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Atty. Marie Joyce Manongsong
2nd Semester, AY 2015-2016
Far Eastern University-Institute of Law
COURSE OBJECTIVE: This course aims to provide guidance to students on ethical rules of behavior involving members of the
legal profession. It aims to acquaint students on usual ethical violations of lawyers and the resulting administrative liabilities based
on available rules and jurisprudence. It seeks to help students to formulate their own set of ethical standards in adjudging propriety
of certain act/s or behavior.


The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot

(advertisement in the Sunday Tribune, lawyer admitted having caused publication)

The advertisement was a brazen solicitation of business from the public. The law is a profession, not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.

2. Linsangan v. Tolentino
(advertisement a calling card, not clear if lawyer was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of the cards thus, court did not rule upon it)

Ambulance Chasing solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment
R.1.03 proscribes Ambulance Chasing as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty
A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in a reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) Lawyers name
(b) Name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) Address;
(d) Telephone number, and
(e) Special branch of law practice.

3. Sally d. Bongalonta vs. Atty Castillo

(Atty. Castillos secretary placed the IBP OR number of another lawyer in the appearance and pleading of Atty. Castillo because she forgot to pay in due time the IBP
membership dues of her employer )

It is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by
the SC.

4. Re: Application for admission to the Philippine Bar v. Vicente d. Ching, Bar Matter no. 914
(Ching was not allowed to take the oath for not having chosen upon his reaching legal age, Filipino citizenship)

One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

5. Villanueva vs. Atty. Teresita sta. Ana

(Lawyer was disbarred for failing to return back the money she collected from the client for the loan to be made. Further, there were other several criminal charges filed
against the lawyer for Falsification of Private Document, Estafa and Falsification of Public Document)

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the legal profession but it must also remain extant in order to maintain one's good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. (Canon 1, R. 1.01; Canon 16, R. 16.01)

6. In the matter of the admission to the bar and oath-taking of successful bar applicant Al C.
(bar applicant was convicted of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence due to the death of a person due to hazing. After conviction and sentencing, he filed
application for probation which was granted and is now asking if he could take take oath after passing the bar exam which the Court denied)

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed
to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of
them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and
more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
For Mr. Argosino to prove his Good Moral Character, he must submit to the Court (for its examination and consideration), evidence that he may now be regarded as complying
with the requirement of GMC through the ff. evidence:
a. Sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant
period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered.
b. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community
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at large.
In other words, Mr. Argosino must submit relevant evidence to show he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.

7. In re Atty. Saturnino Parcasio

(lawyer was convicted of robbery with intimidation which prompted the SocGen to file necessary disbarment proceedings but while the proceedings were pending, he was
granted absolute and unconditional pardon. The disbarment case was then dismissed)

A plenary pardon granted to respondent during the pendency of the disbarment proceedings is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint considering that an absolute pardon
obliterates the crime and effects of conviction upon which the complaint for disbarment was based.
In Re: Lontok [Effects of Absolute Pardon]
the SC held that "a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and
blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense." If granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity." This doctrine applies to
disbarment as well as non-disbarment cases.

8. In re: Atty. Jose Avancea, A.C. No. 407, August 15, 1967
(lawyer was given a conditional pardon by the President, he is now contending that the pardon should bar the disbarment decision against him which the Court disagrees

The conditional pardon has no effect whatsoever to the decision disbarring him from the legal profession. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal
consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he had
been convicted by final judgment.

9. In re Marcelino Lontok, 43 Phil. 293, April 7, 1922

(A pardon was issued to Lontok under the condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct among others.)

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights;
it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

10. Josefina Mortel v. Aspiras, G.R. No. L-9152, December 28, 1956
(WON the dismissal based on a motion to withdraw without court order is valid and the court said yes.)

