Principle and State Policies

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic
and republican State. Sovereignty resides
in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
1. Villavicencio vs Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS
Issue:The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by
the petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women whom
Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty
of abode was also raised versus the power of
the executive of the Municipality in deporting
the women without their knowledge in his
capacity as Mayor.
Facts:Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor
together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief
of Police, took custody of about 170 women at
the night of October 25 beyond the latters
consent and knowledge and thereafter were
shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao
where they were signed as laborers. Said
women are inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the
district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas
corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the
case saying that those women were already
out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be
filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with
the instructions;
or the respondents to have fulfilled the court's
order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the
persons according to the command of the writ;
or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that
on account of sickness or infirmity those
persons could not safely be brought before the
court; or (3) they could have presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question
or their attorney waived the right to be

Held:The court concluded the case by granting
the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos
each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due
to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if
the chief executive of any municipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a
private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his official action, could
calmly fold his hands and claim that the person
was under no restraint and that he, the official,
had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if
the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order
of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he
has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so.
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed
has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue. If the
mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women
from the city of Manila to Davao, the same
officials must necessarily have the same
means to return them from Davao to Manila.
The respondents, within the reach of process,
may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change
her domicile and to avow the act with impunity
in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse.
The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war
as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
2. Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former
Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces
during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He
was tried before the Philippine Military
Commission for War Crimes and other
atrocities committed against military and
civilians. The military commission was establish
under Executive Order 68.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a
special military tribunal and rules as to parties
and representation are not governed by the
rules of court but the provision of this special

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68
arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the
military commission did not have the
jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:

Generally Accepted Principles of International
Law – Police Power

- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the
Hague Convention (War Crimes)
3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a
party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the
Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional
thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal
has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was
enacted by the President and was in
accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution
which renounces war as an instrument of
national policy. Hence it is in accordance with
generally accepted principles of international
law including the Hague Convention and
Geneva Convention, and other international
jurisprudence established by the UN, including
the principle that all persons (military or
civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war
of aggression and other offenses in violation of
laws and customs of war. The Philippines may
not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that
time but the rules and regulations of both are
wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. They were
accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US
and Japan)
2. As to the participation of the 2 US
prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of
interest because its country and people have
greatly aggrieved by the crimes which
petitioner was being charged of.

3. Agustin V Edu

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle
Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor
vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of
“reflectorized triangular early warning
devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which
is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel
motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early
warning devices is redundant and would only
make manufacturers and dealers instant
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement
is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the
fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘batterypowered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’
3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted
two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . .
because: Being universal among the signatory
countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions,
and visible even under adverse conditions at a
distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist
from this country or from any part of the world,
who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
warning device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the
travelled portion of that road, highway, or
expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs
or endangers passing traffic. On the other

hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices
or the petroleum lamps will not immediately
get adequate advance warning because he will
still think what that blinking light is all about. Is
it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the
motorist will thus increase, rather than
decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued
in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance
of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such
a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and
expansive scope of the police power which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of
the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as “nothing more or less than the
powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty” was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus:
“Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision
after the Constitution came into force, Calalang
v. Williams, identified police power with state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the
state. Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine,
such a competence being referred to as ‘the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The
concept was set forth in negative terms by
Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth
decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society.’ In that sense it could be hardly
distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe
v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It
is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. It is, to

quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most
essential, insistent, and at least illimitable
powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly
pointed out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its
scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies
of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial
in the past may be interwoven in the present
with the well-being of the nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The
police power is thus a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal
peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by
Agustin, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged
was clearly intended to promote public safety.
It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this
Court to invalidate a legislative or executive
act of that character. None has been called to
our attention, an indication of its being nonexistent. The latest decision in point, Edu v.
Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, an enactment conceived with the same
end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which
was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstruction on roads and streets designated as
national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the
first law sought to be nullified after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the
National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in
his quest, was likewise prompted by the
imperative demands of public safety.
Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be
Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise
of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who
entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then) –
particularly in the retail business. For some
time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in
Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress
passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to
reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that
it contravened several treaties concluded by
the RP which, according to him, violates the
equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).
He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country
who helps in the income generation of the
country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or
supersede treaties or generally accepted
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a
generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180.
The equal protection of the law clause “does
not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who
do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be
assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with
a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no
longer assert his right to operate his market
stalls in the Pasay city market.

