G.R. No.

168222

April 18, 2006

SPS. TEODULO RUMARATE, (deceased) and ROSITA RUMARATE; deceased TEODULO RUMARATE is
represented herein by his Heirs/Substitutes, namely, ANASTACIA RUMARATE, CELSO RUMARATE,
MARINA RUMARATE, ROMEO RUMARATE, GUILLERMO RUMARATE, FIDEL RUMARATE,
MERLINDA RUMARATE, MARISSA RUMARATE, CLEMENCIA RUMARATE, SANCHO RUMARATE
and NENITA RUMARATE, Petitioners,
vs.
HILARIO HERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ, SALVADOR HERNANDEZ, BENJAMIN
HERNANDEZ, LEONORA HERNANDEZ-LAZA, VICTORIA HERNANDEZ-MERCURIO,
RODRIGOHERNANDEZ, BERNARDO HERNANDEZ, LOURDES HERNANDEZ-CABIDA, MARIO
SALVATIERRA, ADELAIDA FONTILA-CIPRIANO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
PROVINCE, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the May 26, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57053,
which reversed and set aside the March 31, 1997 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch
63, in Civil Case No. C-964, declaring petitioners as owners of Lot No. 379 with an area of 187,765 square meters and
located in Barrio Catimo,3 Municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Quezon.
The facts show that on September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses Teodulo Rumarate (Teodulo) and Rosita Rumarate filed
an action for reconveyance of real property and/or quieting of title with damages against respondent heirs of the late
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. 4 Teodulo averred that Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and
cultivated by his godfather, Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with the Rumarate family in
San Pablo City. Between 1923 and 1924, Santiago and the Rumarate family transferred residence to avail of the land
distribution in Catimo, Guinayangan, Quezon. From 1925 to 1928, Santiago occupied Lot No. 379 cultivating five
hectares thereof. Before moving to Kagakag, Lopez, Quezon in 1929, Santiago orally bequeathed his rights over Lot
No. 379 to Teodulo and entrusted to him a copy of a Decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tayabas dated
April 21, 1925 recognizing his (Santiago) rights over Lot No. 379. 5 Since Teodulo was only 14 years old then, his
father helped him cultivate the land. 6 Their family thereafter cleared the land, built a house 7 and planted coconut
trees, corn, palay and vegetables thereon.8 In 1960, Santiago executed an "Affidavit (quit-claim)" 9 ratifying the
transfer of his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo. Between 1960 and 1970, three conflagrations razed the land
reducing the number of coconut trees growing therein to only 400, but by the time Teodulo testified in 1992, the
remaining portions of the land was almost entirely cultivated and planted with coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, mangoes
and vegetables.10 From 1929, Teodulo and later, his wife and 11 children possessed the land as owners and declared
the same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961.11
In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, respondents predecessors-in-interest,
were able to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. He did not immediately file a case against respondents because he was
advised to just remain on the land and pay the corresponding taxes thereon. 12
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on November 11, 1964, Santiago sold the questioned lot to their parents,
the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, for P9,000.00. 13 Respondents alleged that on April 21, 1925, the
CFI of Tayabas rendered a Decision written in Spanish, declaring Lot No. 379 as a public land and recognizing
Santiago as claimant thereof in Cadastral Proceeding No. 12. However, no title was issued to Santiago because he
failed to file an Answer. Spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta filed a motion to re-open Cadastral Proceeding
No. 12, alleging that though no title was issued in the name of Santiago, the same decision is, nevertheless, proof that
Santiago was in possession of Lot No. 379 since 1925 or for more than 30 years. Having succeeded in the rights of
Santiago, the spouses prayed that Cadastral Proceeding No. 12 be re-opened and that the corresponding title over Lot
No. 379 be issued in their name. On September 13, 1965, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a decision adjudicating Lot No.
379 in favor of the spouses, in whose name Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-11844 14 was issued on the same
date.15 Cipriano Hernandez planted coconut trees on the land through the help of a certain Fredo 16 who was instituted
as caretaker. In 1970, Fredo informed Cipriano Hernandez that he will no longer stay on the land because there are
people instructing him to discontinue tilling the same.17
After the death of the spouses,18 respondents executed a deed of partition over the subject lot and were issued TCT
No. T- 237330 on June 28, 1988 in lieu of OCT No. O-11844.19

Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964, he accompanied his father in inspecting the lot which
was then planted with coconut trees.20 Thereafter, he visited the land twice, once in 1966 and the other in 1970. From
1966 up to the time he testified, his family declared the lot for taxation and paid the taxes due thereon. 21 Joaquin
explained that after the death of his father in 1971, he no longer visited the land and it was only when the complaint
was filed against them when he learned that petitioners are in actual possession of the property.22 He added that his
siblings had planned to convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the
rampant operations then of the New Peoples Army between the years 1965-1970.23
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On March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It held that since the latter possessed the
land in the concept of an owner since 1929, they became the owners thereof by acquisitive prescription after the lapse
of 10 years, pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, when Santiago sold the lot to respondents parents in 1964,
the former no longer had the right over the property and therefore transmitted no title to said respondents. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, to wit:
1. Declaring that the parcel of land (Lot No. 379 of the Cadastral Survey of Guinayangan, Cadastral Case No.
12, LRC Cadastral Record No. 557), situated in Brgy. Katimo, Tagkawayan, Quezon had been fraudulently,
deceitfully and mistakenly registered in the names of the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta;
2. Declaring that herein defendants [heirs] of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta have no better
rights than their parents/predecessors-in-interest, they having stepped only on (sic) their shoes;
3. Declaring that the plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and substitute plaintiffs-[heirs] of the deceased Teodulo
Rumarate are the true, real and legal owners/or the owners in fee simple absolute of the above described
parcel of land;
4. Ordering the defendants to convey the above-described parcel of land to plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate
and to the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the deceased Teodulo Rumarate;
5. Ordering the Register of Deeds for Quezon Province in Lucena City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-237330 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in favor of plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate
and the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the deceased plaintiff Teodulo Rumarate, in accordance with law and
settled jurisprudence; and
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.

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SO ORDERED.24
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 26, 2005, reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court. It ruled that Teodulo did not acquire title over Lot No. 379, either by donation or acquisitive prescription; that
Teodulos bare allegation that Santiago orally bequeathed to him the litigated lot is insufficient to prove such transfer
of ownership; and that even assuming that the property was truly donated by Santiago to Teodulo in 1929, or in the
1960 Affidavit, said conveyance is void for not complying with the formalities of a valid donation which require the
donation and the acceptance thereof by the donee to be embodied in a public instrument. Both requirements, however,
are absent in this case because in 1929, the alleged donation was not reduced to writing while the purported 1960
donation was never accepted in a public document by Teodulo. The appellate court thus surmised that since it was not
established that Santiago donated Lot No. 379 to Teodulo, it follows that the latter also failed to prove that he
possessed the land adversely, exclusively and in the concept of an owner, a vital requisite before one may acquire title
by acquisitive prescription. In conclusion, the Court of Appeals ruled that even assuming further that Teodulo had a
right over the property, his cause of action is now barred by laches because he filed an action only in 1992
notwithstanding knowledge as early as 1970 of the issuance of title in the name of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta. The decretal portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed March 31, 1997 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.25
Hence, the instant appeal.

