Pursuant to Section 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P Blg.

129) and to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases referred to herein,
the Court Resolved to promulgate the following Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:

Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction
A. Civil Cases:

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of
damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded,
the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
(2) All other civil cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiff's claim does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), exclusive of interest
and costs.

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not
exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of action is pleaded in
the same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor
to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal
case subject to the ordinary procedure.

Duty of court. — All pleadings shall be verified. 5. it may. Verifications. that the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons. appearance of parties. B. compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims' pleaded in the answer. Pleadings allowed. 4. II. the court. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff . 7. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. Sec. d-c chanrobles virtual law library Sec. If no ground for dismissal is found it shall forthwith issue summons which shall state that the summary procedure under this Rule shall apply. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Pleadings. the court shall issue an order declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by this Rule A patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Rule on Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action.Sec. or on motion of the plaintiff. 3. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided. Sec. — Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed. and the answers thereto. — The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaints. Determination of applicability. Effect of failure to answer. motu proprio. shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided. — After the court determines that the case falls under summary procedure. the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Preliminary conference.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. This is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived. if there are two or more defendants. — A. — Upon the filing of a civil or criminal action. a preliminary conference shall be held. Civil Cases Sec. 2. however. except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent therefrom for the dismissal of a civil action. from an examination of the allegations therein and such evidence as may be attached thereto. Answer. 6.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library Sec. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded.

10. — Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference. on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties. together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified. (c) Whether. in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order. and if so.. the court shall render judgment. Criminal Cases . it may. the terms thereof. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits. including but not limited to: (a) Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement. — Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers. or the expiration of the period for filing the same. Record of preliminary conference. and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. 8. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference. If a sole defendant shall fail to appear. judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings. Sec. Sec. and (e) Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case. Sec. However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts. Rendition of judgment. or the expiration of the period for filing the same. The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. (b) The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties. the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order. 9. during the said period. — Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section. (d) A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted. the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein. Submission of affidavits and position papers.shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. III. the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof.

but the adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose. or is not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph. the care may be dismissed. 15. — At the trial. such cases shall be commenced only by information. 11. 14. Sec. The prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counteraffidavits of the defense. otherwise. — Should the court. he shall be immediately arraigned and if he enters a plea of guilty. Procedure of trial. that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities. How commenced. 13. Sec. shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf. Arraignment and trial. — (a) If commenced by compliant. upon a consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties. — Before conducting the trial. the affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same.Sec. he shall forthwith be sentenced. however. However. or the propriety of allowing the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense may be considered. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the compliant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court's files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing. the court shall call the parties to a preliminary conference during which a stipulation of facts may be entered into. it shall order the dismissal of the case. — On the basis of the compliant and the affidavits and other evidence accompanying the same. redirect or re-cross examination. . Sec. 12. Duty of court. the court may dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the amused if in custody. Sec. the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial. or such other matters may be taken up to clarify the issues and to ensure a speedy disposition of the case. find no cause or ground to hold the accused for trial. serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Witnesses who testified may be subjected to cross-examination. together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the prosecution. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided. except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. Should the affiant fail to testify. (b) If commenced by information. If the accused is in custody for the crime charged. A refusal or failure to stipulate shall not prejudice the accused. no admission by the accused shall be used against him unless reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his counsel. the court shall issue an order which. Preliminary conference. his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the party presenting the affidavit. — When the case is commenced by information.

— The following pleadings. the court shall promulgate the judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the termination of trial. Sec.Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal. (b) Motion for a bill of particulars. Sec. (h) Motion to declare the defendant in default. (g) Petition for certiorari. Sec. he shall so manifest during the preliminary conference. the accused may file his counter-affidavits and serve the same on the prosecution within three (3) days from such service. or for opening of trial. Prohibited pleadings and motions. stating the purpose thereof. (f) Memoranda. Judgment. Referral to Lupon. . (d) Petition for relief from judgment. 17. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. or for reconsideration of a judgment. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement. If allowed by the court. the additional affidavits of the prosecution or the counter-affidavits of the defense shall be submitted to the court and served on the adverse party not later than three (3) days after the termination of the preliminary conference. IV. (e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings. shall be dismissed without prejudice and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant. — The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required. no witness shall be allowed to testify unless his affidavit was previously submitted to the court in accordance with Section 12 hereof. 16. 18. or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court. affidavits or any other paper. 19. COMMON PROVISIONS Sec. If the additional affidavits are presented by the prosecution. However. — Where a trial has been conducted. (c) Motion for new trial. mandamus. Arrest of accused. motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: (a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. or failure to comply with the preceding section. should a party desire to present additional affidavits or counter-affidavits as part of his direct evidence.