A motion to withdraw or dismiss the complaint filed before service of the answer advises the defendant of the plaintiffs desire to withdraw. It amounts, therefore, to a notice of
dismissal contemplated by Sec. 1 of Rule 30, and the matter may stand dismissed without the necessity of a court order. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
without prejudice. However, a court order may subsequently be entered definitely taking cognizance of the withdrawal without thereby throwing the matter out of the scope of
said section.
It may be stated that in this connection that we are all the more inclined to permit this new litigation, because in another expediente we have just decided, (of which we may
take judicial notice) (Adm. Case No. 154, Mortel vs. Aspiras), evidence has been introduced indicating that the plaintiff's motion for dismissal had been prepared at the request
of defendant Anacleto Aspiras who promised plaintiff full support, and that there is prima facie merit to her claims for annulment and damages.
This is verily one instance requiring liberal construction of the Rules for the purpose of assisting the parties to obtain just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
controversies without regard to technical objections that do not square with the ends of justice.

11. Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation vs. Judge Vallejos

(While defendant was judge in the CFI of Cavite, he entered into a contract of personal and professional services with a corporation under the terms of which he would head
the corps legal department)

The contract is invalid. The contract of professional services entered into between private respondent and the petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the Court of First
Instance, constituted private practice of law and in contravention of the express provision of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Private respondent should have known or ought to know, that when he was elevated to the Bench of the Court of First Instance as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as
an attorney was suspended and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position. It is evident, therefore, that the aforesaid contract is void because a
contract, whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is considered inexistent and void from the beginning.

12. Atty. Procopio s. Beltran vs. Elmo s. Abad, Bar Matter No. 139 October 11, 1984
(SC prohibited respondent, who is not yet a lawyer, from practicing law yet he still did so after the order of the SC not to.)

The actuations of respondent as shown from the foregoing constitute contempt of court that should be punished more severely considering his temerity in still continuing the
practice of law despite the decision of March 28, 1983. He is debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the Court finds him fit to become such a


1. 1989 Elections Of The Integrated Bar Of The Philippines,

[Canon 1 and R. 1.02]

(Newly elected officers of IBP who were to take their oath before the SC enbanc were prevented to for their were widespread reports published in the colums of some
newspapers indicating that there were intensive electioneering and overspending by candidates as well as the use of governmental planes, and officious intervention of
certain public officials to influence the voting which was held to be violative of the IBP by-laws thus)

The IBP elections were annulled and the by-laws of the IBP were amended.

2. Igoy vs. Soriano,

[Rule 6.02]
(Complainant came to respondent (a senior attorney employed in the Highest Court of the Land) to plead for help in preparing a Petition for Review and the Respondent,
seeing an opportunity, led complainant to believe he has influence and connections in the court and that it would be easy for him to help respondent. Thus, SC dismissed him
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from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including
GOCCs. )

Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service, for public service is a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.
Since the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness. It bears stressing
once again that public service requires utmost integrity and the strictest discipline possible of every public servant. A public office is a public trust that enjoins all public officers
and employees, particularly those serving in the judiciary to respond to the highest degree of dedication often even beyond personal interest.

3. Porac Trucking, Inc. vs. Court of appeals

[R. 12.03 & 12.04]

(Atty. Macalino, as lawyer for an Insurance Co., appeared for the insured Porac Trucking as counsel in a suit for damages but he should not have done so.)
As an officer of the court, Atty. Macalino should have known better than to appear in a case on behalf of another at the mere prodding of his client.
The lawyer of the insurance company did not ipso facto become the lawyer for the insured in all subsequent litigations arising from the accident.

4. Edrial vs. Quilat-Quilat,

The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any
pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their failure. The same principle applies more forcefully to motions for continuance. Postponement is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion. Actions thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of a clear or manifest abuse of discretion, resulting in a
denial of substantial justice.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, shall not let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so (Rule 12.03). Moreover, they should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04).
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends-the speedy,
efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but
should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice."

5. Cordova vs. Labayen,

(Atty. Sabio persists on urging his clients ot file a case against the complainants herein without any legal basis)
As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the administration of justice. The present administrative charge seeks to cast doubt
on the integrity of respondent judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and
maintain the respect due to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio thus deserves to be punished for instigating the filing of an administrative complaint by his clients, in the guise of
upholding their rights but actually to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders and consequently obstruct the desirable norms and course of justice.

6. Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

[R. 1.02, Canon 3, R.3.01 and 3.04]

(A legal clinic (not licensed to practice law) has an advertisement wherein the message conveyed was that Filipinos can avoid legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by going to Guam for a divorce)
Practice of Law
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal
rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation
and enforcement of law.
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights
and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status
and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
When not in practice of law:
A person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
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All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

7. Lee vs. Abastillas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and AC. No. 3815. July 11, 1994
(Lawyer admitted having bribed a judge to get a favorable decision)
Undoubtedly, Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his admission that he allegedly delivered P20,000.00 as
bribe money to Judge Abastillas, thereby allowing himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal and immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation before Justice Lagamon humbly expressed his genuine regrets for having acted the way he did. He said: "I
considered that particular moment of my life as one of the human weaknesses." He felt sorry for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong enough to resist," he added
Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients case was meritorious, his clients prevailed upon him to offer bribe money as the practical way to obtain justice.
Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chuas profound expression of remorse, we do not find it difficult to mitigate his liability when we consider his willingness to
come forward, at the risk of being administratively penalized himself, to expose what we considered illegal and immoral acts perpetrated by the very ones tasked with the
sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense justice.
This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in Adm. Case No. 3815 for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing
Judge Abastillas.
Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely.

8. Re: Request Of National Committee On Legal Aid O Exempt Legal Aid Clients From Paying Filing,
Docket And Other Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009,
(The Misamis Oriental Chapter of IBP promulgated Resolution No. 24 requesting the IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from
the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters.)
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of
IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court. With these
twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major
roadblock. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is
no remedy at all

9. Hernandez v Atty. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012

(lawyer filed the wrong pleading which led to the detriment of herein complainants whereby lawyer now is contesting that there was no lawyer-client relationship
established and that there was good faith on his part which the court did not favor on for it found him guilty of violating R. 18.02, 18.03, 18.04 and Canon 5 of the
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it
is that lawyers duty to serve the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz, to wit:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic
legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members
of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.


1. In re: Galang, A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
(Former Bar Confidant Lanuevo and former bar examiner Atty. Galang are charged with an administrative complaint reagarding what took place after the bar exam
whereby their actions are asked to merit disbarment. Court disbarred them both. Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations.It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and wellcalculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.)
RE: Lanuevo
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the
passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners.
After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter
compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be
submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc.
The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner.
He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which
alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the
RE: Galang (he did not disclose previous accusation of slight physical injuries)
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires:
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(1) previous established rules and principles;

(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and
(3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545).
The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by
Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the reevaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any
discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit reevaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is
immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that
"every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines."
Under both rules (old and new RoC), every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable
the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.
As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine.
Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still
pending becomes more compelling.
The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving
moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by
respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated,
implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the
Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a
better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by
its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the
Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he
has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against
him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all
his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with
any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is
there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his
criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention
of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
Cases on the past Court nullified admission of successful bar candidates on grounds of:
(a) misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of
Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7
SCRA 475-478;
(b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and
(c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42].
In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public

Yared vs. Ilarde, G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000

[Canon 8, R. 8.01, & R. 11.03]

(counsel of private respondents employed improper and unethical language in his pleading and motions filed before the court regarding the counsel for petitioner
describing her to be a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury
and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar. That her motive for the case was [T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the
readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco and that she is "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to skin defendant alive for not being a bastard," and a
"horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and injure defendant - if only to please
and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply desired object of her unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every chance to laugh at
her behind her back.")
In Romero v. Valle, we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments,
both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his
use of intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of the court.

3. Royong vs. Atty. Oblena, A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963
(complainant charged respondent lawyer with rape he got disbarred)

Contention of lawyer: he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because
he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds
upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred.

SC Answer: it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is
inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively
prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. he moral turpitude for
which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this
Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so
phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most
apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability,
as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
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Ruling in In Re Pelaez, quoted by Court:

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications
of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the
practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed
not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a
lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to
the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his
paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for
admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive
action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character

4. Saburnido vs. Madroo, A.C. No. 4497. September 26, 2001

(lawyer filed multiple complaints against another party whereby court found his act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait Got suspended)
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall be whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While
we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty
will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as
a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.