The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded? To petitioners who possessed and cultivated the
lot since 1929 up to the present, but do not have a certificate of title over the property, or to respondents who have a
certificate of title but are not in possession of the controverted lot?
In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the parties so that the
complainant and those claiming under him may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim. 26 Under Article
47627 of the Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud
is thereby cast on the complainants title to real property or any interest therein. Article 477 of the same Code states
that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
suit.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.28
In Evangelista v. Santiago,29 it was held that title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is
the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a
rule, assert a right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.
In the instant case, we find that Teodulos open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of Lot
No. 379, in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years vested him and his heirs title over the said lot. The law
applicable at the time Teodulo completed his 30-year possession (from 1929 to 1959) of Lot No. 379, in the concept
of an owner was Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 1942, effective June 22, 195730 which provides:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act (now Property Registration
Decree), to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been, in continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a government grant, without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to be part
of the public domain. The confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited
to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such conversion already effected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete. 31
In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Teodulo and his witnesses that his
(Teodulos) possession of the land since 1929 was open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, and in the concept of an
owner. It is a settled rule in civil cases as well as in criminal cases that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the
findings of the trial courts are given great weight and highest degree of respect by the appellate court considering that
the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.32
A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that Teodulo possessed and occupied Lot No. 379 in the
concept of an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo cultivated the controverted land, built his home, and raised his 11 children
thereon. In 1957, he filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379 but failed to pursue the same. 33After his demise,
all his 11 children, the youngest being 28 years old, 34 continued to till the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago never

challenged Teodulos possession of Lot No. 379 nor demanded or received the produce of said land. For 31 years
Santiago never exercised any act of ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed that he is no longer
interested in asserting any right over the land by executing in favor of Teodulo a quitclaim.
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the land as owner thereof since 1929. While the oral
donation in 1929 as well as the 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are void for non-compliance with the
formalities of donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his familys long years of occupation and cultivation of
said lot and the nature of their possession thereof.
In Bautista v. Poblete,35 the Court sustained the registration of a parcel of land in the name of the successors-ininterest of the donee notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation inasmuch as said donee possessed the property in
the concept of an owner. Thus
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it involves an immovable property and the
donation was not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with
Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may not
serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken possession of the property
adversely and in the concept of owner.
It follows therefore that Teodulos open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No.
379 for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the concept of an owner, earned him title over the lot in accordance with
Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Considering that Lot No. 379 became the private property of Teodulo in 1959,
Santiago had no more right to sell the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently,
the latter and herein respondents did not acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and the titles issued in their name are
void.
Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 not from the April 21, 1925
Decision of the CFI of Tayabas which merely recognized his rights over said lot, but from his more than 30 years of
possession since 1925 up to 1964 when he sold same lot to their (respondents) predecessors-in-interest, the spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. On the basis of said claim, said spouses filed an action for, and successfully
obtained, confirmation of imperfect title over Lot No. 379, pursuant to Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
However, the records do not support the argument of respondents that Santiagos alleged possession and cultivation of
Lot No. 379 is in the nature contemplated by the Public Land Act which requires more than constructive possession
and casual cultivation. As explained by the Court in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court:36
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under
paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction. As this Court stated,
through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
"x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175,
180). (See also Rosales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be observed that the application of the
doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to
observe that among these qualifications is one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with
reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. While, therefore, possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession, possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of
Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot
justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring
ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction x x x."
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted:
"x x x The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and visiting it every once in a while, as was
done by him, does not constitute acts of possession."