The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this Rule. Sec. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. 22. Sec. 21. 129. (j) Reply. 20. — The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. Appeal. — The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent herewith. without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. — This revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall be effective on November 15. including forcible entry and unlawful detainer. A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same to disciplinary action. 1991. Applicability of the regular rules. and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof from the record. . shall be immediately executory. — The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence. (l) Interventions. Effectivity. Sec. and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.(i) Dilatory motions for postponement. (k) Third party complaints. Affidavits. 23. Sec.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Inc. No.200 ft. J.85 per foot. Plaintiff then wrote two letters to defendant asking for . the same was found short of 300 ft. CALO. The transaction was evidenced by Charge Order No. CALO. L-22485 March 13. 1959.. doing business under the trade name CVC Lumber Industries. Tranquilino O.R. 1. INCORPORATED.. Calo. for plaintiffs-appellants. J. 1968 CONSUELO V. plaintiff-appellant Calo ordered from defendantappellee Ajax International. Villareal for defendant-appellee. of John Shaw wire rope at P2. defendant-appellee.00. plaintiffs-appellants. Jr. According to plaintiff Calo. AJAX INTERNATIONAL.: Sometime on May 7. assisted by MARCOS M. Sergio P. 37071. for P3. when the wire rope was delivered to Butuan City. vs.420. BENGZON.P.

37071 was among those included in the assigned account. a judgment by default was entered. defendant moved for the dismissal of Civil Case 860 on the ground. 860.ñët The dismissal of Civil Case No. and a writ of execution issued. assisted by her husband.1 We set aside the judgment of default and writ of execution issued against plaintiff Calo and remanded the case for further proceedings. inter alia.00 and (2) that the latter indemnify her for P12. Charge Order No. when . she instituted the present appeal. IV93062 for the simple reason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court. On November 20. 860 by the court a quo because of the pendency of Civil Case No. Instead of filing an answer.2 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. IV-93062 of the Municipal Court of Manila. plaintiff Calo. However. The court a quo sustained the motion and dismissed the case. against plaintiff Calo. 1962. 1961. There is no question that it arises out of the same transaction which is the basis of the complaint in Civil Case No. Subsequently. Marcos Calo. Inc. prohibition and mandamus. On January 23.000 as attorney's fees. The latter resorted to this Court on a petition for certiorari. a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. that the subject thereof was involved and intimately related to that in Civil Case No. IV-93062 and does not require the presence of third parties over whom the municipal court of Manila could not acquire jurisdiction. damages and expenses of litigation. 37071 or that she be relieved from paying P855. filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a complaint against defendant asking (1) that the latter either effect complete delivery of Charge Order No. When this failed. The rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred. plaintiff's claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. Plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration and new trial. of wire rope.1äwphï1. IV-93062 in the municipal court of Manila is predicated on the supposition that plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the latter case.either completion of delivery or account adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. IV-93062 was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of Calo from defendant Ajax International.

Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12. VI-93062.B. 860. Inc.00 not being a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizable by the inferior court is set up. Reyes. . WHEREFORE. Makalintal. the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. being beyond its jurisdiction. Since defendant still has to institute a separate action for the remaining balance of his counterclaim. Dizon. the reason underlying the rule.. Costs against appellee Ajax International.. So ordered. it need not be filed there.L. Castro.000. J. presupposes that the amount involved is within the said court's jurisdiction. does not obtain.4 This means that should the court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an amount exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious. For. Besides. which is to settle all related controversies in one sitting only.applied to the municipal court. Concepcion. Zaldivar. Sanchez. Otherwise. the previous litigation did not really settle all related controversies. is on leave. Angeles and Fernando.J. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him.. C. Consequently. concur. the defendant cannot obtain positive relief. the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The pendency then of said civil case could not be pleaded in abatement of Civil Case No. as this Court had already noted in Yu Lay v. it will simply dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger credit. Galmes 3 we would come to the absurd situation where a claim must be filed with the municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizance of. JJ.

