident temporarily absent therefrom x x x. No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Preliminary Attachment (Rule 57) ANITA MANGILA vs. Page | 14 . ISSUE: Whether or not lack of prior or contemporaneous service of summons with the writ of preliminary attachment to a defendant who resides in the Philippines but is temporarily absent in action for collection for sum of money renders the attachment invalid and the issuing court without jurisdiction. nevertheless. private respondent filed an action for collection of sum of money. the CA affirm the trial court’s ruling. August 12. the writ together with the Notice of Levy with the Order. T. Because of failure to serve summons on her before or simultaneously with the writ’s implementation. The trial court granted the Motion to Discharge Attachment upon filing of petitioner’s counter-bond. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA G. 125027. private respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment which the Trial court granted. 2002 FACTS: As petitioner Mangila failed to pay private respondent shipping charges. BUELA PROVISIONAL REMEDIES A.

providing for service of summons by publication. Incorporated (ARCI) which is 98% owned by him.000. Moreover. if petitioner’s whereabouts could not be ascertained after the sheriff had served the summons at her given address. Initial payment of US$700. Private respondent never showed that she effected substituted service on petitioner after her personal service failed. It was further stipulated that the Philippine government shall pay Chuidian the amount of US$5. T.000.R.000. by leave of court." Thus. CHUIDIAN vs. be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation x x x. Section 14. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever the defendant’s "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.000. if it were true that private respondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of petitioner after a diligent inquiry. NB: The SC’s disquisition on the required prior or contemporaneous service of summons never touch the private respondent’s argument as to exceptions to the compliance of the said requirement.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. BUELA The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be effected on a party.00. one of which is the Asian Reliability Company. as private respondent also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of the service of summons. M. During the pendency of the suit.00 was actually received by Chuidian. Philguarantee entered into a compromise agreement with Chuidian whereby the latter shall assign and surrender title to all his companies in favor of the Philippine government and the former shall absolve Chuidian from all civil and criminal liability. In June 1985. then respondent could have immediately asked the court for service of summons by publication on petitioner. January 19. 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Chuidian was alleged to be a dummy of the Marcoses in several companies. Philguarantee sued Chuidian before a US Court for violating of the terms of the loan as Chuidian not only defaulted in payment.00. VICENTE B. but also misused the funds by investing them in US corporations for his personal benefit. This is the exact situation contemplated in Section 16. Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.300. still she had some other recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure. PHILGUARANTEE granted ARCI a loan guarantee of US$25. service may. 139941. this made petitioner a resident who is temporarily out of the country. No. While for the Page | 15 . Likewise. SANDIGANBAYAN G.

Page | 16 . HELD: (1) No. Four (4) years after the issuance of the order of attachment. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court”. T. the government filed before the Sandiganbayan civil suit against Chuidian seeking the reconveyance. Hence. (2) Whether or not a writ of attachment may be discharged when the fraud which is the ground for its issuance is not present. namely: (1) to file a counterbond in accordance with Rule 57. there was no evidence at all of initial fraud or subsequent concealment except for the affidavit submitted by the PCGG Chairman citing mere "belief and information" and "not on knowledge of the facts. Chuidian filed a motion to lift the attachment based on the following grounds: (1) First. denied Chuidian's motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to lift attachment." The Sandiganbayan. as provided for in Section 13 of the same Rule. While the case was pending. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the reappearance of a previously absent person against whom writ of attachment had been issued is a ground for lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. BUELA remaining balance of US$4. or (2) to quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued. 1987. and (2) Second. hence. his presence in the country warrants the immediate lifting thereof. he had returned to the Philippines. reversion. accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth allegedly procured illegally and stashed away by the defendants. the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment over the L/C. Since his absence in the past was the very foundation of the Sandiganbayan's writ of preliminary attachment. Sandiganbayan finding that there was a prima facie case of fraud committed issued a writ of attachment. the Sandiganbayan's "most potent ground" for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment no longer existed. Section 12.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. on the ground that “Chuidian embezzled or fraudulently misapplied the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary capacity.00 was to be paid through an irrevocable Letter of Credit (L/C). the instant petition for certiorari contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. To quash a writ of preliminary attachment. On July 30.000. justifying issuance of the writ under Section 1(b). M. the petitioner has two (2) options. however.600.

the attachment may be discharged under Section 13 of Rule 57 when it is proven that the allegations of the complaint were deceptively framed. or clerk. In other words. however. the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion. factor. or an attorney. or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity. broker. or for a willful violation of duty. When the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action. (2) The merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment.g. Page | 17 .Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. T." or "an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought. BUELA It would appear that petitioner chose the latter because the grounds he raised assail the propriety of the issuance of the writ of attachment. e." the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ was based – and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued – the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion. or an officer of a corporation. The rule contemplates that the defect must be in the very issuance of the attachment writ. he repeatedly acknowledged that his justifications to warrant the lifting of the attachment are facts or events that came to light or took place after the writ of attachment had already been implemented. instead of at the regular trial. in the course of his employment as such. Supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule. For instance. agent. By his own admission. M. "an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer. or when the complaint fails to state a cause of action..

that the general and sweeping allegation of fraud against respondent in petitioner's affidavit-respondent as an officer and director of Wincorp allegedly connived with the other defendants to defraud petitioner-is not sufficient basis for the trial court to order the attachment of respondent's properties. MANUEL TANKIANSEE G. Later on. BUELA ALEJANDRO NG WEE vs.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. a collection suit was instituted against it. including herein respondent. T. respondent again filed before the trial court another Motion to Discharge Attachment. The writ was assailed by the defendants but their opposition was denied by the trial court. Thereafter. among others. Power Merge and Wincorp officers. Wee then filed an action for damages against Virata. Connivance cannot also be based on mere association but must be particularly alleged and established as a fact. Respondent filed a certiorari petition before the CA. Wincorp extended another loan to Power Merge. ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of attachment may be discharged on the ground that the fraud alleged against the person to whom attachment was issued is a general allegation of fraud when the basis of the main case is also fraud. The suit ended in a settlement with the latter’s president Virata assuming the liabilities of Hotticks as surety. 171124. Denial was further affirmed by the CA and SC. owned by Virata in the amount equal to the money placement/investment of the petitioner Wee. The complaint alleged that Wincorp officers connived with Power Merge and Virata in transferring petitioner's money placements with it (Wincorp) without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power Merge through an agreement that virtually freed the Virata of any liability. February 13. M. a writ of preliminary attachment was issued with 50M bond by the petitioner. trial court denied the motion. Upon application by the Petitioner. A writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments quoting perfunctorily the words of the Rules.R. Ruling that the grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders affirmed by the CA and SC. The appellate court rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court and lifting Writ of Preliminary Attachment. No. Thus petitioner filed a petitioner for review on certiorari. HELD: Page | 18 . Respondent counters. 2008 FACTS: Wincorp extended a loan to Hotticks Corp. When the latter defaulted.

is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. petitioner has not shown any specific act or deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud. the affidavit merely states that respondent. the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.00 to Nicanor. the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud.00. must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ.000. petitioners filed a Complaint for sum of money and damages. Despite repeated verbal and written demands.00.R. Nicanor failed to remit to them the balance. Nicanor sold the land to Solar Resources. No other factual averment or circumstance details how respondent committed a fraud or how he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud in the transaction sued upon. an officer and director of Wincorp. As to the participation of respondent in the said transaction. Nicanor only remitted the total amount of P9. at the time of contracting the obligation. For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule. petitioner's October 12. The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge. In the instant case. leaving an unremitted balance of P19. against Nicanor et al. being the foundation of the writ. 166759. T. Consequently. vs. In other words. G. had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. However. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor. Inc. (Solar).000. SOFIA TORRES et al. 2000 Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that respondent committed a fraud. The affidavit. No. Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent.000. M.000. connived with the other defendants in the civil case to defraud petitioner of his money placements.000. 2009 FACTS: Petitioners authorized Nicanor.000.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. NICANOR SATSATIN et al. to negotiate for the sale of their c0-owned properties. BUELA The answer is in the affirmative. or without any showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud. Petitioners claimed that Solar Resources. (Solar) has already paid the entire purchase price of P35. through a Special Power of Attorney. November 25. Inc. Petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Page | 19 .

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage. since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities. M. Therefore. Cavite. the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment founded on the said bond. Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the company concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of its issuance. They added that the various clearances which were issued in favor of the bonding company were applicable only in the courts of the cities of Pasay. No. However. BUELA Attachment which was granted by the trial court. 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Idolor obtained a loan from Gumersindo De Guzman secured by a Real Estate Mortgage with right of extrajudicial foreclosure. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. B. ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of attachment may be discharged on the ground that company who issued the applicant’s bond is not among those qualified to transact business with the issuing court. because the bonding company failed to obtain the proper clearance that it can transact business with the RTC of Dasmariñas. Pasay. and Makati. and Pasig. February 7. IDOLOR vs. HON. On May 23. Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58) TERESITA V. Respondents filed their answer with a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment anchored on the ground that the bond issued in favor of the petitioners was defective. the mortgaged property was sold in a public Page | 20 . T. the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas. 141853. In accepting a surety bond. Imus. otherwise. Branch 90. Pasig. Cavite. it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met. but not in the RTC. Upon default of Idolor. the bond should be rejected. al G. COURT OF APPEALS et.R. it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati. Thus. 1997. Manila.

thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not aground for an injunction. is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property in favor of the De Guzman spouses. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it. In the instant case. 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. HELD: No. 1998. 1998. the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered. On July 28. Page | 21 . Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be aright in esse or the existence of a right to be protected. that she shows no equity. M. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court. When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale her right of redemption had already expired on June 23. T. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and no claim to the ultimate relief sought in other words. as the highest bidder and consequently. Hence the existence of a right violated. i. the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents. BUELA auction to respondent Gumersindo.6 Before an injunction can be issued.e. ISSUE: Whether or not Preliminary Injunction may be issued in favor of a mortgagor who filed an action to annul the mortgage agreement and public auction to enjoin the issuance of the final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership. Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents. is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. 1998.

1997. REAL. gross ignorance of the law. RICARDO S. he was constrained to annul complainant's proclamation. and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. M. On May 30. Gustilo charged respondent Judge Ricardo S. HELD: The answer is in the negative. On June 11. respondent admits that he issued the injunctive writ sought on May 29. gross incompetence. was outside the jurisdiction of his court. respondent issued a second TRO "to maintain the status quo between the contending parties. No. In the instant case. 2001 FACTS: Complainant was proclaimed duly elected punong barangay. His failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. Rimeo S. a contender of the complainant in the afore-mentioned election filed an election protest with MCTC and sought the recounting of ballots in two precincts. In other words. misconduct. In his comment. But since the COMELEC ignored Libo-on's petition for correction of erroneous tabulation and Libo-on had no other remedy under the law. T. and damages. preliminary prohibitory injunction. 20-95 in issuing the first TRO is grave abuse of authority. Page | 22 . HON. respondent reversed the order of the RTC. February 28. complainant filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court. 1997. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle. MTJ-00-1250. Thus. SR. RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared as null and void the order nullifying complainant's proclamation as duly elected punong barangay. and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 20-95 provides: “The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. MCTC Judge issued a TRO without sending a notice of hearing to the complainant. Libo-on. a summary hearing may not be dispensed with. which from the very beginning was illegal.“ The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.M. GUSTILO vs. BUELA RIMEO S. 1997 after receiving the applicant's evidence ex parte. the court may act on the application only after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. A. Respondent admits that the annulment of complainant's proclamation." Complainant argues that by issuing the second TRO. Real with gross misconduct. ISSUE: Whether or not injunction may be issued without hearing on the ground that the act sought to be enjoined is void ab initio.

the Appellate Court rendered a decision reversing the NLRC Resolution. In this case. When the CA rendered its decision. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the injunction. September 12. Later. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL. T. the CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution against Bristol-Myers. It also ordered the discharge Page | 23 . but seeks to justify his action on the ground that the proclamation was void ab initio. 2005. On August 12. it was in favor or Bristol-myers. Labor Arbiter Hernandez issued a writ of execution.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Inc. The appellate court gave due course to Bristol-Myers’ petition and issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment.) et al. Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. M.R. Eventually. the appellate court denied the motion as premature since the decision is not yet final and executory due to Lagrosas’ appeal to this Court. 2005./Mead Johnson Phil. MICHAEL J. the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. NLRC set aside the Decision of Labor Arbiter. 168637. Lagrosas moved for reconsideration and NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its earlier ruling. Upon the expiration of the TRO. respondent wantonly usurped a power exclusively vested by law in the COMELEC. LAGROSAS vs. No. The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. G. Labor Arbiter declared that the dismissal is illegal. Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond in view of the Decision dated January 28. 2008 FACTS: Lagrosas then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil. ISSUE: Whether or not bond posted by the winning party before the appellate court for the issuance of TRO and injunction may be released on the ground that the decision of the said court is not yet final and executory.). On appeal. BUELA Respondent admits that his court was not vested with the power or jurisdiction to annul the proclamation. In so doing. and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.

To reiterate. 2010 FACTS: Petitioners are and some of the students (and their parents) of the University who were caught engaging in hazing outside the school premises. injunction may be issued to enjoined an act previously agreed upon between the applicant and the party against whom the injunction is sought to be issued. the apprehended students and their parents. vs. O. the parties agreed that. HELD: Page | 24 . it is not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter. including petitioner students. G. including petitioners. BUELA of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond. the students who participated in the hazing incident as initiators. Contrary to Lagrosas’ claim. On 3 January 2003. FR. the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter and the NLRC. M.S. the University did not anymore convene the Committee on Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident. and that the implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. NELSON JENOSA et al. T. September 8. instead of the possibility of being charged and found guilty of hazing. Petitioners assailed the Principal’s decision to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students as a violation of their right to due process because the COSD was not convened. while those who participated as neophytes would be suspended for one month. et al. This in effect amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction. Notably. ISSUE: Whether or not. the injunction bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by reason of the injunction only.A.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. REV. affixed their signatures to the minutes of the meeting to signify their conformity. DELARIARTE. No. petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages. JOSE RENE C.R. Thus. 172138. would just transfer to another school.5 In view of the agreement. Considering the foregoing. Dialogues and consultations were conducted among the school authorities. we hold that the appellate court erred in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond. both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied. The parents of the apprehended students. During the 28 November 2002 meeting.

Here. he who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean hands. Aggrieved. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION (CBC) G. ISSUE: Whether or not a preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin a creditor from foreclosing the mortgaged property. 2000. this petition. having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason. HELD: Page | 25 .R. 179665. With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order. Medina Foods (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land. To secure the loans. 2013 FACTS: CBC granted several loans to Solid Builders (SBI). and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. SOLID BUILDERS. or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. On October 5. INC. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable. SBI and MFII filed a Complaint "To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages. CBC filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals where it claimed that the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction were all issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. No. April 3. CA ruled in favor of CBC and held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction had no basis as there were no findings of fact or law which would indicate the existence of any of the requisites for the grant of an injunctive writ. BUELA The answer is no. unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in issue. Since injunction is the strong arm of equity. INC. 2007. SBI and MFII filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated September 18. Hence. unfair and dishonest. petitioners. come to court with unclean hands. T. penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings." Trial Court issued an order granting the application for writ of preliminary injunction.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. vs. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been inequitable. or fraudulent. claiming that the interests. M.

they acquired the Page | 26 . BUELA The answer is in the negative. March 5. Moreover. 172909. In the first place. In this connection. No. where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages. PLAZA et al. it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan. They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from unlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the subject property. upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions. al. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. any injury that SBI and MFII may suffer in case of foreclosure of the mortgaged properties will be purely monetary and compensable by an appropriate judgment in a proper case against CBC. M. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA et. vs. SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. 2014 FACTS: Petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction. it cannot be correctly claimed that the irreparable damage sought to be prevented by the application for preliminary injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties to auction sale. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. that is. and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. According to the petitioners. Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. G. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law. The alleged entitlement of SBI and MFII to the "protection of their properties put up as collateral for the loans" they procured from CBC is not the kind of irreparable injury contemplated by law. a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante. T. Damages.R. namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie.

it is auxiliary. the petitioners challenged the RTC’s order before the CA. HELD: The answer is in the negative. BUELA land from Virginia Tuazon in 1997. Page | 27 . 1996. While the petition for review on certiorari was pending before the CA. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more issue between the parties or object that can be served in deciding the merits of the case. found the petitioners guilty of forum shopping. The petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari with SC to challenge the CA rulings. Upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8. The City Government of Butuan must therefore issue them a certificate of sale.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. an adjunct of. they acquired possession and ownership over the auctioned property when they redeemed it from Tuazon. the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy. the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it. the petitioners filed an action for specific performance against the City Government of Butuan. Upon the dismissal of the main action. According to the petitioners. T. 2005 decision. and subject to the determination of the main action. any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. ISSUE: Whether or not petition for review on certiorari assailing the order denying the issuance of a preliminary injunction may proceed despite the dismissal of the main case from which the preliminary injunction was originally prayed for. Tuazon was the sole bidder and winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December 27. The RTC found that the auction sale was tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a government employee disqualified in accordance with Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and ordered that prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be denied. Through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65. In its October 24. the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. M. 2013. dismissed the case.

" are without merit. in the acts prohibited whenever banks are "prohibited from doing business" during receivership and liquidation proceedings. One characteristic of a fortuitous event. Receivership (Rule 59) SPS. Cebu City.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. October 1. in a legal sense and consequently in relations to contract. is that its occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for a party to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. Section 29 of the Republic Act No. 1995. It held that the defendant bank’s right to foreclose the mortgaged property prescribes in ten (10) years but such period was interrupted when it was placed under receivership. 1985 until August 1992. 1985. ISSUE: Whether or not the period within which the bank was placed under receivership and liquidation was a fortuitous event which suspended the running of the ten-year prescriptive period in bringing actions. respondent bank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of petitioners’ property. Foreclosure should not be considered included. RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint. On April 26. LARROBIS. to declare the extra-judicial foreclosure and the subsequent sale thereof to respondent bank null and void. M. CESAR A. LARROBIS vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK G.R. T. provides that when a bank is forbidden to do Page | 28 . the respondent bank went bankrupt and was placed under receivership/liquidation by the Central Bank. 1996. BUELA C. the property was sold in a public auction by Sheriff Arthur Cabigon with Philippine Veterans Bank as the lone bidder. it could not foreclose the mortgage on petitioners’ property within such period since foreclosure is embraced in the phrase "doing business. Respondent’s claims that because of a fortuitous event. JR. No. On October 18. as amended known as the Central Bank Act. 2004 FACTS: Petitioner spouses contracted a monetary loan with respondent Philippine Veterans Bank secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed on their lot together with the improvements thereon. and VIRGINIA S. petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC. and that since it was banned from pursuing its business and was placed under receivership from April 25. More than fourteen years from the time the loan became due and demandable. On March 23. however. HELD: The answer is in the negative. 135706. it was not able to exercise its right to foreclose the mortgage on petitioners’ property. 265. While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of "doing business.

bringing and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank. and prevent the dissipation of its assets to the detriment of the creditors of the bank. January 20. had refused to do so.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.R. There was no legal prohibition imposed upon herein respondent to deter its receiver and liquidator from performing their obligations under the law. 2010 FACTS: Respondent Fidela Y. civil and criminal cases. despite demand to turn over the administration of the property to Fidela. and represent the bank personally or through counsel as he may retain in all actions or proceedings for or against the institution. as expeditiously as possible. to receive collectibles and preserve the assets of the bank in substitution of its former management. Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of the profits and. FIDELA Y. and damages with prayer for the immediate appointment of a receiver Fidela also filed three estafa cases with the RTC of Olongapo City and a complaint for dispossession with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) against Evelina and Aida. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES vs. exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including. T. but not limited to. BUELA business in the Philippines and placed under receivership. rent. In all these cases. Since Fidela was busy with her law practice.e. Consequently. i. all of which with prayer for appointment of receiver constitutes forum shopping. Petitioner Evelina had been staying in a remote portion of the land. COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. Fidela and Evelina agreed to divide the gross sales of all products from the land between themselves. However. HELD: Page | 29 . the person designated as receiver shall immediately take charge of the bank’s assets and liabilities. EVELINA G. Vargas owned a five-hectare land.. 174356. Fidela filed a complaint against Evelina for recovery of possession. collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors. Evelina undertook to hold in trust for Fidela her half of the profits. No. M. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of an administrative. the bank may go after the receiver who is liable to it for any culpable or negligent failure to collect the assets of such bank and to safeguard its assets. This is consistent with the purpose of receivership proceedings. VARGAS G. Fidela asked for the immediate appointment of a receiver for the property.

The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties. the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. and fraudulent banking practices. The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all of them. or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions. No. the General Banking Law of 2000. and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will. or materially injured. the Securities Regulation Code.R. If the action does not require such protection or preservation. removed. a party initiates two or more actions in separate tribunals. Hence. more particularly. Page | 30 . the relief being founded on the same facts. June 19. 168332. acts that violate the prohibition on self-dealing. Consequently. G. trusting that one or the other tribunal would favorably dispose of the matter. Here Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land’s produce. T. grounded on the same cause. receiver may not be appointed. amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Fidela does not claim that the land has been materially injured. 2009 FACTS: Koruga’s Complaint charged defendants before the RTC-Makati with violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code. and prayed for Receivership and Creation of a Management Committee. But receivership is not an action. By forum shopping. It is but an auxiliary remedy. ANA MARIA A. BUELA The answer is in the negative. a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the particular action. She accused the directors and officers of Banco Filipino of engaging in unsafe. pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. KORUGA vs. regardless of which party is successful. TEODORO O. unsound. ARCENAS et al. M. necessitating its protection or preservation. invoked her right to inspect the corporation’s records under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code. (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for. Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost. and the New Central Bank Act. prohibiting self-dealing and conflict of interest of directors and officers. necessitating its protection and preservation.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res judicata on the merits of the other cases. NB: A petition for receivership under Section 1(b). Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. the remedy is not receivership.

" D. Stronghold Insurance Co. Replevin (Rule 60) JOSE S. and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on a petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. COURT OF APPEALS and FCP CREDIT CORPORATION G. OROSA vs. On the strength of these provisions.. FCP Credit Corporation filed a complaint for replevin and damages against petitioner to recover possession of the vehicle subject of the chattel mortgage. 2000 FACTS: Petitioners purchased a vehicle from Fiesta Motors payable in installment. Fiesta Motors assigned the PN and mortgage to FCP.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.R. M. the appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. HELD: RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership. BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over cases which seeks to place a bank under receivership. upon an affirmative finding. 111080. T." The term "exclusively" connotes that only the Monetary Board can resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and. Crystal clear in Section 30 is the provision that says the "appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. OROSA and MARTHA P." And. RTC eventually dismissed private respondent's complaint and ordered private respondent's surety. Petitioner failed to pay 4 monthly installment. April 5. Under Section 29 of the New Central Bank Act. Petitioners executed by promissory note and a chattel mortgage over the vehicle to secure future payment thereon.5 Sedan or its and to Page | 31 . the law explicitly provides that "actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory. No. as a clincher. Inc. it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of banks. Writ of Replevin was issued. HON. However. This is further affirmed by the fact that the law allows the Monetary Board to take action "summarily and without need for prior hearing. to jointly and severally with private respondent return to petitioner the 1983 Ford Laser 1. it also has authority to appoint a receiver.

SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. and (2) to pay petitioner the amount equivalent to the value of the fourteen (14) monthly installments paid by them. In February 1998. the CA’s Eighth Division affirmed the ruling of the trial court and ordered respondent to: (1) return the car subject of the replevin issued. BUELA pay damages to the extent of the value of the bond in the replevin (i. January 28. Astorga to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal. the car’s value was multiplied to three fold. Petitioners assailed the ruling of the CA. The realignment resulted to Astorga’s termination on ground of redundancy. SMART COMMUNICATIONS.R. It is as if petitioner’s initial asset. To uphold the assertion of the petitioner would result to the return of the car to them plus payment of the bond equivalent to double the value of the car. in private respondent's appeal. REGINA M. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the main case wherein replevin was availed of results to the return of the property taken by the sheriff and the payment of the full amount of the bond posted by the applicant.. HELD: The answer is in the negative.000. SC affirmed CA’s First Devisioin’s decision. not the car itself. or to Page | 32 .Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. M. 2008 FACTS: Astorga was employed by respondent Smart Communications as District Sales Manager and enjoyed various benefits including a car plan in the amount of P455. Meanwhile.e. Court of Appeals that the trial court erred when it ordered private respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent considering that petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price.00. 148132.e. The Court of Appeals was correct when it instead ordered private respondent to return. double the value of the sedan plus the return of the car) The surety company assailed the decision by way of petition for certiorari. i. Meanwhile.8th division as it amounts to annulling the decision of the CA-1st division. Verily. SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the company’s car plan program.. T. vs. but only the amount equivalent to the fourteen installments actually paid with interest. to sustain the trial court's decision would amount to unjust enrichment. INC. ASTORGA G. No. but the same was dismissed by CA’s First Division.

June 18. Astorga elevated the denial of her motion via certiorari to the CA. the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. M. the surrender of the car. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. Astorga’s motion to dismiss the replevin case was denied. dispute. Her subsequent MR was denied as well. the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts. KENNETH HAO vs. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. the CA held that the case is intertwined with Astorga’s complaint for illegal dismissal On the other hand. Page | 33 . but a civil. the seized vehicles were kept in a compound owned by the applicant. (2) the day after the seizure. Macadangdang to get a keymaster to duplicate the vehicles’ keys in order to take one motor vehicle. in the alternative. As such. 2008 FACTS: Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin while respondent is the sheriff who implement the writ of replevin. Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination. failed and refused to do either. T. hence. Astorga. the illegal dismissal case was decided by NLRC in favor of SMART ISSUE: Whether or not regular courts has jurisdiction to grant an application for replevin over a vehicle issued to an employee pursuant to an employment car plan benefit. BUELA surrender the same to the company for proper disposition. however. ANDRES A. thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin Astorga moved to dismiss on the ground that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an employment contract.M. and (4) eight of the nine seized motor vehicles were reported missing. P-07-2384. SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or. ABE C. dismissing the replevin case.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. No. Complainant Hao filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent and alleged the following: (1) Andres gave undue advantage to the replevin applicant in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized the nine motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. consequently. (3) allowed applicant’s lawyer Atty. Granting the petition and. is not a labor.

Hence.R. ROGER V. or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. In accordance with the said rules. HON. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant. As the said checks were dishonored upon presentment. without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification. 2009 FACTS: A lease agreement with option to purchase entered into by and between Respondent and petitioner whereby the latter delivered unto the former six (6) post-dated checks. the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose. JOSE L. No. The rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff. Respondent Karen Page | 34 . BUELA Investigating judge found Andres guilty of serious negligence in the custody of the nine motor vehicles. or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant’s bond or approves a new bond. NAVARRO vs. he failed to do. November 27. M. Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon. T. GO G. the property shall be delivered to the applicant. or of the surety or sureties thereon.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. This. Section 6 of Rule 60. the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond. the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. ESCOBIDO and KAREN T. It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely for safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least five days. ISSUE: Whether or not a property seized pursuant to a writ of replevin may be kept in a place owned by the applicant for purposes of safekeeping the following day immediately after the implementation of the writ. 153788. of the Rules of Court provides that: If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff. HELD: The answer is in the negative. or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond.

ISSUE: Whether or not prior demand is required for the issuance of writ of replevin. Thus. alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge. Nothing in these provisions requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Petitioner maintains that the complaints were premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed. and (d) The actual market value of the property. Rule 60 of the Rules. or is entitled to the possession thereof. for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged. M. that it is exempt from such seizure or custody. and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action. For a writ of replevin to issue. or otherwise placed under custodia legis. all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond. Go filed two complaints for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession. T. (c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law. The applicant must also give a bond. and belief. (b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party. BUELA T. information. or if so seized. particularly describing it. prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin. Page | 35 . HELD: Demand is not required prior to filing of replevin action. In these complaints.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. which states: The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts: (a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed. executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned. or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment. Pursuant to Section 2.

which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the obligation. T." Certainly. Despite this. Petitioner elevated the case before the SC and argued that respondent’s remedy of resorting to both actions of replevin and collection of sum of money is contrary to the provision of Article 1484 of the Civil Code ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a writ of replevin and ordering the party against whom writ was issued to pay the applicant the value of the obligation considering that the writ was never implemented. RTC ruled for the respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally pay the amount of Php576. For failure to pay four successive installments from May 15. INC. commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. BUELA SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. The vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. June 3. The trial court.R. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. No. G. 2002 to August 15. 2002 until fully paid. the subject vehicle was not seized. Inc.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK. 2013 FACTS: Petitioners spouses Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors. After trial on the merits.04 plus interest at the rate of 72% per annum from August 20. respondent filed an action for Replevin and Damages. and the costs of suit. therefore. HELD: The answer is in the negative. 2002 despite repeated demands. there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of. Inc. rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of money. As there was no seizure that transpired. in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage was assigned the same to respondent BPI.664. Thereafter the right and interest of Citimotors. Page | 36 . A writ of replevin was issued. M. 182963. it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. BUELA E.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor. As the dismissal of the first Page | 37 . de Asis. Andres filed a manifestation withdrawing the petition on the agreement that herein petitioner would no longer pursue his counterclaim. No. Future support cannot be the subject of a compromise according to Art. despite repeated demands. CA likewise denied petitioner’s petitioner for certiorari assailing RTC’s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not a second action for support is barred by the previous action for support which was dismissed upon agreement of the parties. in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor. 1999 FACTS: Vircel D. 1995. as well as Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. brought Civil Case Q -88-935 for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis alleging that Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis. he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. Vircel D. M. and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter. Acting thereupon. the petitioner. By virtue of the said manifestation. The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case. represented by her legal guardian/mother. T. cannot be renounced. alleging that instant case is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q -88-935. Andres. 2035 of the Civil Code. support which is the means to attain the former. Subsequently. RTC terminated the case. Glen Camil. The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence. COURT OF APPEALS G. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata. On September 7. Glen Camil Andres de Asis. February 15. both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. The right to life cannot be renounce. this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis. Support (Rule 61) MANUEL DE ASIS vs. Andres.R. 127578. hence. the right to claim support from his putative parent.

the rule is that if the rapist is a married man. bringing the children with her (then all minors). Makati City.R. Page | 38 . after a violent confrontation with Edward. sued petitioners. Guerrero. As pronounced by this Court in People v. as his child. CHERYL S. Cheryl. In any case. 163209. No. The family resided at the house of petitioners. T. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring. BUELA case is anchored on an invalid compromise.000. 2009 FACTS: Respondent Cheryl S." NB: compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. September 29. Edward. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MANAHAN G. it cannot have the effect of barring the second action for support. ISSUE: Whether or not support may be granted in a criminal action for rape." Consequently. Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence. M. and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. Chua Giak and Mariano (petitioners) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. 1999 FACTS: Maning was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by the court a quo.00 as moral damages. unless the law should prevent him from doing so. that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. Lim married Edward Lim." and "in every case to support the offspring. for herself and her children. On 14 October 1990. he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime. Branch 140 (trial court) for support.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. should there be any. HELD: The answer is the affirmative. whether legitimate or illegitimate. No.R. October 30. 128157. we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law. They have three children. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim P50. Edward’s parents in Forbes Park. pay the costs. MA. SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM vs. LIM G.

No. HELD: Page | 39 . Also. while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents. the RTC.000. Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children. the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime.R. as amended.00 monthly child support. HELD: Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren. the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support. conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension. Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2. ISSUE: Whether or not grandparents may be sued for support of their grandchildren and daughter-in-law.00 monthly child support. petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them. 165166.000. M. CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. granted a P2. CHARLES GOTARDO vs. DIVINA BULING G. ISSUE: Whether or not the amount in the order granting support is fix and may not be changed. T. Because at the time respondents sued for support. on the respondent’s motion. August 15. claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority.. 2012 FACTS: Divina Buling filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. retroactive from March 1995. During the pendency of the case. on Parental Authority. BUELA Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code. the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

M. no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. Page | 40 . It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. for this reason. dwelling. medical attendance. education and transportation. BUELA The answer is in the negative. clothing. Thus. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance. T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. the amount of support is variable and.

LEE E. and (b) judgment be rendered. Won’s claim is by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 in CFI Manila while Tan’s claim is by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. which require the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary. and in holding that "the principal motive for the present action is to reopen the Manila Case and collaterally attack the decision of the said Court". BUELA SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS A. and (3) interpleader suit would Page | 41 . Won and Bienvenido Tan claims to be the owner of membership fee certificate 201.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. it alleges both Lee E. M. 1199 issued to him by "Swan. declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201. March 26. HELD: The answer is in the negative for three reasons. for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay." the original owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201. No. after hearing. it alleged that the membership fee certificate issued to Won by CFI of Manila is null and void because issued in violation of its by-laws. Interpleader (Rule 62) WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB. vs. The trial court dismissed the complaint with the following findings: (1) that the allegations in its amended and supplemental complaint do not constitute a valid ground for an action of interpleader. 1478 issued in the name of Lee. INC. 1976 FACTS: Wack Wack Golf & Country Club filed a complaint for interpleader alleging two causes of action. Culbertson and Fritz. WON and BIENVENIDO A. For the first cause of action. and ordering the surrender and cancellation of membership fee certificate 201serial no. TAN G. L-23851. T.R. (2) present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case. and (2) that the decision in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila constitutes res judicata and bars its present action. The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims. For its second cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not an interpleader suit may prosper when one of the claimants is a winning litigant in a previous suit involving the subject matter of the said interpleader. namely: (1) action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late.

because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants. which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. In this case. is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. Instant interpleader suit is contrary to the purposes of an interpleader suit which is to diminish litigation. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. he may be barred by laches or undue delay. This cannot be done because having elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances. A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants. which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader. the Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat. T. M. To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201. BUELA compel the winning litigant to establish his rights anew. Page | 42 . with full knowledge of all the fact. Otherwise. Action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late. the Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. the remedy is not barred. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. Application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case. By then it was too late. and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations. with the possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.

IAC issued an order setting aside the assailed order of the trial court and directed Eternal Gardens to to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement of October 6. there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development Program. No. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G. Acting on such motion. 73794.R. All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land in question. Out of the proceeds from the sale. M. Confronted with such conflicting claims. private respondent is entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection from the project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to private respondent through a designated depositary trustee bank. HELD: The answer is in the negative. petitioner as plaintiff filed a complaint for interpleader against private respondent MISSION and Maysilo Estate. at a stipulated area and price per lot. Petitioner opposed the IAC decision before the Supreme Court ISSUE: Whether or not the stakeholder or the person who filed a complaint for interpleader may refuse the order for judicial deposit of the subject matter of the interpleader. T. the trial court denied the motion for judicial deposit. Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court denying the motion for judicial deposit before the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). 1988 FACTS: Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and private respondent North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (MISSION for short) executed a Land Development Agreement whereby the former undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned by private respondent into a memorial park to be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots. BUELA ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION vs. Page | 43 . 1976 with a reputable bank to be designated by the respondent court to be the depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall be found entitled thereto. Private respondent presented a motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. September 19. Under the circumstances.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

Consignation shall Page | 44 . then General Manager of private respondent. petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco). Consequently. Petitioners. No. and petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease whereby the former. DON LUIS DISON REALTY. M. ISSUE: Whether or not obligor may refuse payment of an obligation on the ground that he does not know to whom payment must be made." SUBHASH C. Thereafter. 2008 FACTS: Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty. agreed to lease to the latter several units of the San Luis Building. they were not without any remedy. Bautista. aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner. but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment. 136409. March 14. as lessor. BUELA The essence of an interpleader. Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992.R. G. before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November 1992. Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides: If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it. Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista. in turn. because if such were the case. It is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto. T. agreed to pay monthly rentals. despite repeated demands. however. the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due. Inc. Ms. HELD: The answer is in the negative. INC. petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. PASRICHA vs. is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. Non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made did not justify their failure to pay. While the contracts were in effect. After that. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. respondent filed a complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondent through its representative.

sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth P 70 million. 28 (Regulations Governing Open Market Operations. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK (PDB) and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS G. before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case. 2012 FACTS: RCBC owned two sets of Central Bank Bills (CB Bills): (1) 7 CB Bills worth 70Million. M. instead of availing of the above remedies. invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. All in all. The first set was sold to BOC which the latter in turn sold to PDB. BUELA be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial authority. 1994. Servicing and Redemption of the Public Debt) which requires the presentation of the bond before a registered bond may be transferred on the books of the BSP. petitioners opted to refrain from making payments. 154470-71. On June 30. or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. with maturity date of June 29. and (2) 2 CB Bills worth 20Million. Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides: Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter." BSP denied the request. The second set of CB Bills was sold by RCBC to PDB and subsequently acquired by BOC. Otherwise stated. 1994.60 The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. PDB. Stabilization of the Securities Market. Nos. PDB requested the BSP to record its claim in the BSP’s books. and the announcement of the consignation in other cases. an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). Section 1. T. BANK OF COMMERCE (BOC) vs. explaining that its nonpossession of the CB bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer. upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills. Notably.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. in turn. Moreover. Issue. the BOC acquired the first and Second sets of CB bills. Page | 45 . September 24.R.

On the other hand. Section 5. BUELA In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of the CB bills. as a special civil action. the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion. in relation to Section 1. Similarly. Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim. In October 2000. the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. although separate and independent from.136 Indeed. The remedy of interpleader. reiterating its earlier arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead. In May 2001. Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-ininterpleader as part of. Accordingly. Accordingly. Rule 6. the PDB filed with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus." of which the PDB is neither. praying for the dismissal of the petition. is primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions." ISSUE: Whether or not a motion for interpleader may be made an alternative defense in an answer. Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. the BSP released the maturity proceeds of the CB bills by crediting the Demand Deposit Account of the PDB and of the BOC with 50% each of the maturity proceeds of the amount in escrow. The BOC filed its Answer. questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over the BOC’s "additional counterclaims. the BOC and the PDB entered into two separate Escrow Agreements. M. T. it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful owner. the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face value. Alternatively. However. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and substantiate their respective claims on the subject CB bills. or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to Page | 46 . 28 because this section applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond. the BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. a form of defense. It argued that the PDB has no cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. the answer. the total face value of the subject CB bills should be deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only upon order of the RTC.

INC. BUELA dismiss. made only in the BSP’s Answer. however. respondent dealt with petitioners. Petitioner’s asserted that the changes in the monthly rental is pursuant to condition no. On February 18. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (Rule 63) EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL MARKETING INDUSTRIES. B. 1998.348. On two separate dates. that the BSP’s "counter-complaint/crossclaim for interpleader" runs counter to general procedures. January 28. petitioners advised respondent that the former’s monthly rentals shall be inclusive of VAT and that monthly rental shall be increased by 73%.107. What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an original complaint but through its Answer. the PDB does not possess any right to have its claim recorded in the BSP’s books.R. 1997 During the effectivity of the contract. the rules allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through the procedural device of a motion. BATHALA FACTS: Bathala Marketing Industries. (4) term of four (4) years from May 1. Ponciano’s heirs. as lessee. Apart from a pleading. the PDB cannot properly be considered even as a potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. No. G. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim for interpleader. 150806. Thereafter. consequently. Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 2008 ALMEDA vs. 6 and 7 of the contract of lease. Thus." the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion. respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of Page | 47 . T. the interpleader was only an alternative position.25 square meters of the Almeda Compound in Pasong Tamo.. M. This does not mean.348. renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned. Almeda with the following terms: (1) leased property is 7. Inc.69. Ponciano died. seeking relief which essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that "payment is made to the rightful or legitimate owner" of the subject CB bills. (2) for a monthly rental of P1.

