CCS 1AC Long Beach HS

1AC Warming
Climate change is real, anthropogenic, and causes extinction
through environmental crises and wars
Sharp and Kennedy 14 Robert Sharp (UAE National Defense College
Associate Dean for Academic Programs, Professor of Strategic Studies at the College
of International Security Affairs, MSc in National Security Strategy) and Edward
Kennedy (renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the
World Bank), 8-22-2014, "Climate Change and Implications for National Security,"
International Policy Digest, http://intpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-changeimplications-national-security/
Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the
dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years
ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on
December 28th humans made the first fires wood fires neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most
recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial
revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago,
coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled
tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today
and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which

The release of this carbon however is

changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and
presence on earth. It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short
time. The implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to
life on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. This
relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We
know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a
result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is
occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some,
confused many, and polarized politics. It has already led to an increase in natural disasters
including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the
is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar.

10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that

climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were
displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of

people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms . Climate change
affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and
weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and
acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods
in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are
reduced because glaciers are retreating. As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an
albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation
because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is
less reflection of the suns light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to
the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon,

The planet has

already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods
and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed . It is human intervention
that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature,
coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create
which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far.

uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of
insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. Rising sea levels will
increasingly threaten our coastal population and infrastructure centers
and with more than 3.5 billion people half the planet depending on the
ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may
dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced
rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today,

the impact is not only to the

environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also
would lead to conflict and thus impact national security. Resource wars are
inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set
of those available resources. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the
future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival ; the so-called
Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the
Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security.
It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The
temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus

scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from
declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and

the Center for Naval

Analyses (CNA) Institute of Public Research convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and
admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change . Their initial
report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The
team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that
it was: most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for
extremism. The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the
following. Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration . Africa
would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the U nited States.
The Middle East would experience a loss of food and water security (which) will
increase pressure to emigrate across borders . Asia would suffer from threats to
water and the spread of infectious disease. In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change
and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA
again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and
the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that climate change is
no longer a future threat but occurring right now and the authors appeal to the security
community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected
climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to
integrate climate change across all strategy and planning . The calm of the 2007 report is
measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006

replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because
time and tide wait for no man. The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of

Actions by the United

States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with
projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is
critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are
accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change . The 9/11
climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that:

Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeaces

report describes a coming climate Armageddon

A world
thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries
2003 account of

the Pentagons

alleged

which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described:

rendered uninhabitable. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and
Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to
find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. Demands for access to
water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons. The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon
reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the
physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human impacts that
threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately
foster conflict. Climate change is the quintessential Tragedy of the Commons, where the
cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal
gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous
and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was)
slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely global. With our planet and culture
figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the
reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!

Chinese coal is the single largest contributor reducing

emissions is crucial to solve warming
Hsu 16 [Sara Hsu, Assistant Professor of Economics at the State University of New
York at New Paltz, PhD in Economics from the University of Utah, 9-8-2016, "Is
China's Pollution Accelerating Climate Change?," Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/09/08/is-chinas-pollution-acceleratingclimate-change/#38988bb343dd]
China is not known for fostering a healthy and sustainable environment, despite the stepped-up enforcement of
environmental laws in very recent years. The nation contributes the highest percentage of
carbon emissions to the atmosphere in the world. While carbon emissions in China may
be declining due to slowing economic growth and reduced use of coal, pollution is rampant, and
greenhouse gas emissions continue to be alarmingly high. Some scientists are reporting that
the pace of climate change is occurring faster than had been predicted, and human
activity is the major cause. Is Chinas pollution accelerating climate change? Maybe. In China alone, more
than 1.6 million people die annually from air pollution. Heavy coal use has resulted in high carbon
emissions. Although China has reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 250,000 tons, the nation continues to
emit 25 million tons of greenhouse gases, according to Environment Minister Chen Jining. Enforcement of
environmental laws has improved, but slowly, and air pollution continues to be a fact of life in most
cities. This has contributed to an accelerated pace of climate change, which has been
noticed in the past few years. According to scientists at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
temperatures are rising at a faster rate than they have in the past 1,000 years,
about 2.5 times as rapidly. This has been confirmed by NASA, with global average temperatures not seen
for 4,000 years. Stanford scientists Noah Diffenbaugh and Chris Field find that at the rate we are producing
greenhouse gas emissions, global temperatures could rise by 5-6 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. Rising
temperatures are already translating into extreme weather such as floods, droughts and wildfires. However, China is
not the only country to blame. America produces more carbon emissions than China does on a per capita basis,
given a much higher standard of living, including access to a range of appliances, heating and cooling and vehicles.
Also, Bengang Li of Peking University, and others, wrote in Nature this past March that China has contributed only
about 10% of the global climate energy changes since 1750, the dawn of industrialization. Greenhouse gases,
especially carbon dioxide, remain in the atmosphere for a long time, and the U.S. and Europe have contributed
more, since they industrialized earlier. Certainly, China has been working hard to improve the air while continuing to
grow. It has set a goal of improving air quality 10% by 2017, and the economic slowdown and restructuring have
resulted in somewhat less use of coal. The leadership has been forward thinking on the use of renewable energy,
integrating wind, water and solar power into its electricity system. China is also planning to launch a carbon
emissions trading scheme in 2017. Still,

while China has agreed to lower carbon emissions per

unit of GDP by 60-65% from the 2005 level by 2030, its timeline may be too slow to
stave off the process of climate change. Along with the U.S., China may be
implementing policies that are not radical enough to prevent global warming
from ramping up. The United Nations Environment Program released a report at the end of last year stating
that pledges at the UN climate summit to reduce greenhouse gas emissions amounted to only half of the emissions

The results of
moving beyond a rise in temperatures of 2 degrees Celsius, the dangerous level of
temperature increase, include superstorms, devastating droughts, rising sea levels
and large migrations. China has also stated that it will cap annual energy consumption to 5 billion metric
cuts necessary to keep global warming below dangerous levels by the end of the century.

tons of standard coal equivalent by 2020, which is greater than what was emitted in 2015, and a very achievable (if
not meaningless) target, since it allows China to produce even more CO2 than it has so far emitted annually. While
China constantly notes that the United States and Europe had time to industrialize and spew greenhouse gases into
the atmosphere, it is little cited that average carbon dioxide emissions in the United States per year, during its
Industrial Revolution, amounted to 1,846 metric tons of carbon dioxide, according to data from the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory and my calculations. This is a tiny fraction of Chinas emissions in recent years, which emitted
10.5 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2014, double that of the United States in that year, and over 5.6 million
times the average annual emissions from the U.S. during its Industrial Revolution. The number is probably even

China has been burning 17% more coal, since 2000,

than it had initially reported. The bottom line is that China, like most other countries, must
implement more stringent controls over greenhouse gas pollution, and
sooner rather than later. The excuse that China needs time to industrialize is flimsy, especially since the
need to keep temperature increases below dangerous levels is so pressing. As the
largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, China is , in particular, contributing to
accelerated climate change, and more must be done to control it.
higher, since we learned last year that

Only carbon capture and storage can achieve sufficient

emissions reductions all other approaches fail, and China is
key to deploy it successfully and set a global model
Mann 14 [Charles C. Mann, citations including Steven Chu (Professor of Physics
and Molecular & Cellular Physiology @ Stanford, was the 12th U.S. Secretary of
Energy, was director of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, winner of Nobel
Prize in Physics, founder of the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy, the
Energy Innovation Hubs, and the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Centers) and
William Nordhaus (Professor of Economics and Environmental Studies @ Yale
University, President of American Economic Association, foremost researcher on
economics of climate change), 3-25-2014, "Renewables Arent Enough. Clean Coal Is
the Future," Wired, https://www.wired.com/2014/03/clean-coal/]
Coal supplies over 40 percent of global electricity needs, and that percentage is
going up. The only real question is how to minimize the damage. Proof that good things
dont always come in nice packages can be found by taking the fast train from Beijing to Tianjin and then driving to
the coast. Tianjin, Chinas third-biggest city, originated as Beijings port on the Yellow Sea. But in recent years
Tianjin has reclaimed so much of its muddy, unstable shoreline that the city has effectively moved inland and a
new, crazily active port has sprung up at the waters edge. In this hyper-industrialized zone, its highways choked
with trucks, stand scores of factories and utility plants, each a mass of pipes, reactors, valves, vents, retorts,
crackers, blowers, chimneys, and distillation towersthe sort of facility James Cameron might have lingered over,
musing, on his way to film the climax of Terminator 2. Among these edifices, just as big and almost as anonymous
as its neighbors, is a structure called GreenGen, built by China Huaneng Group, a giant state-owned electric utility,
in collaboration with half a dozen other firms, various branches of the Chinese government, and, importantly,
Peabody Energy, a Missouri firm that is the worlds biggest private coal company. By Western standards, GreenGen
is a secretive place; weeks of repeated requests for interviews and a tour met with no reply. When I visited anyway,
guards at the site not only refused admittance but wouldnt even confirm its name. As I drove away from the
entrance, a window blind cracked open; through the slats, an eye surveyed my departure. The silence, in my view,

is foolish. GreenGen is a billion-dollar facility that extracts the carbon dioxide from a coal-fired power plant and,
ultimately, will channel it into an underground storage area many miles away. Part of a coming wave of such

carbon-eating facilities, it may be Chinasand possibly the planetssingle most

consequential effort to fight climate change. Because most Americans rarely see coal, they
tend to picture it as a relic of the 19th century, black stuff piled up in Victorian alleys. In fact, a lump of coal is a
thoroughly ubiquitous 21st-century artifact, as much an emblem of our time as the iPhone. Today coal produces
more than 40 percent of the worlds electricity, a foundation of modern life. And that percentage is going up:

In

the past decade, coal added more to the global energy supply than any other
source. Nowhere is the preeminence of coal more apparent than in the planets
fastest-growing, most populous region: Asia, especially China. In the past few decades,
China has lifted several hundred million people out of destitutionarguably historys biggest, fastest rise in human

That advance couldnt have happened without industrialization, and that

industrialization couldnt have happened without coal. More than three-quarters of
Chinas electricity comes from coal, including the power for the giant electronic
plants where iPhones are assembled. More coal goes to heating millions of homes, to
smelting steel (China produces nearly half the worlds steel), and to baking limestone to make
cement (China provides almost half the worlds cement). In its frantic quest to develop, China burns
almost as much coal as the rest of the world put togethera fact that makes
climatologists shudder. China already emits one-quarter of the worlds greenhouse
gases, more than any other country. The International Energy Agency (IEA), a Paris-based think tank sponsored
by 28 developed nations, estimates that Beijing will double its ranks of coal-fired power
plants by 2040. If that happens, Chinas carbon dioxide figures could double or even
triple. Coal is too low-cost, too plentiful, and too available from reliable
sources to be replaced, says fuel analyst John Dean, president of the JD Energy consulting firm.
China is putting in solar and wind power at a tremendous pace, but it will have to
use more and more coal just to keep up with rising demand. Dependence on coal is
not just a Chinese problem, though. Countries around the worldeven European
nations that tout their environmental track recordshave found themselves unable
to wean themselves from coal. Germany, though often celebrated for its embrace of
solar and wind energy, not only gets more than half its power from coal but opened
more coal-fired power plants in 2013 than in any year in the past two decades. In
well-being.

neighboring Poland, 86 percent of the electricity is generated from coal. South Africa, Israel, Australia, Indonesia
all are ever more dependent on coal. (The US is a partial exception: Coals share of American electricity fell from 49
percent in 2007 to 39 percent in 2013, largely because fracking has cut the price of natural gas, a competing fuel.
But critics note, accurately, that US coal exports have hit record highs; an ever-increasing share of European and
Asian coal is red, white, and blue.) According to the World Resources Institute, an environmental research group,

almost 1,200 big new coal facilities in 59 countries are proposed for construction.
The soaring use of coal, a joint statement by climate scientists warned in November, is
leading the world toward an outcome that can only be described as
catastrophic. Which brings me, in a way, back to the unwelcoming facility in Tianjin. GreenGen is one of the
worlds most advanced attempts to develop a technology known as carbon capture and storage. Conceptually
speaking, CCS is simple: Industries burn just as much coal as before but remove all the pollutants. In addition to
scrubbing out ash and soot, now standard practice at many big plants, they separate out the carbon dioxide and

Many energy and climate

researchers believe that CCS is vital to avoiding a climate catastrophe.
Because it could allow the globe to keep burning its most abundant fuel source
while drastically reducing carbon dioxide and soot, it may be more important though
much less publicizedthan any renewable-energy technology for decades to come. No less
than Steven Chu, the Nobel-winning physicist who was US secretary of energy until last
year, has declared CCS essential. I dont see how we go forward without it, he says.
pump it underground, where it can be stored for thousands of years.

Unfortunately, taking that step will be incredibly difficult. Even though most of the basic concepts are well
understood, developing reliable, large-scale CCS facilities will be time-consuming, unglamorous, and breathtakingly

Engineers will need to lavish time and money on painstaking calculations,

minor adjustments, and cautious experiments. At the end, the world will have several thousand
costly.

giant edifices that everyone regards as eyesores. Meanwhile, environmentalists have lobbied hard against the
technology, convinced that it represents a sop to the coal industry at the expense of cleaner alternatives like solar
and wind. As a consequence, CCS is widely regarded as both critical to the future and a
quagmire. At a 2008 meeting of the Group of Eight (a forum for powerful Western nations, Russia, and Japan), the
assembled energy ministers lauded the critical role of carbon capture and storage and strongly backed an IEA

But the number of such

projects around the world is actually fallingexcept in China, which has a dozen big
CCS efforts in planning or production. It is perhaps appropriate that China should take
the lead: It has the worlds worst coal pollution problem. In addition, its energy companies are partly
state-owned; they cant readily sue the government to stop its CCS program . At the
same time, they wont be penalized, either by the government or shareholder
advocates, if developing this costly, experimental technology cuts into their profits.
recommendation to launch 20 large-scale CCS demonstration projects by 2010.

In any case, outsiders should be grateful that China is weighing in, says Fatih Birol, chief economist for the IEA.

Somebody needs to figure out how to capture and store carbon dioxide on a
massive scale before its too late. I dont know of any other technology which is so
critical for the health of the planet and at the same time for which we have almost no appetite, Birol
says. The only place it seems to be increasing is China . COAL CANT BE IGNORED Coal is MEGOuntil you
live near it. MEGO is old journalistic slang for my eyes glaze overa worthy story that is too dull to read. In America, where coal is mostly burned far out
of sight, readers tend to react to the word coal by hitting Close Tab. But people in Hebei dont think coal is MEGO, at least in my experience. Hebei is the
province that surrounds Beijing. When the capital city set up for the 2008 Olympics, the government pushed out the coal-powered utilities and factories
that were polluting its air. Mostly, these facilities moved to Hebei. The province ended up with many new jobs. But it also ended up with Chinas dirtiest air.
Because I was curious, I hired a taxi to drive in and around the Hebei city of Tangshan, southeast of Beijing. Visibility was about a quarter milea good
day, the driver told me. Haze gave buildings the washed-out look of an old photographic print. Not long ago, Tangshan had been a relatively poor place.
Now the edge of town held a murderers row of luxury-car dealerships: BMW, Jaguar, Mercedes, Lexus, Porsche. Most of the vehicles were displayed
indoors. Those outside were covered with gray crud. Coal was everywhere, people said. One truck driver told me with a kind of mocking pride that we
were breathing the worlds worst air. A university graduate in striped Hello Kitty socks remarked that every time she wiped her face the cloth had black
dirty stuff on it. The stuff, she said, was PM2.5technical jargon for particles that are 2.5 micrometers in diameter and therefore most likely to lodge in
the lungs. Respiratory problems were common, she said. Everybody is sick, but the government would never report it. We gave a ride to a steelworker
who told me that Tangshan had plans to clean itself up in 30 to 35 years. We are a city of industry, a city of coal, he said. Dirty air is not solely a problem
of obscure locations in flyover China. Face masks to help filter pollution are increasingly common in great cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou. One
company, Vogmask, sells masks on which corporations can print their logos: smog as branding opportunity. A few days before my ride around Tangshan,
the more than 10 million inhabitants of the northeastern city of Harbin were enveloped by coal pollution. Schools closed; people kept to their homes;
highways shut down because drivers couldnt see the road. During my visit, I picked up a Beijing newspaper with a full-page glossy ad insert for the citys
first high tech condominium project that realizes real-time control of PM2.5 levels. According to one major research project involving almost 500
scientists in 50 nations, outdoor air pollution annually contributes to about 1.2 million premature deaths in China. Another study argued that eliminating
coal pollution in northern China would raise average life expectancy there by nearly five years. (By contrast, wiping out all cancer would increase US life
expectancy by just three years.) Last year 10 Chinese scientists calculated that reducing PM2.5 to US levels would cut the total death rate in big Chinese
cities between 2 and 5 percent. A different way of saying this is that in some places, the side effects of breathing are responsible for as many as 1 out of
every 20 deaths. Understanding these numbers, affluent Chinese are beginning to send their children out of the country. Not-so-affluent Chinese, like the
people I spoke to in Hebei, have little recourse. What good are these jobs [in Hebeis new industry] if theyre at the expense of our health? asked the
woman in the Hello Kitty socks. Chinas coal fumes have effects far outside Hebei. Smoke from coal plants rises high and absorbs sunlight, heating the air.
Black-carbon particles interact with clouds, helping them both trap heat and block solar radiation. Soot lands on glaciers and ice fields in a fine mist,
covering them with a thin black film. Sunlight reflects less from smoky ice; indeed, the dusting of coal particles is helping to melt the poles and uncover
the Himalayas. Last year an international team calculated that black carbon was the second-most important human emission contributing to climate

The simplest solution to all

these woes would be to ban immediately all of the worlds 7,000 coal-fired power
plants, including the almost 600 in the USsimple but impossible. For power
generation, there are alternatives to fossil fuels, says Barry Jones, a general manager of the
change. The most important, of course, is carbon dioxide; coal is the greatest single source for it too.

Global CCS Institute. (The institute, an Australia-based association of international governments and energy
companies, helped me make contacts in China but provided no financial assistance or editorial supervision.) But

for some industrial processes, there are no alternatives . Examples include

steel and cement, essential building blocks for all modern societies. Most steel is smelted
in large blast furnaces. The furnaces require coke, a solid fuel made by burning coal in a low-oxygen environment.
Not only an energy source, coke literally supports the iron ore in the furnace and participates in the chemical
reactions that transform pig iron into steel. According to Vaclav Smil, an energy researcher and prolific author on
the subject, producing a ton of steel requires almost half a ton of coke. Coal is also the primary fuel for cement
manufacturers. In

theory, coal could be replaced, Jones says. But that would involve
rebuilding every cement plant in the world. More important from Chinas perspective,

more than one-quarter of its citizens still live on less than $2 a day. These people
more than 350 million men, women, and children, an entire United States of destitution want schools and
sewers, warm homes and paved highways, things that people elsewhere enjoy without reflection.
China cant provide enough energy to make and maintain these things with oil or
natural gas: The nation has little of either and not much incentive to import them at
great cost. (Asian natural gas prices are roughly five times higher than US prices.) Nor can solar,
wind, or nuclear fill Chinas needs, even though it is deploying all three faster
than any other country. Meanwhile, it has the third-biggest coal reserves in the
world. China, like most of the rest of the world, pretty much has to use coal, says
Dean, the fuel analyst. Or, I guess, leave people in the dark. And since coal is not going away,
coal plants around the world will need to find a way to capture and store
their emissions. Its just crazy not to develop this technology. CAPTURE AND STORAGE IS OUR BEST OPTIONFOR NOW Inner Mongolia
is cold and dry and nearly treelessthe North Dakota of China. Long winters and summer sandstorms make people from other parts of China leery of
moving there. Yet some are doing just that, because Inner Mongolia, like North Dakota, is a rising energy powerhouse, and jobs are plentiful. Two coal
mines near the city of Ordos are the second- and third-biggest on earth. There are plans to develop part of another coal field; when complete, the area
would be roughly three times that of Los Angeles. All are operated by Shenhua Group, a state-owned firm that is the countrys largest coal producer. In
2006, Beijing established a nationwide program to boost its coal production and develop its capacity to refine coal into liquid fuels, which would allow the
country to use domestic coal to replace imported oil, gasoline, and natural gas, as well as the petrochemical products made from them. In response,
Shenhua built a $2 billion facility near Ordos that transforms coal into something you can put in an automobile tank. Just outside the plant is one of the
few filling stations on earth that sells liquefied coal. Unfortunately, every kilowatt-hour generated by coal produces more than 2 pounds of carbon dioxide.
(By contrast, natural gas emits about 1.2 pounds per kilowatt-hour; nuclear and solar, of course, emit none.) Turning coal into liquid fuel releases even
more CO2 than turning coal into electricity. Which partly explains why Shenhua has picked this coal-to-liquid plant in Inner Mongolia to house what is, by
some measures, Chinas most important CCS initiative. The project looms above a barren bluff over the Wulanmulun River (Ulan Moron, in Mongolian),
which runs through a massive coalfield. The CCS project is small in dimension, employing only 20 of the 1,700 workers at the coal-to-liquids facility. But it
has large implications, says Maoshan Chen, its chief engineer. Shenhua launched the project, he says, because the company foresaw that Beijings
mandates to expand the use of coal would soon be followed by others to cut coal emissions. Its inevitable that the government will set up carbon
regulations, he says. Its just a matter of time. Indeed, the first wave of emissions rules appeared in Novemberthe government banned some types of
coal mines and the use of particularly dirty coal. By then, Chen says, Shenhua had long since decided to get ahead of everyone else and launched the
Wulanmulun project. GreenGen captures more carbon dioxide but at present is selling the gas to soft-drink companies rather than storing it (storage is
planned for the next phase, in 2020). The Wulanmulun project, by contrast, already is the complete packagecapture and storage, Chen says. Shenhua
initiated feasibility studies in 2007 in consultation with the US Department of Energy. A lot of US researchers took part in planning, both at DOE and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Chen says. Further aid came from scientists at Beijing University, Beijing University of Chemical Technology,
Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and petroleum-company geology departments. Also pitching in: Chinas Ministry of Science and
Technology and the National Development and Reform Commission, the state planning agency. So many scientists were needed, Chen says, because CCS
involves not only his field of chemical engineering but geology, economics, atmospheric chemistry, industrial engineeringhalf a dozen different
disciplines. Construction began in June 2010; the completed facility initiated tests six months later. Last year, its initial phase reached full capacity,
capturing and storing more than 110,000 tons of carbon dioxide in an underground saltwater aquifer. By 2020, if all goes well, Shenhua could be putting

China is launching CCS schemes like the Shenhua

facility faster than any other nation, and the country is unique in its determination
to address the emissions from coal-fired plants. According to the Global CCS Institute, the world
away as much as 2 million tons of CO2 every year.

has just 12 fully operational large-scale carbon-capture projects, most in the United States. Not one of them is what
is most needed: a facility that traps and stores emissions from a big coal-fired power plant. Instead they mainly take
in CO2 from natural-gas wells and refineriesa worthwhile task but of only secondary importance. This month, the
first coal plant project, a $1.2 billion effort in Canada, is scheduled to open, but it remains true that the world has
little experience with capturing and storing emissions from coal plantsso little that environmentalists charge that
CCS is not much more than energy vaporware, a fantasy concocted by coal companies to greenwash an inherently
dirty industry. Energy analysts put it differently. CCS is a real technology, but its real in the same way that stem
cell medicine is real, Maggie Koerth-Baker wrote in Before the Lights Go Out, a fine recent study of the electric grid.
Its a concept car, not the minivan in your neighbors driveway.

Getting CCS to the minivan stage requires

surmounting multiple technical challenges. The most developed technique for capturing carbon from emissions is
known as amine scrubbing. It involves bubbling the exhaust from burning coal through a solution of water and monoethanolamine. MEA is unpleasant:
toxic, flammable, and caustic, with an acrid, ammoniacal smell. But it bonds to carbon dioxide, separating it from the other gases in the exhaust. The
process creates a new chemical compound called, uneuphoniously, MEA carbamate. (More technically, CO2 is a weak acid when dissolved in water
sometimes scientists refer to it as carbonic acidand MEA is a weak base; in a reaction familiar from high school chemistry, they form a salt.) The MEA
carbamate and water are pumped into a stripper, where the solution is boiled or the pressure is lowered. Heat or expansion reverses the earlier reaction,
breaking up the MEA carbamate into carbon dioxide and MEA. Carbon dioxide and water vapor gush out, ready to be buried; MEA returns to combine with
the next batch of coal exhaust. (Because Shenhuas coal-to-liquids plant emissions have a much greater concentration of CO2 than those from an ordinary
power plant, the facility uses a somewhat different method.) Scaling up this simple-sounding process into a plant that can physically process millions of
tons of CO2 is not easy. Big power plants produce big amounts of CO2 and need big structures to capture it: multistory metal towers with pipes and valves.
The compounds are corrosive and poisonous, ever trying to attack the machinery and kill the operators. Much of the MEA breaks down in every cycle and
must be replenished at high cost. Most important, constantly boiling a silos worth of MEA carbamate solution requires a great deal of energy. Common
estimates are that this kind of CCS will eat up 20 to 30 percent of a power plants output. Given that typical coal plants can translate only 50 percent of
the energy in coal into electricity, deploying CCS means that power plants will consume 40 to 60 percent more of the black stuff. Mitigating the
environmental costs of digging up and burning coal thus means digging up and burning even more coal. The industry jargon for these costs is parasitic.
(Sample usage, from an energy consultant: Holy crap, the parasitics are awful.) Often parasitic costs are estimated at $100 per ton of stored CO2. A
single 500-megawatt power plant emits roughly 3 million tons of carbon dioxide a year. Arithmetic suggests that sticking all that gas from thousands of
plants in the dirt would cost $2 trillion a year, a figure that doesnt include the billions required to build the CCS facilities in the first place. This back-of-anenvelope calculation rests on implausible assumptions: coal plants of identical size, no technical progress, no economies of scale, no plant conversions to
lower-emission natural gas, and so on. But the overall conclusionthat CCS based on present technology is prohibitively expensiveis all too plausible. By

the storage part of the equationthe S in CCSseems relatively straightforward.

Chen says that nature is the proof of concept. What are oil and natural-gas deposits but
natural storehouses of carbon? CCS simply re-creates or replenishes them. As a rule, an
contrast,

oil or gas field consists of two layers of stone. The bottom layer is porous and spongelike, its holes filled with
petroleum. Atop it is the second layer: a cap of nonporous stone. Oil or gas companies drill through the cap,
releasing the liquids and gases below. CCS is the reverse: Companies pump liquid carbon dioxide through
impermeable rock into permeable rock. After the rock is filled to the brim, the entrance is sealed permanently, a

The continents are riddled with potential storage

sites, geologists say, at least a centurys worth in the United States alone. Obvious targets
reliquary for humankinds energy obsession.

include saline bedsunderground reservoirs of salty waterand exhausted oil fields. Exhausted does not mean
the field has been pumped dry; rather, the remaining petroleumas much as two-thirds of the total in the ground
is too thick and tarry to extract at a reasonable price. Injecting carbon dioxide changes the equation. Flowing into
the pores of the rock, the gas mixes with the remaining crude oil, lowering its viscosity and squeezing it toward the

In principle, carbon dioxide

could be tucked into such lairs until the sun explodes. In practice, it needs to be
stored only for a century or so, the time required for the carbon dioxide to combine
with the surrounding stone and form stable minerals. Still, nobody is yet sure how to safely
wellhead. (After all possible oil is extracted, the well would be plugged.)

contain CO2 for even that long. At Shenhuas Wulanmulun project, Chen tallies the list of questions his team is
trying to answer. Is the carbon dioxide leaking into the air? Is it spreading from one rock stratum to another? Is it
reaching groundwater? Is it reacting chemically with the rock? What happens if the pressure in the pump changes?
If the rock is fracturedfrackedto open more storage space? What about earthquakes? Using heavy machinery,
Chen says, Shenhua is hitting the ground really hard to see how it affects the spread of CO2. The

innovation

is needed.

