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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1992 > September 1992 Decisions > G.R. No.

81883 September
23, 1992 - KNITJOY MANUFACTURING, INC. v. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, ET AL.:

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 81883. September 23, 1992.]
KNITJOY MANUFACTURING, INC., Petitioner, v. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of
Bureau of Labor Relations, and KNITJOY MONTHLY EMPLOYEES
UNION, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 82111. September 23, 1992.]
CONFEDERATION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (CFW), Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR PURA
FERRER-CALLEJA and KNITJOY MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION
(KMEU), Respondents.
V.E. Del Rosario & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 81883.
Rogelio R. Udarbe for petitioner in G.R. No. 82111.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio and Associates for Private
Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; LABOR RELATIONS; ONE COMPANYONE UNION POLICY; EXCEPTION. The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the
one company-one union policy, anchored on the greater mutual benefits which the parties
could derive, especially in the case of employees whose bargaining strength could
undeniably be enhanced by their unity and solidarity but diminished by their disunity,
division and dissension, is not without exceptions. The present Article 245 of the Labor Code
expressly allows supervisory employees who are not performing managerial functions to
join, assist or form their separate union but bars them from membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees. Even Section 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, which seeks to implement the policy,
also recognizes exceptions. The usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has
to give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof, the
recognition of these exceptions takes into account the policy to assure employees of the
fullest freedom in exercising their rights. Otherwise stated, the one company-one union
policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for purposes
not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations,
among others, which the Constitution guarantees.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO FROM UNION OR ASSOCIATIONS;
SCOPE. The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two

(2) broad notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of restraint which
guarantees that the employee may act for himself without being prevented by law, and (b)
the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an
association. (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54).
3. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; LABOR RELATIONS; ONE COMPANYONE UNION POLICY; NOT APPLICABLE WHERE EXISTING UNION COVERED ONLY ONE CLASS
OF EMPLOYEES; CASE AT BAR. in the bargaining history of KNITJOY, the CBA has been
consistently limited to the regular rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piece-rate
basis. On the other hand, the rank-and-file employees paid on a monthly basis were never
included within its scope. Respondent KMEUs membership is limited to the latter class of
employees, KMEU does not seek to dislodge CFW as the exclusive bargaining representative
for the former. The records further disclose that in the certification solicited by TUPAS and
during the elections which followed thereafter, resulting in the certification of CFW as the
exclusive bargaining representative, the monthly-paid employees were expressly excluded.
Thus, the negotiations between CFW and KNITJOY following such a certification could only
logically refer to the rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piece-rate basis. Clearly
therefore, KNITJOY and CFW recognize that insofar as the monthly-paid employees are
concerned, the latters constituting a separate bargaining unit with the appropriate union as
sole bargaining representative, can neither be prevented nor avoided without infringing on
these employees rights to form a union and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations.
Stated differently, KNITJOY and CFW recognize the fact that the existing bargaining unit in
the former is not and has never been the employer unit. Given this historical and
factual setting, KMEU had the unquestioned and undisputed right to seek certification as the
exclusive bargaining representative for the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees; both
KNITJOY and CFW cannot block the same on the basis of this Courts declaration in Bulletin
Publishing Corp. v. Hon. Sanchez 15 and General Rubber and Footwear Corp. v. Bureau of
Labor Relations (155 SCRA 283 [1987]) regarding the one-company-one union concept.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; RESULTS THEREOF CONFINED ONLY TO THE
GROUP IT REPRESENTS; CBA ENTERED DOES NOT BAR HOLDING OF ANOTHER
CERTIFICATION ELECTION FOR THE OTHER GROUP; CASE AT BAR. Considering that (a)
the TUPAS solicited certification election was strictly confined to the rank-and-file employees
who are paid on a daily or piece-rate basis, (b) the results of the election must also
necessarily confine the certified unions representation to the group it represents and (c) the
issue of the plight of the monthly-paid employees was still pending, KNITJOY and CFW
clearly acted with palpable bad faith and malice in including within the scope of the new CBA
these monthly-paid employees. Thus was effected a conspiracy to defeat and suppress the
right of the KMEU and its members to bargain collectively and negotiate for themselves, to
impose upon the latter a contract the negotiation for which they were not even given notice
of, consulted or allowed to participate in, and to oust from the BLR the pending appeal on
the certification issue. In the latter case, KNITJOY and CFW are guilty of contumacious
conduct. It goes without saying then that the new CBA cannot validly include in its scope or
coverage the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees of KNITJOY. It does not bar the holding
of a certification election to determine their sole bargaining agent, and the negotiation for
and the execution of a subsequent CBA between KNITJOY and the eventual winner in said
election (Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code).