In Panganiban. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute. in that case. Page | 48 . thus. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation we held that the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. On March 10. the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court. there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief petition. in the case at bench.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Given all these attendant circumstances. In fact. T. BUELA determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. Yet. 1998. where the rescission case was on appeal. We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro. as it would settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case. the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case. v. we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it. itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief. Conversely. rescission and damages against respondent for failure of the latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the former. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. petitioners in turn filed an action for ejectment. the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum. the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief may be heard despite the existence of a pending action for rescission involving the same parties and contract terms. M. notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. It is true that in Panganiban v. Jr. However. again. Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission. Mirasol where the declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative.

Sometime in 2000. In this petition. that is. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse. Finding merit in the petition. M. Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Section 1. obtained a divorce decree. and for a declaration of his rights or duties. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides: Any person interested under a deed. and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. October 5. We note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. contract or other written instrument. sought reconsideration but it was denied. ordinance.A. through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No. thereunder. as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent. not denominated as petition for declaratory relief. 2005 FACTS: On May 24. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III G. insists on a declaration Page | 49 . will.S. HELD: Yes. a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship. The Republic. T. Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. 1981. invoking applicability of a legal provision to his case. a private citizen. A few years later. BUELA REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.R. The interests of the parties are also adverse. the court granted the same. xxxx The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy. or whose rights are affected by a statute. Villanueva. herein petitioner. the OSG raises a pure question of law: The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage. 154380. and remarried while in the U. or other governmental regulation may. In this connection. (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy. bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising. executive order or regulation. In 1986.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. before breach or violation thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not a party may file a petition.

authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code. praying for relief.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. HELD: The answer is in the negative. 2009 FACTS: Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land which they inherited from Anastacio Danao.R. RTC dismissed petitioners’ Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction being that the suit is a real action involving a real property with assessed value less than P20. recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code. 181303. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title. Respondent. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court13 states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. since Section 1. September 17. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument. Averring that they already needed it. vs. (2) an action to quiet title. petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion.Tuguegarao City. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries. has legal interest in the controversy. G. CARMEN DANAO MALANA et al. he had allowed Consuelo Pauig to build on and occupy a portion of the subject property with the agreement that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it. litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.000. Respondents. T. and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. Quieting of Title. No. petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same. refused to heed petitioners’ demand. however. During the lifetime of Anastacio. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory Page | 50 .00 and hereby dismisses the same without prejudice. BUELA of his capacity to remarry. and Damages against respondents before RTC . BENIGNO TAPPA et al. Petitioner’s Complaint should not have been dismissed. M. the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not an action for Quieting of Title falls under the jurisdiction of RTC pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63. As Respondents presented dubious documents supporting their claim of ownership before the proceedings in Lupong Tagapamayapa. The second paragraph of Section 1.

the Court ruled that the Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings. in accordance with Section 8(1). FRANCIS JOSEPH G. JR. Through the subject motion. said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20. and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution. the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. 2013 FACTS: In his initiatory pleading.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight. On July 17. To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility. In contrast. 3] that two Page | 51 . as amended. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL. M. BUELA relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants. as amended.R.000. It is important to note that Section 1. ESCUDERO and REP. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. April 16. petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8. 202242. respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature. and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court. 2012. NIEL C. CHAVEZ vs. SEN. 2012. No. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. respondents’ filed a motion for reconsideration. TUPAS. an opportunity or an option. G.00 FRANCISCO I. It repeatedly uses the word "may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief. T. On July 31.

is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them." In all these provisions. It is very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. ISSUE: Whether or not both the Senate and the House of Representatives is entitled to only one seat in the Judicial and Bar Council. Page | 52 . and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct. and Congress. the Constitution could have. voting separately. clearly. the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress. compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it. BUELA representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship. as one whole body. the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and." the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint. M. the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses. Article VIII. Thus. in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress. to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8. A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. voting separately. HELD: The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. as can be read in its other provisions. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. voting separately. As stated in the July 17. in no uncertain terms. 2012 Decision." Similarly. according to its text. under Section 18. Article VII.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. by sheer inadvertence. by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the VicePresident to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress. What the Constitution clearly says. For this reason. to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature. which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress. One example is Section 4. Had the intention been otherwise. T. so provided. the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.

Congress has two (2) Houses. 5327.8 The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on February 6. JR. took actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. the declaration of an existence of a state of war. and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances. through a notarized deed of absolute sale. When Domingo Sr. No. 2000. against herein petitioners Atty. In their Answer with Counterclaim. as to the other branches of government. T. Sabitsana opposed the application. Sabitsana and his wife. 1992. claiming that they bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same. The need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular House plays. and MA. Clemencio C. was issued in Atty. Rosario. August 5. canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President. On April 11. M. and impeachment. On October 17. Sabitsana. each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber. SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to Juanito is null and void absent the marital consent of Garcia’s wife. Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer. 2013 FACTS: Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of respondent Juanito over a parcel of unregistered land. (Atty. 1991.9 TD No. which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title. passed away. Juanito filed an action for quieting of title and preliminary injunction before Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval. Juanito’s father Domingo Sr. Soledad Corto Page | 53 . Biliran. BUELA The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. SABITSANA vs. his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. the power of appropriation. Jr.R. MUERTEGUI G. JUANITO F. claiming that he was the true owner of the lot. petitioner Atty. the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. and brother Domingo Jr. In all these instances. 1996 was cancelled and a new one. regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. TD No. Sabitsana). Sabitsana’s name. Immediately thereafter. 141. 181359. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA. Whether in the exercise of its legislative or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia. Atty.

contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. for being void for vagueness. (c)Section 18. (b) Section 7. al G. M. 2013 FACTS: On July 17. 204603. the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. for violating the right to travel. HELD: On the question of jurisdiction. as well as for contradicting Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. (d) Section 26. private respondents filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. and that the Complaint is barred by prescription and laches. for violating due process. for violating the right to privacy of communication and due process and the privileged nature of priestpenitent relationships. and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case. it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs. 2007. 2012. an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC. that they acquired the property in good faith and for value. They likewise insisted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval. as amended. finding that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was properly filed. On February 27. HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE et. T.230. On April 23. assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3.00 outside Metro Manila. BUELA (Soledad).R. for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over an action for quieting of title where the subject property is valued below 20. the RTC issued an Order24 which denied the subject motion to dismiss. they averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases. Likewise.00. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. and (e) Section 27.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. September 24. which involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the assessed value of which is merely P1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 2012. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Page | 54 .000. No.

however. adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. will. there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse. BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not a declaratory relief. private respondents only assert general interests as citizens. distemper. or ordinance. T. by "ripening seeds" it is meant. second. passion. remain wanting. executive order or regulation. Corollary thereto. third . fifth. may be given due course despite the fact that no controversy had arisen from the said legislation. there must have been no breach of the documents in question. private respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. statute. contract or other written instrument. not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with. the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed. and sixth requirements. Pertinently.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases. and third requirements appear to exist in this case. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration. fifth . HELD: Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: First . While the first. A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. the fourth. fourth . As their petition would disclose. animosity. As to the fourth requisite. and sixth. the issue must be ripe for judicial determination. and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case. a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination. the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction. but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity. They. however. failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA Page | 55 . second . M. the subject matter of which is a new legislation. and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled.

Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism.—When any tribunal. Petition for certiorari. the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in the first place. 2007. Finally. INC vs. As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief. remain highly-speculative and merely theorized." otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar. No. or with Page | 56 . M. neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL et al G. October 5. 2010 FACTS: Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. Section 1. signed into law on March 6.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. as regards the sixth requisite. board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionshas acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear: Section 1. 178552. HELD: Preliminarily. there was no particular. The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined.R. 9372 (RA 9372). BUELA 9372 against them. ISSUE: Whether or not constitutionality of a law may be assailed via petition for certiorari. real or imminent threat to any of them. based on the above-discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition. In other words. T. certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK.

Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Without any justiciable controversy. the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections. nor any plain. its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and Page | 57 . alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal. and there is no appeal. the petitions fail just the same. September 10. 206987. board or officer. T. over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. In the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013. declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency. lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. Then again. No. petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions. The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside. BUELA grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political constituencies. Parenthetically. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. C." where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief. and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. speedy. The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court. Review of Judgments and Final Orders of COMELEC and COA (Rule 64) ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD) vs. the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. 2013 FACTS: On 7 November 2012. M.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

that ANAD was already afforded a summary hearing on23 August 2013. however. Page | 58 . or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. "Grave abuse of discretion. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion. ANAD’s president.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. the present petition raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause. T." under Rule 65. Balang. prejudice or personal hostility. arbitrary. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion. or the whimsical. HELD: The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2. and whether or not the COMELEC erred in finding that petitioner submitted only three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007 Elections. Domingo M. during which Mr. It is to be noted. BUELA regulations. has a specific meaning. there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. particularly for its failure to submit at least five nominees. the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it promulgated the assailed Resolution without giving ANAD the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing. authenticated documents and answered questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANAD’s qualifications. Hence. ISSUE: Whether or not a resolution of COMELEC may be assailed via petition for certiorari on the ground of its failure to set the case for a second evidentiary hearing. thus violating its right to due process. For a petition for certiorari to prosper. and for its failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections. M.

T. Prohibition and Mandamus (Rules 65) 1. THE HON. Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court. ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO. July 31. two sets of Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) were issued by Espenesin for 38 units and the allotted parking spaces in Malayan Tower. allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of The Malayan Tower. The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the Page | 59 . Thereafter." wherein the latter shall provide the real property while former would construct and shoulder the cost of construction and development of the condominium building. Thus. The second set of CCTs was issued upon the instruction of Serrano an officer of MICO. MICO and ASB executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). 3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman. Certiorari (Section 1) OSCAR R. 2013 FACTS: ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of "The Malayan Tower. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. And as already stated. The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower representing their investments. 192685. ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman’s discretionary power to determine the existence of probable cause may be assailed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court HELD: The Supreme Court have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. BUELA D. et al.R. G. No. Certiorari. Ampil. the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution. unsecured creditor of the ASB charged Espenesin with violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. The first was in the name of MICO and the second in the name of ASB. AMPIL vs. On 11 March 2005. M. Ombudsman dismissed Ampil’s complaint on the ground of lack of probable cause for the alleged commission of falsification. Due to financial difficulties.

As Registrar of Deeds. EMMA MONDEJAR G. ordinance or regulation. (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense. Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason for Serrano’s new instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding. (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice. (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions. However.R. for a contract or an authenticated writing to ascertain which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt. A. His actions would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona fides mistake. No." He should not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the amendment Serrano sought was to correct simple and innocuous error. January 22.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. M. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. He heads the Office of Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands x x x in the province or city wherein such office is situated. Espenesin could have then easily asked. on several occasions. as he is obliged to. vs. neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. T. 200804. (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority. BUELA ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law. ANG NETWORK. seeking to collect from respondent the Page | 60 . (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent. Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings thereon. (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution. 2014 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC.L. INC. the court have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause: (a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused. the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit. The fourth circumstance is present in this case.

2011. similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy." Truly. wherein it was held that: In a long line of cases. the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent. the RTC issued a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. immediately move for its execution. does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 2005. On November 23. speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding. M. finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the nonappealable nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases.111. ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that petitioner failed to establish with certainty respondent’s obligation. the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where there is no appeal or any other plain. On June 10. Page | 61 . Nevertheless. 2011. one which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial. 2002 to September 30. Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule. This general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any "plain. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. BUELA amount of P23. thus. ISSUE: Whether or not a decision on a complaint falling under small claims cases may be questioned via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 when the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that decisions rendered in such case is final and unappealable. and the prevailing party may. T. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. the remedy of appeal is not allowed. speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law. and in not ordering the latter to pay the full amount sought to be collected. but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the proscription on appeals in small claims cases. Aggrieved. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation.

Due to an altercation with a customer. instrumentalities and agencies of the Government. the CA held that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches. M. 2009. before the CA. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR. petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. as amended. in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. December 11. Petitioner was charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer. No. the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. 2013 FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino which was operated by respondent PAGCOR. petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the board’s decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he is indeed found guilty as charged. HELD: Page | 62 . Justifying his recourse to the CA. petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Hence. the penalty be only a reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty. Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.R. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari filed directly before the CA assailing a decision for which the law provides no remedy of appeal may be dismissed on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. BUELA MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG vs. T. 190566. In its assailed Resolution dated September 30. Invoking Section 2(1). Moreover. He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by reprimand. His Motion for Reconsideration was denied. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) G. Aggrieved. subdivisions. He was later on found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense.

Page | 63 . (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question. there being no appeal or any plain. and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant. T. speedy. the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside. then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days. M.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. However. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence. (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings. (12) where no administrative review is provided by law. the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process. (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned. fraud or error of law. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness. (10) when the rule does not provide a plain.29 The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law. (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter. (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. In sum. or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion. he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. speedy and adequate remedy. (5) when there is irreparable injury. BUELA The answer is in the negative. (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable. if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction.

. the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. "no proof whatsoever was presented by the prosecution showing that the certified true copies of the public documents offered in evidence against both accused were in fact issued by the legal custodians. Here. stressing. that to grant it would place the accused in double jeopardy. JR. ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA ISSUE: Whether or not a final decision in a criminal complaint may be assailed by way of petition for certiorari. Private Respondent filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence which was granted by the CTA. Subsequent to the filing by prosecution of its Formal Offer of Evidence. in its March 26. a perusal of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its part or denial of due process. The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively participated during the trial and. among others. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. According to the CTA. this petition for certiorari. 2013 Resolution. No. et al. the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in accordance with the rules on evidence and existing jurisprudence. BUELA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Page | 64 .Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration. Hence. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. but it was denied by the CTA. M. CASTANEDA. THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer. T. or to act at all in contemplation of law. it must be shown that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.R. 208290. 2013 FACTS: Private respondents were charged before the CTA for misdeclaration of goods. G. In this case. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. in fact. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Despite opposition. December 11.

1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university. Abueva. Armand V. a student enrolled in the UP College of Law. who is living abroad. Fabella and Olivia C. October 12. T. The Executive Committee affirmed the decision of the SDT. No. 1993. As such. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction and alleged that RTC judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal. Cesar A. non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum from march 30. Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva. not having been authorized by the Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the instant petition. Alfonso.P. who verified the petition. Buenaventura.R. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN G. in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies. Caoili. the BOR found Nadal guilty and imposed upon him the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT). BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT. 1993. Caoili. and Dr. In the morning of March 29. the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement. Nadal. Oscar M. BUELA UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS vs. 110280. 1993 FACTS: Ramon P. Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR). the BOR. M. applied for Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP). HON. SDT rendered a decision finding him guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholding information in his STFAP application about the income of his mother. Private respondent opposed the petition and argued that Dr. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision. U. not being the "Board of Page | 65 .

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. would have sufficed to disqualify him from receiving the financial assistance he sought. BUELA Regents" nor "the University of the Philippines.P. to rationalize the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the public funds allocated to the State University. as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. if disclosed. M. or a mere incidental interest. HELD: The answer is in the negative. the University President and member of the BOR. Caoili is named as a petitioner. however. would have the effect of subverting a commendable program into which the University officials had devoted much time and expended precious resources. under Sec. 7 of the U. Having specifically named Drs. Nadal is now estopped from questioning their personality to file the instant petition. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest. As the Court has time and again held. from the conceptualization to the implementation stage. a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. T. Abueva. Moreover. which information. Such dishonesty." they are not real parties in interest who should file the same. if left unpunished." Undoubtedly. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition for mandamus that he filed below. the U. ISSUE: Whether or not a respondent to a petition for certiorari may assail the legal standing of the petitioner when the former had specifically named the latter in a petition for mandamus for which the injunction was issued and is assailed in the certiorari petition. Page | 66 . It is not mandatory." It is in accordance with these legal provisions that Dr. notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that the naming of the party would be but a formality. has to verify the petition. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. Necessarily. an action may be entertained. an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree. A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. that each and every member of the BOR be named petitioners. Board of Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline by withholding information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits. 11 of the University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be served on "the president or secretary thereof'. Dr.

293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. 70484. board. a piece of land in Caloocan City. et al.. T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Section 1. the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands had the duty at once to protect the Government from loss by bringing suit to obtain judicial authority to enforce the Government's lien. CALOOCAN City. REGISTER OF DEEDS. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. G. 293 which invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor. board or officer exercising judicial functions. it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction. TUASON vs.. TUASON and REMEDIOS V." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. BUELA ROMAN C. unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. ISSUE: Whether or not a presidential proclamation annulling a registered title over a real property may be assailed via petition for certiorari HELD: It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts. The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal. M. declaring Page | 67 . January 29. He made a determination of facts. he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners.” On September 14. 1973. exercising functions judicial or ministerial. Inc. The decree reveals that Mr. 1988 FACTS: Petitioner Spouses Tuasons bought from Carmel Farms. or person . while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal. No. Carmel. and applied the law to those facts. The said land had been earlier purchased by Carmel from the Government by installment with the following clause: “in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money and interest thereon. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function.R. corporation. Said Presidential Decree No. or with grave abuse of discretion. In his comment on the petition.

August 7. Since Mr. ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting Eurocredit Bank from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership." And applying the law to that situation. 191424. BUELA what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function. (the) Association (of homeowners) stand. Marcos was never vested with judicial power. or with grave abuse of discretion. the MB issued Resolution No. and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy to assail an order of the BSP to place a bank under receivership. Page | 68 . 2013 FACTS: On March 4." and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic . VIVAS vs. including those on which the dwellings of the members of . 2010. No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.. 2. Assailing MB Resolution No. as everyone knows. T.. being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. 276. or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION G. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms. M. he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the Government. Vivas (member of Eurocredit Bank new management team) filed this petition for prohibition before this Court. Prohibition (Section 2) ALFEO D. These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari. and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines. (were) null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy. such power..R. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function... Inc. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive. 27623 placing Eurocredit Bank under receivership.

Prohibition is already unavailing.A. The MB issued Resolution No. prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law. officers. however. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. dated March 4. No. 7653 read: x x x x The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory. Though couched in imprecise terms. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership. Resolution No. T. 2010. liquidation or conservatorship. Pertinent portions of Section 30. it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances obtaining. and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. any act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship. Vivas Availed of the Wrong Remedy. M. this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Under Section 30 thereof. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts. Apparently. BUELA HELD: The answer is in the negative. 7653.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 276. and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari. tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. 276. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. As a rule. R. had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Page | 69 . in the exercise of its power under R. the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. To begin with. Indeed. the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Vivas availed of the wrong remedy.A. tribunals. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts. Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed.

on Andal’s behalf. Respondent Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. he may be entitlted to emoluments of the office for actual services rendered but instead of the municipality of Nagcarlan. Angeles as Municipal Administrator during his Second and Third term as mayor of Nagcarlan. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for prohibition may be availed of to assail an Audit Observation Memorandum of the Provincial State Auditor stating that according to law the petitioner is liable to pay and requiring the petitioner to submit a comment thereon.R. the Sangguniang Bayan disapproved petitioner Dr. Even so. he is considered merely a de facto officer. Angeles for the latter’s services as Municipal Administrator. Court of Appeals granted respondent’s Petition for Certiorari dismissed petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition. 186613. T. petitioner Dr. As De Facto officer. issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) addressed to petitioner Corales who was asked to comment/reply. The AOM states that: As Angeles’ appointment was not confirmed by Sangguniang Bayan. Provincial State Auditor of Laguna. Laguna. OSG. as it unjustly denied respondent’s right to actively prosecute the case through a mere declaration that it was a nominal party despite a clear showing that the Petition for Prohibition referred to the respondent as a real party in interest. it should be Petitioner Corales who should shoulder the petitioner Dr. 2013 FACTS: Petitioner Corales appointed Dr. filed a Motion to Dismiss. unfitness and unsatisfactory performance. August 27. M. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. The trial court denied the said Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Andal was merely a nominal party. BUELA ROSENDO R. Angeles’ salary according to the Local Government Code. Andal. However. Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon. Angeles continued to discharge the functions and duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received an annual salary. Angeles’ appointment on the ground of nepotism. No. Page | 70 . petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal to recall its AOM and to eventually desist from collecting reimbursement from petitioner Corales for the salaries paid to and received by petitioner Dr. CORALES vs.

Angeles. 2007 FACTS: James L. speedy. an assertion of opposite legal claims. ELENA TAN and LAMBERTO TAN vs. A mere issuance stating a possible liability and requiring a person to comment thereon cannot be considered an actual controversy over which the power of judicial review may be exercise by way of petition for prohibition. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. Page | 71 . petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. Prohibition. even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order. M. No.R. King (King) charged Petitioners with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B. the action for prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM. Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the power of judicial review." ROLANDO TAN. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The audit investigative process was still in its initial phase. (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication. decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr." An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights. Closely related thereto is that the question must be ripe for adjudication. may only be resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other plain. the following must be extant: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power. June 8.P. 2002. T. BUELA HELD: The answer is in the negative. And. being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. still. and (3) the person challenging must have the "standing. 164966. In a Joint Resolution dated November 8. susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a mere hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. In this case. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 22) and Estafa.

Accordingly an information was filed. and when the proceedings are done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Page | 72 . After their motion for reconsideration was denied. petitioners. petitioners interposed the instant petition for review on certiorari to review the Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed their petition for prohibition. The petitioner must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. BUELA public respondent Montero found probable cause.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. They sought to restrain the trial court from proceeding with the subject criminal cases against them and prayed that the same be dismissed. the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. through their own fault. In fine. failed to avail themselves of this remedy. On November 24. T. the principal issue is whether resort to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition was proper. However. This is but a veiled attempt to litigate issues which should have been timely appealed to the Secretary of Justice via a petition for review. M. Countless times we have ruled that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. HELD: The answer is in the negative. It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain. ISSUE: Whether or not an extraordinary remedy of writ of prohibition may be availed of to assail the validity of a prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause over a criminal complaint. Therefore. 2002. petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals. the arguments raised in their petition for prohibition ineluctably shows that petitioners are principally questioning the factual and legal bases of the finding of probable cause against them. On December 17. 2003.

BUELA 3. March 17. 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order. M. corporation. petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Cases before the City Prosecutor on the ground of lack of probable cause. On 2 October 2006. or station. petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the trial court to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus by virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor finding no probable cause against the accused and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information. Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Information in an Order of even date. trust. immediately or at some other specified time. On the same date. officer or person. de Vera. or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled.R. the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information before Judge Bay. 2009 FACTS: Two Information for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Nos. HELD: The answer is in the negative. On 10 August 2004. to do the act required to be done. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases. the Office of the City Prosecutor affirmed the Information filed against petitioners. Thereafter. BAY G. 174813-15. reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004. Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Information had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution. board. HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal. Page | 73 . T. On the other hand. Mandamus (Section 3) NILO HIPOS vs. and there is no other plain.

in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE G. BUELA As an extraordinary writ. In the case at bar. In the case at bar.R. SANCHEZ and EX-C2C SALVADOR A. when refused.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Information. In effect. Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Information. he had already acted on it by denying the same. petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion. September 25. for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters. However. the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Information against petitioners. the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty. In other words. METEORO vs. Page | 74 . There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus. to grant or deny such Motion. i. Accordingly.. 161735. ROBERTO T. mandamus is not available anymore. No. T. the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay. mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act. he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way. mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. they were both cleared of all charges and thereafter applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon even up to the integration of the PC into the PNP. because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. On appeal.e. EX-C1C JIMMY B. 2007 FACTS: Petitioner were former constable in the Philippine Constabulary (PC) that were discharged from the service due to administrative cases filed against them. while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Information can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same. LASTIMOSO. not a discretionary one. M.

and who subsequently filed petitions for reinstatement that were not acted upon by the PNP. it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. HELD: No. No. NAPOLCOM issued two resolutions. subsequently cleared of the charges against them. BUELA On the account of the integration. applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon until the integration of the PC into the PNP in 1990 when R. on the one hand. NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No. Thus. Viewed in light of the said guideposts. petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with RTC against the PNP Chief. the constables in the list requested the assistance of the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). those who had been discharged by virtue of pending administrative or criminal cases but who were later acquitted or had their cases dismissed. 98-105 . among others.affirming and confirming the absorption into the PNP 126 ex-PC constables including therein the petitioners. mandamus will not issue. 98-037 . not to inquire and to adjudicate. 98-105. ISSUE: Whether or not a public official who has the power to appoint/reinstate may be compelled by mandamus to appoint or reinstate petitioners previously discharged from service. As petition for absorption is yet to be acted upon. During the pendency of the said petition. which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. 99-061 on April 19. petitioner has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and that. and (2) Resolution No. 1999 recalling the earlier Resolution No. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right.A. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite. the PNP Chief’s issuance of the orders for the absorption of herein petitioners in the police force is not compellable by a writ of mandamus precisely because the same does not involve a performance of a ministerial duty. respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him. it is essential that. As no absorption order had yet been issued by the Chief of the PNP. In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue. 697523 was enacted. DILG Secretary sent a memorandum to the Chief of the PNP.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. on the other hand. we no longer speak of the reinstatement of the petitioners to the service because the Page | 75 . or to compel compliance with a duty. Thus. M. T. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded. Let it be noted that petitioners were discharged from the PC service. to wit: (1) Resolution No.considering as absorbed into the police force.

under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. as we held in Gloria v. the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Thus. 8027 which became effective on December 28. HON. 156052. They cannot claim the right to be issued an appointment based on the NAPOLCOM issuances. petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4. vs. No. JR. The power to appoint is essentially discretionary to be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights. T. March 7. Instead. ATIENZA. Inc. However. Page | 76 . and not in the NAPOLCOM. Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. he has allowed them to stay. Consequently. the petitioners do not have a clear legal right over the issuance of the absorption orders. ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus may be issued in order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance. Ordinance No. Suffice it to state that R. to enforce Ordinance No. G. 2007 FACTS: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 98-037 and 98-105. No. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) et al. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. technically an issuance of a new appointment. it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus.. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines). specifically Resolution Nos. De Guzman. Furthermore. M. 2001. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty. JOSE L. 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No.A. 6975 clearly provides that the power to appoint PNP personnel with the rank of "Police Officer I" to "Senior Police Officer IV" to which petitioners may be appointed27 is vested in the PNP regional director or in the Chief of the PNP as the case may be. but of their employment in the PNP which is. implementation of the ordinance was repeatedly postpone. BUELA Philippine Constabulary no longer exists.R.

As the chief executive of the city. 193462. of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain. to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. M." One of these is Ordinance No. No. FUNA vs. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. DENNIS A. Assistant Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum referring the petitioner’s request to COA Assistant Commissioner Emma M.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. On the other hand. when refused. as city mayor. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty.21 He has no other choice. T. February 4. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Besides. Espina for Page | 77 . as residents of Manila.B. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding. clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined. 2014 FACTS: Petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for a "copy of the latest financial and audit report" of the MECO invoking. for that purpose. The reason for this is obvious. It is his ministerial duty to do so." In reply to the said letter. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT G. 8027. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.R. BUELA HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty. his "constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.

and the public. COA argues that the instant petition already became moot when COA Chairperson Maria Gracia M. the petitioner filed the instant petition for mandamus on 8 September 2010." In this memorandum. coupled with the pressing public interest in the resolution of all related issues. among other government agencies based therein." Taking the 25 August 2010 memorandum as an admission that the COA had never audited and examined the accounts of the MECO. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Page | 78 . the bar. BUELA "further disposition. otherwise moot and academic. the MECO. at least. the Court invokes its symbolic function. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. An allegation as serious as a violation of a constitutional or legal duty. Pulido-Tan (Pulido-Tan) issued Office Order No. 2011-698. Petitioner posits that by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. T. specifically for the purpose of auditing the accounts of. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench. Article IX-D of the Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise bona fide GOCC or government instrumentality. It is the adamant claim of the petitioner that the MECO is a GOCC without an original charter or. then for the formulation of controlling principles for the education of the bench. if not for the proper guidance of the government or agency concerned. prompts this Court to pursue a definitive ruling thereon. and fourth. a government instrumentality. there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Courts will decide cases. Chairperson Pulido-Tan already directed a team of auditors to proceed to Taiwan. the funds of which partake the nature of public funds. second. the COA is neglecting its duty under Section 2(1). if: first." He impleaded both the COA and the MECO. 2011-69850 on 6 October 2011. however. Assistant Commissioner Naranjo revealed that the MECO was "not among the agencies audited by any of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector. HELD: No. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for mandamus may be denied on the ground of mootness despite allegation of violation of the constitution and involving paramount public interest.51 The COA notes that under Office Order No. a member of the Philippine Bar and law book author. Petitioner filed the suit in his capacities as "taxpayer. concerned citizen. third. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved. bar and the public in general. For this purpose. M.

The CA dismissed the appeal upon the motion of the Petitioner. Office Order No. after decades of not auditing the accounts of the MECO. 2011-698 did not state any legal justification as to why. Quo Warranto (Rule 66) PEDRO MENDOZA vs. While the case was pending before said court. Page | 79 . He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. 1996. In the first place. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES G.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. On July 24.R. respondent Allas was promoted to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. the COA suddenly decided to do so. 1996. 131977. The justifications provided by the COA. E. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for quo warranto that was granted may be executed against the new person occupying the position vacated by respondent in the said petition. petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. M. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III. the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition. and at the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other benefits appurtenant thereto. BUELA Assuming that the allegations of neglect on the part of the COA were true. February 4. 1996. No. only appears in the memorandum it submitted to this Court for purposes of this case. The order of dismissal became final and entry of judgment was made on March 19. his successor-in-interest. Neither does it state any determination regarding the true status of the MECO. in fact. Office Order No. 1999 FACTS: Mendoza filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas as the latter was appointed (by President Ramos) to the former’s position while the former was temporarily designated in Cagayan. T. Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same. 2011-698 does not offer the strongest certainty that they would not be replicated in the future. On May 9. Allas appealed to the CA.

Feria in Unilongo v. As declared by Justice Jose Y. respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose. if his claim is not well-founded. forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to Respondents. Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction. the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. BUELA HELD: No. February 28. No. public officers who Page | 80 . HELD: No. even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. 2006 FACTS: On May 16. position or franchise. they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office. Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. LUTGARDA P. not against Godofredo Olores. PANDAY et al. T. Incorporated. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for quo warranto is the proper remedy to assail the persons who usurped the powers of a board member of a private corporation. Section 1.R. Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court. or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. but sometime in May 2005. 168696. but always against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in. It is never directed to an officer as such. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas. who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation. In the case at bar. CALLEJA et al. G. or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. vs. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. JOSE PIERRE A. Court of Appeals. John Hospital. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office. M. petitioners. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. 2005.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. MA.

June 22. and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated” Clearly. The second nominee in the list is herein petitioner. the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales (third nominee) as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Page | 81 . Nos. therefore. As a result.R. M. No. BUELA forfeit their office. COMELEC approves the withdrawal and substitution of the nomination. After the election. 2010 FACTS: CIBAC.. 8799.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. John Hospital. Hence. LOKIN. 7804 promulgated on January 12. and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R. the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office. JR. public officers who forfeit their office. any question relating to the election. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. T.A. as CIBAC was declared to be entitled to two seats. LUIS K. returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G. The said request was not granted in view of the pending motion for substitution of nominees. position or franchise.A. substitution and amendment of the list of nominees whereby it withdrew the nominations of Second. It is. The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office. as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) vs. a party-list submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes in May 2007 Election. Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC and assails Section 13 of Resolution No. Fourth and Fifth nominees. The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R. 2007. No. the president of CIBAC filed a certificate of nomination. it was requested to the Secretary General of the House of Representative to have the petitioner sworn in as the second nominee of the party list. However. Incorporated. 179431-32.

considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines. Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET. not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated. Thus. not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court. the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. ISSUE: Whether or not special civil action for quo warranto is the proper remedy of an alleged winning party-list nominee seeking to oust proclaimed nominee of the same party list. 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. or some other cause of disqualification for her. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office. As Rule 64 states. Any voter may initiate the action. M. final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14. which provides for the review of the judgments. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes. or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. which is. for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. strictly speaking. Undoubtedly. T. Page | 82 . Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. but not to install the petitioner in his place. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State. BUELA Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: No. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie.

Lonzanida was disqualify pursuant to Rodolfo’s petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Lonzanida’s MR. No.. BUELA EFREN RACEL ARA TEA vs. In a Page | 83 . COMELEC further ruled that it should be Antipolo and not Aratea that should be the mayor. Lonzanida filed an MR. Antipolo. HELD: In eligibility requirements and disqualification issues of election candidates. ISSUE: Whether or not the second placer should in election should be declared as mayor in the event that the winning candidate was disqualify. Pursuant to a DILG opinion that in light of Lonzanida’s pending MR. contender in 2010 mayoralty election who garnered the second highest votes.R. These three (3) remedies may be differentiated from each other into three ways. period of filing and effects. there are three remedies available. 2010 Election resulted to Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor. On 25 August 2010. 2012 FACTS: Lonzanida and Antipolo were candidates for 2010 Mayoralty candidates. Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. as to grounds. namely: (1) cancellation of a CoC. ANTlPOLO G. However. M. and had served. the governing provisions are Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC. thereby upholding his disqualification. COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. October 9.e. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor. COMELEC allowed the intervention and ruled that Lonzanida’s disqualification and ineligibility to hold public office is established both in fact and in law on election day itself. as mayor of San Antonio. In his Comment filed. The ground for the disqualification is to the fact that Lonzanida was elected. Pending the resolution of the MR. On 11 August 2010. the office of the mayor is considered vacant. Aratea opposed the Antipolo’s motion. 195229. She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor. As to the grounds In cancellation of a CoC. and (3) quo warranto. T. i. (2) disqualification from candidacy or from holding office. the ground is essentially lack of eligibility under the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office.

(1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. If the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC. to all intents and purposes. Under section 253. characteristics or acts of disqualification. On the other hand. substitution. if the petition is brought under Section 69 of the same law. and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office. the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections. In a quo warranto petition. BUELA disqualification case. as provided in COMELEC Resolution No. Similarly. and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results. they differ as to the time these grounds are cited. and have nothing to do with. the petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last day of filing the CoC. Material representation may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. the petition must be filed within twenty-five (25) days from the filing of the CoC. As to the period for filing: The period to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC depends on the provision of law invoked. However. the grounds are traits. as mentioned above. whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds . for obvious reasons.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. substitution can thus take place under the terms of Section Page | 84 . While quo warranto and cancellation share the same ineligibility grounds. the period to file a disqualification case is at any time before the proclamation of a winning candidate. M. a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy. Under section 78. conditions. a candidate who was simply disqualified is merely prohibited from continuing as a candidate or from assuming or continuing to assume the functions of the office. On the other hand. can no longer apply. T. This is provided under Section 253 of the OEC and governed by the Rules of Court as to procedures. A "candidate" whose CoC has been cancelled or denied due course cannot be substituted for lack of a CoC. the grounds to oust an elected official from his office are ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. The grounds for disqualification are different from. a successful quo warranto suit results in the ouster of an already elected official from office. individually applicable to a candidate. a candidate’s CoC. 8696. As to the effects of a successful suit: A candidate whose CoC was denied due course or cancelled is not considered a candidate at all.

As to the effects of a successful suit on the right of the second placer in the elections: In any of these three remedies. from before the elections. the candidate with the second highest number of votes (second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the winner in the elections should the winning candidate be disqualified by final judgment before the elections. i. however. Exec. CARLOS G. EMERSON S. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning. As an exceptional situation. In 2010. who therefore received the highest number of votes. DE CASTRO vs. as the cancellation signifies non-candidacy from the very start.R. the "second placer" should be proclaimed the winner as the candidate with the highest number of votes for the contested position. As in a quo warranto. Disqualification that is based on a breach of the threeterm limit rule cannot be invoked as this disqualification can only take place after election where the three-term official emerged as winner.e. a three-term candidate with a valid and subsisting CoC cannot be substituted if the basis of the substitution is his disqualification on account of his three-term limitation. his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. EMMANUEL A.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. any substitution is too late at this point. Ochoa issued OPPage | 85 . T. the law is silent on the legal effect of a judgment cancelling the CoC and does not also provide any temporal distinction. This same consequence should result if the cancellation case becomes final after elections. the SC ruled that Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. In a CoC cancellation proceeding. 194994. the doctrine of rejection of the second placer applies. Given. M.Anti polo. No. Although legally a misnomer. the formal initiatory role a CoC plays and the standing it gives to a political aspirant. Petitioner was appointed by PGMA as assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the MMDA. BUELA 77 of the OEC. 2013 FACTS: In 2009. In this case. April 16.32 However. Sec. NB: note that the petition filed against Lonzanida is not for the cancellation of his CoC but for disqualification for false misrepresenatation. the cancellation of the CoC based on a finding of its invalidity effectively results in a vote for an inexistent "candidate" or for one who is deemed not to be in the ballot. however. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections ..

Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll. in his own name. In a quo warranto proceeding. CESB Executive Director stated that the position of AGMO had not yet been classified and petitioner was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. HELD: No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. petitioner. In his comment. or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited. 2 stating that: “All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office and continue to perform their duties and discharge their responsibility until October 31. Respondent maintains that the function of an AGM is executive and managerial in nature. exercises management Page | 86 . petitioner sent a letter to MMD Administration Service. Absent a showing of that right. must be a Career Executive Service official (CESO)." Where the action is filed by a private person. respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. In this case. Petitioner filed instant Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto seeking to oust respondent from the position of AGMO. BUELA Memorandum Circular No. whichever comes first. For his failure to obtain an action or a response from MMDA. otherwise. he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position. An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character. 1 and 2. AGMO position was held to be within the coverage of the CES. the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial. if the claim is not well-founded. he elevated his demand to the Office of the President.” Pursuant to the said Circular petitioner was terminated. T. 2010 or until their resignations have been accepted and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated. in order to have security of tenure. ISSUE: Whether or not petition for quo warranto may be availed of to question an alleged illegal termination wherein the petitioner’s right over the position sought to be reinstated is disputed. thus. Hence. unless they are reappointed in the meantime. When Petitioner sought a clarification from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper classification of the position of AGMO. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment. M. Meanwhile a new AGMO for MMDA was appointed. respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES. thereof.