More than a centurys worth of coal remains beneath the surfacean amount so large, two University of Victoria climate scientists
calculated in 2012, that burning it all would raise Earths average temperature as much as 44 degrees Fahrenheit. In fact, this estimate comes with an
asterisk, because after temperatures hit a certain point, current climate models break down, making the future almost impossible to predict. Our society
will live and die by our consumption of coal, Andrew Weaver, one of the researchers behind the study, wrote in an email. Soon after I received Weavers
note, Chinas National Development and Reform Commission reported that in 2013 it had approved new mining operations that would produce more than
100 million tons of coal, six times more than the previous year. The storage part of Shenhuas CCS project is easy to miss. Covering about a quarter acre
of land, it consists mainly of a cement platform holding up three big, sausage-shaped tanks. A pipe runs down from the tanks to a fair-size pump. From the
pump emerges a second, smaller pipe that goes around the walls of the yard at about waist height before connecting to a red valve-covered device that
vaguely resembles an antique fireplug. Next to it is a red-lettered sign informing visitors that the fireplug sits atop a shaft conducting pressurized carbon
dioxide 8,185 feet below the surface. At one end of the facility is an administration building with a small display showing how this works. On the walls are
charts and diagrams not selected for visual interest. The accompanying texts describe the geology of Inner Mongolia, the chemistry of gases, the design of
tests. From the display, one would never learn that in the West CCS is controversialthat it has, in fact, been scoffed at by hosts of environmental
activists, including the Sierra Club and the Rainforest Action Network. In 2008, Greenpeace issued a major study arguing that CCS is a dangerous
gamble, in part because safe and permanent storage of CO2 cannot be guaranteed. Instead of the false hope of carbon capture, Greenpeace and
other activist groups contend that the real solutions to climate change are renewable energy and energy efficiency. Most scientists and engineers
agree with Greenpeace that humankind will ultimately need a grid driven by renewables: three-quarters or more of the worlds energy provided by sun
and wind, bolstered by resources like tides and geothermal heat. Getting there is tricky, though. Indeed, former US energy secretary Chu believes that

deploying solar and wind on this broad scale a goal he strongly supportscannot happen
before the end of the century. Chu ticks off the obstacles. No one has ever powered
a nation solely, or even mostly, with sun and wind over the long term . Never
been done, he says. Moreover, there are times when you get a week of bad weather or a
week of cloudy days over hundreds of miles. There are times when the wind stops
blowing across all of Washington and Oregon for two weeks. During these times
guess what?you still need a source of reliable power. Where will energy come from
during big, protracted bouts of bad weather and windlessness? Several companies are
experimenting with load-shiftingstoring solar power generated in the day for use at night. But nobody has
built facilities that can store enough energy to power entire regions for a
week or two. Nor has anyone even begun to test an electric system that can
transmit those huge amounts of extra power for long periods from those storage
plants to where it is needed. Few doubt that the technology for such facilities could be invented,
developed, and installed. Even so, the process of replacing the present coal-and-gas grid with
a new, sun-and-wind gridall the while keeping the old grid runningwill be long,
expensive, and risky. In contemporary societies, blackouts are more than an
inconvenience; recall the awful events that occurred inside New Orleans hospitals when Hurricane Katrina
caused a long power outage in 2005. Even if we cut demand by 50 percent , Chu says, something I

solar and wind cant yet provide the kind of steady power
needed by a modern societythat is, one with continuously functioning factories and computer centers
and traffic control systems. For decades to come, he says, fossil fuels will be a very
important factor, and well need CCS to mitigate that. Because fossil fuels will be
needed as backupand because they are vital to making steel, fertilizer, and
cementcarbon capture inevitably will be part of tomorrows renewableenergy grid. Unfortunately, outside of China, its prospects are dim, Yale economist William Nordhaus
would be very much in favor of,

believes. (Nordhaus, president-elect of the American Economic Association, is probably the professions foremost
researcher into climate change.) CCS

is caught in a vicious cycle, he argued last year in his book The

Climate Casino. Firms will not invest in CCS because it is financially risky ; it is financially risky
because public acceptance is low and there are big hurdles to large-scale deployment; and public acceptance is low
because there is so little experience with CCS at a large scale. Chu agrees, to some extent. The parasitics right
now are impossible, he says. We need something where were not doubling the cost of the electricity. Still, he

the prospects for making CCS practicable in the near term are
good. From what I know, he says, I dont see any show-stoppersnothing insurmountable. After Chu left the Department of Energy, he went to Stanford. He also joined the board of one
believes that

company: Inventys Thermal Technologies, a Vancouver-area CCS startup that he says might have a better idea.
The idea consists of a ceramic-coated drum that rotates inside power-plant smokestacks. Carbon dioxide molecules
adhere to the drum somewhat in the way that static cling makes pet hair stick to clothes. Steam washes off the
carbon dioxide. One of the drums inventors has claimed that it can capture carbon for about $15 a ton, much less
than the conventional amine method. When I ask Chu about the figure, he is carefully unspecific, to avoid giving
away proprietary information. The larger point, in his view, is that the potential for innovation has barely begun to
be explored. Technological innovation will not be enough if CCS has no public supportand in the US, at least,
neither the coal industry nor environmentalists have shown much interest. In January, the Obama administration
proposed blocking the construction of new coal-fired power plants unless they use CCS. The same coal companies
that have long extolled the promise of clean coala marketing term for CCSimmediately began protesting that
CCS was impossible. Inevitably, they have gone to court to thwart the requirement. Without strong support from
environmental groups, the regulations are much less likely ever to be put into place and enforced. The picture looks

The
Chinese government faces twin imperatives: lifting people out of poverty and
avoiding the worst consequences of industrialization. As a result , Chen tells me, we
must make CCS work. A little later he smiles; a thought has occurred to him. If we can make it
work here, he says, maybe it will help other companies pick it up. If were lucky,
different from Beijing, where ample coal supplies are both a national treasure and a national emergency.

some of those companies might even be in the United States.

It solves Chinas emissions but international cooperation on

R&D and regulations is key.
Gu 13 [Yan Gu (MA in Environmental Sciences from Columbia University),
CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE POLICY IN CHINA, Columbia Law School Center for
Climate Change Law White Paper, October 2013,
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climatechange/files/Publications/Students/Yan%20Gu%20CCS%20Paper%20Final.pdf]
Chinas landscape and ecosystems.1 To address the negative
consequences, the central government is exploring a variety of different approaches to
reduce domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. There are now seventeen national departments
involved in coordinating strategies to address climate change.2 Complicating these efforts is the fact that Chinas
economic growth and development still rely heavily on energy produced from coal,3
which contributes greatly to GHG emissions. The reliance on coal for economic
development thus constrains Chinas capacity for GHG reduction. And this is
more than a domestic problem. Chinas ability to stem its coal reliance has major global
Climate change has already profoundly affected

implications: China surpassed the United States in 2006 to be the worlds largest carbon dioxide (CO2)
emitter.4 It is now widely accepted that any new global climate change
framework will be ineffective without both the U.S. and Chinas
participation.5 Fortunately, China is showing increasing interest in tackling climate
change, and has issued a series of policies and plans to facilitate the development of new clean energy
technologies. This paper focuses on one such rising technology Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS).6

China is faced with an urgent need to develop and implement CCUS tech nology, and
the government has recognized as much.7 This is true for several reasons: most basically, because China
heavily relies on coal and is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable
future, CCUS will be a key part of any emissions reduction approach in the
medium to long term. CCUS has several other recognized benefits: it acts as an alternative to present
low-carbon technologies, benefits energy diversity and increases energy security,
and can help meet the urgent reductions demanded of high-emitting industries
including coal chemistry, steel and cement manufacturing. Finally, the early development of CCUS
technology offers a critical opportunity to increase Chinas global competitiveness in
low-carbon technology.8 CCUSs promise is great. If successfully commercialized
and properly regulated to ensure its longevity as a solution, it could
potentially enable the capture and storage of all or most of the CO2 emissions
from both existing and planned new sources within China. 9 Much like in other
countries, however, commercialization and regulation of CCUS in China has proceeded
slowly to date. At present, there are no concrete plans for CCUS legislation in China
to regulate large-scale demonstration projects and deployment of the technology.
However, China has conducted initial research and development (R&D) of CCUS to get a basic
understanding of the policies and regulations necessary to address the barriers posed.10 Since CCUS
involves interdisciplinary research and trans-department cooperation, appropriate
policy to support its development is much needed in three areas: R&D and
demonstration, industrialization, and international cooperation.11 If China
is able to develop competitive advanced global CCUS technology, it could
lead the global market with the help of the manufacturing capacity it has
accumulated in the past 30 years.12 It is clear that the need to develop CCUS in
China is great, but it is too early to judge its viability. China currently has only 11 active demonstration
projects, half of which were powered by Chinas own technology. China is trying to catch up with the
development of CCUS technology owned by and applied in developed countries , e.g.,
the U.S., Australia, Japan, and the U.K. CCUS could offer huge emissions mitigation benefits for
China and could go a long ways towards easing international pressure on the
country to address its mounting coal consumption. However, in China as in other
places, CCUS still faces challenges in forms of high cost and concerns over
long-term safety.

1AC Safety
CCS is inevitable in China but status quo environmental
regulations fail only international cooperation advances
monitoring tech and risk management.
Li et al 16 [Qi Li, Ranran Song, Xuehao Liu, Guizhen Liu, Yankun Sun (all with
State Key Laboratory of Geomechanics and Geotechnical Engineering, Institute of
Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Monitoring of Carbon
Dioxide Geological Utilization and Storage in China: A Review, in Acid Gas
Extraction for Disposal and Related Topics, 1/22/16,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Qi_Li45/publication/287242406_Monitoring_of_
Carbon_Dioxide_Geological_Utilization_and_Storage_in_China_A_Review/links/5677b
ac308ae0ad265c7e417.pdf]
With the exception of the America, China has more CCUS projects than any other
country in the world. However, China has no corresponding CCUS
environmental risk assessment and management system [71]. Currently, the
technical standards have not kept pace with the development of CCUS
projects in China. The Notice on Strengthening the Use of Carbon Capture and Sequestration Pilot
Demonstration Projects of Environmental Protection released by Environmental Protection Department of China
aims to establish environmental risk prevention and control systems as well as the standard operating
procedure[72, 73]. The Carbon Dioxide Capture, Utilization and Storage Guidelines for Environmental Risk
Assessment formulated by the Department of Science, Technology, and the Standards of the State Environment

Guideline implementation will help the

parties to the CCUS environmental risk perception, and help governmental
departments to better preform regulatory functions, reduce the possible risks of
CCUS projects in operation, and ensure the safe and effective operation of
projects. Chinas environmental impact and safety risk assessment of CO2
geological storage is still at the exploratory stage. There are no environmental
impact assessment specifications in CCUS projects. The guideline provides the technical
Protection Administration is expected to begin in 2015[23].

specifications of risk assessment and management of CCUS projects. The guideline presents environmental risk
assessment and management methods for the different segments, technologies, and processes of CCUS projects,
and is only applicable to CO2 geological utilization and/or storage (exclusive of chemical utilization and biological
utilization). It also defines environmental risk receptors mainly for people, animals, plant, surface water,
groundwater, soil, air, and other environmental media. Environmental risk assessment of CO2 geological utilization
and storage must consider the geological structures of storage sites, injection parameters, number and depth of
new and existing wells within the storage area, migration of CO2, construction, resource extraction activities, and

China pays more and more attention to the development of CCUS

technology, and many national CCUS research projects are being set up. With the
popularization of CCUS technology, China is increasingly improving its technical
level and policy making. 6 Conclusion Compared with foreign countries, China has still a
large gap in CO2 geological utilization and storage. Moreover, in China, CCUS
projects lack systematic monitoring programmes. Application of monitoring
technology is limited by the high cost , processing technology, and inadequate research
and development capacity. A number of demonstration projects need to establish
CCUS monitoring index systems and thresholds for indicators. China needs to
strengthen communication with advanced foreign CCUS projects to learn
advanced monitoring technology, the experience of project risk
assessment and management. Government should develop laws and regulations related to CO2
mechanical material[74].

geological storage, enhance public participation in the process, and increase the public acceptance of CO2 storage

guidelines for
environmental risk assessment will make risk assessment and management of China's CCUS
projects more standardized.
projects. Implementation of the Carbon dioxide capture, utilization and storage

Insufficient environmental standards make CCS leaks

inevitable only US assistance can ensure safe and effective
operation.
Liu et al 16 [Lan-Cui Liu (Center for Climate and Environmental Policy, Chinese
Academy for Environmental Planning, Ministry of Environmental Protection of the
Peoples Republic of China) & Qi Li (State Key Laboratory of Geomechanics and
Geotechnical Engineering, Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of
Sciences) & Jiu-Tian Zhang (Renewables & Environment, Ministry of Science and
Technology) & Dong Cao (Center for Climate and Environmental Policy, Chinese
Academy for Environmental Planning, Ministry of Environmental Protection of the
Peoples Republic of China), Toward a framework of environmental risk
management for CO2 geological storage in china: gaps and suggestions for future
regulations, Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, February
2016, Volume 21, Issue 2, pp 191207,
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11027-014-9589-9]
Global climate change has primarily been attributed to human activity since the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution, which led to increases in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) (Solomon et al. 2007). In the broad portfolio of measures
and actions that are envisioned to reduce these emissions, carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology has been

CCS chain
consists of three parts: capturing, transporting, and storing the CO2 securely
underground, mainly in depleted oil and gas fields or deep saline formations. Geological storage of
captured CO2 is vital to this technology. From the global perspective of CO2 emission reductions that
seek to mitigate climate change, geological storage requires that captured CO2 is safely and
permanently stored in targeted storage formations for very long periods to prevent its
return to the atmosphere (Court et al. 2012). A large body of literature indicates that CO2
geological storage is a viable technology that can be used safely when
coupled with a comprehensive approach to ensure the protection of both
human health and the environment (e.g., US Environmental Protection Agency 2008; Li et al. 2009; Russell
et al. 2012). However, in certain cases, there are natural or manmade flow pathways that are
conducive to CO2 leakage (Zhang and Bachu 2011), which present potential risks and
uncertainties. IPCC (2005) states that a monitoring program to detect leakage and related effects, a
regulatory system and appropriate use of remediation methods to stop or control
CO2 releases, and local health, safety and environmental (HSE) risks would be comparable to
the risks of current activities. Such activities include natural gas storage, enhanced oil recovery (EOR),
and acid gas injection. Therefore, the development of an innovative framework for
managing such risks is crucial. China now has 12 CCS projects, ranking second to the United
considered an option for the stabilization of atmospheric GHGs concentrations (IPCC 2005). The

States (USA), which has 20 projects (Global CCS Institute 2013a). Do these projects assess their environmental
impacts using environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements for construction projects? Which current EIA
guidelines are applicable to these projects in China? What are the environmental regulations for CCS projects in
other countries? To help answer these questions, the following objectives will be fulfilled: (1) We review and
characterize previously demonstrated and new environmental consequences associated with CO2 geological
storage. (2) Based on the EIA experiences of the Shenhua Ordos Coal-to-Liquid (CTL) Project and PetroChina Jilin Oil
Field EOR, we identify gaps in current EIA guidelines to match the HSE risks of CO2 geological storage projects. (3)
We provide suggestions for policymakers and decision makers to manage environmental risks in China. 2 Review of

HSE risks for CO2 geological storage Potential HSE risk assessment for CO2 geological storage has been discussed
in many studies (e.g., Damen et al. 2003; Koornneef et al. 2008; Eriksson et al. 2006; US Environmental Protection
Agency 2008; Li et al. 2013a). The primary risk of underground CO2 storage is leakage.
Leakage can be divided into short-term leakage, large-scale leakage and long-term diffusion, which can occur
through several pathways, such as (abandoned) wells, cap rock fissures, and faults (Fig. 1) (Zhang et al. 2004;

Short-term leakage may have a considerable impact

because of potentially high concentration levels, but it is relatively easy to
detect and resolve because it often occurs over limited areas. Compared with short-term
leakage, long-term diffusion and/or seepage may have a lesser effect, although it is
likely to be more difficult to detect and resolve , as it can occur over large areas. The HSE risks of
Benson and Hepple 2005).

CO2 leakage can be separated into local and global risks. Global risk is related to the release of CO2 back into the
atmosphere. CO2 leakage from containment would render its geological storage less effective. Although there is a
certain range of acceptable leakage rates, most studies appear to agree that the rate should be less than 0.1 % per

Local risk is defined as the potential hazard of CO2

affecting soil, water and even human health at a local level. CO2 is a naturally occurring
year (e.g., Bowden and Rigg 2005).

gas in ambient air, with a concentration of approximately 0.04 %. Although CO2 is nontoxic, it can be dangerous if
there is exposure to a high concentration.

