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HACIENDA LUISITA INC. V.

PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL
G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011
J. Velasco
FACTS:
In 1988, RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was passed. It is a program aimed at
redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the
lands covered by this law is the 6, 443-hectare Hacienda Luisita in Tarlac.
In the earlier 2011 Decision, the Court ordered, among others, that the lands subject of Hacienda Luisita
Incorporated’s stock distribution plan (SDP) be placed under compulsory coverage on mandated land
acquisition scheme of the CARP and declared that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker beneficiaries
(FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI.
However, the order was not followed due to the operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court
cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the
operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether they want
to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution. Department of Agrarian Reform was
instructed to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects,
consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to
manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the
case may be, over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the operative fact doctrine is applicable to the present case.
II. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 is constitutional.
III. Whether or not the Court properly determined the coverage of compulsory acquisition.
IV. Whether or not the matter on just compensation has been correctly passed upon by the Court.
V. Whether or not the subject agricultural lands may be sold to third parties though they have not been fully
paid.
RULING:
I.
Yes, contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently
declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. Prior
to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that
resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that
the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to
the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock
distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as
stockholders of HLI or not.

The 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has not lapsed on May 10. be covered is 6. Thus. To be precise. and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). V. The majority clarified that in its July 5. since. Moreover.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6. then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory. FARM is.915. Therefore.443 hectares. the 10year prohibitive period has not even started. 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. III. therefore. which only involves 4. these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP. such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. November 21. in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4. 2011 decision. Under RA 6657 and DAO 1. at the end of the day. Moreover. Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case. 1999. The Court ruled that the date of "taking" is November 21. it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP. should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands. whereas the area that should.75 hectares.915. 1989. The lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain.II. the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The second requirement that the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting. It took the Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) some 18 years from November 21.75 has. these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP. but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.915. 89-12-2. 1989. 31 of RA 6657. which is the agricultural land allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO). at the least. of agricultural land.. IV.443 has. the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. . the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA. 31 of RA 6657. Significantly. the qualified FWBs should not yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties. that is. FARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it limited the maximum area to be covered to 4.

Olimpio dies and was succeeded by his heirs. Private respondent on the other hand. In so providing. ISSUE: Whether or not the compulsory heirs inherit the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent. SC affirmed the decision of CA." . Subsequently. Still dissatisfied. The Deputy Sheriff submitted his report stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied by the private respondent which the latter refused to vacate. RTC held the decision of the sheriff to be null and void. it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in "personal cultivation. September 5. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. They assert that the CAR case. Not being a purely personal right. 36 (1). stress on the fact that the action is not an ordinary ejectment but an agrarian case for the ejectment of the agricultural lessee. the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. no notice of such death was given to the Court. Fernan FACTS: Olimpio Bonifacio is the owner of a land where private respondent Pastora San Miguel was an agricultural lessee. On July 1.R. private respondent sought relief to SC. the law clearly did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly. thereby vesting all rights conferred.ROSALINDA BONIFACIO V. the CA modified the judgment with respect to her counterclaim. Sec. 1989 CJ. RULING: Yes. The CAR granted the ejectment of private respondent from the two-hectare agricultural land owned by Bonifacio. hence no order of substitution of his heirs was made. Olimpio filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of private respondent from Bonifacio’s agricultural land. 79416. On appeal by the private respondent. 1968. Under the said provision. During the pendency of the case. In this regard. the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest. petitioners moved for the execution of the decision by RTC. Petitioners contended that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion. but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. Private respondent moved to quash the execution. SC resolved to deny the petition of the private respondent for lack of merit. However. No. being an ejectment case survives the death of a party. ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding. RA 3844 provides for the continuation in the enjoyment and possession of an agricultural lessee of his landholding except when the dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executor. JUDGE NATIVIDAD DIZON G.

