Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov.

10, 2015 (Digest on RA 6770)

Carpio-Morales
vs.
Binay,
G.R.
No.
(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)

217126-27,

Nov.

10,

2015

FACTS:
The Ombudsmans argument against the CAs lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the
main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of
Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
The Ombudsmans maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually
prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation
conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase [n]o writ of injunction shall
be issued by any court, the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?
RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as
part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second
paragraph is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.
The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and,
in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Courts constitutional
rule-making authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy
that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is
both integral and inherent to every courts exercise of judicial power. Without the Courts
consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be
a violation of the separation of powers principle.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional
injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine
the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a courts ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no
provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against decision or
findings of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Courts appellate
jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former
provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsmans
posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions
are in part materia in that they cover the same specific or particular subject matter, that is,
the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the
existence of the CAs subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has

developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the courts own motion. The Court
ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that
fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in
any proceeding.