5. Narido vs. Linsangan, A.M. No. 944 July 25, 1974

6. In Re: Soriano, G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970
(a lawyer who substituted for another enters appearance over a case which has been terminated by final judgment for a long time already)
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an
unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be
accorded final judgments of courts of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that something more can be done
toward overturning a final judicial mandate. Attorney so offending is severely censured.
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then
he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution.
Attorney in the case at bar is found guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would
merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he
made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely censured.

7. Laput vs. Remotigue, A.M. No. 219, September 29, 1962

A lawyer was dismissed by his client because the latter no longer trusted him. In his stead, the client contracted the services of another lawyer, who, to safeguard
the interest of his client, prepared the papers for the revocation of the power of attorney previously executed in favor of the first lawyer. After the second lawyer filed
his appearance in court, the first lawyer voluntarily withdrew as counsel and, simultaneously, filed a motion for the payment of his attorneys fees.
Held: The appearance of the second lawyer is not unprofessional, unethical or improper; the first lawyers voluntary withdrawal as counsel and his filing of a motion
for the payment of his fees amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of the second lawyer.
Notes. It is the duty of an attorney not only to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged (Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b), RoC). Malpractice is one of the grounds for removal or suspension of a member of the bar.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of the gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice (Rule 138, Sec. 27, RoC).

8. Morales vs. Fabello, G.R. No. 73576 April 29, 1987

Requirements for substitution of counsel:
1) Filing of a written application for substitution;
2) Written consent of the clinet;
3) Written consent of the lawyer to be substituted, if such consent be obtained, and
4) In case such written consent cannot be procured, then application for substitution must be accompanied with proof of service of notice of such motion in the
manner required by the rules, on the attorney to be substituted.
It is the duty of counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system that efficiently takes into account all court notices sent to him. And for want of diligent supervision, the
inexcusable negligence of (his employee) is imputable to the counsel.

9. Amalgamated Laborers' Association vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-23467, March 27, 1968
ATDL Notes l

An agreement that a union president should share in the attorneys fees for legal services is illegal where the union president is not a lawyer on the case.
Where the pleadings were filed by an association of two lawyers who later break-up during the pendency of the case, their fees must be shared in amounts to be determined
by the trial court.

10. Foodsphere, Inc., v Mauricio, Jr., A.C. No. 7199, July 22, 2009
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.

11. Tapay v. Bancolo, AC No. 9604, March 20, 2013

[Violated R. 9.01 & 1.01]

(Lawyers complaint filed against complainants were signed by his secretary)

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that
(1) he has read the pleading;
(2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and
(3) it is not interposed for delay.
Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.

12. Perez v. Catindig, A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

(Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct. Atty. Catindig is found guilty of gross immorality and of
violating the lawyers oath and rule 1.01, Canon 7 and R. 7.03 Disbarred; Charge of Gross immorality against Atty. Karen Baydo dismissed for lack of
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character
is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence;
he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
Gross Immoral conduct - Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.
The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.


1. Comelec vs. Noynay, G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998


Tiongco vs. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932, January 25, 1995

Boquiren vs. Del Rosario-Cruz, A.C. No. MTJ-94-894 June 2, 1995
Acme Shoe, Rubber vs. CA, G.R. No. 103576. August 22, 1996
Lacson vs. CA, G.R. No. 113591, February 6, 1995
Bautista vs. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990
CEIC vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 112438-39, December 12, 1995
TAN vs. CA, G.R. No. 97238, July 15, 1991
Mariveles vs. Mallari, A.C. No. 3294 February 17, 1993
ATDL Notes l

10. Gabriel vs. CA, G.R. No. L-43757-58 July 30, 1976
11. Paas v. Almarvez, A.M. No. P-03-1690. April 4, 2003

ATDL Notes l


1. Junio vs. Grupo, A.C. No. 5020, December 18, 2001
Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. GRUPO for malpractice and gross misconduct

Respondent Rosario JUNO engaged the services of Atty. Salvador GRUPO for the redemption of a parcel of land registered to the name of her parents.
She entrusted Atty. GRUPO Php25K in cash to be used in the redemption of said land. Atty. GRUPOs receipt of said cash was evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt.
Petitioner GRUPO did not redeem the property which resulted to the loss of the redemption right of the client.
When she demanded for the return of the money, Atty. GRUPO did not return it without justifiable cause. He continuously refused to refund the money entrusted to him.