OSCAR SERRANO et al. Upon motion by petitioner. Page | 87 . Court of Appeals. 7833. directing petitioner to deposit the amount of P1. As petitioner failed to show that it had done so. M. he did not hold the position of AGMO in a permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Thus. Otherwise stated. Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Expropriation (Rule 67) CITY OF MANILA vs. and assumes functions like planning. the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the government. BUELA over people. the trial court issued an order. the law permits. For the foregoing reasons. organizing. authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First District in Tondo. coordinating. v. After petitioner had made the deposit.241. the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES. June 20. directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. the Court of Appeals gave judgment for respondents and enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1-C. resource. ISSUE: Whether or not compliance an LGU in an expropriation proceeding to the legal requirement that the government must try other modes of acquisition before resorting to expropriation is condition sine qua non before the court may issue a writ of possession. 142304. The position requires the application of managerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance. But in all such cases. and supervision. on many occasions. controlling. leadership. his appointment was temporary and "co-terminus with the appointing authority.R. and overseeing the activities of MMDA. T. directing. the appointment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. While. G.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties.825." F. the trial court issued another order. 2001 FACTS: City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§9-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals held that in accordance with the ruling in Filstream International Inc. and/or policy.

a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. In this case. Private respondent Pobre is the owner of a 68. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant. T. these requirements were satisfied and. M. the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. August 12. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in R. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties.A. 2004 FACTS: NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain. however. No.A. therefore. This is error. In this case. Albay. unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. 7279 and reiterated in the Filstream ruling. the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Thus. Pobre began developing the Property as a resortPage | 88 . It is. ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements laid down in §§9-10 of R. The ruling in Filstream was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in that case. The Court of Appeals. the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial.R. Such deposit shall be in money. No. 106804. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE G. premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted to expropriation without first trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated in §10 of the law. No. it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of possession. Thus. the judgment in that case had already become final. In 1963. therefore.969 square-meter land located in Tiwi. BUELA HELD: The answer is in the negative. Upon compliance with these requirements. 7279.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

BUELA subdivision. M. NPC as plaintiff had the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint. Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court.60 square-meter portion of the Property and second for the 5.448.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 1979 and damages. plus legal rate of interest per annum from September 6. Unless otherwise stated in the notice. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. provided that: SECTION 1.450. Subsequently. The trial court granted NPC’s motion to dismiss but the trial court allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages..969) square meters. i. Section 1. NPC relies on Section 1. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. T. The courts could only accept and record the dismissal.00 PESOS which is the fair market value of the subdivision of defendant with an area of sixty eight thousand nine hundred sixty nine (68. On 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan.311. Thereafter. the dismissal is without prejudice. ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on dismissal of action as a matter of right is applicable to a special civil action of expropriation. Dismissal by the plaintiff. NPC filed two expropriation case over a portion of the said property. For as long as all of the elements of Section 1. A plain reading of Section 1. Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes it obvious that this rule was not intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same Rules. HELD: No.554 square-meter lot (1 September 1979). the Rules then in effect. first for the 8. Rule 17 were present the dismissal of the complaint rested exclusively on the plaintiff’s will. NPC insists that at the time that it moved for the dismissal of its complaint. except Page | 89 . The defending party and even the courts were powerless to prevent the dismissal. On 2 January 1985. trial court issued a judgment ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant P3. NPC argues that the dismissal of the complaint should have carried with it the dismissal of the entire case including Pobre’s counterclaim. Thus. Section 1. NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site. Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided the exception to the general rule that the dismissal of the complaint is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.e. Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Pobre had yet to serve an answer or a motion for summary judgment on NPC.

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right. The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain conditions. upon the dismissal of the expropriation case. the motion to dismiss took the place of the answer.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. NPC filed its notice of dismissal of the complaint on 2 January 1985. M. While Section 1. T. BUELA that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in the same action. Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case. In short. Page | 90 . In lieu of an answer. Thus. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court. Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil actions. such as the reservation of the defendant’s right to recover damages either in the same or in another action. The plaintiff’s right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions. The trial court in this case reserved Pobre’s right to prove his claim in the same case.” the Rules then did not require the filing of an answer or summary judgment in eminent domain cases. The records show that Pobre had already filed and served on NPC his “motion to dismiss/answer” even before NPC filed its own motion to dismiss. NPC’s theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobre’s claim for damages is baseless. In expropriation cases. for all damages occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that provided for the dismissal of the defendant’s claim for damages. there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The exceptional right that Section 1. Rule 17 spoke of the “service of answer or summary judgment. a reservation that has become final due to NPC’s own fault. Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant to file a single motion to dismiss where he should present all of his objections and defenses to the taking of his property for the purpose specified in the complaint. in expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic liable for just compensation if in enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way on a property. which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. Eventually. the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. 160656.R. as correctly observed by the Board and affirmed by the courts a quo. 1998. in our view. the trial court issued an Order of Expropriation upon payment of just compensation. but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property. As a result. failed to reach an agreement. it recommended the payment of consequential damages amounting to P2. One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law. For this reason.937 square meters. the nature and the effect of the floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. 1996. the Board reported that the project would affect a total of 10. there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining area of Andaya’s property.380 square meters of Andaya’s properties. however. Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project.820. Using this standard. occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use. M. The Board also reported that the easement would diminish the value of the remaining 5. It would prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River. The trial court issued a writ of possession on April 26. “Taking. no burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession of the property. True. 4. June 15. On December 10. and in expropriation Page | 91 . (Indirect expropriation) HELD: The answer is in the affirmative.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.443 square meters of which will be for the 60-meter easement. On December 13.430 for the remaining area. The easement was for concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1. It also constituted a Board of Commissioners (Board) to determine the just compensation.” in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. But. The parties. BUELA REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DPWH) vs. No. T. 2007 FACTS: Republic of the Philippines (Republic) negotiated with Andaya to enforce the 60meter easement of right-of-way. 1995. the Republic instituted an action to enforce the easement of right-of-way or eminent domain. Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation. ISMAEL ANDAYA G.

G. BUELA cases. 2008 Page | 92 . 169914. ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION vs. M. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS et al. T. No. April 18. an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use.R.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

M. BUELA Page | 93 . T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

T. rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer case against petitioners. During the pendency of the case. through purchase or expropriation proceedings. They filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7. the MeTC ruling was reinstated. are not suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership. 2008. vs. and since the judgment had already been rendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City. November 24. . the City of Parañaque filed expropriation proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including petitioners. MeTC. The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings. M. CA. final judgment and writ of possession" due to nonpayment of just compensation. Respondent filed a petition for review before the CA. any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended. 189239. for such time as may be required by the Page | 94 . A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the City. 53810 enlightens. ISSUE: Whether or not an unlawful detainer case involving a property. which is later on subjected to expropriation proceedings. the MeTC has no jurisdiction to "disregard the . lands belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania). Gingoyon. When the Government seeks to acquire. 2003 against above-named petitioners before MeTC. Hence. No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. On March 3. On appeal. . ejectment proceedings. due to its summary nature. the Regional Trial Court reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents’ complaint.R. however: Section 1. HELD: As a general rule. Parañaque City. is deemed suspended upon the institution of expropriation proceedings. FIL-HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION G. BUELA SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD et al. citing Republic v. held that the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings does not signify the completion of the expropriation proceedings. 2010 FACTS: Respondents are co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat.

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA
expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the
lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the
landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court
where the action for ejectment has been instituted. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the
benefits of the suspension. They nevertheless posit that since the lots are the subject
of expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer assert a better right of
possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation
proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to
continue staying there.
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not complete until
payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession
in this case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the
transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the
final just compensation.
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation
proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance
was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial
deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the City’s possession of the
lots, contrary to Section of the LGC.
Respecting petitioners’ claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots,
the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not
state so. Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of the
ordinance.

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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. YCLA SUGAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 193936, December 11, 2013
FACTS:
YCLA is the registered owner of three parcels of land situated in Puerto Galera. In
order to complete its 69 KV Calapan–Mamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto
Galera, Oriental Mindoro, NPC had to construct transmission lines that would
traverse several private properties, including the said parcels of land owned by
YCLA. Accordingly, on December 2, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for
expropriation with the RTC against YCLA and several other individuals.
On May 2, 2001, the Board of Commissioners submitted its Report, which fixed the
amount of just compensation of the subject properties at P500.00 per sqm. YCLA
objected to the amount recommended by the Board of Commissioners. On
September 15, 2003, after conducting an ocular inspection requested by YCLA, the
Board of Commissioners submitted its second Report, which fixed the just
compensation of the subject properties at P1,000.00 per sqm.
RTC rendered a Decision and adopted the report and recommendation of the Board
of Commissioners. NPC appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, alleging that the
amount of P1,000.00 per sqm recommended by the Board of Commissioners as the
reasonable amount of just compensation, which was adopted by the RTC, is too
excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and undeveloped
agricultural lands at the time it instituted the action for expropriation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Board of Commissioners tasked to determine the just
compensation may revised its previous determination according to the fair market
value of the subject property determine through an ocular inspection conducted five
years after the taking.
HELD:
No. It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the
time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into
the property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of
the filing of the complaint.
In this case, in arriving at the amount of just compensation, both the RTC and the
CA relied heavily on the Board of Commissioners’ Report dated September 15,
2003, which, in turn, was arrived at after conducting an ocular inspection of the
subject properties on August 27, 2003. However, the Board of Commissioners’
recommendation as to the amount of just compensation was based on the prevailing
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market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped the attention of the
lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003
cannot be used to determine the amount of just compensation considering that the
Complaint for expropriation was filed by NPC on December 2, 1997.

G. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage (Rule 68)
JOSE T. RAMIREZ vs. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 198800, December 11, 2013
FACTS:
Jose T. Ramirez mortgaged two parcels of land in favor of respondent The Manila
Banking Corporation to secure his P265,000 loan. The real estate mortgage provides
that all correspondence relative to the mortgage including notifications of
extrajudicial actions shall be sent to petitioner Ramirez at his given address.
Respondent filed a request for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage9
before Atty. Hipolito Sañez on the ground that Ramirez failed to pay his loan despite
demands. During the auction sale on September 8, 1994, respondent was the only
bidder for the mortgaged properties.10 Thereafter, a certificate of sale11 was issued
in its favor as the highest bidder.
Ramirez sued respondent for annulment of sale and prayed that the certificate of
sale be annulled on the ground, among others, that paragraph N of the real estate
mortgage was violated for he was not notified of the foreclosure and auction sale.
The trial court ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were null and
void and the certificate of sale is invalid. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision
ISSUE: Whether or not the breach in the stipulation requiring personal notice to
the mortgagor annuls a concluded extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
HELD:
Yes. A contract is the law between the parties and … absent any showing that its
provisions are wholly or in part contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the courts. When respondent
failed to send the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale to Ramirez, it committed
a contractual breach of said paragraph N sufficient to render the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale on September 8, 1994 null and void.
Section 3, Act No. 3135 reads: The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of
sale in three public places, and (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of
general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary.
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Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting
additional requirements.
In Carlos Lim, et al. v. Development Bank of the Philippines, we held that unless
the parties stipulate, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings is not necessary because Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the
posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice
in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case, the parties stipulated in paragraph
N of the real estate mortgage that all correspondence relative to the mortgage
including notifications of extrajudicial actions shall be sent to mortgagor Ramirez
at his given address. Respondent had no choice but to comply with this contractual
provision it has entered into with Ramirez. The contract is the law between them.
Hence, we cannot agree with the bank that paragraph N of the real estate mortgage
does not impose an additional obligation upon it to provide personal notice of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor Ramirez.

SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ vs.
SPOUSES CARLITO ALINDOG AND CARMEN ALINDOG
G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Marquez extended a loan to Benjamin Gutierrez secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land located in Tagaytay. The mortgage was duly
annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. T-13443, which Sps. Marquez had
verified as clean prior to the mortgage.
Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation, Anita sought the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject property. At the public auction sale, Anita
emerged as the highest bidder. Upon Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same
property within the prescribed period, title was consolidated under the name of Sps.
Marquez, which, however, bore an annotation of adverse claim dated March 2, 2000
in the names of respondents-spouses Alindog. Said annotation was copied from an
earlier annotation on TCT No. T-13443 made only after the subject property’s
mortgage to Sps. Marquez.
Subsequently, Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for annulment of real estate mortgage
and certificate of sale against Sps. Marquez. Meanwhile, Anita filed an ex-parte
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC. RTC granted the
same. Claiming that they would suffer irreparable injury, Sps. Alindog sought the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC issued a writ

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of preliminary injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the
subject property until after the controversy has been fully resolved on the merits.
Aggrieved, Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration, essentially pointing out that,
as the confirmed and registered owners of the subject property, they are entitled to
its possession as a matter of right. They argued that pursuant to Sections 728 and
829 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the RTC was legally bound to
place them in possession of the subject property pending resolution of the
annulment case. Further, it is their position that the purpose for the issuance of the
injunctive writ – i.e., to restrain the implementation of the writ of possession – had
already been rendered moot and academic by its actual enforcement in the interim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the possession of the winning bidder in a foreclosure sale after the lapse of
the redemption period.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. It is an established rule that the purchaser in an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the property and
can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during (with
bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor.
A writ of possession duly applied for by said purchaser should issue as a matter
of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of the
court.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged
property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a
third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right.
The phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor’ contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property
by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The coowner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right,
and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of
another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not
only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to the
judgment obligor." The third person must therefore claim a right superior to that of
the original mortgagor.
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps.
Marquez, who had already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially
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foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature. The general rule as herein stated
– and not the exception found under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules – should apply
since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over the subject property on their purported
purchase of the same from its previous owner, i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez
being the original mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps.
Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez) successors-in-interest who do not have
a right superior to them.

RUSTICO A. ARDIENTE and ASUNCION PALOMARDIENTE vs.
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON and
PENINSULA DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 148448, August 17, 2004
FACTS:
Spouses Ardiente obtained a loan from the Peninsula Development Bank secured
by Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land. Out of the proceeds of the loan, the
Ardientes purchased a mini bus. As Ardientes failed to pay the loan, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the parcels of land covered thereby were sold
at public auction to the bank which was the highest bidder.
Two days before the period to redeem the foreclosed mortgage expired, Spouses
Ardiente filed before the RTC a complaint for Annulment of Auction Sale with
Preliminary Injunction and Damages Alleging that the requisite of notifying the
mortgagors of the intended extra-judicial foreclosure sale was not duly complied
with. The bank, on the other hand, filed its Answer with Counterclaim and alleged
that petitioners were duly notified of the extra-judicial foreclosure and public
auction sale. There was sufficient notice and publication served to all concerned of
said public auction sale of the properties offered as collaterals
By Decision, the trial court, noting the absence of documentary evidence showing
strict compliance with the statutory requirements on publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, declared the extra-judicial foreclosure and the sale
of the mortgaged properties null and void. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court after finding the argument of the defendant-appellants
bank et al. that the lack of required notice and publication of the extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage was not averred in the complaint, hence, cannot be the basis
of an adverse judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of mortgagee to comply with the publication
requirements may be raised on appeal.
HELD:

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if the wrong or omission of the defendant is not alleged in the complaint. January 20. LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. purpose or function of the complaint is to inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. the defendant-appellant Bank saw no need to present the Sheriff’s Certification of Posting and the newspaper where the notice was published as well as the publisher’s affidavit. petitioners having merely assailed the lack of "personal" notification to them of any "intended" extrajudicial foreclosure and the "grossly and greatly inadequate" purchase price of the lands. Clearly. Page | 101 .R. BUELA No. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G. Nor even in their memorandum filed before the trial court.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. No. Indeed. the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure of the mortgage was raised only on appeal. Understandably then. Otherwise stated. The office. readily reveals the absence of any averment relating to the required posting and publication of the notice of foreclosure sale. In this case. M. It was not also raised during the trial as the entire transcripts of the stenographic notes of the proceedings before the trial court show. T. as correctly held by the respondent Court. Due to LZK Holdings' failure to pay its loan. the presumption that the Provincial Sheriff of Quezon has discharged his official duty in a regular manner and that the defendant-appellant Bank complied with the requirements under the law will suffice. 2014 FACTS: LZK Holdings obtained a loan from Planters Bank secured the same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot located in La Union. the mortgaged property was extrajudicially foreclosed with Planters Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale and its certificate of sale was registered. even perfunctory reading of the Petition and the Amended Petition. the plea of bank’s lack of publication of notice of foreclosure was not raised by petitioners either in the Amended Complaint or in the Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. Petitioner does not represent that he directly attacked in his complaint the validity of the foreclosure because of such lack of notice. 187973. Despite the bank’s repeated claim that the statutory requirements governing extrajudicial foreclosure had been complied with. then the defendant would be precluded from presenting evidence to refute the imputation of such wrong or present justification for the alleged omission.

167998 is binding and conclusive on the parties. petitioner is bereft of valid title and of the right to prevent the issuance of a writ of possession to Planters Bank. M. promissory note and damages with prayer for issuance of TRO/Writ of Preliminary injunction before RTC-Makati.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. LZK Holdings opposed the motion. In the annulment case." Page | 102 . the right of Planter's Bank to a writ of possession as adjudged in G. 2000. RTC-Makati declared as null and void the consolidated title of Planters Bank in an Order dated June 2. Until then. On the other hand. Planters Bank filed before the RTC-San Fernando a motion to set ex-parte hearing for the issuance of a writ of possession. Such ruling was affirmed by the CA sustained by the SC in a Resolution dated September 13. RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction On April 3. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. 2008. the judgment of the court. Planters Bank also appealed the Order of the RTC-San Fernando which held in abeyance the resolution of its ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Consequently. 2004. as long as it remains unreversed. RTC-San Fernando denied the opposition and set the hearing on April 14. Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC-San Fernando. mortgage contract. 2000. to wit: “Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction. or when an opportunity for such trial has been given. CA granted the appeal and SC affirmed such decision. On April 8.R. the ex-parte proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession was suspended by the RTC-San Fernando in view of the injunction issued by the RTC-Makati. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. the RTC-San Fernando declaring the scheduled hearing moot and academic and granting Planter Bank's ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession ISSUE: Whether or not hearing in a petition for issuance of writ of possession may be dispensed with when the SC had already decreed the propriety of the issuance of such writ. BUELA LZK Holdings filed a complaint for annulment of extra judicial foreclosure.” Armed with the above ruling. 2008. T. it is the trial court's ministerial function to grant the possessory writ to Planters Bank. No.

195540.R. or the prevention or redress of a wrong. EQUITABLE PCI BANK G. In a letter dated March 8. No. No. petitioner’s counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed properties Page | 103 . 2001. BUELA All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court. by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right. 2000. During the public auction. the Certificate of Sale was registered. (Citations omitted) Given the ex-parte nature of the proceedings for a writ of possession.000. The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. the parties in G. No. T.000. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.R. 2001. On February 16. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Banks's right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case. M. NB: Was the initial decision of the trial court.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.R. By its very nature. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. 2013 FACTS: Petitioner executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank over its real properties to secure a P2. As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation. a Certificate of Sale was issued.00 loan. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. respondent extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13. March 13. respondent emerged as the highest bidder and accordingly. declaring the consolidated title of Planter’s Bank null and void abrogated by the subsequent decision of the SC upholding the issuance of the writ of possession? GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION vs. which was affirmed by CA and SC. The final judgment in G. Lastly. the R TC did not err in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in granting Planters Bank's motion without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it to participate. an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a nonlitigious proceeding.

No. On December 7. but not after. whichever is earlier.A. No. On January 8. Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s decision. shall have the right to redeem the property until. 8791 to the real estate mortgage executed in 1985 would result in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution. Furthermore. petitioner was told that such redemption is no longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered. M. The right of redemption being statutory. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) which took effect on June 13. notwithstanding Act 3135. 2001. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure. 2007.A. 8791 was already in effect. providing for a shorter redemption period in foreclosure sale where the debtor is a juridical entity. juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure. BUELA However. and within the prescribed time limit. Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights until their expiration. petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale. it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section Page | 104 .A. whichever is earlier. asserting that it is the one-year period of redemption under Act No. it has to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. No. to make it effective. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 47 of R. 3135.A. 8791 (General Banking Law). as with other individual rights to contract and to property. A. 2000.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure. the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim. T. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption period provided in R. be validly applied in this case when the real estate mortgage contract was executed in 1985 and the mortgage foreclosed when R. Petitioner argued that applying Section 47 of R. 8791 otherwise known as "The General Banking Law of 2000”. No. Under section 47 of R.

January 15. 168970. 3135. ISSUE: Whether or not an extra-judicial settlement of estate involving a foreclosed property where title is already issued in favor of the mortgagor can be a basis for assertion of co-ownership. the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement. petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the property. petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.R. 1984. because it contains a provision whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same from the Bank. This agreement. No. is the law between the parties and. M. in and by itself. DE CALUNOD G. 1995. T. H. but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. 1989. Meanwhile. herein petitioner and respondents (heis of Rufo) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property. Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is. binds the respondents. As a result. As a result. a contract between him and respondents. HELD: Page | 105 . On June 27. herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 10. Rufo obtained a loan from Rural Bank of Maigo secured with a mortgaged on herein disputed land. contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. A new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6. petitioner contends. 2010 FACTS: During his lifetime. by reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank. as such. BUELA 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. comprising 1/3 thereof. Partition (Rule 69) CELESTINO BALUS vs. Rufo failed to pay his loan. respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner.

the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. Leona. 161746. namely Delia. Rosauro. In other words. 2010 FACTS: When Antonio Feliciano passed away on May 20. as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father. petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. On even date. Maria. Recovery of Real Property and Damages. for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title. Leona. M. On October 18. 1930. No. vs. 1993.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. BUELA The answer is in the negative. an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case. Felisa Feliciano. Felisa Feliciano (Salina’s portion) and Pedro Canoza (Leona and Maria’s portions). all surnamed Feliciano. G. all surnamed Feliciano. Pedro and Salina.R. the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Pedro Canoza and the heirs of the late Jacinto Feliciano. vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. Pedro and Salina executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of the late Jacinto Feliciano (Pedro’s portion). Nardo and Ponciano. They alleged that Page | 106 . Stated differently. a parcel of land. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. declared themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Antonio Feliciano and executed an extrajudicial settlement of Antonio Feliciano’s estate and appropriated among themselves the said parcel of land. EUGENIO FELICIANO et al. In the first place. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner. surviving heirs of the late Esteban Feliciano and Doroteo Feliciano. PEDRO CANOZA et al. The deceased father lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime. Petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. he left behind his only property. Maria. there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to partition. deceased children of Antonio Feliciano. Elsa. T. it only follows that at the time of his death. filed a complaint against Salina Feliciano. September 1. to the exclusion of the heirs of Esteban Feliciano and Doroteo Feliciano.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. the records show that petitioners’ complaint was filed only on October 18. BUELA the settlement of the estate and sale were done without their participation and consent as heirs of Esteban and Doroteo. they clearly failed to institute the present civil action within the allowable period. October 20. It reasoned that when petitioners filed the instant complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of Antonio Feliciano’s estate. CARMELA BROBIO MANGAHAS vs. EUFROCINA A. fourteen (14) years had elapsed from the issuance of the free patent in Canoza’s favor. The heirs of the deceased executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Trial court’s decision was reversed on appeal. according to the CA. the action for the annulment of the documents had prescribed. Hence. and four legitimate and three illegitimate children. or almost sixteen (16) years after Jacinto Feliciano was issued Free Patent No. Petitioner Carmela Brobio Mangahas is one of the illegitimate children. T. As regards the portion claimed by the late Jacinto Feliciano. (IV-4) 012293 onNovember 28. 1998. 183852. and almost fourteen (14) years from the time Pedro Canoza was issued OCT No. BROBIO G.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.R. 1993. 1979. The CA committed no error in dismissing their complaint. The CA ruled that prescription had set in. No. On August 3. The same result obtains even if their complaint is treated as one (1) essentially for reconveyance as more than ten (10) years have passed since petitioners’ cause of action accrued. Evidently. more than four (4) years had elapsed from the issuance of the free patents. 2010 FACTS: Pacifico died intestate and was survived by his wife. As petitioners are deemed to have obtained constructive notice of the fraud upon the registration of the Free Patent. P-364 on November 28. Brobio. the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs. while in the case of Canoza. However. respondent Eufrocina A. De Guzman. the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud as held in the case of Gerona v. sixteen (16) years had elapsed from the time the free patent was issued to him before petitioners filed the complaint. 1977. ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of an extra-judicial partition of an estate wherein some of the compulsory heirs where excluded may be assailed after more than four years had lapsed from the issuance of new titles of the subsequent transferees thereof. Respondent agreed to pay Page | 107 . M.

Forcible entry and Unlawful Detainer (Rule 70) CARMENCITA SUAREZ vs. EMBOY–DELANTAR G. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. the properties are no longer under a state of coownership. considering that petitioner signed the Deed way back in 2002 and she had already received the consideration of P150. T. petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against respondent. In 2004. 1907–A–2. a landlocked portion (of the same inherited property) sans a right of way. FELIX E. Respondent failed to pay but subsequently issued a Promissory Note in favor of the petitioner. BUELA the petitioner for the latter’s share in the estate. as expressed in the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Thus. to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. An action for partition implies that the property is still owned in common. 187944.R.000. No. respondent failed and refused to pay despite demand. then she should have filed an action for partition. Upon demand. 1907–A–5. When the promissory note fell due. there is nothing more to be partitioned. as ownership had already been merged in one person. JR. CA reversed the trial court decision and held that the waiver of petitioner’s share in the three properties.00 for signing the same. 2014 FACTS: Spouses Padilla owned Lot No. MR. EMBOY. 1907–A which he partitioned among their heirs among which are Claudia and Vicente who are the predecessors of herein Respondent and Petitioner respectively. They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. HELD: The remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one under the circumstances. AND MARILOU P. M. respondents received from Petitioner Carmencita a demand letter requiring them to vacate the subject lot and informing them that Carmencita had already purchased the subject lot from the Page | 108 . March 12. ISSUE: Whether or not an action for partition is the proper remedy to contest the terms of the extra-judicial settlement. Thereafter. may not be considered as the consideration of the promissory note. Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and waived their shares in favor of respondent. I.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. AND MRS. The CA went on to hold that if petitioner disagreed with the amount she received. respondents (heirs of Claudia) were asked by the Heirs of Vicente (predecessor of petitioner).

1907–A. M. 3) thereafter. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered Page | 109 . ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a complaint for unlawful detainer which merely alleges prior legal possession by tolerance without specific averment as to when and how possession by tolerance of the defendants began is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction. T. 2) eventually. the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof. the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. (2) the pendency of another action (partition) anchored on the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real property. the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established: 1) initially. She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Heirs of Vicente. RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling. CA rendered a decision reversing the disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.40 In the case at bar. HELD: (1) No. In a complaint for unlawful detainer. possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff. The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims and ordered the respondents to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built thereon. Respondents ignore the demand and filed a complaint for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No. Respondent opposed the said action on the following grounds: (1) complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate – lack of specific averment as to when and how possession by tolerance of the respondents began. Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer. and 4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession. the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. (2) Whether or not an action for unlawful detainer may be suspended by an action for partition filed by the defendant putting in issue the ownership of the property subject of the ejectment proceedings. BUELA Heirs of Vicente.

with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. One such exception is Vda. as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Avendaño. M. “The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession. as distinguished from one of forcible entry. (2) The answer is in the affirmative. Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion. is brought to restrain. wherein the Court declared: “x x x. and how and when such tolerance came about. and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after Carmencita. T. that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding. therefore. the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. as these proceedings are summary in nature. As a general rule.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding. should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it. In short. Instead. the effects of any order or Page | 110 .” Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. therefore. sans factual substantiation. as purchaser and new registered owner. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer. they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof. on not a few occasions. or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. and. whether involving ownership or not. that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners. for the Court in which the issue of legal possession. this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land. without resort to parol testimony. it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy. de Legaspi v. Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot. It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that for decades. is one of illegal detainer. Again. it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession. BUELA the subject lot and constructed a house upon it. a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. Where the action. had demanded for the former to vacate the property.

de Legaspi. the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. The face-off escalated into a heated argument was recorded on video. Page | 111 . thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force. disturbance. Necessarily. M.” Like Vda. ATTY. the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary. While the appeal is pending. Alconera went to RTC Br. a matter that is likely to create the “confusion. 2014 FACTS: Rafols was a defendant in an unlawful detainer case of which Alconera is his counsel. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land. P-12-3069. unjust and probably irreparable. the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. ALCONERA vs. T. BUELA decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. On March 17.) Needlessly. PALLANAN A. RTC issued a writ of possession upon the motion of the complainant in the ejectment suit. 36 with his daughter to confront respondent sheriff.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. herein Respondent Sheriff enforced the writ of execution against Rafols. 2011. not of the house. No. VIRGILIO P. but the result of enforcement is permanent. Alconera and the Sheriff had a verbal disagreement over the phone as the former is asserting that the writ should not be enforced pending the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. January 20. Rafols through Alconera appealed with RTC. During the enforcement of the writ. MTCC ruled against Rafols. inconveniences and expenses” mentioned in the said exceptional case. On April 6. 2011. And most certainly. Alconera filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the writ of possession issued. strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.M. ALFREDO T. the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house.

Rule 70.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. In ejectment cases. The defendant in such a case may have such judgment stayed only by (a) perfecting an appeal. the bond filed did not meet the legal requirements because first and foremost. or the occurrence of supervening events which brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and which would make the execution inequitable. Conversely. M. it was also not issued in favour of the plaintiff in the ejectment case. and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. complainant lost his client’s case and appealed to the RTC. T. ISSUE: Whether or not a motion seeking the reconsideration of the court in issuing a writ of possession in an unlawful detainer suit would stop the enforcement of the writ. His client has also been periodically depositing rental with the court for the use of the property pending appeal. Respondent filed his comment where he averred that the duty of a court sheriff in enforcing a writ of execution is ministerial. Furthermore. the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. the bond posted was a property bond. The only exceptions to non-compliance are the existence of fraud. Necessarily then. Hence. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment. accident. However. Page | 112 . In the case at bar. the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. not cash nor surety. HELD: The answer is in the negative. the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be stayed via compliance with Section 19. Under said Sec. the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. and without a TRO enjoining it. as ruled by the RTC. a sheriff is duty bound to implement it. Because of the non-compliance with the requirements under the above-quoted rule. 19. But whether or not these obtain in the case at bar is an issue best left to the court that issued the writ of execution. a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is made immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. (b) filing a supersedeas bond. Rafols did not own the property he posted as bond and besides. mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from posting the supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit. BUELA Alconera filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the respondent sheriff for grave misconduct before this Court on April 6. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. the execution of the judgment was not effectively stayed. 2011. if the defendant-appellant has perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond. the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

erected a fence on the surrounding portion. Maria. Teodoro Teodoro effected the demolition of the ancestral house. In the will. effectively dispossessing Teodoro Teodoro of the property bequeathed to him by Petra. respondents asserted their own ownership and possession of the subject property. living at the ancestral house. the RTC ruled in favor of Theodoro. only Petra occupied the subject lot. declared that there is no sufficient evidence of Teodoro Teodoro’s prior actual physical possession over the subject property. Soon thereafter. her purported will. Petra. BUELA TEODORO S. Page | 113 . intending to use the subject property for other purposes. Mariano. and Ana. the MTC ruled that respondents cannot be disturbed in their possession of the subject property "until and unless the question of ownership over the same is finally resolved before the appropriate court. February 5. was probated which Decision has become final and executory. Given both parties respective claims of ownership over the subject property via succession from their ascendants. Genaro had five children: Santiago. HELD: The answer is in the negative. a holographic will. who are all compulsory heirs of Genaro in whose name the subject property is still registered. Petra. T. 189248. refusing to touch and rule on the issue of ownership. barricaded its frontage. ISSUE: Whether or not exclusive ownership of a property subject of an action for forcible entry should be proven before rightful possessor may be ajudged. Thus. M. The appellate court. who resided at portions of Lot No. After Petra’s death. No. 2014 FACTS: The subject of the instant controversy is a lot included in a property registered in the name of Genaro Theodoro. In contrast. Of all Genaro’s children. from whom respondents descended and trace their claim of ownership and right of possession. and put up a sign thereat. G.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. After Teodoro Teodoro’s demand for respondents to vacate the subject property went unheeded. he filed the complaint for forcible entry against respondents. DANILO ESPINO et al. TEODORO vs.R. 2476 that surround the subject property on which the ancestral house previously stood. asserting ownership. Exclusive ownership is not among those needed to be proved to be entitled to possession in an action for forcible entry. the appellate court dismissed Teodoro Teodoro’s complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner Teodoro Teodoro’s father. respondents. devised the subject property to Teodoro Teodoro. In their Answer.

Although the property remains unpartitioned. (2) Plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant. Page | 114 . Petra inherited the property from her father Genaro. (4) Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership. in whose name the subject property is still registered. respectively. the finding of both the MTC at first instance and by the RTC on appeal. 2476 including the portion now litigated is. As the RTC concluded. Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can. In turn. Co-ownership. threat. But exclusive ownership of Lot No. Teodoro has not proven exclusive ownership. the MTC was right. T. preclude the court from taking cognizance of the case. strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of real property. or both Teodoro Teodoro and respondents are entitled to exercise the right of possession as co-owners. intimidation. 2476 or a portion thereof is not in this case required of Teodoro Teodoro for him to be entitled to possession. not only by virtue of Petra's bequeathal in his favor but also because of his own right of possession that comes from his co-ownership of the property. at the outset. which is that which was possessed by Petra. In this case. both parties assert prior and exclusive physical possession in the concept of owner acquired through succession from the same decedent. their aunt and grand aunt. This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Petra. All. the respondents in fact possess specific areas. M. as found by the trial courts. BUELA The ground rules in forcible entry cases: (1) One employs force. as heirs substituting Teodoro Teodoro in this suit. should be restored in the lawful possession of the disputed area. co-owned property. Teodoro Teodoro cannot be dispossessed of such area. (3) The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property. Teodoro Teodoro can likewise point to a specific area. owing to the fact that it has remained registered in the name of Genaro who is the common ancestor of both parties herein. is sufficient. Neither party can exclude the other from possession. petitioners. the whole of Lot No. and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.

Consequently. disregard of the law. ARANDEZ vs.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. JUDGE ROMEO A. The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant. plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for immediate execution. It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right and mandatory. knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order. M. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. Immediate execution of judgment. dereliction of duty. damages. MTJ-05-1580. Rabaca. Indeed. could not exculpate him from liability. Granting the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendant’s failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from. RABACA A. then the Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC). Rule 70. Section 19. ISSUE: Whether or not a motion for issuance of writ of execution in an ejectment suit may no longer be issued when notice of appeal had already been filed. T. with ignorance of the law. In the said suit. Romeo A. execution shall issue immediately upon motion. viz: Section 19. Respondent Judge is expected to know this and his justification of erroneous application of the law. respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff.M. BUELA LOURDES B. during the pendency of the appeal. HELD: No. approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents. 2010 FACTS: This administrative case charges Hon. unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond. No. although mitigating. praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment. and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Officials. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in a number of cases involving the same issue posed before the respondent judge. and unless. how to stay same. he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under Page | 115 . of the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty. Respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate execution on the ground that notice of appeal had been timely filed hence jurisdiction over the case is now elevated to the Regional Trial Court. October 6. respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having appealed.

Treyes.R. CGR CORPORATION vs. it holding that a complaint for damages may only be maintained "after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been made. petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against respondent. In the absence of a contract. set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners’ fishponds. On November 18. and respondent. April 27. Treyes. with the other papers. and harvested several tons of milkfish. to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds. In a separate move. during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry. The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use and Page | 116 . Sr.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners. T. Bacolod RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of prematurity. as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court." ISSUE: Whether. M. BUELA the contract. G. if any. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. On November 22. ERNESTO L. 2000. petitioners can independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the premises. 2000. petitioners promptly filed complaints for Forcible Entry against Ernesto M. 2024.3033 hectares of public land even before the notarized separate Fishpond Lease Agreement in their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of twentyfive (25) years or until December 31. 2007 FACTS: Petitioners claimed to have occupied 37. TREYES. res judicata and forum shopping. 170916. No. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages on three grounds – litis pendentia. JR. he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. Ernesto L. Jr.

rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. their claim for damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them. or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property. regardless of which is successful. It had to do with respondent’s alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds. ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation. Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damagesother than the use and occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees. Settled is the rule that in ejectment cases.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Surely. or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former. Page | 117 . with respect to the parties. Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.is not present. M. BUELA occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and attorney’s fees and costs. Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action. is such that any judgment rendered on one action will. it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages.that the identity between the pending actions. T. amount to res judicata in the action under consideration . the elements of litis pendentia not being present. the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. As reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the complaint for damages of herein petitioners. and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. one of the elements of litis pendentia . damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor. Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages. hence. after the act of dispossession had occurred. Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession.

The exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie.. respondents filed their comment. On May 2. the SEC declared the stockholders meeting of Interport Resources Corporation held on July 9. Notwithstanding the SEC's TRO. On October 7. RECTO et al. YASAY. on June 11. upon request of certain stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation. null and void and directed respondents to appear before the SEC on July 15. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. the stockholders proceeded with the meeting on July 9.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. In the main. 1996 scheduled annual meeting of the stockholders. G. presided over by respondent Manalaysay. On July 10. 1996. At the hearing on July 15.R. 1997. 1996. 1996. September 7. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. HELD: We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. on April 14. 1996. 1997. ISSUE: Whether or not the contempt instituted motu proprio and holding of guilty thereof by a quasi-judicial agency when reversed on appeal before the CA may again be appealed to the SC. et al vs. 1996. BUELA J. JR. MANUEL D. After due proceedings. M. to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them or why they should not be cited in contempt. However. Contempt (Rule 71) SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN PERFECTO R. 129521. at 3:00 p. the SEC issued an order stating Manalaysay and Ricalde are GUILTY OF CONTEMPT. After the hearing. respondents submit that contempt is criminal in character and their exoneration from a charge of contempt amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie. No. issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Interport Resources Corporation from holding the July 9. 1997. A Page | 118 . 1997. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the SEC order declaring respondents guilty of contempt. respondent Manalaysay questioned the validity of the TRO as well as the contempt proceedings in light of the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals restraining the SEC from enforcing its TRO. A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Petitioner appealed to the SC.m. the Court of Appeals denied the motion. T.. 1999 FACTS: SEC Chairman Yasay.

or his successor. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment. for instance. the SEC order directing respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt was highly improper. Hence. the effect of the temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals directing the SEC to desist from enforcing its own TRO was to allow such meeting to proceed as scheduled." At any rate. the Court of Appeals in its final decision nullified the SEC's order. "Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature. an appeal would not lie from the order of dismissal of. it is criminal in nature. More. is a bar to a second prosecution." In this case. or an exoneration from." If the contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the power to punish a given contempt. a temporary restraining order against the order of the SEC of June 28. that is. civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party. Page | 119 .Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The distinction is for the purpose only of determining the character of punishment to be administered. a charge of contempt. 1996. they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty. Petitioners argue that the contempt committed by respondents was civil in nature. The Court of Appeals issued on July 8. but criminal. 1996. imposed to vindicate the dignity and power of the Commission. BUELA criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court. The State is the real prosecutor. there was no willful disobedience to a lawful order of the SEC. as in criminal proceedings. and the proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases. hence. or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. as the temporary restraining order the SEC issued was for the benefit of a party to a case. M." "In general. T. Contrary to the view of petitioners." "But whether the first or the second. and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. "The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which acquittal. and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. 1996 directing the Interport Resources Corporation to desist from holding the stockholders' meeting on July 9. Respondents were not guilty of contempt. The contention is untenable. the contempt is not civil in nature.