5. Gonzalez V. Hechanova
Constitutional Law – Treaty vs Executive
Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal Executive
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered
into two executive agreements with Vietnam
and Burma for the importation of rice without
complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the Nat’l Economic Council
showing that there is a shortage in cereals.
Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation
of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the
detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements.
Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”,
because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of
rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over
the 2 executive agreements entered into by
HELD: Under the Constitution, the main
function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of
laws, by indirectly repealing the same through
an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty
and a statute, the one which is latest in point of
time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case
at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also,
insists that the contracts adverted to are not
treaties. No such justification can be given as
regards executive agreements not authorized
by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances which
are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive
or an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that
the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly

settled it in the affirmative, by providing that
the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction
to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or
the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question”. In other words, our
Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.

6. In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985
Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to
the practice of law in the phils. without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In
his verified petition, he avers among others
that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city
of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato
Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice
law profession in spain under the provision of
the treaty on academic degrees and the
exercise of profession between the republic of
the phils.
Whether treaty can modify regulations
governing admission to the phil. bar.
The court resolved to deny the petition. The
provision of the treaty on academic degrees
between the republic of the phils. and spanish
state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said
treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in spain.
The treaty could not have been intended to
modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the phils.,
for the reason the executive may not encroach
upon the constitutional prerogative of the
supreme court to promulgate rules for
admission to the practice of the law in the
phils. The power to repeal, alter or supplement
such rules being reserved only to the congress
of the phils.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is
to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to
defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military or
civil service.

7. People V Lagman
Political Law – Defense of State
In 1936, Lagman reached the age of 20. He is
being compelled by Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law)
to join the military service. Lagman refused to
do so because he has a father to support, has
no military leanings and he does not wish to kill
or be killed. Lagman further assailed the
constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense
Law is constitutional.
HELD: The duty of the Government to defend
the State cannot be performed except through
an army. To leave the organization of an army
to the will of the citizens would be to make this
duty of the Government excusable should there
be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so
far as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. “The defense of the
State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be
required by law to render personal military or
civil service.”

Section 6. The separation of Church and
State shall be inviolable.
8. Case DIgest: Aglipay vs Ruiz
Facts of the Case:
The Director of Posts announced on May 1936
in Manila newspapers that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps for the
commemoration of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of

Manila. The said event was organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio
Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of
the Philippine Independent Church, requested
Vicente Sotto who is a member of the
Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the
President. The said stamps in consideration
were actually issued already and sold though
the greater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be
prevented by the petitioner.
Whether or not the respondent violated the
Constitution in issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress
No, the respondent did not violate the
Constitution by issuing and selling the
commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted
under the provision of Act No. 4052, which
contemplates no religious purpose in view,
giving the Director of Posts the discretion to
determine when the issuance of new postage
stamps would be “advantageous to the
Government.” Of course, the phrase
“advantageous to the Government” does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. In
the case at bar, the issuance of the postage
stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a
particular church or denomination. The stamps
did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor
were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. The purpose of
issuing of the stamps was to actually take
advantage of an international event considered
to be a great opportunity to give publicity to
the Philippines and as a result attract more
tourists to the country. In evaluating the design
made for the stamp, it showed the map of the
Philippines instead of showing a Catholic
chalice. The focus was on the location of the
City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription
that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering
these, it is evident that there is no violation of
the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing
of the stamps is constitutional.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a
writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as
to costs.

Section 10. The State shall promote social
justice in all phases of national
Section 11. The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.

The National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works
and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along the following for
a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30
pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to
the Director of Public Works with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions
of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes said Director with the approval from
the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communication to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended
to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of
the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works
approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation.
As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.
1) Whether the rules and regulations
promulgated by the respondents pursuant to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548
constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations
complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?

prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism,
nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but
the humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the timehonored principles of salus populi estsuprema

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest
and convenience of the public. In enacting said
law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the
public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom
of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental
aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing which should not be made to prevail
over authority because society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to

Social justice must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society
and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.”