JUDGE ROQUE TAMAYO G. public respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter. alleging that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been the bona fide agricultural tenant of a portion of the land. The Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit. Meanwhile. Respondent Judge Roque A. holding that to admit petitioners' complaint in intervention would be tantamount to allowing a person to sue the State without its consent since the claim for disturbance compensation is a claim against the State. No. prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the orders of the Court of First Instance. RULING: No. Cortes FACTS: Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for expropriation of a parcel of land located owned by private respondents. The Court is fully aware that the phrase "deemed to be the owner" is used to describe the grantee of a certificate of land transfer. Tamayo issued an order denying the petitioners' supplemental motion. in the alternative. that portion of the decision of the Court of First Instance which fixed the compensation for the land expropriated at thirty pesos per square meter. petitioners filed a supplemental motion for leave to intervene. the Office of the Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal. Petitioners asked the trial court to order payment to Celso Pagtalunan of just compensation for his landholding or. Counsel for private respondents filed an objection to the public respondent's record on appeal claiming that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. to order payment of his disturbance compensation as bona fide tenant. upon its deposit as provisional value. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the right to intervene in the expropriation proceedings instituted by the State. The Court of First Instance issued a writ of possession placing the Republic in possession of the land. . But the import of such phrase must be construed within the policy framework of Pres. with complaint in intervention attached thereto.CELSO and PAULINA PAGTALUNAN V. Thereafter. The Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal interposed by the Republic. 1990 J.R. L-54281 March 19.

they do not dispute private respondents' allegation that they have not complied with the conditions enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a patent. the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. In the present case. it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and established. The certificate simply evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the qualified party. Pres. Decree No. Furthermore. petitioners cannot now successfully argue that Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the expropriation proceedings corresponding to the value of the landholding. the State in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain has decided to expropriate the subject property for public use as a permanent site. On the other hand. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Thus. . PD No. petitioners have not been issued an emancipation patent. Failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer [Section 2. the farmer/grantee. 27 (otherwise known as the "Tenant Emancipation Decree") was anchored upon the fundamental objective of addressing valid and legitimate grievances of land ownership giving rise to violent conflict and social tension in the countryside. and is no longer open to doubt or At best. prior to compliance with these conditions. Hence. Clearly. merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding. and interpreted with the other stipulations of the certificate issued pursuant to this decree. 27.Decree No. Under these circumstances. 816]. the transfer of ownership over these lands is subject to particular terms and conditions the compliance with which is necessary in order that the grantees can claim the right of absolute ownership over them.

Ramos Plantation Company. Meanwhile. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS G. executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of petitioner Ramon Gonzales. Thereunder the Land Bank can only issue bonds in the name of the assignor-landowner. 1990 CJ. This is in consonance with the Land Bank's policy to deal primarily with the landowners in order to save time and effort in ascertaining the identities of claimants. Inc. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Land Bank can be compelled to issue Land Bank bonds in the name of petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Petitioner filed a case to compel public respondent Land Bank to issue Land Bank Bonds in the name of petitioner instead of the aforesaid corporation as the original and registered owner of the property. defendant bank filed its answered stating that the corporation failed to comply with 6 of the requirements. 1981. should comply with all the requirements imposed by respondent bank to effect the release of payments under land transfer claims because of the restriction that the bonds will only be released in the name of the landowner-assignor corporation which may thereafter indorse the same to petitioner. By an appeal of Land Bank. 76759.RAMON GONZALES V. The Ramos Plantation Company. It is only after the issuance of bonds in the landowner's name that he shall be required to make the necessary indorsement of the bonds to his assignee. Defendant corporation was declared in default for failure to file an answer. RULING: The determination of the issue was guided by Resolution No. It is only after the issuance of bonds in the landowner's name that he shall be required to make the necessary indorsement of the bonds to his assignee. Inc. the CA reversed the decision of the lower court. The lower court granted the plaintiff the issuance of the Land Bank bonds. No. March 22. 75-68 entitled “Proper Parties to Receive Land Transfer Payment”. Thereunder the Land Bank can only issue bonds in the name of the assignor-landowner.R. Fernan FACTS: On August 8. Petitioner appealed by certiorari to set aside the decision of the CA. .