In the instant case, Santiagos short-lived possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 could not vest him title. While he
tilled the land in 1925, he ceased to possess and cultivate the same since 1928. He abandoned the property and
allowed Teodulo to exercise all acts of ownership. His brief possession of Lot No. 379 could not thus vest him
title. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right to another than he
himself has. Hence, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta and herein respondents did not acquire any right
over the questioned lot and the title issued in their names are void, because of the legal truism that the spring cannot
rise higher than the source.37
Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta cannot be considered as purchasers in good faith because
they had knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry.38 The Court notes that Santiago was not residing in Lot No. 379 at the time of the sale. He was already 81
years old, too old to cultivate and maintain an 18-hectare land. These circumstances should have prompted the spouses
to further inquire who was actually tilling the land. Had they done so, they would have found that Teodulo and his
family are the ones possessing and cultivating the land as owners thereof.
In the same vein, respondents could not be considered as third persons or purchasers in good faith and for value or
those who buy the property and pay a full and fair price for the same 39 because they merely inherited Lot No. 379
from spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.
Then too, even if Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 by virtue of the April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of
Tayabas, and not on account of his alleged 30-year possession thereof, we will still arrive at the same conclusion. This
is so because the declaration of this Court that petitioners are the rightful owners of the controverted lot is based on
Teodulos own possession and occupation of said lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, regardless
of the manner by which Santiago acquired ownership over same lot.
On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for quieting of title is imprescriptible, as in the instant
case, where the person seeking relief is in possession of the disputed property. A person in actual possession of a piece
of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps
to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
title.40 Considering that petitioners herein continuously possessed Lot No. 379 since 1929 up to the present, their
right to institute a suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot be barred by the statute of limitations.
Neither could petitioners action be barred by laches because they continuously enjoyed the possession of the land and
harvested the fruits thereof up to the present to the exclusion of and without any interference from respondents. They
cannot therefore be said to have slept on their rights as they in fact exercised the same by continuously possessing Lot
No. 379.
On the contrary, we find that it is respondents who are actually guilty of laches. Though not specifically pleaded, the
Court can properly address the issue of laches based on petitioners allegation in the complaint that "[n]either spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta x x x nor [herein respondents] had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to
said parcel of land from the date of their registration of title in November, 1965 up to the present." 41 Such averment is
sufficient to impute abandonment of right on the part of respondents. At any rate, laches need not be specifically
pleaded. On its own initiative, a court may consider it in determining the rights of the parties. 42
The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier constitutes laches. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. While it is
by express provision of law that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be
barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.43
In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a party allows the following number of years to lapse
from the emergence of his cause of action without enforcing his claim, laches sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34
years; 37 years; 32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years; 19 years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4
years; and 67 years.44
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of which the other party seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting ones rights, despite having had knowledge or notice of the other partys conduct and having been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of a party that the person against whom

laches is imputed would assert the right; and (4) injury or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the event the suit is
allowed to prosper.45
All these elements are present in this case. Petitioners continuous possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 should
have prompted the respondents to file an action against petitioners, but they chose not to. Respondents cannot deny
knowledge of said possession by petitioners as they even asserted in their Answer that in 1970, Teodulo ousted the
tenant they (respondents) instituted in the lot. From 1970 up to the filing of petitioners complaint in 1992, or after 22
years, respondents never bothered to assert any right over Lot No. 379. Respondent Joaquin Hernandez testified that
he and his siblings had a plan to convert the land into a grazing land for cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the
rampant operations of the New Peoples Army between the years 1965-1970. However, even after said years,
respondents took no step to implement their plan. Worse, among the siblings of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta who are all living in the Philippines, 46 only Joaquin Hernandez visited the land and only thrice, i.e., once in
each years of 1964, 1966 and 1970. Thereafter, not one of them paid visit to Lot No. 379, up to the time Joaquin
Hernandez testified in 1996,47 despite the fact that two of them are living only in Calauag, Quezon; one in Agdangan,
Quezon;48 and two in Lucena City.49Neither did they send a notice or correspondence to petitioners invoking their
right over the property. From all indications, the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta as well
respondents, have neglected Lot No. 379. Were it not for this action instituted by petitioners in 1992, their conflicting
claims over the property could not have been settled. It goes without saying that to lose a property that has been in the
family from 1929 up to the present, or for 77 years will certainly cause irreparable pecuniary and moral injury to
petitioners, especially so if the same ancestral land will be lost under most unfair circumstances in favor of
respondents who appear to have no real interest in cultivating the same.
Finally, payment of taxes alone will not save the day for respondents. Only a positive and categorical assertion of their
supposed rights against petitioners would rule out the application of laches. It means taking the offensive by
instituting legal means to wrest possession of the property which, however, is absent in this case. Respondents
payment of taxes alone, without possession could hardly be construed as an exercise of ownership. What stands out is
their overwhelming passivity by allowing petitioners to exercise acts of ownership and to enjoy the fruits of the
litigated lot for 22 years without any interference.
In sum, the Court finds that Lot No. 379 should be adjudicated in favor of petitioners.
One last point. Notwithstanding this Courts declaration that Lot No. 379 should be awarded in favor of petitioners,
their title over the same is imperfect and is still subject to the filing of the proper application for confirmation of title
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, where the State and other oppositors may be given the chance to be
heard. It was therefore premature for the trial court to direct the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to issue a certificate
of title in the name of petitioners.
Nevertheless, the imperfect title of petitioners over Lot No. 379 is enough to defeat the certificate of title issued to
respondents.50
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the May 26, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. GR. CV
No. 57053, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 31, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag,
Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964, awarding Lot No. 379 in favor petitioners and ordering the cancellation
of respondents Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 237330, is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION deleting
the trial courts order directing the Register of Deed of Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the name of
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 146556