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of
appeal which was disapproved by the trial
court due to it being filed five (5) days late
beyond the reglementary period and
subsequently denied of motion for
reconsideration. Respondent court dismissed
the petition contending that the requirement
regarding perfection of an appeal was not only

mandatory but jurisdictional such that the
petitioner’s failure to comply therewith had the
effect of rendering the judgment final.
Subsequently, petitioner motions for
reconsideration and is denied. Also, it was
found that there was lack of merit in the
petitioner’s reason for the late filing of the
notice of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with
the requirement regarding perfection of an
appeal within reglementary period would
render a judgment final and executory.
HELD: Yes, the period to appeal is prescribed
not only by the Rules of Court but also by
statute, particularly Sec 39 of BP 129, which
Sec.39. Appeals. The period for appeal from
final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from…

was found dead. Therefore, Estrella was asking
for compensation from the death of her son
while in the respondent’s employ. However,
the statement given by the chief engineer and
oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and
therefore dismissed the claim for lack of merit.
Even when a motion for reconsideration was
filed, this was also denied by the Secretary of
Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of
Whether or not the compensation for the death
of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is social justice
applicable in this case?

The right to appeal is a statutory right and one
who seeks to avail of it must strictly comply
with the statutes or rules as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for an orderly discharge of
judicial business. Due to petitioner’s
negligence of failing to perfect his appeal,
there is no recourse but to deny the petition
thus making the judgment of the trial court
final and executory.

Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact
finding of the Department of Labor. It merely
disregarded the statements made by the chief
engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of
social justice applied in this case is a matter of
protection, not equality. The Court recognized
the right of the petitioner to the claim of
compensation because her son was shown to
have died while “in the actual performance of
his work.” To strengthen the constitutional
scheme of social justice and protection to
labor, The Court quoted another case “as
between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered,
and the employer, who has resources to secure
able legal advice, the law has reason to
demand from the latter the stricter

11. Estrella Ondoy vs Virgilio Ignacio

12. Salonga V. Farrales

Art II Sec 10 of the Constitution of the
Philippines : The State shall promote social
justice in all phases of national development.


Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned
while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio.
According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose
Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the
workforce. He was invited by friends to a
drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter

:1.Farrales was the titled owner of a parcel of
residential land that was leased.2.Prior to the
acquisition by Farrales of the aforesaid land,
Salonga was already a lessee of some portion
of the land. She had built a house and paid
rentals thereon.

Sometime prior to November 1968, Farrales
filed an
ejectment case
(one of the old forms of action for recovery of
the possession of real property) for nonpayment of rentals against Salonga. The lower
court rendered a decision in favor of Farrales
and ordered Salonga and the other lessees
(Pascual et al.) tovacate the portion occupied
by them and to pay rentals in arrears,
attorney’sfees and costs.4.Even before the
rendition of the decision of the lower court,
Farrales sold toPascual et al. (the other lessees
of Farrales) the areas occupied by
them.5.Salonga offered to purchase from
Farrales the portion of land that Salonga
wasleasing. Farrales persistently refused the
offer and insisted to execute the judgment
rendered in the ejectment case. Hence if
Salonga’s offer to purchasewas persistently
refused by Farrales, it is obvious that no
meeting of the mindstook place and no
contract was ever perfected between them. It
was revealedthat Farrales wanted the payment
of the portion of land under consideration tobe
in cash but Salonga did not have any money
for that purpose that is whyFarrales
persistently refused to sell the portion of the
leased land to the lessee.
: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the
complaint of Salonga on the ground that no
legal contract exists between Farrales and
Contracts are only enforceable from the
moment of perfection. In the case at bar,
Farrales rejected and did not accept the offer of
Salonga to buy the land in question. There
being no consent there is, therefore, no
contract to sell to speak of. In the case of the
other lessees (Pascual et al.) who were able to
buy the portion of land that they occupy, there
was an existing contract between them and
Farrales, unlike Salonga who does not have the
right to buy the landin question because the
contract between her and Farrales is nonexistent.