it must be shown that the surrender was voluntary through convincing and sufficiently proved evidence. RULING: No.00 and the price equivalent to sixty-five cavans of palay per agricultural year. 2. 1973 and that he was not actually a tenant of the petitioners. they stated that the taking of the private respondent’s possession was in accordance with their “Casunduan” executed on March 30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision that the Casunduan did not constitute valid surrender of the land contemplated under the law. Exhibits presented as evidence showed that Talaveras did not cultivate the land and actually resides in another barangay. 000. Private respondent alleged that he had been a bonafide tenant of the said land since 1958. Laxamana also continued working on the land until 1984 even after the Casunduan was made while the Talaveras claimed that they cultivated the land themselves.R. The document states that private respondent sold his rights and interests over the property for a consideration of P1. No. written notice of which shall be served three months in advance. Laxamana could also hardly sign his own name. It was shown that the Casunduan was prepared by petitioner Visitacion Talavera and that Jose Laxamana. 1990 J. FACTS: Respondent Jose Laxamana instituted an action for recovery of possession on July 10. Jr. The Decision of the RTC and the CA is affirmed. It cannot be presumed nor implied otherwise. Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor. Under the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines (R. the surrender did not constitute a valid surrender as contemplated by the law. Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee.A. He had been in continuous possession of the said land until the petitioners took possession of it and planted palay without private respondent’s knowledge and through force and intimidation. Gutierrez. The . in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE LAXAMANA G. agricultural leasehold shall only be extinguished based on the following grounds: 1. No.00. 3844) Section 8.VICTOR TALAVERA V. Tarlac. In the petitioner’s defense. respondent Laxamana as tenant is deemed to have surrendered voluntarily the subject landholding to its owners — the petitioners. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of the private respondent to which the petitioners appealed in the Court of Appeals. at the time the Casunduan was made. or 3. needed money for his wife’s illness which later caused her death. the right of the tenant to security of tenure becomes illusory one. 77830 February 27. Absence of the person under Section rune to succeed to the lessee. The private respondent suffered damages amounting to P500. 1984 against the petitioners over a parcel of agricultural land located in Capas. ISSUE: Whether or not by virtue of the "Casunduan". Voluntary surrender does not require any court authorization since it involves the tenants own volition however.

The agricultural lots had been leased by Bernas pursuant to a production sharing arrangement executed between Bernas and Benigno--. the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister but when the owners sought to take possession. Benigno. played no part in this arrangement as she was not privy to the same. Padilla FACTS: Natividad Bito-on Deita is the owner of a 5. Natividad filed an action for recovery of possession. ISSUE: Whether the agricultural leasehold established by Benigno Bito-on in favor of Graciano Bernas is binding upon the owner of the land who disclaims any knowledge of.whereby the first provided for all the expenses and the second worked the land. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA G. Benigno was the legal possessor of the property and the law expressly grants him the authority and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally possessed. that Benigno as legal possessor of the landholding. In 1985.circumstances showed that Laxamana was forced to sign the Casunduan without fully understanding it and continued cultivating the land after. or participation in the same. an agricultural lessor is a natural or juridical person who. GRACIANO BERNAS V. No. As legal possessor of the property. Consent must be given by the true and lawful landholder of the property. Even if there was a lack of authorization (from Natividad) for Benigno to install a tenant. but he should cultivate the entire area leased. The area of agricultural land that a lessee may cultivate has no limit. The owner.R. Natividad. For. so that he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of financing his children's schooling in Manila. as defined in Section 166 (3) of the Code. Nothing in said section. the two deducted said expenses and divided the balance of the harvest between the two of them. usufructuary or legal possessor should have the prior authorization of the landowner in order to let or grant to another the cultivation or use of the landholding. The trial court ruled in favor of Bernas but this was subsequently reversed by the CA. requires that the civil law lessee. . The three hectare limit under RA 6657 applies only to the award that may be given to the agrarian reform beneficiary. 85041 August 5. usufructuary or legal possessor lets or grants to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certain.831-sq m property which she entrusted to her brother. in our view.. For agricultural tenancy to exist. Whatever was the true nature of his designation. Bernas was claiming that he was an agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure. either as owner. Bernas refused to relinquish the property. it will be noted. Benigno had the authority and capacity to enter into an agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. and after harvest. 1993 J. civil law lessee. RULING: Yes. could install an agricultural lessee on the landholding. it still follows. the subject of the agreement must be an agricultural land as defined in RA 6657.