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

These petitions have a common origin and raise identical issues. They were ordered
consolidated on 23 November 1988.
In G.R. No. 81883, the 1 December 1987 Decision of respondent Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in BLR Case No. A-10-315-87, which reversed the Order of Med-ArbiterDesignate Rolando S. dela Cruz dated 4 September 1987 and ordered the holding of a
certification election among the regular rank-and-file monthly-paid employees of Knitjoy

Manufacturing, Inc. (KNITJOY), is assailed by the latter.


The Med-Arbiters order dismissed the petition of private respondent Knitjoy Monthly
Employees Union (KMEU) for such certification election and directed the parties "to work out
(sic) towards the formation of a single union in the company."
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The antecedent material operative facts in these petitions are as follows:

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Petitioner KNITJOY had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Federation of
Filipino Workers (FFW). The bargaining unit covered only the regular rank-and-file employees
of KNITJOY paid on a daily or piece-rate basis. It did not include regular rank-and-file office
and production employees paid on a monthly basis. The CBA expired on 15 June 1987. Prior
to its expiration, the FFW was split into two (2) factions the Johnny Tan and the
Aranzamendez factions. The latter eventually became the Confederation of Filipino Workers
(CFW), herein petitioner in G.R. No. 82111.
Also prior to the expiration of the CBA, the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) filed a petition for the holding of a certification election among KNITJOYs regular
rank-and-file employees paid on a daily and piece-rate basis. Excluded were the regular
rank-and-file employees paid on a monthly basis. In the certification election conducted on
10 June 1987, CFW emerged as the winner; thereafter, negotiations for a new CBA between
CFW and KNITJOY commenced.
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On 24 June 1987, during the pendency of the said negotiations, private respondent KMEU
filed a petition for certification election among KNITJOYs regular rank-and-file monthly-paid
employees with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
which docketed the same as R-04-OD-M-6-75-87. The Knitjoy Monthly Employees
Association and Confederation of Citizens Labor Union (KMEA-CCLU), another union existing
in the said company, and petitioner CFW intervened therein.
The petition was dismissed in the Order of 4 September 1987 of Med-Arbiter Rolando S. de
la Cruz, the dispositive portion of which reads:
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"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby Dismissed, but the parties are
instructed to work out (sic) towards the formation of a single union in the company." 1
KMEU filed a motion to reconsider this order, which was treated as an appeal by the Bureau
of Labor Relations (BLR).
On 1 December 1987, public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja. Director of the BLR, handed
down a Decision 2 reversing the order of Med-Arbiter de la Cruz. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
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"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal of Knitjoy Monthly Employees is hereby


granted subject to the exclusion of the monthly paid employees who are deemed
managerial.
Let, therefore, the certification election proceed without delay, with the following as
choices:
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1. Knitjoy Monthly Employees Union (KMEU); and


2. No Union.
The companys latest payroll shall be the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.
SO ORDERED."

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Respondent Director brushed aside KNITJOYs arguments that the monthly-paid employees
have the same working incentives as their counterparts, the daily-paid workers; that the
existing collective bargaining agent (CFW) is willing to include the monthly-paid employees,
and that out of the 212 monthly-paid employees, 116 qualify as managerial employees while