2004 FACTS: On September 29. On September 15. 1999 Order. May 27. and for the latter to personally appear for hearing before his sala on September 29. Judge Caoibes Jr. and alleged the following: (1) that former was charged for indirect contempt for apprehending the latter’s son for traffic violation.. issued an order requiring Sison to appear before him to explain a traffic incident involving his son and to show cause why he should not be cited as in contempt of court. issued another Order dated September 22. Page | 120 . lifted the September 22. 1999. Branch 253 A. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of an MMDA officer in apprehending a person. and (3) that the acts of respondents in arresting him without any warrant of arrest before a charge of indirect contempt is heard constitute the gravest ABUSE OF AUTHORITY ever committed by the respondents. JUDGE JOSE F. the complainant appeared and executed an affidavit admitting to the court that he made a mistake and that it was all a misunderstanding. RTJ-03-1771. Jr. The act complained against must be any of those specified in Sec. The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks of Sison as thereby displaying arrogance towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect. Las Piñas City. even bragging in the process that he did the same to somebody who introduced himself as a lawyer the day before. Regional Trial Court. 3. there is no contempt of court. which requires that the person obstructed should be performing a duty connected with judicial functions. and TEODORO S.. 1999.M. ALVAREZ. T. thereafter. Sison confiscated the driver’s license of Caoibies III. an MMDA officer apprehended Caoibes III for violating a no right turn sign while the latter was driving along EDSA. Judge Caoibes Jr. M. Notwithstanding such introduction and plea. Presiding Judge. who while not an official employee of the judiciary was allegedly performing official function for his father who is a judge. (2) that former was arrested and was only released upon admitting his mistakes in relation to the apprehension under duress. Rule 71. Sheriff IV. 1999. BUELA SALVADOR SISON vs.. is contumacious act under Section 3. 1999 for the complainant’s arrest and commitment. Caoibes III introduce himself to be the son of RTC Judge Caoibes Jr. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of the complainant’s failure to appear as directed. The respondent judge. CAOIBES. otherwise. No. HELD: The answer is in the negative. and plead that he had an official errand for his father. Rule 71.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its representative. JR. Sison. On the scheduled hearing. Sison filed an administrative case against Judge Caoibes.

Inc. ESPAÑOL vs. Title in Evanswinda’s name was cancelled and in lieu thereof. However.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Sharcons Builders Philippines. Cavite. Page | 121 . Español came across Civil Case No. That same day. T. Hence. BENJAMIN S. Judge Dolores L. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land purported to be registered under the latter’s name. 1979.R. and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City. The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no legitimate basis by which to consider Sison’s apprehension of his son as indirect contempt. June 21. But they were denied outright by petitioner. 2007 FACTS: On April 15. On January 25. In the course of the proceedings. respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest. BUELA The refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause resentment on the part of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet know at the time) because he knew. regardless of the office or position of the violator’s father. No. 1994. ATTY. Thus. Evanswinda Morales. T511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons. Sharcons filed a complaint for quieting of title and impleaded as defendants spouses Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and MARLY SEE G. respondents were confined in municipal jail. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that TCT No. M. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13. they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into a one-way street from the wrong direction. TCT No. as a public official himself. 150949. Judge Español issued an Order declaring respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas. 2000. when the latter’s workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot. Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was granted. 623-92 wherein it was adjudged that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are responsible therefor. By virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by petitioner. JUDGE DOLORES L.

HANSEL M. and as such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. 2014 FACTS: Marantan. and that charges for murder be filed. However. The use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction. In G. more so where the falsity of the document is not apparent on its face.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O G. Diokno. where Marantan was the ground commander in a policemilitary team. such act is an improper conduct which degrades the administration of justice. Pursuant to Section 3.R. on January 6. T. 2013. and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel. which resulted in the death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not the act of presenting falsified documents before a court constitutes direct contempt. Rule 71. M. the modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. Rule 71. prayed that the corresponding informations for homicide be withdrawn. Thus. MARANTAN vs. merely constitutes indirect contempt. Marantan alleges that. riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident. Branch VI. ATTY. organized and conducted Page | 122 . and Brian Anthony Dulay. 199462. HELD: The answer is in the negative. February 12. Court of First Instance of Cebu. No. and one Ernesto Manzano. La’O and her counsel. we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document. where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent La’O). La’O. which incident was captured by a television crew from UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident). P/SUPT. together with the other petitioners. Atty. Quezon. it constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. In the meantime. Moreover. No. 205956. She should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents. 2005.R. a shooting incident occurred in Atimonan. Francis Xavier Manzano. settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action. Perforce. were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at Ortigas Center. et al were charged with homicide. Thus. following Section 3. In Santos v. The said case involve an incident which transpired on November 7. a contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed.

3(d). directly or indirectly. – x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: xxx (d) Any improper conduct tending. The respondents. T. obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete way. During the press conference. 199462.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. making them liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. or degrade the administration of justice. argue that there was no violation of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions of their desires. For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede. branding Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident. obstruct. as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC. for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede. BUELA a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. is the maintenance of the Page | 123 . He argues that their pronouncements and malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the Court in resolving the petitions filed. influencing the court. but also on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and his co-accused are guilty of murder. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. HELD: The answer is in the negative. interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not comments made in national television regarding an ongoing case violates sub judice rule and consequently a contemptuous act.R. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue. in their Comment. obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. M. they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling G. to impede. or obstructing the administration of justice. hopes and opinions which were taken out of context and did not actually impede. which reads: Section 3. The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule. As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech. No.

2002. MANUEL O. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. upon the theory that in such a case. respondent filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. T. it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent. In this case. Page | 124 . No. INC. "A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts. As to the conduct of the Court. CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually. 2002 and the special meeting of stockholders of April 23. that an inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. or does not even tend to. February 24. The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. and PABLO B. or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments of the respondents. BUELA independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights. 2014 FACTS: Respondent. express or implied. a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club. SANCHEZ G. vs. On August 12. a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. JR. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G. which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. not merely a likely. Inc. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. There was no complaint.R. 182738. M. filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21. 199462. the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. influence the Court." By no stretch of the imagination could the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. threat. No. obstruct. which the court granted in an Order dated September 10. ROMAN. No criminal intent to impede.R.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 2002. 2002.

the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.00 for every day of delay to comply with the order of September 10. CA ruled that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2002 Order. 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10. BUELA On December 9. 2002 despite the order of this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not an order of the court stating that failure to strictly comply with it will result to the persons being directed thereby to be cited for contempt constitutes a final order in an indirect contempt proceeding. On several occasions. then Presiding Judge Bruselas issued an Order for the immediate implementation of the September 10.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Petitioners claim that the threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be willfulness or that the contumacious act be done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court. The September 3. 2002 order. 2007. This Court shall order defendants solidarily to pay a fine of P10. the trial court issued an order directing the defendants to strictly comply with this September 10. 2002. Hence it violates due process. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Petitioners questioned the aforesaid Resolution via Petition for Certiorari. On September 3. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. T. Further sanctions shall be meted upon defendants should the Court find that defendants have been in bad faith in complying with the order of September 10. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. Page | 125 . M. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with the directive. Failure of the defendants to comply with all the requirements of the order dated September 10. petitioners failed to comply with the directive to produce documents for inspection. 2002 will result in this court citing all the defendants in contempt of court. 2002 until the defendants shall have fully and completely complied with the said order.000. 2002 Order.

128781. HON. had given some real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the decedent. Petioner Teresita N. HON. ruling that the Order dated November 11. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. DE LEON et al. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. filed a "Motion for Collation.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether titled properties should be collated.R. the RTC issued an Order denying said motion. On February 23. Page | 126 . Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the properties subject of the Order "were already titled in their names years ago" and that titles may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which provides that the final order of the court concerning questions as to advancements made shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir. INVENTOR and RAMON NICOLAS G. Respondent Ramon G. an oppositor–applicant in the intestate proceedings. 1994 directing the inclusion of the properties therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas had already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal from the order of collation. T. citing Section 2. Settlement of Estate (Rules 73 to 90) TERESITA N. 2002 FACTS: Petitioners and Respondents are heirs of Rafael and Salud Nicolas. August 6. during his lifetime. On November 11. ISSUE: Whether or not an order of collation is a final order and failure to appeal therefrom makes it unassailable. vs. PABLO P. prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Nicolas. the RTC issued an Order for collation of the properties mentioned in Ramon’s order of collation. M. BUELA SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS A. Nicolas. No. COURT OF APPEALS. Court of Appeals found the petition devoid of merit. 1994." claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas. Petitioners claimed that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the collation of the properties already titled under petitioners’ name. 1995.

by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings. 2. they are now bound by said Order. the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties. – Questions as to advancement made. is not feasible. the administrator." in support of his claim that the assailed Order is a final order and therefore appealable and that due to petitioners’ failure to appeal in due time. This is because the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of collation both by the RTC and the appellate court. If there is no dispute. BUELA HELD: The answer is in the negative. What seems to be a conflict between the above-quoted Rule and the afore–discussed jurisprudence that the Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more apparent than real. that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the subject lots. or alleged to have been made. Page | 127 . and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so Private respondent’s reliance on Section 2. well and good. Questions as to advancement to be determined. T. The order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order. M.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory. to wit: "SEC. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. then the parties. For all intents and purposes. but if there is. and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir. said Order is a mere order including the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent.

and (2) that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2. Claiming to be the widow of the decedent.R. he married Felicidad San Luis with whom he had had no children but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18. was still legally married to Merry Lee. or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. the term "place of residence" of the decedent. for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Court of Appeals reversed the orders of the trial court. 1998. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974. Petitioners appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. Tobias.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS G. Petitioner further asserted that paragraph 2. but said marriage was divorced by virtue of a decree granting said divorce by Family court of Hawaii. Page | 128 . to wit: (1) first with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children. at the time of his death. nevertheless. Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code. Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. 1995. Jr. (3) On 1984. The appellante court ruled: (1) that under Section 1. the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City. 2007 FACTS: Felicisimo T. No. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter. On July 2. 1992. 133743. 30 and Pilapil v. (2) on 1968 he was married to Merry Lee. On September 12. actual or physical habitation. On appeal. BUELA EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. the trial court finding merit on petitioner’s arguments dismissed the petition for letters of administration. during his lifetime. ISSUE: Whether or not a surviving spouse whose marriage to the decedent is assailed on the ground of prior marriage may be considered an interested party in the settlement of the decedent’s estate. one of which is herein petitioner. we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration. Romillo. refers to the personal. T. contracted three marriages. San Luis. with whom he had a son. February 6. IbaySomera. M. Thus. Respondent sought the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate and filed a petition for letters of administration before RTC Makati.

Article 148 governs. unless the contrary is proven. as far as known to the petitioner: x x x. and not merely indirect or contingent. In Saguid v. M. Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: SEC. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. Meanwhile. we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect. An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage.. BUELA as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Court of Appeals. Contents of petition for letters of administration. respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show. or their marriage is void from the beginning. In a co-ownership. In the instant case.A. the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal. the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 2. T. The interest must be material and direct. such as an heir. it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Section 2. Hence. Page | 129 . such as a creditor. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry. However.S.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U. efforts and industry. Section 6. or one who has a claim against the estate. the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.

He particularly questions the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros. On August 27. Gloria. and Milagros. they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. Joseph. Gloria. Joseph. He states that this violated the rule on precedence of testate over Page | 130 . and Mercedes. and that. resulting to the issuance of TCT No. Sebastian. Gloria. M. the estates of Lucia. 2000. Jose. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and included in its resolution is the settlement not only of the estate of Joaquin. 1994. 8925 in Milagros’ name and of TCT No. (2) CA erroneously settled. Jesus. On October 23. but also the estates of Lucia. On September 15. Jesus (died prior to 1994 without issue). 1964 without any known debts or obligations. No. and Teresa – herein respondent). Aggrieved. Gloria. and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. During his lifetime. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP. On appeal.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Jose. and Teresa. 8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. first with Lucia (died on April 24. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia. AGTARAP vs. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia Eduardo. 2001. Milagros (died on 1996 with a will subject to a separate probate proceedings) and Jose (survived by three children. 2011 FACTS: Joaquin died intestate on November 21. 177099. and Milagros. in contravention of the principle of settling only one estate in one proceeding. WALTER DE SANTOS. Mercedes. Joaquin contracted two marriages. At the time of his death. JOSEPH AGTARAP. 1924) with whom he had three children. Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City. (38254) and TCT No. Jesus. T. Sebastian. and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for reconsideration. June 8. bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquin’s estate. the RTC issued a resolution declaring that the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. Joseph. namely. Mercedes. upon Lucia’s death in April 1924.R. petitioner Eduardo filed a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap. and ABELARDO DAGORO G. They proferred the following contentions: (1) that the estate must have already been settled in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros. together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration. BUELA EDUARDO G. RTC issued an Order of Partition and declared that bulk of the estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. TERESA AGTARAP. and second with Caridad with whom he also had three children—Eduardo (herein petitioner).

as enumerated in the said provision. acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction. was not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have already been settled in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax cannot be upheld. Jesus. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not estate is considered settled upon payment of inheritance tax.34 While there has been no showing that the alleged will of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC. The inclusion of Lucia. and inheritance tax. Pasay City. we agree with Eduardo’s position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquin’s estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. The records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965. expenses of administration. Mercedes. (2) Whether or not the share of the heir who died pending the settlement of the estate of predecessor decedent may be settled in the said pending settlement case of the decedent. they being his legal heirs. funeral charges. HELD: (1) No. allowance to the widow. as cited above. However. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. has already been probated and approved. Payment of the inheritance tax. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court—an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts of the estate. and Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquin’s estate. which properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction. Jose. bequeathing all of her share from Joaquin’s estate in favor of Eduardo. Branch 108. as well as their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the estate. and (3) that RTC. BUELA intestate proceedings. T. prudence dictates that this Court refrain from distributing Milagros’ share in Joaquin’s estate. (2) The answer is in the affirmative provided the estate of the heirs who died during the pendency of the settlement their predecessor is not subject of a separate proceedings. (3) Whether or not the intestate court has the authority to determine questions of ownership over properties covered by the estate. Page | 131 . As provided in Section 1. the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin. per se. does not settle the estate of a deceased person. M. Pursuant to Section 1.

this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. who predeceased his parents. relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons. all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child. such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. M. More importantly.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY G. we hold that the RTC. Second. Dr. or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. EMILIO A. Emilio A. BUELA (3) As to the issue on the ownership of the subject real properties. Cristina was survived by her spouse.M. the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in. Isabel. SUNTAY III vs. the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin. as an intestate court. or the question is one of collation or advancement. We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court. including petitioner Emilio III. including herein respondent. No. but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. had jurisdiction to resolve the same. Emilio III and Nenita. October 10. 183053. the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate. Suntay (Emilio I). T. if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren.R. Isabel Page | 132 . and two illegitimate grandchildren. either as a probate or an intestate court. However. Their legitimate grandchildren. 2012 FACTS: The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. The illegitimate grandchildren. First. were both reared from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. or exclusion from.

were involved in domestic relations cases. Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse. Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and appointed Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay as administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco. the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator. filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate. ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child has preference over the illegitimate child with respect to the appointment as administrator of the estate of their grandparent. improvidence or mismanagement. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise. Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren. along with her paternal grandparents. the person to be Page | 133 . Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001. following the separation of Isabel’s parents. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6. Federico. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. This is the same consideration which Section 6. suffer the consequences of waste. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that the explicit provisions of Section 6. Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court included Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate. Three years after Cristina’s death. speedy and economical administration of the estate. The rule lists an order of preference. Isabel’s parents. Federico died. On appeal. respondent Isabel. In all. opposed the petition. including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. Margarita and Emilio II. T. the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. has been reinforced in jurisprudence. On 13 November 2000.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. or. in the appointment of an administrator. The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. in the alternative. This order of preference. Emilio I was eventually acquitted. BUELA and her siblings. given that the rule speaks of an order of preference. Emilio III and Nenita. M. On appeal by certiorari. On 26 October 1995. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.

February 23. in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person. During the pendency of the intestate proceeding. Juliana Ortañez and her two children. entered into a memorandum of agreement (MOA) for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. T. claiming to be owners. Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent). sold the Philinterlife shares to Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG). the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s property (citations omitted). Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin. M. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO et al.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin. Mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. 2004 FACTS: Dr.R. 1980 and was survived by his wife (Juliana Salgado Ortañez). Having Page | 134 . Ortañez died on July 21. BUELA appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate. Juvencio Ortañez. whose interest in the estate is more preponderant. ‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. Juliana S. partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. Ortañez and Jose Ortañez. the nearest of kin in the category being preferred. vs.” JOSE C. No. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6. G. Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez. the nearest of kin is to be preferred. The court further drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin. Juvencio P. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 et al. Indeed. Pursuant to the MOA. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor. 146006. As between next of kin. Rule 78. is preferred in the choice of administrator. three legitimate children (Rafael. but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.

Page | 135 . An heir can sell his right. BUELA failed to repurchase the shares. after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. M. 1982. The SC dismissed the petition of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez and such decision became final and was subsequently recorded in the book of entries of judgments. petitioner FLAG. an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication. T. The appellate court denied his petition. after one year. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao. the intestate court granted the motions of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the MOA. 1995.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. On July 6. interest. and (2) to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate. The rule is clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court. consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock On July 12. ISSUE: Whether or not sale of property included in the inventory of the estate by some of the heirs made during the pendency of the intestate proceeding without intestate court’s approval may be declared null and void. However. On August 29. Jose Ortañez assailed the order of the intestate court by filing a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. not any specific property therein. private respondent filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. He then elevated the CA decision to the SC via petition for review. that is. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. officers of FLAG filed before the CA a petition for certiorari. The motion was granted by the intestate court. 2000. or participation in the property under administration under Art. 1997. Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion: (1) to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement dated March 4. the intestate court granted the motion for execution filed by private respondent. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative.

THE COURT OF APPEALS G. ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. filed a motion praying for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk. Edmond turned over the amount net of expenses for repair and maintenance on the estate. Petitioner filed a petition Page | 136 . private respondent Montes filed a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. The probate court. The court. No. T. specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments. During the pendency of the probate proceedings. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion and prayed for the release of the said rent payments to the testator’s grandchildren and for the distribution of the testator's properties. 1993. however. EDMOND RUIZ. on December 22. in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will. BUELA In the present case. Montes and his three granddaughters (private respondents) with Edmond as the executor. RUIZ. 1993. In compliance. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate. Edmond Ruiz. the court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk the rental deposit and payments representing the oneyear lease of the Valle Verde property. On July 28. 118671. The probate court denied petitioner's motion but granted respondent Montes' motion.R. as what happened in the present case. M. with Edmond Ruiz as executor. Executor vs. petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz. held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate (1. Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals but the CA dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court's order. his adopted daughter.014 and 1. Four years after the testator's death. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son. Hence. on January 25.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. January 29. 1996 FACTS: Hilario M. 1993.011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG.

regardless of their minority or incapacity. regardless of their age. BUELA for review on certiorari before the SC and argued that affirming the Probate Court’s order would have the following effect: (1) disallow the executor/administrator of the estate of the late Hilario M. During the pendency of the testate proceedings. February 23. HELD: It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. the deceased's legitimate spouse and children. Be that as it may. to certain persons not entitled thereto. especially the right to education. provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Edmund and his sister Florence executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between Page | 137 . after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and obligations. Ruiz to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. the surviving heirs. Santibañez obtained two (2) set of loans used to by three (3) tractors which remained unpaid upon his death. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate. therefore. are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. Upon his death. (2) grant support.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support. T.R. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren. and (3) prematurely partition and distribute the estate pursuant to the provisions of the holographic will even before its intrinsic validity has been determined. the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death. during the pendency of the settlement of an estate. subsist even beyond the age of majority.16 It was error. civil status or gainful employment. Efraim M. grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. his heirs commenced a testate settlement proceeding pursuant to his holographic will. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA G. No. 149926. has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren. ISSUE: The issue for resolution is whether the probate court. and despite the existence of unpaid debts and obligations of the estate. M. 2005 FACTS: During his lifetime.

Edmund and Florence. but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending. during the pendency of the probate proceedings. FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Petitioner Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the heirs may. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC. Thus. court approval is imperative. 1988. in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition. corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. The trial court ruled in favor of Florence and Edmund. BUELA themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors. it was null and void. although it should purport to be a sale. a compromise. or any other transaction. M. T. enter into an agreement distributing among themselves properties of the testator and by virtue of such agreement assumed the indebtedness corresponding to such properties. during the pendency of the probate proceedings. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition. It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased. as in the case at bar. an exchange. file a separate complaint for collection against the heirs based on an agreement executed by the heirs whereby they distribute the properties of the estate and assume the debts corresponding to such property. Pursuant to the assigned assets and liabilities. (2) Whether or not a creditor of the testator may. Thus. the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez. and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. respondent Florence filed her Answer and alleged that considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court. she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement. including the three (3) tractors. hence.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. On December 7. Union sent demand letters to Edmund. HELD: (1) The answer is in the negative. To dispose Page | 138 . The act of the heirs in the instant case of dividing the 3 tractors amounts to partition.

for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON G. thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. or heirs. Perusing the joint agreement. On 12 September 1994.R. pay off its debts and distribute the residue. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. Elise filed a Petition for Letters of Administration and claimed that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. legatees. July 31. Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON vs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible. T. and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. To prove her filiation to Page | 139 . purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez. it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp. 2013 FACTS: Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992." The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event. No. LOURDES BELEN. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry. that is. BUELA of them in any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. We rule in the negative.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petitioner. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees. that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. M. should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5. MA. 189121. (2) The loan was contracted by the decedent.

the personal. from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the residence of the decedent as indicated in the death certificate should be taken into account for purposes of determining the venue for the probate of the will. is not binding on the courts. Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. In addition to their claim of improper venue. actual residence or place of abode. deporting themselves as husband and wife. opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. HELD: (1) Under Section 1. the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death The word “resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense. Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid. Eliseo Page | 140 . This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate. Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court. meaning. Pursuant to Section 1. actual or physical habitation of a person." in the context of venue provisions. T. at the time of his death. among others. provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas. the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes. however. M. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. (2) Whether or not the natural child of the decedent may be appointed as an administrator. Amelia. On appeal. Eliseo was a resident of Capas. Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Jenneth and Jennifer. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death. attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. BUELA the decedent. together with her children. wife of the decedent. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City and directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. Elise. the contents thereof.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode. As thus defined. "residence.

It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Page | 141 . Factual findings of the trial court. Also. Subsequently. such as an heir. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo. In the instant case. Branch 106. the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate. CFI issue an Order. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. is one who would be benefited in the estate. No. when affirmed by the appellate court. 2007 FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate. or one who has a claim against the estate. February 5. in estate proceedings. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir." in estate proceedings. CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate. BUELA filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City. 150175. dated 2 October 1952.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. (2) Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person An "interested party. on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. Elise. is deemed to be an interested party. such as a creditor. Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children.R. PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES vs. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952. Certainly. M. awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata. is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. T. the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. under the law. who. BRIONES G. must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

in breach of trust. HELD: The answer is in the negative. dated 2 October 1952. annulment. including the real properties. making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino. in favor of the heirs of Maximino. The CFI Order. Erlinda. Gregorio. BUELA Donata died on 1 November 1977. no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. CEB-5794. the heirs of Donata elevated the case before the SC. Erlinda and her husband. as administratrix of the estate of Maximino. through fraud and misrepresentation. to have the real properties. and exclusive heir of her deceased husband.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. reproduced below – Page | 142 . and recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. T. SC reversed the decisions of CA and RTC and dismissed the Complaint for partition. In the absence of fraud. instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed. presumed to be fairly and regularly issued. hence. 928-R. declared Donata as the sole. absolute. succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. annulment. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name. the RTC rendered its Decision. and without the knowledge of the other heirs. Unsatisfied the Decision of the Court of Appeals. belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. dated 2 October 1952. and exclusive heir of Maximino. They alleged that Donata. and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. but pursuant to an Order. The CFI Order. M. 928-R. issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. dated 8 April 1986. one of Donata’s nieces. issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. through fraud. and recovery of possession of real property. ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment awarding ownership of the properties included in the decedent’s estate to his surviving wife may be assailed on the ground of fraud after more than 30 years had lapse from the promulgation of the said judgment. enjoy the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision before the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed the decision. effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole. were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate. The issuance by the CFI of the said Order. registered in her name. not through fraud or mistake. as well as its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. After trial in due course. On 3 March 1987. absolute. the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition.

RODOLFO C. On May 31. whether testate or intestate. 1983. Hodges Estate is the subject of a pending intestate proceedings. whether in the Philippines or elsewhere. is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. expenses and costs. Branch 3. and it could not give credence to the following statements made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision. No. 2013 FACTS: The subject of this controversy is Lot No. docketed at the MTCC Iloilo City. At the time. regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made. 928-R had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties. in the absence of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary. While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings. and to have rendered a judgment valid in every respect. NICOLASITO S. SABIDONG vs.M. Branch 4. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings. By reason of the foregoing provisions. 11 which is part of the Hodges Estate. this Court must presume. attorney’s fees. respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC. or judge acting as such. in the manner prescribed by law. P-01-1448. is a proceeding in rem. one of the longtime occupants of Lot 11. a decision was rendered in said case ordering the occupants to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due. Under the Order dated November Page | 143 . T. was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction. June 25. SOLAS A. On January 8. most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition. (n) That a court. it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate. Iloilo City. M. and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same. BUELA (m) That official duty has been regularly performed. that the CFI in Special Proceedings No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate.100. Herein complainant is the son of Trinidad Sabidong. 1986. respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square meters for the amount of P35.

T. 1989. judges. the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. 1986 issued by the probate court. In the case at bar. 1994. either in person or through the mediation of another: Justices. a new certificate of title in the name of respondent was issued. commit deception. it cannot be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp. On November 21. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31. the probate court issued another Order granting respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. clerks of superior and inferior courts. 1994. On June 14. oppression and grave abuse of authority.000. 1983 had long become final. 1491 of the Civil Code. 1672). No. no violation of paragraph 5. the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions. Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. M. the Decision in Civil Case No. ISSUE: Whether or not an estate proceeding may be considered a pending litigation in relation to the property included is such estate which disallows a court official from purchasing the same on the ground of Art. 1987. Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code provides that he following persons cannot acquire by purchase. even at a public or judicial auction. On January 21. and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case. prosecuting attorneys. Proc. dishonesty. Be that as it may.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. For the prohibition to apply. 1999. Page | 144 . with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21. Thus. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to respondent on installment for the total purchase price of P50. The writ of possession over Lot 11 was eventually issued on June 27. a Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed. this Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court employee respondent cannot buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith). respondent’s Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved. this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers. BUELA 18.

4. Page | 145 . 1993. Proc. The document of transfer was filed with the Bureau of Lands. On June 24. was an awardee of Lots Nos. Sgs-3451 and being the winning bidder at the auction sale of these parcels by the Bureau of Lands. 3-B. Escheat (Rule 91) CASTORIO ALVARICO vs. 1994. a widown. the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. He claimed that on January 4. BUELA A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court. herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. No. 1984. June 6. Proc. Consequently.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. No. He averred that the donation to him had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita. Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo. Lopez. he took possession of the same. Branch 27. This notwithstanding. who agreed to assume all the obligations. it was held that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to purchase property because Sp. and conditions imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application No. had already been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21. 138953. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. AMELITA L. M. 2002 FACTS: Fermina A. B. SOLA G. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with. T. Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita.R. 1672 was then pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court. but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. an OCT was issued in the name of Amelita and her husband. Fermina donated the land to him and immediately thereafter. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. 5. V-81066. CEB-1419110 for reconveyance against Amelita. duties. No. On May 28. 1983. Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting the amendment of the application from Fermina to Amelita. 3-C and 6-B.

For one. All persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of its registration. ISSUE: Whether or not a person imputing bad faith on the transfer of land patents may assailed the validity of an OCT subsequently issued to the transferee of the land patents. 3439 was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. HELD: The answer is in the negative. it is undisputed that OCT No.30 Clearly then. the execution of public documents. In other words. to wit: All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead. the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita's title. Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina was no longer the owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner. She added that the donation was void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands. as in the case of Affidavits of Adjudication. and that she had validly acquired the land as Fermina's rightful heir. serves as notice to the whole world. a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof. RTC decision was reversed. It follows that he cannot "recover" the property because. Second. to begin with. its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. BUELA For her part. Since Amelita Sola's title originated from a grant by the government. It requires more than petitioner's bare allegation to defeat the Original Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of issuance. M. in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. the property having been transferred earlier to her. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. She also denied that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner. Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith. in the proper courts. once registered. A Torrens title. T. only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof. hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert them. Page | 146 . this allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary support. is entitled to the presumption of regularity. On appeal. such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. 101 of the Public Land Act. After trial.

R. his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error. and (3) because Petitioner thinks that the Respondent dislikes her. as the latter is not in a position to care for herself. Petitioner (Goyena) opposed the petition for letters of guardianship on the following grounds: (1) that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property. There is also no showing that petitioner's business decisions in the past had resulted in the prejudice of Julieta. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO G. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. M. CA held that there are really no antagonistic interests to speak of between petitioner [Amparo] and Julieta. 2003 FACTS: On July 8. (2) Respondent is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their interests are antagonistic. respondent (Amparo) filed a "PETITION FOR LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP" over the person and properties of her sister Julieta. T. i. and that she needs the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises.. As a rule. it was held in the case of Garchitorena v. In the selection of a guardian. when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian. Sotelo that a person with antagonistic interest with that of the ward may not be appointed as guardian. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision having been denied. GOYENA vs.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. On appeal of petitioner. 147148. and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties. the Respondent and the ward. no such antagonistic interest exist in the present case as between the appointed guardian. 1996. HELD: While. BUELA C.e. Guardians and Guardianship (Rules 92 to 97) PILAR Y. Page | 147 . Julieta. they being co-owners of certain properties. January 13. a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties. The trial court found Julieta "incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property" and appointed respondent as guardian of her person and properties. she filed the present petition ISSUE: Whether or not a grant for letters of guardianship may be assailed on the ground of antagonistic interest and mere presumed dislike by the appointed guardian of the oppositor. No.

While the case was pending before the SC. she had allowed the Estrada Spouses. the defendants declared that Cañiza executed a holographic will on September 4. through her guardian. and (5) the complaint was filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3. RTC held that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion publiciana. and Ramon C. respectively — were by this Court's leave. T. which is reflective of a lack of good faith. No. elevated the case before the SC. the Appellate Court affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. her niece and nephew. Later on. Page | 148 . Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house. "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support. February 24. Nevado." (4) through her guardian. M. AMPARO EVANGELISTA vs. BUELA In the case at bar. (2) that out of kindness. Evangelista. Furthermore. COURT OF APPEALS. among other reasons. et al. Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC in Cañiza's favor. she felt she was disliked by respondent. substituted for her. it should be noted that Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial court because. Finally.R.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the decision was reversed by the RTC. The Incompetent. a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian. 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question. judicially appointed legal guardian of the person and estate of Carmen Cañiza. CARMEN CAÑIZA. 1990. The Complaint alleges that: (1) plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question. Carmen Cañiza died and her heirs — the aforementioned guardian. represented by her legal guardian. Hence. (3) Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health. to temporarily reside in her house. 110427. petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error. G. Amparo Evangelista. But on appeal. representing the latter in the said capacity filed an unlawful detainer suit against the Respondent Estradas. their children et al. Petitioner concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court. Cañiza. maintenance and medical treatment. rent-free. 1997 FACTS: Amparo A. In their Answer with Counterclaim.

HELD: (1) The answer is in the negative. Rule 96 of the Rules of Court. Metropolitan Trial Courts. T. M. In bringing the action of desahucio. A will is essentially ambulatory. (3) Page | 149 . prior to the probate of the will. 838. only to determine the issue of possession.: A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste. or as owners. it may be changed or revoked.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . Municipal Trial Courts. viz. at any time prior to the testator's death. BUELA ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a holographic will purportedly executed by the registered owner of the property in favor of the defendants is a valid defense against an action for unlawful detainer. Thus. any assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious. in other words. NCC). if there be any. and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance. and apply the income and profits thereof. They could not claim the right of possession by sufferance. (2) Whether or not a legal guardian had authority to bring an action for unlawful detainer in representation of his/her ward. at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio. Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4. the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate. to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family. They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house. so far as maybe necessary. the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. the Estradas had no legal right to the property. that had been legally ended. and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose. and until admitted to probate. it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder. their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to them — an event which still has to take place. (2) The answer is in the affirmative. upon being authorized by order to do so. whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance. (3) Whether or not a guardian may continue to represent the ward after the latter's death.

Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Xxxxx” To be sure. Nevado. Visminda. they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court of June 20. in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas. When Anunciacion died intestate. BUELA While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar. 39 the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Cañiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. as niece of Carmen Cañiza. Alicia. survived her death. T. That action. adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties. together with Napoleon. is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs. conveying them to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of P 80. 1979. Amparo Evangelista. NERI. Rosa and Douglas. vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY G. Ramon C. and thereafter. viz. M. No. the other being Cañiza's nephew. and (2) children of Anunciacion from her first marriage were excluded and deprived of their legitimes. the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties against spouses Uy arguing that (1) the sale was made within the prohibited period.: “ xxx The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased. and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique). RTC ruled that the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children. 2012 FACTS: Anunciacion had seven children. et al. NAPOLEON D. they acquired several homestead properties. Alicia. October 10. 1994. two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo). 17 years after. namely: Eutropia and Victoria.00. and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale on July 7. in accordance with Section 17. Douglas and Rosa.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Page | 150 . not being a purely personal one. namely: Napoleon. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion.R. 194366.000. an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Enrique.

(3) Whether or not the heirs who have no notice of the execution of the extrajudicial settlement and sale or minor heirs who was represented by their surviving parent in the said settlement may still question extrajudicial settlement and sale after 17 years. (2) No. BUELA On appeal. as natural guardian of the minor heirs may dispose the share of such minor heirs in the properties inherited. CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years. Section 1.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. M. (2) Whether or not surviving spouse of the decedent. T. all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. they belatedly filed their claim or more than 2 years from knowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died. the laws in force at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale. Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code. CA held that the extrajudicial settlement and sale valid as far as the heirs of Anunciacion on the following grounds: (1) as to the children of the first marriage. while they are not bound by the extrajudicial settlement. – x x x The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein. It also found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time. (2) as to the children of the second marriage who as a minor at the time of the sale. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not compulsory heirs who have not notice of the fact that the some of the heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale are bound thereof. the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy. provide: Page | 151 . a total nullity. but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. HELD: (1) No. Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides: Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. because they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority. the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently. Furthermore.

is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. however. BUELA ART. Page | 152 . an "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos. a father or mother. the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial authority. appoint another suitable persons. shall be his legal guardian. Section 7. with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules. exceeds the limits of administration. the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia. Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. (3) Yes. the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. T. or in his absence the mother. 320. does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos. Victoria and Douglas. subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court. who were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority. Corollarily. Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides: When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less. as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority. Thus. ART. the father or the mother. and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. M. without the necessity of court appointment. The father. Any act of disposition or alienation. is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code. the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property. the court may. Consequently. For good reasons. the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. Contrary to the ruling of the CA. Besides. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos. or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child. 326.

April 25. his girlfriend. petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. 2012 FACTS: Nilo Oropesa (petitioner) filed a petition to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father. Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning. positive and definite evidence. it was held that "where the sanity of a person is 1 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. Accordingly. Cirilo Oropesa (Respondent). Page | 153 . reasoning and orientation. J. and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. No. Cirilo O. except for mildly impaired abilities in memory. 184528. Luisa Agamata. Respondent filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered. manage his property wisely. (2) that his judgment and memory were impaired. emotional. In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue. without outside aid. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed. Ma. Oropesa does not have the mental. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp. CIRILO OROPESA1 G. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a medical expert is required to prove the incompetency of the purported ward in a petition for guardianship. Respondent opposed the petition for guardianship. (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record. The Trial Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Oropesa. alert and able. he cannot. HELD: A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear. (3) that due to his age and medical condition. and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence. particularly Ms. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court. On the contrary. (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested. After the presentation of evidence of the petitioner. and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him.R. (2) is capable of mental calculations. He alleged among others that: (1) the respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years after suffering from stroke on 2003. M. T. BUELA NILO OROPESA vs. The Report concludes that Gen.

Thus. BUELA at issue. MAGNO G. She averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and academic the issues raised in the petition. Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion. nobody entered an opposition and Abad was allowed to present evidence ex parte. No. December 5. alert and able.R. Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and opposed the appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Pangasinan. On appeal.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the appointed guardian terminate the guardianship and renders all issues assailing his appointment moot. informing this Court that Biason died. Abad. M. RTC denied Abad’s petition and appointing Biason as Maura’s guardian. i. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. 2007. Pending the resolution of the instant petition. expert opinion is not necessary and that the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice. Leonardo Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties. (2) he was not given the opportunity to submit evidence to controvert Biason’s appointment.e. Page | 154 . and (3) the fact that he does not reside in the place where the ward is residing is not a ground for his disqualification as guardian.. Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC. Abad filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but the RTC denied the same." The trial court in its order denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration stated its own observation of respondent’s physical and mental state. Abad contends that: (1) CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite the fact that it did not hold any hearing to determine whether Biason possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as provided by law. “that oppositor is still sharp. 191993. 2012 FACTS: Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura B. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship be terminated. On June 14.” EDUARDO T. When the petition was called for hearing. ABAD vs. T.

The latter. Advent Capital failed to automatically deduct the trust fees due to them at the time when they were still in possession of the trust account. ALCANTARA and EDITHA I.59. Concepcion had no right to compel the delivery of the dividends to him as receiver. With Biason’s demise. regardless of its disposition. or anyone else for that matter. January 25. Alcantaras opposed the motion and claimed that the money in the trust account belonged to them under their Trust Agreement with Advent Capital.R. ALCANTARA G. 2012 FACTS: Advent Capital and the Alcantaras entered into a trust agreement wherein the former shall manage the latter’s several trust accounts and in lieu thereof. seeking to annul the rehabilitation court’s order. Belson turned over the subject dividends to him. representing trust fees. the latter shall pay trust fees which could automatically be deducted from the Portfolio at the end of each calendar quarter.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. NICASIO I. Trustees (Rule 98) ADVENT CAPITAL AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs. Advent Capital filed a petition for rehabilitation. However. 183050. Concepcion filed a motion before the rehabilitation court to direct Belson to release the cash dividends that Belson held under the Alcantaras’ Trust Account 95013.026. the Alcantaras filed a special civil action of certiorari before the CA. For this reason. Danilo L. T. Concepcion’s motion. The trust account is now in the possession of Belson. Subsequently. Concepcion found that respondents Alcantara owed Advent Capital P27. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. No. Page | 155 . BUELA HELD: Yes. Atty. D. M. Complying with the rehabilitation court’s order and Atty.398. Meanwhile. The rehabilitation court granted Atty. it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. the trustors-beneficiaries. could not claim any right or interest in the dividends generated by their investments since Advent Capital merely held these in trust for the Alcantaras. any substantial relief. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. they said. Concepcion was appointed as its rehabilitation receiver. will not afford Abad. The petition. Atty. Concepcion’s demand letter.

Ultimately. the issue is what court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the conflicting claims of the parties over the dividends that Belson held in trust for their owners. 2012 FACTS: LBP extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the execution of a Credit Line Agreement. T. granting the petition and directing Atty. M. Advent Capital could not dispose of the Alcantaras’ portfolio on its own. The CA pointed out that the cash dividends in Belson’s care cannot be summarily applied to the payment of such charges. Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned and.R. ACDC used the Letters of Credit/Trust Receipts Facility of the Page | 156 .Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The income and principal of the portfolio could only be withdrawn upon the Alcantaras’ written instruction or order to Advent Capital. HELD: The answer is in the negative. PEREZ. ISSUE: Whether or not trust fees stipulated to be automatically deducted from the trust account per trust agreement may be ordered by the rehabilitation court to be delivered to the trustee when the trust account is already in the possession of a third person. Thus. LAMBERTO C. In this case. all it had against the Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper subject for an ordinary action for collection. Having failed to collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in the contract. To enforce its lien. BUELA CA rendered a decision. It cannot enforce its money claim by simply filing a motion in the rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras but in the possession of a third party. put the money in escrow for payment to whoever it rightly belongs. Advent Capital has to file a collection suit. No. the trustors-beneficiaries are the Alcantaras. not the rehabilitation court which has not been given the power to resolve ownership disputes between Advent Capital and third parties. June 13. with the trial court’s authorization if warranted. G. et al. Concepcion to account for the dividends and deliver them to the Alcantaras. The rehabilitation court cannot simply enforce the latter’s claim by ordering Belson to deliver the money to it. The real owner of the trust property is the trustorbeneficiary. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Neither Belson nor the Alcantaras are its debtors or creditors with interest in the rehabilitation. 166884. Certainly.