Section 10, Article II states that “
The State shall promote social justice in
all phases of national development
.” The aforementioned provision is applicable
to the case at bar. The social justice cannot be
invoked to trample on the rights of property
owners who are also entitled for protection
under our Constitution. The social justice
consecrated in our Constitution was not
intended to take away rights from a person and
give them to another who is not entitled
thereto. The plea for social justice cannot
nullify the law on obligations and contracts.
Supreme Court’s Decision:
The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit and
the judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.

Section 12. The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital
role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs.

13. Meyer V. Nebraska
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for
teaching a child German under a Nebraska
statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign
languages to students that had not yet
completed the eighth grade.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from creating
legislation that restricts liberty interests when
the legislation is not reasonably related to an
acceptable state objective.
Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a
child German under a Nebraska statute that
outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to
students that had not yet completed the eighth
grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld
the conviction.
Issue. Does the statute as construed and
applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional
because it infringes on the liberty interests of
the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to
any end within the competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses
more than merely the freedom from bodily
restraint. The state argues that the purpose of
the statute is to encourage the English
language to be the native tongue of all children
raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection
of the Constitution extends to those who speak
other languages. Education is a fundamental
liberty interest that must be protected, and
mere knowledge of the German language
cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.
Discussion. Liberty interests may not be
interfered with by the states when the
interference is arbitrary and not reasonably
related to a purpose which the state may
permissively regulate.

14. Pierce vs. Society of Sisters
Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public
schools, were protected by a preliminary
restraining order prohibiting appellants from
enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents
and guardians to send their children to public
school. Appellants appealed the order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment
provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or
guardian’s right to decide the mode in which
their children are educated. State may not

usurp this right when the questioned legislation
does not reasonably relate to a viable state
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a
corporation with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Appellee
Hill Military Academy, a private organization
conducting an elementary, college preparatory,
and military training school, obtained
preliminary restraining orders prohibiting
appellants from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory
Education Act. The Act required all parents and
guardians to send children between 8 and 16
years to a public school. The appellants
appealed the granting of the preliminary
restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under
their control?
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment
because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to
any purpose within the competency of the
The Appellees have standing because the
result of enforcing the Act would be destruction
of the appellees’ schools. The state has the
power to regulate all schools, but parents and
guardians have the right and duty to choose
the appropriate preparation for their children.
Discussion. While the state has the right to
insure that children receive a proper education,
the 14th Amendment provides parents and
guardians with a liberty interest in their choice
in the mode in which their children are

15. People V. Ritter
FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter
brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a
hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated
Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he
inserted a foreign object to the vagina of
Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie
200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that
Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina.

Sometime the following day, Rosario said that
the object has already been removed from her
vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw
Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario
was brought and confined to Olongapo City
general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove
the object inside her vagina using forceps but
failed because it was deeply embedded and
covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis.
She told the attending physician that a Negro
inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago.
Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that
Rosario was only 12 years old when the
incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario
prostituted herself even at the tender age. As
evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the
following morning. A doctor/specialist also
testified that the inserted object in the vagina
of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from
that which caused her death. As evidence,
Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day
that the object has been removed already. She
also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to
her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a
Caucasian. Ritter was also acquitted for the
criminal case of rape with homicide. However,
it does not exempt him for the moral and
exemplary damages he must award to the
victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow
that the appellant is also free from civil liability
which is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. Ritter was deported.

16. DECS vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT
(National Medical Admission Test) three times.
When he applied to take again, petitioner
rejected his application based on the “threeflunk-rule”. He then filed a petition before the
RTC on the ground of due process and equal
protection and challenging the constitutionality
of the order. The petition was granted by the
RTC therefore this petition.

Whether or not the NMAT “three-flunk-rule”
order is valid and constitutional.
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical profession is
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health. The method employed by the
challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The right to quality education is not
absolute. The Constitution provides that “
every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements”. It is not enough to
simply invoke the right to quality education as
a guarantee of the Constitution but one must
show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. Petition was granted
and the RTC ruling was reversed.