If leakage occurs, an increase in concentration in

different media alters environmental conditions. For example, Eriksson et al. (2006) examined the
effects of elevated CO2 concentration on the ecosystem and organisms. 2.1 Effects on groundwater In examining
groundwater, Eriksson et al. (2006) reported that CO2 dissolved in water forms carbonic acid. When CO2 levels are
at or below 2 %, there is an elevated level of low acidity, without a significant impact on the environment. When

When CO2 levels exceed 6 %, there is

increased acidity, well corrosion, and irrigation loss. Acidity changes the pH of
water. This change in pH can, in turn, have indirect impacts, such as the mobilization of toxic
CO2 levels exceed 2 %, mild acidity and corrosion can occur.

metals, sulfate, or chloride, or it can change water quality by adding odor, color or bad taste. 2.2 Effects on soil

Increased CO2 concentration in soil also decreases soil pH (Eriksson et al. 2006). Soil acidity
causes numerous problems and affects the balance of nutrients and trace elements
by changing soil chemistry and redox conditions. For example, increased CO2 concentration in
soil reduces the nutrient availability of phosphorus, which is most available at pH values between 6
and 7.5. At low pH levels, phosphorus reacts with dissolved aluminum, iron and calcium to form insoluble
compounds. Low soil pH can increase the solubility of certain micronutrients, such as aluminum, to toxic levels. 2.3

high levels of CO2

can cause adverse human health effects, which vary based on CO2 concentration and length of
Effects on human health The US Environmental Protection Agency (2008) indicates that

exposure. Swedish occupational safety regulations require that the hygienic threshold for exposure during a
workday be 0.5 %. The short-period threshold value (average exposure over 15 min) is 1 %. The health standard in
China for CO2 in workplace air is 1 %. The effects of various CO2 levels are depicted in Fig. 2. 2.4 Effects on the

When
the CO2 level exceeds 5 %, there are deleterious effects on plant health and yield.
When that level is between 5 % and 30 %, severe effects can be expected. When the level exceeds 20 %
in soil, long-term exposure (weeks or months) has been shown to produce dead zones
where no macroscopic flora survive (Eriksson et al. 2006). A CO2 level exceeding 30 % in
soil is defined as a lethal concentration level for plants. However, there are still uncertainties about these
risks. Koornneef et al. (2008) noted that the environmental impact depends on how local
organisms respond to elevated CO2 concentrations or changes in groundwater composition, and
it is important to distinguish between long-term, chronic exposure and short-term, acute exposure. Many
studies thus focus on potential leakage and the associated HSE risk management.
The US Environmental Protection Agency (2008) developed a vulnerability
evaluation framework (VEF) for geologic sequestration of CO2 to serve as a
reference document for regulators responsible for approving
environmental impact statements, giving site approval, or issuing project
permits. Stenhouse et al. (2009) examined the status of risk assessment and the regulatory framework for the
ecosystem The standard amount of CO2 used to preserve food from insects, microbes, and fungi is 40 %.

geological storage of CO2. Koornneef et al. (2008) constructed a conceptual taxonomy for the scope of EIA and
strategic environmental assessment (SEA) for CCS in the Netherlands. Bachu (2008) addressed legal and regulatory
challenges for the implementation of CO2 geological storage, while Condor et al. (2011) compared risk assessment
methodologies for storage. Tanaka et al. (2011) introduced a risk assessment tool to assist in decision making for
safety and risk management legislation, using the optimum level of risk quantification. Koornneef et al. (2011)
identified quantitative environmental indicators based on the drivers, pressures, states, impacts and responses

Insight into the risks associated with CO2 storage is a key factor for
decision making and public acceptance; it is indispensable to facilitate the
creation of standards and a regulatory framework that are required for
large-scale application of underground CO2 storage . Li et al. (2014) discussed the
effects of coal mining on safety in the Shenhua Ordos CTL Project. In addition to these academic discussions, the
USA, the European Union (EU), Japan, the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia have developed specific
regulations that emphasize environmental risk management of CO2
geological storage. These regulations are discussed in Section 3. 3 Environmental regulations for CO2
(DPSIR) framework.

geological storage To ensure CO2 storage security and lay a foundation for the large-scale deployment of CCS
technology in the future, Australia established the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 and
the Victorian Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (IEA 2011). Moreover, the Australian Environment
Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC) formulated the Environmental Guideline for Carbon Dioxide Capture and
Geological Storage in 2009, which guides environmental assessments, monitoring and site closures of CCS projects.
In 2011, the European Union released the Directive on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide (Directive
2009/31/EC), which provides a necessary regulatory framework and ensures that CO2 will be safely and
permanently stored underground (Zero Emissions Platform 2013). In 2010, t he

US Environmental Protection
Agency formulated the Federal Requirements under the Underground Injection Control
(UIC) for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, which sets out
requirements to prevent the endangerment of underground sources of drinking
water. Japan revised the Law on Prevention and Control of Marine Pollution (Daisuke 2008), which makes specific
provisions for marine CO2 sequestration. The Storage of Carbon Dioxide (Licensing) Regulations 2010 came into
force in the UK and defined the application, contents, issuance, modification and review of the CO2 geological

The regulations
above cover storage permits, EIA, monitoring, and remedial measures , as shown in Table
storage license in statutory form (UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 2010).

1. Additionally, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) Phase II Report from the CSLF Risk Assessment
Task Force reviews a gap assessment to identify CCS-specific tools and methodologies, which will be needed to

The report also reviews a feasibility assessment for

developing general technical guidelines for environmental risk assessments
that can be adapted to specific sites and local needs (CSLF Task Force to Examine Risk
support environmental risk assessment.

Assessment Standards and Procedures 2012). 4 Progress of Chinas CCS projects In China, there are six projects in the identification stage, three in
evaluation and three in definition,1 as shown in Fig. 3 and Table 2. Large state-owned petroleum companies dominate more advanced projects. Sinopec
and PetroChina are responsible for three projects in the definition stage: Sinopec Shengli Oil Field EOR, Sinopec Shengli Dongying CCS, and PetroChina Jilin
Oil Field EOR. Yanchang Petroleum Group is responsible for a project named after Yanchang, which is in the evaluation stage. All of these petroleum
companies tend to own the full CCS chain, from CO2 source to site. This exclusive ownership reduces complications associated with third-party
involvement and allows companies to move much more swiftly (Global CCS Institute 2013a; Xie et al. 2013). 4.1 Main policies and regulatory status of
environmental risk management of CCS projects in China (1) Environmental risk management of CO2 geological storage is one of the principal tasks of
Chinese experts in Working Groups (WGs) 4 and 5 of the International Standards Organization (ISO). At a recent annual meeting of the ISO Technical
Committee (TC) 265 in Beijing, the scope of the work of the TC265 was largely defined, as was the leadership of five WGs that were established to explore
the areas of capture (WG1: Japan), transport (WG2: Germany), storage (WG3: Canada for onshore, Japan for offshore), quantification and verification
(WG4: China and France), and cross-cutting issues (WG5: France and China) (Walker 2012). The scope of WG4 comprises mainly project boundaries,
project leakage, quantification procedures, CO2 stream composition and quantification, monitoring and reporting, third-party verification, quantification of
the CO2 avoided, detection limits, and life-cycle analysis. The scope of WG5 comprises mainly terminology, system integration (full value chain) and
overall risk management, including HSE, relationship/consultation with stakeholders, public engagement, reporting, and gas stream mixing from different
sources. (2) The impact assessment of CCUS, assessing health, safety and environment impacts, strengthening long-term security, environmental risk
assessment and control, building up and improving related safety standards and a system of environmental regulations are included in the Notice on
Promoting Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage Pilot and Demonstration, which was released by the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) in April 2013. This notice highlights several near-term tasks to assist in the promotion of CCUS pilot and demonstration plants in China (Global CCS
Institute 2013a). (3) MEP emphasizes the environmental protection aspect of CCUS projects. From December 12 to December 14, 2012, the MEPs
Department of Science, Technology and Standards and the Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning hosted Chinas first environmental management
conference on CCUS. Most of Chinas leading scientists and key scientific officers on CCUS were invited to give speeches and brainstorm environmental
management issues for CCUS. In October 2013, MEP released a Notice on Strengthening the Environmental Protection of Pilot and Demonstration Projects
for Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage. This document briefly addresses the general tasks of environmental risk management in CCUS projects (MEP

The Law on Environmental Impact

Assessment stipulates that when the plan is compiled as prescribed in Article 9 of this law for
the project to be constructed in the territory of China and sea areas under the
jurisdiction of China with impact on the environment, the environmental impact
2013). 4.2 The EIA progress of two CCUS demonstration projects in China

assessment shall be conducted in accordance with provisions of this Law. In December

2004, the former State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and NDRC jointly issued the Circular on
Strengthening Classification Approval for the Environmental Impact Evaluation of Construction Projects. This circular
stipulated the following: (1) For a construction project that has applied for administrative approval,2 the
construction unit will submit EIA documents for approval before the feasibility study report is submitted. (2) For a
construction project that has applied for an authorized approval,3 the construction unit will submit EIA documents
for approval before the project application report is submitted. (3) For a construction project that has applied for an
approval,4 the construction unit will submit EIA documents for approval after the filing procedures have been dealt

In view of the provisions above, an EIA must first

be conducted for CO2 geological storage as a construction project in China. In September
with and before the project construction begins.

2013, we participated in a field investigation for the Shenhua Ordos CTL Project and PetroChina Jilin Oil Field EOR. The MEPs Department of Science,
Technology and Standards organized this investigation with the aim of identifying the progress of environmental risk assessment and monitoring. These
two projects finished their EIAs in 2011 and 2009, respectively. As Asias largest and Chinas first saline storage project, the Shenhua Ordos CTL Project in
Ordos, Inner Mongolia, was designed to capture and store approximately 0.1 million tons of CO2 per annum from an existing CTL facility, with a single well
injecting into deep saline formations; pilot-scale operations started in 2010. A tank truck is used to transport CO2 liquid with a purity of 99.2 % (Li et al.
2013a). At the end of November 2013, the China Shenhua Group had injected approximately 160,000 tons of CO2 in total. The PetroChina Jilin Oil Field
EOR project in Songyuan, Jilin Province, began in 2009 and was Chinas first CO2-EOR project. The CO2 processed is from the nearby Changchun gas field,
where CO2 content is approximately 22.5 %. After the successful injection of approximately 200,000 tpa of CO2 from a natural gas processing plant in the
first phase, PetroChina plans to increase the project to Phase 2, aiming to expand capacity to between 800,000 and 1,000,000 metric tons per annum by
2015 to 2016 (Global CCS 2013b). In addition to EIAs of air, noise, solid waste, resource mining, underground water and surface water of project
construction and operations, the EIA of the Shenhua Ordos CTL Project includes environmental risk assessments of both ground units and underground
storage. The assessment for ground units was undertaken using current Technical Guidelines for Environmental Risk Assessment on Projects(HJ/T 169
2004), which SEPA (now the MEP) issued (now the MEP) in 2004. The assessment for underground storage was based on the VEF method and the Transport
of Unsaturated Groundwater and Heat (TOUGH2) model. However, the Shenhua project did not consider the environmental risks of coal mining. Project
storage areas include eight coal seams with buried depths varying from 200 m to 444 m. Li et al. (2014) indicated that future coal mining may induce
wellbore failure if the stope border is too close to the well, which is a real and challenging problem for environmental safety. In addition, the Shenhua
project formulated a detailed environmental monitoring plan, including two monitoring wells. Based on the Technical Guideline for Environmental Impact
Assessment for Construction Projects of Petroleum and Natural Gas Development on Land (HJ/T349- 2007),

the EIA of the PetroChina Jilin

Oil Field EOR project emphasizes ecological environmental impacts of engineering construction and generally
assesses its effects on surface water, air, underground water and noise. However, environmental risk assessment

focuses only on leakage from buffer tanks at injection stations and in transport
pipelines and does not consider storage risks. We review the EIA procedures in
the Shenhua Ordos CTL and PetroChina Jilin Oil Field EOR projects, which consider the
importance of environmental risk analysis for potential leakage and flow of CO2
stored in geological formations, but their risk analyses vary and remain incomplete
due to the lack of EIA regulations applicable to CO2 geological storage. There are
many types of EIA guidelines in China in addition to the Technical Guidelines for Environmental Impact
Assessment: General Program (HJ 2.1-2011). Some guidelines are applicable to a specific
industry, such as the petroleum and natural gas industry on land, while others focus on a specific
environmental medium, such as underground water. We chose some of these
guidelines to provide a reference for the EIA of CCUS projects and analyzed their
applicability to CCUS projects (Table 3). We found that it is difficult or even
unfeasible to undertake environmental risk assessment based on current
guidelines, as shown in Table 3. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop and
implement regulations to protect the environment and human health,
particularly with regard to groundwater resources. Chinas lack of relevant
regulations for the environmental risk management of CCS leads to two salient
problems, i.e., overestimation or underestimation of environmental risks (on the enterprise
side) and a lack of applicable regulations to supervise those risks during
CCS projects (on the government sector side). Environmental monitoring is also carried out in some
demonstration projects. The Sinopec Shengli Dongying Oil Field EOR Project may be the first CCUS project in China
to implement comprehensive baseline monitoring (Table 4) (Li et al. 2013b). 5 Principal suggestions to manage

Comparing the international experiences

above with Chinas current EIA guidelines gaps, our suggestion for environmental management of
Chinese CCUS projects is shown in Table 5. Environmental management should be listed in the
license for CO2 geological storage, and this management should include
environmental risk assessments, environmental monitoring requirements,
environmental risks for CO2 geological storage in China

environmental emergency plans and standards related to environmental protection.

6 Conclusions With 12 CCS projects in all stages of development, China is beginning to realize that
environmental management for potential HSE risk of CO2 geological storage are
very necessary to ensure the healthy development of CCUS technology in China.
Therefore, this article identifies the gaps in environmental management combining domestic EIA guidelines

China has no
specific environmental risk regulations suitable for CO2 storage, and
environmental risk management lags behind the development of CCUS
projects, which presents a challenge to demonstration enterprises in terms of assessing
applicability with specific regulations in Australia, Japan, USA, EU, and UK. We found that

environmental risk. Therefore, we provide some suggestions about environmental risk assessment, mandatory

From a regulatory
perspective, a consistent and seamless regulatory framework should be
developed and implemented for CO2 geological storage, avoiding the one size fits
all approach. To protect drinking water resources and gain public acceptance, the
regulatory framework should consider diverse geological conditions and types,
population density and distribution, and any other relevant socioeconomic
considerations. Based on environmental management experiences and the significance of CCUS projects, we
monitoring schemes, environmental emergency plans, and related issues.

suggest that central and provincial sectors approve environmental risk management plans of CCS projects in China.
These sectors include the environmental, science and technology, and Development and Reform Commission
sectors.