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. This transaction becomes a mere loan. ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal complaint for estafa is the proper remedy for an alleged violation of the Trust Receipt Law by the Trustee. but ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts. whether raw or processed. where the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods. the latter filed the affidavit-complaint for estafa before the City Prosecutor’s Office.D. The trust receipts matured. 115. As a government financial institution.D. ACDC had yet to receive the proceeds of the materials that were the subject of the trust receipts and were allegedly used for these constructions. The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of construction materials to a construction site ACDC’s projects. Page | 157 . it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Section 13 of P. In all trust receipt transactions. ACDC argued that its clients for the construction projects have not yet paid them. as officers and representatives of ACDC. M. repudiates the idea that LBP intended to be the owner of those construction materials. As there were no proceeds received from these clients. executed trust receipts in connection with the construction materials. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. When ACDC failed to comply with the demands of LBP. the only obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. It is fundamental in a trust receipt transaction that the person who advanced payment for the merchandise becomes the absolute owner of said merchandise and continues as owner until he or she is paid in full. or if the goods had already been sold. BUELA Agreement to buy construction materials. should prosper against a borrower who was not part of a genuine trust receipt transaction. no misappropriation thereof could have taken place. However. 115. thus. The respondents. Violations of Trust Receipts Law are criminally punishable. paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. T. the proceeds should be turned over to him or to her. but no criminal complaint for violation of Article 315. the trustee has the obligation to either the return of the proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the goods. the transaction between the parties to this case is not a trust receipt. When both parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the part of the trustee. in relation with P.

BUELA LBP should have been aware that the materials were to be used for the construction of an immovable property. Consequently. as soon as the bank demands them. Since these transactions are not trust receipts. 2003 FACTS: Petitioner representing ARMAGRI executed two sets of Trust Receipts in favor of Solidbank. M. an action for estafa should not be brought against the respondents.R. EDWARD C. should be dismissed as it does not appear from the records that the complaint was filed with the participation or consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). the ownership of whatever was constructed with those materials would presumably belong to the owner of the land. April 29. there can be no violation of the right against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. As an immovable property. disqualify them from being covered by trust receipt agreements. Furthermore.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. But the goods and the materials that are used for a construction project are often placed under the control and custody of the clients employing the contractor. the proceedings regarding the criminal aspect of this case. On appeal with CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. under Article 445 of the Civil Code It should be noted line of work that the borrowers were engaged in was construction. No. as well as a property of the public domain. In the case of materials used in the manufacture of finished products. who are liable only for a loan. ONG vs. The trial court convicted him of the said charged. who can only be compelled to return the materials if they fail to pay the contractor and often only after the requisite legal proceedings. Petitioner contends that he is neither an officer nor a director of AMAGRI and that he merely acted as an agent of ARMAGRI. The contractor’s difficulty and uncertainty in claiming these materials (or the buildings and structures which they become part of). T. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. As the law stands today. Petitioner elevated the case before the SC. ARMAGRI failed to pay or deliver the goods to the Bank despite several demand letters. Petitioner was charged with two counts of estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 119858. these finished products – if not the raw materials or their components – similarly remain in the possession of the trustee until they are sold. Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the trust receipts Page | 158 . When the trust receipts became due and demandable.

HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Second. officers. without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the offense. petitioner comes within the purview of Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law which provides: If the violation is committed by a corporation. ARMAGRI was the one responsible to account for the goods or its proceeds in case of sale. Petitioner. Page | 159 . employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense. and thus a direct participant to the crime. Being the entrustee. petitioner acted on behalf of ARMAGRI.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. First. the loan applications and the letters of credit. the Bank was the entruster while ARMAGRI was the entrustee. petitioner did not explain or show why he is not responsible for the failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale or account for the goods covered by the trust receipts. the Bank accepted the trust receipts signed by petitioner based on petitioner's representations. However. is the person responsible for the offense for two reasons. T. In the instant case. When a person participates in the commission of a crime. he cannot escape punishment on the ground that he simply acted as an agent of another party. It is the fact of being the signatory to the two trust receipts. despite being the signatory to the trust receipts and the other documents. which makes petitioner a person responsible for the offense. petitioner is the signatory to the trust receipts. partnership. it is a well-settled rule that the law of agency governing civil cases has no application in criminal cases. The Trust Receipts Law expressly makes the corporation's officers or employees or other persons therein responsible for the offense liable to suffer the penalty of imprisonment. BUELA did he assume personal responsibility for the undertakings of ARMAGRI which was the entrustee. True. ISSUE: Whether or not a person who signs as an agent of the corporation a trust receipt agreement may be held liable for estafa in the event that the said agreement had been breach. In the instant case. However. the criminal liability for violation of the Trust Receipts Law falls on the human agent responsible for the violation. petitioner signed the two trust receipts on behalf of ARMAGRI 24 as the latter could only act through its agents. M. association or other juridical entities. who admits being the agent of ARMAGRI. In the instant case. the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors.

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA
E. Adoption and Custody of Minors (Rules 99 to 100)
CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO
and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were legally separated with the
custody of their three (3) children remained with the latter. After the separation,
Petitioner then left for the United States where he divorced Anna Marie.
On September 25, 1987, private respondents Spouses Clavano, respectively the
brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the three minor
Cang children. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying
consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging
that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her
brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking
care of the children; that because she would be going to the United States to attend
to a family business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally
hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited
his parental rights
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto. The trial court issued a decree of
adoption. The said decree was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the SC alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31
(2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article
188 (2) of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not minor children may be legally adopted without the written
consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them.
HELD:
While the law requires that the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable
for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written
consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that
such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or one of
the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality
with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.

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In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over
his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without
financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. 24 While
admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he
was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo.
During the pendency of the said proceedings, Respondent sought to intervene
therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as
his sole surviving heir.
Respndent presented the Order in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then
Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo
which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
As the presiding judge was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma",
his deposition was taken at his residence. During the taking of the deposition, when
asked to identify his signature on the alleged adoption decree, he said: “I do not
remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose; I can’t make
out clearly what comes after the name; Jose Moya is not my signature.
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity
and genuineness of Judge Moya's signature. Confronted with two (2) conflicting
reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature
of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
ISSUE: Whether or not the fact of adoption may be proved merely by a decree of
adoption wherein the signature of the issuing judge is in question.
HELD:
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented
by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

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The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however,
Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded
guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was
always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not
contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and
other acts that he performed thereafter.
In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an
adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued
Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr.
Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption
of respondent.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, et
al.
G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondent spouses filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the
first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with
which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been
called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since he arrived at private
respondents' residence.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition
for adoption. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of
the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter
and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the
change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of one's legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule
103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites
therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with
a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows
permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in
line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations.

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ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for change of name of the adopted may be filed
jointly with the petition for adoption.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be
done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem. It is an independent and
discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A
fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a
mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law
system.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and
liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action.
While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have,
there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common
question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express
prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name,
there is no relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or
character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which
conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly
meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their
joinder under our Rules.
The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related
and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously
and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits
or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse
such that they are best taken up individually.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO
G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996
FACTS:
private respondents' petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon with prayer for
the correction of the minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael." The Solicitor
General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the
child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought
concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the
petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the
Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of
entries concerning the civil status of persons. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a petition for adoption may be denied on the ground that the
publication thereof contains the misspelled name of the person to be adopted.
(2) Whether or not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to a correction of name
prayed for in a petition for adoption.
HELD:
(1)
The answer is in the affirmative. The present case involves an obvious clerical error
in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves
merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as
"Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General admits
that the error is a plainly clerical one. The purpose of the publication requirement
is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their
objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.
(2)
The answer is in the affirmative. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case
and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without
force or effect. This case falls under letter "(o)," of Rule 108, referring to "changes
of name."
Now §3 of this Rule further provides that “the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
Page | 164

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA

The local civil registrar is thus an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much
less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to
the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
NB: SC ruled that granting of correction of name is invalid for failure to comply
with the provisions of Rule 108 but failed to discuss whether correction of name
may be prayed for in a petition for adoption.

EUGENIO R. REYES, et al. vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and
LEONIDA F. MAURICIO
G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010
FACTS:
Respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada filed before the DARAB of Malolos,
Bulacan a complaint for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and
between Librada and Petitioner Eugenio as parties.
Librada died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by her alleged
daughter Leonida F. Mauricio. Leonida’s legal standing as a party was assailed by
Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death
of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is
a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
ISSUE: whether or not legal standing of person who substituted the original
complainant may be assailed of by questioning the validity former’s adoption by
the latter in an action for annulment of contract
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally
attacked. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, Supreme Court reiterated that adoption cannot
be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate.
Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, Supreme Court declared that the legality of the
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that
purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
Page | 165

that Stephanie was born on June 26.” his surname. among others. The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1) of the Civil Code.” her mother’s surname. BUELA IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA G. the law provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters. He alleged therein. the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child. that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia. No. 2005 FACTS: Honorato B. in which case. Catindig. in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants. as a matter of right and obligation. In the case of an adopted child. and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. March 31. One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.R. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. upon adoption by her natural father. is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter. use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. 1994. and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig. Page | 166 . upon issuance of the decree of adoption. Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname. HELD: There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. Notably. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia. 148311. the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added. M. The trial court granted the petition for adoption and declared that the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. herein petitioner.” What it only expressly allows.

Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. where the Page | 167 . May 12.R. ERLINDA I. In fact. Antipolo City a petition10 for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age. Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court. T. Habeas Corpuz (Rule 102) ERLINDA K. 2000 FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. 1999. M. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. frail health. ILUSORIO vs. 1998. ISSUE: Whether or not a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss HELD: The answer is no. JOHN DOE and JANE DOE G. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. BUELA Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption. where there is denial of due process. Makati. 139789. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. In 1972. F. they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium. No. 1998. it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind. poor eyesight and impaired judgment. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. On May 31. On February 25. On March 11. ILUSORIO.

Petitioner also assailed the decision of the Sandiganbayan in allowing the joint hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail with that of President Estrada and Jinggoy’s petition for bail. not merely nominal or moral. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. (3) Whether or not petition for bail of two defendants may be heard jointly. (2) motion to quash amended information. as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom To justify the grant of the petition. M. prosecution is deemed to have waive its right to question the propriety of grant of bail. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. BUELA restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary. (4) Whether or not petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus may be availed of on the ground of delay in the hearing of a petition for bail not as a matter of right. EDWARD SERAPIO vs. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective. thus. T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Before the arraignment. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. January 28. among which are as follows: (1) petition for bail. 148468. G. No. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age. ATTY. petitioner filed a series of motions and/or petitions before the Sandiganbayan. (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail.R. SANDIGANBAYAN. the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted. et al. 2003 FACTS: Herein petitioner was charged with plunder together with former President Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. and (3) petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the delay in proceeding with the bail hearing was caused by the prosecution. or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Page | 168 .

a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law. his arraignment cannot be held. to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. The matter is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. the alleged specific violation as to each one Page | 169 . This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. (3) There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law. the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Because although all defendants were charged with plunder. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. T. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved. and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. An accused may file a motion to quash the Information. As stated earlier. before arraignment. furnished by him or a bondsman. However. (2) These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. M. There is no inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Estrada is an entirely different matter as it will prejudice the petitioner. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. as a general rule. or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. On the other hand. in the cases at bar. BUELA HELD: (1) The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail.

As a general rule. money x x x from illegal gambling. with respect to petitioner. the latter will have the right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the evidence against him for the charge of plunder is strong are those related to the alleged receipt or collection of money from illegal gambling as described in subparagraph (a) of the amended Information. had later become invalid. while initially valid under the law. BUELA of them is different. and even though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty. It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a Page | 170 . With the joinder of the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of the former President. habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail. T. in previous cases. The joinder of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition with the trial of former President Joseph E. 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued. The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the respondent court. x x x in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling Thus. for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes. The petitioner is merely charged with conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by "receiving or collecting. we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty. M. (4) The answer is in the negative." Thus. directly or indirectly. on several instances. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25. In exceptional circumstances. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies. because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25.

a petition for prohibition. 2001 FACTS: On May 1. since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. ISSUE: Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of against an imminent danger from warrantless arrest. Michael Ray B. vs. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Page | 171 . Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests. 147780. T. and the declaration of a "state of rebellion. 2001. Mancao. G. BUELA matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail. No." which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests. Enrile that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent developments finds no application in the present case because the hearing on petitioner's application for bail has yet to commence. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. R. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ. May 10. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected. and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition. or has not even exercised said discretion. She likewise issued General Order No. The delay in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio M.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and Cezar O. Lacson. They alleged that they are under imminent danger of being arrested. 147781 (DefensorSantiago Petition). et al. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed with the series of pleadings filed before the Sandiganbayan which totaled to 8 and 32 is those filed by other defendants will be considered. The ruling in Moncupa vs.R. mandamus. M. et al. 147780 (Lacson Petition). No. Aquino. HELD: petitioners' contention in G. injunction. PANFILO LACSON. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region.

Consequently. an information charging Adam with violation of Section 5. Verily. where he may adduce evidence in his defense. 2007 FACTS: PDEA charged Lovely Impal Adam with violation of RA 9165. M. On petition for review before the Department of Justice. 2007 granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the accused. BUELA Rules of Court. Page | 172 . ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA vs. the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of. T. 2006. Article 2 of R. Gonzalez found no probable cause to hold Adam liable for the offense charged The Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to withdraw the information. 175864. No. June 8. The inquest prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. unless otherwise held for another valid ground. Further. 9165 was filed before RTC. Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged.R. THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY G.A. petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam. PDEA filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary on December 8. On January 4. a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time The application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is not proper since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint a matter which remains speculative up to this very day. Secretary Raul M. Should the detention be without legal ground. No. Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 2007.

conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. June 17. Mangila was arrested on June 18. Page | 173 . et al G. T. 2003. Presiding Judge of the MTCC. including the warrant of arrest. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. Pangilinan. 160739. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) before the Municipal Trial Court On the following day.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. No. As a consequence. the entire records of the cases. 2003 and detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue. On the next day. one of the complainants. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest. BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of in case of warrantless arrests where there is pending motion to withdraw information before the trial court. Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. ANITA MANGILA vs. Judge Heriberto M. July 17.R. and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon. M. 2013 FACTS: petitioner Anita Mangila and four others were charged with seven criminal complaints of syndicated estafa and violations of Republic Act No. Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of his liberty. Mangila filed in the CA a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. PANGILINAN. Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation. HELD: Yes.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error. It is not a writ of error. and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC. certiorari or writ of error.M. M. does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face. where the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody under process. 2003. Moreover. could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal. T. 05-8-26-SC. for any reason. It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed only effective on October 3. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are. being lawful and pursuant to a court process. The function of habeas corpus.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Hence. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16. With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan. the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. HELD: The answer is in the negative. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course. Judge Pangilinan. was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. This is because the restraint. it cannot be issued where what is being questioned is the propriety of the issuance of the warrant of arrest and other remedies to inquire into such issue is no longer available. Page | 174 . BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus may be availed of on the ground that an accused in a criminal case when remedies such as motion to quash or motion to recall warrant of arrest is no longer available. habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. 2005 pursuant to A. null and void." His authority was expressly provided in Section 2. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant.

and third. 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Ma. only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE may be the subject of a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code).Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Valencia that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. T. Carlos Borbon. in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. It ruled that. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed. where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the Page | 175 . No. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY.R. Charles Christian: first. Lourdes E." In support of her petition. Eleosida. Correction/Cancellation of Entries (Rule 103 v. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical. that she and the boy's father. Borbon. it is deemed substantial. Lourdes B. the informant's name should be "Ma. and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON G. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. were never married. BUELA G. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida. ISSUE: whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature." instead of "Ma. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA vs. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents. 130277. the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank. and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. then the procedure to be adopted is summary. 1992. The trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Rule 108) MA. Change of Name v." second. Thus. and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. If the rectification affects the civil status. M. May 9. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition seeking to correct the following entries in the birth certificate of her son. authorizing changes or corrections. Petitioner filed the instant petition for review. In was held in Republic vs. citizenship or nationality of a party. petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24.

The trial court granted the petitions. within fifteen (15) days from notice. file his opposition thereto. after which it was set for hearing on August 9. a newspaper of general circulation. 5. 3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SEC. G. Petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature. BUELA opposite party's case. thus: SEC. the petition was published for three consecutive weeks4 in Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA. Opposition. 170340. T. June 29. Parties. Notice and publication. 2001. by an order. Trial Court’s decision was affirmed by the CA. 4.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 2007 FACTS: Carlito and his siblings filed a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry. the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which Page | 176 . and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. SEC. the court shall. The corrections to be made are as follows: (1) with respect to his and his siblings’ birth certificate. the deletion of the word married opposite the phrase “date of marriage of parents” as his parent were not legally married. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. fix the time and place for the hearing of the same. 1989 to January 21.—Upon the filing of the petition. to change the date of marriage from April 27. Herein petitioner assailed the decision of the Trial Court and the CA. (2) with respect to his birth certificate alone. No.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought. As required. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. and (3) with respect to his marriage certificate. CARLITO I. 2000. the date appearing in their marriage certificate. et al. to change the citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to “Filipino” and to delete his second name. KHO.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may. M.R. and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.

The purpose precisely of Section 4. Petitioner sought to drop Page | 177 . Verily. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. a petition for correction is an action in rem. BUELA indispensable parties. i. Rule 108. Rule 108. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. 2005 FACTS: The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore. notices were sent to the residence of Carlito which He shared with Marivel and their children. Thus. she was presented as witness during the proceedings. Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. should have been notified or impleaded. but were inadvertently left out. the mother and the wife respectively. Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. it seems highly improbable that Marivel or Carlito’s mother were unaware of the proceedings. As for Carlito’s mother. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name. IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG G. which requires notice by publication. No.e. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for correction of substantial entries in the birth and marriage certificates for which corresponding publication was made is invalidated by failure to implead indispensable parties.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. an action against a thing and not against a person. filed a petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Parenthetically. they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. a minor. represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang. such as Marivel and respondents’ parents.R. First. HELD: The answer is in the negative. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3. The defect was cured by compliance with Section 4. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. M. T. March 30. 159966.

In the case at bar. and was unaware of alien parentage. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous. the request should be denied. (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name. BUELA his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. M. Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry. Thus. (b) when the change results as a legal consequence. while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage. Secondly. T. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother. and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. he must show proper or reasonable cause. petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name could not warrant favorable action on his petition. in which case they may bear the father’s surname. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and Page | 178 . (c) when the change will avoid confusion. as in legitimation. Firstly. or any compelling reason which may justify such change. the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. Otherwise. that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle name—did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. However. ISSUE: Whether or not middle name may be dropped on the ground of convenience. trial court denied the petition. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. unless their father recognizes their filiation. HELD: The answer is in the negative. all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody. the law does not allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name. The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition—that is. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child.

M. for this purpose. and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and. petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation. Jr. and the use of the last name "Braza". spelling. the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. Cristina and Pablo. HELD: The answer is in the negative. MA. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo. December 4. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for correction of birth entries may be made praying the declaration of illegitimacy of filiation and of nullity of marriage of the parents of the person whose birth certificate is sought to be corrected. typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY. 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Ma. (Pablo) were married with three (3) children. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical. a mistake in copying or writing. No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry). to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation. NEGROS OCCIDENTAL. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. BUELA difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. vs. the name of the father and his acknowledgment. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate which states that Patrick was the legitimated son of Pablo by reason of his marriage to Lucille Titular subsequent to the birth of Patrick. or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement Page | 179 . et al. Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza Patrick as her and Pablo's son. et al. 181174. as guardians of the minor Patrick. When Pablo died. all surnamed Titular. T. Cecilia and Lucille. said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. G. 2) a directive to Leon. an error made by a clerk or a transcriber. Ma. Cristina and Pablo Sicad Braza.R. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA. the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community. 2007 FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio underwent sex change from male to female by way of surgery. the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. October 22. validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party. No. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings.R. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. ISSUE: Whether or not a person may successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous. HELD: A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he Page | 180 . in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 174689. Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. doctrinally. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15. he filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. respectively. tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. M. or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Thereafter. T. BUELA of the occupation of the parent. 2003. and Art.M. It is well to emphasize that.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. No. and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo. 171 of the Family Code. These causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A. hence. The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

(7) legitimations. a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.19 In addition. To correct simply means "to make or set aright.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. including those corresponding to his first name and sex. or (12) recovery of citizenship. he failed to show.20 In this case. events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. or even allege. and (16) changes of name. to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment Under RA 9048. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. were all correct. 2 ART. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 4072 and 4083 of the Civil Code. (4) legal separations." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. (14) judicial determination of filiation. (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor. BUELA thought he transformed himself into through surgery. (2) marriages. However. 3 ART. (9) acknowledgments of natural children. 407. he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. (5) annulments of marriage. Acts. T. M. (13) civil interdiction. (8) adoptions. Rather than avoiding confusion. (3) deaths. 408. Before a person can legally change his given name. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births. All entries therein. (10) naturalization. events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. Page | 181 . any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. However. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. No correction is necessary. The acts. (11) loss. (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning.

a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion. No. (2) Whether or not change of name may be allowed without complying with Rule 103 when such change is merely incidental to the substantial correction as to the gender following Rule 108. underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. the change of name to conform to the proper sex without filing a separate petition under Rule 103 is proper. tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized. she has become a male person. Act No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. Page | 182 . However. 9048. (2) As a rule the change of name is a matter of judicial discretion under Rule 103. HELD: (1) Under Rep. we find merit in respondent’s change of name. JENNIFER B. M. September 12. the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender. she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. T.R. 2008 FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate In her petition. Thus. 166676. she alleged that she was born on January 13. Thus. BUELA REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six. 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up. At age thirteen. CAGANDAHAN G. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not correction of entry under rule 108 does not allows change of "sex" or "gender" in the birth certificate on the ground of the petitioner’s inborn medical condition. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

No. it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the petition below. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented. Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings. In this case. T. earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. legitimacy of paternity or filiation. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations. While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing. which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA. and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. LUGSANAY UY G. the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open. 2013 FACTS: respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese. notwithstanding. the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent. NORMA S. BUELA REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. or legitimacy of marriage. when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties. August 12. including those on citizenship. Lugsanay” following her mother’s surname as her parents where never married. Her petition seeks to change her name from “Anita Sy” to “Norma S. DR. the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. This. HELD: The answer is in the negative. or when a party is inadvertently left out. The CA held that respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing ISSUE: Whether or not failure to implead indispensable parties aside from the local civil registrar in petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate is cured by the publication of the order setting the case for hearing.R. 198010. M. a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. Page | 183 .

it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. June 26.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY. No. HELD: (1) The answer is in the affirmative. T. and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). BUELA MINORU FUJIKI vs. 02-11-10-SC.R. The second marriage ended due to an alleged physical abuse committed by Maekara against Marinay. A recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment. The first marriage ended without being legally annulled due to Fujiki’s parents who does not favor the marriage. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. et al. (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines. On 14 January 2011. and (2) that under A." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized. In 2010. Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "a special proceeding Page | 184 . a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. G. 2013 FACTS: Marinay contracted two marriages. Fujiki and Marinay met again in Japan and reestablished their relationship. Rule 1. 196049. first with Petitioner Fujiki and second with Maekara. (2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.M. Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). ISSUE: (1) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The RTC motu proprio dismissed of the petition on the following grounds: (1) that a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry) may not be done to recognize a foreign judgment which is effect collaterally attacks the validity of or to nullify marriages. M. No.

" Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. or a particular fact. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. No. (2) The answer in the affirmative. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A. Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Any person interested in any act. death or marriage. No. BUELA is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status. the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.M. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce. as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." While it was repeatedly held that a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for a direct action to invalidate a marriage under the Family Code. Rule 108. this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register. Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 8369. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court. a right. 3753.M. which the State has an interest in recording. Tomas this Court declared that "the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage.A. No. No. Sto. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. event. M. which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Neither can R. These are facts of public consequence such as birth. The procedure in A. T. In Corpuz v.A. nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R. may file a verified petition for Page | 185 ." The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.

the supposed solemnizing officer. M. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga. but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent. which compromises the public record of his marriage. at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated. who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office. at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). and.R. as parties to the case. Upon receipt thereof. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry. a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract. respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores. She. 2002. as well as her alleged husband. 2014 FACTS: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Branch 1. No. thus. she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune. because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. February 10.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City. that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. Lastly. During trial. 189538. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. Palace of Justice. MERLINDA L. BUELA the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto. T. with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. she did not appear before the solemnizing officer. OLAYBAR G. an employee of MTCC. on June 24. especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Page | 186 . a Korean National. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. Prerogative Writs DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ et al. et al. it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code. intimidation and threats and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Otherwise stated. the trial court did not. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage.R. vs. Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national. June 17. 2008 FACTS: Private respondents spouses Sanson claiming to be owners of 1+ hectare parcel of land located at Boracay filed complaint for forcible entry on the ground of force. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for correction of entry in the civil registrar may be availed of to correct the marriage status of a person who claimed that she had never been married. no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. T. the procedures were followed. M. the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Aside from the certificate of marriage. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of. in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof. No. G. Rather. H. Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. 182484. not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of. in any way. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The MCTC rendered a Page | 187 . Respondent indeed sought. and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO. BUELA Contrary to petitioner’s stand. we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent.

Writ of Amparo is not a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. the factual allegations of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo provides that the private respondents availed of the help of armed men and intrude into the property alleged to be owned by petitioners by firing shotguns and burning their houses. petitioners filed herein petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data Contrary to the factual findings of the MCTC. petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA. property and security arising from property dispute. a petition for issuance of writ of amparo may be availed of against an alleged violence or threats committed against a person’s life. On appeal with RTC. as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life. Pending resolution of the MR. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. liberty or security. the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related Page | 188 . The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life. CA denied the petition but petitioners filed an MR. liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. Assailing the RTC decision. RTC upheld the decision of MCTC and subsequently issued a writ of permanent mandatory injunction and order of demolition. (2) Whether or not writ of habeas data may be availed of for purposes of mandating the authorities to release an information on alleged arson committed in relation to a property dispute where such information was never sought in the main action over possession of the property in dispute. and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. HELD: (1) The answer is in the negative. or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. BUELA decision in the private respondents' favor. Petition for a writ of habeas data is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence allegedly employed against them by the private respondents. T. M.

BUELA and focused on the disputed land. (2) The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ. I – XIII. June 5. et al. in a proper case. INC. No.. M. G. to an application for the issuance of the writ. vs. freedom and/or rights to shelter filed the instant petition for the issuance of writ of amparo. as in this case. there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment. the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court . ARMANDO Q. applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N.R.. We see no legal bar. Thus. the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. CANLAS. Petitioners alleging that they were deprived of their liberty. In these lights. the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo. Pasig City. et al. has not also been shown. 2008 FACTS: Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan. we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition. liberty or security . if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data .had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. Where. ISSUE: Whether or not a demolition of dwelling pursuant to a final and executory judgment is a ground for the issuance of writ of amparo on the ground that petitioners had been deprived of their liberty and/or right to shelter. 182795.the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect .is immediately in danger or threatened. They alleged that the titles which is the basis of a final judgment ordering the demolition of their houses is spurious and is issued by fraudulently by unprincipled land officials. however. based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information. Page | 189 . or is about to be demolished pursuant to a judgment of the Supreme Court. In sum. or that the danger or threat is continuing. T. by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari.

Hence. AMANDA T. BUELA HELD: The answer is in the negative. 08-1-16-SC). Their claim to their dwelling. P/SUPT. Respondents later filed a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data and averred that despite the TRO petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy equipment. assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court.. vs. secure and maintain the possession of the property. therefore. Notwithstanding that the judgment in the said case had become final and executory.12 ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of amparo may be issued against those who allegedly entered the petitioner’s property unlawfully in violation of a previously issued TRO. tore down the barbed wire fences and tents. Upon remand. 2009 FACTS: Provincial Government of Bulacan is the winning party in an unlawful detainer case against Respondent Spouses Cruz. no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. and FERDINAND T. liberty and security. MTC again decided in favor of the Provincial Government of Bulacan and issued a writ of demolition. CRUZ G. and arrested them when they resisted petitioners’ entry RTC granted the petition. Respondent obtained a TRO from the RTC. No. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO et al. respondents refused to vacate the property and clashed with Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al." entered the property. No. 182165.M. M.R. Consequently. November 25. the present petition for review on certiorari. T. who were deployed by the City Mayor to "protect. Invoking the TRO. HELD: Page | 190 .M. CRUZ. pursuant to Section 1910 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A. There is. respondents were arrested. RTC further ordered the remand of the case to MTC. is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. the latter as able to obtain an injunction from the RTC.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. DR. No. Despite execution of the writ of execution. does not constitute right to life. 07-9-12SC). CRUZ.11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A. NIXON T.

AVELINO I. a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism (Kasim evidence). through a letter. respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right tolife. GEN. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life.R. Page | 191 . among other considerations. on the finding that Col. No undue confinement or detention was present. respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest. BUELA The answer is in the negative. It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation. RAZON vs.5 that he was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan. there and then willfully. as well as the haphazard investigations conducted that did not translate into any meaningful results. liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison. that Tagitis was a liaison for the JI. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. it was held that a wirt of amparo is not a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance. the Supreme Court rendered confirming the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. In the case of Tapuz v. imminent or continuing threat to their life. February 16. Kasim’s information. Kasim) informed the respondent Mary Jean Tagitis (respondent) and her friends that her husband had been under surveillance since January 2007 because an informant notified the authorities. No. 2009. T. In fact. 182498. forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly. the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)" will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. together with the consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently. 2010 FACTS: On December 3. the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property. The Supreme Court considered Col. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granting the Writ of Amparo.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs. MARY JEAN B. liberty and security. conspiracy and in contempt of court. Del Rosario. M. TAGITIS G. The decision was based. to be indicative of government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis.

No. to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all the other pieces of adduced evidence. T. 2010 FACTS: Petitioner.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Kasim by a personal intelligence "asset" without any other evidence to support it. Kasim’s disclosure unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. although the Kasim evidence was patently hearsay (and was thus incompetent and inadmissible under our rules of evidence). Thus. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO et al. an American citizen of Filipino descent. September 7. to our mind. even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test. In other words. G. filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court. BUELA Herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Tarlacm she and her companions were abducted and tortured for five day. 189155. and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. ROXAS. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. We noted that while we must follow the substantial evidence rule. we must also observe flexibility in considering the evidence that we shall take into account. M. Specifically. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents. the petitioners contend that Supreme Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to Col. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of Writ of Amparo on the basis of a hearsay evidence is valid. we introduced a new evidentiary standard for Writ of Amparo cases in this wise: The fair and proper rule. is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality.e. Page | 192 ..R. MELISSA C. ROXAS vs. the unique evidentiary difficulties posed by enforced disappearance cases compel us to adopt standards that were appropriate and responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. She alleged that while doing a volunteer work in La Paz. we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i. Thus.

means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. Bernas. liberty or security." Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability. "command responsibility. reception of evidence and appropriate action. in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life. ISSUE: Whether or not a government officials may be impleaded as respondent in a writ of amparo on the ground of command responsibility. T. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and. gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention. if not incorrect. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance. as well as the sounds of construction. are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement. by so doing. Petitioner contested the CA decision and filed a petitioner for review on certiorari. CA granted the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data. it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government. M. Page | 193 . BUELA In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009." in its simplest terms. extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not. The use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility is legally inaccurate. However.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Petitioner argues that (1) the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out. by this account. this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing. HELD: The answer is in the negative. as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court. were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court. and (2) petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition According to Fr.

or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. CA denied petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus (The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus Page | 194 . Baliaga. In which case. civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. on the other hand. No. A petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus and writ of amparo was filed before the SC. issued a writ of habeas corpus but hold in abeyance the ruling on the merits of Amparo and referred the same to CA to allow Lt. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner. T. BURGOS vs. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way. among them. HERMOGENES ESPERON et al. M. G. it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt. the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. February 4. 2014 FACTS: This case relates the proceedings on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos. or at least accountability. that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not. or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence. killing or threats. It must be clarified. pursuant to CHR’s initial report. however. refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above. by action or omission. preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Jr.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.R. whether that may be criminal. or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure. SC. BUELA fix liability for such disappearance. the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. but have failed to discharge. Accountability. or those who carry. to comment on the CHR Report. by any measure. 178497. GEN. EDITA T. as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft. commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility. in an enforced disappearance.

Jr. ISSUE: Whether or not after the grant of petition for issuance of writ of amparo. the writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced Page | 195 . CA directed PNP and AFT to conduct an exhaustive investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos. the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the Court among others to: xxx (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion). v. M. operating together. Tagitis. BUELA is not the illegal confinement or detention of Jonas. 2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall. T. CHR was also directed to continue with its own independent investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Thus. The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested to remain anonymous) documentary evidence proving that an intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army and 56th Infantry Battalion. to determine who is responsible or accountable. but his enforced disappearance) and granted the issuance of writ of amparo. The SC resolved to deny the motion for re-issuance of the writ of amparo and to refer the case to the CA based on newly discovered evidence. It should be emphasized that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance. On April 1. and (3) refer the cases to the CA for further hearing on the newly discovered evidence. the CA held that Lt. Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance. The CA found that the totality of the evidence supports the petitioner’s allegation that the military was involved in the enforced disappearance of Jonas. The ROLE of SC in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place. Quezon City. Commonwealth Avenue. and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. captured Jonas on April 28. As we held in Razon. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the PNP were accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas. 2013. it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already ongoing. a new writ of amparo may be issued on the basis of newly discovered evidence HELD: No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

DOLOT vs. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not RTC may motu proprio dismiss a petition for continuing mandamus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction following A. which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. criminal. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12. At this stage. damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. MARICRIS D. M.O. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions. August 27. In this case. RTC relied on SC Administrative Order (A. and Administrative Circular (Admin. 2011. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it directs. No. the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12. and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency. (3) Whether or not a petition for issuance of continuing mandamus requires the attachment of judicial affidavits. (2) Whether or not a final judgment finding that the public officials failed to act on the contemplated environmental issue is a condition precedent for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus.R. 2011. T. RTC further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree. petitioners filed a petition for continuing mandamus." The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Baliaga. order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on. 23-2008. RAMON PAJE (DENR) G.) No. Circular) No. 199199. 2013 FACTS: On September 15. (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law. Page | 196 . investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us. No. the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. as required by the rules. HON. BUELA disappearance of an individual. On September 16.O.

and does not restrict their access to the courts. These administrative order issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. it would serve the higher interest of justice if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case No. Circular No. order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that Page | 197 . 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution. to wit: Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. Under the Rules. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties. the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. T. with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case. The final court decree. decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4(c). as it relates to the place of trial. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A. 7 and Admin. the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government. Similarly. Venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. Rule 1 of the Rules. Section 7 and such judgment has become final. the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners. order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.O. BUELA HELD: (1) Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect. No. M.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment. Consequently. At most. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress. (2) The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment.

contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. M. in essence. the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket." (3) RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. BUELA the judgment has been fully implemented.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. A writ of continuing mandamus is. albeit not prohibited. Page | 198 . It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits. Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified. a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision. T.

CA reversed the trial court and denied petitioner’s application for naturalization. since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal. cadastral and election cases. the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 4 provides that: “These rules shall not apply to land registration. Preliminary Consideration ONG CHIA vs. The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. and other cases not herein provided for. the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132. he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking. except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. with whom he had four children. naturalization and insolvency proceedings. justified the reversal of the trial court’s decision. on the basis of which. T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. On appeal. Petitioner’s principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant’s brief and. otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law. On July 4. HELD: The answer is in the negative. at the age of 66.A. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient. §34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. Sec." Since then. In 1932. married a Filipina. 2000 FACTS: Petitioner was born in Amoy.R.” Prescinding from the above. No. as a nine-year old boy. China. in fact. March 27. they are mere "scraps of paper” devoid of any evidentiary value ISSUE: Whether or not the rules on evidence applies to a petition for naturalization. appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings Page | 199 . M. 127240. BUELA EVIDENCE A. 473. 1989. It ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases." That is not the case here. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS G. he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business. Rule 1. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence during the trial. he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C. No.

Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. No. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. cancelled checks. T. CECILIA ZULUETA vs. ISSUE: whether or not documents and/or correspondence taken by one spouse without the consent of the owner spouse may be used by former against the latter as evidence in an action for disqualification to practice a profession. February 20." Page | 200 . Hence this petition. and photographs. diaries. entered the clinic of her husband. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. On appeal. and in the presence of her mother. Dr. a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents. Dr. Martin’s passport. RTC rendered judgment for private respondent. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise. After trial. M." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding. a driver and private respondent’s secretary. Martin and his alleged paramours. 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta. HELD: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.R. Consequently. wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN G. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner. a doctor of medicine. as prescribed by law. greetings cards. BUELA are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 107383.

Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. by contracting marriage. HELD: Page | 201 . the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage. (5) the dirty white shirt with collar found at the crime scene was stained by blood.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. it was found to be identical to that of accused’s DNA. (6) when the blood stain and accused’s blood was subjected to DNA testing. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. May 19. NO. 2004 FACTS: Appellant Yatar was charged and convicted of Rape with Homicide by the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not. (3) latter on he was seen wearing a dirty white shirt with collar. to: (1) the presence of the accused at the crime scene within the timeframe of the approximate time of death of the victim. it was found that it contained the same DNA. 12 and 17 of Art. A person. save for specified exceptions. (7) that when semen found inside the victim’s body was subjected to DNA testing. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. (2) at one point prior to the commission accused was seen wearing a white shirt with collar. In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence. But one thing is freedom of communication. The basis of the conviction rest on circumstantial evidence gathered from the testimony of various witnesses. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT G. M. a dirty white shirt was seen beside her.R. T. 150224. taking of accused’s blood sample and subjecting the same to DNA testing is inadmissible in evidence as it amounts to violation of his right against self-incrimination. (4) when the body of the victim was found. BUELA The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. III of the Constitution.

T. 1989. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion. 1988. Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor. Gallarde. the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him. 155208. blood and DNA. herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating.R. Hence. It was held in People v. As a consequence. On 1989. NENA LAZALITA* TATING vs. 2000. March 27. in the presence of counsel. we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. Daniela sold her property to her granddaughter. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. G.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. BUELA Accused’s contention is untenable. where immediately after the incident. paraffin. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972 1988 Daniela died on July 29. The right against selfincrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. Daniela’s heirs herein respondents found a sworn statement executed by Danila stating that she had actually no intention of selling the property. M. the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property. NO. but against testimonial compulsion. Page | 202 . Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination. Under People v. et al. a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting. for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel. title thereto was transferred in the name of Nena. photographing. 2007 FACTS: On 1969. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA. It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused. On September 6.