the rest who are holding confidential or technical positions should likewise be excluded. In
finding for KMEU, said Director declared that:
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"As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the similar case of General Rubber and Footwear
Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, Et Al., G.R. No. 74262, it is perhaps unusual for
management to have to deal with two (2) collective bargaining unions but there is no one to
blame except management for creating the situation it is in. From the beginning of the
existence of the CBA, management had sought to indiscriminately suppress the members of
the petitioners right (sic) to self-organization. Respondents argument that the incumbent
collective bargaining agent is willing to accommodate herein petitioner is of no moment since
the option now rests upon the petitioner as to whether or not they desire to join the existing
collective bargaining agent or remain as separate (sic) union." 3
KNITJOY and CFW separately moved to reconsider the said decision alleging, as principal
underpinning therefor, the conclusion and signing between them, allegedly on 27 November
1987 before the rendition of the challenged decision of a CBA which includes in its
coverage the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees. It is averred that said CBA has rendered
the case moot and academic; moreover, to remove the monthly-paid employees from their
present bargaining unit would lead to the fragmentation thereof, contrary to existing labor
policies favoring larger units.
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In her Decision of 8 February 1988, respondent Director denied for lack of merit the motion
for reconsideration on the principal ground that although the monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees were allegedly included within the scope of the new CBA, they are not barred
from forming a separate bargaining unit considering that: (a) since the petition for
certification election was filed as early as 24 June 1987, there already existed a pending.
representation issue when KNITJOY and CFW commenced negotiations for a new CBA;
nevertheless, KMEU was not brought into the said negotiations and was therefore not a privy
to the CBA; (b) members of KMEU did not participate in the ratification of the CBA; contrary
to KNITJOY s claim that the same was unanimously ratified by the members of the
bargaining unit, the CBA failed to mention even one monthly-paid employee who
participated in the ratification process, and (c) while it is true that the policy of the DOLE is
to favor a one company-one union scenario which finds basis in Section 2, Rule V, Book V of
the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, there are, nonetheless, some exceptions thereto, as
where the bargaining history requires the formation of another bargaining unit. Besides,
such a policy must yield to an employees Constitutional right to form unions which includes
the freedom to join a union of ones choice. 4
The new CBA, which KMEU claims to have been signed on 12 December 1987, and not on 27
November 1987 as both KNITJOY and CFW boldly assert, defines the bargaining unit covered
as follows:
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"SECTION 2. The bargaining unit covered by this Agreement consists of all regular and
permanent rank-and-file employees of the COMPANY employed in its production plants and
paid on a daily or piece-rate basis and regular, rank-and-file monthly paid office employees,
excluding managerial, supervisory, casual, temporary and probationary employees, and
security guards." 5
Unfazed by their defeat before the BLR, KNITJOY and CFW separately filed the instant
petitions. The former imputes upon respondent Director grave abuse of discretion in holding
that (a) the scope of the bargaining unit agreed upon in the new CBA does not bind KMEU
because it is not a party thereto, (b) the acceptance by all the members of KMEU of all
benefits of the CBA did not constitute an overt act of ratification and (c) the CBA was
concluded on 12 December 1987 and not on 27 November 1987. It further contends that
respondent Director contumaciously violated the one company-one union policy of the Labor
Code and disregarded the ruling of this Court in Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Hon. Sanchez, 6
reiterated in part in General Rubber and Footwear Corp. v. Bureau of Labor Relations. 7 Upon
the other hand, CFW contends that respondent Director committed grave abuse of discretion
in (a) allowing the creation of a unit separate from the existing bargaining unit defined in the
new CBA thus abetting the proliferation of unions, (b) disregarding the CBA provisions which
consider the CFW as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees
and (c) excluding CFW from the choices of unions to be voted upon. 8

On 24 August 1988, 9 this Court gave due course to the petition in G.R. No. 81883 after
both the public and private respondents filed their separate comments and the petitioner
filed its consolidated reply thereto. 10
On 23 November 1988, G.R. No. 82111 was consolidated with G.R. No. 81883 and the
petitioner in the former was ordered to file a consolidated reply to the separate comments of
both respondents. 11
The principal issues raised in these petitions are:

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1. Whether or not petitioner KNITJOYs monthly-paid regular rank-and-file employees can


constitute an appropriate bargaining unit separate and distinct from the existing unit
composed of daily or piece-rate paid regular rank-and-file employees, and
2. Whether or not the inclusion in the coverage of the new CBA between KNITJOY and CFW
of the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees bars the holding of a certification election
among the said monthly paid employees.
We decide for the respondents.
1. The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one company-one union policy,
anchored on the greater mutual benefits which the parties could derive, especially in the
case of employees whose bargaining strength could undeniably be enhanced by their unity
and solidarity but diminished by their disunity, division and dissension, is not without
exceptions.
The present Article 245 of the Labor Code expressly allows supervisory employees who are
not performing managerial functions to join, assist or form their separate union but bars
them from membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. It reads:
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"ARTICLE 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any
labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own."
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This provision obviously allows more than one union in a company.