Atty. GRUPO, in his answer, contended that

The land the money was intended for could really not have been redeemed anymore
It was desperate last-ditch attempt to persuade mortgagee to give back land to mortgagors with the tender of redemption but mortgagee wont budge.
That when the transaction failed, he requested her that he be allowed, in the meantime, to avail of the money because he had an urgent need of money for his childrens
educational expense.
Emphasis that its a personal request, a private matter between respondent and complainant
That because of such request, a promissory note was issued by him to her.
That they were old family friends since her sisters served Atty. GRUPOs family as household helpers for many years which is why he was asked a favor to handle her request.

That based on this, he did not ask for any fee. His services were then purely gratuitous and that his acts were his own and by his own. It was more than pro bono; it was not
even charity; it was simply an act of a friend for a friend.
He recognizes that he failed in paying for the money he borrowed for despite the client sisters demands for the money, he could not due to circumstances provide for the

That his non-payment does not mean he will not pay for it.
Case was referred to IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Investigating Commissioner: Atty. GRUPOs liable for violation of R.16.04 of the CPR which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latters interests are
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
He failed to pay his client for money borrowed.
Due to his admission of liability recommends Atty. GRUPO to simply be REPRIMANDED and ordered to pay Php25K plus interest at legal rate.
IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved Investigating Commissioners findings with certain modifications.

Atty. GRUPO would be SUSPENDED indefinitely.

Atty. GRUPO filed for MR
Contests the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors and assails that it gravely modified the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue: WON Atty. GRUPO should be reprimanded or suspended?
SC: SUSPENDED from practice of law for 1yr and pay Respondent JUNO w/in 30 days from notice with legal interest.
His main violations were that
He failed to pay the loan
Violation of Rule 16.04, CPR
Respondent's liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any security for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has also refused to pay the said
amount. His claim that he could not pay the loan "because circumstances . . . did not allow it" and that, because of the passage of time, "he somehow forgot about his obligation" only
underscores his blatant disregard of his obligation under Canon 15, CPR
Addnl violation: Canon 15, CPR
A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
Client-Attorney Relationship
Atty. GRUPOs contention that he did not act as a lawyer but as a friend has no merit.
As explained in Hilado v. David,
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid. promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had.
If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established . . .
Violation of R. 16.04
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice (Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Rule is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over the client.
Rule is especially significant in the instant case where the respondent enjoys an immense ascendancy over the complainant who, "as well as two of his sisters, had served respondent's
family as household helpers for many years."
Having gained dominance over the complainant by virtue of such long relation of master and servant, the respondent took advantage of his influence by not returning the money
entrusted to him. Instead, he imposed his will on the complainant and borrowed her funds without giving adequate security therefor and mindless of the interest of the complainant
In the light of the foregoing, . . . respondent has committed an act which falls short of the standard of the norm of conduct required of every attorney. If an ordinary borrower of money is
required by the law to repay the loan failing which he may be subjected to court action, it is more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct serves as an example.
Five (5) years had already passed since respondent retained the cash for his own personal use.
ATDL Notes l

But notwithstanding the same and his firm promise "to pay Mrs. Junio on or before January 1997" he has not demonstrated any volition to settle his obligation to his creditor,
although admittedly "there w[ere] occasions when complainant's sister came to respondent to ask for the payment in behalf of complainant," worse, "the passage of time made
respondent somehow forgot about the obligation."
JUNO allowed Atty. GRUPO to borrow the money due to her acceptance of the promissory note.
What Atty. GRUPO failed to do was to give adequate security for the loan and the subsequent failure to settle his obligation.