vs. 107356 March 31. Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment. J. amount upon presentation of the excess baggage ticket. as long as it is properly supported by receipt. its employees returning to Dhahran. to April 15. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. 1981. petitioner.: Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract with the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) for the period covering April 16. On April 1980.50. No. He immediately asked his wife Beatriz in Manila to seek a written confirmation from SIA that he indeed paid for an excess . 1980. respondents.R. Aramco reimbursed said. In December 1980. with a 50kilogram excess baggage for which he paid P4. ROMERO.147. 1995 SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED. As part of Aramco's policy. Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess baggage of up to 50 kilograms. Rayos learned that he was one of several employees being investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claims.\ Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.

On December 10. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Singapore Airlines Limited. that it had no participation in the tampering of any excess baggage ticket.80) as actual damages. with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid. threatened it with a lawsuit.900. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 3. SIA's manager. Johnny Khoo. 1981. Aramco gave Rayos his travel documents without a return visa. in turn.000. PAL. On August 5.baggage of 50 kilograms. sued it for damages. Judge Jesus O. sentencing the latter to pay the former the following: 1. The sum of Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P430. assisted by a lawyer. the dispositive portion of which reads thus: WHEREFORE. The sum equivalent to ten Per Cent (10th) of the total amount due as and for attorney's fees. Rayos' salary. also with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until paid in full. The cost of suit. 2. SIA claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses because the tampering was committed by its handling agent. Philippine Airlines (PAL). . 1981. 1981. The sum of Four Thousand One Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P4.50) as reimbursement for the amount deducted from Mr. His employment contract was not renewed. rendered judgment on September 9. and that if any tampering was made. 1980. On April 14. convinced that SIA was responsible for the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with Aramco.147. the spouses Rayos. after its investigation of the anomaly and after Beatriz. 1988. in favor of the plaintiffs. it was done by SIA's personnel. SIA issued the certification requested by the spouses Rayos only on April 8. countered that its personnel did not collect any charges for excess baggage.00) as moral damages. notified Beatriz of their inability to issue the certification requested because their records showed that only three kilograms were entered as excess and accordingly charged. The sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50. The defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed. and 5. Branch 30. It then filed a third-party complaint against PAL. 4.

citing the case of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. 1992. In said case. Tempongko. which dismissal was eventually sustained by this Court. The Rayos spouses withdrew their appeal when SIA satisfied the judgment totaling P802. the third-party . and not for the purpose of altering in any way the executed judgment against SIA. SIA set up the defense that the excess baggage ticket was indeed tampered with but it was committed by PAL's personnel. SIA argued that the only issue in the said appeal is whether or not it was entitled to reimbursement from PAL. the court a quo concluded that the excess baggage ticket of Rayos was tampered with by the employees of PAL and that the fraud was the direct and proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' contract with Aramco. It added that the appellate court should have restricted its ruling on the right of SIA to seek reimbursement from PAL. the third-party defendant PAL is ordered to pay defendant and third-party plaintiff SIA whatever the latter has paid the plaintiffs. In its appeal. and not the alleged tampering of his excess bagged ticket On the other hand. SIA argues that PAL cannot validly assail for the first time on appeal the trial court's decision sustaining the validity of plaintiff's complaint against SIA if PAL did not raise this issue in the lower court.34. 1 The appellate court disagreed with SIA's contention that PAL could no longer raise the issue of SIA's liability to the Rayoses and opined "that SIA's answer to the complaint should inure to the benefit of PAL. and the latter may challenge the lower court's findings against SIA in favor of plaintiffs-appellees (the Rayos spouses) for the purpose of defeating SIA's claim against it.ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT.435." In its answer to the main complaint. ultimately. In this petition for review. On September 21. SO ORDERED. as this was the only issue raised by SIA in its third-party complaint against PAL. All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. the appellate court granted PAL's appeal and absolved it from any liability to SIA. the Court expounded on the nature of a third-party complaint and the effect of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant and in favor of such defendant as third-party plaintiff against. In so ruling. PAL claimed that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA because it was the inefficiency of Rayos which led to the non-renewal of his contract with Aramco. The instant appeal is impressed with merit. SIA's appeal was dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. The petitioner correctly pointed out that the case of Firestone squarely applies to the case at bench.