April 19, 2006

DANILO L. PAREL, Petitioner,

vs.
SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Danilo Parel (petitioner) which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 dated March 31, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 60, Baguio, in Civil Case No. 2493-R, a case for recovery of possession and damages. Also
assailed is CA Resolution2 dated November 28, 2000.
On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No.
61 Forbes Park National Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City; such property
was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048; he commenced
the construction of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when the second floor of said house
became habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioners parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move
therein and occupy the second floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to supervise the
construction and to safeguard the materials; when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975,
respondent allowed petitioners parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of
sheer magnanimity as petitioners parents have no house of their own and since respondents wife is the older sister of
Florentino, petitioners father; in November 1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said
house as the former was due for retirement and he needed the place to which petitioners parents heeded when they
migrated to U.S. in 1986; however, without respondents knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and
took possession of the ground floor of respondents house; petitioners refusal to vacate the house despite repeated
demands prompted respondent to file the instant action for recovery of possession. Respondent also asked petitioner
for a monthly rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises
and surrender possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost of suit.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that: his parents are the co-owners of the said residential
house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioners parents; he is
occupying the ground floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino, with respondents full knowledge; his
parents spent their own resources in improving and constructing the said two-storey house as co-owners thereof; the
late Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house stands and as a co-owner of the house, he occupied the
ground floor thereof; the demand to vacate was respondents attempt to deprive petitioners parents of their rights as
co-owner of the said house; that respondent had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them involving
the subject house which were all dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for
damages and attorneys fees.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision 3 dated December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares that the house erected at No. 61 DPS Compound,
Baguio City is owned in common by the late Florentino Parel and herein plaintiff Simeon Prudencio and as such the
plaintiff cannot evict the defendant as heirs of the deceased Florentino Parel from said property, nor to recover said
premises from herein defendant.
Likewise, the plaintiff is ordered to:
(a) pay the defendant in the total sum of P20,000.00 for moral and actual damages;
(b) pay the defendant P20,000.00 in Attorneys fees and P3,300.00 in appearance fees;
(c) pay the costs of this suit.4
The RTC found the following matters as conclusive: that petitioners father was an allocatee of the land on which the
subject house was erected, as one of the lowly-paid government employees at that time when then Mayor Luis
Lardizabal gave them the chance to construct their own house on said reservation; that respondent failed to show
proof of any contract, written or oral, express or implied, that the late Florentino and his family stayed on the house
not as co-owners but as mere lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his sole ownership of the house;
and, that the late Florentino was the one who gathered the laborers for the construction of the house and paid their
salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-ownership existed between respondent and petitioners father, Florentino.
The RTC concluded that respondent and petitioners father agreed to contribute their money to complete the house;
that since the land on which said house was erected has been allocated to petitioners father, the parties had the
understanding that once the house is completed, petitioners father could keep the ground floor while respondent the
second floor; the trial court questioned the fact that it was only after 15 years that respondent asserted his claim of sole