T. ISSUE: Whether or not a statement made to another person by a victim of murder before he died is admissible as evidence.R. Page | 203 . a trust relationship was created between them. February 22. which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. BUELA cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena. Moreover. No. On appeal. and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements. as a consequence. The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine her. the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Estaño that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told him that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA Y BELLO G. 2012 FACTS: Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged and convicted of murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon. However. his conviction was affirmed by the CA. unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay. The basis of the conviction is the testimony of the victim’s uncle Rodolfo B. the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that. For this reason. 1977. HELD: No. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead. CA Affirmed its decision. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28. petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in evidence. 173476. ISSUE: Whether or not a sworn statement/affidavit of a deceased may be given probative value for purposes of deciding a complaint. M.

and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. homicide. and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. At the time of his statement.e. T. BUELA HELD: Yes. or both. to wit: (a) the principal act. having sustained a stab wound in the chest.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital. and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide.. or by the opinion of his physician. or parricide. Surely. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño. facts. (b) that at the time the declaration is made. (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness. (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise. The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. the res gestae. statements made in his presence. Res gestae refers to the circumstances. his stabbing by Salafranca. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur. Bolanon was conscious of his impending death. i. M. Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence.There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence. in which the declarant is a victim. murder. Lastly. such as the nature of his wounds. when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño. A dying declaration. although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character. is a startling occurrence. the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death . An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the Page | 204 . All the requisites were met herein. or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae. may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur. namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death. identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him.

However. M. Trial court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI. February 28. G. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a defendant who failed to conduct cross-examination due to its own fault may questioned the admissibility of the evidence for violation of hearsay rule. T. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.R. SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. the right to cross-examine may be waived. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. The repeated Page | 205 . During Pre-Trial. Rule 130. BUELA startling occurrence. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time. The appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment. and (2) that due execution and authenticity of private documents evidencing the loan was not proved during trial. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator. Upon failure of SCC to pay. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision. SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. 2001 FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc. then the same is admissible.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the rule does admit of an exception. SIHI filed an action for a sum of money. 128538. et al. SCC admitted the existence of the loan executed through its officers. HELD: (1) Petitioner’s reliance on Section 36. (SIHI). (2) Whether or not the due execution of loan documents is necessary when the existence of the loan had already been admitted during pre-trial. However. As a rule. SCC elevated the case before the SC with the following contentions: (1) that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated in violation of Sections 36. It is settled that it is the opportunity to crossexamine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. No.

00. 143276.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. NO. T. are the registered owners of 19+ hectares of agricultural land situated in Camarines Norte. In concluding that the valuation of respondents property. After the pre-trial. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.918.000. Page | 206 . What Need Not Be Proved LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.00. July 20.chanrob1es virtua1. Respondents filed before the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court’s finding that petitioner had waived its right to crossexamine the opposing party’s witness. RTC merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in another case pending before it and applied the same to instant case without conducting a hearing. (2) No.55. Unsatisfied with the Landbank valuation and the subsequent affirmance of such by PARAD. respondents.R. Petitioner Landbank valued the expropriated portion at P173. Trial court computed the just compensation for a total of P703. Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. BUELA failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL G. which is beyond respondents valuation of P623. 2004 FACTS: Spouses Banal. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party’s witness. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired by DAR pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity.137. the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda. B. M.

Trial court convicted the seven accused positively identified by the victims. Nos.R. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party. G. to wit: SEC. Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to crossexamine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. or on request of a party. 3. may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. he contends that the latter’s testimony should not be used against him. Melquiades Feliciano. 1998 FACTS: Appellants were charge with five (5) counts of kidnapping for ransom and three (3) counts of kidnapping before the RTC. T. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Page | 207 . who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. M. The RTC failed to observe the above provisions. 100901-08. Section 3. BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the records of one case pending before it and apply the same to another case also pending with it without conducting trial and without the knowledge or consent of the parties. and before judgment or on appeal. on its own initiative or on request of a party. JAILON KULAIS et al. vs. which are not obtaining here. After the trial. July 16. when hearing necessary. the proper court.Judicial notice. Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter. the court. Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. on its own initiative. plaintiff-appellee. may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. During the trial. HELD: The answer is in the negative.

LAUREANO vs. Hence. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous crossexaminations conducted by appellant’s counsel. even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court. No. or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. since plaintiff was employed in Singapore. 2000 FACTS: Sometime in 1978. plaintiff is an expatriate employed by Respondent Singapore Airlines Limited on a contractual basis which is stipulated to last for five (5) years.R. Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. HELD: No. defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. MENANDRO B. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED G. all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. HELD: Page | 208 . Plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo. included in the termination is herein plaintiff. that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano. February 2. courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings. BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the testimony of one witness in a case pending before it and use the same to another case also pending with it. due to recession. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims. where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Having said that. it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. we note. however. This is especially true in criminal cases. However. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiff’s employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that. Thus. T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 114776. ISSUE: Whether or not courts may take judicial notice of foreign law. Respondent decided to terminate some of their pilots. M. As a general rule.

KHADDAFY JANJALANI G. confessing his participation in the Valentine's Day bombing incident.R. accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident. Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3. 2011 FACTS: Herein accused were charged of multiple murder in relation to the Valentines Day bombing. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.Abu Solaiman . CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs. After the bombing. BUELA The answer is in the negative. 195649. 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. In another exclusive interview on the network. T. the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group . et al.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Therefore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not courts may consider applicability of foreign laws to a case upon reference to it by one of the parties. Page | 209 . The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice.announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. July 2.R. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. As stipulated during pretrial. Finally. he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks. HELD: The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. The Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. G. NO. 188314. January 10. which must be presented as public documents of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof. 2013 FACTS: Arnado filed herein Motion for Reconsideration assailing the previous decision of the Supreme Court as to his disqualification to run as mayor. M. confirming that shortly before the explosion. the Philippine law should be applied." Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case. No.

M. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. Rule 130 of the Rule of Court provides that statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. Section 30. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. Admission by conspirator. BUELA accused Asali gave a television interview. 30. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Page | 210 . While Section 30. Accused were convicted largely due to the testimony of Asali who turned state witness and the testimony of the conductor who identified the two accused to be those who alighted from his bus shortly before the bomb exploded. confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad. T. Distinction must be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. Section 30. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a co-conspirator made during a televised interview and repeated during trial may be admissible as evidence against a coconspirator. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant's co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. if the declarant repeats the statement in court. his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission.

2011 FACTS: In 1993. the petitioner filed a Motion stating that petitioner wishes to adopt in Civil Case No.R. 152375. This rule though admits of exceptions. introduced and admitted in evidence is but a "child" of the "parent" case. Hence. Petitioner then filed another motion asking SB to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition. together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not courts in trying consolidated cases may take judicial notice of testimony and evidence presented in one of the cases consolidated. generally. and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Bane and Rolando Gapud for the reason that said deponents are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the respondents. petitioner filed the instant motion alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of SB’s refusal to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence. This motion partly denied insofar as the adoption of testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. the initiative is upon the Court. evidence offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent" case. or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. 0009. Such being the case. courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a Page | 211 . This provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings. As a matter of convenience to all the parties. to wit: Judicial notice is found under Rule 129. This was again denied by the SB. T. HELD: In adjudicating a case on trial. Civil Case No. 0009 testimonies and the documentary exhibits presented and identified by them in another related case. At the trial of Civil Case No. SB ordered the consolidation cases related to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos Family and cronies. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary. the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant. SANDIGANBAYAN et al. Petitioner asserts that the case where the Bane deposition was originally taken. M. G. No. BUELA REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 0009. under this relationship. Petitioner’s 3rd motion was again denied by SB. December 16.

we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case. or when the original record of the former case or any part of it. which. the adverse party. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases. where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it. when. During the trial. the following persons were presented as witnesses: (1) two members of the raiding team. Furthermore the item seized was immediately sent to the laboratory without presenting the same to the judge who issued the warrant. i. The member of the raiding team who conducted the recording and marking of the seized items were not presented. Object/Real Evidence JUNIE MALILLIN Y. petitioner was charged with violation illegal possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165.. 2008 FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure. is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s argument. BUELA case pending before it. M. and absent an objection from. and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. at the request or with the consent of the parties. No. and (2) the forensic chemist who examined the seized items. warranting the dismissal of the latter case. He appealed from the said decision and averred that there was irregularity on the conduct of the search. Accused was convicted. Rules of Admissibility 1. Furthermore. which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case. in all likelihood. with the knowledge of. LOPEZ vs. the forensic chemist admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory Page | 212 . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. involve issues of varying complexity. reference is made to it for that purpose. Esternon and Bulanon. The search allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance. simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases.e. C. a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner. Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.R. 172953. Accordingly. April 30. T. by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated.

9165 mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served. HELD: No. Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. M. People v. Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory of the same. where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession. Esternon deviated he brought the seized items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of making a "true inventory" thereof. BUELA by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed. but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioner's house. T. they would have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency. Page | 213 . Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. as required by Rule 126. Go characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties. in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received. Del Castillo declared that the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and without it. Section 1246 of the Rules of Court.A. No. from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence. Thus. People vs. as a reasonable safeguard. The items seized were not presented to the judge who issued the warrant. The chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain. Likewise. the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very purpose for the enactment. together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of the raiding team and the forensic chemist is sufficient to establish the identity of the seized items by virtue of a search warrant.

Accused appealed the decision of the RTC and claimed that: (1) his guilt was not prove beyond reasonable doubt due to failure of the police did not conduct a prior surveillance on him before conducting the buy-bust operation. the implementing rules provides that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds. as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are Page | 214 . T. Thereafter. Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory examination. where they were received by PO2 Fernando Dulnuan. in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received. The appellant was transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained. conducted an examination on the specimen submitted. and found it to be positive for the presence of shabu. Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero. the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory. for laboratory examination. M. For this reason. where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession. The accused was charged with violation of RA 9165 and was convicted. 2010 FACTS: Captain de Vera.R. and (2) a period of two days had elapsed from the time the shabu was confiscated to the time it was forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination. August 12. No. FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO G.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. HELD: No. SPO1 Balido and PO3 Almarez conducted a buy-bust operation which resulted to the apprehension of the herein accused. BUELA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISSUE: Whether or not chain of custody was sufficiently established when the two day period which lapsed between the day of apprehension and day of turnover to the laboratory was not explained. 179029. The chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain. or on December 29. and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory. PO3 Almarez transmitted the letter-request. The strict compliance to the chain of custody rule may not always be possible under field conditions. from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence. Two days later. the buy-bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police Station for investigation. the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. 2003. At the police station.

noncompliance thereof is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case. Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment rental. Respondent also presented the following evidence: (1) certificate of live birth of Christian Paulo which she allegedly filled up with entries supposedly dictated by the Petitioner. his presence during and after delivery of respondent’s baby. and (2) baptismal certificate. 180284. These lapses. NARCISO SALAS vs. However. where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan. the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified. M. had not been established. the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory. As earlier discussed. Page | 215 . must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds.R. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM G. In the present case." Thus. September 11. and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. T. respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. however. photographing of the seized drugs and the details of the turn over during the two day period. the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu. At the trial. respondent’s attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the bill. as well as the person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days. police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses. 2013 FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas and claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas. her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioner’s wife at the headquarters.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The records show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo. No. as in the present case. his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her. BUELA properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. and later examined by PSI Quintero. shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. In his answer. 2003.

registrar. or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent. Thus. T. BUELA On April 5.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. In the absence of the foregoing evidence. the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. 1999. while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents. they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the Page | 216 . M. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines. if the father did not sign in the birth certificate. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Hence. Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment. doctor. illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. the placing of his name by the mother. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that CA erred in holding that the filiation of Christian Paulo was duly established pursuant to article 175 in relation to article 172 of the Family Code and existing jurisprudence and therefore entitled to support from the petitioner ISSUE: Whether or not illegitimate filiation may be proved by mere testimonial evidence that the alleged father provided financial support and unsigned birth certificate and love letters. Furthermore. or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The accused-appellant. On appeal. 9165. as provided under Section 21 of R. 9165. The People. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. countered that although the requirements under Section 21 of R. No.R. 196973. and their informant conducted a buy-bust operation which resulted to the apprehension of herein accused. A. T. The trial court found Posing GUILTY.A. The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters. Thus. RUPER POSING Y ALAYON G. BUELA dates so specified. the accused-appellant. the accused was charged with violation of both Sections 5 and 11. non-compliance with the same. PO1 Ralph Nicart. of R. 9165 has been held to be mandatory. hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. does not necessarily warrant an Page | 217 . even if these notes were authentic. 2013 FACTS: SPO1 Angeles together with PO1 Jesus Cortez. July 31. and (4) the police officers failed to prepare an inventory report of the confiscated drugs. (2) SPO1 Angeles was not able to recall who brought the drug specimens to the crime laboratory. Consequently. no photographs of the same were taken in the presence of the accused-appellant and that of a representative from the media or the Department of Justice or any elected public official. through the Office of the Solicitor General. they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) visà. Article II. M. argued that the following instances would constitute a break in the chain of custody of the seized plastic sachets of shabu: (1) SPO1 Angeles failed to identify the duty officer to whom he turned over the alleged confiscated shabu. (3) SPO1 Angeles failed to mark the confiscated sachets at the crime scene immediately after the accused-appellant was arrested. A. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity. which ultimately affected the chain of custody of the confiscated drugs. No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. No. contended that the police officers’ failed to comply with the proper procedure in the handling and custody of the seized drugs.

Time and again. and (2) witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the item. the specimens were delivered by PO1 Nicart to the PNP Crime Laboratory for quantitative and qualitative examination. jurisprudence is consistent in stating that less than strict compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible. In this case. unless there is evidence to the contrary. through the testimonies of its witnesses that the integrity of the seized item was preserved every step of the process. and then turned over the same to the desk officer. the defense failed to show any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police operatives to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an innocent person. Finally. BUELA acquittal. from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence. In addition. who in turn handed it to PO1 Sales. the accused-appellant did not interpose any evidence in support of his defense aside from his bare denial. The latter then prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination. Jabonillo. In Malillin v. After the sale of shabu and another sachet was discovered in the person of accused-appellant. such as in the case of appellant. M. we laid down the chain of custody requirements that must be met in proving that the seized drugs are the same ones presented in court: (1) testimony about every link in the chain. marked the drug specimens. the prosecution was able to prove. In this regard. it was averred that the police officers are entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. SPO1 Angeles. Page | 218 . T. ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody rule provided under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be followed strictly. conducted by Engr. who was the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and on the same day. it remains a question why no administrative charges were brought against the police operatives. if these were simply trumped-up charges against him. credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. Incidentally. People. In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act. HELD: The answer is in the negative.

45 caliber pistol.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. It was stipulated during the pre-trial that there were four plastic sachets of shabu but prosecution witness SI Saul testified that as poseur-buyer. do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. 198318. as well as to mark the sachets at the place of arrest. Thereafter. BUELA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. the marked money. November 27. as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. the buy-bust team brought accused-appellants to the NBI Headquarters in Manila. No. and the motorcycle. Accused were charged and convicted by the trial court. the buy-bust team seized from accused-appellants’ possession two other sachets of shabu. T. SI Saul testified that in addition to the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-appellants. did not include the two other sachets of shabu seized from accused-appellants’ possession. there were two more sachets of shabu recovered from accused-appellants’ possession by the buy-bust team during the body search conducted incidental to accused-appellants’ lawful arrest. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. ISSUE: Whether or not there was substantial compliance to chain of custody when not seized items where included in the inventory. No details were provided about the seizure of the other two sachets of shabu. 2013 FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs in violation of RA 9165. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. During the search incidental to accused-appellants’ arrest.R. he bought and received only two sachets of shabu from accused-appellants. the failure of the police officers to make a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu. the inventory report. They were apprehended through a buy-bust operation conducted by the joint team of NBI and PDEA. J. 4 Penned by Leonardo-De Castro. accused-appellant Asir’s . M. Jurisprudence has decreed that. in dangerous drugs cases. However. ASIR GANI y ALIH and NORMINA GANI y GALOS4 G. Page | 219 . Accused-appellants further point out that the prosecution’s evidence conflicted as to the number of sachets of shabu seized from them. During trial.

36 plus interest and penalty fee. 5 Page | 220 .388. failed to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 35 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. September 23. RTC affirmed the MTC Decision in toto. 1995. the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of the credit card. prosecution witness. as well Section 3. However. CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips as proof of the obligation are insufficient to prove any liability on respondent’s part. MASTERCARD vs. On appeal. as of January 20. Rule 130. no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered. This prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for collection. exceptions. Accordingly.A. or cannot be produced in court. Documentary Evidence Best Evidence Rule CITIBANK. petitioner claims that respondent was not able to pay his bills despite demand.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. M. SI Saul. for which he tendered various payments. and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. when SI Saul only bought two sachets during the buy. was able to explain why there were a total of four sachets of shabu presented during trial. they are inadmissible because petitioner. Original document must be produced. 150905. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. However. HELD: The answer is in the negative.bust operation. 2. without bad faith on the part of the offeror. as the offeror.R. petitioner presented several sales invoices or charge slips. the MTC ordered him to pay petitioner the amount of P24. 2003 FACTS: Respondent made various purchases through his credit card. Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures of respondent. During the trial. BUELA In this case. EFREN S. N. The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation following Section 3. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document. No. ISSUE: Whether or not mere photocopies as proof of obligations is admissible as evidence where unavailability of the original thereof was not explained or proved during trial. TEODORO G. Accordingly. T. he was billed by petitioner for those purchases. As such. except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed.

however. M. or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document. In the present case. 2013 FACTS: Respondents employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various PLDT offices in Metro Manila area.R. Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices. 189404. First. Both parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the NLRC. the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims and illegal dismissal. INC. On the other hand. December 11. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals. or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated 6 Page | 221 . failed to prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost or destroyed. the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original. Rule 130. T. the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. SEC. POWER MASTER. 5. and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards. execution.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. respondent’s obligation was not established. Subsequently. petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the deletion of the supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered from infirmities. may prove its contents by a copy. upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part. Petitioner. BUELA as the conditions of their admissibility. vs. Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. G. the (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole. No. Labor Arbiter (LA) partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. WILGEN LOON et al. They attached photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal. the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. loss. the offeror.et al. and contents. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence. 6 months after filing their notice of appeal. or cannot be produced in court. and (3) on the part of the offeror. (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court in accordance with Section 56.

Instead.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling. 2002. the liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence. Third¸ the attached documentary evidence on the supplemental appeal bore the petitioners’ forged signatures. BUELA supplemental appeal was not verified. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals. Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection. HELD: The answer is in the negative. especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings. T. ISSUE: Whether or not mere photocopies as documentary evidence filed 6 months from notice of appeal are admissible in evidence where there is an allegation of forgery by the adverse party. in this case. failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. It maintained that the absence of the petitioners’ signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable factor for their authenticity. NLRC giving weight to the photocopy of computerized payroll records ruled in favor of respondent. Respondents. M. Page | 222 . it was belatedly filed six months from the filing of the respondents’ notice of appeal with memorandum on appeal. and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the respondents’ filing of a responsive pleading until December 18. Failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. Second. While strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required in labor cases.

petitioner alleged that the subject property had already been extra-judicially partitioned between the heirs of Vitaliano and Perfecto. The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record. JOSE and SONIA A. Anent violation of Best Evidence Rule. this petition for review on certiorari where petitioners argued that the cadastral map. except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. (2) had long been partitioned between her two sons. its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. They now claimed that the property was not partitioned with specific metes and bounds. Later on the complaint was amended to an action for recovery. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. M. the certified true copy of cadastral map and the municipal assessor's records. While in their original answer. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding Page | 223 . HELD: The answer is in the negative. January 27. Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila. MONTEIRO G. Hence. vs. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. 2014 FACTS: Respondent spouses filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages against the petitioners. and (3) that owned 1/3 of the portion of Perfecto’s share by virtue of a deed of sale executed between them and one of Perfecto’s heir. No. RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document. Respondent alleged: (1) that the disputed property was originally owned by Buenaseda. ISSUE: Whether or not a certified true copy of cadastral map is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it violates the best evidence rule and hearsay rule. Pedro. T. no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.R. 201011. What is cleared among the heirs is their respective shares thereof.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. BUELA THERESITA DIMAGUILA et al. is inadmissible in violation of the best evidence rule and hearsay rule. they subsequently changed their position when the complaint was amended. which serves as the basis of the alleged partition.

ORTAÑEZ vs. or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. January 23. they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are primafacie evidence of the facts stated therein. Private respondents. No. M. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were never reflected in the deeds of sale Page | 224 . BUELA list of claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. et al. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. Offshoot. and petitioner’s acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions. When the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. T. supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person. respectively as evidence by two (2) deed of sale. 107372.00.000. As such. 1997 FACTS: Private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land for a consideration of P35. but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. The DENR is the department tasked to execute.R. clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR.000. THE COURT OF APPEALS. As to the Hearsay Rule. petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. It is. Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. as mandated by law. G.00 and P20. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines. Parole Evidence RAFAEL S. therefore.

at or before the signing of the document. and ELIAS Q. As a contract. LAPULAPU FOUNDATION. we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. as in this case. INC. T. Parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary. Oral testimony on the alleged conditions. contrary to the rule that “the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth. January 29. other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale. it is the law between the parties. when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing. 2004 FACTS: Respondent bank filed instant collection suit against Petitioner Foundation and previous president Tan for failure to pay four matured loan as evidenced by promissory notes signed by Tan in his capacity as president of the said Foundation. whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. G. it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. M. HELD: The answer is in the negative.R. Page | 225 . 126006.” Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract. Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. No. hence. TAN vs." No such fraud or mistake exists in this case. contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not parol evidence relating to certain stipulated condition made orally may be admitted in evidence in addition to those expressly provided in a contract. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORP. depending exclusively on human memory. is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.

Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank. the petitioner Foundation maintains that said loans were contracted by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity. ISSUE: Whether or not an alleged unwritten agreement between the creditor and the debtor which is not reflected on the promissory note (PN) evidencing the loan is admissible in evidence in addition to the terms of the PN HELD: The answer is in the negative. On the other hand. CA likewise rejected petitioner Tans assertion that there was an unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank that he would pay the loans from the proceeds of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. BUELA In disclaiming any liability for the loans. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts. between the parties and their successors-in-interest. it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing. while admitting that the loans were his personal obligation. Trial Court ruled petitioners are liable to the bank solidarily. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary. contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. The parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the obligation. the CA affirmed the judgment of the court a quo. petitioner Tan avers that the same is not yet due as he had an unwritten agreement with the respondent Bank that these loans would be renewed on a year-to-year basis and paid from the proceeds of his shares of stock in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. M. In this case. T. Accordingly. this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes. Section 9. On appeal. no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. unless there has been fraud or mistake. Page | 226 . it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be.

which he subdivided into two portions and caused to be covered by the two TCTs in question. Thus. the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties' true intention. CA reversed the RTC. Factual findings of the CA holding that such affidavit is spurious due to discrepancy of respondent’s signature therein leads us to rely only on the agreement as the basis for the claim of ownership of both parties. (2) that he actually possessed and subsequently acquired has a total area of 4. However. BUELA MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. The RTC dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not an allegation of ownership that is contrary to those expressly stated in an agreement may be used as evidence HELD: The answer is in the negative. and two covering an area of 1.covering an area of 3.024 square meters. the petitioner claimed: (1) that the parties has agreed that the extent of their ownership would be based on their actual possession. M. In his defense. 169985.27 square meters. In 1996.544.R. Page | 227 . June 15. he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. on one hand. on the other.004 square meters.020 square meters identified in the parties' Agreement. The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity the Agreement entered into between him and the respondent. allotting their portions of the subject property. respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title. which corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed the petitioner's ownership over the disputed property. 2011 FACTS: Respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement.004-square meter portion on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3. CASIMERO VALDEZ G. Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner.020 square meters and Respondent Casimero Valdez – 7. and (3) that respondent participated in executing an Affidavit of confirmation of subdivision. CA noted the discrepancy between the respondent's signatures as appearing in the Affidavit.020 square meters. and the documents on record. No. to wit: Petitioner Modesto Leoveras – 3. the respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two TCTs: one . T. seeking the reconveyance of the 1.

R. the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. this Petition. Tagorda. BUELA The petitioner's argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule. ALBERTO C. Hence. for humanitarian reasons. as in this case. On 7 May 1998. Therefore. To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule. Page | 228 . predecessor of petitioners.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. On appeal. No. explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading. respondents after sufficiently proving their actual. which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties. 152807. when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing. petitioners avers that CA gravely abuse its discretion in giving weight to the CENR Officer’s Certification. Affirming the RTC. continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960 have better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain. the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. COMORPOSA et al. inequitable conduct or accident. MTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. that Marcos’ son Adolfo. Electronic Evidence HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. The CA lend credence to the Certification issued by the DENR’s community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted. i. physical. allowed respondents to occupy a portion of Marcos Saez’ land without paying any rental. August 12. M. open. which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises. RTC reversed the said decision. T. the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement. the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. exclusive. G. the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying.e.. 2003 FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondents and alleged that the disputed property was owned by Marcos Saez. notorious. fraud. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.

HELD: The rule stated in Garvida v. which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking. as the latter was under the former’s direct control and supervision. The Certification. 193531.R. T. In fact. on the other hand. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature. As such. BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not a certification issued by a public officer bearing a facsimile signature is inadmissible in evidence. Petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR for illegal dismissal. Instead. Sales Jr that – “Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic” is not applicable to the instant case. they are not admissible in evidence. M. the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2. 2011 FACTS: Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) who was terminated due to his alleged participation in padding of Credit Meter Readings (CMR) or slot machines at Casino Filipino-Hyatt. he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action. If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims. December 14. Tagorda. then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. 1998. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. TORRES vs. ELLERY MARCH G. and business transactions. It found that a verification of one of the telephone numbers where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration disclosed that such number did not belong to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board Page | 229 . No. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) G. CSC held that petitioner's appeal had already prescribed.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. financial. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida.

It may. ISSUE: Whether or not a letter reconsideration filed through facsimile is allowed HELD: Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission. As we stated earlier. it was held inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that: “x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. 8792. Ssangyong Corporation. the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. at best. x x x” Moreover. and that petitioner should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile transmission at the first instance when he filed his complaint and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription in its Comment. He claims that the sending of documents thru electronic data message. BUELA of Directors. he then filed his complaint before the CSC. the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways. Petitioner further contends that since his letter reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR. Sales. 2007. which includes facsimile.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. be a sham pleading. it was held that a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his dismissal on August 13. Without the original. is sanctioned under Republic Act No. and that he did so by means of a facsimile transmission sent to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors.. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Page | 230 . T. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. which was within the 15-day period for filing the same. there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. In Garvida v. in fact. It is. Jr. such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. either by mail or personal delivery. M.

Section 2. Ability to observe/perceive ii. and administrative proceedings. M. 2010 FACTS: Rustan Ang was charged of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act for purposeful sending Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone. as provided under Section 1. Ability to recall/remember iii. 01-7-01-SC). Rule 1. a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud.M. T. quasijudicial proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not text messages to be admissible as evidence in a criminal case must be authenticated following the Electronic Evidence Rule. BUELA RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. 01-7-01-SC. (A. April 20.M. No. Ability to relate/communicate Page | 231 .R. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD G. The said Rules applies only to civil actions. 182835. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Testimonial Evidence a. HELD: The answer is in the negative. whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish. it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature. No. Qualifications: “one who can perceive and perceiving can make known his perception” i. psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud. Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A. who was his former girlfriend. Thus. Electronic Evidence Rule do not apply to the present criminal action.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.) 3.

ANDRES NAVARRO. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. BUELA b. After the pre-trial. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. Petitioners elevated the case before the CA by way of petition for certiorari. Thus. Jr. July 03. M. and perceiving. and (4) Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called. respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. may be witnesses. (3) Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged communications. Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The disqualifications are as follows: (1) Section 19. Sr.. (2) Section 20 of the same rule provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Disqualifications LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS* vs.e. 198240. Section 20. Sr. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres. (common ascendant of both petitioner and respondent) donated the subject lot to Andres. all persons who can perceive. the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation. i. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. CA denied the petition ISSUE: Whether or not expert’s testimony who is not authorized by the trial court is disqualified from being a witness. the sisters. Page | 232 .R. 2013 FACTS: Petitioner discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. HELD: No. T. Rule 130 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. No. JR G. can make known their perception to others. were not written by one and the same person. Sr. requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides the qualifications of a witness.

at the time of their production for examination. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. HELD: The answer is in the negative. No. her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. per se. can make known their perception to others. 145225. April 2. A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. Section 21 of the same rule provides that the following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition. disqualified from being a witness. 2004 FACTS: Accused was charged and convicted of the crime of rape committed against Evelyn G. M. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. may be witnesses. BUELA As a handwriting expert of the PNP. is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others. Canchela (Evelyn). Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Moreover. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony. Section 49. (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth. is not a valid objection to the Page | 233 . and perceiving.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ "BADONG" G. no matter what form it assumes. Sections 20 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that all persons who can perceive. PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to others. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness. T. a mental retardate who is the niece of the accused’s wife. On the other hand. The trial court in convicting the accused gave credence to the testimony of Evelyn ISSUE: Whether or not a mental retardate is not qualified to become a witness due to her mental state.R.

1999. Section 22. The reasons given for the rule are: (1) There is identity of interests between husband and wife. 2005 FACTS: Accused was charged with arson for setting fire in his sister-in-law’s house while the latter’s family is inside including the former’s estranged wife . This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez to file with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that during their marriage. the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice. During trial. depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. (3) The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life.R.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. ISSUE: Whether or not a wife is disqualified to testify against her husband to prove a crime committed purposely committed to injure the former. MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. M. his wife Esperanza was presented as witness to prove that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged. T. and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness. October 14. Page | 234 . BUELA competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. If his or her testimony is coherent. SUSAN RAMIREZ G. there is consequent danger of perjury. the same is admissible in court. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification. It cannot then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness. neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse. NO. HELD: No. (2) If one were to testify for or against the other. Trial court granted the motion and disqualified Esperanze. 143439. 2000. On May 31. and (4) Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19. except in a civil case by one against the other.

February 27. where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. 1979 C. The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule. At the trial. T. identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Page | 235 . as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness wife. and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter. which the law aims at protecting. the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions. No. HON. Hence.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. In such a case. For instance. MANALOTO G. which through their absence. invoking the Marital Disqualification Rule under Sec. Likewise. 20. Rule 130. knowing fully well that his wife was there." ISSUE: Whether or not a wife may testify against her husband in a criminal case for falsification of public document done by forging the signature of the wife a contract of sale of conjugal property. L-46306. contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. Benjamin was charged with falsification of public document by his wife. in such a situation. will be nothing but ideals. BUELA But like all other general rules.R. HELD: The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. FACTS: Benjamin Manaloto sold the conjugal lot without his wife’s consent by forging the latter’s signature in a contract of sale. JR. the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness. both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. merely leave a void in the unhappy home. The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez. M. and BENJAMIN F. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA. the security and confidences of private life.

and (5) Thus. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot. Chuidian. (4) the shares of stock were actually owned and remained in the possession of Razon. filed an action for specific performance against petitioner praying that the later be compelled to deliver the stock certificate representing the share holdings of Juan Chuidian in E. ENRIQUE RAZON vs. Razon. the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Inc.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Petitioner. M. (ERI). that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case. petitioner testified that: (1) all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of record of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant. On appeal. March 16. (3) petitioner distributed shares of stock previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T. To rule. (2) said shares are subject to the agreement between defendants and incorporators. assailing CA’s decision. no crime could have been charged against said husband. 74306. During trial. CHUIDIAN G. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. Trial court ruled that the real owner of the stocks is the petitioner. therefore. and the signing of the wife’s name by her husband in the deed of sale.R. (2) respondent did not object to his oral Page | 236 . been made with the consent of the wife. as administrator of the estate Juan Chuidian. filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which. BUELA The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife’s signature in a deed of sale. therefore. accordingly. thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. No. the stock certificate under the name of the late Chuidian actually belongs to the petitioner with the understanding that he shall remain in possession thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders. CA ruled that petitioner is disqualified from being a witness under the dead man’s statute (Section 20 (a) Rule 130). T. Razon. it is the husband’s breach of his wife’s confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. Clearly. contends that: (1) dead man’s statute is inapplicable in this case. 1992 FACTS: Respondent.

nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. (2) Granting that the petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20 (a).Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. In the instant case. (2) Whether or not failure to object to a testimony on the ground of dead man’s statute rule constitutes as a waiver to object to the admissibility of such testimony. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not dead man’s statute disqualifies a defendant from testifying against the claims of an administrator in relation to a transaction entered into by the deceased during his lifetime. the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of petitioner as defendant in an action commenced by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. The rule. therefore. that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. T. Inc. Razon. delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto. The purpose of the law is to ‘guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. M. Chuidian. It is clear. HELD: (1) The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person). BUELA testimony. many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them. Page | 237 . the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate. thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. however. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. and (3) the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.

the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. On appeal. (2) for business convenience. HELD: Page | 238 . petitioners invoke the "Dead Man’s Statute" or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23. (4) despite respondent’s repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting. LAMBERTO T. CHUA G. The trial court. 143340. Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment. 2001 FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners who are the daughter and wife of the deceased Jacinto L. As counterclaim. and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action. contending that respondent does not have a cause of action against them. to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto’s death.000. he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of LPG in Manila. winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership. inventory. No. giving weight to Respondent’s testimony which was corroborated by another witness who work with the deceased during his lifetime. and (5) on March 31. Petitioners assails the finding of the trial court and the CA and argued that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness. petitioners took over the operations and control of the partnerhsip without respondent’s consent. Accounting. Josephine.00 representing partial payment of the former’s share in the partnership. for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs. the SEC being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. To support this argument. T. petitioner disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of P200. 1991. Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims. appraisal. ruled in favor of the Respondent. petitioner sought attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. ISSUE: Whether or not dead man’s statute applies to a complainant/witness who is also a defendant due to counterclaim of the original defendant. Sunga.R. M. (3) upon Jacinto’s death. with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of the business establishment. respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. August 15. During trial Respondent testified that: (1) in 1977. BUELA LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. petitioners failed to comply.

the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man’s Statute." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. it is necessary that: (1) the witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. and with the filing of their counterclaim. Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen. BUELA The answer is in the negative. the latter being the party plaintiff. may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the trial court. (4) the testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. The "Dead Man’s Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death. Josephine is merely a witness of respondent. and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen. (2) the action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind. the plaintiff. as defendant in the counterclaim. Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man’s Statute" to this case. First. M. (3) the subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind. insanity. Second." Plainly then. T. herein respondent. said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence." Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim. Moreover. or other mental disabilities. the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man’s Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Page | 239 .

BUELA TERESITA P. the property was extraj-judicially partitioned in the following manner: 1/3 to their grandchild Nicanor Jayme. declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person. CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. daughter of Elena. as the same violated the dead man’s statute. de Perez. petitioner filed the instant petition. No. petitioner subdivided the property into 6 lots and disposed the two parcels thereof. Upon learning of the issuance of the Free Patent and OCT. When the application was granted and corresponding OCT was issued. However. or communication made by the deceased to the witness. petitioner admitted that the existence of the above-mentioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. HELD: Dead Man’s Statute finds no application in the present case.R. HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME G. The trial court. 2002 FACTS: Lot 1242 was originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. respondents filed with RTC the instant complaint for annulment and cancellation of the Free Patent and OCT against petitioner and purchasers. and 1/3 to an unidentified party. Petitioner. In 1947. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court. T. filed an application for issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot 1242. assailing the decision of the CA. on cross-examination. 112443. ISSUE: Whether Dead Man’s Statute applies to disqualify the testimony of all witnesses attesting to the existence of an agreement entered into by the deceased during her lifetime. 1242 was acquired by her through purchase from her mother. Page | 240 . She. Thus. giving weight on the testimony of witnesses as to the existence of the extra-judicial partition and finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent and OCT. January 25. as well as the conveyances made by petitioner. identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of her mother. who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. BORDALBA vs. M. however. Petitioner averred that Lot No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. COURT OF APPEALS.

covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. During the pre-trial conference. T. says Josielene.” Following up on this point. BUELA Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based. Johnny opposed the motion. on August 22. JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. The privilege. does not cover the hospital records. arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a motion for issuance of subpoena duces tecum may be done prior to the trial. the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court. HELD: (1) Yes. inter alia. Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case. No. Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City. be examined” regarding their professional conversation. 179786. (2) Whether or not hospital records may not be the subject of a subpoena duces tecum before trial on the ground of privilege communication. a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. JOHNNY T. M. July 24. The request was accompanied by a motion to “be allowed to submit in evidence” the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. without the consent of the patient.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from “methamphetamine and alcohol abuse. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents. Section Page | 241 . Josielene premarked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. but only the examination of the physician at the trial. RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. 2013 FACTS: Josielene Lara Chan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan. CHAN G. 2006 or before trial. on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents. and not on dealings and communications with the deceased.R.

C. it can only be offered during trial. The antecedent facts are as follows: (1) Page | 242 . the diagnosis of the patient’s illness. To allow. however. and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. that Johnny may opt to object. thus putting his own health at great risk.” Considering that hospital records may not be a subject for motion for production of documents. Hence. ELLIS F. BUELA 1. M. LACUROM v. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA A. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. Disclosing hospital records would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient. 5921. and give him access to his body. (2) The answer is in the affirmative. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. T. NO. enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial. not just to their admission in evidence. March 10. Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. relate to him the history of his ailment. but more so to their disclosure. The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. without the latter’s prior consent. But the right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged. 2006 FACTS: Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered. ATTY. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician. JACOBA and ATTY.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. JUDGE UBALDINO A.

(3) the losing party filed an MR signed by Velasco-Jacoba. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion. Page | 243 . ATTY. (6) Velasco-Jacoba explained that she is not the author of the motion as she merely signed the same as it was the practice between her and her husband. 2007 FACTS: Samala filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. on a subsequent estafa case between Valdez and Alba. BUELA respondents law firm acts as the counsel in the unlawful detainer case appealed to the sala of Judge Lacurom. Valencia represented Valdez against Alba his previous client. Records show that Valencia acted as counsel for Valdez in three separate cases. being a rule of evidence.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. M. denied that he prepared the motion. Jacoba’s Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife's account. (9) Judge Lacurom issued another order directing Jacoba (husband of Velasco-Jacoba) to explain why he should not be held in contempt. (7) Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. Instead. LUCIANO D. No. 5439. January 22. Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion. (4) the MR contains scathing remarks against the Judge. (11) as to against Velasco-Jacoba's statements implicating him. SAMALA vs. (8) Velasco-Jacoba filed a petition for certiorari assailing the decision of Judge Lacurom. VALENCIA A. T. may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent.C. in his answer. HELD: The answer is in the negative. her co-counsel in the law firm. (5) Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the contents of her motion. However. Luciano D. ISSUE: Whether or not marital privilege rule may be invoked against a statement made by one spouse against the other without actually denying the contents of the statement. In of the cases Valencia represented Valdez and Alba against Bayuga and Bustamante. (12) Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court. CLARITA J. (10) Jacoba. (2) Judge Lacurom reversed the decision of the MTC and ruled against the counsels’ client. Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. Valencia for serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties. The marital privilege rule.

Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioners as chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders. The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. a lawyer should not. No. May 23. T. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claimed that they cannot be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents Page | 244 . Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy or materially of the documents required to be produced. 95367. ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of lawyer-client relationship allows a counsel to act as counsel against a previous client. M. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. COMMISSIONER JOSE T. avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. even after the severance of the relation with his client. Consequently. 1995 FACTS: Pursuant to his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. ALMONTE et al. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS G. The termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. HONORABLE CONRADO M. respondent.R. do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman's office. vs. BUELA In his defense Valencia.