.

The tenant’s intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed. In 1976.R. 1998 J. Policarpio. The Court found the private respondent’s contention baseless. No. voluntary surrender. As a result of the sale. August 12. as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations. He can only be ejected for cause. Gavino sold two hectares of the land. has been cultivating one hectare of said land since 1961. Moreover. countered that spouses Nisnisan have no cause of action because they voluntarily surrendered their landholding. ISSUE: Whether or not the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered subject landholding. They then filed an action for reinstatement of tenancy against the Manceras. Thus. the agricultural leasehold relation cannot be extinguished by the mere expiration of the term or period in an agricultural leasehold contract nor by the sale. . Martinez FACTS: Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a 4. Policarpio and family were ousted. the son of Gavino. The Manceras. on the other hand. 3844. Other than their bare allegations. RULING: No. the filing of the complaint for reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-spouses against private respondents before the CAR militates against the private respondents claim that petitioners-spouses voluntarily surrendered their landholding to them. Based on the foregoing disquisition. In 1978. including the land tenanted by Policarpio. is absent in this case. it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees and are therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act 3844. COURT OF APPEALS G. alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding.POLICARPIO NISNISAN V. which. private respondents failed to present any evidence to show that petitioners-spouses surrendered their landholding voluntarily after the private respondents purchased the subject property. Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. to spouses Mancera. Gavino and Policarpio executed a leasehold contract which stipulates a sharing arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. much less determined by mere implication. 126425.9774 hectare land in Davao del Sur. however.

RULING: Yes. petitioner instituted an ejectment suit before the MTC of Sta. The RTC remanded the case to the DARAB for further adjudication. Under Sec. is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. No. Finding no tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent. Maria. Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same within the very small landholding of petitioner. And here. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Private respondent appealed to the RTC. Hence. petition for certiorari.CECILLEVILLE REALTY V. Despite private demands.R. the CA find the petition devoid of merit. “The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area no more than 3 percent of the area of his landholding…” the law is unambiguous and clear. the private respondent is not entitled to a home lot. Compelled. Bulacan. 120363. The policy of social justice. 1997 J. private respondent does not dispute that he is not petitioner’s tenant. Under the law. ordered private respondent to vacate the land. as amended by RA 2263. Petition is impressed with merit. in which private respondent Herminigildo Pascual occupies. The Court emphasized that like the tenant the landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law as one of the purposes of the Act is to afford adequate protection to the rights of BOTH tenants and landholders. 22 par. Hence. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. private respondent seek appeal to the CA. we reiterate. petitioner refused to vacate the property and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land because he is helping his mother Ana Pascual to cultivate the land in question. Only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house thereon. . therefore. Francisco FACTS: Petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation owns a land in Sta. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that while the private respondent is entitled to work on the agricultural land of petitioner in his capacity as member of the family of the tenant. Maria Bulacan. the MTC. 3 of RA 1199. A Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. nonetheless he cannot occupy a substantial portion and utilize the same for residential purposes. September 5. COURT OF APPEALS G.