17. Virtuoso v. Mun. Judge 82 SCRA 191
On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco
Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for the
writ of habeas corpus, premised his plea for
liberty primarily on the ground that the
preliminary examination which led to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was
a useless formality as respondent Municipal
Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, (1) failed to meet
the strict standard required by the Constitution
to ascertain whether there was a probable
cause. (2) He likewise alleged that aside from
the constitutional infirmity that tainted the
procedure followed in the preliminary
examination, the bail imposed was clearly
excessive. (3) It was in the amount of
P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set
being imputed to petitioner.
As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas
corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday, March
15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed
on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no
impropriety in the way the preliminary
examination was conducted. As to the
excessive character of the bail, he asserted
that while it was fixed in accordance with the

Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the
Executive Judge in Bataan in 1977, he
nevertheless reduced the amount to P8,000.00.
Whether or not the procedure by respondent
Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable
cause was constitutionally deficient?
The Supreme Court declared that the petition is
granted in accordance with the terms of the
Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978.
The Court issued the following Resolution:
“Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for
petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court
Resolved pursuant to section 191of Presidential
Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old
minor, to order the release of the petitioner on
the recognizance of his parents Francisco
Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his
Counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in
open court, agreed to act in such capacity,
without prejudice to further proceedings in a
pending case against petitioner being taken in
accordance with law.” This Court should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to
the Youth and Welfare Code.
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it
should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a
sum that is excessive.

Section 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
18. Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
224 SCRA 782
July 1993
FACTS: Plaintiffs, who are minors represented
by their parents, alleged that the then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.’s continued
approval of the Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to numerous commercial logging
companies to cut and deforest the remaining
forests of the country will work great damage
and injury to the plaintiffs and their successors.
Defendant, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), avers that the plaintiffs failed to
state a specific right violated by the defendant

and that the question of whether logging
should be permitted in the country is a political
question and cannot be tried in the Courts. The
RTC of Makati, Branch 66, granted defendant’s
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case at bar subject
to the judicial power of the Court
COURT RULING: Being impressed with merit,
the Supreme Court granted the petition and set
aside the Order of the RTC which dismissed the
The case at bar is subject to judicial review by
the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified
in his opinion the requisites for a case to be
subjected for the judicial review by the Court.
According to him, the subject matter of the
complaint is of common interest, making this
civil case a class suit and proving the existence
of an actual controversy. He strengthens this
conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
Although concurring in the result, Justice
Feliciano penned his separate opinions on a
number of topics pointed by Justice Davide, Jr.
in this Court decision. Justice Feliciano said that
the concept of the word “class” is too broad to
cover the plaintiffs and their representatives
alone, and that the Court may be deemed
recognizing anyone’s right to file action as
against both the public administrative agency
and the private entities of the sector involved
in the case at bar, to wit:
“Neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provisions of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to
a specific legal right which petitioners are
seeking to enforce.”
Justice Feliciano further stated that the Court in
the case at bar in effect made Sections 15 and
16 of Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution to be
self-executing and judicially enforceable even
in its present form, and that these implications
are too large and far reaching in nature ever to
be hinted in this instant case.

19. Laguna Lake Development Authority
vs. Court of Appeals

The Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in
order to execute the policy towards
environmental protection and sustainable
development so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA
4850 since water quality studies have shown
that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are
not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of the LLDA and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term “Laguna de Bay
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991), the municipalities
assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to
issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:
“Municipal corporations shall have the
authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rental fees or
charges therefore…”
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the
occasion to establish fishpens& fish cages to
the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent
policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and
the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by
the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the
lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological
stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general
public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aquaculture structures unregistered with the LLDA
as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2)
those declared illegal shall be subject to
demolition by the Presidential Task Force for
Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3)
owners of those declared illegal shall be
criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of
RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising
the owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures otherwise demolition
shall be effected.
1.Which agency of the government – the LLDA
or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region – should exercise jurisdiction over the
Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850,
the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO
No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the use of all surface water for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said region. On the
other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges on municipal waters. The
provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal
the laws creating the LLDA and granting the
latter water rights authority over Laguna de
Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law
and a special statute, latter should prevail
since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than the general statute. The special
law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Implied repeals are not favored and, as much
as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law
cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges
was granted for revenue purposes. On the
other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant
permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other
aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating & monitoring activities in
the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control
and management. It partakes of the nature of

police power which is the most pervasive, least
limitable and most demanding of all state
powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which
embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to
pollution cases with authority to issue a “cease
and desist order” and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and
other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the
provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850,
as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated therein and
the authority to exercise such powers as are by
its charter vested on it.