. . since this was no longer an issue on account of the finality and. may be brought into the case with leave of court. When he finds favorably on both complaints. an appeal by one party from such judgment does not inure to the benefit of the other party who has not appealed nor can it be deemed to be an appeal of such other party from the judgment against him. in respect of the plaintiff's claim. PAL disclaimed any liability to the Rayoses and imputed the alleged tampering to SIA's personnel. After all. in fact. SIA argued that it was improper for PAL to question SIA's liability to the plaintiff. subrogation or any other relief. Failure of any of said parties in such a case to appeal the judgment as against him makes such judgment final and executory. satisfaction of the judgment. however. therefore. by the defendant. On appeal. It must be noted that in the proceedings below. Speaking through then Justice and later Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee. PAL changed its theory and averred that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA on the around that the non-renewal of Sancho's contract with Aramco was his unsatisfactory performance rather than the alleged tampering of his excess baggage ticket. the appellate court ignored the Court's pronouncements in Firestone and declared: [T]here is nothing in the citation which would suggest that the appellant cannot avail of the defenses which would have been available to the nonappealing party against the prevailing party which would be beneficial to the appellant. the Court stated: The third-party complaint is. the Court renders in effect two judgments in the same case. In response to PAL's appeal. . By the same token. he renders judgment on the principal complaint in favor of plaintiff against defendant and renders another judgment on the third-party complaint in favor of defendant as third-party plaintiff. a procedural device whereby a "third party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff. Surprisingly. who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such thirdparty defendant a right for contribution. indemnity.defendant. When leave to file the third-party complaint is properly granted. In its own defense. as in this case. it should have the right to avail of defenses of SIA against plaintiffs-appellees which would redound to its . ordering the third-party defendant to reimburse the defendant whatever amount said defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff in the case. PAL's liability here is premised on the liability of SIA to plaintiffs-appellees. one on the plaintiff's complaint and the other on the third-party complaint. The third-party complaint is actually independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff's complaint.

Fear of collusion between the third-party plaintiff and the plaintiffs aired by the appellate court is misplaced if not totally unfounded. rather than on the merits of its appeal. and they were even blaming each other for the fiasco. however. One of the defenses available to SIA was that the plaintiffs had no cause of action. it should have so stated in its answer as one of its defenses. Here. and if it was convinced that SIA should have raised the defense of no valid claim by the plaintiffs. PAL opted to deny any liability which it imputed to SIA's personnel. not by its personnel but by PAL's. Yet. While the third-party defendant. or directly by so stating in unequivocal terms in its answer to SIA's complaint that SIA and PAL were both blameless. The stand of SIA as against the plaintiffs' claim was transparent from the beginning. What remains to be resolved. The judgment. To hold otherwise would be to open the door to a possible collusion between the plaintiff and defendant which would leave the third-party defendant holding the bag. It was only on appeal — in a complete turn around of theory — that PAL raised the issue of no valid claim by the plaintiff against SIA. as far as the Rayoses and SIA are concerned. This could be done indirectly by adopting such a defense in its answer to the third-party complaint if only SIA had raised the same in its answer to the main complaint. as correctly pointed out by petitioner. would benefit from a victory by the third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff. is whether it is entitled to reimbursement from PAL. PAL could have used the defense that the plaintiffs had no valid claim against it or against SIA. indeed. This is where the rule laid down in Firestone becomes applicable. has already gained finality. For its part. committed. this is true only when the third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant have non-contradictory defenses.benefit. it had no valid claim against SIA. This simply cannot be allowed. This became its defense as well as its main cause of action in the third-party complaint it filed against PAL. SIA investigated the matter and discovered that tampering was. that is. therefore. This is especially true here where SIA lost the capability to defend itself on the technicality of failure to pay docket fee. considering that PAL appealed that part of the decision to the appellate court. PAL was aware of SIA's defense. There are. the defendant and third-party defendant had no common defense against the plaintiffs' complaint. There is no question that a third-party defendant is allowed to set up in his answer the defenses which the third-party plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have to the plaintiff's claim. special circumstances present in this case which preclude third-party defendant PAL from benefiting from the said principle. instead of waiting for an adverse judgment and raising it for the first time on appeal. .