Agriculture:
CCS leaks destroy soil biodiversity.
Fernandez-Montiel 16 [Irena Fernandez-Montiel (PhD in Functional and
Applied Ecology from Universidad de Len), Ricardo Sidrach-Cardona (Technical
Director @ Biecon, PhD in Functional and Applied Ecology from Universidad de
Len), Regina Gabilondo Toscano (PhD, Protozoan and Invertebrate Biology from
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Postdoctoral Researcher in Biodiversity of Soil
Protozoa), Anna Pedescoll (researcher in environmental science @ Universidad de
Len), Soil communities are affected by CO2 belowground emissions at a natural
vent in Spain, Soil Biology and Biochemistry 97:92-98, June 2016,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299336487_Soil_communities_are_affecte
d_by_CO2_belowground_emissions_at_a_natural_vent_in_Spain]
***Note: mofette = natural volcanic CO2 discharge used for modeling leaks
Soil pH significantly decreased (p <0.05) from slightly acid in Control sampling points (5.63 0.38, mean from two
sampling times) to strongly acid in High flux sites (4.20 0.37). Manganese also decreased relative to CO2 increments,
together with Magnesium (p <0.05). Oppositely, phosphorus, K:Mg ratio, iron and copper significantly increased with increasing CO2 flux (Table 1).Strong
positive correlations were observed between CO2flux and P, Fe and Cu (Spearmanr0.83, 0.91 and 0.70 respectively; p<0.001). By contrast,

strong negative correlation was found between CO2 flux and pH

(0.83, p <0.001) or Mn (0.74,

p<0.001). Total nitrogen, organic matter, carbon to nitrogen ratio and the other cations and metals measured were not significantly correlated to CO2flux.

Moisture varied significantly (p <0.01) in relation to seasons (20.5 5.5% in November to 8.2 4.5% in May) and also had a moderate
correlation with CO2 fluxes (0.55, p <0.01).There was also a slightly decrease in Na from November to May(p <0.05) and an
increase in Cu (p <0.05).3.2. Soil biota Bacterial and fungal abundance (measured as gene cop ynumbers, Fig. 1)
showed a significant decrease in November (Table 2) related to high CO2 emissions.
However, in May they increased in relation to CO2 (Fig. 1). Archaeal numbers were not affected by CO2fluxes. In general, microbial abundances were

Abundance of
amoebae significantly decreased to zero in High CO2 flux samples (Table 2).
However, flagellates and ciliates did not show differences between CO2levels, although we observed a trend to decrease at
higher in May than in November (Fig. 1). Protozoal community presented different patterns depending on the group.

higher CO2 levels (Fig. 1). Nematodes were severely affected by CO2with their
abundance declining to 81% in Low CO2flux samples and almost disappeared in High CO2 flux
samples (p <0.001). Similarly, total mesofauna abundance showed a negative response to
High CO2 fluxes (p 0.02) in November sampling, but not in May (Table 2). Mesofauna showed a unimodal pattern from Control to High

fluxes (Fig. 1). Acari was the most abundant order, with a significantly increase (Table 2) at Low fluxes (ca. 100 individuals kg 1) comparing to Control (3

Overall, soil biodiversity decreased when

CO2 increased, although not all groups were significantly affected at both sampling times (Table 2). Considering the sum of
bacteria, ciliates and mesofauna richness, we found a significant decrease in total
soil biodiversity (F 7.63, p <0.01). Fig. 2 shows that bacteria richness (sum of total, alpha, and beta proteobacterial number
of bands) decreased as CO2 increased, with this decline statistically significant between
Control and High fluxes in May. Ciliate richness also significantly declined with
CO2fluxes, with differences statistically significant between Control and Low samples (Table 2).
Mesofauna richness responded in the same way as densities , both showing a hump-shaped trend with
statistical differences between High andLow CO2fluxes in November and between Control and Low in May. Correlations between the
abundance of individuals in the community and its respective richness followed the
expected positive pattern for all groups. Higher abundances and richness were
found in the Control and Low flux conditions while lower abundances and richness
occurred at higher CO2 fluxes, with regressions significantly linear (p <0.05) for
bacteria (r20.31 in November),and total mesofauna (r20.76 and 0.60 in November and May, respectively). However, there was
an opposite trend in bacteria in May: while bacteria gene copies increased at high CO2 fluxes, the
richness showed a significant decrease , leading to a specific bacterial community adapted to acidic and anoxic
environment.3.4. Relationships among communities The fungi-to-bacteria ratio was negatively affected by
high CO2 fluxes (linear regression, R20.95, p <0.001 for November samples, R20.47, p 0.04 for May). Further, there was a positive
ind kg1) and High (12 ind kg1)fluxes.3.3. Effect of CO2vent on biodiversity

relationship between this ratio and mesofauna and nematode abundance (R20.62, p 0.01 and R20.75, p <0.01, respectively) in November. Also, as
indicated by linear regression, mesofauna and bacteria abundances (R20.83, p <0.001) as well as mesofauna and fungi abundances (R20.70, p <0.01)
were closely correlated. Further, positive correlations were observed between ciliate richness and bacterial and fungal numbers (Spearmanr0.71 and
0.81respectively, p <0.05), as well as between mesofauna richness andbacterial and fungal numbers (r0.87 andr0.73 respectively,p<0.05). However,

To visualise the overall effect of high CO2

emissions and its derived consequences on soil chemistry, redundancy analysis (RDA)
was conducted (Fig. 3). Samples from high CO2 flux sites were separated from low flux
and Control sites, demonstrating the negative effect of CO2on soil biota abundance
and richness. Once again, differences between sampling times were explained by higher soil moisture in November.3.5. Biological
communities in extreme fluxes at La Sima vent La Sima vent presented the highest flux ever
registered in a biological study, ranging from 10 to 300 kg m2d1which con-tributes to the knowledge about the
most of the correlations were only significant in November and not in May.

adaptability of edaphic com-munities. Soil characteristics from Extreme flux sampling points were significantly different for Fe, Cu, P and moisture (Table
1,p<0.05) from Control, Low and High flux sites leading to diverse responses in soil biota. Extreme fluxes tended to reverse negative effects observed in
microbiota densities at high CO2emissions, with a significant increase in flagellate abundance (p <0.05). Nevertheless, other protozoan groups, i.e. ciliates

With regard to richness, Extreme CO2

emissions maintained the negative impact observed from Control to High
fluxes for most groups studied, although the decrease was only significant for alpha and beta-proteobacterial richness (p
and amoebae, showed no differences when compared with High fluxes (Fig. 1).

<0.01).4. Discussion In the last decade, natural CO2 vents or mofettes have received increasing attention as they represent extreme environments where
soil biota responses to long-term environmental changes can be studied, in the context of CCS risk assessment. To date, most of biological research on

we
present the first study on microbial, protozoan, nematode and mesofauna
populations in a natural CO2 vent. High CO2 fluxes had profound impacts on
soil chemical properties, resulting in reduced pH and, consequently, a mobilization of
metal compounds (P, Fe and Cu increased), as has been observed in several studies (Beaubien et al., 2008; Frerichset al., 2013; Mehlhorn
et al., 2014). In this work we observed a general negative effect of increasing CO2 fluxes on soil
biota abundance and diversity. The significance of this effect was different depending on the month of sampling (November or
May)probably due, as reported in other studies (Castro et al., 2010;Morales and Holben, 2013), to seasonal differences on soil conditions. Our
results demonstrate that, overall, bacterial communities were affected by high
mofettes has focused on microorganisms (Oppermann et al., 2010; Frerichs et al., 2013; McFarland et al.,2013; Sibanc et al., 2014), here

CO2 emissions, leading to reduced abundances and less diverse

communities. Previous research on mofettes has confirmed strong impacts on
community structure and composition (Saenz de Miera et al., 2014; Sibanc et al., 2014; Beuliget al., 2015) and
decreasing bacterial numbers or biomass (Beaubien et al., 2008; Krger et al., 2009, 2011; Oppermann et al. 2010,
McFarland et al., 2013). Likewise, we found reduced numbers of fungi at high CO2 fluxes , consistently with
the results of McFarland et al. (2013) in Mammoth Mountain (USA) or the decline in Eukarya copy numbers observed by Oppermann et al. (2010) atLatera
Caldera (Italy). These changes led to reduced fungi-to-bacteria ratio, also reported by McFarland et al. (2013) in the area most influenced by CO2. The
well-accepted pattern that the fungi-to-bacteria ratio increases due to acidification (Hogberg et al., 2007;Joergensen and Wichern, 2008; Rousk et al.,
2009) is not valid when considering very high CO2 conditions. In fact, at fluxes above260e160 0 g m 2d 1and due to the difference in oxygen
requirements, bacteria appear to be better adapted than fungi resulting in the ratio to decrease. Several studies reported changes in archaeal community
composition in mofettes, although results varied between sites, and therefore general conclusions are difficult to draw. Most studies observed increments
in methanogenic archaea associated to vent centre (Beaubien et al., 2008; Oppermann et al., 2010; Sibanc et al.,2014; Beulig et al., 2015). On the
contrary, Frerichs et al. (2013)found a reduction in methanogens, whereas Crenarchaeota and Thaumarchaeota phylum were beneficially affected.
Oppermannet al. (2010) found reduced Archaea numbers related to higherCO2fluxes whereas Krger et al. (2011) even using the same primers observed
them to increase. In our study, archaeal numbers (Crenarchaeota), in contrast, were not significantly affected by increased CO2. However, extreme fluxes
showed an increasing trend in archaeal abundance suggesting that these extreme conditions can harbor very high microbial abundances of archaea as
well as adapted fungi and bacteria. There is scarce information on CO2effects on protist communities and previous studies focused on atmospheric
CO2experi-ments (Treonis and Lussenhop, 1997; Rillig et al., 1999; Hungateet al., 2000; Rnn et al., 2003). Gabilondo and B ecares (2014)studied

we found
a significant reduction in amoebae individuals. There is no consensus in previous research studies regarding the
protozoan communities at La Sima reporting a change in ciliate community composition and a decrease in their diversity. Furthermore,

effects of increased atmospheric CO2on protozoan abundances, but Treonis and Lussenhop (1997) also described a decrease in amoebic density when

ls

they applied twice-ambient CO2 leve

within open-top chambers for 4 weeks. While many studies have evaluated potential consequences of elevated
atmosphericCO2(<10%) on soil fauna (Eisenhauer et al., 2012) these findings have little relevance to environments with extreme
CO2(>90%)concentrations (Beulig et al., 2015). In our case, some protists exposed to extreme fluxes were favoured by increasing CO2 conditions;
flagellates significantly increased probably due to elevated humidity and higher bacterial abundance in these extreme points, which might trigger the

Nematoda were strongly affected by CO2 emissions,

almost disappearing at high CO2 fluxes probably due to oxygen re-strictions. This detrimental effect has also been
increased abundances in the bacterivory mesofauna.

observed byYea te s et al. (19 99) who found a significant decrease in total abundance and diversity of nematodes in mofette fields althoughno

Mesofauna abundance and richness also responded

negatively to high CO2 fluxes, but there was a unimodal, non-significant trend along the CO2 fluxes. Coincidentally, at Cheb
explanation was provided to this decrease.

Basin (Czech Republic) abundance of mesofauna (collembola) also increased at intermediate fluxes(Russell et al., 2011), but mesofauna richness was
reduced when exposed to higher CO2 fluxes. It could be possible that low CO2 fluxes stimulate the presence of some mofette-tolerant species, as has
been proposed elsewhere (Russell et al., 2011). Although not statistically significant, extreme fluxes also presented an increased mesofauna abundance
compared to High and Control fluxes, following the pattern observed in protist and microorganisms, and supporting the idea of an increasing effect of CO2

high CO2 emissions affect most groups of soil biota.

on the bottom-up cascade. Our results show that

However,
whether CO2 influenced directly edaphic biotaor, on the contrary, soil community indirectly responded to CO2effects on soil chemistry (e.g. pH, mobilized
mineral compounds, microaerobic environment) is difficult to elucidate (Sibanc et al.,2014). There are too few experiments about mofettes' soil fauna to
draw any generalizations. Nevertheless, we speculate that the decreasing trend on the number of mesofauna and microfauna, and the known resilience of

Mofettes could offer a monitoring tool to evaluate

and validate methods for the study of the environmental impact of potential
accidents from CCS technologies (Schtze et al., 2012). Understanding the consequences of a
potential leakage of CO2 on soil ecosystem is a major issue nowadays; our results
demonstrate the deep ecological impact of high CO2 emissions, resulting in
areduced, less diverse edaphic biota. Mofettes offer natural CO2releasing areas where many research opportunities still
notexploited could be conducted (Pfanz et al., 2004).5. Conclusions Soil biota (microbiota, microfauna and mesofauna) were affected
by CO2, with a reduced and less diverse soil community, compared with the reference soil. We
found that bacteria, fungi, amoebae, nematodes and mesofauna significantly decreased
in abundance, at least at one of the sampling times studied. Richness of bacteria, ciliate and mesofauna
were clearly limited by CO2 increases. Nevertheless, high microbial and protozoa abundance atextreme CO2fluxes proved
that these groups have tolerant species highly resilient to such an extreme environment. These results need to be
considered when applying CCS technologies, as derived consequences
from a potential leakage could deeply transform soil ecosystem , changing
chemical features and leading to altered communities.
bacteria to such an extreme environment, favoured the latter.

Soil biodiversity is key to sustainable agriculture and food

security.
FAO 2 [The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, SOIL
BIODIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE, Paper prepared as a background

paper for the Ninth Regular Session of the Commission on Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture (CGRFA), FAO-Rome, 14-18 October 2002]
1. Given the escalating population growth, land degradation and increasing demands for food, achieving

sustainable agriculture and viable agricultural systems is critical to the issue of food security and
poverty alleviation in most, if not all, developing countries. It is fundamental to the sustained
productivity and viability of agricultural systems worldwide. 2. Sustainable
agriculture (including forestry) involves the successful management of agricultural resources to satisfy human
needs while maintaining or enhancing environmental quality and conserving natural resources for future
generations. The sustained use of the earths land and water resources - and thereby plant, animal and human
health - is dependent upon maintaining the health of the living biota that provide critical processes and ecosystem
services. However, current technologies and development support for increased agricultural production have largely

Improvement in agricultural sustainability

requires, alongside effective water and crop management, the optimal use and management of soil
fertility and soil physical properties. Both rely on soil biodiversity and soil biological processes. This
calls for the widespread adoption of management practices that enhance soil
biological activity and thereby build up long-term soil productivity and health. 4. FAO considers the
issue of soil biodiversity and soil ecosystem management of great importance to the
achievement of sustainable, resource-efficient and productive agriculture. Soil
ignored this vital management component. 3.

biodiversity has been identified as an area requiring particular attention under the programme of work on
agricultural biodiversity of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). II.
SOIL BIODIVERSITY AND THE JOINT FAO/CBD PROGRAMME ON AGRICULTURAL BIODIVERSITY 5. The agricultural
biodiversity work programme was established at COP-3 (decision III/11, Buenos Aires, 1996) to promote: a) the
positive and mitigating the negative impacts of agricultural activities on agricultural biological diversity; b) the
conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources of actual or potential value for food and agriculture; and c)
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of genetic resources. The programme was further
elaborated, with FAO support, in collaboration with partners, and on the basis of advice and recommendations of
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) as outlined in COP decision V/5
(Nairobi, 2000). It has four main objectives: assessment; management practices and policies; capacity building; and
national plans and strategies and mainstreaming. FAO was invited to support development and implementation of
the programme and governments, funding agencies, the private sector and NGOs were invited to join efforts. 6.