Section 19. The State shall develop a selfreliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a
Taiwanese private corporation, applied for
registration with the Board of Investments
(BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic
producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It
originally specified the province of Bataan as
the site for the proposed investment but later
submitted an amended application to change
the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change
of the site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the
Second District of Bataan requested a copy of
BPC’s original and amended application
documents. The BoI denied the request on the
basis that the investors in BPC had declined to
give their consent to the release of the
documents requested, and that Article 81 of
the Omnibus Investments Code protects the
confidentiality of these documents absent
consent to disclose. The BoI subsequently
approved the amended application without

holding a second hearing or publishing notice
of the amended application. Garcia filed a
petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BoI committed grave
abuse of discretion in yielding to the wishes of
the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcia’s
Constitutional right to have access to
information on matters of public concern under
Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The
Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had
an “interest in the establishment of the
petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is
actual, real, and vital because it will affect not
only their economic life, but even the air they
breathe” The Court also ruled that BPC’s
amended application was in fact a second
application that required a new public notice to
be filed and a new hearing to be held.

Although Article 81 of the Omnibus
Investments Code provides that “all
applications and their supporting documents
filed under this code shall be confidential and
shall not be disclosed to any person, except
with the consent of the applicant,” the Court
emphasized that Article 81 provides for
disclosure “on the orders of a court of
competent jurisdiction”. The Court ruled that it
had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the
application, amended application, and
supporting documents filed with the BOI under
Article 81, with certain exceptions.

The Court went on to note that despite the
right to access information, “the Constitution
does not open every door to any and all
information” because “the law may exempt
certain types of information from public
scrutiny”. Thus it excluded “the trade secrets
and confidential, commercial, and financial
information of the applicant BPC, and matters
affecting national security” from its order. The
Court did not provide a test for what
information is excluded from the Constitutional

privilege to access public information, nor did it
specify the kinds of information that BPC could
withhold under its ruling.

Section 21. The State shall promote
comprehensive rural development and
agrarian reform.

LANDOWNERS IN THE Phils. Vs. Sec. of

These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the
constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act.
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights
includes a call for the adoption by the State of
an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by
law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly
or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land
Reform Code, had already been enacted by
Congress on August 8, 1963. This was
substantially superseded almost a decade later
by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21,
1972, along with martial law, to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for
distribution among tenant-farmers and to
specify maximum retention limits for
landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO
228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment.
This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the
mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is
the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory
signed on June 10. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments,
nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its

In considering the rentals as advance payment
on the land, the executive order also deprives
the petitioners of their property rights as
protected by due process. The equal protection
clause is also violated because the order places
the burden of solving the agrarian problems on
the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar
obligation is imposed on the owners of other
The petitioners maintain that in declaring the
beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of
the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored
judicial prerogatives and so violated due
process. Worse, the measure would not solve
the agrarian problem because even the small
farmers are deprived of their lands and the
retention rights guaranteed by the
In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the
alleged violation of the equal protection clause,
the sugar planters have failed to show that
they belong to a different class and should be
differently treated. The Comment also suggests
the possibility of Congress first distributing
public agricultural lands and scheduling the
expropriation of private agricultural lands later.
From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition
would be premature.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of
the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The
argument of the small farmers that they have
been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become
academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the
area of such limits. There is also the complaint
that they should not be made to share the
burden of agrarian reform, an objection also
made by the sugar planters on the ground that
they belong to a particular class with particular
interests of their own. However, no evidence
has been submitted to the Court that the
requisites of a valid classification have been
Classification has been defined as the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each

other in these same particulars. To be valid, it
must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of
the class.
The Court finds that all these requisites have
been met by the measures here challenged as
arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons
or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the
liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not
shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument
that not only landowners but also owners of
other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is
clearly visible except to those who will not see.
There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by
the courts of justice except only where its
discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill
of Rights.