" ISSUE: Whether or not privilege communication may be invoked against a subpoena duces tecum enjoining the production of records relating to personal services funds on the ground that they are state secrets. smuggling. where necessity is dubious. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy. the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. M. movements. Indeed. but even most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. BUELA are classified. diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations. courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws. a formal claim of privilege. but not limited to. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production. . This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen. tax evasion. will haw to prevail. even though." Consequently. the necessity of according such treatment must be shown. A fortiori. Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military. no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations unless it falls under statutorily- Page | 245 . such as. . strategies. as a consequence thereof. made under the circumstances of this case. targets. economic sabotage. dollar salting. T. Where there is a strong showing of necessity. and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB. the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted. Governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military. HELD: For information to be accorded confidentiality on the ground that such are state secrets. will necessarily lead to knowledge of its operations. diplomatic and similar matters. In the case at bar.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

Testimonial Privilege d. October 02. Sr. Petitioners now assails the erroneous disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made during pre-trial are binding upon the parties.. Rule Page | 246 . RTC rendered a Decision finding both plaintiffs and defendants in pari delicto. No. i. c. filed a complaint seeking to annul the 1992 extrajudicial settlement involving the 240sqm lot on the ground that they. did not adjudicate the 192 sqm lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The separate Deeds came into being out of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr. BUELA created ones such as the Government's privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of laws. by virtue of the 1968 Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver. Hence. hence.e. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. from Pedro Jr. in Pedro Sr.. CA rule in favor of respondent and declared that the 1968 Deed covering the 192 sq m lot which actually belongs to Pedro Jr.R. who are grandchildren of Pedro Sr. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. one in 1968 involving the 192 sqm and another in 1992 involving the 240 sqm. HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO G. heirs of Pedro Jr. Admissions OSCAR CONSTANTINO et al. Respondent. vs. were excluded thereto. there are two (2) deed of extrajudicial settlement involving estate properties of Pedro Constantino. During the pre-trial. not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. T. M.. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7. 181508.’s Estate.. Petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them considering that the respondents’ already have their lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr. who are also heirs of Pedro Sr.. On the other hand. respondents admitted that they executed the 1968 Deed to partition the 192 sqm which is the share of their predecessor Pedro Jr. (herein respondent). On appeal. 2013 FACTS: In this case..

2005 FACTS: Provincial Auditor conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C.933. as follows: P200. The State Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on their examinations showing his shortages. HELD: Page | 247 . However. thereby. Doldol. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G. the Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo.R. DOLDOL vs. However. 436756. BUELA 18 of the Rules of Court. 1995. NO. ISSUE: Whether or not. 1995.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was issued Official Receipt No.00 on October 31. he reneged on his promise. However.26. Doldol was convicted. taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors. the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake. production of evidence is dispensed with. September 20.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.66 on or before November 30. and P884. T. respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial.139. Pangasinan. person convicted of malversation may assail his conviction when he had already partially paid the alleged shortage. M. and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit. which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof. defining and limiting the issues to be tried. On the same day. he remitted P200. CONRADO C. 1995. Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage. Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and cash account. 164481. Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City.000.000. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a shortage of P801. On September 15.

in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim’s death. particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant's commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds. LADIANA. — The act. a member of the Integrated National Police (now PNP). Before Cortez was presented as witness. The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit. Defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship. December 4. M. which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. BUELA The said payment. 26. petitioner argued that the counter-affidavit cannot be considered an extrajudicial confession as the same was executed during custodial investigation with the assistance of a counsel. Accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense. Admissions of a party. and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana. 2002 FACTS: Accused. Cortez. HELD: The answer is in the negative. the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation. Page | 248 . Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows: "SEC. On appeal with the SC.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The same counter-affidavit became the basis of SB in convicting the accused. declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. No. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of appellant's guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use. testified that the accused executed before him a counter-affidavit admitting the commission of the crime. During the trial. e. Confessions JOSUE R. may be used as evidence against him. authenticity. T. ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of the commission of an offense while invoking self-defense in a Counter-affidavit executed during preliminary investigation without the assistance of a counsel may be admitted as an extrajudicial confession against him. However. It is only an admission. was charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for the death of Fancisco San Juan.R. v. Petitioner. 144293.

T. 1997.R. However. 2004 FACTS: Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY G. not a confession. 1997. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged. the appellant objected thereto on the ground that he was not assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing the same. In fact. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Page | 249 . four Information were filed against her uncle. M. in an admission. the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when he was brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for inquest investigation. may be given in evidence against him. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BUELA "SEC. 26 Thus. Confession. whether categorized as a confession or as an admission. NOS. The records also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the barangay hall where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2. 33. Petitioner admits shooting the victim — which eventually led to the latter’s death — but denies having done it with any criminal intent.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. February 23. there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged. 131799-801." In a confession. Neither did the court a quo inquire about the circumstances and the appellants reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver. the appellant for qualified rape. The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay in evidence to prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2. in the case at bar. or of any offense necessarily included therein. it is admissible in evidence against him as the voluntariness of the execution thereof was admitted by the defense. a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission. he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless.

HELD: Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed the same. Sayaboc that questions will be asked to you regarding an incident last December 2. G. Nueva Vizcaya. January 15. Quezon. as follows: That you have the right to remain silent or refuse to answer the questions which you think will incriminate you. Before questions will be asked of you I would like to inform you about your ri[g]hts under the new Constitution of the Philippines. and the testimony of Dr. He was arrested pursuant to the testimony of two (2) eyewitnesses. it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellants statement before the barangay chairman is inadmissible. 2004 FACTS: Herein accused were charged with murder. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA et al. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion. BUELA The trial court convicted the appellant of rape on the basis of Lucelles sworn statement. owner of the said Disco House as a result of his death. Page | 250 . No. T. in connection with the shooting of Joseph Galam. physical and psychological. Armie Soreta-Umil. The barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention. ISSUE: Whether or not an admission made before a Barangay Chairman without the assistance of a counsel may be used against the accuse. During his custodial investigation the accused made an extrajudicial confession after the following was recited to him: “I would like to inform you Mr. the appellants statement executed in the Barangay Chairmans Office. this covers investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police. 147201.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.R. is forcefully apparent. Brgy. it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. the testimony of her mother. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 1994 at the Rooftop. M. Solano. Under these circumstances. the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government.

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA
That you have the right to seek the services of a counsel of your own choice or
if not, this office will provide you a lawyer if you wish.”
The appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be
admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who
was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent,
independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective because he
remained silent during the entire proceedings.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not an extrajudicial confession made during custodial
investigation wherein the rights of the accused were merely recited to him
may be admissible in evidence against such accused.
(2) Whether a counsel who remain silent at the time the extrajudicial confession
was made qualifies as an independent counsel.
HELD:
(1)
The answer is in the negative. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and
consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the
suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV,
was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the
police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another
offense.
(2)
A counsel who remains silent all through-out the investigation shows that there
is lacking of a faithful attempt at each stage of the investigation to make
Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his actions.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should
satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect
understands the import and consequences of answering the questions
propounded. Counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain
the nature of the questions by conferring with his client and halting the
investigation should the need arise. The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that
the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused to
remain silent may be invoked at any time.
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CARLOS L. TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial
documents. The prosecution alleged that: (1) the petitioner as branch manager
caused the preparation of promissory notes (PN) and cashier’s check in the
name of one of their valued client; (2) that by forging the signature of such
client, petitioner was able to obtain the proceeds of the loan evidenced by the
PN.
After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and
an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank,
during which appellant signed a written statement in the form of questions and
answers admitting the commission of the allegations in the Information. Trial
court convicted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed his conviction.
Elevating the case before the SC, petitioner avers that the written statement
should not be admitted as evidence against him as it was taken in violation of
his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his
right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two
rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not a statement of an accused-employee made during
administrative investigation conducted by his employer may not be admitted an
evidence against the former on the ground that it was made without the
assistance of a counsel.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The constitutional proscription against the
admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section
12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner.
In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled
written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed,
the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law
enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank;
and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to
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be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional
prerogative during the taking of his written statement.
No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence
and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no
constitutional impediment to its admissibility.

f. Conduct and Character
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL SANTOS y NARCISO
G.R. Nos. 100225-26, May 11, 1993
FACTS:
Santos was charged and convicted of murder and frustrated murder. On appeal,
accused makes the following assignment of errors: (1) his identification in the
police line-up by the two witnesses is inadmissible as he was not afforded his
right to counsel; (2) he questions the trial court for admitting a sworn statement
by one Ronaldo Guerrero, a witness in another criminal case accused was also
charged with the murder which had taken place in the very same site where
Bautista and Cupcupin were ambushed as such accused contends that the
affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that the
prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not identification in the police line-up is not admissible on the
ground that the accused was not provided with a counsel.
(2) Whether the trial court may not admit a sworn statement of a witness taken
from another criminal case wherein the accused for both cases are one and
the same.
HELD:
(1)
There is "no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police lineup. The customary practice is, of course, that it is the witness who is investigated
or interrogated in the course of a police line-up and who gives a statement to
the police, rather than the accused who is not questioned at all at that stage. In
the instant case, there is nothing in the record of this case which shows that in
the course of the line-up, the police investigators sought to extract any
admission or confession from appellant Santos.
(2)
Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or
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did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to
prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage and the like."
Trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit
for the limited purpose for proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more
specifically, that appellant knew that the particular corner of two (2) particular
streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. As
in fact, both in the instant case, as well as the case where Guerrero’s testimony
was originally presented, the scene of the crime is one and the same.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES
G.R. No. 133888, March 1, 2001
FACTS:
Herein accused was charged of raping his eldest daughter. The prosecution
presented the victim as its main witness, while, the defense presented a number
of witnesses who testified to different occasion for which the victim was caught
lying.
After the trial, trial court, giving credence to the testimony of the victim,
convicted the accused. On appeal, the accused presented series of letters
allegedly written by the victim to the defense counsel asking said counsel to
help her father be acquitted.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a minor witness’ credibility may be assailed by proving that
she lies on a number of occasion.
(2) Whether or not letters written by the witness after trial containing details
that is contrary to testimony made in open court constitutes recantation of
said testimony.
HELD:
(1)
The answer is in the negative. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court
provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." While
lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by
Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and

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inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one’s own father of the
sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.
Furthermore, as a rule, findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
are not to be disturbed, for the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the
same. Lastly, jurisprudence dictates that testimonies of child-victims are given
full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
(2)
An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered
inferior to the testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to
reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness
who gave it later on changed his/her mind for one reason or another. Such a rule
would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses.
Recantations are frowned upon by the courts because they can easily be
obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration.
A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Especially,
recantations made after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant
consideration.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA
SR.
G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002
FACTS:
Respondent Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed Free Patent Application. In relation to the
said application, Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation
to the Bureau of Lands. Less than 3 months after the application, free patent was
issued.
Sometime in April 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested for an
investigation for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in
favor of respondent. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator,
submitted his Report. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not
actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land.
Thereafter, government instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of
Patent and Title and Reversion against respondent.

Page | 255

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA
Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. In reversing the RTC, CA brushed
aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagena’s testimony that Land Inspector Efren L.
Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application of Felipe
Alejaga Sr.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony based on a report which relates an admission
of a third person who was not presented as witness is inadmissible in evidence
for being a hearsay.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of
another person — the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith — and the
former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without
violating the hearsay rule. Recio’s alleged admission may be considered as
"independently relevant."
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to crossexamination, the Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the
Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the report
that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not
hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio
may be considered as independently relevant.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations
communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that,
regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the
making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of
such fact.
Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had
conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by
the trial court.

g. Hearsay Evidence Rule
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner, a sales representative at Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, was charged
with estafa for failure to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the
collection to the said company.
Page | 256

prosecution. submitted the following documentary evidence: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment. the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand. and their derivatives. subject to the test of crossexamination. this testimony is admissible not to prove that the Page | 257 . not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted. HELD: Section 36 of Rule 130. inclusive. BUELA During the trial. that is. in a slander case.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. M. However. Prosecution also presented Guivencan to testify on the entries in the documentary evidence. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives. except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. in order to prove that collectibles lawfully belonging to the company where misappropriated by the accused. The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. Moreover. which are derived from her own perception. For example. the hearsay rule does not apply. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY. and. a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge. the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted. and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments. the credit of the assert or becomes the basis of inference. Rules of Court. if an extrajudicial utterance is offered. were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. inclusive. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness pertaining to entries in a document made by another person constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted as evidence. T. therefore. if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact.

Prosecution presented Perlito’s brother.. BUELA complainant was really a thief. as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove an asserted fact. to which the hearsay rule applies. March 17.R. No. Edmund testified that on the day his brother died the latter upon inquiry as to who shot him answered the Accused’s name three times. Even if the declarant did not make a statement that he was at the brink of death. therefore. Dying Declaration PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Edmund. to which the hearsay rule does not apply. The statement is highly reliable. but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. T. The distinction is. i. as witness. and when the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. CESARIO MONTAÑEZ G. Page | 258 . 148257. ISSUE: Whether or not accused may be convicted on account of a witness testimony recounting the words of a deceased person few moments before the latter died.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.e. HELD: Yes. misappropriation on the part of the accused through documentary evidence of which the witness has no personal knowledge. the same is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence. the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death superseded shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition. between (a) the fact that the statement was made. Perlito’s statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying declaration. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. M. Hence. 2004 FACTS: Accused was charged of murdering Perlito Ollanes. having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of survival is gone. and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement. when every motive to falsehood is silenced.

G. Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Jr. T. if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest. His confession to Enriquez.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. presented Enriquez. since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime. and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. is admissible in evidence Page | 259 . (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant. Jr.. Declaration against interest. Openda. or unable to testify. against the interest of the declarant. in order to prove that accused has a motive in perpetrating the alleged crime. BUELA Declaration against Interest PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. viz. 1997 FACTS: Accused was charged with Kidnapping Openda.: "Sec. (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest. to wit:" (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify. HELD: Openda. confided to him that the latter is having an affair with accused’s wife. The trial court." A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites. definitely a declaration against his own interest. having been missing since his abduction. Accused assailing the decision of the trial court and for admitting the testimony of Enriquez.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is admissible in evidence. Jr. Jr. as witness. vs. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony made by a witness as to a statement made a deceased person that is against the interest of the latter may be admissible in evidence as against a third person. giving credence to Enriquez’s testimony as well as testimony of other witnesses attesting to the circumstances prior to the alleged abduction. — The declaration made by a person deceased. M. June 19. the prosecution. No. Enriquez testified that Openda. 113685. a common friend of both the accused and the victim. During trial. that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true. convicted the accused. 38. may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons. THEODORE BERNAL et al. pursuant to Section 38.R. cannot be called upon to testify.

and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a trial court may dismissed an action for reconveyance on the ground of complainant’s failure to prove his alleged filiation on which the cause of action is anchored. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action Page | 260 . such as the baptismal certificates. and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. one of the petitioners. M. The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock. DEZOLLER vs. During the trial. Thereafter. family picture. alleging to be TDG’s niece and nephew. (2) Whether or not testimony as to filiation to a deceased person is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence. 1997 FACTS: Martin Guerrero. testified that she is the niece of TDG and submitted documentary evidence such as pictures. Corazon. Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. When Martin Guerrero died. July 31. In upholding the dismissal. sold the property originally owned by the latter to herein respondent Teodora Domingo. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO G. BUELA because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. T. baptismal certificate etc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. herein petitioners. The court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. to prove the alleged filiation. respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners. 374012 was issued in the latter’s name. Declaration about Pedigree CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. The trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence. HELD: (1) The answer is in the negative. No. filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation from TDG. 121027.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the surviving spouse and only heir of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero (TDG).R.

not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration. as an exception to the hearsay rule. and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. by the proper parties.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor. or by other declarations of said declarant. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. and so hold. As an exception. that is. does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. second and fourth elements. or sometime in 1946. (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration. if at all. What remains for analysis is the third element. but before any controversy has arisen thereon. The general rule. M. (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry. subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify. but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate. that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. There is no dispute with respect to the first. the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or. BUELA brought for that purpose. Distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself. but on private respondent who is disputing the same. and within the period limited by law. is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant. Page | 261 . Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration. We are sufficiently convinced. (2) The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime. the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship. categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece. T. under Section 39. There must be some independent proof of this fact. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible. that is. therefore. and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam.

implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. Lourdes). Iloilo. No. Francisco elevated the case before the SC and assailed the admissibility of the letters of his relatives. February 24. ISSUE: Whether or not letter of the relatives of a putative father is admissible in evidence as part of the family reputation. Section 39. FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. (2) MONINA was born on 6 August 1946. HELD: The answer is in the negative. At trial on the merits. neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question. The trial court dismissed the complaint. there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter. (3) since childhood. in Dingle. On appeal. and (4) that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education. she had enjoyed the continuous. the contents of these documents may not be admitted. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON G. such that she obtained a Master's degree. JISON vs. provides: Page | 262 . T. Rule 130. Section 40. MONINA presented as documentary evidence letters written by Francisco’s relatives as proof of her recognition as illegitimate daughter of the latter. Neither may it be admitted under under Rule 130. a Central Bank examiner. however. In her complaint.R. CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that Monina was able to establish her filiation as FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter not just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record. became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually. 124853. M. she alleged that: (1) at the end of 1945 or the start of 1946.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 1998 FACTS: Monina Jison filed a petition for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison. BUELA Family Reputation FRANCISCO L. Section 40. Under Rule 130.

M. These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. What must then be ascertained is whether letter presented in this case as private documents. matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family. under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand. may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family. a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. family portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree. 40. if preserved in a family. engravings on rights and family portraits. in light of the rule of ejusdem generis. (emphasis supplied) It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence. is limited to objects which are commonly known as "family possessions. as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above. except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community. in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members." or those "which. in effect. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy. and the section containing the second underscored phrase. engravings on rings. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130." or those articles which represent.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. either by consanguinity or affinity. and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity. and not the common reputation in community. fall within the scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "entries in family bibles or other family books or charts. the common reputation in the family. letters. that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Section 41 regarding common reputation. Section 40. Page | 263 . it having been observed that: the weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts. may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130. Thus." Plainly then. T." We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision. BUELA Sec. may be regarded as giving a family tradition.

No. is a startling occurrence. prosecution presented two (2) witnesses. Felix Taylaran. Accused Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante at the store.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. FRANK LOBRIGAS et al. Accused-appellant insists that the statements made by the victim to Castor Guden and Rosa Solarte cannot be considered dying declarations for they were made not under the consciousness of an impending death. On the other hand. and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. namely: Castor Guden. Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante. daughter of the victim. 147649. BUELA Res gestae PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. Felix Taylaran died. (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise. he became rowdy and drew his knife. (2) he told Castor that he was mauled by accused-appellant Frank Lobrigas. the res gestae. who was a barangay councilman. This was snatched from him by Mario Granderos and turned over to Mante. and (3) the next day. T. 6 All these requisites concur in the case at bar. was a startling occurrence. upon returning to Castor Guden from Mante’s (one of the accused) store. her father came to her house and told her that he was beaten up by Frank Lobrigas. testified that a day after the mauling. Neither can they be deemed part of the res gestae because the victim was drunk and mad at Teodoro Mante for taking away his knife. 1996. December 17. The principal act. He denied the accusation and testified that Felix had too much to drink. Castor testified that: (1) on February 19. 2002 FACTS: Accused together with others were charged with murder for killing Felix Taylaran. During the trial. He told her that he was in pain and felt weak. Accused-appellant had a different version of the events. owner of the farm where the victim work. G.R. M. and Rosa Solarte. HELD: A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act. the mauling of the victim. was with bruises on his face and injuries all over his body. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of Castor and Rosa are admissible in evidence as res gestae. Rosa Taylaran Solarte. without any prior opportunity to Page | 264 . The declarations were made shortly after the mauling incident while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence.

father of the victim. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary. who testified that he also heard gunshots and saw accused aiming their guns upward and were about to leave. 158362. However. and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial.R. HELD: Page | 265 . and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof. we hold that Rosa Solarte’s testimony on what her father told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct from hearsay. The RTC accorded faith to the positive identification of the accused by the Prosecution's witnesses. but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered. hence. GILBERTO VILLARICO et al. T. The declaration concerns the circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran. for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. mother of the victim. only the fact that such statements were made is relevant. During the trial. Nevertheless. sister-in-law of the victim.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The hearsay rule does not apply. 2011 FACTS: Accused were charged of murder for the death of Haide Cagatan. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. the CA modified the RTC's decision and convicted the accused with murder. who testified that she saw accused pointing their gun at the victim. the declaration made by the victim to his daughter does not satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because they were made a day after the incident and the exciting influence of the startling occurrence was no longer present. the statements are admissible as evidence. G. (3) Francisco. prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Remedios. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements. No. M. who testified that she was at the sala when she heard gunshots followed by seeing the victim wounded and asking for help stating that he was shot by Berting (accused). On intermediate review. BUELA contrive a story implicating Accused-Appellant. The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did not actually see who had shot Haide and that Lolita’s testimony is a hearsay. RTC convicted the four accused of homicide aggravated by dwelling. April 04. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony relating the last statement of the victim immediately after the shooting incident is admissible in evidence. (2) Lolita Cagatan.

the identities of the assailants). is a startling occurrence. A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act.the shooting of Haide .” The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. or spectators to a crime immediately before. M. victims. and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication." In a general way. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants. his statement to his mother about being shot by the group of Berting was made before Haide had time to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the shooting. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise. T. thirdly. And. during. BUELA The answer is in the affirmative. may be received as part of the res gestae. the statement directly concerned the startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is. So. Firstly. or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself. and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. the res gestae. Verily. declaration. Secondly. We find that the requisites concurred herein. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act.was a startling occurrence. also. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Page | 266 . may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. facts. statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue. the principal act . or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. which provides: “Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof. res gestaeincludes the circumstances. and giving it a legal significance. and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. the statement was reliable as part of theres gestae for being uttered in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Respondent objected to the documentary evidence submitted and argued that those are self-serving. G. ISSUE: Whether or not the entries made on a ticket by employees of a party in the course of their business may not be given weight on the ground that the same is self-serving. 1985. 92740. private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies. vs. March 23. they carry more weight and credence. INC. and (6) they suffered damages due to the cancellation. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue. and (2) there were other passengers who came late before the respondents. 264 on September 24. HELD: The answer is in the negative. defendant presented the check-in counter clerk at their Naga Branch on the date of respondent’s scheduled flight. claiming that the non-accommodation of Respondent on said flight was due to their having check-in late for their flight. (2) they check-in at least one (1) hour before the published departure time. and (2) the passenger manifest showing the other names of other passengers who were also late. when admitted as proof of those facts. (4) upon checking-in. two documentary evidence were offered. RAMOS et al. (5) they have to take the bus instead. namely: (1) the ticket bearing the notation “late 4:02” of the clerk. Petitioner disclaims any liability. No. During the trial. T. 1992 FACTS: Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner alleging the following: (1) they are passengers of PAL Flight No. Consequently. is ordinarily Page | 267 . In relation to the testimony. BUELA Entries in the course of business PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. JAIME J. (3) no one was at the check-in counter until 30 minutes before departure. M. they were informed that their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers.R. The plane tickets of the private respondents with the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264 which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and the private respondents are entries made in the regular course of business which the. The clerk testified that: (1) the respondents were late and that he noted the time of check-in on their tickets.

Petitioner assails the admissibility and evidentiary weight given to the police blotter. as a basis for the factual finding of the RTC and the CA. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements. owner of a Fuso truck insured by respondent Standard Insurance Co. STANDARD INSURANCE CO. filed a claim with the latter. elucidate. 1985. Entries in Official Records RUDY LAO vs. M. petitioner offered in evidence the Motor Vehicle Accident Report stating that the driver at the time of the accident is not Anit but Giddie Boy. are admissible as part of the res gestae. No. and which illustrate. the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that the driver of the insured truck. He contends that the same entry was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the investigating policeman himself. BUELA regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform language Private respondents’ only objection to these documents is that they are selfserving cannot be sustained. did not possess a proper driver’s license at the time of the accident. as stated in the Police Blotter. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4. However.500 kgs.. he therefore violated the "authorized driver" clause of the insurance policy. Page | 268 . petitioner filed an action for breach of contract and damages. G.. T. ISSUE: Whether or not admissibility of a police blotter may be assailed on the ground that it contains entries that is contrary to another police report made by the same investigating officer who made the blotter. acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it. August 14. Thus. Inc.. 140023. On the other hand..R. RTC dismissed the complaint and this was affirmed by CA on appeal. qualify or characterize the act. Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three days after the accident or on April 27. INC. Respondent offered as evidence the police blotter and presented the investigating police officer who made the entries on the said blotter report. The restriction in Leonardo Anit’s driver’s license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4. 2003 FACTS: Petitioner Lao.500 kgs.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. During trial.

specially enjoined by law to do so. 2012 COMMISSION ON FACTS: When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections. (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties. and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated. which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. Section 44 of the Rules of Court. vs. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names. The COMELEC in disqualifying the petitioner did not consider the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Page | 269 . Private respondent Florencio Librea filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification. or by another person. he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. BUELA HELD: Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated. In order to prove his compliance with the residency requirement. the following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer. he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The person who made the entries was likewise presented in court.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. PETITIONER. T. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him in comparison to the accident report he made three (3) days after the accident. MEYNARDO SABILI. and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. No. M. petitioner presented as evidence his barangay certificate. ELECTIONS AND FLORENCIO LIBREA G. In this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. April 24. Under the said rule. The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130. He alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Although police blotters are of little probative value.R. 193261.

BUELA Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade. HELD: The answer is in the negative. M. Rule 130. and (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him. 142943. Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain. petitioner presented another. Commercial Lists Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING vs. No.” Subsequently. they immediately disconnected petitioners' electrical supply. four (4) MERALCO inspection personnel and the secretary of appellees.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and. which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. “cannot be relied on. During the inspection the following persons were present. April 3. As to the first requisite. it is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to “keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay. are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. substantially identical. or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY G. ISSUE: Whether or not barangay certificate is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it is not notarized.R. or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. Anent the third requisite. the BarangayCaptain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary. Three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence: (a) The entry was made by a public officer. Page | 270 .” Regarding the second requisite. T. (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties. 2002 FACTS: Meralco team conducted their inspection at petitioner’s meter and found alleged meter tampering. save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public. Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides: Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines. hence.

HELD: Yes. Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by its experts. There was no sufficient evidence to show that they had not been actually residing in the house before the date of the said document. The evidence it presented.332. The only defense presented by petitioner is that they cannot be held liable thereof because the bills are already outstanding when they transferred to their residence. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and examinations presented by respondent to prove that. petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants of the premises. The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage does not necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing differential. MERALCO presented as witness its Senior Billing Computer Officer to testify as to the unpaid bills of the plaintiff. During the trial. CA likewise upheld respondent's counterclaim for the billing differential representing the value of petitioners' used but unregistered electrical consumption. T. petitioner assailed ruling upholding the validity of the disconnection and denying their claim for damages.96 that petitioners owed respondent. His testimony was corroborated by documentary evidence showing the account's billing history and the corresponding computations. On the other hand. Trial court ruled that immediate disconnection was illegal due to lack of due process. Petitioner elevated the case before the SC by way of petition for review on certiorari.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. BUELA Plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The said testimony as corroborated with the documentary evidence showing unpaid bills as well as the laboratory test results proving the tampering. which had been established without being controverted. On appeal. the CA reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the complaint. indeed Page | 271 . In their memorandum. The procedure through which this amount was arrived at was testified to by Meralco's Senior Billing Computer Officer. The petitioner did not questioned the computation of the differential billing both during the trial as well as in their memorandum submitted before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not a party may be held liable for unpaid bills based on the uncontroverted documentary and testimonial evidence. sufficiently proved the amount of the differential. MERALCO filed a counterclaim with respect to the unpaid bills of herein plaintiff. M. Hence. both documentary and testimonial. Lorna Quisumbing herself admitted that they did not have any contract for electrical service in their own name. but it also established the amount of P193.

1997 FACTS: Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan. Page | 272 . especially where what is presented is only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision is based. the OSG argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the Parañaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario as well. Appellant. Nos. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against only one person. wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. Trial court’s utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Parañaque court must be rejected. HELD: The answer is in the negative. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court. therefore. BUELA there had been meter tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption. may only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense in large scale. particularly. Learned Treaties Testimony at a Former Proceeding PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE G. Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa involving the same circumstances in the instant case. This decision was not appealed and had become final and executory. Elenita Marasigan. T. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court may adopt the findings of fact and decision of another court involving the same parties and incidents.R. 115338-39. M. September 16. On appeal. the lower court adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis for the judgment.

prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC. The prosecution elevated the case to the CA. in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition. G. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. Rule 119. Cambodia. GO. BUELA A previous decision or judgment. while admissible in evidence may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. vs. T.R. 185527. Page | 273 . The procedure for testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness is covered under Section 15. LTD. NO. as said previous decision is hearsay. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied. a frail old businessman from Laos. 30 It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case. RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Li Luen Ping. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. alleging that he was being treated for lung infection. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY. which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face. et al. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness is a criminal case may be taken by way of oral deposition. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. 2012 FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the MTC for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. HARRY L. July 18. M. et al. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. the MeTC granted the motion.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K..11The RTC held that Section 17. Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases. The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping. The prosecution's complaining witness.

Appellant. the burden of proof lies on the party Page | 274 . or at least before the judge. 197813. The conviction was affirmed by the CA. Rachel could not have witnessed the murder of Wilfredo. September 25. where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15. however. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. can make known their perception to others. T. Rowena and minor daughter. more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial. tried to further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that Rachel was a mere child who had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and could barely read. EDWIN IBAÑEZ Y ALBANTE and ALFREDO NULLA Y IBAÑEZ G. For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases. Child Witness PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.e With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court. Aniceta testified testified that she and Rachel were out on that day selling doormats and only returned at 6:00 p. It is not without exceptions. the testimonial examination should be made before the court.m. may be witnesses. and perceiving. HELD: The answer is in the negative. all persons who can perceive. M. BUELA The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. Rachel testified that she saw the appellants killed her father. The defense.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and did not know how to tell time. on appeal with the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not a child witness may be disqualified on the ground that she does not know how to read and tell time. Rachel (10 years old) as witnesses. presented Aniceta as witness whose testimony discredit that of Rachel. Thus. on the other hand. Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2013 FACTS: Appellants were all charged in an Information for Murder of Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog.R. No. To rebut this presumption. The trial court convicted the accused. The prosecution presented the victim’s wife.

No. first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case. they claim that his opinion that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of the crime was not reliable. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive. T. conduct a competency examination of a child. (3) He could not "scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet. and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which Page | 275 . HELD: An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an opinion. petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father. remember." particularly books on the subject by foreign authorities. communicate." Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics. appellants argue that the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence against them is weak. (2) He is not conversant with "the required references concerning ballistics. On appeal. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL et al. (2) particular. G. or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court. appellants contend that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser. Appellants also assail Caser’s failure to take the necessary photographs to support his findings. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education.R. Specifically. and inconclusive. ambiguous. BUELA challenging the child's competence. 123137. Opinion Rule Expert Witness PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. goniometer.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 2001 FACTS: Herein accused was charged and convicted of murder by the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of an expert witness which was given credence of the trial court may be assailed on appeal on the ground of incompetence. motu proprio or on motion of a party. clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer. h. and pressure barrel. M. October 17. the prosecution’s ballistics expert. Thus." There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. distinguish truth from falsehood.

At the trial.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the ballistician conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the evidence. In the instant case. August 11.R. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the country. The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court. 2004 FACTS: During his lifetime. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO MORELOS G. as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale. Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient. and in the National Bureau of Investigation. claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar Morelos. BUELA his opinion is based. Moreover. instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages. the CA relying on the testimony of the expert witness reversed the trial court’s decision. HELD: Page | 276 . Respondent presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were not his. An expert witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings. Cesar Morelos sold and conveyed a parcel of land in favor of his niece. HON. He is a licensed criminologist. NO. in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame. M. Respondent Fernando Morelos. The trial court dismissed the complaint. petitioner presented Carmelita Marcelino who testified that she saw Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista sign the Deed in question. test cartridges and slugs. Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. 158015. LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA vs. On appeal. P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. On the other hand. petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of expert witnesses are conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a duly executed and notarized deed of absolute sale as against the testimony of one who witness the signing of the deed. trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio. T.

the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny. the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. To overturn this legal presumption. he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. Cabamongan to testify on the possible position of the gunman based on the wounds sustained by the victim. July 17. Aggrieved. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Page | 277 . arguing that the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada and disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman. M. 181444. the defense presented as one of its witness Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D. Carmelita Marcelino. Having been physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the document. evidence must be clear. convincing and more than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract. the CA sustained the conviction of the accused and disregarded the testimony of soco Cabamongan. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Although such testimony may be useful. Cabamongan’s testimony was offered as an ordinary witness. the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. No. as to the position of the gunman. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof.R. 2013 FACTS: Herein accused was charged with murder. During the trial. It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. With Cabamongan’s testimony. the defense intends to assail the testimony of the eye-witnesses. confirmed the genuineness. T. On appeal.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners. BUELA The answer is in the negative. In the case at bar. authenticity and due execution thereof. petitioner now seeks to reverse his conviction. BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO Y BULAWAN vs. Manalangsang and Cañada. the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale.

namely. In this case. and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim’s mental age was not proven. He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived. 2001 FACTS: Herein accused was charged with two (2) counts of rape. Page | 278 . (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity. EMILIANO DURANAN G. January 16. who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question. During the trial. complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara. Rosalina O. the prosecution presented three witnesses. Dr. Cosidon. In this case. Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: the opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding — (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge. HELD: No.R. Accused was convicted by the trial court. is considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. T. complainant’s mother Virginia de Lara Lozada. He argues that an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant’s mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. counsel for the petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. M. and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. only the mother of the complainant testified as to the latter’s metal age and fitness. Rule 130. Nos. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise. BUELA ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of an expert presented as an ordinary witness may be admitted as evidence and be considered against testimony of eyewitnesses. On appeal.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame. Complainant Nympha Lozada. 134074-75. Ordinary Witness PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinary witness’ testimony on the mental fitness of the complainant who is a mental retardate may be admissible in evidence.

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
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A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of
another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such
person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental
condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he having first
testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as
the basis for his opinion. In the case at bar, Virginia Lozada testified on the
mental condition of her daughter

i. Character Evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN
G.R. No. 130601, December 4, 2000
FACTS:
Accused was charged with Robbery with Rape. During the trial, the accused
was positively identified by the victim as her assailant. The trial court formally
rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of the crime charged;
consequently, accused-appellant is now before us on appeal. Accused-appellant
in his brief, maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the
crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does
the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family
man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be acquitted on the ground of his god
moral character.
HELD:
An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good
moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his
conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had
discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since
the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict,
the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.The
fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly
justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his
having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee
against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed,
religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious
alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape.

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D. Burden of Proof and Presumptions
1. Burden of Proof v. Burden of Evidence
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) vs. ROBERT MAR
CHANTE
G.R. No. 170598, October 09, 2013
FACTS:
Instant complaint was filed by petitioner against Chante to recover from Chan
the principal sum of P770,488.30 representing the unpaid balance of the amount
fraudulently withdrawn from Chan’s ATM. FEBTC alleged that between 8:52
p.m. of May 4, 1992 and 4:06 a.m. of May 5, 1992, Chan had withdrawn funds
totaling P967,000.00 from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila
Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the withdrawals were done in a series of 242
transactions with the use of the same machine, at P4,000.00/withdrawal; and
that the transactions were processed and recorded by the respective computer
systems of PNB and MEGALINK despite the following circumstances, namely:
(a) the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch); (b)
Chan’s account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time; (c) the maximum
withdrawal limit of the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and (d) his
withdrawal transactions not being reflected in his account, and no debits or
deductions from his current account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being
recorded. FEBTC asserted further that defendant took advantage of a system
bug which allowed the excessive withdrawals.
Chan denied liability and instead insisted that he had been actually home at the
time of the withdrawals. He alluded to a possible “inside job” as the cause of
the supposed withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the effect that an
employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having debited accounts of its depositors
by using his knowledge of computers as well as information available to him.
Chan claimed that it would be physically impossible for any human being like
him to stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil action may be decided in favor of the plaintiff
where the defendant relies on bare and uncorroborated denial of the former’s
allegation.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the
burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it.
Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
evidence is given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of
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facts from the responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts and
arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The
burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the
plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the
manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits
expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense
or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply
persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of
going forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden
of evidence.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or
issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which
the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the
beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima
facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes
from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests
throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead
of upon the weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to
preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the
withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by
another person to make the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not
recover from him any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn from the ATM
account.

2. Presumptions
a. Conclusive
IBAAN RURAL BANK INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR.
and MRS. RAMON TARNATE
G.R. No. 123817, December 17, 1999
FACTS:
Respondent spouses entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage of the lots in question from its original owner Spouses Reyes. As,
Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the bank extra-judicially
foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. At the public auction, the bank was the sole
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bidder. Consequently, a certificate of sale was issued. The said certificate stated
that redemption period expires two (2) years from the registration of the sale.
Certificate of sale was registered on October 16, 1979.
Within the two (2) year period, private respondents offered to redeem the
foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption amount. However, petitioner Bank
refused and argued that the right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one
year had elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale. Private
respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of
the foreclosed lots. They argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed
lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before
October 16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year.
ISSUE: Whether or not failure to previously contest the redemption period
stated on the certificate of sale precludes the bank from asserting it as a defense
to oppose the exercise of right of redemption.
HELD:
By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that
they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two
years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was
only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises
when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when
he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces
another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts
on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny
the existence of such facts.
When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive
knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two years, it did not object to
the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said
that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it
had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on
the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be
construed as consent.