Parties recognised, inter alia, the need to improve understanding of: the multiple goods and services
provided by the different levels and functions of agricultural biodiversity; the relationship between
diversity, resilience and production in agro-ecosystems ; and the impacts of traditional and
newer practices and technologies on agricultural biodiversity and on the sustainability and productivity of

The role of soil and other below-ground biodiversity in supporting

agricultural production systems, especially in nutrient cycling was highlighted. 7. In this
agricultural systems.

light, SBSTTA, during its review of progress in implementing the agricultural bidodiversity programme, at its seventh meeting (Montreal, November 2001)
considered a paper on Soil Biodiversity and Sustainable Agriculture submitted by FAO (UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/7/INF/11). Based on SBSTTAs recommendation,
the COP, at its sixth meeting decided: to establish an International Initiative for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Soil Biodiversity (SBI) as a crosscutting initiative within the programme of work on agricultural biodiversity, and invites FAO and other relevant organizations, to facilitate and coordinate
this initiative (para. 13, COP decision VI/5). 8. The current paper has been prepared building on material provided to SBSTTA-7 and COP-6 (Information
documents). It is provided to the CGRFA as a background document for its consideration of this critical, yet much neglected component of biological
diversity and agricultural ecosystems. It is expected to assist the CGRFA in its consideration of the role FAO should play in regard to the Soil Biodiversity
Initiative (SBI). It presents work in progress, emphasising the vital role and functions of soil biodiversity and its importance and value for sustainable and
productive agriculture. Opportunities for the sustainable management of soil biodiversity are illustrated that contribute to both the CBD agricultural
biodiversity programme and to FAOs mandate for improving agricultural production and food security, particularly in regard to integrated land
management. 9. There is a need, worldwide, to help promote adoption of strategies that enhance the important roles and functions of soil biodiversity for
sustainable and productive agriculture and to encourage integrated soil management approaches building on available information and knowledge,
expertise, technologies, progress and opportunities. In this regard, this paper sets out some suggested priority areas for action for the SBI, highlighting the
need to adapt and use integrated ecosystem management approaches in order to harness the economic, environmental and food security benefits from
better management of soil life. 10. Under its joint programme of work with the CBD Secretariat, and with support of the FAO-Netherlands Partnership
Programme (FNPP), FAO is working on the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity within sustainable and productive ecosystems and
its contribution to global food security. One of the four main areas of attention is on improving understanding and implementation of the ecosystem
approach, including adaptive management and best practices. In this regard, the sub-component on soil biodiversity aims, firstly, to generate increased
awareness of the importance of soil biodiversity for land resources management and sustainable agriculture systems. Secondly, it aims to expand
cooperation among interested partners in improving soil biodiversity and ecosystem management, as invited by COP decision V/5. 11. In collaboration with
other programmes, scientific institutes and resource experts, FAO is making available knowledge on the categories and functions of soil biodiversity and
on specific technologies for improved soil biological management. Through the preparation of case studies, bioindicators, training materials and
participatory technology development approaches, it is piloting applied work on soil biological management in the agricultural and land sectors. The
information compiled by FAO through contacts with partner organizations is available at the FAO Soil Biodiversity Portal
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGL/agll/soilbiod/ 12. Linkages are being identified with ongoing programmes and networks, with a view to establishing
partnerships, for example with: Regional thematic networks, for example, on macro-fauna, rhizobia and mycorrhiza; Research bodies and programmes
on soil biodiversity and ecosystem functioning; Agro-biology/ecology bodies of academic/research and development bodies; Soil biodiversity, land
management and agricultural development programmes and projects worldwide. Including the important TSBF-BGBD Network project on the Conservation

and Sustainable Management of Below-ground Biodiversity (supported by GEF/UNEP and executed by the Tropical Soil Biodiversity and Fertility Institute of
CIAT). 13. Under COPs agricultural biodiversity programme, it was agreed to carry out a series of case studies, in a range of environments and production
systems, and in each region (programme element 2.1). Recognising a critical gap in knowledge, Parties had previously been encouraged to conduct case
studies on the issue of symbiotic soil micro-organisms in agriculture (Annex 3, COP decision III/11) and subsequently on soil biota in general (decision IV/6,
Bratislava, 1998). Case studies on soil biodiversity management are being compiled and made available through websites of the CBD Secretariat
http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/areas/agro/case-studies.asp and FAO http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/agll/soilbiod/default.htm. 14. An international technical
workshop on the Biological Management of Soil Ecosystems for Sustainable Agriculture was organised by FAO and EMBRAPA-Soya (the host institution) in
Londrina, Brazil from 24 to 27 June 2002. It allowed over 45 participants from more than 20 countries, representing a wide range of scientists and
practitioners from each region, to share knowledge and experiences on soil biodiversity and its management, to review the state of the art in terms of
assessment and adaptive management, with a focus on practical, participatory and integrated approaches, and to identify priorities for capacity building
and mainstreaming and for implementing the Soil Biodiversity Initiative. (Further information is providd in paras. 87-90 on the workshop and its outcome).
Consideration by the CGRFA 15. The extent of FAOs participation and role in the CBD Soil Biodiversity Initiative will depend on the in-house capacity, taking
into account its mandate, as set by the Strategic Framework (2001-2015), Medium Term Plan (2002-2007), and the ability of FAO to work through strategic
partnerships with organizations and experts in the field. To the extent that its existing programme and budget allows, FAO seeks to develop a crosssectoral partnership, with participation at local, country and international levels, to advance on the implementation of the initiative. It can further the
knowledge sharing among partners and existing networks to share experiences and good practices and generate collaborative action to raise awareness
on the importance and opportunities for integrated biological management of soil ecosystems. 16. The FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture, may wish to provide guidance in regard to work in this area, during its Ninth session and/or subsequent sessions, and for eventual
consideration by FAOs Committee on Agriculture (COAG). In particular, guidance is welcomed: in identifying issues that require attention and priority
setting; in mobilising attention to this issue by Members of FAO, while ensuring close collaboration between environmental and agricultural sectors in
view of the opportunity for support to this area, including through the CBD Soil Biodiversity Initiative; and in ensuring an integrated ecosystem approach
that address the important linkages and interactions between soil management, water management, pest management, plant production, animal
production and farming systems development. Suggestions regarding priority areas for attention are provided in section VI of the current document. III
SOIL BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 3.1 What is soil biodiversity and its relation to sustainable

Healthy soils contain enormous numbers of diverse living organisms, and

assembled in complex and varied communities. They range from the myriad of invisible microbes,
agriculture? 17.

bacteria and fungi to the more familiar macro-fauna such as earthworms and termites. Plant roots can also be
considered as soil organisms in view of their symbiotic relationships and interactions with other soil components.

These diverse organisms interact with one another and with the various plants and
animals in the ecosystem, forming a complex web of biological activity.
Environmental factors, such as temperature, moisture and acidity, as well as anthropogenic actions, in particular,
agricultural and forestry management practices, affect to different extents soil biological communities and their

Soil and its living organisms are an integral part of agricultural and
forestry ecosystems, playing a critical role in maintaining soil health, ecosystem
functions and productivity. Each organism has a specific role in the complex web of life in the soil: The
activities of certain organisms affect soil structure - especially the so-called soil engineers such
as worms and termites - through mixing soil horizons and organic matter and increasing porosity. This directly
determines resilience to soil erosion and availability of the soil profile to plants. The
functions of soil biota are central to decomposition processes and nutrient cycling. They
functions. 18.

therefore affect plant growth and productivity, as well as the release of pollutants in the environment, for example,

soil organisms can be detrimental to plant growth, for

can also protect crops
from pest and disease outbreaks through biological control and reduced
susceptibility. The activities of certain organisms determine the carbon cycle - the rates of
the leaching of nitrates into water resources. Certain

example, the build up of nematodes under certain cropping practices. However, they

carbon sequestration and gaseous emissions and soil organic matter transformation. Plant roots, through their
interactions with other soil components and symbiotic relationships, especially Rhizobium bacteria and Mycorrhiza,
play a key role in the uptake of nutrients and water, and contribute, through their growth and biomass, to soil

soil organisms can also be used to reduce or

eliminate environmental hazards resulting from accumulations of toxic chemicals or
other hazardous wastes. This action is known as bioremediation. 19. The interacting functions of
soil organisms and the effects of human activities in managing land for agriculture and forestry
affect soil health and quality. Soil quality is the capacity of a specific kind of soil to
function, within natural or managed ecosystems boundaries, to sustain plant and
animal production, maintain or enhance water and air quality, and support human
health and habitation. The concept of soil health includes the ecological attributes of the soil, which have
implications beyond its quality or capacity to produce a particular crop. These attributes are chiefly
those associated with the soil biota: its diversity, its food web structure, its activity
and the range of functions it performs. Soil biodiversity per se may not be a soil property that
is critical for the production of a given crop, but it is a property that may be vital for the continued
capacity of the soil to support that crop. 20. Of primary importance is the contribution
quality and organic matter content. Certain

of soil organisms to a wide range of essential services and to the sustainable

function of all ecosystems: by acting as the primary driving agents of nutrient
cycling, regulating the dynamics of soil organic matter, soil carbon sequestration
and greenhouse gas emission, modifying soil physical structure and water regimes,
enhancing the amount and efficiency of nutrient acquisition by the vegetation and
enhancing plant health. These services are not only essential to the functioning
of natural ecosystems but constitute an important resource for
agricultural production and food security as well as the sustainable management of
agricultural systems. 21. The conservation of healthy communities of soil biota and prudent use
of specific soil organisms through biological soil management can be used to maintain and enhance soil fertility
and ensure productive and sustainable agricultural systems . On the other
hand, the consequences of neglecting or abusing soil life will weaken soil functions
and contribute to greater loss of fertile lands and an over-reliance on chemical means for maintaining
agricultural production. This important relationship between soil life and agricultural productivity emphasises the need : to bring together experience
and ideas from farmers experiences and modern science on the management of agricultural biodiversity in agricultural ecosystems; and to enhance
collaboration among soil biology specialists and agricultural practitioners, those concerned with land degradation and other stakeholders, in promoting
improved soil biological management. 3.2 Soil biodiversity and land management practices of farmers 22. Through a review of literature and ongoing
work, much has been reported on the loss of managed soil biodiversity and its functions in different agricultural systems under controlled-research
conditions. This work has been largely driven by pure research and commercial or private sector interests rather than by poorer, smallholder farmers
needs and by national goals. There has been relatively limited practical work on how farmers manage their resources to sustain and enhance their value
and, in particular, to develop farming practices and systems that optimise the beneficial activities of this managed soil biota. 23. It is well known that land
management practices alter soil conditions and the soil community of micro-, meso- and macro-organisms. However, the relationship between specific
practices and soil functions is less clear. In general, the structure of soil communities is largely determined by ecosystem characteristics and land use
systems. For example, arid systems have few earthworms, but have termites, ants and other invertebrates that serve similar functions. On the other hand,
the level of activity of different species depends on specific management practices as these affect the micro-environment conditions, including
temperature, moisture, aeration, pH, pore size and type of food sources. 24. Management strategies, including tillage, crop rotations and use of plant
residues and manure, change soil habitats and the food web and alter soil quality, or the capacity of the soil to perform its functions. For example, soil
compaction, poor vegetation cover and/or lack of plant litter covering the soil surface tend to reduce the number of soil arthropods. Farming practices that
minimise soil disturbance (ploughing) and return plant residues to the soil, such as no-tillage farming and crop rotation, allow to slowly rebuild and restore
soil organic matter. Reducing tillage tends to also result in increased growth of fungi, including mycorrhizal fungi 25. Farming communities are concerned
with land management issues such as water availability to plants, access to sources of fuel and fodder, control of soil erosion and land degradation,
especially avoiding soil nutrient depletion and pollution of air, soil and water resources. Nonetheless, farmers are essentially driven not by environmental
concerns, but by economics, by issues of costs and returns and efficiency in terms of labour and energy and use of external inputs. A central paradigm for
the farmer for the maintenance and management of soil fertility, without undue reliance on costly and often risky external inputs, is to utilise his or her
management practices to influence soil biological populations and processes in such a way as to improve and sustain land productivity. 26. Options
whereby farmers can actually manage soil biodiversity to enhance agricultural production can be classified into direct and indirect interventions: Direct
methods of intervening in the production system aim to alter the abundance or activity of specific groups of organisms through inoculation and/or direct
manipulation of soil biota. Inoculation with soil beneficial organisms, such as nitrogen-fixing bacteria, Mycorrhiza and earthworms, have been shown to
enhance plant nutrient uptake, increase heavy metal tolerance, improve soil structure and porosity and reduce pest damage. Indirect interventions are
means of managing soil biotic processes by manipulating the factors that control biotic activity (habitat structure, microclimate, nutrients and energy
resources) rather than the organisms themselves. Examples of indirect interventions include most agricultural practices such as the application of organic
material to soil (for example through composting), tillage, irrigation, green manuring and liming, as well as cropping system design and management.
These must not be conducted independently, but in a holistic fashion, because of the recurrent interactions between different management strategies,
hierarchical levels of management and different soil organisms. 27. The means to create a more favourable environment within the soil and soil biological
community for crop production involves site-specific decisions concerning crop selection and rotations, tillage, fertiliser and planting practices, crop
residues and livestock grazing. Bringing about a change in practice requires demonstrating to farmers, technicians and policy makers the negative and
beneficial effects of different agricultural practices. For example, to show how intensive cultivation coupled with mono-cropping practices may
detrimentally affect the functioning of the soil biota leading to loss of plant nutrients and soil aggregate structure and resulting in soil degradation,
environmental pollution and declining crop yields. On the other hand, to show how minimum tillage practices and better crop cover, coupled with a more
diverse cropping regime, may promote the more effective functioning of soil biota, resulting in improved soil structure and nutrient and water
management and hence crop productivity. 28. Despite recognition of the fundamental role of soil biodiversity in maintaining sustainable and efficient
agricultural systems, it is still largely neglected in the majority of agricultural development initiatives. 3.3. The benefits from better management of soil

benefits of improving soil biological management in agricultural systems

can be assessed in terms of economic, environmental and food security benefits:
Economic benefits: Soil biological management reduces input costs by enhancing
resource use efficiency (especially decomposition and nutrient cycling, nitrogen fixation and water storage
and movement). Less fertiliser may be needed if nutrient cycling becomes more efficient
and less fertiliser is leached from the rooting zone. Fewer pesticides are needed where a diverse
set of pest-control organisms is active. As soil structure improves, the availability of
water and nutrients to plants also improves. It is estimated that the value of "ecosystem services"
biota 29. Direct and indirect

(e.g. organic waste disposal, soil formation, bioremediation, N2 fixation and biocontrol) provided each year by soil

Soil
organisms filter and detoxify chemicals and absorb the excess nutrients that would
otherwise become pollutants when they reach groundwater or surface water. The conservation and
biota in agricultural systems worldwide may exceed US$ 1,542 billion. Environmental protection:

management of soil biota help to prevent pollution and land degradation , especially
through minimising the use of agro-chemicals and maintaining/enhancing soil structure and cation exchange

Excessive reduction in soil biodiversity, especially the loss of keystone

species or species with unique functions, for example, as a result of excess
chemicals, compaction or disturbance, may have catastrophic ecological effects
leading to loss of agricultural productive capacity. The mix of soil organisms
in the soil also partially determines soil resilience, the desirable ability of a given
soil to recover its functions after a disturbance such as fire, compaction and tillage. Food
security: Soil biological management can improve crop yield and quality,
especially through controlling pests and diseases and enhancing plant
growth. Soil biodiversity determines the resource use efficiency, as well as the
sustainability and resilience of low-input agro-ecological systems, which ensure the
food security of much of the worlds population , especially the poor. In addition, some soil
capacity (CEC).

organisms are consumed as an important source of protein by different cultures and others are used for medicinal
purposes. At least 32 Amerindian groups in the Amazon basin use terrestrial invertebrates as food, and especially,
as sources of animal protein - a strategy that takes advantage of the abundance of these highly renewable

soil biota and its diversity

contributes both to the needs of farmers, especially in maintaining productivity and
increasing returns from labour and other inputs, and to national interests through
maintaining a healthy and well functioning ecosystem in terms of water quality
(hydrological cycle) and preventing soil erosion and land degradation (nutrient and carbon
elements of the rainforest ecosystem. 30. The improved management of

cycles). There is a need to improve recognition of these multiple benefits and to promote actions that
maintain/enhance soil biodiversity and its vital and valuable functions. This requires placing a value on the essential
ecosystem services provided by soil organisms to agricultural systems: nutrient cycling and renewing soil fertility;
decomposition of organic matter; mediating carbon sinks (and reducing greenhouse gas emissions); maintaining
soil structure and water regimes; and biological control of pests and pathogens that affect plant health.