Section 22. The State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and
FACTS: The Baguio City Mayor ordered
demolition of illegal structures located in Busol
Watershed Reservation. Gumangan et al.,
opposed the demolition, claiming that the
lands where their residential houses stand are
their ancestral lands which they have been
occupying and possessing openly and

continuously since time immemorial. They
further claim that their ownership over the
lands has been expressly recognized
Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and
recommended by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for
exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest
Reserve. Masweng, Regional Hearing Officer of
the NCIP issued TROs to refrain from enforcing
the Demolition, and subsequently the NCIP
granted a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Mayor contends that the NCIP has
no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions
for injunction as it was not a case pending
before such Commission. Another contention is
that the IPRA that Baguio City shall be
governed by its Charter. Thus, private
respondents cannot claim their alleged
ancestral lands under the provisions of the
IPRA. Lastly, the Mayor claims that the Busol
Forest Reservation had already been declared
by jurisprudence as inalienable and possession
thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert
the same into private property.
The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the
NCIP and affirmed the TROs.
W/N the NCIP has the jurisdiction over the
matter. – YES.
W/N Baguio City is exempt from IPRA. – NO.
W/N Gumangan et al.’s ancestral land claim is
recognized by by Proclamation No. 15, in which
case, their right thereto may be protected by
an injunctive writ. – NO.

The NCIP has jurisdiction
In order to determine whether the NCIP
has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary
to resolve, on the basis of the allegations in
their petition, whether private respondents are
members of ICCs/IPs. Private respondents, as
members of the Ibaloi tribe, were asserting
ownership over portions of Busol Forest
Reservation which they claim to be their

ancestral lands. The petition for injunction
sought to prevent the enforcement of the
demolition orders issued by the City Mayor.
These thus qualifies the action as as a
"dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs" within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP.
The IPRA, furthermore, endows the
NCIP with the power to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction
without any prohibition against the issuance of
the writ when the main action is for injunction.

Baguio City is not exempt from IPRA.

SECTION 25: The state shall ensure the
autonomy of the local governments.
23. Basco v. PAGCOR
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under
Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the
policy of the government, “ to regulate and
centralize through an appropriate institution all
games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law.” This was
subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to
the government but also to the society in
general. It is a reliable source of much needed
revenue for the cash-strapped Government.

Although IPRA states that is governed
by its own charter, its exemption from the IPRA,
however, cannot ipso facto be deduced
because the law concedes the validity of prior
land rights recognized or acquired through any
process before its effectivity. The IPRA
demands that the city’s charter respect the
validity of these recognized land rights and

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to
annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and public
order, among others.

Proclamation 15 does not recognize the
ancestral land claim

2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the
City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees;
and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is
violative of constitutional principle of Local

Before a writ of preliminary injunction
may be issued, petitioners must show that
there exists a right to be protected and that
the acts against which injunction is directed are
violative of said right. Proclamation No. 15,
however, does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents’ ancestral
land claim. The proclamation merely identifies
the Molintas and Gumangan families, the
predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents, as claimants of a portion of the
Busol Forest Reservation but does not
acknowledge vested rights over the same. In
fact, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws
the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or
settlement. The fact remains, too, that the
Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the
Court as inalienable by jurisprudence.

Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and
public order;

3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru
PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices; and
4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the
Cory Government, away from monopolistic and
crony economy and toward free enterprise and
1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally
prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the
prohibition of gambling does not mean that the
government can not regulate it in the exercise
of its police power, wherein the state has the
authority to enact legislation that may interfere

with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare.
2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal
Corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. Its charter was created by Congress,
therefore subject to its control. Also, local
governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution
does not preclude classification of individuals
who may be accorded different treatment
under the law, provided it is not unreasonable
or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the
legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different
rules shall operate.
4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues
which are within the domain of the political
branches of government and the people
themselves as the repository of all state power.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. In this case, the
grounds raised by petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. Therefore, it is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit..