Even Section 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code, which seeks to implement the policy, also recognizes exceptions. It reads:
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"SECTION 2. Who may file. Any legitimate labor organization or the employer, when
requested to bargain collectively, may file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization shall contain, among others:
x

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(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances
otherwise require; . . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
The usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to give way to the other units
like the craft unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof, the recognition of these exceptions
takes into account the policy to assure employees of the fullest freedom in exercising their
rights. 12 Otherwise stated, the one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the
employees to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to selforganization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the
Constitution guarantees. 13
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two (2) broad

notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of restraint which guarantees
that the employee may act for himself without being prevented by law, and (b) the power,
by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an
association. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 14 this Court stated:
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". . . Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of


jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a right, it can be safely said that
whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely:
first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act
for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may,
as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who
should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association, and should he choose
to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after
he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership
with said organization at any time [Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel
Brewery v. Enriquez, Et Al., 108 Phil., 1010, 1019]. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join
a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union [Abo, Et. Al. v. PHILAME (KG)
Employees Union, Et Al., L-19912, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 120, 123, quoting
Rothenberg, Labor Relations]. Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial
Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the right to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same
breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an
employee to sign up with any association."
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Furthermore, it is not denied that in the bargaining history of KNITJOY, the CBA has been
consistently limited to the regular rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piece-rate
basis. On the other hand, the rank-and-file employees paid on a monthly basis were never
included within its scope. Respondent KMEUs membership is limited to the latter class of
employees, KMEU does not seek to dislodge CFW as the exclusive bargaining representative
for the former. The records further disclose that in the certification solicited by TUPAS and
during the elections which followed thereafter, resulting in the certification of CFW as the
exclusive bargaining representative, the monthly-paid employees were expressly excluded.
Thus, the negotiations between CFW and KNITJOY following such a certification could only
logically refer to the rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piece-rate basis. Clearly
therefore, KNITJOY and CFW recognize that insofar as the monthly-paid employees are
concerned, the latters constituting a separate bargaining unit with the appropriate union as
sole bargaining representative, can neither be prevented nor avoided without infringing on
these employees rights to form a union and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations.
Stated differently, KNITJOY and CFW recognize the fact that the existing bargaining unit in
the former is not and has never been the employer unit. Given this historical and
factual setting, KMEU had the unquestioned and undisputed right to seek certification as the
exclusive bargaining representative for the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees; both
KNITJOY and CFW cannot block the same on the basis of this Courts declaration in Bulletin
Publishing Corp. v. Hon. Sanchez 15 and General Rubber and Footwear Corp. v. Bureau of
Labor Relations 16 regarding the one company-one union concept. Petitioners have obviously
misread these cases. In the first, We stated that" [t]he crux of the dispute . . . is whether or
not supervisors in petitioner company therein may, for purposes of collective bargaining,
form a union separate and distinct from the existing union organized by the rank-and-file
employees of the same company," 17 and ruled that the members of the Bulletin
Supervisory Union, wholly composed of supervisors, are not qualified to form a union of their
own under the law and rules then existing, considering that" [a] perusal of the job
descriptions corresponding to the private respondents as outlined in the petition, clearly
reveals the private respondents to be managers, purchasing officers, personnel officers,
property officers, supervisors, cashiers, heads of various sections and the like. The nature of
their duties gives rise to the irresistible conclusion that most of the herein private
respondents are performing managerial functions;" 18 hence, under Article 246 19 of the
Labor Code, they cannot form, join and assist labor organizations. It should be stressed that
the statement therein that supervisors "who do not assume any managerial function may
join or assist an existing rank-and-file union or if none exists, to join or assist in the
formation of such rank-and-file organization" 20 is no longer legally feasible under existing
laws. As earlier noted, the present Article 245 of the Labor Code allows supervisory
employees who are not exercising managerial functions to join, assist or form separate labor