Chinese food insecurity destabilizes the CCP and disrupts the

global food supply chain.
Fox 15 [Colonel Natasha Fox, Master of Business Administration and a Master of
Management in Defence Studies, Is a Hungry Dragon a Peaceful Dragon: food
security implications for China?, Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian
Defence College, August 2015,
http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/FoxIPSPaper.pdf]
There are approximately 840 million hungry people in the world , the majority of which live
in developing countries.8 China, despite its recent impressive economic growth, has 19 per cent of that
total, which makes it the second largest population of hungry people in the world, after India. Unsurprisingly, a
large hungry population may impact on social stability, as food insecurity,
especially when is caused by higher food prices, heightens the risk of
democratic breakdown, civil conflict, protest, rioting and communal conflict.9
Such an example occurred in 2008 when the price of staple grains increased significantly across the globe, pushing
an estimated 400 million people into poverty.10 The ensuing protests, reportedly occurring in 48 countries,
highlighted the relationship between poverty and food. Countries with higher per capita incomes generally
experienced non-violent protests, whereas lower per capita income countries experienced rioting and at least 11

Poverty and food insecurity,

can combine to be a complex socio-economic issue for governments to
manage. Poverty and social unrest over food are particularly relevant for China,
as they impact on the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to rule as the
governing party. Legitimacy to rule is linked to the history of China , where the rise and fall of
violent protests, with those in Indonesia contributing to regime change.11
therefore,

earlier dynasties was often associated with the reliance on grain and the Confucian belief that the ruler is

responsible for providing food for the people; those that fail to do so risk losing the Mandate of Heaven, the right

food security needs to be seen in the context of human

security, which includes both safety from hunger, disease, crime and repression , as
to govern.12 More broadly,

well as protection from disruptions to everyday life.13 Human security is part of Chinas comprehensive security
policy, which includes economic, environmental and human dimensions.14 As explained by William Tow et al:
Chinese policymakers view economic development as absolutely critical to enhancing the security of those whom

[T]here is an overlapping or complementary relationship between

national security and human security . [T]he individual level [which is human security] envisions that
they govern.

Chinese citizens have the prerogatives to enjoy such aspects of personal security as freedom from hunger and

By providing human security for Chinas citizens, the CCP is

ensuring its legitimacy as a governing party. This challenge has been publicly
recognised by the CCP, with Vice Premier Hui Liangyu asserting in April 2015 that: Freedom from hunger is
the most fundamental human right. Food security is the basis for economic development and
social stability. It is also an important prerequisite for national independence and
world peace.16 The concept of food security is engrained in Chinas cultural
psyche, with famine a reoccurring theme throughout the countrys history. In the late
freedom from fear.15

1870s, for example, nine million people died from famine in the north of China while, in the late 1950s, an

Chinas approach to food

security, therefore, is based on history, socio-economic management and political
legitimacy. It assumes strategic significance in Chinese policy , reflected in the CCPs 12th
estimated 30 million people died from country-wide food shortages.17

Five-Year Plan covering the period 2011-15, which places particular emphasis on the reform and modernisation of
Chinas agricultural sector.18 Chinas responses to food security Chinas policies to achieve food security have
targeted agricultural reform and government intervention using economic mechanisms. Initial reforms included
evolving the structure of the agricultural sector from a commune system to a household responsibility system.19
More recently, it has evolved to agricultural liberalisation, and now includes a range of initiatives, including
government-provided economic subsidies and farmer education, as well as increased research and development
into seed quality, irrigation, yield and crop management techniques, all intended to improve the capacity of the
agricultural sector to supply food.20 Reforms implemented over the past 30 years have resulted in significant
increases in per capita production of grains, sugar, fruit, meat and seafood.21 In 1996, the Chinese Government
also declared its aim of achieving 95 per cent self-sufficiency in grain production and set a red line to guarantee
that Chinas arable land would not reduce to less than 120 million hectares.22 However, with continued population
growth, China has increasingly needed to import certain foodstuffsnotably rice and wheat to achieve uniform
food security, achieving this as part of its grand going-out and complementary bring it in strategies.23 The dual
strategies have resulted in China becoming the leading importer and the sixth largest exporter of agricultural

China is currently considered food

secure.25 It has also become a significant, and interdependent, part of the
global agricultural production supply chain. However, Chinas food security
status is not assured and any changes in Chinas import or export strategies would
likely have negative consequences for global economies and food chains. It is,
therefore, critical that China continues to develop a transparent and sustainable
food security policy and agricultural system. Achieving this dual imperative
poses significant challenges for China, both because of its projected population growth (to 1.45
billion by 2030) and a range of environmental issues that have arisen as a result of Chinas rapid economic development.
products in the world.24 The net effect of Chinas actions is that

Implications of Chinas actions Chinas rapid economic development has reduced the number of people living in poverty. But it has also resulted in an
increase in wealth for Chinas middle class, currently estimated at 300 million, with a projection of 600 million by 2020.26 The increase in wealth has
facilitated a change in consumption patterns, from a largely cereal-based diet to one comprising more meat, dairy, oils, fruit, vegetable and processed
foods.27 This has increased the requirement for grains and water to produce meat, with one-third of Chinas domestic grain crop already One option would
be for Chinas Government to promote a diet that is less grain intensive. That would likely face considerable domestic resistance from a middle class that
is increasingly being exposed to external influences. However, to feed Chinas projected population, based on current dietary intake, it would be necessary
to increase grain supply over the next 15 years by 35 per cent.29 If domestic and international markets were unable meet this demand, as seems likely,
food price volatility could be expected to occur, based on market supply-and-demand factors. Protests and violence could then occur over food shortages,
similar to what happened with the 2008 food price spikes. This will be a key concern for Chinas governing party at least until 2030, when Chinas
population is expected to peak. A further consideration relates to the availability of arable land, that is, land that can be used for agriculture.30 Over the
past 30 years, it is estimated that approximately 4.18 million hectares of arable land has been lost as a result of urbanisation and industrialisation,
representing 3.6 per cent of the total.31 Chinas urban population, as a proportion of the total, has increased from 17 per cent in 1978 to 50 per cent in
2010.32 It is projected that by 2030, two-thirds of the population will live in urban areas, further increasing the spread of urban centres at the expense of
arable land.33 Paradoxically, the decision to build the Three Gorges Dam, to improve Chinas water security, resulted in the loss of 60,000 hectares of
farmland in the important Yangtze River basin, which grows 70 per cent of Chinas rice crop and 50 per cent of its grain.34 Although Chinas Government
has said that the loss will be compensated in part by the creation of new farmlands elsewhere, any further loss of arable land would likely threaten the
red line level set by the Government in 1996.35 Furthermore, some of the land that is available has been polluted through untreated wastewater,

industrial run-off, and overuse of chemical fertilisers and pesticides.36 While agricultural intensification is used to increase crop yields, it has also resulted
in environmental problems such as soil acidification and erosion. It is estimated that 8 per cent of Chinas farmland is contaminated with industrial
pollutants, which equates to a potential loss of 12 million tonnes of grain annually.37 According to a 2013 report, product samples from six agricultural
regions also revealed that between 11 and 16 per cent of rice samples were contaminated with either cadmium or lead.38 These and similar other reports
have resulted in food safety becoming an important issue in China, requiring urgent remedial action to reassure both domestic and international consumer
confidence. In 2009, China adopted a comprehensive Food Safety Law and also prioritised food safety within the 12th Five Year Plan.39 However, there are
450,000 food production and processing companies in China, of which 350,000 have less than ten employees, so it is a difficult industry to regulate.40
Nevertheless, given Chinas position as a food exporter and its stated self-sufficiency requirements, continuing food safety regulation reform is an
imperative for consumer confidence and continued economic growth. Chinas overseas development projects China has also invested heavily in
agricultural production in other countriesknown in economic terms as outward foreign direct investmentwhich would seem a win-win approach to
food security. Theoretically, if developing countries can achieve a level of self-sufficiency or better, there is more capacity in the international market for
China to trade or import food.41 China has 468 agricultural corporations invested abroad, inclusive of production bases in countries such as Russia,
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America.42 China has also formed bilateral working groups with over 50 countries and regions, and provided
food and agricultural aid to a number of developing countries to assist with irrigation farming and seed technology. Chinas food security-related foreign
investment has also included the purchase or long-term lease of arable land in other countries. While China promotes this as win-win for both parties,
there have been a number of instances where China has been accused by host countries of land grabbing, with Chinese activities in The Philippines,
Indonesia, Myanmar and Cambodia, in particular, causing distrust and social unrest.43 In The Philippines, for example, several Chinese development
projects have been curtailed because of legal challenges and domestic opposition, accompanied by perceptions of corrupt practices, concerns as to the
impact on rural livelihoods, and questions of sovereignty regarding the transfer of large tracts of land to long-term Chinese control.44 Some would argue
that reactions in The Philippines reflect the broader distrust in political and economic relations with China, rather than the foreign investment policy per se.
Nevertheless, it has implications for Chinas longer-term ability to access food sources through the foreign investment mechanism. Chinese activities in
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar similarly illustrate the potentially negative aspects of direct foreign investment. In a number of instances, social elites in
those countries have been accused of aligning with Chinese corporations to dispossess local farmers of their land.45 In addition to concerns about land
tenure security for the local population, there have also been concerns that because the food being produced on host country land is primarily intended
for the Chinese market, it is undermining and distorting the achievement of food security in the host country.46 These issues are also evident in a number
of South American countries, notably Argentina and Brazil, where China has either leased land or purchased land for growing export crops. Protests in
Brazil resulted in China having to adjust its export-only strategy to include purchasing crops from local suppliers, as well as building a facility to produce
soy locally.47 These developments indicate that direct foreign investment by China can produce win-win outcomes for both parties. However, there is
also considerable scope for mistrust to arise because of a lack of transparency on Chinas part. The policy clearly needs careful and sensitive management
ideally in collaboration with agencies such as the World Trade Organisation or through the World Food Program to succeed as an integral policy

the potential remains for further disruptions to

global food market prices, with associated social instability, as occurred in 2008.
Conclusion Food security is of strategic importance to China. Chinas food security is
based on historical and socioeconomic requirements, and ensures the
legitimacy of the CCP as the ruling party. Chinas current food secure status has been
component of Chinas food security. Otherwise,

achieved through a combination of domestic production, the use of direct foreign investment as an alternative

maintaining
adequate food security in the face of diminishing resources and a growing
population poses significant challenges for the future , particularly over the next 15 years. The
source of food production, and through food imports from the international market. However,

challenges of population growth, urbanisation, changing consumer diets, loss of arable land and food safety issues
combine to create a circumstance where China will likely become increasingly food insecure. While it is unlikely

evidence from the 2008 food price spikes suggests

that food insecurity can contribute to violent domestic protests, social
instability and, in more extreme cases, regime change. Given that China has such a
large hungry population, any social instability in this group could impact
the CCPs legitimacy. China clearly needs to continue reforming and modernising its
agricultural sector, including enforcing food safety regulations. This will help ensure
consumer confidence and the sustainability of agricultural production. Any successes in Chinas
domestic production, as well as lessons learnt, should also be made more transparent so that developing
that food insecurity would lead to conflict,

countries with growing populations and similar resource constraints may benefit from Chinas experience. That, in
turn, would contribute to the stability and sustainability of the global food market. The
key lessons from Chinas experience are issues involving arable land, research and development to improve yield
and crop management techniques, and policy development on the issue of direct foreign investment. While direct
foreign investment has been beneficial to Chinas ability to achieve its current level of food security, it needs to be
undertaken in a transparent and win-win situation that does not impact on the host nations food security status.

This would ensure that the global food market remains stable and that China
remains food secure, which is in the interest of all parties , including Australia.

CCP instability causes Korean war goes nuclear.

Perkinson 12 [Jessica Perkinson (Faculty of the School of International Service of
American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of

international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at

American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International
Service), The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses
the Mark, American University, April 19th 2012, Available Online at
http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson_american_0008N_1
0238display.pdf?sequence=1]
the stability of the Korean Peninsula rests in large part on the stability of
Chinas political system. Both North and South Korea have vested interests in the
continued stability of the CCP for their own security . As is generally well-known in the
international community, North Korea relies in large part on China superseding
international trade sanctions not only for luxury goods, but for basic needs such as
food and oil. For example, the United States led the charge and enacted its first set of sanctions against North
First,

Korea over two decades ago in response to the existence of fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and its risk for
proliferation.152 Over time, these sanctions have been expanded upon and have attracted the support and
participation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Specifically, these sanctions have included blocked
property and interests in property, banned transactions involving North Korean vessels and bans on reception of
imports originating in North Korea.153 Though these sanctions have not encouraged the North Korean regime to
change its policies (and in some cases have made them more militant), they have unfortunately had a devastating
effect on the North Korean people, including depravation of access to critical resources such as medication, food

due to a succession of floods and

droughts and the refusal of the international community to intervene in a country
violating international laws, pervasive malnutrition has led to up to one million
excess deaths since the 1990s.155 In order to maintain stability on the Peninsula
and prevent the North Koreans from becoming desperate, China continues to export
both luxury goods and basic commodities into North Korea . For example, in 2005, China
accounted for 53% of North Koreas international commerce . However, this has
increased rapidly since sanctions have become stricter and have increased pressure in the country. In 2009,
and water and energy supplies such as oil.154 In addition,

China accounted for 79% in North Koreas international commerce and as of 2010 was up to 83% of North Koreas

China has
been a facilitator of the Six-Party Talks, the primary international diplomatic forum
for handling tensions on the Korean Peninsula . Countries involved in the Six-Party Talks include
$4.2 billion in trade156 in order to ease the effect of the existing international sanctions. In addition,

China, North Korea, Russia, the United States, South Korea and Japan, and the first round of talks was initiated and

During the talks, China served as a

moderator between the US and North Korea during tense times of debate, also
insisting on certain thresholds of success before members could leave the talks,
such as the drafting of diplomatic agreements158. Though the talks have remained in an onand-off pattern over the last decade, China still makes consistent efforts to bring North Korea
back to the diplomatic negotiations over their nuclear regime.159 South Koreas
dependence on Chinas continued stability is twofold. Not only does South
Korea rely on Chinas continued deterrence of North Korean aggression both through
diplomacy and satisfaction of their trade needs, but they also rely on China as a
trade partner. For example, on November 23, 2010, North Korea fired dozens of missiles
onto the Souths Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean soldiers, significantly escalating tension
on the Peninsula as South Korea threatened military retaliation for the attack.160 In response, China focused
their energy on deterring an armed response by the South Koreans, which could
have potentially led to protracted civil war between the two countries. Though the
international community has expressed deep disagreement with Chinas soft-line approach toward North
hosted by China, taking place in Beijing in August 2003.157

Korea, it appears their understanding, big-brother style of handling North Korean aggression toward South Korea

has

at least

prevented a violent, protracted conflict, though not necessarily further North

Not only does South Korea rely on the continued intervention

of the Chinese in North-South relations, but they have a deep economic integration
and dependence on Chinese trade. For example, in 2010, South Korea was Chinas fourth-largest
trading partner, exchanging goods of $207.2 billion, up 32.6% over 2009.162 In other words, both North and
South Korea rely heavily on China not only for their continued economic prosperity,
but also for the survival of their people and territorial security . Should the Chinese
government undergo a period of reform and instability great enough to interrupt
these benefits to the Korean Peninsula, the international system may be faced with a serious
nuclear and conventional military conflict between North and South Korea.
Korean acts of aggression.161

Food shortages cause global nuclear war.