also answer the main complaint. On appeal. receiving the same or similar evidence for both. including specific denials of allegations in the main complaint which implicated it along with SIA. however. While such a complaint speaks of a single suit. on April 8. PAL. Such a proceeding obviates the need of trying two cases. PAL tried to exonerate itself by arguing that the Rayoses had no valid claim against SIA. SIA was informed of the anomaly in December 1980 but only issued the certification four months later or. a few days before the expiration of Rayos' contract. This situation is not. although related to the main complaint. be allowed because it was neither raised by SIA in its answer to the main complaint nor by PAL in its answer to the third-party complaint. this seemed to be the only way to extricate itself from a mess which the court a quo ascribed to it. a third-party complaint involves an action separate and distinct from. From PAL's viewpoint. where the answer of some of the defendants inures to the benefit of those who did not file an answer. it failed to consider that the immediate cause of such non-renewal was SIA's delayed transmittal of the certification needed by Rayos to prove his innocence to his employer. 1981. The prudent thing that PAL should have done was to state in its answer to the third-party complaint filed by SIA against it everything that it may conceivably interpose by way of its defense. A third-party defendant who feels aggrieved by some allegations in the main complaint should. aside from answering the third-party complaint. analogous to a case where there are several defendants against whom a complaint is filed stating a common cause of action. as claimed by the appellate court. The appellate court was in error when it opined that SIA's answer inured to the benefit of PAL for the simple reason that the complaint and the third-party complaint are actually two separate cases involving the same set of facts which is allowed by the court to be resolved in a single proceeding only to avoid a multiplicity of actions. more specifically. The fact that the Rayos spouses had to be assisted by counsel who threatened to file a damage suit against SIA if the certification they urgently needed was not immediately issued only strengthens the suspicion that SIA was not dealing with them in utmost good faith.The trial court's decision. While the trial court found. We do not. however. that the proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with Aramco was the tampering of his excess baggage ticket by PAL's personnel. The effect of SIA's mishandling of Beatriz Rayos' request became instantly apparent when her husband's contract was not renewed in . and enforcing separate judgments therefor. the investigation conducted by SIA could not have lasted for four months as the information needed by the Rayoses could easily be verified by comparing the duplicate excess baggage tickets which they and their handling agent. agree with the petitioner that PAL is solely liable for the satisfaction of the judgment. kept the record purposes. made PAL ultimately answerable for the judgment by ordering the latter to reimburse the former for the entire monetary award. Surely. and this has not been adequately rebutted by PAL. This cannot. although adverse to SIA as defendant.

spite of his performance which was constantly "highly regarded" by the manager of Aramco's equipment services department. Melo. 142252. 3 and the sharing as between such solidary debtors is prorata. WHEREFORE. Moran opined that "in an action upon a tort. . by way of contribution. the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. 1988. fair. instead of totally indemnifying the latter.R. Under mandate of Article 2176 of the Civil Code.. 1992. Former Chief Justice and noted remedial law expert Manuel V. dated September 9. the defendant may file a third-party complaint against a joint tortfeasor for contribution. Rayos is entitled to be compensated for such damages. and equitable to require PAL to contribute to the amount awarded to the Rayos spouses and already paid by SIA." 2 The non-renewal of Rayos employment contract was the natural and probable consequence of the separate tortious acts of SIA and PAL. CV No. 4 it is but logical. Inasmuch as the responsibility of two or more persons. JJ. Vitug and Francisco. concur. is hereby REVERSED and a new one is entered ordering private respondent Philippine Airlines to pay. or tort-feasors. petitioner Singapore Airlines one-half (1/2) of the amount it actually paid to Sancho and Beatriz Rayos in satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case No. 20488 dated September 21. SO ORDERED. Feliciano. liable for a quasidelict is joint and several.