2. Hilado vs. David et al, G.R. No. L-961, September 21, 1949
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, WHEN EXISTS. "To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults
with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established . . ."
ID.; ATTORNEY IS INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES. There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting
on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in section 26 (e), Rule
123 and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
ID.; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT IS SACRED. Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and
to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the
essential security in, the relation of attorney and client.
ID.; ID. The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information
was received by him from his first client.
ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT IS FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC POLICY. The relation of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy,
on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in
mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
ID.; RETAINING FEE, WHAT IS. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client.
It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the
payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation
to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform."
ID.; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A MEMBER OF THE FIRM. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm.
ID.; PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION OF. Professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.
ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF SUMMARY. The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys
prejudicial to the administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but embraces
authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts, from the general principles of equity and
policy, will always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand
unequal. The courts act on the same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer declaration.
ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE COURTS. Attorneys are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the
administration of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their

3. Tiania vs. Ocampo, A.C. No. 2285 August 12, 1991

Maria TIANIA and Sps ANGEL filed a disbarment case each against Atty. OCAMPO
The cases were consolidated in which Atty. OCAMPO denied the allegations.
AC No. 2285 (TIANIA)
OCAMPO has been her retaining counsel in all her legal problems and court cases as early as 1966, thus he always had her unqualified faith and confidence.
In 1972, OCAMPO appeared for TIANIA in an ejectment case against her by Mrs. BLAYLOCK whom he represented as well.
When confronted by TIANIA, she was reassured she need not look for a new lawyer since he is still her lawyer.
Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment case, which Tiania signed. Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a Compromise Agreement which the latter signed without reading.
2yrs after the submission of the Compromise Agreement She received order to vacate the property.
Ocampo advised her to pay him a certain amount of money for the sheriff.
OCAMPO denies that he is a retained counsel of TIANIA.

Although he handled some legal problems and executed some notarial deeds for Tiania from 1966-1971, she had also engaged the services of various counsel to represent her
in several criminal and civil cases, involving violations of municipal ordinances and estafa. Thus, he could not be the complainant's "retaining counsel" in all her legal problems
and court cases.
Further, he only appeared on behalf of Mrs. Blaylock and not as TIANAs counsel.

He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such could not have discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of another
lawyer, and more so the preparation of the answer in the said case.

He admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case, Tiania showed to him a document which supported her claim, over the property in question.
Ocampo, after going over the document, expressed his doubts about it authenticity.
This convinced Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement and to pay the acquisition cost to Blaylock over a period of six (6) months.
TIANIA didnt fulfill her obligation and to make matters worse, she sold the contested property to a 3 rd party after an alias writ of execution had been ordered to transfer the property to
ATDL Notes l


Mrs. Blaylock.
Further, petition herein was field 5yrs after receiving NOTICE to VACATE
AC No. 2302 (Sps ANGEL)
Sps sold their house in favor of Mrs. BLAYLOCK for Php70K.
OCAMPO acted as their counsel and prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot.
Sps ANGEL bought another land using money from BLAYLOCK which OCAMPO prepared the documents for.
Deed of Sale
Real Estate Mortgage of the property purchased from Laura DALANAN
Promissory Notes (in favor of BLAYLOCK)
The Sps didnt realize the nature of the documents unitl they received a complaint naming them Defendeants in a COLLECTION SUIT filed by OCAMPO for Commercial Corp. of
Olongapo headed by BLAYLOCK
Sps were reassured by OCAMPO there was no need for them to look for a new counsel and that he will take care of everything.
Sps received NOTICE TO VACATE on basis of the 2 documents they signed when they bought the land.
SOL. GEN: charged OCAMPO with MALPRACTICE and GROSS MISCONDUCT punishable under Sec. 27 of R.138, RoC and Violation of his oath of office as an Attorney
a) Administrative Case No. 2285
At the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 11 04-0, the respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and while appearing for the same, gave advice and warnings to the defendant which
paved the way for an amicable settlement and which may have prejudiced the defendant's rights.
b) Administrative Case No. 2302
(1) Respondent while acting as counsel for Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation; also acted as counsel of the complainant Mrs. Angel when he
prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot for Mrs. Angel in favor of Zenaida Blaylock, daughter of Concepcion Blaylock.
(2) Respondent, while acting as counsel for Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation, also acted as counsel of Mrs. Angel when he proceeded to Cavite
and paid Salud Jimenez the sum of P22,000.00 for Dalanan's Kessing Property.
(3) Respondent was representing conflicting interests when he simultaneously prepared the Deed of Sale of the Kessing property in favor of Mrs. Angel and the Real Estate
Mortgage for the same property to be signed by Mrs. Angel in favor of Mrs. Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation.
(4) Respondent used Mrs. Angel by pretending to protect her interest as his client in Civil Case No. 2020-0, when admittedly he was only "forced to help and assist Mrs. Angel in
said case to protect the property of Mrs. Blaylock."
Issue: Was OCAMPO guilty of representing conflicting interests?
SC: guilty of MALPRACTICE and GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of he CPR (R.15.03)
Penalty Suspended from the practice of law for 1yr