1998 J.000. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner could not redeem the property from respondent Bitoon unless the latter decided to sell it. Thereafter. the Leonardos sold the property to private respondent Jose Bitoon.ANICETO QUIO V. 11 of RA No. More than a decade later. petitioner received a letter from the counsel of respondent Bitoon notifying him of the transfer of ownership of the land to his client. He therefore prayed that he be allowed to redeem the property and consigned the purchase price with the trial court on the same day he filed his complaint. 3844 but that notwithstanding the Galans had not informed him of the sale. . Cebu.00. 118599. in 1986. Bernarda and Rosario Galan sold their agricultural land situated in Basak. As no supporting document was attached to the letter to bolster counsel's claim. Meanwhile. Sometime thereafter. he had the right to be notified in writing of the owners' intention to sell the property to enable him to exercise his right of preemption under Sec. His children. He claimed that he learned of the transaction only on 1 September 1986 when he found out that the Leonardos were already the new owners. Compostela. herein private respondents were substituted in his stead as co-defendants. During the pendency of the case. Antonio Leonardo Sr. Bellosillo FACTS: In 1974. and Josefa Galan for P2. to spouses Antonio Leonardo Sr. petitioner filed another complaint against the same spouses for injunction with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin his ejectment from the property. petitioner Aniceto Quio filed a complaint for redemption of the property against the vendees claiming that he had been instituted as tenant thereon by the Galans since 1951. died. petitioner went to the Notarial Division of the Capitol Building and obtained a copy of the pertinent deed of sale between spouses Leonardo and respondent Bitoon. COURT OF APPEALS G. consequently.R. June 26. No.

00. Petitioner was not notified of the first and second instances of sale of the property apparently because all the respondents disputed petitioner's assertion that he has been a tenant thereon since 1951. its terms and its validity. 6389 which provides for the lessee's right of redemption.000. The letter received by petitioner.Petitioner consigned the amount of P2000. in the event that the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee. The purpose of the written notice required by law is to remove all uncertainties as to the sale. he would be paying whatever amount would be finally determined by the trial court as reasonable price and consideration. So long as the redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof. petitioner submits that he is not required to consign the latter amount since that would put an additional burden on a tenant seeking redemption. representing payment by the second vendee. the valuation placed by the Leonardo spouses and respondent Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to be such reasonable price and consideration. the latter is granted by law the right to redeem it within 180 days from notice in writing and at a reasonable price and consideration. The law does not prescribe any particular form of notice. After all. Petitioner had to proceed to the Notarial Division of the Capitol Building to secure a copy of the deed of sale between spouses Leonardo and respondent Bitoon.00 paid by the Leonardos to the Galans. As to what constitutes reasonable price and consideration. Simply stated. However the counsel did not bother to furnish petitioner with the supporting documents which is why petitioner did not readily believe what was written in the letter. An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. A letter from the counsel of respondent Bitoon was received by petitioner informing him that the ownership of subject property has been transferred to respondent Bitoon. respondent Bitoon. was not such written notice. In this regard. . These instances of sale without notification gave rise to his right to redeem the property as lessee although no longer from the Leonardos but from its present owner. he did not increase the amount consigned as would have made it equivalent to P30. nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. 3844 as amended by RA No.RULING: No. being bare. the period for redemption will start running. pursuant to Section 12 of RA No. However when he amended his complaint by impleading respondent Bitoon.

Hence. there was no valid exercise by him of his legal right to redeem. . for failure of petitioner to consign the entire redemption price.

No. The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs.R. there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless peasants. In turn. CMU. The taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB. Under the terms of the program. so vital to the existence. Campos. 1992 J. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. now the CMU. training and other kinds of assistance.CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY V. President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. In 1984. ordered. a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. it is not "actually. DARAB. and exclusively used" for educational purposes. CMU embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and employees. The agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU. These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture. The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the CARP. . that is. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the condition for exemption. Certainly. ISSUE: Whether or not the CMU land is covered by CARP. It started as a farm school in early 1910 and it was converted into a college with campus in the 1960s. RULING: The land is exempted from CARP. they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. 467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College. a piece of land to be used as its future campus. neither need give way to the other. among others. On 16 January 1958. DARAB G. CMU will assist faculty members and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how. growth and development of this country. is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the state located in the town of Musuan. directly. 100091 October 22. assuming the claimants here. In this case. FACTS: Petitioner. the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. or some of them. When the program was terminated. Bukidnon province. In its resolution. Jr.