ownership of the subject house; respondent failed to disprove that petitioners father contributed his own funds to
finance the construction of the house; that respondent did not question (1) the fact that it was the deceased Florentino
who administered the construction of the house as well as the one who supplied the materials; and (2) the fact that the
land was in Florentinos possession created the impression that the house indeed is jointly owned by respondent and
Florentino.
The RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents showing the City Assessors
assessment of the property all in respondents name since tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. It
rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned by respondent saying that the affidavit
should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of an advisement
addressed to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the propertys tax assessment and Florentino,
thought then that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be accepted for
being hearsay.
Aggrieved by such decision, respondent appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated March 31, 2000, the CA reversed the
trial court and declared respondent as the sole owner of the subject house and ordered petitioner to surrender
possession of the ground floor thereof to respondent immediately. It also ordered petitioner to pay respondent a
monthly rental of P2,000.00 for use or occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same
and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and cost of suit.
The CA found as meritorious respondents contention that since petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any
documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered by respondent. It ruled that the trial courts
statement that "defendants occupancy of the house is due to a special power of attorney executed by his parents most
specially the deceased Florentino Parel who is in fact a co-owner of said building" is wanting of any concrete
evidence on record; that said power of attorney was never offered, hence, could not be referred to as petitioners
evidence to support his claim; that except for the bare testimonies of Candelario Regua, the carpenter-foreman, that it
was Florentino who constructed the house and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain, who testified that the lot
was allocated to petitioners father, there was no supporting document which would sufficiently establish factual bases
for the trial courts conclusion; and that the rule on offer of evidence is mandatory.
The CA found the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 of Florentino, petitioners father, stating that he is not the owner
of the subject house but respondent, as conclusive proof of respondents sole ownership of the subject house as it is a
declaration made by Florentino against his interest. It also found the tax declarations and official receipts representing
payments of real estate taxes of the questioned property covering the period 1974 to 1992 sufficient to establish
respondents case which constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2000.

1avvphil.net

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari with the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING RESPONDENT AS THE OWNER
OF THE BUILDING AT 61 FORBES PARK NATIONAL RESERVATION, NEAR DPS COMPOUND, BAGUIO
CITY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CO-OWNERSHIP
BETWEEN THE LATE FLORENTINO PAREL AND RESPONDENT;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO
SURRENDER POSSESSION OF THE GROUND FLOOR OF THE SUBJECT BUILDING TO
RESPONDENT;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO
PAY RESPONDENT P2,000.00/MONTH FOR USE OR OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT
PREMISES FROM APRIL 1988 UNTIL PETITIONER ACTUALLY VACATES THE SAME;
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO
PAY TO RESPONDENT P50,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT;
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. 5

Petitioner concedes that while his former counsel failed to make a formal offer of his documentary evidence before
the trial court and that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, he maintains that the
said rule is not absolute, citing the case of Bravo, Jr. v. Borja; 6 that his documentary evidence which were not
formally offered in evidence were marked during the presentation of the testimony of petitioners witnesses and were
part of their testimonies; that these evidence were part of the memorandum filed by him before the trial court on July
12, 1993.
Petitioner insists that even in the absence of the documentary evidence, his testimony as well as that of his witnesses
substantiated his claim of co-ownership of the subject house between his late father and respondent as found by the
trial court.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding the affidavit of petitioners father declaring respondent as owner of the
subject house as conclusive proof that respondent is the true and only owner of the house since the affidavit should be
read in its entirety to determine the purpose for which it was executed.
Petitioner further contends that since he had established his fathers co-ownership of the subject house, respondent has
no legal right to eject him from the property; that he could not be compelled to pay rentals for residing in the ground
floor of the subject house; that respondent should bear his own expenses and be adjudged liable for damages which
petitioner sustained for being constrained to litigate.
The principal issue for resolution is whether petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father
was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential house.
The issue raised by petitioner is mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law are appealable to this Court
under Rule 45. However, considering that the findings of the RTC and CA are contradictory, the review of the case is
in order.7
We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery of
possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof. Respondent presented the affidavit
dated September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City,
G.F. Lagasca, which reads:
I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, after having
been sworn to according to law depose and say:
That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio City which is the
subject of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office of the City Assessor, Baguio City, for
assessment and declaration for taxation purposes;
That I am not the owner of the building in question;
That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas
District, Quezon City.
Further, affiant say not.8 (Underscoring supplied)
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed
it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that
the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such
declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest. 9
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioners father and had adequate knowledge with respect to the
subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant of
the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City.
It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial
to himself as well as to his childrens interests as his heirs. 10 A declaration against interest is the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. 11 Notably, during Florentinos lifetime, from 1973, the year he

executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even
when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him (Florentino) and
petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing
that petitioner entered the house against the latters will and held that the remedy of respondent was to file an action
for ejectment;12 and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in
1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondents action should be an accion publiciana which
is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.13
Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of respondent and his
wife. It was established during petitioners cross-examination that the existing structure of the two-storey house was
in accordance with said building plan.14
Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house declared under his name
since 1974.15 In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted that there was no occasion that they paid the
real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the house in their name.16
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 17 The house which petitioner claims to
be co-owned by his late father had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent, and
this fact, taken with the other circumstances above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the
sole owner of the house subject matter of the litigation.
Respondent having established his claim of exclusive ownership of the subject property, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to contravene respondents claim. The burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to prove that his father was a
co-owner of the subject house.
We held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, to wit:18
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means
probability of truth.19
In this case, the records show that although petitioners counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his documentary
evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same. 20 Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary evidence
presented by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. 21 It is a settled rule that the mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party.22
Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally offered, the same were marked during the
presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.23
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we allowed evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy of the
birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact
that the birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion for bail to prove petitioners minority which was
never challenged by the prosecution and it already formed part of the records of the case. The rule referred to in
the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the
matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.

and not Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable to the present case.
Even assuming arguendo that the documentary evidence of petitioner should be considered in his favor, the evidence
showing that respondent had filed civil and criminal cases against petitioner which were dismissed as well as the
alleged Special Power of Attorney of petitioners parents whereby they authorized petitioner to stay in the ground
floor of the house, did not establish co-ownership of Florentino and respondent of the subject house.
The testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses failed to show that the subject house is co-owned by petitioners father
and respondent.
Candelario Regua merely testified that he was hired by petitioners father, Florentino, to construct the residential
building in 1972;24 that he listed the materials to be used for the construction which was purchased by
Florentino;25 that he and his men received their salaries every Saturday and Wednesday from Florentino or his wife,
respectively;26 that he had not met nor seen respondent during the whole time the construction was on-going. 27 On
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he cannot tell where the money to buy the materials used in the
construction came from.28
Corazon Garcia merely testified that Florentino started building the house when he was allocated a lot at DPS
compound, that she knew Florentino constructed the subject house 29 and never knew respondent. 30 The bare
allegation that Florentino was allocated a lot is not sufficient to overcome Florentinos own affidavit naming
respondent as the owner of the subject house.
Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and purchased the materials
to be used; 31 and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries upon order of his father 32 and never saw
respondent in the construction site. The fact that not one of the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of
the said house does not establish that petitioners father and respondent co-owned the house.
We also find that the CA did not err in ordering petitioner to pay respondent being the sole owner of the subject house
a monthly rental of P2,000.00 from April 1988, the date of the extra-judicial demand, until petitioner actually vacates
the subject house. Although the CA made no ratiocination as to how it arrived at the amount of P2,000.00 for the
monthly rental, we find the same to be a reasonable compensation for the use of the ground floor of the subject house
which consists of a living room, a dining room, a kitchen and three bedrooms. The rental value refers to the value as
ascertained by proof of what the property would rent or by evidence of other facts from which the fair rental value
may be determined. 33
We likewise affirm the CAs award of attorneys fees in favor of respondent. Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows the
recovery of attorneys fees in cases when the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest 34 and in any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered 35 which are both shown in the instant
case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000 and its Resolution dated November 28,
2000 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.