Rule 15.03
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.

Failed Test of Conflict of Interest

The aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing Blaylock, and at the same time advising Tiania, the opposing party, as in the first administrative case, and once again
representing Blaylock and her interest while handling the legal documents of another opposing party as in the second case, whether the said actions were related or totally unrelated,
constitute serious misconduct. They are improper to the respondent's office as attorney.
Why representation of conflicting interests is prohibited
Relation of Atty and Client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree
Public policy and Good taste dictates so
An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers.
Test of Conflict of Interest in Disciplinary Cases against a lawyer
WON the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance thereof.

4. B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc vs. CA, G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992
Reyes (deceased) filed an action for damages with CFI against Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.
TC: found Petitioner liable for damages and absolved defendants.
Petitioners counsel (law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Assoc.) timely appealed adverse decision to CA. But during the appeal, Plaintiff-Appelle Reyes died.
REYES was substituted by his heirs.
The law firm received notice to file Appellants Brief but it was not filed. It was further asked to show cause why appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file Appellants Brief but the
same was not complied with.
Thus, CA dismissed the appeal through a resolution.
The petitioner, through the firm, filed MR alleging that due to the death of their senior partner, Atty.Crispin BAIZAS, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose
Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Alberto (one who established her own law office); Further, Atty. ESPIRITU (one who handled this case in the TC and who is believed to have
also attended to the preparation of the Appellants Brief) also left the firm.
CA: denied petitioners motion to reinstate appeal dismissed for failure to file Appellants Brief
Considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-) months since counsel received copy of the resolution
requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file brief; Motion Denied.
Records of the case got remanded to the court of origin of the execution.
TC: Issued a Writ of Execution wherein an Auction Sale was eventually scheduled.
Petitioner filed with CA Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was denied by the CA
Petitioner then files a case against the CA, Eulogio Reyes, Nicanor Salaysay as Provincial Sheriff and Antonio Marinas as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of
ATDL Notes l


a TRO.
Issue: WON the death of the Senior Partner is sufficient excuse for their failure to file Appellants Brief which is the reason for the denial of their MR.
SC: NO, the death of the senior partner is not a sufficient excuse. It was the firm, not the senior partner, who was counsel of petitioner. What happened was there was simple negligence
on the part of petitioners counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief.
As revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file Brief but it failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it.
Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the
reglementary period but petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent Court to issue a Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also
received. Then, later, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution. Nothing more was heard from
petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for
the respondent Court.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief.
With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided
by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was
designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file
Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner
could contract the services of a new lawyer.