organizations of their own but prohibits them from joining a labor organization composed of
the rank-and-file employees.
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The second case on the other hand, demolishes the stand of KNITJOY and CFW for, as
correctly contended by the respondents, it in fact recognizes an exception to the one
company-one union concept. Thus:
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"Perhaps it is unusual for the petitioner to have to deal with two (2) collective bargaining
unions but there is no one to blame except petitioner itself for creating the situation it is in.
From the beginning of the existence in 1963 of a bargaining unit for the employees up to the
present, petitioner had sought to indiscriminately suppress the members of the private
respondents right (sic) to self-organization provided for by law. Petitioner, in justification of
its action, maintained that the exclusion of the members of the private respondent from the
bargaining union of the rank-and-file or from forming their own union was agreed upon by
petitioner corporation with the previous bargaining representatives . . . Such posture has no
leg to stand on. It has not been shown that private respondent was privy to this agreement.
And even if it were so, it can never bind subsequent federations and unions particularly
private respondent-union because it is a curtailment of the right to self-organization
guaranteed by the labor laws. However, to prevent any difficulty and to avoid confusion to all
concerned and, more importantly, to fulfill the policy of the New Labor Code as well as to be
consistent with Our ruling in the Bulletin case, supra, the monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees should be allowed to join the union of the daily-paid-rank-and-file employees of
petitioner so that they can also avail of the CBA benefits or to form their own rank-and-file
union, without prejudice to the certification election that has been ordered." 21 (Emphasis
supplied)
2. Regardless of the date when the new CBA was executed - whether on 27 November 1987
as contended by KNITJOY and CFW or 12 December 1967 as claimed by the respondents
the fact remains that it was executed before the resolution of KMEUs petition for certification
election among the monthly paid employees became final. This Court, however, sustains the
respondents claim for indeed if it was executed by the parties on 27 November 1987, both
KNITJOY and CFW would have immediately filed the appropriate pleading with the BLR
informing it of such execution and moving for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that
it has been rendered moot and academic. Moreover, public respondents finding on this point
is supported by substantial evidence, thus:
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"The parties could not have signed the said CBA on 27 November 1987, contrary to their
allegation, because from 4:00 - 10:00 p.m. on the same day, 27 November 1987, the
parties still attended a conciliation conference before Assistant Director Maximo L. Lim of the
NCR (see Annex "F" of respondents Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration) and agreed in
principle on nine (9) items or provisions to be included in said CBA. Said minutes do not
state that these nine items are the remaining unresolved issues in the negotiation of the
CBA." 22 It was only in their motion for the reconsideration of public respondents decision of
1 December 1987 that the existence of the new CBA was made known.
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Considering that (a) the TUPAS solicited certification election was strictly confined to the
rank-and-file employees who are paid on a daily or piece-rate basis, (b) the results of the
election must also necessarily confine the certified unions representation to the group it
represents and (c) the issue of the plight of the monthly-paid employees was still pending,
KNITJOY and CFW clearly acted with palpable bad faith and malice in including within the
scope of the new CBA these monthly-paid employees. Thus was effected a conspiracy to
defeat and suppress the right of the KMEU and its members to bargain collectively and
negotiate for themselves, to impose upon the latter a contract the negotiation for which they
were not even given notice of, consulted or allowed to participate in, and to oust from the
BLR the pending appeal on the certification issue. In the latter case, KNITJOY and CFW are
guilty of contumacious conduct. It goes without saying then that the new CBA cannot validly
include in its scope or coverage the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees of KNITJOY. It
does not bar the holding of a certification election to determine their sole bargaining agent,
and the negotiation for and the execution of a subsequent CBA between KNITJOY and the
eventual winner in said election. Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code expressly provides:
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"SECTION 4. Effects of early agreements. The representation case shall not, however, be
adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the last
60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case."
(Emphasis supplied)
The public respondent then committed no abuse of discretion ordering a certification election
among the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees, except managerial employees, of
KNITJOY. The choice however, should not be, as correctly contended by CFW, limited to
merely (a) KMEU and (b) no union. The records disclose that the intervenors in the petition
for certification are the KMEA-CCLU and CFW. They should be included as among the choices
in the certification election.
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WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED. However, the challenged decision of
public respondent of 1 December 1987 is modified to include in the choices for the
certification election petitioner Confederation of Filipino Workers (CFW) and the Knitjoy
Monthly Employees Association and Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions (KMEU-CCLU).
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on official leave.
Endnotes:

1. Rollo, G.R. No. 81883, 31-39.


2. Id., 21-24.
3. Rollo, G.R. No. 81883, 23.
4. Rollo, G.R. No. 81883, 28-29.
5. Annex "F" of Petition; Id., 44.
6. 144 SCRA 628 [1986].
7. 155 SCRA 283 [1987].
8. Rollo, G.R. No. 82111, 8-9.
9. Id., G.R. No. 81883, 144.
10. Id., 92, 41, 129.
11. Id., G.R. No. 82111, op. cit., 106.
12. PASCUAL, C., Labor Relations Law, 1986 ed., 109.
13. Section 8, Article III and Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.
14. 59 SCRA 54, 66-67 [1974]. See also Anucension v. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 350
[1977]; Vassar Industries Employees Union v. Estrella, 82 SCRA 280 [1978]; Philips
Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 88957, 25 June 1992.