FDI 12, Future Directions International, a Research institute providing strategic
analysis of Australias global interests; citing Lindsay Falvery, PhD in Agricultural
Science and former Professor at the University of Melbournes Institute of Land and
Environment, Food and Water Insecurity: International Conflict Triggers & Potential
Conflict Points, http://www.futuredirections.org.au/workshop-papers/537international-conflict-triggers-and-potential-conflict-points-resulting-from-food-andwater-insecurity.html
There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most
likely be fought over a lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers
point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More
recently, Germanys World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired , at least in part,
by its perceived need to gain access to more food . Yet the general sense among those that attended
FDIs recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly
greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm
inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a
participant in FDIs March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why
countries across the globe are starting to take note. . He writes (p.36), if people are hungry, especially in cities,
the state is not stable riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result. Hunger feeds
anarchy. This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if large
regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale,
bloody wars are liable to follow. He continues: An increasingly credible scenario
for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, selfperpetuating chain of resource conflicts. He also says: The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be
global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies,
terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources. As another workshop participant put it, people
do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed

A study by
the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an
issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea
and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly
aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and
International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a
potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.
that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry.

1AC Solvency
Plan: The United States federal government should
substantially increase its engagement with the Peoples
Republic of China over the development of carbon capture and
storage technologies, including at least financial incentives,
research and development, demonstration projects, and a
unified regulatory framework for environmental impact
assessment.
Government support is key to provide financial incentives and
a regulatory framework
Coneybeare 13 [Duncan Coneybeare (Strategic Analyst, Global Power &
Utilities), citing Dr. Xi Liang (Lecturer in Business and Climate Change University of
Edinburgh), Professor Xiaochun Li (leads the CO2 Geological Storage Research
Group at the Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences)
and Dr. Di Zhou (Professor at the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology Chinese
Academy of Sciences, leads the research project Guangdong CCS Readiness, lead
author of the chapter entitled Underground Geological Storage in the IPCC special
report Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage),China could lead in CCS, EY Regional
Reports: Asia-Pacific, Utilities Unbundled Issue 14 | June 2013,
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/China_could_lead_in_CCS/
$FILE/China_could_lead_in_CCS_UU_14.pdf]
China has become a global leader in renewables and it could do the same with
carbon capture and storage (CCS). China is the top consumer of coal globally, and is
building new coal-fired power plants faster than any other country in the world. 1
Given its deep coal resources, fossil fuels are expected to remain the dominant
energy source. To reduce the environmental impact of coal, China is investigating a number of solutions,
including CCS. With 11 projects at different stages of development (see Table 1), China is one of the global
leaders in CCS. But insufficient government support means that businesses
are bearing the majority of the costs of the pilot projects which could
limit the development of CCS in the country that could benefit from it the most .
Businesses picking up the tab for CCS However, just as in other jurisdictions around the world (see Future-proofing

At present, support from the government is

and inconsistent. And with an immature carbon market, businesses

coal, page 25), cost is proving to be a major obstacle.

seen as being at an inadequate level

are picking up the tab for CCS projects, says Dr. Di Zhou of the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences. Dr. Xi Liang, secretary of the China Low-carbon Energy Action Network (CLEAN) and lecturer
in Business and Climate Change at the University of Edinburgh, believes change could happen quickly: There

is interest from large energy companies, but theres a lack of financial

incentive. The timescale for commercialization depends on the priority the
government sets for CCS. If it receives the same amount of support as wind or
solar, CCS will happen. Zhou agrees: Our financial modelling for Guangdong province showed that CCSequipped coal-fired power plants will be cost competitive when the carbon price reaches US$32 to US$56 per ton of
CO2. To commercially exploit the technology, China must set a clear reduction target to drive forward carbon
market developments, says Professor Xiaochun Li of the Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of
Sciences. Although CCS was included in the 12th Five-Year Plan (20112016), Li believes

insufficient

legislation for CCS is a key challenge, and that technology and legislation need
to develop together to build confidence. The question of storage After cost, one of the biggest
questions to answer is what to do with the captured CO2. Lessons learned from Chinese
demonstration projects highlight the need to consider CO2 transport and storage
from the onset. A systemic assessment was not carried out on the Dongguan Taiyangzhou IGCC project. They
hadnt factored in the difficulties of installing pipelines in densely populated residential areas, says Li. Although
captured CO2 has been used for industrial application and food processing, these processes only use a small

More promising is injecting CO2 to assist with

Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), says Li. Two very successful EOR projects are Chinas
largest oil field, Daqing (CNPC), and the Jilin oil field (Sinopec). But EOR is still at least three to
proportion of a power plants total CO2 emissions.

five years from commercialization. The alternative is to store CO2 in deep underground geological formations.
Onshore

storage in geological formations is the cheapest solution. Northern China

has good onshore storage sites, but this is not the case in southeastern China, says Zhou. Offshore
storage is more feasible in the southeast, but the cost is much higher. However, we are looking into using
depleted oil or gas fields for offshore storage to reduce costs. Insuring against leakage
Safety risks arising from CO2 leakage are a concern in China, but Zhou believes these
can be mitigated. CO2 leakages are avoidable if the site is chosen carefully
and possesses sound storage conditions. Natural gas and CO2 underground
reservoirs have existed for many years with no issues identified, he says. Insurance and
risk sharing may be part of the solution, adds Liang. He collaborated with Andrew Voysey at
University of Cambridge and a number of major insurance and energy companies on a pioneering study by
ClimateWise3 into the commercial insurability of CO2 leakage risks in Europe. For the CCS-specific liabilities

some of
these risks can be insured, but others will need to be shared with
governments, says Liang. Future of CCS CCS success depends on many factors including
government support, the right geological conditions for storage, EOR potential and a sound
regulatory framework. Still, we have seen what happens when China decides to
invest in a new technology as it did with solar and wind, becoming the global
leader in a matter of years. The key to determining the success or failure of
CCS will be policymakers understanding of CCS and their willingness to put it at the
forefront of emissions reduction, agrees Zhou.
identified by the EU CCS Directive, off-the-shelf insurance solutions do not exist. Weve shown how

Incentivizing is private sector is crucial China needs

international assistance to advance tech, make it costcompetitive, and set environmental regulations.
Gu 13 [Yan Gu (MA in Environmental Sciences from Columbia University),
CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE POLICY IN CHINA, Columbia Law School Center for
Climate Change Law White Paper, October 2013,
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climatechange/files/Publications/Students/Yan%20Gu%20CCS%20Paper%20Final.pdf]
For China, CCUS has particular appeal as a climate change strategy given the fact
that the country is an emissions giant. However, CCUS is not without its challenges. Most basically,
because CCUS remains a costly mitigation option, it is not likely that comprehensive
CCUS deployment in developing countries like China will occur without an ambitious
emissions cap or substantial assistance.118 The current barriers to CCUS R&D and
demonstration include the lack of a systematic development plan and enforceable
technical roadmap, insufficient funding and immature financing mechanisms, lack of

safety regulations and other relevant laws, and low public acceptance.119 Ideally, all these
deficiencies in the status of CCUS in China should be handled in a coordinated
manner. And China should continue to track developments in CCS deployment and
regulatory policy in the developed world as they slowly progress, to learn what it can from
other countries experiences. Extra cost The application of CCUS inevitably adds extra cost to building a
conventional coal power plant, which presents perhaps the largest constraining factor in its broader development.
From the technical perspective, the capture process takes up the largest part of cost, accounting for 80% of an
integrated CCS project.120 Because one side effect of CCS is the fact that CCS requires significantly more energy
consumption in operation, it reduces the efficiency of a power plant to generate electricity and consequently results
in a higher net cost to any power plants equipped with CCS, 121 a technical deficiency called an energy penalty.
This means that the plant requires much more coal in order to generate the same net amount of electricity. Chinas
CCUS policy encourages independent innovation,122 but how the policy initiates specific programs to fulfill the goal
remains a question. China may want to learn from other countries that have are taking actions towards removing
the technical gap between the state of the technology today and ultimate commercialization. For example, the U.K.
Department of Energy and Climate Change launched a competition called CCS Commercialisation Programme123
in April 2012, hoping to find more cost effective CCS technologies. The technological drawbacks and inadequate
funding mechanisms in particular may slow down CCUS deployment in China since the higher technical and
financial risk is necessarily associated with the early development stage of CCUS124. Even if the utilization of CO2
may pay off the cost to some extent, theres still much uncertainty associated with the initial investment in CCUS

With currently available technology, a major challenge posed to CCS

deployment in China is whether CCUS can be proven financially feasible. Theres no such
projects.

guarantee yet that a diversity of funding resources will be readily available for deploying CCS demonstration

The question of financial viability calls for government

involvement to hammer out a workable incentive mechanism to close the
funding gap.125 Transition to commercial-scale CCUS market China is still far away from a commercialization
projects in China.

of a CCUS market. Right now, only a small group of stakeholders are involved in CCUS. Chinas ten large-scale
demonstration projects either under planning or operation are mostly being carried out by state-owned
corporations, in collaboration with the government and/or through international partnership. It may be that only

To
achieve the transition from lab research to commercial-scale deployment of CCUS,
the Chinese government needs to develop a framework that ensures the
engagement of private companies and small-to-medium-scale businesses. In this
development framework, incentives will be critical to spur investment by additional
stakeholders who are now being kept out of the CCUS market due to its high cost.
Additional investments should bring down costs as more experience is
gained and competition ramps up, with the hope that lower costs will
further accelerate the formation of the larger scale of commercialization
of CCUS. In other words, addressing the high cost of CCS and promoting its
commercialization supplement each other. Like other low-carbon technologies such as energy
efficiency and renewable energy, CCUS could seek further international economic
assistance. The uncertainty of international climate change governance, however, could hinder CCUSs
these industry giants have the capacity to deploy high-cost large-scale integrated CCUS demonstration projects.

transition toward a commercial market. For example, the Conference of the Parties approved the decision to include
CCS activities in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) during the 2011 Durban Climate Conference after
months hard negotiation.126 However, although the largest current CDM project holder, Chinas CDM growth is
likely to be restricted in the future because new EU policy requires that CDM credits used for future compliance with
its Emissions Trading Scheme will in general only be allowed from CDM projects in least developed countries (LDC).
127 To encourage a revenue stream outside of the global CDM marketplace, China may want to allow CCS
investments to qualify for credit in its own emerging carbon emission trading scheme (ETS).128 This program is
currently in its pilot stage, and is the first ever market-based scheme in China. It caps the emissions of Chinas

Chinas
limited regulatory experience with CCUS is another barrier to deploying CCS
projects in China. Several aspects of CCUS need improved regulation and
management, including the construction of CO2 pipelines, storage site
selection, evaluation standards for monitoring, and clarification of the right
seven most developed provinces or cities beginning in June 2013. Management and Regulation

and liability to use the underground space. 129 Though it is unlikely that China could immediately
set in force specific rules that fulfill those deficiencies, the country at least needs a framework that
plans for future regulation of potential environmental risks and liabilities
associated with CCUS activities. There are possible models to be found in other
countries, as several developed countries and international organizations have pioneered regulatory
mechanisms, 130 including the North Sea Basin CCS task force131 and the Australian Regulatory Guiding Principles
on CCS.132 These early efforts can help inform Chinas early attempts at CCUS regulation. One final issue that
bears consideration is the possibility that Chinas CCUS activities may fall under not only domestic regulation, but
also international law. One assessment study demonstrated that the more populated and developed east coastal
China represents the largest bulk of CO2 emissions, but that many resources are not located close to suitable onshore geological storage sites.133 Alternatively, off-shore sites may provide more economical options for storage
than distant on-shore candidates.134 The ocean sequestration of CO2 falls under the international regulations on
marine dumping, to which the London Protocol may apply. China is one of the 87 signatory countries to the London
Convention, and is thus is subject to its regulations regarding to the injection of CO2 streams from capture
processes for sequestration into seabed underground. If China is to develop ocean sequestration activities for
eastern regions, the constraints created by the London Protocol and corresponding provisions need to be included in
regulations in order to avoid possible conflicts. CONCLUSION Chinas unprecedented economic development in the
past thirty years has depended heavily on the consumption of coal. Electricity was generated to fuel other

The economic value

and abundant supply of coal mean that Chinas development pattern will not
change in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, China appears willing to put
great effort into mitigating the intense GHG emissions that result from coal use, and is also
industries at the cost of emitting large amounts of GHG pollutants into the atmosphere.

ready to play an important role on the international political stage. As it seeks to reconcile rapid economic growth

China is emerging as a leader in the development of

carbon capture, utilization and storage, a promising GHG mitigation technology that could help slow
down the global warming trend. The application of CCUS technology is still in its early stage
in China, but the potential for development is great considering the large
number of existing coal plants. Chinas government has already attached great
importance to CCUS and appears to be pursuing the technology with a sense of
urgency and a firm belief in its feasibility. Chinas key central government
departments have embarked on a series of policy changes in order to support CCUS
technology research and development projects, creating a basis for advanced R&D
and deployment in the future. China has raised climate change policy to the same level of importance as
with a desire to combat climate change,

national development strategy. In this context, the specific plan and policy of promoting CCUS R&D has been set up

China actively fosters international

cooperation in increasing CCUS capacity , implementing demonstration projects and
developing a regulatory framework. Some state-owned companies have cooperated with relevant
to facilitate the commercialization of CCUS projects. Moreover,

government departments, international organizations and/or developed countries governments in implementing

Nevertheless, China is still in need of a

more coordinated strategy to govern and promote future CCUS
development and overcome the current barriers and challenges ahead.
large-scale CCUS pilot and demonstration projects.