5. Ducat vs. Villalon, A.C. No. 3910, August 14, 2000


Sevilla vs. Salubre, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1336, December 19, 2000

Angeles vs. Uy, A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000
Santiago vs. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
In Re: De La Rosa, March 21, 1914

ATDL Notes l


10. PNB vs. Cedo, A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
11. Pasay Law And Conscience Union, Inc vs. Atty. Paz, A. M. No. 1008 January 22, 1980
12. Consolidated Rural Bank (Cagayan Valley), Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123810. January 20, 1999
13. Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa vs. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
104600 July 2, 1999
14. Del Rosario vs. CA, G.R. No. 98149 September 26, 1994
15. Licudan vs. CA, G.R. No. 91958, January 24, 1991
16. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. CA , G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990
17. Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc vs. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999
18. Law firm of Armovit vs. Gines, G.R. No. 90983 September 27, 1991
19. Aro vs.Naawa, G.R. No. L-24163, April 28, 1969
20. Miranda v. Carpio, A. C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011

ATDL Notes l



Libaros vs. Dablos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991

Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991
Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992
Sabitsana vs. Villamor, A.M. No. 90-474 October 4, 1991
Oca vs. De Guzman, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1021. January 31, 1997
Alfonso vs. Alonzo-Legasto, A.M. No. MTJ 94-995. September 5, 2002
RE: Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, September 9, 2008
In re Derogatory Nest Item on Justice Demetria, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA. March 27,
9. In re Cornelius,, 436 S.E.2d 836 (N.C. 1993)

Kilat vs. Macias, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1960, October 25, 2005

Jacinto vs. Vallarta, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541, March 10, 2005
Royeca vs. Anmas , G.R. No. L-39584 May 3, 1976
Tan vs. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004 (f
Cabrera vs. Pajares, A.M. Nos. R-278-RTJ & R-309-RTJ May 30, 1986
In Re Judge Marcos, A.M. No. 97-253-RTC, July 6, 2001
Centrum Agri Business Realty Corp. vs. Katalbas-Moscardon, A.M. No. RTJ-92-880
August 11, 1995
8. Olga M. Samson v. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138. August 5,


1. Tan vs. Gallardo, G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976
2. Pimentel vs. Salanga, G.R. No. L-27934, September 18, 1967
3. Ty vs. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, G.R. Nos. 149797-98, February 13,
4. Datuin vs. Soriano, AM No. RTJ-01-1640. October 15, 2002
5. Oktubre s. Velasco, A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444, July 20, 2004
6. Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996,
7. Villaluz vs. Mijares, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1402, April 3, 1998
8. Associacion de Agricultura de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. Talisay Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No.
L-19937 February 19, 1979
9. Paredes vs. Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710, September 30, 1969
10. Bellosillo vs. Saludo, A.M. 32971, April 5, 1961,
11. Choa vs. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-95-063, February 9, 1996
1. Cabreana vs. Avelino, A.M. No. 1733-CFI September 30, 1981
2. Mamerto Maniquis Foundation, Inc. vs. Pizzarro, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1750. January
14, 2005

Vidal v. Dojillo, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591. July 14, 2005

ATDL Notes l


4. Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge Edmundo T. Acua, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891. July 28,
5. Dawa vs. Judge Asa, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144. July 22, 1998
6. Padilla vs. Zantua, A.M. No. MTJ-93-888 October 24, 1994
7. J. King & Sons vs. Hontanosas, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1802, September 21, 2004
8. Macias vs. Araula, Adm. Matter. No. 1895-CFI July 20, 1982
9. Carual vs. Brusala, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999



Espayos v. Lee, A.M. No. 1574-MJ, April 30, 1979;

Mane v. Judge Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008
Cua Shuk Yin vs. Perello, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1961, November 11, 2005
Sy v. Judge Fineza, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1808, October 15, 2003

1. Villanueva v. Judge Buaya, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131, November 22, 2010
2. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-072063/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2064/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2066. June 26, 2009,

Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2026. March 4, 2009,


Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014. March 4, 2009,

5. Macalintal vs. Teh, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375. October 16, 1997

A. Lawyers
Study Rule 139-B
1. Aludo, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121404, May 3, 2006
2. Fortun v. Quinsayas, G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013
3. Lahm v. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012
B. Judges, Justices
Study Rule 140

1. Tobias v. Limsiaco, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011

2. Rivera v Judge Mendoza, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2013, August 4, 2006
ATDL Notes l



1. ABA Formal Opinion 10-457
2. IN Re Skinner, 740 S.E.2d 171
3. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Peshek, 798 N.W.2d 879
4. Hunter v. Virginia State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 611
5. Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184

ATDL Notes l