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona,
was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman
of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in
his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of
Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members
through the Assembly Secretary that there
shall be no session in November as his
presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2,
1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance
of the Limbona's advice, where he was

unseated from his position. Petitioner prays
that the session's proceedings be declared null
and void and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a
resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership therefrom.
Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a
case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on a question which
should have been resolved within the confines
of the Assembly," for which the respondents
now submit that the petition had become
"moot and academic" because its resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have
jurisdiction over the autonomous governments
or regions. What is the extent of selfgovernment given to the autonomous
governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions
in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to
"ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys
autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is,

as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter
sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the
domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of
the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But
if it is autonomous in the former category only,
it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618,
in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if
we can make an inquiry in the validity of the
expulsion in question, with more reason can we
review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle,
that of local autonomy. We have to obey the
clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations,
one in favor of centralized power in
Malacañang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor
of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the
November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid.
It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of
the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own,
we still invalidate the twin sessions in question,
since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could do so. In the second place, the
invitation tendered by the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives
provided a plausible reason for the intermission
sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess
could not be called, it does not appear that the

respondents called his attention to this
mistake. What appears is that instead, they
opened the sessions themselves behind his
back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on
the ground of good faith.

SECTION 28: Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the state
adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.

Legaspi Vs Civil Serv. Comm.
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to
information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for
mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission.
The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's
request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access
government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to
information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any
and all information. Under the Constitution,
access to official records, papers, etc., are
"subject to limitations as may be provided by
law" The law may therefore exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny, such
as those affecting national security It follows
that, in every case, the availability of access to
a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one
that involves public interest, and, (b) not being

exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. The threshold
question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or
public concern. This question is first addressed
to the government agency having custody of
the desired information. However, as already
discussed, this does not give the agency
concerned any discretion to grant or deny
access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing
that the information requested is not of public
concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
same has been exempted by law from the
operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise
will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As
aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and
interpret arguments against release . . ." (87
Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To
safeguard the constitutional right, every denial
of access by the government agency
concerned is subject to review by the courts,
and in the proper case, access may be
compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office
being a public trust it is the legitimate concern
of citizens to ensure that government positions
requiring civil service eligibility are occupied
only by persons who are eligibles. Public
officers are at all times accountable to the
people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions. In the instant, case while
refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would
limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and
who are not, civil service eligibles. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the names of
those who pass the civil service examinations,
as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are
released to the public. Hence, there is nothing
secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.
And when, as in this case, the government
employees concerned claim to be civil service
eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a
right to verify their professed eligibilities from
the Civil Service Commission. The civil service
eligibility of a sanitarian being of public
concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the

register of civil service eligibles for said
position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies

Aquino Vs Morato
FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a
member of respondent Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB),
wrote its records officer requesting that she be
allowed to examine the board's records
pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by
the individual board members after a review of
the movies and television productions. It is on
the basis of said slips that films are either
banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by
respondent Morato on the ground that
whenever the members of the board sit in
judgment over a film, their decisions as
reflected in the individual voting slips partake
the nature of conscience votes and as such,
are purely and completely private and personal
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato
called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to
discuss, among others, the issue raised by
petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17)
members of the board voted to declare their
individual voting records as classified
documents which rendered the same
inaccessible to the public without clearance
from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent
Morato denied petitioner's request to examine
the voting slips. However, it was only much
later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent
Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which
declared as confidential, private and personal,
the decision of the reviewing committee and
the voting slips of the members.
ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid
HELD : The term private has been defined as
"belonging to or concerning, an individual
person, company, or interest"; whereas, public
means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or
affecting a nation, state, or community at
large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD
1986) creating the respondent classification
board, there is no doubt that its very existence

is public is character. it is an office created to
serve public interest. It being the case,
respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy.
The right to privacy belongs to the individual
acting in his private capacity and not to a
governmental agency or officers tasked with,
and acting in, the discharge of public duties.
the decisions of the Board and the individual

voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their
official functions, and as such, are neither
personal nor private in nature but rather public
in character. They are, therefore, public records
access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry
by no less than the fundamental law of the