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SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ
PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN et al.
G.R. No. 128568, April 9, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioners leased a building from Respondent’s predecessor (Virginia). At the
time of the perfection of the contract, the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were
aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the
rented house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with
the terms thereof for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for
two years.
After two years from the effectivity of the lease contract, Respondents filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages against petitioner for failure to
pay rent. On the other hand, the petitioner spouses alleged that they paid the rent
to the new owners (Virgilio and Angelita) of the lot where the building stood
and not to respondents since the latter supposedly no longer had the legal right
to collect rentals. Petitioner claimed that the lease contract ceased to be effective
because Virgilio’s assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents
of ownership of the building.
MTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs. MTC ruled that petitioner failed
to show that the subject house belonged to Virgilio. On the other hand, the
respondents proved that the property in question is registered in their name. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC based on the petitioner’s
failure to present any documentary evidence modifying or amending the
contract of lease to justify the transfer of payment of the monthly rental to
Virgilio Tanga-an who claims only as the registered owner of the lot on which
the leased house is located.
ISSUE: Whether or not a defendant is a suit, to which the cause of action arises
from a contract may assailed the operation of such contract by disputing a
previously affirmed fact.
HELD:
No. Petitioner were aware that the lot in question was not owned by the lessors
at the time the lease contract was entered into. After recognizing the validity of
the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging
the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents
lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot. Section 2,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:

Page | 283

Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II
by: K. M. T. BUELA
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances
of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
be permitted to falsify it;
x
x
x
b. Disputable
HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO et al. vs. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA et al.
G.R. No. 194846, June 28, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for nullity of the SPA authorizing Respondent to
sell the subject disputed lots to Meridian, as well as the deed of sale entered into
pursuant to the said SPA. Petitioner alleged that the said lot had already sold to
them by their predecessor Luis Rosaroso.
During trial the second wife of Luis, Lourdes testified deed of sale in favor of
petitioners, was obtained through fraud, deceit and trickery. She explained that
they signed the prepared deed out of pity because petitioners told them that it
was necessary for a loan application.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC decision. The CA ruled that the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners
was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered a consideration
for the four (4) parcels of land. It relied on the testimony of Lourdes that
petitioners did not pay her husband. The price or consideration for the sale was
simulated to make it appear that payment had been tendered when in fact no
payment was made at all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of a contract may be assailed on a mere
testimony that it has no consideration.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been
fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3)
there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate
against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create
the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created,
Page | 284

This testimony. 5053–H covered by Tax Declaration No. No. however. they were informed that Tax Declaration No. in lieu thereof. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CAÑADA G. by the presumption. unsubstantiated by evidence. petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for quieting of title. The deed of sale covers a portion of Cipriano’s property which was encroached upon by Dioniso during the former’s lifetime. 2013 FACTS: Cipriano Trazona owned Lot No. Consequently. are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court. Apparently. herein petitioners. because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted. but the new tax declaration issued covers the whole property of Cipriano. The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. 07764 had been cancelled and. will prevail. cancellation of Tax Declaration No. tried to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio. they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of sale. the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations. HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA vs. T. if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration. M. Sometime in 1997. explaining that it was necessary for a loan application. 07764.R. 07764. 23959. the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment. The burden of proof remains where it is but. BUELA and which. In this case. Tax Declaration No. 175874. the owner of the property adjacent to Cipriano’s lot. As such. annulment of deed of sale. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 Page | 285 . when the heirs of Cipriano. December 11. the presumption that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed. 23959 was issued on 24 June 1996 in the name of Dionisio. but they did not pay the purchase price for the subject properties. respondents had caused the issuance of Tax Declaration No. is selfserving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

During the trial. petitioners presented an expert witness testifying to the forgery of Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. being a notarized document. Also. the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had been forged. On appeal. In this case. Notarial Division. Nevertheless. convincing. First. when the analyst was asked the question of when the assailed deed was received by the Bureau of Archives. Further. CA ruled that petitioners had failed to prove by requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery. M. bodes well for its authenticity. Based on RTC Judge’s observation Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed bares a difference as compared to other documents bearing his signature. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. she answered that it was forwarded to them only on 28 September 1987 by RTC Region 7. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear. when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed deed. It likewise supported its finding that the signature was forged through independent observation. enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution. clear and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed was presented. Second. while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken had turned yellow with age. Page | 286 . the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. the paper was noted to be white. ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of regularity of a notarized ancient document may be assailed by the testimony of an expert witness and independent observation of the trial court as to the forgery of signature therein. while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. The deed. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. T. Lastly. No issue has been raised about his expertise. BUELA was a forgery. the fact that it was an ancient document that “remained unaltered after so many years. and more than merely preponderant. this presumption is disputable.

" The nonpresentation. 2002 FACTS: Accused Roberto Padrigone. Rowena was certified to be suffering from "Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition" and thus "cannot stand judicial proceedings yet. the rule that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties. ROBERTO PADRIGONE G. (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative.k. Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister. Third. and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. No. Suppression of Testimony PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. May 9. of January 3. BUELA 3. On appeal. a 16 year old lass.a. a. ISSUE: Whether or not failure to present as witness the victim of a crime who became insane by reason of such offense amounts to suppression of evidence. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Jocel Ibanita. the trial court deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter’s conviction. Roberto San Miguel. of Rowena was not willful. The victim became insane after the incident and was not able to testify in Court. Nimfa Contridas.m.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.R. Michael San Antonio and Abel Triumpante entered the dwelling of the Contridas sisters at 3:00 a. herein Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena. there was no suppression of evidence in this case. 1995. 137664. Second. the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. while Rowena was the victim. First. Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court. convicted the accused. the defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. and at knifepoint successively raped Rowena Contridas. Under Rule 131. who was also present that time narrated the incident when her elder sister’s innocence was forcibly violated. (b) the suppression was not willful. Plainly. T. in any case. M. The trial court. disregarding the Accused’s defense of denial and alibi. when the latter should have had her sane moments. therefore. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression of evidence. Page | 287 . her fourteen year old sister. the victim. As a consequence. Instead.

Respondent. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. BUELA METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. On appeal. Chia. With this unfavorable turn of events. M. T. respondent GTP. 122899. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. June 8. Metrobank refused to discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans” as there exist a stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors’ debts subsequently obtained would be covered by the same security. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party. the presumption arises that the evidence.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact. if produced. Hence. pursuant to the balance declared by Metrobank prior to the execution of the sale. Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to be released." At the re-scheduled date of oral arguments where METROBANK was supposed to bring before the CA the current statement of the mortgage debt of Mr.R. COURT OF APPEALS and G. METROBANK’s counsel did not appear. and support the case of his adversary. CA reversed its previous decision. Page | 288 . Chia and Respondent GTP entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage wherein the latter assumes the former’s indebtedness with Metrobank. filed a motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer to require METROBANK to furnish appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr.P. This notwithstanding. thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests. ISSUE: Whether or not failure of the mortgagee to present the proof of loan secured by the mortgage estopped him from further asserting the existence of such liability HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G. would operate to his prejudice. the payment made by GPT does not extinguish the mortgage. CA reversed the decision. 2000 FACTS: Mr. No. and he refuses to produce such evidence. Consequently. paid Chia’s loan balance with Metrobank in the amount of P116K+.T. Chia.

000. capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program. By way of defense. It was agreed that Cuenco shall identify and recommend the patients who may availed of the program. But Metrobank failed to appear thereon.386. No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact. Official Duty FILOMENA G. solidarily liable therefor. Special Audit Team Supervisor. thus." 4. Several years after the enforcement of the MOA. and holding petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not assertion of good faith in the performance of a public function prevails over factual findings revealing violations of rules and regulations in the performance of such function. T. would benefit him.697. if proved. HELD: Page | 289 .500. Boado disallowed the amount of P3. M. DELOS SANTOS vs. BUELA The scheduled oral arguments before the CA was supposed to be Metrobank’s golden opportunity to prove the existence the "other unliquidated past due loans" which is the basis of its refusal to release the mortgage property. Consequently. invoke good faith in the performance of their respective duties. Thereafter.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified prescription and documents. his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist. No. August 13. which. together with other VSMMC officials. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G. 198457. allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. an audit thereof was conducted and rampant violations of bidding and audit procedure were revealed. if it exists.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. 2013 FACTS: Congressman Cuenco entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC) appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1.R. petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and.

despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. 2013 FACTS: Accused was charged with violation of RA 9165. Petitioners failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and regulations. Had there been an internal control system installed by petitioners. No. on appeal. petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy. Trayvilla recalled that Cadidia denied that the two sachets of shabu were hers and said that she was only asked by an unidentified person to bring the same. M. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear. October 16.R. Not convinced with Cadidia’s explanation. and the hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. absent any showing of bad faith and malice. while performing her duty as a female frisker assigned at the NAIA Terminal I. She claimed that the self. accused interposed the defense of frame-up. T. a Non-Uniformed Personnel of the PNP. Both the trial court and the CA. they discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu. However. The accused also assails the application of presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of the witnesses. During trial. ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of a public officer may be assailed by bare allegations of frame-up. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their supervisor SPO3 Musalli I. Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness. the irregularities would have been exposed. BUELA Jurisprudence holds that. there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA G. Appang (SPO3 Appang). she frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area and she noticed something unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia’s buttocks. Page | 290 .serving testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome her presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. The prosecution presented Trayvilla. Evidently. this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. Trayvilla and her female co-employee Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room inside the domestic airport to check. conviced the accused. and of their duties under the MOA. 191263. who testified that on 31 July 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning. Upon inquiry.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.

On the other hand. 119072. While accusedappellant's defense before the trial court alleges that he had left the scene of the incident together with defense witness Calixto Flora.R. credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers. the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the accused who entered the x-ray machine of the departure area. Neither could they harbour any ill-will against each other. April 11. The subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual task when they found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. JESUS EDUALINO G. 5.” In this case. Page | 291 . BUELA HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Aileen Yayen – eyewitness. and Dr. he alternatively raises before this Court the contention that the elements of the crime of rape have not been established. No. In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. This is bolstered by the fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other. M. Prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Rowena Nantiza – victim/complainant. 1997 FACTS: Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with consummated rape of a pregnant woman.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. T. accused-appellant relies on alternative defenses of alibi and consent on the part of complainant. Cohabitation PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding the apprehension. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the accused especially in her private area. Rogelio Divinagracia – medico-legal.

In the present case. A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may question his conviction by assailing the character of the victim. who was then three (3) months pregnant. BUELA Accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant Rowena Nantiza. Legitimacy 7. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape. 6. were true. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the influence of drug and alcohol. Survivorship Page | 292 . convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things. The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisite in prosecutions for rape. It is argued that a responsible and decent married woman. T. would not be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer. M. HELD: It should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped. natural.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married woman.

R. Order of Presentation of Evidence PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court should give full weight as to the veracity of a testimony which was not subjected to cross-examination by the adverse party. 146697. her mother and the wife of the accused. At the trial. Certainly. M. 2002 FACTS: Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre. countered with the testimony of the accused himself. the defense argues. Jalalon. The defense. the sworn statement of Adela.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou. the doctor who examined Marilou. Presentation of Evidence 1. T. that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence. July 23. BUELA E. the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party. Reinerio Jalalon. along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. during its turn in the presentation of evidence. Page | 293 . No. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. and that of Dr. that of Adela Fabre. HELD: The answer is in the negative. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. On appeal. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE G. and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela.

In the case at bar. 142556. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA G. which took effect on December 15. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him in open court. if not uncertain. On appeal. Leading and Misleading Questions PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. leading questions are not allowed. 2000. Perez guilty of raping Mayia P. the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice. However. No. 2003 FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Jesus S. (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth. BUELA 2. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness. she referred to him as a man named "Johnny" and did not give any description or any identifying mark. making the recall of events difficult. T. As a rule. Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Ponseca and imposing on appellant the death penalty.R. M. (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment. the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered. (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child. Moreover. Appellant bewails that the identification was not done with the usual police line-up." Page | 294 . appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. and (4) avoid waste of time. February 5. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the minor-victim should be expunged on the ground that leading questions were asked during her testimony in court. HELD: The answer is in the negative. The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. Appellant points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. namely.

the crossexaminer must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. the widow of Diosdado. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made. accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies. the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. SR. On the other hand.R. Luz was not. Escosura52 that the statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility Page | 295 . was inconsistent with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn statement before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier. the prosecution’s principal witness. the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz. 139412. et al. M. as mandated by Section 13. of murder of the Diosdado Volante. cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. therefore. and the physical evidence on record. Jr. Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony. April 2. G.51 This Court held in People v. Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence ISSUE: Whether or not a testimony made in open court may be impeached by asserting that the said testimony is inconsistent with those made by the witness in the preliminary examination. Appellant Jaime. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 2003 FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellants Ronald Castillano alias "Nono" and Jaime Castillano. T. BUELA 3. On appeal.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Jr. JAIME CASTILLANO. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Moreover. No. Impeachment PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

Section 16.R. It is asserted that the testimony of Francisca Espina should not be given worth since. but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party. also. if he chooses. T. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. It convicted the three accused of murder The instant appeal was interposed by the three convicted appellants. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to impeach the credibility and truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination. 1995 FACTS: Antonio Plasencia. 4. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred. Appellants attack the credibility of the prosecution's lone eyewitness. The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. she would at times be seen reading some notes written on her left palm. or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded. cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with homicide. who during her testimony was seen looking at some notes written on her palm. So. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present testimony. should not be given credence HELD: The answer is in the negative. a witness may testify from Page | 296 . ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness. Reference to Memorandum PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. M. ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO G. who may. of the Rules of Court states: A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact. November 7. 90198. In this case. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court. the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. or immediately thereafter. BUELA unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies. No. Rule 132. said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court. while testifying.

ISSUES: Page | 297 .) Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. ruled in favor of respondent. Due to Petitioner’s refusal to pay the amount billed by the Respondent. It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be considered an exception to the hearsay rule. T. petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose. Petitioner contends that Aday’s testimony is considered a hearsay for lack of personal knowledge of the entries made as the information entered was merely provided to her by the engineers of the respondent. if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made. The trial court. as well as Aday’s testimony. No. said decision was affirmed by the CA. they may be admitted under Rule 132. Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. giving due weight to the plaintiff’s Book of Collectible Accounts. During the trial. Section 10 of the Rules of Court. April 13. plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.R. though he retain no recollection of the particular facts. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. 1999 FACTS: Petitioner entered into two contracts with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION G. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills were supervised by "an engineer for such functions. private respondent presented its Book of Collectible Accounts and their bookkeeper. M. but such evidence must be received with caution.717. (Emphasis supplied. To prove the unpaid bills of the petitioner. BUELA such a writing or record.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. CANQUE vs. In this case. 96202. On appeal. ROSELLA D. the latter brought a suit to recover from the former the sum of P299.75. the exercise of that discretion has not been abused. On the other hand. Dolores Aday to testify on the entries of the said book. the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.

FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY G. the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. When the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him. 2013 FACTS: Petitioner. Classes of Documents YASUO IWASAWA vs. where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. even where this requirement has been satisfied. Assuming that the book of collectible accounts presented by the respondent would qualify as a memorandum. the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence. such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the informer. September 11. unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down.R. a Japanese national married Private respondent in 2002. BUELA (1) Whether or not testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on bills provided to her is inadmissible on the ground of hearsay evidence rule. and may not be admitted as such. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute. No. Suspecting that something might Page | 298 . and the person who gave him the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have intervened. petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. In other words. 204169. M. In July 2009. T. What is more. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence 5. (2) The answer is in the negative. (2) Whether or not the testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on information provided to her may be admissible as memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness HELD: (1) The answer is in the affirmative.

It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus. To his shock. BUELA have happened in the Philippines. T. It held that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents. the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present Page | 299 . It further ruled that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document. 410 of the Civil Code provides that “the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. M. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.” As public documents. he confronted his wife about it. 2002. aside from his testimony. petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the NSO: (1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on November 28. it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage. private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away. (2) Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20. (3) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent RTC rendered the assailed decision. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one During trial. 1994 Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo. Art. HELD: The answer in the negative.

Revilla Customs Brokerage. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. PHILAM INSURANCE CO. And in the instant case. No. Inc. Public documents. Moreover.R. ASIAN TERMINALS. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam. ISSUE: Whether or not certificates and/or receipts offered as evidence required authentication. are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. Universal Motors declared them a total loss. as enumerated under Section 19. Inc. they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. the authorized broker of Universal Motors. Accordingly. not only are said documents admissible. The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. When the case was elevated to the SC. 2013 FACTS: Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors 219 packages containing 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. Owing to the extent of the damage to said cargoes. Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages against Westwind. it was found that the package marked as 03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. T. G. 181163. BUELA the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary. When Universal Motors’ demands remained unheeded. vs. INC. ATI10 and R. Revilla Customs Brokerage. The shipment was insured with Philam against all risks. July 24.F.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. When the package arrived and was unloaded by ATI. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. INC. and delivered to the latter’s warehouse. Page | 300 . On appeal.F.. Universal Motors issued a Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam.. The shipment was withdrawn by R. it sought reparation from and was compensated by Philam. petitioners objected to the admission of Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt for being hearsay as they were not authenticated by the persons who executed them. M.

Suerte for the transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances. 2012 FACTS: Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar Market in Baguio City. SUERTE G. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents which Philam and the consignee. Before full payment could be made. deed or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. M. deceased. Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in these cases. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence. or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine. (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party. Offer of Evidence LOMISES ALUDOS. (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted. a private document is any other writing. June 18. Rule 132 of the Rules: SEC. Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly authenticated. Rule 132 of the Rules. a private document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20. issue in the pursuit of their business. however. BUELA In contrast. Indubitably. or the solemnities prescribed by law. JOHNNY M. Proof of private document. substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs. Page | 301 .R. 165285. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. 6. No. 20. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document. Marine Certificate No. or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written. T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. respectively. specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21.

Under Section 34. On appeal. M.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. however. the owner of the improvements." Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer to Johnny’s complaint and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pretrial brief. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.000. for making it appear that it was part of the records of the case. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered. Page | 302 . and the Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. Atty. In fact. Lomises. 1985 lease contract. Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises for specific performance with damages. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. T. pursuant to the May 1. BUELA Lomises backed out of the agreement and returned the P68. The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1. a copy of it was never attached. however. objects to the CA ruling upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it involved the sale of improvements on the stalls. as it was not formally offered in evidence before the RTC.00. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls.Thus. The sale of the improvements. in fact. Lomises alleges that the sale of the improvements should similarly be voided because it was made without the consent of the Baguio City Government. the Baguio City Government. CA agreed with the RTC that the assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the lessor. the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. ISSUE: Whether or not a document repeatedly mentioned in the pleadings of the parties which was presented only on appeal may be considered for purposes of adjudicating the case. the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. was valid because these were Lomises’ private properties. HELD: The answer is in the negative. 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. Lockey. 1985 lease contract between the Baguio City Government and Lomises. a copy of the May 1. RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the Baguio City Government to the agreement. the CA admonished Lomises’ lawyer.

On March 7. Neither may it be taken into account on appeal. Page | 303 . No. the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp solely liable to them. AMOS P. Evidence not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. Section 34.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence states that: "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. 194128. any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected. JR. 2004. BUELA WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION FRANCIA. Moreover.R. ISSUE: Whether or not documents attached to a motion for reconsideration made before the appellate court may be considered for purposes of adjudicating the merits of the case. T. G. three (3) days before the scheduled hearing. Consequently. On the other hand. Wincorp filed a written motion to postpone the hearing." A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. FACTS: Respondents filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their investments against petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent Pearlbank Securities Inc. et al. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. On September 27. Wincorp filed an MR with the CA attaching to the said motion evidentiary evidence which it was not able to present during trial. December 7. M. 2011 vs. HELD: The answer is in the negative. The RTC denied Wincorp’s Motion to Postpone and considered it to have waived its right to present evidence. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. 2003. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. The Motion for Reconsideration of Wincorp was likewise denied. the case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp.

coupled with the fact that Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAA’s body had been submerged in the water ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a witness attesting to identifying the perpetrator of a crime by merely seeing his back constitutes positive identification that warrants conviction. HELD: The answer is in the negative. observing that the incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest. 2011 FACTS: Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide. 183830. despite his back being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. BUELA Prescinding therefrom. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso. No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been. Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 1. On appeal. a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl. M. her identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral Page | 304 . 7. October 19. The CA ruled that she made a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing. T. No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Tender of Excluded Evidence F. CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC had rendered. and sentenced him to death. DELFIN CALISO G. Hierarchy of Evidence Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents attached in the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court and all the documents attached in the defendant-appellant’s brief filed by defendantappellant Wincorp cannot be given any probative weight or credit for the sole reason that the said documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court because to consider them at this stage will deny the other parties the right to rebut them.R. but the Regional Trial Court found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA.

This constitutes direct evidence. be instances where. however. the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body. then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness. must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Page | 305 . like the face. like the crime itself. There are two types of positive identification. To achieve such distinctiveness. DNA. the identity of the offender. for even if the commission of the crime can be established. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. the voice. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others. the dentures. Indeed. there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd. when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain. the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or characteristics. which forms part of circumstantial evidence. The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. This is the second type of positive identification. T. because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. absent other reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA’s killer. There may. leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion. M. because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity. In every criminal prosecution. BUELA certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing.although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime. fingerprints.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence. he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. the only means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability. which.

Page | 306 . Trial court convicted the accused. she was able to visit her grandmother.R. (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury. So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility. who testified that after the dates wherein the latter was supposedly rape. he noted the following observations about AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark. observation and common experience of man. when prosecution presented Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations. a friend of the complainant. The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge. the defense presented Wilma Enriquez. Dr. Thus.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the latter visited her and discussed plans about marrying the accused. M. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA G. Furthermore. observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance. On appeal with CA. February 12. In his report. the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy. T. ISSUE: Whether or not a person accused of rape may be convicted based solely on the testimony of victim who positively identified him to be the perpetrator notwithstanding blatant inconsistencies therein. and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. but to disprove the accusation is difficult. complainant testified that she was abducted by the accused and brought to the latter’s residence where the former was repeatedly rape for 8 days. During the trial. conviction of the accused was confirmed. On the other hand. and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa. No. 190178. However. (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution. HELD: In reviewing rape cases. BUELA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge. the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. she testified that in between those 8 days. though the accused may be innocent. in the course the complainant’s testimony. 2014 FACTS: Accused was charged with forcible abduction with rape.

2011 FACTS: On 2 June 2011. (2) that she was not able to ask for help from any of the family member nor any of them was able to realize that accused was keeping her against her will. and (5) lastly. DELGADO et al. which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty. SC Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T. Clear and Convincing SUPREME COURT vs. (4) admission that she was able to visit her grandmother within the period of the alleged abduction when she was supposed to be kept inside accused’s house against her will. only four (4) persons are authorized to photocopy. only Ms. Acceding to the request.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Puno is authorized to receive and open. (3) the discussion of wedding plans with her friend after her ordeal.g. Herein Respondents were charged with grave misconduct for taking specific pages in the said agenda without being authorized thereto. The said Agenda contain an itemized list of cases taken up by the Court’s Second Division during the sessions held on the concerned date and the handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio noting the specific actions adopted by the division on each case. M. EDDIE V. Carpio caused the transmittal of two (2) sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court – Second Division (OCC-SD).M. only a few specified personnel within the OCC-SD are authorized to have access to an Agenda – e. A. In the case at bar. The complicity of each respondent are as follows: Madeja and Florendo asked respondent Delgado for a copy of several items included in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. respondent Delgado removed pages 58.. No. the OCC-SD follows a very strict procedure in handling them. 59 and 70 from a copy of Page | 307 . BUELA The following inconsistencies in complainant’s testimony is found to be incompatible to human experience: (1) the admission that she during her abduction she was brought to accused’s house where 8 family members of the latter also resides. the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats. that she was repeated mauled by accused on their way to his to residence and within the duration of abduction but no physical injuries was seen during the medical examination conducted after the incident.Thus. October 4. T. Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda. the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. 2011-07-SC. A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt. force or intimidation.

in fact. However. It was never shown that respondent Delgado was motivated by any ill will in implicating respondents Madeja and Florendo. private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. No. while respondents Madeja and Florendo admitted during the initial investigation that they asked for and. Jr.R. ISSUE: Whether or not mere denials made by respondent during formal investigation warrants prevails against the contrary testimony of their corespondent implicating them in the alleged deed. For his part. private respondent filed. On October 22. HON. Initially. unless supported by clear and convincing evidence.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order. It was then raffled off to Branch presided by respondent judge.. HELD: The answer is in the negative. obtained the missing pages in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. This was granted by respondent judge. Delgado admitted that he removed and took the said pages from the agenda and gave the same to Madeja and Florendo. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. Judge Bernardo. the instant Page | 308 . and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ G. As a witness. JR. 153675. 2001. FELIXBERTO T. cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses. 2007 FACTS: petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. 2001. M.a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. BUELA the Agenda entrusted to him for stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja and Florendo. in the same case. 2001. inhibited himself from further hearing the case. Hence. T. OLALIA. petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order. During the initial and formal investigation. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials. the petition for bail was denied by Judge Bernardo. they vehemently denied having been involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during the formal investigation of the OAS. the credibility of respondent Delgado remained unsullied. April 19. On December 21. On October 30.

" We further note that Section allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused. but one that is merely administrative in character. created by treaty. even though such punishment may follow extradition. an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal. for it is not punishment for a crime. ISSUE: (1) What should be the quantum of evidence needed to grant such bail to a potential extraditee. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding. Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled. Puno. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail. that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice. It is not a criminal proceeding. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan. and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state." While administrative in character. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal.D. to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction. pending receipt of the request for extradition. for the purpose of trial or punishment." This is shown by Section 6 of P. Page | 309 . HELD: Clear and convincing evidence." and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently. BUELA petition. M. it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law. the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. Nor is it a full-blown civil action. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. then Associate Justice. tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. now Chief Justice Reynato S. T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. No. It is sui generis.

In order for selfdefense to be appreciated. ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO G. and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered.R. causing him to run away. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ a big stone. Fontanilla claimed self-defense. where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival. (b) Page | 310 . She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the victim more than once. She attested that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the skull. M. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic. Olais fell facedown to the ground. the sons-in-law of Olais. 2012 FACTS: Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. T. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of accused alleging self-defense may be given credence amidst gravity of the injury sustained by the victim. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. having been immediately released from the hospital. Fontanilla was charged with murder. At the trial. January 25. 177743. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him. considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on the skull had been radiating. causing his death. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. BUELA According to him. shouted at him. that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment. Consequently. Prosecution presented the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais. No. this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death" due to the victim attacking him only with bare hands. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone.

With PCIB’s failure to prove Ramos’ actual participation in Balmaceda’s fraud. On appeal. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. BUELA reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. On the other hand. by taking advantage of his position as branch manager. for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill. For failure to file an answer. the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee in some of the Manager’s checks does not suffice to prove that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s fraudulent scheme. Balmaceda was declared in default.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. M.R. 2011 vs. and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It was also observed that other persons were also named as payees in the checks that Balmaceda acquired and encashed. RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. not just to defend himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense. not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. T. September 21. no legal and factual basis exists to hold him liable. PCIB alleged that Balmaceda. Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations. RAMOS G. No. for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established. for there is nothing to repel. but maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of Balmaceda’s money. PCIB also impleaded Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. The plea of self-defense was thus belied. FACTS: PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Antonio Balmaceda. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda. fraudulently obtained and encashed 34 Manager’s checks amounting to 11M+. Preponderance of Evidence PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK ANTONIO B. 158143. self-defense is unavailing. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim. the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos.8 According to the CA. Page | 311 . and PCIB only chose to go after Ramos.

Petitioner had to undergo physical therapy and eventually a spine surgery to treat the injury. as the CA correctly observed.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. was involved in a vehicular accident which resulted to minor injuries of Petitioner Dra. DELA LLANA vs. petitioner can no longer practice her profession. While mere denial by the defendant is intrinsically weak evidence. Petitioner was diagnose with whiplash injury which she attributed to the accident that had happened. the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. But.R. In civil cases. 182356. while the surgery was successful. DRA. LEILA A. BUELA PCIB insists that since Ramos’ defense – anchored on mere denial of any participation in Balmaceda’s wrongdoing – is an intrinsically weak defense. December 04. Consequently. petitioner sued the respondent for damages for the medical expenses and loss of earnings At the trial. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The traffic investigation that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. No. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. Dra. the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee on some of the Manager’s checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s fraud. this does not mean that the complainant may just rely on the weakness of the defense presented by the former. 2013 FACTS: Joel Primero. However. all that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos’ name as a payee when he filled up the application forms for the Manager’s checks. a truck driver employed by the Respondent. M. The rule is that the party asserting a claim must still provide proof of his allegation. dela Llana. Dra. ISSUE: Whether or not appellate court may exonerate defendant on the basis of his mere denial of the imputed wrong in a civil case. a number of other people were made payees on the other Manager’s checks yet PCIB never alleged them to be liable. More than one month after the incident. nor did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos’ participation that would justify his separate treatment from the others. it was error for the CA to exonerate Ramos from any liability. T. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm Page | 312 . On its face. to the court. or evidence which. is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition. REBECCA BIONG G.

M. none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. (2) the medical certificate dated November 20. dela Llana. did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established. In other words. HELD: No. as fully discussed below. by act or omission. ISSUE: Whether or not mere assertion that damages suffered was caused by a certain event imputable against the defendant without explaining the causal link between the injury and the imputed act warrants a ruling in favor of the complainant. of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence. was guilty. during trial. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged car. Dra. To prove her claim. The medical certificate stated that Dra. 2000. In the present case. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. mere allegations are not evidence. However. It held that Dra. the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff. Notably. dela Llana. and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. In short. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. CA reversed the RTC ruling. she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated issued by Dr. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. (2) negligence. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. But on appeal. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Page | 313 . are not equivalent to proof. in its natural and continuous sequence. and (3) her testimonial evidence. T. unsubstantiated by evidence. Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. dela Llana. In civil cases. The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. produced her whiplash injury.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Milla. BUELA because of the vehicular accident. Dra. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations.

CANDAO. Page | 314 . Mendoza. BUELA ZACARIA A. the party having the burden of proof loses. SB convicted the petitioner and held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks without the required disbursement vouchers of the amounts covered by the 43 checks constitutes illegal withdrawals. filed in the Sandiganbayan (SB) criminal cases for malversation of public funds against petitioners. 186659-710. T. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. Petitioners contend that SB committed a reversible error in not applying the "equipoise rule" which if applied would have resulted in the acquittal of the accused-petitioners. and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Such is not the situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence that one of the peitioners failed to account for funds under his custody and control upon demand. On crossexamination. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations. Under the equipoise rule. HELD: There is therefore no merit in petitioners’ argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the equipoise rule. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN G. specifically for the P21. the audit team failed to conduct entry and exit conference.R. M. Nos.64 illegally withdrawn from the said funds. for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.570. The prosecution’s lone witness was Heidi L. vs. The Special Audit Office Report submitted by the audit team shown that illegal withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of petitioners without the required disbursement vouchers. SB convicted herein petitioners. 2011 FACTS: COA conducted an expanded audit on the financial transactions and operations of ORG-ARMM for the period July 1992 to March 1993. October 19.045. one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt. witness Mendoza testified that due to security reasons. where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates. et al. ISSUE: Whether or not equipoise rule finds application in the instant case.

It is that amount 7 Penned by LEONARDO – DE CASTRO. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. T. he submitted two other affidavits of LTO employees who allegedly had first-hand knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing and pocketing additional fees. Petitioner argues that it is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before an administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. 170512. their indispensable participation of petitioners in the issuance of the subject checks to effect illegal withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly established by the prosecution and the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron in embezzling and misappropriating such funds. BUELA Petitioners are both accountable public officers within the meaning of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. REYES7 G. October 5. M. Peñaloza filed a counter-affidavit implicating Reyes as the mastermind behind the practice of extorting money from those who failed the driver’s licensure exam. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not findings of substantial evidence of administrative or quasi-judicial body is not subject to review by appellate courts. In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial Evidence OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. No. In other words. Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. ANTONIO T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. as amended.: Page | 315 . J. 2011 FACTS: Reyes and Peñaloza were charged with grave misconduct pursuant to a complaint-affidavit executed by Jaime Acero. In addition to Peñaloza’s affidavit. Reyes was not furnished with the copies of two other affidavits submitted by Peñaloza.R. Ombudsman convicted Reyes of grave misconduct with penalty of dismissal.

R. 203186. applies herein. determine the credibility of witnesses. Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal. a person pretending to be their valued client Acosta secured another auto loan from BPI Family which had remained unpaid. XAVIER C. However. 2013 FACTS: Ramos was employed by BPI Family as Vice-President for Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division. T. After carefully perusing the records of this case. an exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. BPI Family discovered that: (1) a person misrepresented herself as Acosta and succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a Toyota Prado pursuant to the Purchase Order (PO) and Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos. G. SALCEDO. Reyes’ right to due process was violated. even if other minds. A judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process. M. Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Ramos’s complaint. His duties and responsibilities includes the receipt and approval of applications for auto loans from auto dealers and salesmen. Consequently. No. During his tenure. BUELA of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Court of Appeals reiterates that in reviewing administrative decisions. or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. and/or ALFONSO L. (2) Ramos released these documents without the prior approval of BPI Family’s credit committee. Considering that petitioner rendered its Decision on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. After investigation. rather than the general rule. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence. Dadulo v. Ramos’ employment was severed and his last pay and benefits were deducted with a portion of the losses incurred by BPI due to the Acosta incident. might conceivably opine otherwise. December 4. RAMOS vs. JR.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. while it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again. we find that the above-cited exception. equally reasonable. NLRC reversed the LA in a Decision alleged negligence committed by Ramos was not substantially proven Page | 316 . Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of retirement benefits against BPI.

" Applying the foregoing considerations. CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos. as an exception. the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits was improper as BPI was not able to substantially prove its imputation of negligence against Ramos. the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion.00. M. The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5.000.000. Page | 317 . the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed before administrative or quasi. BUELA as he was not expected to personally examine all loan documents that pass through his hands or to require the client to personally appear before him because he has subordinates to do those details for him. Wellsettled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. HELD: As a general rule. Finding BPI Family’s negligence to be concurrent with Ramos. in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not findings of fact by a labor tribunal may be assailed by petition for certiorari. holding that Ramos was remiss in his duty. instead.judicial bodies. a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence. The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence . equitably reduced the same to the amount of P200. T.00 from Ramos ’s retirement benefits and. But it also attributed negligence on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the approval of the credit committee.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. the CA found it improper to deduct the entire P546.

as a preliminary matter. June 6. HELD: Although a paternity action is civil. the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. specifically seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent. JESUS S. Thus. (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. LUCAS G. the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable. filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation specifically seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. Lucas. CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation. 190710. Jesse U. M. there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. As explained hereafter. RTC dismissed the. before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing. No. LUCAS vs. a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the RTC.R. during the hearing on the Page | 318 . and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. BUELA Prima Facie Evidence JESSE U. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent. ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order for purposes of proving filiation. and petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay. On appeal by the respondent to CA. T. 2011 FACTS: Petitioner. not criminal. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

200. M. ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause to prosecute Tria with qualified theft. the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. and Manager’s Check Application Form were then evaluated by the bank’s Sales and Service Officer (SSO). it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. the Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) issued a Resolution finding no probable cause against Tria. for example. T. Notwithstanding these. The court may. the court may. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative. a manager’s check was issued payable to Atty. AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE G. On April 26. consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. 2004. Reyes. supporting documents. Reyes in presenting Manager’s Check No.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. MWSS opened a Current Account with the said PNB Branch and made an initial deposit of PhP 6. Bagasani." The letter-request. Thus. in its discretion. BUELA motion for DNA testing. Probable Cause PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs.R.13. HELD: Page | 319 . sought to hold Tria liable for qualified theft. Flandez of PNB-MWSS Sale and Service Head.714. Veniegas and placement of Tria’s signature on the check above the handwritten note "PAYEE IDENTIFIED – AMELIO C. During preliminary investigation. PNB conducted its own investigation and. 2012 FACTS: Respondent Tria was a former Branch Manager of PNB-MWSS. April 25. 2004. SSO. disallow a DNA testing.000 from C/A and the issuance of the corresponding manager’s check payable to a certain "Atty. 1165848 to PNB’s Circle Branch.660. Reyes. Rodrigo A. PNB-MWSS received cash delivery from PNB’s Cash Center in the amount of PhP 8. No. On April 22. ACP‘s resolution was affirmed both by DOJ and CA.000. respondent Tria accompanied Atty. Onthe same day. who found the same to be in order.621." It was later on found that MWSS did not authorize the issuance of the said manager’s check. PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from MWSS instructing the deduction of PhP 5. at its conclusion. TRIA. 193250.

more likely than not. On Page | 320 . for purposes of filing a criminal information. RUBEN DEL CASTILLO vs. In fact. Reyes for qualified theft. secured a search warrant from the RTC which was granted. During the implementation of the warrant. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Article III of R. but only that there is probable cause to believe that he is guilty of the crime charged. after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner. And indeed. While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of an information rests with the executive branch. No. BUELA Yea. a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. such authority is far from absolute. are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him. It may be subject to review when it has been clearly used with grave abuse of discretion.R. RTC convicted the accused. charging him with violation of Section 16. 2012 FACTS: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu. grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop the charges against Tria as there was more than probable cause to proceed against him for qualified theft. The finding of conviction was affirmed by the CA.A. 6425.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor. petitioner escaped and illegal drugs were found inside a nipa hut in front of his rented two-story residence. it is easy to infer from the factual milieu of the instant case the existence of all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified theft. an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner. M. T. Probable cause. The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide more than sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an information against him and John Doe/Atty. January 30. police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon. 185128. Consequently. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that.

totality of the circumstances standard. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion. a substantial basis exists. petitioner assailed the validity of the issuance of the search warrant on the ground that the police officer who applied for the same as no personal knowledge of the basis for the issuance of such warrant. and must employ a flexible. (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge. is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula. The judge. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that. A review of the records shows that in the present case. T. it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them. in determining probable cause. ISSUE: Whether or not validity of the issuance of a search warrant may be questioned on appeal on the ground that the person applying for the warrant had no personal knowledge of the cause for the issuance thereof. and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. HELD: The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present. more likely than not. M. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. therefore. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court. the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce. This Court. a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. (3) the judge must examine. in writing and under oath or affirmation. Page | 321 .Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. BUELA appeal with the SC. as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.

G. (5) the last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle. M. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO et al. (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 178771. while she and the victim Abad were sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience . testified: (1) that on May 7. she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied. (2) Inside the house. RTC found the appellants guilty of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention of AAA and Murder of Abad. On appeal with SC. T.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling. several persons entered to rob the place. During the trial. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and Page | 322 . June 8. (4) inside the Revo. (3) appellants took her outside the house and pushed her into the Revo (vehicle). AAA was repeatedly rape by the appellants. 2011 FACTS: Appellants are charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate Information. No. she saw and recognized the appellants. (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. BUELA Iota of Evidence (Circumstantial) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Abad. appellants assailed the conviction of murder on the ground that there was no eye-witness presented that they indeed kill Abad. 2002.R. the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime. ISSUE: Whether or not an accused may be convicted even if there are no eyewitness on the commission of the offense. one of the victims. Considering that the victim AAA was raped during her detention. (6) during her captivity. AAA. the maximum penalty of DEATH was imposed. and heard one of them uttering "somebody will die.

February 15. the prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas. Efren Deocampo. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. (4) On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next to the old couple’s house. as the perpetrator. (3) On May 28 they suddenly went missing. (8) Maritess lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City / Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for them. 1998. The next day.R. BUELA reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused. vs. G. M. RTC convicted them considering the following circumstantial evidence: (1) Efren had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved his relationship with Maritess. 2012 FACTS: Maritess Alolod. EFREN DEOCAMPO et al. although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio. 185212. On appeal. and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried. a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen. the guard discovered that the fence wire had been cut.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K. tied and blindfolded him. (9) A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside the house. T. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that accused Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on circumstantial evidence. of May 28 a `neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what seemed like the butchering of a pig. (5) At about 2:00 a. to the exclusion of all others. Edwin Deocampo. and (10) The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants. Accused Efren Deocampo assailed their conviction based on circumstantial evidence. In the case at bar. No. HELD: The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of the crime provides: Page | 323 . and Elmer Deocampo were charged with double murder. (7) From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s house.m. (6) At break of dawn. (2) The old couple were enjoying good health before of May 27. with Efren wearing the old man’s watch.

The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance. Page | 324 . (3) the planting of camote on the ground where the victim’s where found buried. the trial court was correct in holding that the accused was guilty due to the following facts: (1) the presence of the accused in the victim’s house and used of the latter’s things when he had always been banned therefrom during the lifetime of the victim.e. In this case. BUELA SEC. i. Circumstantial evidence. All these when taken together leads only to one conclusion.Compilation of Digested Cases for Remedial Law Review II by: K.. 4. (2) the cover-up story of the adopted daughter that her parent went away for a medical check-up. when sufficient. that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. M. T. (4) testimony of a neighbor hearing a scream the night before the victims went missing then seeing the accused inside the house of the victims.