NICARAGUA vs US

Brief Fact Summary. Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United States
(D) on the ground that the United States (D) was responsible for illegal military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice to entertain the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaraguas (P)
application to the I.C.J. was challenged by the United States (D).

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United

States (D) on the ground that the United States (D) was responsible for illegal
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice to entertain the case as well as the admissibility of
Nicaraguas (P) application to the I.C.J. was challenged by the United States (D).

Facts.

The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of the I.C.J when it was
held responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua (P) in the suit the plaintiff brought against the defendant in 1984. Though
a declaration accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court was deposited by
the United States (D) in a 1946, it tried to justify the declaration in a 1984
notification by referring to the 1946 declaration and stating in part that the
declaration shall not apply to disputes with any Central American State.
Apart from maintaining the ground that the I.C.J lacked jurisdiction, the States (D)
also argued that Nicaragua (P) failed to deposit a similar declaration to the Court.
On the other hand, Nicaragua (P) based its argument on its reliance on the 1946
declaration made by the United states (D) due to the fact that it was a state
accepting the same obligation as the United States (D) when it filed charges in the
I.C.J. against the United States (D).
Also, the plaintiff intent to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. was
pointed out by the valid declaration it made in 1929 with the I.C.Js predecessor,
which was the Permanent Court of International Justice, even though Nicaragua had
failed to deposit it with that court. The admissibility of Nicaraguas (P) application to
the I.C.J. was also challenged by the United States (D).

Issue.

(1) Is the jurisdiction to entertain a dispute between two states, if they

both accept the Courts jurisdiction, within the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice?
(2) Where no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, is the application of
such a state to the International Court of Justice admissible?

Held.

(1) Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a dispute between two
states if each of the States accepted the Courts jurisdiction is within the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice. Even though Nicaragua (P) declaration of 1929
was not deposited with the Permanent Court, because of the potential effect it had
that it would last for many years, it was valid.
Thus, it maintained its effect when Nicaragua became a party to the Statute of the
I.C.J because the declaration was made unconditionally and was valid for an
unlimited period. The intention of the current drafters of the current Statute was to
maintain the greatest possible continuity between it and the Permanent Court.
Thus, when Nicaragua (P) accepted the Statute, this would have been deemed that
the plaintiff had given its consent to the transfer of its declaration to the I.C.J.

(2) Yes. When no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, the application
of such a state to the International Court of Justice is admissible. The five grounds
upon which the United States (D) challenged the admissibility of Nicaraguas (P)
application were that the plaintiff failed because there is no indispensable parties
rule when it could not bring forth necessary parties, Nicaraguas (P) request of the
Court to consider the possibility of a threat to peace which is the exclusive province
of the Security Council, failed due to the fact that I.C.J. can exercise jurisdiction
which is concurrent with that of the Security Council, that the I.C.J. is unable to deal
with situations involving ongoing armed conflict and that there is nothing
compelling the I.C.J. to decline to consider one aspect of a dispute just because the
dispute has other aspects due to the fact that the case is incompatible with the
Contadora process to which Nicaragua (P) is a party.

Discussion.

Although the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility are

primarily based on the principle that the I.C.J. has only as much power as that
agreed to by the parties, these can be quite complicated. The 1946 declaration of
the United States and the 1929 declaration of Nicaragua was the main focus of the
case on declaration and each of these declarations pointed out the respective
parties intent as it related to the I.C.Js jurisdiction.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial

Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the
Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of
E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the
trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.

II.

THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III.

THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O.
No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the

present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant

precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those

person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a
war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and
incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are
part of the our Constitution.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try

petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva
Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the
second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague
and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were
accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in
its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international
law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory.

PIMENTEL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

462 SCRA 622
G.R. No. 158088 July 06, 2005

Facts:
On December 28, 2000, the Philippines through the Charge d Affairs Enrique A.
Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations, signed the Rome Statute
which established the International Criminal Court. Thus, herein petitioners filed the
instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to
the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.

Issue: Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate for ratification the copy of
the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations even without the signature of the President.

Held:
The Supreme Court rule in the negative.

The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority
in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As
the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece
with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in
the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify
it.

ABAYA vs. EBDANE, JR.

515 SCRA 720
GR No. 167919, February 14, 2007
"A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity."

FACTS: The petitioners, Plaridel M. Abaya who claims that he filed the instant
petition as a taxpayer, former lawmaker, and a Filipino citizen, and Plaridel C. Garcia
likewise claiming that he filed the suit as a taxpayer, former military officer, and a
Filipino citizen, mainly seek to nullify a DPWH resolution which recommended the
award to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the
implementation of the civil works known as Contract Package No. I (CP I). They also
seek to annul the contract of agreement subsequently entered into by and between
the DPWH and private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation pursuant to the
said resolution.

ISSUE: Has petitioners the legal standing to file the instant case against the
government?

HELD: Petitioners, as taxpayers, possess locus standi to file the present suit. Briefly
stated, locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
More particularly, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case such that
he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
being challenged. Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it
has been recognized that in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but
by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Consequently, the Court, in a catena of cases, has invariably adopted a liberal
stance on locus standi, including those cases involving taxpayers.

The prevailing doctrine in taxpayers suits is to allow taxpayers to question

contracts entered into by the national government or government- owned or
controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of law. A taxpayer is allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Significantly, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity.