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Theses and Dissertations

Thesis and Dissertation Collection

1993-09

An illustrated overview of ESM and ECM systems


Petterson, Gran
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/26584

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY CA

93943-5101

Approved

An

for public release, distribution

Illustrated

Overview of ESM and

is

unlimited.

ECM

Systems

by

Goran Sven Erik Pettersson

Swedi^ Army
War

Major,

M.S., Swedish Armed Forces Staff and

Submitted

in partial fiilfillment

College, 1991

of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL


September 1993

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AGENCY USE ONLY


TITLE

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6.

AND

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2.

REPORT DATE
September

REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

993

Master's Thesis

SUBTITLE

Illustrated

5.

Overview of ESM and

FUNDING NUMBERS

ECM Systems

AUTHOR(S)

Pettersson, Goran, S. E.

7.

PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

Naval Postgraduate School


CA 93943-5000

Monterey,

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Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey.

CA

93943-5000

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this

11.

12a. DISTRIBUTION

Approved

13.

thesis are those of the author

and do not

reflect the official policy or position

of

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

the

AVAILABILITY

STATEMENT

for public release, distribution

is

12b. DISTRIBUTION

CODE

unlimited

ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This thesis gives an overview of electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems.
objective is to give the intended reader, students of the
curriculum new to the subject, an introduction to several

EW

The

different electronic warfare systems.

The

thesis consists of seven chapters discussing different areas of EW.

The

first

two chapters introduce the reader to the definitions of EW and the threat which
equipment is designed to counter.
The following two chapters are a presentation of typical ESM and ECM systems. The final three chapters cover the
integration of ESM and ECM systems as well as two subjects, suppression of enemy air defense and directed energy
weapons, which differ from the typical ECM systems. Included with each chapter describing systems is a conclusion
section which discusses possible future developments for the group of systems.

EW

14.

SUBJECT TERMS

ESM, ECM,

15.

Recei\ers, Integrated Svstems, Directed Energy Weapons,

NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE

1^

CODE

Decovs. Chaff
17

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT

Unclassified

NSN 75A0-01 -280-5500

18.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified

20.

LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

Same

as report

Standard Form 298 (Rev 2-89)


Prescribed by ANSI Sid
298- 102

239-18

ABSTRACT

This thesis gives an overview of electronic support measures

countermeasures
the

(ECM)

systems.

The

objective

is

(ESM) and

electronic

to give the intended reader, students

of

EW curriculum new to the subject, an introduction to several different electronic

warfare systems. The thesis consists of seven chapters discussing different areas of EW.

The

first

two chapters introduce

EW equipment
typical

and

ESM

ECM

is

and

EW and the threat which

designed to counter. The following two chapters are a presentation of

ECM systems.

The

final

three chapters cover the integration of

systems as well as two subjects, suppression of enemy

energy weapons, which


describing systems
for the

the reader to the definitions of

is

differ

from the

typical

ECM

systems

air

ESM

defense and directed

Included with each chapter

a conclusion section which discusses possible future developments

group of systems.

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

I.

II.

A.

PURPOSE

B.

STRUCTURE

BACKGROUND

A.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

B.

THE THREAT TO COUNTER

L Ground Forces

III.

2.

Naval Forces

Air Forces

4.

Radar

5.

Laser

6.

Infrared

10

Summary

12

ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES

A ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES RECEIVERS


(CVR)

13

14

1.

Crystal Video Receiver

2.

Tuned RF Receiver (TRF)

15

3.

Superheterodyne Receiver (SHR)

15

4.

Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver (IFM)

15

5.

Combined Receivers

16

6.

Microscan Receiver

16

7.

Conventional Channelized Receiver

17

8.

Bragg

17

Cell Channelizer

iv

14

...
.

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
9.

B.

Summary

ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES SYSTEMS


1

19

20

Microwave Systems
a,

AN/SLQ-32

EW

20

System (Raytheon)

Communications System
a.

C.

18

23

AN/MLQ-34 TACJAM-A (Lockheed

Sanders)

WARNING SYSTEMS
1

25

(RWR)

Radar Warning Receivers


a.

23

AN/APR-39A(V)3

25

Threat Warning System (Litton

26

Applied Technology)

b..AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving Set


(Hughes
2.

Missile

a.

b.

Aircraft

Company)

Warning Systems

28

(MWS)

31

32

Passive Systems
(1).

AN/AAR-44

33

(2).

AN/AAR-47

33

(3).

AN/AAR-FX

34

(4).

Silent

Attack Warning System

(SAWS)

Active Systems
(1).

...35

AN/ALQ-153

Tail

Warning Set

(Westinghouse Defense and Electronics Center)


(2).

AN/ALQ- 156(A)

(Lockheed Sanders
3

Laser Warning Systems


a.

D.

35

Missile

Warning System
37

Inc.)

(LWS)

AN/AVR-2 (Hughes Danbury

CONCLUSIONS

37

38
Optical Systems Inc)

40
41

.
.

IV.

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

43

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

43

General Description

43

A.

2.

a.

Noise Jamming

43

b.

Radar deception

44

(1).

Range-Gate Pull-Off

45

(2).

Angle Deception

45

(3),

Cross-Eye

45

46

Radar Countermeasures System


a.

Sidekick (Raytheon)

b.

AN/ALQ-184(V)

46

Self Protection

Pod (Raytheon)

B LASER COUNTERMEASURES
C.

47
49

INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES

50

General Description

50

2.

Infrared Countermeasure Systems

52

a.

Matador (LORAL)

52

b.

AN/ALQ-144 (Lockheed

c.

Directed Infrared Countermeasures

Sanders Inc)

(DIRCM)

D OFFBOARD COUNTERMEASURES
1

53

54

56

General Description

56

a.

Chaff

56

Smoke and Aerosol

58

c.

Radar

59

reflectors

(1).

Replica Naval

Decoy

(Irvin

Great Britain Ltd.)

59

d.

IR-Flares

60

e.

RF-Expendables

61
vi

(1).

GEN-X,

Generic Expendable Cartidge (Texas


61

Instruments)
(2).

STRAP,

Straight

Through Repeater Antenna


62

Performance (Tracor)
(3).

f.

Flying

Carmen

(THORN EMI

63

Electronics)

Decoys

65

(1)

LORALEI

(2).

TALD,

65

(Loral Electro-Optical)

Tactical Air

Launched Decoy
66

(Brunswick Defense)
g.

Recoverable Decoys
(1).

AN/SSQ-95

68
Active Electronic

Buoy

(Litton,

ATD/Magnavox)
(2)
h.

i.

j.

AN/TLQ-32

68
Antiradiation missile decoy (ITT)

Towed Decoy
Unmanned

69

Aerial Vehicles

71

Dispensing Systems for Chaff, IR-flares and RF-decoys


(1).

RAMPART (ML

(2).

Shield Tactical

Aviation Ltd)

2.

75

75

(3).

BOL

(Celsius Tech)

77

(4).

BOP

(Celsius Tech)

78

COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES
1.

73

Decoy System (Marconi

Underwater Systems Ltd)

E.

68

79
79

General Description

Communication Countermeasures System


a.

TACJAM-A (Lockheed

b.

AD/EXJ AM

Sanders/AEL)

(Loral Control Systems)


vii

80
80
81

F.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

81

INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS

83

A GENERAL DESCRIPTION

83

B GROUNT) APPLICATIONS

85

1.

C.

VXDS

Vehicle Integrated Defense System,

85

NAVAL APPLICATIONS

85

AN/SLQ-3 2 (Raytheon)

85

2.

EW 400 (Celsius Tech)

86

Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare

Suite,

AIEWS

D AIRBORNE APPLICATIONS

E.

VI

87

1.

Integrated Electronic Warfare System,

2.

APR-39A(V)2

Controller

INEWS

(TWS/EWC)

88

89

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE (SEAD)

A RADIATION HOMING SYSTEMS


High-Speed Anti-Radiation

Missile,

Anti Radiation Missile

HARM (Texas
92

Unmanned

Aerial Vehicle

B CONCLUSIONS
VII

97

LASER WEAPONS
1

98

High Energy Laser Air Defense Armoured Vehicle (MBB,


99

Diehl)

B HIGH-POWERED MICROWAVE (HPM)


C.

94
95

DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS


A.

91

92

Instruments)
2.

87

Threat warning system and Electronic Warfare

CONCLUSIONS

1.

87

NON-NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)


viii

101

102

D.

CONCLUSIONS

104

APPENDIX A MONOLITHIC MICROWAVE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT

TECHNOLOGY
APPENDIX B TRANSMISSION

105

IN

THE ATMOSPHERE

106

APPENDIX C JOINT ELECTRONICS TYPE DESIGNATION SYSTEM


(JETDS)

108

APPENDIX D FORMULAS FOR ECM

109

APPENDIX E LIST OF ACRONYMS

HI

LIST OF REFERENCES

115

LIST OF FIGURES

120

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

124

IX

I.

A.

PURPOSE
This tutorial
-

First to

is

written with

two main purposes:

be an introduction to

curriculum and

B.

INTRODUCTION

among them

ECM and ESM systems for the students of the EW

especially the international students

Second to give the author the

possibility to investigate a

broad spectrum of systems.

STRUCTURE
This tutorial categorizes equipment using the traditional definitions,

described

fall

outside the old

EW definition but are included by the new, wider definition.

For each group of equipment there

One

techniques involved

or

some systems

more

is

a short presentation including a description

typical systems for the

group are discussed

of the

At the end

of each chapter are the author's conclusions about the systems described and the trends for
the future in that area.

These conclusions are based both on discussions with people from

the industry but mostly from the facts amassed during the

The information

work

for this tutorial.

from three main

for this unclassified tutorial has been collected

sources:
-

Open

Visits to conferences

Information from the industry.

literature,

books and magazines.


and exhibitions

Because of military and economical considerations many


configuration and performance are secret and have not been

details

made

about the systems

available to the author

for inclusion in this tutorial.

Also, because the width of the subject

about different systems and technologies have been

recommended
The

left

many

in-depth details

out and the reader

is

to refer to the sources listed in the tutorial for further information.

written tutorial

is

accompanied by

five videos

from manufacturers of different

systems and by a bank of computerized pictures which either can be shown using
Microsoft PowerPoint or turned into viewgraphs.

n.

A.

BACKGROUND

ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Electronic warfare

(EW)

has traditionally been divided into three categories:

Electronic Support Measures (ESM).

Electronic Countermeasures

Electronic Counter-Countermeasures

To

this

group has been added

ESM

similar to

(ECM).

signal intelligence

(SIGINT) which

in

many ways

is

but has a longer time perspective.

The

general definitions have been:

EW

exploit,

(ECCM).

Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine,

reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which

retains friendly use

ESM

of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Actions taken to search

for, intercept, locate

and immediately identify radiated

electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition and the tactical

employment of forces

ECM

Direction finding of radios and radars

ECM includes jamming and

technique.

electronic deception.

1]

definitions have

been under review and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" Operations

Directorate has suggested the following


-

ESM

Actions taken to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum against

electronic warfare. [Ref

These

an

Actions taken to prevent or reduce the enemy's effective use of the

electromagnetic spectrum.

ECCM

is

Electronic

Combat (EC).

new

definitions:

Electronic Protection (EP).

Electronic Warfare Support (EWS).

EC

includes either electromagnetic or directed energy to attack the entire

possible targets with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or destroying

EC

is

the offensive part of

EP

replaces

EW and

ECCM and

is

is

list

enemy

of

capabilities.

ECM.

replacing

the protection of friendly forces against friendly or

enemy

employment of EW.

EWS
tactical

replaces

ESM and

comprises the collection actions primarily geared toward

support of the joint force commander

toward collection so combat

threat

This definition of

warning systems

will

EWS

is

more orientated

probably rather be a part of EC.

[Ref 2]

The

difference between the old and the

emphasize the use of

The new

B.

new

definitions

EW as an offensive weapon,

is

mainly that the

the old definitions

definitions also clearly includes directed energy

weapons

as

new ones

were more

reactive.

EW.

THE THREAT TO COUNTER


The purpose of this chapter

is

to give a description of the possible threat to

different platforms could be exposed.

This description

is

not intended to be an operational evaluation but rather a


capabilities represented

by modern weapon systems

the threat arsenal that can be countermeasured by

The main

expressed

in

which

general terms and

summary of the

technical

The chapter discusses those

EW-systems

at

parts of

the protected platform.

threat against the platforms of ground, naval and airborne forces are identified

and discussed.

is

1.

Ground Forces
The ground

forces main platform

is

the armored vehicle

(AV) which

includes

both the armored fighting vehicle (AFV) and the main battle tank (MBT). The main threat
against the

the

AV is the anti

tank guided missile

AV operates the threat

systems.

The

technologies.

from

ATGM can come from air launched

ATGM guidance system can


The

threat against the

range finder and thermal

sights.

(ATGM), depending on

or surface launched

operate using either IR/EO, radar,

AV also

Artillery

the terrain in which

wave

firing

(MMW)

guided munitions are also an


seekers being used (see

Figures 2-1 and 2-2).

s^

v:^K

Figure 2-1.

BONUS

or laser

includes direct fire from tanks using laser

and mortars

increasing threat with both IR and millimeter

TV

Guided

Artillery

Sub-Munitions

Figure 2-2.

STRIX IR Guided Mortar

Munitions

Naval Forces

2.

The main

threat against ships continues to be the anti-ship cruise missile

(ASCM). An example of a modern


Exocet

Mach

is

ASCM

is

the follow-on to the Exocet.

ASCM's

km

to 180 km.

are capable of even higher speeds but then their

be sea-skimming but instead a step dive toward the

equipped with better


seekers.

original

a subsonic sea-skimming missile while the one in development will be capable of

2.0-2.5, with an increase in range from 65

Russian

The

The times

target.

larger

mode of attack

Modern ASCM's

will

will also

not

be

ECCM and could include multiple sensors such as radar and IR

the missiles are transmitting will also decrease which, together with

the increased speed, reduces the time for defensive reactions.


to shore there will also be a threat from
missiles as well as

Some of the

from land based

weapons using

ASCM

When

navy operates close

laser designators

(see Figure 2-3). [Ref 3,

Figure 2-3. Land Based

ASCM

Ref

and IR guided
4]

Air Forces

3.

The main

Most

launched.

and often the

threat against aircraft

modern

aircraft losses in

pilot has

missiles, radar or

is

conflicts

been unaware of the attack

improved by taking advantage of progress

in

EO/IR

guided, air or surface

have been caused by IR guided missiles


until impact.

The IR

detector and seeker area.

missiles

Modem

is

being

IR

missiles are not limited to target the aircraft's hot parts, this gives the missiles ability to

attack from

all

aspects.

Modern

IR-missiles will also have seekers which

bands which makes deception with

flares

work

in

multiple

more complicated. Combinations of RF and IR

seekers will also be possible [Ref 5]


4.

Radar
Radar has been

in

use since world war

II, first

for surveillance but later also for

guidance of weapon systems. Radar systems have traditionally been the main antagonist
for

EW systems in a continuous measures

radar challenges to

countermeasures race

Some of the

latest

EW systems are described below;

Monopulse radar using

a single pulse for angle determination which

makes

deception techniques used against conical scan radars obsolete

Low

probability of intercept radars, using either spread spectrum,

coding or pulse compression, which

will challenge the

waveform

ECM receivers detection

sensitivity.

Pulse repetition frequency and carrier

agility

which

limits the effective

generation of noise or false targets.


-

High pulse

repetition fi^equency

which creates a very dense pulse environment

and places high demands on radar warning receivers


is

not necessary pulses from

adjacent battle areas).

enemy radar but

(RWR)

(the largest

instead friendly emission

problem

from

Phased array antennas which give an opportunity to instantaneously switch the

beam,

it

is

also possible to introduce sidelobe blanking

identification

jamming

to

This will

by scan rate obsolete and sidelobe blanking

mask

much more

a platform in another direction

For further information about radars the reader

will

is

make

make

sidelobe

difficult.

[Ref

6]

referred to specific radar

literature.

5.

Laser

The

threat

Today

decades.

from weapon systems using

lasers are

used

lasers has increased rapidly during the last

in several different

functions

Figure 2-4). The most important applications of lasers


-

Rangefinders: Range information

Designators: the target

is

is

in

in

weapon systems

weapon systems

provided to

fire

(see

include:

control systems.

illuminated by a laser and the missile

homes

in

on

the radiation reflected from the target.


-

Beamriders: the laser

detector to follow the


-

is

pointed

beam

at the target

and the missile uses a rear

to the target.

Blinding systems: intense radiation

is

used to cause temporary blinding of

personnel and sensor damage (see Chapter

VIT High Energy Beam Weapons).

LASER AAA GUNS

AREA DEFENSE
SYSTEMS
.

LASER ILLUMINATOR

TRACKERS
LASER PORTABLE
BEAMRIDER MISSILES

LASER BEAMRIDER

USER

MISSILES

GUIDED
MISSLES
LASER TANK
FIRE

Figure 2-4.

CONTROL

Weapon Systems Using

Lasers

Infrared

6.

Systems
purposes.

So

far

utilizing

IR radiation are today

IR has had

its

in

use for both detection and guidance

greatest impact in missile seekers and in sights.

With the

use of new detector materials today's missile seekers are able to detect longer
wavelengths. The effect of this development

homing

in

is

that the IR-missiles are not limited to

on hot objects such as the engine exhaust but instead can attack from a wider

range of engagement angles. There has also been a change


seekers since the
missiles

first

in

the techniques used by the

IR-missiles appeared in the early 60's (Figure 2-5).

were equipped with a chopping

reticle

which made

background. The next generation of seekers used a small

10

it

The

first

IR-

possible to reject the

field

of view to scan the area of

interest.

With the development of the

possible to build staring seekers.

focal plane array

(FPA) technology

The modern seekers constructs

by using a microprocessor the system

is

it

is

today

a image of the target and

able to discriminate the target

from the

background. The advanced IR seekers are not susceptible to some of the countermeasures
used against

reticle

based systems. [Ref 5) For further information about IR-radiation see

Appendix B.

RETICLE "CHOPPING" SEEKERS

SCANNING SEEKERS

STARING SEEKER

nnDDDD

n nnonn

DaDDDD
DDDDDn
DDDDDD
1970*

1S0

20OO*

Figure 2-5. Development of IR Seekers

11

Summary

7.

Table

gives a

summary over

the importance of different threats against different

platforms

TABLE

SUMMARY OF THREATS AGAINST DIFFERENT PLATFORMS

Threat/Platform

Ground

Radar guided

Ship

Aircraft

Low

High

High

High

Low, except

vehicle

missile

Laser guided missile

at

Medium

close ranges

IR guided

missile

Medium

Medium,

as part of

High

a multi sensor antiship missile

Laser rangefmder

Low

High

Medium, from

anti

aircraft artillery

(AAA)
IR/EO

sights

Low

High

Medium, from
short range missile

systems and
Surveillance radar

Low

High

12

High

AAA.

m. ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES

The purpose of ESM


radiation.

is

to search, intercept, locate and identify sources

The information acquired by

deployment of countermeasures.

ESM

being limited to systems which react

ESM is divided

into

in

two broad

ESM

is

used for threat recognition and

from electronic intelligence (ELINT) by

differs

real-time

categories:

Warning systems operating

Reconnaissance/surveillance systems operating

in real

time and used mainly for self protection.

the local electronic order of battle (EGB), for

in

near real time and used to update

ECM deployment

and

also to give information about target location for launch of missiles.

The border between


warning systems are called
referred to as

The

ESM

ESM

the

of enemy

two categories

is

not distinct and

it is

in

some cases

[Ref

common

1]

that the

RWR while the reconnaissance/surveillance systems are

systems.

system normally consists of the following:

Antennas.

Receivers.

Signal processor.

Computer with

Display

emitter library.

unit.

Different approaches regarding the antennas are used to determine the direction to
the emitter.

By

using several antennas, normally four, with separate receivers the direction

can be determined by comparing the amplitude from the different receivers or by

comparing the time on

arrival.

The

direction can also be found by using a directional

13

antenna which

is

rotated

There are also special direction finding antenna arrangement

the

Rotman

A.

ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES RECEIVERS


The

lens (see

receiver

is

SLQ-32).

that part

characteristics of the

ESM

of the system which has the largest influence on the

system. There are several different receiver approaches to

achieve the desired characteristics for the system. Below

important

ESM

like

is

a short description

of the most

receivers followed by a table describing the different system's

characteristics.

1.

Crystal Video Receiver

The

CVR

(CVR)

consists of a frequency multiplexer, detectors, log video amplifiers (see

Figure 3-1). The multiplexer

splits

the input signal spectrum into bands

where

it

is

detected and amplified.

ComprMslve
Vld*o

RF AmpJMtvr

Ampllflef

Band

Crystal

Video
MtillifMeier

Video

w-

Band

Vidao

Band

CVR
3

Video

Figure 3-1. Crystal Video Receiver

14

Receiver

Tuned RF Receiver (TRF)

2.

The TRF

is

an improved

crystal video detector.


sensitivity

good

The

filter

CVR,

computer controlled

can be switched

by noise bandwidth reduction and

receiver in a

to

In the

SHR the

incoming frequency

is

its

signals.

The TRF

is

narrow bandwidth.

down

to a lower intermediate

This lower frequency renders possible

and amplification which cannot be performed

SHR

of extraneous

translated

frequency (IF) before detection (see Figure 3-2)


filtering

of the

or out and improves the receivers

limiting

low density environment due

in front

Superheterodyne Receiver (SHR)

3.

the

in

put

filter is

at

the higher frequency.

higher sensitivity and better frequency selectivity than the

Wide Band
Filter

-^^
T

This gives

CVR.

Wideband

IF Filler

Signal

f^unprhpt

Flid

Frequency
Otcillator
1

Figure 3-2. Superhetrodyne Receiver

4.

Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver (IFM)

The IFM

By

receiver divides the incoming signal into

delaying one of the signals a phase

frequency.

The two

shift will

occur that

two paths

is

(see Figure 3-3).

a function

of the input

signals are fed into a phase correlator and an envelope detector

converts the phase difference into frequency information.

15

which

Splltt*r

Instantaneous

Sin

Y\

Phase
DtctOf

Video

Frequency

Cot Conversion

Information

Frequency
Measurement
IFM

"0"
Limiting
Ampllftef

Otiay
line

Figure 3-3. Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver

Combined Receivers

5.

By combining

different types

of receiver

it

is

possible to design a system

which

provides the advantages of both receivers and eliminates the major disadvantages.

combination of the IFM,

Doppler and

CVR and SHR gives a

CW without losing the ability against spread spectrum signals.

can take advantages of the


the

system which can handle both pulse

SHR

The system

CVR and/or IFM to

narrow bandwidth and use the

cue

SHR
6.

Microscan Receiver

The microscan

receiver has

the local oscillator, the receiver

width (see Figure 3-4)

is

many

is

case for

With increased sweep

long enough to be intercepted

some modern

radar, the

with the

caused to sweep the entire

but at the same time the sensitivity declines


pulse

similarities

POI

will

will

be excellent but only

be dramatically reduced

disadvantages could be overcome.

16

in a

filter

sweeping
pulse

bandwidth becomes wider

once during the sweep,

scan strategies including parking on a signal and varying

rapidly

RF bandwidth

rate the effective

The POI

at least

SHR. By

if not,

By

if

the

which

is

the

applying different

bandwidth the

7.

Conventional Channelized Receiver

The channelized
broad bandwidth and
with this approach
(see

is

at

receiver

the

8.

in

that the receiver

size

high performance

Bragg

group of parallel

same time

Appendix A) the cost and

be the norm

is

SHRs

(see Figure 3-4), this gives a

a high sensitivity and high POI.

becomes

large and expensive.

The disadvantage

By

use of MMIC

can be reduced and channelized receiver will probably

ESM

systems.

Cell Channelizer

The Bragg
deflection of a laser

cell is

beam

an acousto-optic device which converts


proportional to the frequency of the

17

RF

RF

energy into a

signal (see Figure 3-4).

Mulli

Combiner

MulNpleacr

pleier

j"

Encoder

Frequency Data

Channelized
Receiver

z^
=^
Local
CHclttators

Detector Array

FrequerKy
Frequeftcy

Bragg

Information

Tranalaion

Cell

Instantaneous
Fourier

Transform
LaMr

IFT

Source

Frequerwy

- Weight1r>g

Tranaiatlon

S%wept

"nmlf^g

Local
OacMlator

and
Sync

Microscan
Compressive
Receiver
Amplifier

Ffequer>cy
Data

Figure 3-4. Channelized Receiver

9.

Bragg

Cell

Microscan Receiver

Summary
Table 2 gives a summary of the characteristics for the different receivers, some of

the features

compared might need

Pulse width,

CW, PRI

minimum

agile,

to be defined:

length of pulse required for detection by the receiver.

Frequency

agile

and Spread Spectrum, the receiver's

detect and measure.

18

ability to

TABLE

COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT RECEIVERS


CVR

Receiver

IFM

IFM
CVRy

SHR

[Ref

Micro-scan

7]
Bragg-cell

Conventional

SHR

Features

PW(ns)

40

20

20

50

125

100

35

CW

Fair (if

Degradable

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

^'es

Good

Good

Good

Fair

Good

Good

equipped
with chopper)

PRI

Good

agile

(Imprecise

TOA)
Frequency

Fair

agile

(does not

Good

Good

Poor

Good

Good

Good

Acceptable

Poor

Fair

Good

Good

measure
frequency)

Spread

Fair

Fair

Spectrum

(does not

(does not

measure

measure

frequency)

amplitude)

Wide

Wide

Narrow

Wide

Wide

Wide

Wide

Poor

Good

Excellent

Good

Good

Good

Good

Sensitivity

Fair

Fair

Excellent

Fair

Good

Good

Good

POI

High

High

Poor

High

Higli

High

High

Simul-

Poor

Poor

Good

Moderate

Good

Good

Good

Poor

Poor

Good

Fair

Good

Good

Good

Good

Good

Excellent

Fair

Fair

Fair

Excellent

Lowest

Low

Medium

Low

Medium

High

Highest

Smallest

Small

Medium

Medium

Small

Small

Large

Lowest

Low

Low

Low

High

Medium

Highest

In-

stantaneous

BW
Frequencv'

response

taneous
signals

Immunity

to

jamming
Dynamic
range

Power consumption

Size&
Weight
Cost

[Ref.

B.

l,Ref

7]

ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES SYSTEMS

ESM

systems are normally divided into two categories depending on frequency

coverage, communication surveillance systems (0.5-500


surveillance systems (0.5-20 GHz).

19

MHz)

and microwave

Microwave Systems

1.

(L

SLQ-32
5).

EW System (Raytheon)

AN/SLQ-32

a ship-borne threat detection and analysis system (see Figure 3-

is

There are several versions of the system, some of which incorporate

chapter

V Integrated

Electronic Warfare Systems and chapter

Countermeasures. The SLQ-32

is

ECM (see

IV Electronic

designed to provide warning, identification and

direction finding of radar-guided anti-ship missiles and the radar associated with the

targeting and launch of the missiles.

US

More

than 360 systems have been delivered to the

Navy.

The system

IFM

consists of two antenna arrays (one for each side of the ship),

and direction finding receivers (DFR),

tracking unit

(DFC/DTU),

a direction frequency correlator/digital

computer including

threat library

and a display unit (see

Figure 3-6), The two different receiver types are used to achieve both frequency and
direction.

The data from

descriptor

word (PDW), which

memory.

the receivers are correlated in the

more

If three or

DTU

ms

computer

DTU to

fiirther analysis.

the

The data

to

form a pulse

then stored by frequency and angle

cell in

the emitter

file

pulses of this frequency and from this angle are received within

a time interval of 32
directs the

is

DFC

is

notifies the

computer

that a

new

emitter

is

present.

The

store pulses of the emitter to provide sufficient pulses for

used to calculate pulse repetition interval (PRI), scan period

and type of scan. These parameters are used along with frequency to characterize the
emitter for identification.
threat emitter library.
fijrther actions

The observed

The computer sends

by the operator.

treat the emitter as

signals characteristics are

though

it

is

When

compared with the

the emitter information to the display for

an ambiguous identification occurs the system will

the most threatening of the possible matches.

20

Figure 3-5.

AN/SLQ-32 Antenna Array

21

Freq

Direction

16

Finding
Receiver

16

Channels

Angle
Encoder

Angle

Angle

Pulse
Rate

Scan
Type

(DFR)
Presorter

Computer

(DFC DTU)

Display
Control

Console

Instantaneous

Semi Omni

a-

Frequency
Measuring

1
Frequency

Receiver
(IFM)

Figure 3-6. Block Diagram for

The IFM
the

DFR

AN/SLQ-32

receiver determines the frequency of the received energy while

provides the system with angle and amplitude information

omni antennas while the

DFR

The IFR uses semi

uses four multibeam antennas, each covering 90 degrees, to

determine the direction to the emitter(see Figure 3-7). The multibeam antenna determines
the direction by focusing the incoming signals to a point detector representing the
direction of the emitter.

The focusing property of the

lens

is

independent of frequency

which makes accurate direction finding possible over a wide frequency band.

22

Direction Finding

Antenna Elements

Collector

>>

Receivers

Signal

Out
Signal

N
Microwave
Lens

Input
Ports

Figure 3-7. Multibeam Lens Antenna

The
three rings.

The

receiving ship and friendly emitters are

missile emitters are


in the

display unit presents the data on a polar display which

shown

outer ring. [Ref.


2.

8,

in

shown

in

is

divided into

the center, hostile

the middle ring while hostile non-missile emitters are

shown

Ref. 9, Ref. 10]

Communications System
(L

AN/MLQ-34 TACJAM-A (Lockheed Sanders)

TACJAM-A
a tracked vehicle.

The

is

ESM

a tactical

part

VHP jamming

system

and provides the operator with


(see Figure 3-8).

deployed on

The monitoring of frequencies

computer controlled and the operator inputs frequency range,

The

is

of the system consists of multiple receivers to allow the

system to monitor many frequencies simultaneously

operational characteristics.

The system

signal characteristics

is

and

receiver automatically scans the desired frequency range

a report

Multiple stations

over channels which match the given description

may be connected by wire

or radio to form a

coordinated automatic direction finding and emitter position fixing network. The

demodulated audio output

fi-om the receivers

is

headset.

23

available to the operator through a split

The block diagram

ESM part

for the

is

shown

in

Figure 3-9. The system

operates as follows:
-

The RF

ESM

distributor interfaces the

subsystem to antennas

in

four

bands.
-

The tuner down-converts

The

a broad bandwidth for digitization.

acquisition units applies digital

FFT

for detection

and direction

finding.

The

analysis unit provides automatic signal recognition

demodulation, parallel channels permit high throughput


-

The

acquisition/analysis

system

in

(ACQ/ ANAL)

response to tasking,

jamming and maintains


Frequency range

is

20

it

selects

and

rate.

automatically optimizes the

and schedules signals for

active and historical data bases.

200 MHz. [Ref

8,

Ref

11,

Ref

12,

Ref

13]

TASKING:

SIGNAL FREQUENCY RANGE


SIGNAL CHARACTERISTICS
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
VOICE CONTENT

SIGNAL ENVIRONMENT

OPERATOR ANAUrZES THE


VOICE CONTENT OF SIGNAL
TO MAKE THE FINAL
DETERMINATION

TACJAM-A EQUIPMENT
TACJAM-A EQUIPMENT ANALYZES
AND MEASURES THE OF OF EACH
DETECTED SIGNAL ONLY THOSE
WHICH MATCH THE TASKING ARE
REPORTED TO THE OPERATOR
FOR FINAL THREAT DETERMINATION

REPORTING
FREQUENCY

SIGNAL CHARACTERtSTiCS
EMITTER LOCATION
VOICE CONTENT

Figure 3-8.

TACJAM-As Man-Machine

24

Interface

HF VHF

UHF

CTL/

SHF

CAL

uw
I

r!oc<

II

Hegri (m

<flri
Irtxjl

(t))

Pov

(I.W1

Oprair*g )omo (C)

**<

^^

Mii-sio-e'oo

<4

VC'Crnor

Md-siD-eioc

:6

A/l.iuOe

MH-STD-eiOO

Ht^TKjry/Son fog/Ti#Tgu*

MK-STD-eiOO

RF DISTRIBUTION

<*

5'

SfWCk

45

-i5i&

'"

TUNER

KEYBOARD

Tcsr
ACQUISITION

SUN-4
GRAPHIC
TERMINAL

ANALYSIS

ACQUISITION

ANALYSIS

(optlonaO

ZL
-^ AUDIO

GPS, NAV, MHI (MIL-STO-1S53)


DATA LINKS (RS-4Z2)

SYSTEM CLOCK

(10

MHi COAX)

SCSI

ACQ/ANAL

CONTROUER

HIGH SPEED JAM BUS

ETHERNET (IEEE-802

Figure 3-9.

C.

TACJAM-A Block

3)

Diagram

WARNING SYSTEMS
1.

Radar Warning Receivers (RWR)


The

RWR

is

an

ESM

system with scaled-back capacity,

it

was developed

the requirement for deployment in aircraft, submarines and armored vehicles.


platforms' limited space puts heavy constraints on

volume and weight

and modes of operation

To be

between

able to provide sufficient warning the

needs to be capable of real time signal processing. The

RWR

RWR measures the signals

frequency, pulse width, amplitude, angle of arrival and time of arrival.

compares the measured parameters against

The

The system should

further provide sufficient warning against radar and be able to distinguish


different types

meet

to

a library over

known

The

RWR

threat emitters.

The

amplitude and time/angle of arrival are used to determine the direction and an approximate
distance to the emitter.

25

RWR can be equipped with a variety of receivers including crystal video,

The

wide and narrow band superhetrodyne and tuned radio-frequency. Combinations of


different receivers are also possible to

meet the requirement of sensitivity, probability of

intercept and ability to operate in a high pulse density environment.

operating

RWR which can handle a high pulse density

high altitude a

at

a platform operating

low

at

For platforms

altitude can use a less

complex and cheaper

is

favorable while

RWR with less

capability to handle high pulse densities.

The

threat emitters are prioritized depending

(searching, illuminating, tracking or guidance) and


identified emitter.

The

presentation of the threat

of a blinking symbol and audibly with

is

on the detected mode of operation

weapon system associated with the


normally done both visually by means

different tones representing different types

of threats

or by a synthetic voice describing the threat emitter.

RWR can either be used as a stand-alone system or as a part in an integrated

The

EW system (see Chapter V).


different types

tactical aircraft.

low

[Ref

1,

level,

Ref

with both audio warning

The

emitter.

It

lock

is

ALR-67

14,

Ref

AN/A PR-39A (1^3


The ALR-39

threats.

are described

depending on requirements.

aircraft operating at

CL

Two RWRs

in

is

is

ALR-39A

is

below and they represent two


designed for helicopters and light

a system designed for frontline carrier-based

15]

Threat Warning System (Litton Applied Technology)

a lightweight radar warning system that provides the pilot

form of synthetic speech and a graphical presentation of the

graphical presentation identifies the threat type and the azimuth to the

also indicates if the threat

is

searching or locked and tracking, and

broken.

The system

consists often units (see Figure 3-10):

26

when

the

One

digital signal processor.

Two

crystal video receivers.

Four E/J band

spiral

One C/D band

omnidirectional blade antenna.

One

display unit.

One

control unit.

MCMCATOH

antennas

aOXTWO.
VT

Figure 3-10.

The system

is

AN/APR-39A(V)3

able to identify the threats by pulse repetition interval (PRI),

pulse width (PW), pulse frequency modulation

(PFM) and scan

measure frequency. The system has the following


radar types:

27

limitations

rate.

The system does not

of detection for different

CW:

Pulse Doppler (PD); limited.

Low

effective radiated

Low

probability of intercept (LPI): not possible.

not possible.

The APR-39s
reprogrammable
[Ref

8,

Ref

either

power (ERP):

library is capable

limited.

of storing 200 emitters,

by change of the user data module or through a

it is

memory

loader.

16]

b..AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving Set (Hughes Aircraft

Company)
The ALR-67
with

MMIC

(see

is

a faurth generation

RWR

It is

compact system designed

Appendix A). The system consists of both channelized and

superhetrodyne receivers to enhance detection of all relevant radar threats. Thanks to the
use of three different types of antennas the
polarization in the

system

is

microwave

threat

and

can provide coverage of all

band including the millimeter wave

designed to be able to operate

different parts

ALR-67

in a

(MMW). The

very dense pulse environment.

their location at the aircraft are

28

shown

in

Figure 3-1

The systems

and 3-12.

g'/

Signal

Interception

Receiver

RFDown

^-^

Conversion

Signal

and

Detection

Millimeter

and

Wave

Signal

Conditioning

Conditioning

Pulse/CW Detection and Generation

^p? -;^:^

Countefmeasures

of Signal Description

Countermeasures

Threat Identification and

Prioritization

Computer

Si^

AudiO

Tones

and
Azlmutfi Display

Visual Presentation

kidlcator

of Threats

Figure 3-11.

Pilot

^>-^^L.

Control SUtusUnIt

AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving

29

Interfaces
to

Set

System

Quadrant Receiver

Countermeasures

Computer

Figure 3-12.

AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving

The countermeasures
parameters of the pulsed and

receiver generates digital

CW radar waveforms detected.

Set

words describing the


Measured parameters

include amplitude, angle of arrival, time of arrival, frequency, pulse width and modulation.

By

using the rapid tuning superhetrodyne receivers

The

fiilly

channelized receiver has 22 parallel

filters

30

CWs

can be detected and measured.

to accomplish pulse intercept.

Via the countermeasures computer the ALR-67 interfaces with several


systems including dispensers and
2.

Missile

HARM.

CM

[Ref. 8, Ref. 17, Ref. 18]

Warning Systems (MWS)

The functions of a
and give a warning to the

Missile

pilot

Warning System

and to the

is

to detect an approaching missile

aircraft defensive systems.

The

integration of

MWS into the Electronic Warfare Suite of the aircraft will be discussed in the Integration
section.

MWSs have been in use on aircraft

since the late 70's.

They have gained

increased importance because of the proliferation of highly lethal IR and


the aircraft losses suffered during the conflicts in the

IR

missiles.

Because many IR/EO

last

surface-to-air missiles

RWR will not be sufficient to give warning.

EO

missiles.

Of

decades a majority have been to

work independently of a

The increased

ECCM

capability in

radar, a

modern

missiles has decreased the effectiveness of on-board countermeasures and today the trend
is

toward using more

Because of the decoys short operating

oflf-board systems.

timing of the deployment becomes

critical for its effectiveness.

The

life

the

MWS can provide

information about the time to intercept and the direction of the approaching missile and
trigger launch of off-board countermeasures.

MWS can be divided into two groups:

active and passive

The

active systems

use a pulsed Doppler radar when the passive works with IR or EO. The choice of system

depends heavily on the type of platform used. For a stealthy platform a passive
the natural choice so as not to give

away

platform with large signatures an active

the advantage created by the platform.

MWS could be a good choice.

is

For a

Some of the most

important advantages and disadvantages with the different systems are shown

31

MWS

in

Table

3.

TABLE

COMPARISON BETWEEN ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MWS

Active

Avoidance of detection

MWS

Passive

MWS

Very good

low
compared with other
radiating sources on
Fair, relatively

platform

Weather

Almost

sensitivity

all

Poor performance

weather

capability

weather

Range estimation

Yes

No

Time-to-intercept

Good

Poor

in

bad

estimation

Yes,

Ability to detect missile in

in all

Some

phases

different phases

systems unable to

detect missile after rocket-

motor burn out


Similar techniques as those used

in

MWS

is

used

in

passive detection systems for air

defense surveillance systems. These systems are deployed both

discussed further here. [Ref


a.

8,

Ref

14,

Ref

19,

Ref 20]

Passive Systems

The passive
missiles for detection.

MWS uses the IR radiation generated from the incoming

The exclusion of detectable energy transmission

systems' greatest advantage compared with active systems

assumed

sea and land

Normally those systems are not considered EW-systems and are not

applications.

wavelengths

in

at

which the

different systems operate has not

that they are optimized against the radiation

represents a wavelength of 4.3

\xtc\.

It is

is

the passive

Information about the

been released but

it

can be

from the rocket-motor, which

expected that the propulsion systems of future

generations of threat missiles will be cooler than the current systems which will lead to

new

classes of warning systems operating at longer wavelengths. [Ref 20]

32

(1).

AN/AAR-44
The system

Corporation and

is fitted

to the

USAF

is

produced by Cincinnati Electronics

The AN/AAR-44 uses search continually

C-130s

while tracking and verifying missile launches. The system

is

and has some countermeasure discrimination. To eliminate


is

able to handle multiple missile

false

alarms the

AN/AAR-44

equipped with multidiscrimination modes against solar radiation and terrain reflections.

Different fields of view can be attained by using different sensor unit configurations. [Ref
8,

Ref 21]
(2).

AN/AAR-47
The system

AN/AAR-47

is

installed

is

produced by Loral Electro-Optical Systems

on helicopters and slower fixed-wing

Marine Corps. The system consists of four sensors, a


indicator.

To

aircrafls in the

central processor

US Navy

and

and a control

achieve spherical coverage additional sensors can be added. The system

uses algorithms and signal processing techniques to achieve a low false alarm rate.

The

data from the sensors are analyzed by the processor both independently and as a group

Loral also markets the

AAR-47

as

warning receiver for armored vehicles

The AAR-47

should, according to Loral, be able to detect not only incoming anti-tank missiles but also
shells

from larger

caliber

weapons. The

detectors for laser warning

latest

modification of the

The four detectors

are

AAR-47

mounted around the

(see Figure 3-13) and operate in different wavelengths between 0.4 and

detector gives the

AAR-47

a laser warning capability.

33

[Ref

8,

Ref

21,

sensor includes

existing optics

LI

[am.

Ref 22]

The

laser

Figure 3-13.
(3),

AAR-47

Detector Unit

AN/AAR-FX
The system

Corporation (see Figure 3-14) and

is

is

produced by Cincinnati Electronics

sized for fighter aircraft.

The system uses

continuous track-while-search processing and has simultaneous multi-threat capability.

The AN/AAR-FX uses

multi-spectral discriminators to reject

countermeasures. [Ref 23]

34

backgrounds and

AN/AAR-FX

Figure 3- 14
(4)

Silent

The

Attack Warning System

SAWS

developed under the sponsorship of the

is

US

second generation IR warning system being

Air Force.

SAWS

declare and categorize potential hostile aircraft and missiles.


array technique which at the start of the project

systems using staring arrays. The system


missile and an aircraft

and the

aircraft's in

b.

is

designed to detect,

The system uses the scanning

showed much lower false-alarm

rates than

supposed to be able to differentiate between a

should be able to categorize the missiles

in

burn or post-burn

normal or after-burner mode [Ref 21]

Active Systems

The
missiles.

It

is

(SAWS)

active

MWS systems uses pulse Doppler radar to detect incoming

The radar gives accurate

time-to-intercept predictions at

all

altitudes

weather conditions. The main challenge for the radar based systems

almost

all

effects

of clutter. The

effects

of clutter varies with

aircraft speed, altitude

is

the

and approach

angle of the attacking missile (see Figure 3-15). The most demanding case

35

and during

is

a tail-chase

"

high speed missile attack

at

low

altitude.

The amplitude of the

clutter received increases

with decreasing altitude and the spectrum of the clutter return signals becomes broader
with increasing ground speed. The backlobe of the antenna can produce positive clutter

Doppler returns which can compete with the positive Doppler return of the incoming
missile (see Figure 3-16).

[Ref 24, Ref 25]

T7~

r!'''!

T^
J,.-

MISSIUE

SIDE/BACKLOBE
CLUTTEfi RETURN
V

MAIN BEAM
CLUTTER RETURN

Figure 3-15. Clutter Return for Active

36

MWS

MAINLOB?

BACKLOBEO
*DOPPLER

SIDELOBES

90"

ZERO OOPPLCrt

Figure 3-16. Doppler Return from Incoming Missile


(1).

AN/ALQ-153

Tail

Warning Set (Westinghouse Defense and

Electronics Center)

The ALQ-153
range-gated Doppler system and

it

is

installed in the

USAF

B-52G/H.

It is

continuously displays the most imminent threat.

The

system automatically calculates range and time-to-intercept and transfer the information to
automatic countermeasures equipment. [Ref 8]
(2).

AN/ALQ- 156(A)

Missile

Warning System (Lockheed

Sanders Inc.)

The ALQ-156
operating

in

is

Doppler

radar, probably

the C/D-band, which detects incoming missiles and can trigger an automatic

ECM dispenser.
system

consists of a pulse

The system

evaluates the threats by comparison of the closing rates.

stated to be able to operate close to the

37

The

ground with good detection probabilities

of missiles. Depending on the type of aircraft, the system uses two or four antennas (see
Figure 3-17). [Ref 26]

1^

ANTENNAS

FORWARD
ANTENNA

RECEfVER/TRANSMITTER
UNIT
Figure 3-17.

3.

AN/ALQ- 56(A)
1

Missile

Warning System

Laser Warning Systems (LWS)


Laser warning systems have become a part of the survivability equipment during

the last decade because of the rapid growth in


for missile guidance or for range finding.
laser systems

needs a

line

weapons systems

utilizing the laser either

Because of the properties of the

of sight between the pointer and the

38

target.

For

laser radiation,
this

reason laser

warning systems have so

far

mainly been installed on aircraft and armored vehicles. For

ships operating in coastal areas

LWS

will

become an important

part of the overall

equipment. Because of the laser beams' small width, a warning from a


high probability that the platform

means

is

targeted but the small

beam width

LWS
at the

warning

means with

same time

that a large platform like a ship needs several detectors to insure proper warning.

The

LWS

gives the following information:

Warning,

Angle of arrival, direction to the

Pulse repetition interval, which

if

the platform

is

targeted.
laser threat.

is

compared to the emitter

library

and used to

identify the threat emitter.

The

LWS

background using

takes advantage of the laser radiation's high coherence to fiUer out the

a four-stepped etalon.

The angle of arrival

system together with a detector array (see Figure 3-18). The

component

in

an integrated

EW system (see Chapter V).

39

is

achieved by using a

LWS

slit

can be used as one

LASER RADIATION

DETECTOR ARRAY

Figure 3-18. Angle of Arrival Determination

a,

AN/A VR-2 (Hughes Danbury


The AN/A VR-2

characterizes optical signals.

one interface
the

unit

AN/ A VR-2

is

a airborne laser detecting set

The system

covers 360 around the


I, II

detects, identifies

III,

With the four sensor

unit

aircraft.

and

It

and

consists of four sensor units (see Figure 3-19),

comparator and one display

sensor heads one for each band

Optical Systems Inc)

The sensor

there

is

space

unit

left in

is

units

mounted

equipped with three

the unit for a band

IV

sensor head. The sensor unit receives the laser signals, validates the signals, identifies
threat type, prioritizes the threats and passes the threat

comparator. The

pilot gets the

warning about the

message to the interface

laser threat

from the display

unit

The

system can also be used as a part of an integrated radar and laser warning receiver system.

40

The same sensor heads


for the

as used in

Ml Abrams tank.

AN/AVR-2

in a laser

warning system

[Ref. 27, Ref. 28]

Figure 3-19.

D.

have been used

AN/AVR-2

Detector Unit

CONCLUSIONS
Because todays

threat

from missiles uses a wide array of techniques for

their

guidance

the warning systems needs to be able to detect not only radar and laser radiation but also

IR

radiation

from passive missile systems. The use of all aspect-attacking IR missiles has

further increased the requirements of the warning system by


missiles

from

all

angles a necessity.

41

making detection of incoming

The

increased pulse density created by the deployment of pulse doppler radar, both

demand

enemy and

friendly, has created

capability.

The dense pulse environment and

signals has lead to a

for systems with a high signal processing

the introduction of frequency and

renewed importance of direction

finding, in this case as a

PRI

agile

method

to

discriminate between different signals. Because the ability to handle a dense signal

enivronment

is

strongly related to the price of the warning system,

important to analyse

in

it

has

which kind of threat environment the platform

become

will operate; the

pulses present are very different for a low flying helicopter compared to those encountered

by a high flying interceptor. Below

is

a table describing potential

of the introduction of the systems described

TABLE

ESM

countermoves because

in this chapter.

POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES TO ESM SYSTEMS

(microwave)

The use of special "war modes" could make the system unable

to identify the radar.


-

Low

probability of intercept radar will challenge the

ESM

receivers sensitvity

ESM

Spread spectrum techniques.

(communication)

Increased capability for coding will

make

the possibilities for

effective decoding for tactical use small.

RWR

MWS passive

Complex wave forms makes identification harder.


mode makes the reaction times

Late switch to active

Reduction of IR signature decreases the

short.

MWS detection

range.

MWS active

Decreased radar cross section and use of stealth techniques.

Use of deceptive jamming

to create false alarm

which causes

distraction

LWS

Illuminating only during the very last phase of an

engagement

with semi-active laser weapons gives the platform short time to


react to the warning
-

Destructive illumination with high energy laser operating in

same band as the detector.


Use of cheap laser illuminators emulates beam
and that way creates false alarms.

the
-

42

riding systems

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

IV.

The

electronic countermeasures described in this chapter are divided into five

categories:
-

Radar CM.

Laser

Infi-ared

Off-board

Communication CM.

CM.
CM.
CM.

Infrared and laser

CM are used mainly for self protection,

used to support an operation while radar and off-board

communications

CM

is

CM can be used both as self

protection and as support for a strike.

A.

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES
1.

General Description

The radar countermeasures can be divided


deception.
the aircraft.

Denial

is

into

two

categories: denial and

normally achieved by using noise jamming that masks the echo from

Deception

is

performed by introducing signals designed to fool or conflise the

radar by appearing as one or

more

false targets.

[Ref 14]

Noise Jamming

(L

The
radar system to

objective with noise

mask or obscure

as a large area of clutter.

jamming

is

the target echo.

to introduce a noise like signal into the

The operator

sees the noise on the

Depending on the power of the jammer, the noise

the radar's threshold in only the main lobe or both

43

in

will

PPI

be above

the main lob and in the side lobes.

By

changing the radiated power with respect to the radar's antenna gain, the jammer can
introduce a constant amount of noise into the radar and thereby deny the radar the
direction information.

There are several techniques to introduce noise


the frequency of the radar

is

unknown

or

is

The disadvantage with


needed to jam which

this

much wider

approach

will lead to a

high

If the radar's frequency

jamming technique uses


bandwidth

is

that

is

the right frequency.

If

changing, or to cover the operating frequency

of several radars a technique called barrage can be used. This


covering a spectrum of frequencies

at

is

a broad

band jamming

than the operating bandwidth of the radar.

most power

will

be wasted on frequencies not

power requirement.

is

known, spot jamming can be used. The spot

bandwidth centered

at

the radar frequency; the

jammers

normally somewhat larger than the bandwidth of the radar.

Swept jamming

is

another technique for broad band noise which

is

achieved by sweeping a narrow band noise signal across the range of frequencies to be

jammed.

By
noise
the

utilizing the

jamming can be

power

in

frequency and direction information from an

limited in

bandwidth and directed thereby substantially increasing

the radar receiver [Ref 14,

b.

RWR the

Ref

29]

Radar deception
There are several

different techniques

used for deception of radars and two

main approaches;
-

Generation of a large number of false targets to overload the system.

Provision of incorrect target bearing, range and/or velocity information

to the radar.

44

Some of the

specific techniques to achieve incorrect targeting are described

below.
(1).

Range-Gate Pull-Off
This

against tracking radars.

makes

the most fundamental deception technique used

The deceiver

repeats the received radar pulse which

initially

the radar indicate this as a target and because of the strong return adjust

sensitivity.

The decption jammer then

signal, this is

done

discontinued.

starts to increase the

time delay

to fool the radar to follow the false target.

the real and false targets


is

is

is

When

in

its

the repeated

the distance between

larger than the range gate of the radar, the deceptive signaling

If succesful this will lead to the radar losing

its

tracking on the actual

target.

(2).

Angle Deception

To employ

a succeful angle deception, the

which angle-measurment technique the radar

is

Con-scan radar systems can be

using

deceived by transmitting a signal when the radar beam

and stopping the transmission when the beam


real

echo and the deceiving

is

is

pointed

pointed toward

signal will be interpreted

jammer must know

away from

it

the platform

The combination of the

by the radar which

will result in

incorrect information about the target's angular position.

Range-gate pull-off and angle deception are often used


together

in

deceptive systems.
(3).

Cross-Eye

The cross-eye deception technique


tracking radars including mono-pulse
a direction perpendicular to the

wave

The tracking system has

is

effective against

a tendency to align itself in

front of the signal being tracked.

repeaters located at different ends of the platform

45

it

is

By

using

two

possible to create a phase-front

distortion

1).

[Ref.

which causes the radar to misinterpret the position of the target (see Figure

1,

Ref. 14,

Ref

29, Ref. 30,

4-

Ref 31]

UAOET POSITION

REAL

WAVE FRONT DISTORTION

Figure 4- 1

2.

Cross-Eye Deception

Radar Countermeasures System


CL

Sidekick (Raytheon)
Sidekick

is

with SLQ-32. The system

an active
is

ECM

system for anti-ship defense that works together

designed for small and midsized ships (900-4500 tons). The

transmitter uses a multibeam array antenna which

the receiver antenna

miniature travelling
reliability since

in

SLQ-32. Each array element

wave tube (TWT)

an individual

performance and not a

works
is

(see Figure 4-2)

after the

The multibeam

46

lens principle as

fed by an individual

low-power

This design improves the system's

TWT failure only cause a slight

total failure.

same

degradation of the system's

array antenna also gives the system a

high effective radiated

power (ERP) and

beams. The jamming power

is

said to be sufficient to prevent burn-through

targeting radar until the source

radar

is

the possibility of instantly-directed

is

within the hard

said not to burn through the deception

its flight

path enough to

types and

hit

the ship.

in different directions

kill

A typical

envelope.

jamming power

until

it

jamming
of a typical

anti-ship missile

can no longer adjust

The Sidekick system can engage radars of different

simultaneous

The system

selects

jamming techniques

depending on the identification of the radar done by the SLQ-32. [Ref 32]

Antenna
Elements

TWTs

\-^

Beamport

Countermeasures

Control Unit

Computer
Control

Exdter

Driver

Jamming

Jamming
Signal

Out

Signal

/A

In

Microwave
Lens

CXitput

Ports

Figure 4-2.

b.

AN/SLQ-32 Multibeam Lens Antenna

AN/ALQ-184(V) Self Protection Pod (Raytheon)


The ALQ-184

missiles, radar-directed

is

an active countermeasure system against surface-to-air

gun systems and airborne

interceptors.

The system can function

as

both repeater, transponder and noise jammer. The different parts of the system are shown
in

Figure 4-3. The pod uses a multibeam system similar to that used

lens

producing up to 15 beams. The ALQ-184

47

is

in

Sidekick with each

equipped with 16 mini-TWTs.

Pump
Accum

cs^'-t LVPS No.

Transmitter

Assy

(
Aft

^
LB RF Assy

LB SSA Driver

HVPS

r^r'*^'

il^^

fc'

Antenna Assy
(Articulated)

(2)

-lU)-*

Transmit

Assy

(2)

-^

Auxiliary

Receiver

t^'

*A.,

^^4a^->...
LVPS

No. 2

Fwd
*

LB Tech

kjwt^
-*

Generator

_-r^
mummm

.^*^

Techniques
Generator

LB vco

LB Service
Module Assy

Antenna Assy
(Articulated)

v^
'^

Set

'

On Assy
i'- '

Att

Receive

System Control
Assembly

Antenna Assy

Figure 4-3.

AN/ALQ-

The block diagram


Figure 4-4.

An incoming RF

the signal direction

The

for

signal

is

determines the

Processing

r^

Fwd Receive Assy

VCO Assy' Antenna


A
Assy
.

84( V) Self Protection

ALQ-184

Pod

describing the operation

focused by the lens to the

DF

is

shown

in

receiver representing

receiver determines signal presence and encodes the signal by

angle-of-arrival and frequency subband.

the central processor.

,,^^

Sub-Band

"-^J^^^

Once

The

signal

is

compared against a

a signal has been classified as a threat, the

threat library in

ECM

control

ECM mode response and initiates the pod's active countermeasures in real-

time operation. The transmit switches select the transmission angle to be transmitted and
the

Rotman

lens provides the correct phasing and feeds the mini

TWTs

to the antenna

array elements.

modes, an

In the transponder and noise

selected from the voltage controlled oscillator

by the techniques generator.

(VCO)

internally generated signal is

assembly. This signal

mode, the

In the repeater

48

signal

is

is

modulated

retransmitted to the threat

u
radar with the selected deceptive modulation.
threshold which stops
received. [Ref 8,

Sector

Omni

Rc)ver

it

from transmitting

The system has

until a certain

a preset pulse-count

number of pulses have been

Ref 33]

^
^

Frequency

Measured
Recei/er

lLns

II

OF

Preprocessor

C>

Receiver

Central

MPMT

Processir>g

^j,^ System Data


arxl Conlrol

_y

Interlace

Switch

i^
ECM

\Jr.

Channel

Umts

Cl

Control

ECM
Waveform

EfeL

Generator

xr

Min.-TWT
Amptifters

Transmit
Array

^-^

AmpHier

Switch

Mods

VCOs

MPMT

Lens

^--O

Figure 4-4.

B.

xr

MPMT

Switch

Integrated Multibeam Electronic

Warfare System Block Diagram

AN/ALQ- 84(V)
1

Self Protection

Pod Block Diagram

LASER COUNTERMEASURES

There are today two very


laser designator or

beam

riders

some of the

is

beam

different

ways

to utilize laser for the guidance

riding (see Chapter

to transmit a laser

II

beam toward

Background)

The countermeasure

against

the sight with the purpose of destroying

electronics or optics in the system (see Chapter VII

Weapons). The method against

of missiles: by

laser designators

is

more

High Energy Beam

similar to deceptive

countermeasures. In systems using laser designators the incoming missile homes on the

49

from the target

laser radiation reflected

The

target's

illuminate another object that will serve as a decoy.

systems have some resistance against


use some form of code

in

this

countermeasure

is

The most modern

to use a laser and

laser designator

type of deceptive jamming and are expected to

the laser beam. In order to be able to defeat these systems the

platform needs to have a receiver that can detect the code and implement modulations to

More of a

the deceptive laser.

brute force approach to counter laser designators

direct either a high energy laser or direct fire

toward the illuminating

is

to

laser with the

purpose of distracting the operator.

C.

INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
1.

General Description
Because the

aircraft missiles the

threat

from IR-guided weapons so

countermeasure

field is

far

have been mainly from

anti

dominated by airborne systems. With the

fast

introduction of both IR sights and IR guided missiles and munition to the battlefield the

need for IR-countermeasures for ground forces has increased


is

neccessary to have some knowledge about

(see Chapter

II

different

IRCM

the threat, mainly the IR-missile,

it

works

methods of IR countermeasures, saturation and

deception. For the saturation method the

noise into the IR seeker.


is

the

Background).

There are two

the purpose

how

To understand

The noise has

described

in

device introduces large amounts of IR

to be in the bandwidth of the seeker's detector and

to saturate the detector and

some of the systems

IRCM

if

possible

damage

it.

For

this

type of IRCM

Chapter VII can be used. The deception type of

CM

uses a modulated IR signal into the seeker. The modulated signal together with the
radiation

from the target creates

false information

about the target's real location. For this

to be effective the energy of the modulated signal in the detector's band needs to be higher

50

than the same energy from the target. This "blinking" method of
reticle

To be

based and conical scanning systems.

CM

is

effective against

able to deceive the missile seeker the

CM system needs to know the seeker's reticle modulation frequency,

or

in

the case of a

conical scanning system, the conical scan frequency. These frequencies will change from
missile to missile, but by observing the energy reflected

from the

missile's optics the

frequency can be measured.

The IR
most

common

radiation

from the

IRCM

radiation source in today's system

using electrical and fuel-heated ceramics


the radiation.

power

The

resources.

source as

in

in

is

in several different

ways. The

the arc lamp but there are also systems

For directed systems, lasers are used to produce

fuel'heated systems are normally used for aircraft with limited electrical

The modulation of the

radiation can be achieved either by pulsing the

the case of the arc lamp or by mechanical modulation which

the heated ceramics.

source

can be produced

To

is

the case with

avoid detection of the platform because of radiation from the IR

the visible region, the device

is

normally equipped with a

filter.

Figure 4-5 gives an approximate expression for the power required. The
efficiency of the

CM

is

dependent on:

The number of different

system

is

threats operating in the different wavelengths that the

supposed to counter,

The amount of radiation

The

The percentage of the IR

solid angle

this increases the jam-to-signal ratio (J/S).

the platform emits

which must be covered by the system

detector, the arc lamp's

radiation

maximum

from the source

occurs

at short

approximately 1.5|im (see Appendix B). [Ref

51

5,

that falls in the

wavelengths of

Ref

14]

band of the

A GKEATEN

()

MX OF THREATS

THE PftOTECmON VOLUME, n, HAS


INCREASED WTTH AU-AfiPCCT THREATS

NCREASeSJ/S

AAC LAMP SOURCES HAVE A SMALL


PERCENTAGE OF THEIR OUTPUT IN
THREAT SPECTRAL BAND

10

10

10>

10*

WAVELENGTH

RELATIVE PLATFORM SIGNATURE

Figure 4-5. Influences on the

2.

(e)

Power Requirements

Infrared Countermeasure Systems

a.

Matador (LORAL)
Matador

is

a powerful

surface vehicles (see Figure 4-6).

one transmitter per engine


which are

is

IRCM

system designed to protect large aircraft and

The system

modular and for large transport

is

the suggested configuration

The

aircraft

transmitters use arc lamps

electronically synchronised by the electronics control unit to achieve the desired

modulation. The transmitter's IR source has an output between 4 and 12 kW. The system
is

pre-programmed with a

with

new

threats.

multi-threat

Matador

is in

jamming code and new codes can be added

operation with the

Force One Presidential Transport [Ref

8,

Ref

52

1,

USAF
Ref

and

34]

is

to

deployed on the Air

cope

Figure 4-6. Matador

b.

AN/ALQ-144 (Lockheed Sanders


AN/ALQ-144

The IR source

is

IRCM

system designed for helicopters (see Figure 4-7).

consists of an electrically heated graphite source.

omnidirectional with a cylindrical source


rotating

between

two drums with


1.2

Inc)

slots

and 2 kW. [Ref

The

radiation

is

The

modulated,

transmitter
this is

is

achieved by

around the source. The transmitter has an output of


8,

Ref

1,

Ref 35]

53

Figure 4-7.
c.

Directed Infrared Countermeasures

DIRCM
missiles.

By

AN/ALQ-144

will

directing the

(DIRCM)

probably be neccessary to counter the threat from modern IR

IR radiation toward the

missile the

same

effect

as for omnidirectional systems using only a small fraction of the power.

important against missiles operating


is difficult

in

the longer wavelength

to find a continuously radiating high

Northrop has developed an

power

DIRCM

This

in a ball turret

which makes

it

is

even more

IR band (8-12|am) where

it

source.

designed to protect against IR guided

missiles including those operating at longer wavelengths (see Figure 4-8).

housed

can be achieved

The system

is

possible to provide a 360-degrees azimuth coverage

54

and -90 to +40 degrees elevation. To find the


a

MAWS (see Chapter

the

DIRCM

two

parallel

that the

III.

beams (probably

short and long

DIRCM

Electronic Support Measures), but

can take over the tracking using

two beams

missile, the

laser)

needs to be directed by

when aimed

IR tracking sensor. The

its

of IR energy to jam the

missile.

It

at the missile

DIRCM uses

can be expected

are of different wavelengths to provide sufficient intensity for both

IR wavelengths. [Ref

5,

Ref 36]

Figure 4-8.

55

DIRCM

OFFBOARD COUNTERMEASURES

D.

General Description

1.

The

ofifboard countermeasures consist of several different systems representing a

wide range of techniques

to decrease the susceptibility

The systems range from

protect.

of the platform they are designed to

complex

relatively simple chaffs to

UAV equipped with

auto pilot and sophisticated repeater transmitters. There are both active and passive

systems

in

the group as well as expendable and recoverable systems.

for these systems


(L

is

that they operate outside

first

radar guided missiles.

laid

of the protected platform.

countermeasure invented to counter the radar. Even

today chaff is widely used to protect

aircraft,

by a special

aircraft as well as ships against

The use of chaff is divided

The masking measure

normally an

is,

as the

from detection. This

aircraft, the strike force

name
is

in

two

both detection and

different missions,

masking and

indicates, an attempt to hide the platform,

achieved by having a corridor or barrier pre-

can then attack through the chaff corridor

without being detected by the radars. To avoid the exposure of a chaff-laying


systems using unmanned vehicles are under development (see TALD).
chaff barrier has to provide a stronger echo than the target

processing

throw out chaff in

target.

a burst

The radar guided

platform.

in

To be

aircraft,

effective the

each of the radar's

cells

The seducing measure


to

factor

Chaff
Chaff was the

seducing.

The common

is

away from

missile

is

today

in

use

in

both aircraft and ships. The idea

is

the platform in order to create the impression of a

then seduced to target the chaff cloud instead of the

In the case of ships, the seduction

is

countermeasures.

56

often supported by on-board electronic

Todays chaff is normally


aluminum or
and

is

The chaff is

zinc.

made of thin

a dipole

glass fiber coated with

usually package in cartridges or cassettes (see Figure 4-9)

ejected by electromechanical, pneumatic or pyrotechnical methods.

t.Tz'

tXti
ti
1
r:l5

rip if

;.--,

'

,-

Figure 4-9. Chaff Cassettes

The

radar return from each dipole

peak return occurs when the radar wavelength


dipole.

Resonances also occur

at integer

is

is

a fijnction of radar wavelength.

The

approximately twice the length of the

multiples of the dipole length but with

much

lower amplitudes. To achieve good results against radars with different frequencies the
chaff in a cartridge

is

cut to different lengths representing different frequencies.

magnitude on the radar return

is

also dependent

to the orientation of the radar.

The maximum

the side while

when

it

is

near to zero

on the orientation of the dipole compared

return

is

approximately

0.

5X^.

As

achieved

is

illuminated from the end.

section at the resonant frequency from a single dipole

average

is

The

is

when

illuminated from

The maximum radar cross

approximately 0.866^^ while the

obvious from the formula the number of dipoles

57

necessary to create a certain radar cross section increases with the square of the
frequency.
After being dispensed the chaff forms a cloud

cloud equals the time the dispensing


cloud

is

grow because of differences

in fall rates

length of the

initial

The

during the dispensation time.

spread out because of turbulence caused by the dispensing

continues to

and the

aircraft traveled

The

among

The cloud

aircraft.

the chaff, the prevailing

wind

air turbulence.

"Smart chaff" or "Chips Expendables" are under development by the

The smart chaff is

Air Force.

actually a miniature active

self-powered single chip repeater. The chip uses the

and has an integrated antenna


limited to

The smart chaff will,

one frequency, instead

it

is

RF decoy which

MMIC
in

US

consists of a

technology (see Appendix A)

contrast to ordinary chaff, not be

expected to be effective over a wide range of

frequencies.

The

effectiveness of chaff

is

severely reduced by radars using

MTI (Moving

Target Indicator) and pulse-Doppler. Both systems are able to resolve targets against
static clutter

backgrounds, to which category a slow moving chaff clouds belongs.

Because of the

scintillations

caused by the continuous movements of the dipoles neither of

the radars are capable of totally eliminating the effects of the chaff. [Ref
29,

Ref

37,

Ref
b.

is

14,

Ref

Smoke and A erosol

When

effective counter

radiation

Ref

38]

Smoke
wavelength.

1,

has been used since historic time to give cover

the visible

in

not normally considered an electronic warfare component

measure against several

a function

EO

and ER systems. Smoke's

58

it

is

is

a very

ability to scatter

of the wavelength of the radiation and the particle

the longer the wavelength the larger particles necessary. Generally

it

size in the

easier to

smoke,

produce

smoke with

smaller particles and

Aerosols can be used

in

smoke with

larger particles also tend to dissipate faster.

smoke

a similar fashion to

The aerosol cloud

will interfere

with

the radiation because of a reduction in intensity caused by absorption and scattering.

Unlike the smoke case, the aerosol also causes scattering because of the different
refractive index in the small particles. [Ref 14]
c.

their

Radar

reflectors

Radar

reflectors are used to create target-like radar echoes.

form they have a large radar cross section and thereby create an echo normally

received from a

produces a

much

The corner

larger target

thickness.
14,

To

reflector

is

a simple device

wide range of angles.

relatively high return over a

The

achieved by using a Luneberg lens

[Ref

Because of

An

which

even better coverage

is

lens has a focal length equal to half the lens

turn the lens into a reflector the far surface

is

given a reflective coating.

Ref 29]
(1).

Decoy

Replica Naval

Replica

is

RF

(Irvin

Great Britain Ltd

passive naval decoy intended to provide a

ship-like target to seduce/distract an anti-ship missile (see Figure 4-10).

The decoy

is

octahedral shaped radar reflector and to achieve better azimuth coverage they are

normally deployed
section a

in linked pairs.

few seconds

The

reflectors inflate

after hitting the sea

[Ref

59

8]

and operates with

fiill

radar cross

Figure 4-10. Replica Naval


iL

Decoy

IR-FJares
IR-Flares are used to seduce missiles with IR-seekers.

the missile the flare has to produce intense radiation


(see

Appendix

B).

The

intensity

from the

flare

in

the

waveband

few seconds which makes the timing of the launch

The

it

is

the seeker

flares

is

using

exposed to IR-missiles

(for

normally burn for

There are two ways to

critical

assure proper timing of the launch, either continuous launch of flares

reaches an altitude where

able to attract

decreases with increasing altitude and

velocity, this complicates the use of flares for fighter aircraft.


just a

To be

when

the aircraft

example take-off and landing

in

an unsecured area) or automatic launching as a part of an integrated EW-system. The


different launcher systems for airborne, land

under dispenser systems. For IR

flares to

and naval applications are discussed

be effective against modern IR-missiles they

need to emulate closely the platform; by using sensors sensitive

waveband

the missile

is

flirther

able to discriminate a "one-color" flare

14]

60

in

more than one

from the platform. [Ref

RF-Expendables

e.

(1).

GEN-X,
The

Generic Expendable Cartidge (Texas Instruments)

GEN-X

is

a active radar

decoy which provides endgame

protection for tactical aircrafts against radar guided missiles (Figure 4-11),

measures 6

in. in

lithium battery.
fins

length and 1.3

diameter.

in. in

Power

The decoy has no propulsion and

which are unfolded

decoy

is

stabilized in its free-fall

GEN-X

decoy.

The

technology
relatively

is

low

Microwave Monolithic

essential for production


price.

When

programmable

'-r^nds

band

searches. [Ref 8,

initially

in

the decoy

Integrated Circuits (see Figure 4-12).

of a

GEN-X

sized

The

MMIC

decoy with high performance and

released from the aircraft the decoy repeats received radar

signals to seduce the incoming missile.

it

by four small

projectile has a forward-facing spiral

antenna system located on the nose cone. The receiver and transmitter
consist of four

provided by a

from the dispenser. Both the ALE-39 and ALE-47

after ejection

dispensers can be used for the

is

to the

The decoy

between which

it

Ref

The

GEN-X

can switch
38,

Ref

Figure 4-11.

39,

if

said to

is

it

field-

does not pick up any signals

Ref

40,

Ref 41]

GEN-X Decoy

61

have three

in

the

_,,

^g

-V *.

-f

,_y_ ^^^^ J^^st,

^9ah

,
.

K>'Tjji^7sj,

P^h

-.-i-r,/.^

,3

1-?

GEN-X Decoy

Figure 4-12.
(2).

STRAP,

Straight

Through Repeater Antenna Performance

(Tracor)

The STRAP

The Strap

differs

from

GEN-X

reception and transmission, and

of solid-state

amplifiers.

in

it

is

two major

areas,

uses Traveling

it

uses

two antennas, one each

Wave Tube

The advantage with using

the disadvantages are the cost and the

TWTA

is

Amplifier

(TWTA)

that they are

power requirement. On

the

STRAP

requirement has been solved by using a thermally heated cathode for the

been possible because the


39,

TWTA

is

USN.

under development by Tracor for the

only supposed to

Ref 40]

62

work

for

instead

more powerful,
the

power

TWTA.

for a short time.

[Ref

This has
1

1,

Ref

Carmen

(3).

Carmen
antiship missiles.
"soft-kill".

Carmen

is

The decoy purpose

After detection of the

(THORN EMI
is

an expendable active decoy against radar guided


to seduce an incoming missile, thereby achieving a

is

ASM threat by the ship's own

launched clear of the ship from a standard 130

descends slowly by parachute to provide

away from

Electronics)

sufficient

sensors (see Figure 4-13),

mm launcher.

time for the decoy to seduce the threat

the protected platform electronically (see Figure 4-14).

technology to achieve low weight and volume and high

equipped with

TWTA to

covered are H,I and

reliability.

8,

m ^^^^^s^hI^^^Bh

B?jEii^8B!SBfl|8PB|wWPBB^Bil|WPB^^B

''

-r
.

^**35Ai*iH I^EH IBS!*^^2u^3Sb!i^^mR^^hhcS^IB^I^h^^I^^H^3I^^I^^^^I

^B
JC jMj ^gg^^^ffiljj^jfeartpBBBBB^HHB^^^^W
yS^P^^^Pgfj^M|B^KB|BBH|^a!Sy^BH^^B
K^ M AjnW^itftjffyCiVgf^^MSwpgfli^M^^Bw^nSjW'^^^^^^^^^B

^^gi

.'-''>**sfi

^?^^*: *.".;
1

*jL''''-^*jf3
''':<Lvt-y

.-

:yiL
\.;iv(-_^j|^g
*

"^.'..JT''

'.-

Vs'^^^^l

B ^^
^
^ fM^^^^^S^aa^S^^Sg^^SS^W^^SSm
^pM^SX^^nSS^SSdSScSK^i^r^^ ^ -Jt^B^^

^^Mr^

"4feiwffiiBPfl^MBByjlBTifSWtffr!gMHHH

^fffTvf

w, ^^^^Sr^*P^iji^iiti3BmViSj^^S9ffKtUBtB^O^K3^3IK^^BK^^Sm

^r/^^ K| ^^^^^^^^ne^^s^^SSS^^^b^bS^A

'.jC^^ji

'

-.^^a wk ^^^^J^SbMbW^BBH^B^^B
.'''"?>^^^ WML

"-:'

^R ^S^^S^^Bv^^^^^BBSg^^S^Sl^^St^^

JL^^^ ^ tSo^iys^Jwff^P^PT^jBBBj^H^^^^Bffii^B^wlB^^BM^B^M^B

'^^^^^^^^Ss^S^iKSKkSB^
yi^^f^. teSySBjCTjjBMiaMBsjj^^
'^^B^'',"^
S^ ?>y3BMBwgSBlJwiK
^^j^'^S^aafiSlKBHPIaHy^HB^B
'

MMIC

Further, the decoy

Ref 42)

.....

Carmen uses

provide high power (see Figure 4-15). The frequency bands

[Ref

J.

The decoy

t^'fi

^^^:M^

Figure 4-13.

ASM Attack

63

un Ship

is

Figure 4-14

Launch of Carmen Decoy

64

Propulsion assembly
Sifsty and arming section

Parachute section

Thermal Battery

Compass

TWTA

Antenna

Signal processing

Antennae

Figure 4-15. Carmen

Flying Decoys

A flying

decoy

The main advantage with


of the platform
all-aspect

Decoy

it

is

is

a drone with

a free flying

decoy

its

is

own

that

it

navigation and possibly propulsion.


is

possible to send the

supposed to protect. This option provides

weaponry such

decoy

a better ability to

in front

counter

as heat-seeking missiles operating in the longer wavelengths.

also improves the possibilities to counter missiles with processors capable

It

of

discriminating between the relative velocities of the platform and the gravity-bound

decoys.
(1).

LORALEI
The

aircraft in

Loralei

(Loral Electro-Optical)
is

an expendable decoy which emulates the host

order to seduce the attacking threat. The decoy simulates the

and spectral signatures. The system

is

powered by

65

a rocket

motor and

is

aircraft's flight

able to protect

By

the aircraft from attack in the forward hemisphere.

decoy

is

able to fly close to the host aircraft initially to increase the probability that the

threat missile

is

seduced. Loral states that

capabilities into Loralei.

it

is

possible to incorporate

TALD,
The

Tactical Air

The maximum range of the

TALD

TALD

is

an unpowered decoy which

is

field to

TALD

can also have a

in

flight profiles.

is

will

is

Because the

TALD

to discriminate

is

it

in

the

unpowered

it

from the platform

to protect.

be equipped with a turbojet engine.

range

km. The system

programmable

is

working on an upgrade of TALD called

(Improved Tactical Air Launched Decoy). The main improvement

more

launched fi'om

controlled by an autopilot.

The system

weapon systems

Brunswick

aircraft

is

the front as well as with an active repeater

chaff" dispenser.

allow simulation of different

was supposed

will

RF

repeater system has one antenna, receiving and transmitting, under each

gives an opportunity for sophisticated


it

flight is

stated to be approximately 130

equipped with a passive radar reflector

wing. The

as well

Launched Decoy (Brunswick Defense)

high altitudes (see Figure 4-16). The decoy's glider

The

EO/IR

[Ref 34, Ref 38]


(2).

system.

using a time-delayed ignition the

closely with an expected

ITALD

low

be that

ITALD

be able to emulate an attacking

altitude speed

be increased to approximately 280 km.

anti-radiation missile (see Chapter

will

will

of Mach

ITALD

0.8.

The

effective

can also be configured as an

VI Suppression of Enemy Air Defense). [Ref

38]

66

ITALD

8,

Ref

Figure 4-16.

TALD,

Tactical Air

Delilah, Tactical

(3)

Industries Ltd

Delilah
called

Samson was deployed with

systems

in

the

Bekaa Valley 1982

is

at altitudes

the range

is

approximately 400

Luneberg

lens,

or active,

in

Decoy System

(Israel Military

development of the

TALD. An

earlier version

great success by the Israeli Air Force against air defense


Delilah

is

a jet engine

between 150 and 30,000

be launched

Launched Decoy

km The

ft.

powered radar decoy and

The maximum speed

payload can be either passive,

the form of RF repeaters. [Ref 8,

67

Ref 43]

in

is

Mach

it

can

0.8 and

the form of a

g.

Recoverable Decoys

AN/SSQ-95

(1)

Active Electronic

Buoy

(Litton,

ATD/Magnavox)
The SSQ-95

is

an antiship missile decoy,

sonobuoy container and can be dropped from an


deck of the ship or towed behind the

TWT transmitter.
water.

The power

The SSQ-95

is

The decoy

ship.

provided by a battery that

expected to operate

in

the

AN/TLQ-32
is

system by seducing incoming antiradiation

relatively

few exposed

designed to protect the


missiles.

parts give the system a

both continuous,
possible.

in

It is

not

is

activated by sea

bands. [Ref 44]

is

said to be capable

good

know what

The decoy's

68

be

small size and

radiation patterns the

in

will

radar

of protecting the

survivability in case

order to attract the missile, or intermittent,

[Ref 45]

AN/TPS-75

Three decoys systems

missile launches simultaneous.

detonation (see Figure 4-17).

in

Antiradiation missile decoy (ITT)

deployed with each radar system. The TLQ-32

from multiple

I/J

packaged

equipped with a receiver and a

is

The system

site

is

is

launched from the

to the decoy

(2).

radar

aircraft or helicopter,

it

of a close

decoy uses but

order to confuse

it,

are

Figure 4-17.

h.

AN/TLQ-32

Antiradiation missile decoy

Towed Decoy

Towed decoys
conditions of use are different
several advantages

are used in both naval and airborne applications but the


In the airborne application the use

of a towed decoy has

compared with expendables. Because the decoy

is

connected to the

platform the expensive and power consuming equipment can be inside platform and be

used several times,

it

will also

reduce the weight and size constraint on the equipment. In

the case of an aircraft the decoy of course needs to be kept on a distance from the

platform so the platform


will

is

not

damaged by

a missile hitting the decoy.

be most effective when the attack against the

course of the aircraft and

least effective against a

techniques for using towed decoys

in

aircraft

comes perpendicular

to the

forward attack. There are several

order to protect the platform.

to produce a stronger return using a repeater jammer.

69

The towed decoy

One technique

Another method

is

is

"blinking"

just

which

means
will

that the transmitter in the aircraft and the

cause a back-and-forth motion

because of the apparent

in

one

in

the decoy transmit alternately, this

the threat angle which might stop a missile launch

instability in tracking.

Figure 4-18 shows different possible

configurations for airborne towed decoys, from the most complicated with
in

the decoy to a solution where the decoy actually only

is

all

components

a remote antenna. [Ref 46,

47]

OFF BOARD

ON BOARD

TOW

LINE

A/C

POWER

CONVERT

A/C

POWER

CONVERT

TOW
POWER

ECM

LINE&

LINE & TRANSMISSION LINE

SIGNAL

iSm^^^^

fc

'

TOWLINE
g,

TRANSMISSION LINE

Figure 4-18. Different Possible Configurations for Airborne Decoys

70

Ref

In the ship applications the

towed decoy can be a small boat equipped with

both radar reflectors and active repeater transmitter. The purpose of the decoy
to break a missile's lock

towed decoy
called

Ltd.

on the ship and seduce

for naval applications

TOAD (Towed Offboard

is

shown

in

is

Figure 4-19. The decoy


is

built

mainly

An example of a

towards the decoy.

Active Decoy) and

TOAD is equipped with radar reflectors,

an antenna which

it

is

in

the picture

by Marconi Defence Systems

receiver, signal processor, transmitter

The system covers the

possible to point toward the threat.

is

and

and
J

bands. [Ref 8]

'''^C-r

Figure 4-19.

/.

Jl

).UHi|iii<Hiriii!~!m

Towed Offboard

Unmanned Aerial

two

principal

methods

in

\-

Active

Decoy (TOAD)

Vehicles

UAV can be used for offboard


are

J.

which

countermeasures (see Figure 4-20). There

UAV can be used.

71

One method

is

to use the

UAV as

decoy (compare

transmitter.

TALD)

The purpose of this method would be

Israeli attack in the

batteries to turn
Battle).

equipped with radar reflectors and possible a repeater-

on

Beekaa

valley in 1982,

their radars

The use of UAVs

UAVs were

used to seduce the Syrian missile

and thereby give away their

as decoys could also be

EOB

(Electronic Order of

done with the purpose of removing

attention and resources from the striking force, the attack of which

with the

UAV. The

second method to use

By

as a substitute for a jammer aircraft.


to achieve

it

is

name,

it

is

which makes

it

equipping a
a

UAV with ECM

jammer

aircraft

The

easier to avoid detection, and as

unmanned which make

it

would be coordinated

UAV as an offboard countermeasure could be

some advantages compared with

also smaller,

During the

to distract the air defense.

is

it

would be possible

UAV is less expensive,


apparent from

its

possible to plan missions without considerations for

the loss of pilots. For these reasons

it

is

possible to operate closer to the threat radar.

This has several advantages, the primary being that the power necessary to achieve the
desired effect in the radar

D)

jammer

operating

at half

is

reduced.

As can be seen

in

the equation for

the distance only needs a quarter of the

away from

the protected platform

interfere with the platform's

own weapons

is

power

that the effect

to the

ECM (Appendix

Another advantage of

of the jamming

same degree which makes

will

it

not

possible to

use wideband countermeasures without jepordizing the friendly systems. [Ref 48, Ref 49]

72

Figure 4-20.

Aerial Vehicle

Dispensing Systems for Chaff, IR-flares and RF-decoys

The requirements
applications.

Unmanned

Below

is

for a dispensing system are very different for different

a brief description of the application-specific considerations for

landbased, naval and airborne dispensing systems.

Because the

been IR/EO

threats against landbased systems have mainly

guided systems, the dispensing systems have been concentrated toward smoke launchers.

Smoke

is

today the most widespread countermeasure system for armoured vehicles. With

the increasing threat from anti-tank systems using laser guidance and IR-guided systems,
the importance of reliable

smoke launchers becomes more

right sort in the right place at the right time has

response times

in

become

important.

To

get

a challenging task.

smoke of the

To

shorten the

order to decrease the susceptibility, the launching systems are becoming

integrated with the vehicle's different warning systems (see integrated

one landbased system using both


military installations

is

chaff,

known and

that

EW systems)

IR-decoys and smoke for protection of key


is

the British system

73

RAMPART.

Only

Dispenser systems for chaff are today the most

on naval ships and


chaff,

IR and

decoys a

RF

for

many

common countermeasure

smaller ships chaff is the only countermeasure system.

decoys are normally dispensed by rocket systems. This

sufficient distance

part of an integrated

away from

EW-system

the platform.

The

done to get the

is

The dispenser system

usually a

is

(see Chapter V. Integrated Electronic Warfare Systems)

which calculate what countermeasure should be used and


should be deployed

The

British Shield system

is

in

which direction the decoys

described below as an example of naval

dispensing systems.

For airborne systems the location of the dispensing system


significance for effectivness of chaff and IR flares

it

is

For chaff used

is

of great

in a self-protection role

important that the chaff cloud blooms rapidly to create a sufficient return to the radar

when

the cloud and the aircraft are

in

the

same range

bin

For

this

reason

it

locate the chaff dispenser so the chaff is dispensed into turbulent flow; this

is

is

desirable to

achieved

forward of wing roots and close to the engine exhaust. For IR-flares the considerations
are almost opposite.
flare

The

intensity

of the

flare

decreases with increasing velocity so the

should be ejected into non-turbulent flow. The velocity with which the flare

ejected has to be balanced so as to be not so slow that the miss distance

is

is

insufficient to

protect the aircraft, but not so high that the missile seeker does not respond and breaks the
lock-on. In

many systems

IR-flares and chaff use the

of the dispenser has to be a compromise between the


locations of dispenser units are

shown

in

same dispenser

different requirements.

Figure 4-21. [Ref

74

unit so the location

8,

Ref

14,

Ref

Typical
37]

Figure 4-21

Typical Locations of Dispenser Units

RAMPART (ML

(1)

RAMPART
laser,

TV

and radar guided

The system

aircraft.

km. The

firing units are activated

a landbased countermeasure system against IR,

The system

missiles.

consists of a

is

Aviation Ltd)

also has a feature against

number of firing

units

low

flying

which can be spread out up to 15

by radio

from a

central transmitter

The

firing units are

equipped with

rocket decoys for chaff and IR, smoke (both rapid and slow burning) and the Skysnare
airborne obstruction.
the target to cause

obstructions

is

Skysnare

is

an airborne tethered obstruction that

weapon aiming problems

for

low

flying aircraft.

to force the aircraft to climb to higher altitudes

is

The

where

it

placed around

idea behind the

will

be exposed by

active air defense systems. [Ref 8]

Shield Tactical

(2).

Decoy System (Marconi Underwater Systems

Ltd)
Shield
missiles (see Figure 4-22).

configurations.

system

is

is

a chaff" and

The system

Launchers with

is

IR decoy system against anti-ship

modular which allows

three, six, nine

equipped with an automaitc response

75

different launcher

and twelve barrels are available. The


library

which takes the input from the ships

different sensors and selects the best

system

is

deployment pattern for the decoys. The launcher

equipped with rockets with either

rockets are fitted with a variable


positions along the trajectory.
to take

wind changes

further

away from

system

is

fijse

IR or a combination of both. The

which allows the chaff to be dispensed

The fuse

into account.

chafif,

is

electronically

programmed

at different

just prior to launch

The submunition IR round deploys each submunition

the platform which

makes the IR center move away from the

ship.

The

also able to fire both active offtoard and acoustic decoys.

Shield has four different operational

modes

to protect the

platform:

Conflision

the purpose

is

to confijse hostile radars

by

creating multiple false targets.

Distraction

incoming missiles

lock on to chafif clouds

will

before they lock on to the platform, this

deploying

chafif

around the ship

is

achieved by

of up to 2.5

at a distance

km.
Seduction/Break lock
targets

seduction of the missile to change

from the platform to the decoy. The decoys are

deployed so they, together with the effect of the wind and


the platform's manoeuvre, cause the missile to

move

with

the decoys and break the lock on the ship.

Seduction

dump mode

the decoy

missile range gate and an

is

onboard jammer

the gate position to the decoy. [Ref

76

deployed outside the

8,

is

Ref

used to
1

1]

shift

^_a_^.M^j/'v'^^

'

Figure 4-22. Shield Tactical Decoy System

BOL

(3).

BOL

(Celsius Tech)

is

an chaff dispenser which

for self protection without any reduction in

constructed to

work with

original missile launcher

it

the

LAU-7

weapon payload

Sidewinder launcher.

lets

the aircraft carry chaff

capacity.

The dispenser

By changing some

turns into a chaff dispenser (see Figure 4-23).

is

parts in the

The chaff

dispenser module consists of a chaff" compartment, an electromechanical feed mechanism

and an electronics

unit.

For cooling of the IR

missile, a

77

new gas

bottle

is

mounted

in

the

nose of the launcher. Each dispenser holds 160 chaff packages. Chaff cloud dispersion
synchronised by an on-board countermeasures computer. [Ref

8,

Ref 37]

r r;;.;:?:V

:BOtmcdula:::

^-r""""'
1

New gas bottle

Figure 4-23.

(4)

BOP
BOP

BOL

Chaff Dispenser

(Celsius Tech)
is

a pyrotechnical dispenser

which

is

produced

in

different versions for compatibility with installation configurations to avoid the risks

connected with

flares (Figure 4-24).

The BOP/B can be loaded with up

78

to six 55

mm

is

diameter standard

EW-system

NATO type flares.

The dispenser can be controlled by an automatic

An

(see integrated EW-system).

rear to indicate whether the

IR

flares

optional

IR sensor can be mounted

have ignited correctly. [Ref.

^--^-m^^'^^m^ P

Figure 4-24.

E.

BOP

8,

at the

Ref. 37]

1^'Wf'<

v^

Pyrotechnical Dispenser

COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES
1.

General Description

The purpose of communications countermeasures


possibility to

command

his troops

by way of radio

is

to

deny the enemy the

The countermeasures can be

of jamming or deception. Radio deception, which can be

in

ratio or in the

form

the form of giving false and

misleading information, will not be discussed further. Jamming can be either

of noise which reduces the signal-to-noise

in

in the

form

form of psycho-acoustic

modulations which distracts and enables the receiving operator. The jammer system
normally operates

which activates
active

it

it

in a

responsive mode; the transmitter

when an

active channel

is

detected.

is

To

connected to a receiver system


ensure that the channel

uses a process called look-through, which means that the jamming

79

is

is still

interupted

periodically to provided for the receiver to check.

The channels can be

channels.

preset and the

multiplex mode, this means that the

jammer

There are different ways to jam several

jammer can operate

is

moving between the

which creates the impression of simultaneous jamming. The


be given different

priorities

different intervals.

Some

which means

in a

that the

jammer

time-division

different channels

different preset channels

will return to the

can

channels with

systems are using multiple transmitters so some channels with

high priority can have true continous jamming. Another method to jam several channels

simultaneous

2.

is

to use wide band jamming. [Ref 50]

Communication Countermeasures System


CL

TACJAM-A

TACJAM
described

in

Chapter

III

is

(Lockheed Sanders/A EL)

VHP jamming

a mobile

ESM

Systems. The system

system, the
is

ESM

part

itself to a

if a

system component

fails

is

designed to cover a wide frequency

range and compared to older systems lighten the operator's workload.

modular design and

of the system

TACJAM

has a

the system automatically reconfigures

degraded performance. The system consists of multiple exciter and transmitter

sets to allow

it

many

to disrupt

frequencies simultaneously.

controlled and has look-through capability.


amplifier chains can be combined, this

control to synchronize the

two

is

To

done by a combiner

Frequency range: 20
3

maximum
unit

amplifier chains (see Figure 4-25).

Specifications

Power;

increase the

The jamming

200

MHz

kW ERP

80

is

computer

output power, two

which also uses phase

Modulation modes: Amplitude modulation (AM), frequency modulation


(FM), continous wave (CW), frequency
(SSB). [Ref.

key (FSK), Noise and single side band

shift

Ref. ll,Ref. 51]

8,

30

SINGLE CHANNEL

270V CX

i
HE FILTER
UNIT

HIGH POWER

~}

AMPLIFIER
UNIT

HF ANTENNAS

HF

DC

COMBINER

POWFR

UNIT

VHE FILTER
f

UNIT

DC

POWEB

LOWER POWER

HIQH SPEED

UNIT

JAM BUS
(2

CHANNELS)

SYSTEM CLOCK
t\0 MHl COM.)

_
ETHERNET

(IEEE-302

31

SF

HF FILTER
UNIT

HIGH POWER
AMPLIFIER
UNIT

VHF
VHF ANTENNAS
COMBINER

POWER

VHF FILTER

UNIT

UNIT

DC

DC

Figure 4-25.

b.

TACJAM-A

Blockdiagram for

section

AD/EXJAM (Loral Control Systems)

EXJAM

an

is

artillery

(155

mm howitzers)

consists of five devices stacked within the projectile.

transmitter for disrupting

enemy communications

trajectory by an automatic

around a

ECM

command

flise.

its ability

The jammer

The jammers

The system provides

post thereby limiting

delivered jammer.
is

The sytem

broadband barrage

are released in the

the possiblity of deploying

jammers

to receive radio communications.

[Ref

8]

F.

CONCLUSIONS
The

ECM

systems uses many different technologies and methods to achieve their

purpose, below
described

is

summary of the expected

future for the different types of

in this chapter.

81

ECM

The competition between


continue.

New ECM

systems

radar and
will

ECM will,

with a high degree of certainty,

no longer only be able to counter the "red" threat but

must be able to counter western systems as

well.

The high

cost of developing

sophisticated on-board systems will probably lead to a challenge by off-board systems.

The use of MMIC

will

make expendable RF-decoys an

attractive alternative.

Chaff will

probably continue to be a cost-effective self protection against a large part of the radar

guided threats. Future systems might well use a combination of on and off board systems
to achieve the desired deception at a reasonable cost

Laser
laser

CM will

probably become more

common

because of the

latest

successes for

guided weapons. Systems which are able to deceive designator based systems could

be deployed
Infrared

in

the defense of high value assets.

CM will,

because of the effectivness of IR-missiles, increase

With the deployment of all aspects attacking IR


preferred
lead to

missiles, directed

IRCM

in

importance.

will

be the

CM method. New missile seekers with less sensitivity to deception will probably

IRCM

of the destructive type.

82

INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS

V.

A.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The introduction of new

threats using

new

techniques for detection and guidance has

lead to the development and deployment of new countermeasure systems to counter them.

These new

CMs

have been added to a growing arsenal of

The trend today

is

worked without

coordination.

to integrate these

The

CMs to

EW systems on the platforms.

achieve a higher efficiency than

if

the

CMs

EW systems should also be integrated with the other

systems on the platform to achieve further synergy effects The modern threat

is

also

pushing for integrated systems by reducing the reaction time for deployment of CM.

With an integrated system


from several

different sensors

officer or apply the

ECM

it is

possible to produce an interpretation of real-time data

and either present a recommendation to the

tactical action

automatically. For expendables the timing of the deployment

critical for their effectiveness

By

using the information achieved from the

is

MWS together

with information from the navigation system regarding wind and speed, an optimal

automatic launch

By

is

possible.

fusion of the information from different sensors,an integration processor can get a

more complete

picture of the threat (see Figure 5-1). Fusion of the

ESM

information with

the IR-signature and the targets speed achieved from the radar can give a better
probability of identification and thereby a better chance to deploy the best

information from the

By

ESM

ECM. The

can serve as target information for weapon systems

integrating the platforms

weapon systems with

obtain a better evaluation of the effects of the

the

CM. The

83

EW systems

it

is

possible to

platform's radar can track the

incoming missile and through the


to the
if

ECM unit.

This

way

it

common

processor communicate the missile's behavior

would be possible

necessary also be able to decide

when

to

to determine the effect

go over

to the hard

FCM
SENSOR

X,

RADAR
SENSOR

OPERATOR(S)

Blockdiagram

The most important advantage might be


would be possible

manage

GUN

MISSILE

it

X
/

CATLING

SURFACE-AIR

Figure 5-1

method.

PROCESSOR
^

\^

for Integrated

a less

EW

WEAPON

System

obvious one: by integrating the systems

to avoid the systems fighting each other

central control unit could

the different components of the system so that no components which

interfere with each other are active at the

and specified as a integrated system

it

soft kill and,

INTEGRATION

SENSOR

kill

of the

same

will also

time. If the integrated system

would
is

designed

decrease the risk of interference compared

with a merger of independent systems

Today
is

there are several integrated systems in operation or under development;

a presentation

Ref

53,

Ref

54,

below

of a few systems for ground, naval and airborne applications. [Ref 52,

Ref 55]

84

B.

GROUND APPLICATIONS
Only recently has

EW become a part of the normal equipment for fighting vehicles.

The components of the


aircraft.

The

threat

is

threat against a tank are also different than those for a ship or

the threat from radar guided


1.

system

weapons

is

small.

VTDS

Vehicle Integrated Defense System,

VXDS
will

is

a system under

combine

development by the Tank-Automotive Command. The

threat sensor, navigation systems, identification friend or foe (IFF)

and countermeasures. The sensors include

laser

smoke grenade launchers and semi-automatic

and radar warning. The

counterfire

carry IR screening, visual as well as millimeter

The launcher

central processor interprets the information

of the

VIDS

CM consists of

from the

is

VLQ-6 Hardhat

different sensors

multithreat

is

a laser

equipped with GPS. The

and provides the

a graphic presentation with the threats prioritized. Further

will incorporate the

be able to

will

wave smoke. The IFF system

interrogate/RF response system For navigation the vehicle

commander with

IR/EO while

mainly from ami tank missiles guided by either laser or

development

jammer system

into the

integrated suite. [Ref 8]

C.

NAVAL APPLICATIONS
1.

AN/SLQ-32 (Raytheon)
The SLQ-32

stand alone system.


also with the

(see Chapter

Today

Combat

transferred to the ship

ESM

III.

the system

is

Direction System

command where

Light Airborne Multipurpose Platform

and IV.

ECM) was

originally designed as a

interfaced with other sensors and

(CDS) which enable


it

can be used

(LAMP)

in

the

using the

the

on some ships

EW intercepts to be

managing of the

AN/ALQ-142

battle.

The

ESM system

can

be integrated with the SLQ-32. Signals detected by the ALQ-142 are transmitted to the

85

SLQ-32 This
horizon

it

integration gives the system a capability to detect threats over the radar

also enables the system to locate threat emitters using cross bearing correlation.

[Ref. 9]
2.

EW 400 (Celsius Tech)


The EW 400 an integrated ship-borne warning and self protection system (see
is

Figure 5-2). The system

is

built

around the

EW computer which gets information from

radar warning receivers, laser warning receivers and the ships

The

weapon and

systems.

EW computer can apply the CM and suggest appropriate steering commands to the

steering indicator; this

achieve

maximum
ESM

way

effect

the ship can coordinate chaff launch and ship

of the

CM. [Ref

Antenna System

OMNI

AfTE>'Nrt

IFNSANTCNNA

maneuver to

8]

Medium-Range

Trainable Launcher

Laser

Launchers

Warning Receivers

C-'

^^^^

4^

p*^^.

X,

Active

ECM

System

A\\\\>v\\V>\\\SV\SSSS\\\\N\\SS\SV\\\S\\.SS\\\\\VVSSS\\\S\.\SS\S.S\S\.SVXSS\\\

CD
miiii

iitpi

ESM Operators

Weapon

^^

Bndgcpouiicn

Sleering Indicuor

Console
III

PEAB

Control Console

Electronic Warfare Sisttm

JKT7

iiiiiiiffl

Weapon Control System

^J>D

^\s\s\\\\\vssv\v\\\v>.\.\v\ss\v.v\\sv\s.v.\\sv\.svvo.s\\s\\\N.\vsyv.\\\\\s\s\vs

Figure 5-2. Electronic Warfare System

86

EW 400

3.

Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare

AIEWS
objective for the

is

the

US

program

Suite,

AIEWS

Navy's name for a program for a future

is

EW system.

a system which integrates active and passive

The

EW equipment

with weapons and offboard countermeasures. The systems should be able to handle
multiple threats using both hard and soft

option of automatic decision making.

be equipped with

D.

systems. Further, the system should give the

To meet

the threat from

IR-jamming system [Ref

8,

Ref

IR attacks the

AIEWS

will

9]

AIRBORNE APPLICATIONS
1.

Integrated Electronic Warfare System,

INEWS
by integrating

INEWS
at

laser based

kill

all

is

USAF

the

INEWS

project which tries to minimize the use of redundant

EW systems.

One of the

principals in the

be one of the fundamental building blocks for the

as an additional equipment load.

countermeasure systems the

By combining

INEWS

countermeasures capability for the

will

total

program

is

aircraft instead

to

let

hardware

the

of being looked

an array of different threat warning and

provide an multispectral warning and automatic

electromagnetic threat

The system

will share data

with the integrated communications, navigation and identification avionics (ICNIA)


system.

To

achieve this performance,

it

will

monolithic microwave integrated circuits

(VHSIC).

Ref

A principal

take advantage of the recent development

(MMIC)

diagram over the system

56]

87

is

in

and very high speed integrated circuits

shown

in

Figure 5-3. [Ref

8,

Ref

9,

cw
RECEIVER

RADAR
WARNING

LASER

MISSILE

CW

WARNING

RECEIVER

RECEIVER

APPROACH
DETECTOR

RADAR
JAMMER

PULSED
RADAR

JAMMER

_J

ii

IR

JAMMER

1
1
1

"i
AVIONICS

'

--

PROCESSOR

SYSTEMS

MISSION

SYSTEMS

DISPENSERS

EXPENDABLES

>

Figure 5-3. Prinicpal Diagram over

2.

APR-39A(V)2 Threat warning system and

INEWS

Electronic

Warfare Controller

(TWS/EWC)
The

RWTl

TWS/EWC

(see Figure 5-4)

systems with

is

an integration of different

The lEWS

RF jammers

EW systems around the APR-39

interfaces already operational laser and missile

warning

and dispenser systems. The integrated system provides

multispectral warning as well as semiautomated and automated countermeasures without

being originally designed as an integrated system. [Ref

88

8,

Ref

57]

APR-39A(V)2 lEWS INTERFACES


VIDEO/POWER

DISCRETE

APR-39A(V)2

ALQ-162

JAMMER

TWS/EWC
RS-422

& DISCRETES

AVR-2

AAR-47

LWS

MWS

I
553B

1553B

I 1553B

ASM-687/

ALQ-136

RRT

JAMMER

MLA/

I
ALE-39

ALE-47

DISPENSER

DISPENSER

Figure 5-4. Blockdiagram over

E.

APR-39A(V)2

as Integrated

EW system

CONCLUSIONS
Integrated

EW systems will be more or

;vss the role

model

in

the future, the reason for

this will be:

Extreme short reaction times requires the option of automatic countermeasures.

The introduction of threats using

The

several different sensors.

fusion of sensors increases the possibilities in evaluating the threats reaction

to countermeasures.
-

Increased effectiveness by combining different types of countermeasures, such as

on and off board.

89

Increased ability to avoid different systems jamming eacii other.

The

integrated systems will not only coordinate the different

EW fijnctions but will

also be integrated with the platform's other systems like navigation and avionics/steering.

This will

make

possible.

For platforms

of the

a truly coordinated response including both


utilizing stealth

ECM and

platform maneuvers

by minimizing their radar cross section, the design

EW systems antennas will be an important part of the original design of the

platform.

90

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE (SEAD)

VI.

The purpose of SEAD

is

to render an integrated air defense system

inoperable through soft and/or hard


aircraft to

perform

component

in

the

icili.

SEAD

is

system

is

SEAD

aircraft

from the

air

defense.

aircraft

shown

in

Figure 6-1

and electronic combat and reconnaissance (ECR); by using a data

with an

ELS

strike

primary

the attack aircraft using anti-radiation missiles

and emitter locator systems (ELS). The Tornado


for

done to allow the follow-on

their missions without interference

SEAD

(IADS)

is

link

(ARM)
equipped

one

system can transmit emitter information to another aircraft carrying

anti-radiation missiles.

[Ref 58]

ADVANCED
MtSSlONSPECtnC DtSPLAVS

EMHTf R LOCATOR SYSTEK

FUB

OOm

DATA LINK

m LWE SCANNEB or
m IMAGING SYSTEM

?i

HARM MISSILES

TOWtAOO 5ELF.PB0THCT JAMMER


(TSPJ)

Figure 6-1. Tornado Aircraft Equipped for

91

SEAD

A.

RADIATION HOMING SYSTEMS


1.

High-Speed Anti-Radiation

(see Figure 6-2).

warhead uses a

The

missile has a

phase the missile has

two

in

maximum

speed of Mach 2+. The prefragmentated

laser range radar as a proximity fuse to determine time for detonation so

maximize the damage

launched

HARM (Texas Instruments)

HARM uses an anti-radiation homing seeker to track the radar emissions

The

as to

Missile,

its

to the target's antenna.

own

different

inertial

For guidance during the midcourse

navigation system and auto

The

pilot.

modes, reactive and preemptive. In the reactive mode the

HARM maintains the tracking of the enemy radar from launch to impact.
normally used
launch which

at shorter distances.

is

HARM can be

submode of the

used when the launching

aircraft

is

reactive

mode

is

This

mode

is

the self protect

engaged by an enemy radar guided

weapon.

HARM Features
~

V-liJ

^l-iH-

CI

-.OC.^Cl

..li.

-,.li.li-..v

(r.n.

L.iJ

'.: .-viol

^
t_i-X-/

TT
."p;i,' ;rcj

...-

r.-..

on

\ii

.ii r.-.;;iT.<

'C-;:.

sol

.lilt.

;1.JI

*ti^.|'Joi.ii ini-iii

Figure 6-2. High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

92

i!

;>.n

ir.'.tii'

II

-yMjiji

In the preemptive

mode

the missile

Before launch, information regarding the


the missile, normally from the aircraft's

is

known

launched toward a

target's location

RWR. The

target location.

and characteristics

aircraft's

airspeed and altitude

passed to the missile prior to launch. Shortly after launch the missile starts
trajectory during which

it is

guided by

its

missile reachs the calculated target area

seeker

on the radiation

becomes

active

until impact.

it

is

inertial

navigation system.

will

If the missile

its

guidance

Ref

60,

mode

it

When

the

guidance system

will

home

in

does not find the target when the seeker

continue toward the calculated target position. After a certain time

tries to

again.

also

midcourse

the missile will enter a energy conserving profile with the purpose of increasing

during which time

is

pointed toward the projected target and the

If the seeker finds the target the missile's

activated.

is

it

own

passed to

is

acquire a target. If a target

The preemptive mode

is

is

its

range,

found the missile enters the

illustrated in figure 6-3.

[Ref 43, Ref 59,

Ref 61]

BBQINS SEARCH FOR


pmiAPnr TARGET

HARMEOM
FUGHT PROFILE
BEQD4S SEARCH FOn

AUBINATE TARGET

LAUNCH AT
TARGET WITH
HAiOOFF/NAV
BVIORS
PWMAflnr

Figure 6-3.

LOCATION
VMTH ERROR

HARM in Preemptive Mode

93

ALTBMATE

2.

Anti Radiation Missile

Unmanned

SEAD

Another method of achieving

is

Aerial Vehicle

UAVs

to use

as

UAV

ARMs. The

equipped with a radar homing seeker can be put into a patrol route to search an area for
radar emitters, during this patrol the
increase durability.

When

a radar in the area

radar using a radar homing seeker

The sensor has

UAV can be using an energy preserving

becomes

typical radar

a frequency range of 2-18

GHz,

active the

Figure 6-4

is

a total weight of 12

Radar Homing Seeker

94

UAV can home in on the

homing sensor

against typical radar of approximately 10 km. [Ref 62]

speed to

shown
lb.

in

Figure 6-4.

and a range

B.

CONCLUSIONS
The importance of SEAD was shown

of many nations

in the

Gulf war and

Expected improvements of the

arsenals.

the navigation system and

in

ARMs

ARM will

are

becoming

probably

come

the ability to counter different types of ARM-CM.

a part
in

both

In the

navigation field the inclusion of GPS could lead to improved precision in the midcourse
phase, the
In the case

ARM would become more or less a cruise missile with an anti-radiation seeker.
of resistance to

- Artificial

intelligence

CM there are several possible developments;


which could make the missile discriminate between the radar

and decoys by way of operation patterns


Multiple sensors which makes endgame guidance possible against shut

down

radar.

Improved navigation which

will

make

close

hit

possible even

if

the radar

is

turned

off during the guidance phase

Other development

in

the area might be the inclusion of radar

missile systems both air-to-air and surface-to-surface

95

homing seekers

to other

96

Vn. DIRECTED

Directed energy weapons

(DEW)

ENERGY WEAPONS

can be divided into three categories: lasers, high-

powered microwave (HPM) weapons and charge


categories, the lasers

and charge
decade.

do not

light.

A general

rely

supply.

particle

seem to have the highest

beam weapons

particle

beam weapons. Of these

potential in the shorter perspective.

are not predicted to enter the battlefield during the next

advantage for beam weapons over conventional weapons

on a magazine of explosive

Beam weapons

HPM

shells but instead

is

that they

on an almost unlimited power

also have the advantage of a high velocity, literally the speed

of

This makes the time to reach the target negligible, which significantly simplifies

weapon guidance,

it

also gives the systems a potential to

engage many targets

time (Figure 7-1). [Ref 63]

Figure 7-1. Example of possible deployment of beam weapons

97

in a short

A.

LASER WEAPONS
Laser weapons can be divided into two categories: jamming and destructive. The

jamming systems use


Chapter IV.

power

in

ECM)

the laser

beam

either to introduce false information into a seeker (see

or to saturate the detector while the destructive systems use high

order to destroy components, normally sensors,

in

also be used against personnel, especially against the unprotected

on the

human

laser could

eye.

Depending

intensity the radiation can cause:

- Irritation,

The

the target.

the illuminated individual

Flash blindness,

at this

is

forced to turn the head away.

energy-level there will also be permanent injuries to the

eye.

The

destructive laser systems can either be optimized against the detector or be high

power systems which by

introducing energy to the surface layer of the target creates

thermal and mechanical effects which causes breakdowns. If the laser operates

same wavelength

as the sensor, the radiation

becomes magnified by the

seeker's

the

in

own

optics which can increase the radiation density

in

consequence of this

would be of great importance as weapons

fact is that tuneable lasers

because they could radiate

at the sensor's

the detector by a factor of 100 000.

wavelength and thereby use only a small fraction

of the power otherwise necessary. Figure 7-2 shows possible weapon


different sensors.

There are several methods for frequency conversion which would lead

The

free electron laser

(FEL)

would be

a suitable laser for

weapons

to a laser tuneable in a large part of the optical spectrum.

with

its

potential for both high

applications, studies are under

FEL. [Ref

64,

lasers against

Ref

65,

Ref

power and

way

66,

tuneablity

to build a ship-borne

Ref

67]

98

weapon system based on

the

Sensor

Laser

Wave

length ^im

A
Carbon
10

dioxide

IRV8-12|im

Hydrogen

IRV

fluoride

3-5

^m

Night vision

Human

eye

0.3

Figure 7-2. Wavelengths for different sensors and potential laser weapons

1.

High Energy Laser Air Defense Armoured Vehicle (MBB, Diehl)


The high energy

flying aircraft, helicopters

laser

and

(HEL) system
missiles.

It

is

a short-range system for use against

has an expected range of 8000 m.

99

low

The sytem

uses a 10.6 [xm carbon dioxide

laser.

The

laser

is

fueled with hydrocarbon fuel and a

nitrogenous oxidator, which both are carried by the vehicle. The two components form
the carbon dioxide which

is

used

in

the stimulated emission.

The

laser

the target by a focusing mirror on an extendable arm (see Figure 7-3).

from the gas formation are vented rearwards from the

The

HEL

achieves

its

beam

is

The hot

directed at
ftimes

laser generator system.

purpose by directing the beam onto a small spot with a

very high energy density which causes the material to become heated, melted and

vapourised

The

HEL

succesflilly tested.

system

is still in

the study phase but a small scale version has been

[Ref 68]

100

((fltcOOB from

Targ(

Focuting Opttes

nd Tfachw

Figure 7-3. High Energy Laser Air Defense Armoured Vehicle

B.

HIGH-POWERED MICROWAVE (HPM)


The concept used

for

HPM

is in

many ways

similar to

but instead of distracting or deceiving the system, the


possible destroy the electronic equipment itself

used
-

in

The

RF-jammers (see Figure 7-4)

HPMs

HPM

purpose

is

to affect and if

systems could potentially be

three different levels:

As

traditional

jammers but with a power

that

101

would make

it

possible to totally

dominate the target and decrease the "burn through" distance to almost zero.
-

To

destroy microcircuits

To

heat up targets and thereby cause mechanical and thermally induced breakdown.

systems.

in electronic

Wave

guide

^^^

Antenna

High-

Pulse

Microwave

voltage

generator

source

generator
Figure 7-4

Because of the high power

jamming

Block diagram for

radiation generated by the

friendly electronic systems

To be

aircraft

C.

HPM A trend

in aircraft

stealth aircraft are designed to

make them

stands a high risk of

HPM close to other systems

HPM

to be

masked by the

systems operate as

Another drawback for

HPM

systems

normally have protection from electromagnetic pulses which

effective against

modern

it

would need

solution to this problem will probably be that

independent units away from other systems

modern

site

system

HPM

able to operate

the antennas need to be highly directional and the


terrain.

HPM

highly succeptible to

design working

in

favour of the

is

that

will also

HPM

is

be

that

maximize absorption of microwaves which might

microwave thermal

effects.

[Ref 69]

NON-NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)


Even though

the

EMP

definition be considered an

of a non-nuclear

generated by a high altitude nuclear detonation might by

EW weapon

it is

not discussed fijrther here.

EMP generator has emerged

as a possible effective

102

The development

weapon which does

not cause severe loss of life.


electronic

components

By

using an

to cause loss

EMP

weapon

of data and other

it

would be possible

failures

to upset

which would lead to system

collapse.

The

EMP

generator consists of a helical

high explosives.

A bank

magnetic

field in the

magnetic

field

conducted

400

ns.

cruise missile

of capacitors are used to supply the

gap between the

coil

initial

current which creates a

and cylinder. The explosion compresses the

where the generator has produced a 12- 16

EMP

generator

(ALCM)

is

planned to be

By

(see Figure 7-5)

be focused into a 30 degree beam


target, for

copper cylinder surrounded by

which creates a very short-duration pulse of high power. Los Alamos has

tests

The

coil inside a

example a command

The

center,

fitted into a slightly

modified

air

using a well-tuned antenna the

ALCM
and

MA pulse during a rise time of

at

would be programmed to

passage detonate

70]

103

its

EMP

launched

EMP

fly

would

over the

generator. [Ref

ALCM MODIFIED TO CARRY NON-LETHAL


ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) WEAPON
ENLARGED
FACETED NOSE
TO CARRY EMP
GENERATOR

OPTICALLY

TRANSPARENT

'

WINDOW

30

EMP
BEAM
Figure 7-5. Electromagnetic pulse

D.

weapon

CONCLUSIONS
The use of directed energy weapons

branches of

weapon

in

On

the battlefield anti-sensor lasers are likely to

the self protection

development of non-nuclear
in

low

EMP

level conflicts

become

common

weaponry of tanks and AFVs and the use of laser

anti personnel (eye destructive) role

of choice

probably be one of the fastest growing

EW under the coming decade due to the rapid deployment of EO/IR guided

systems.

component

will

and

is

might be the role


successful

it

in

conflicts.

has the potential to

in retaliation attacks.

104

coming

in

an

If the

become

the

weapon

APPENDIX A MONOLITHIC MICROWAVE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT

TECHNOLOGY

The Defense Advanced Research

Projects

Agency has sponsored

develop the Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit

(MMIC)

program

Technology. The

to

MMIC

can be described as a building block for microwave equipment similar to Integrated


Circuits (IC) for electronics.

The aim of the program was

to develop the

MMIC

technology to reduce future costs for producing complex microwave subsystems. The
result

of the program

is

a series of standard building blocks, such as amplifiers,

synthesizers, transmitters and receivers.

The introduction of MMIC has made

to significantly reduce size, weight and cost for


also helped to

improve the

reliability

achieved without the expected loss

many

EW systems

because of cost or

size.

Among

in

lightweight, high performance

The use of MMIC has

performance compared to hybrid designs where

[Ref 71]

possible products which

the

possible

of the systems. These improvements have been

transistors can be selected to optimize the performance

The use of MMIC has made

it

new products

earlier not feasible

are expendable decoys like

RWR like ALR-67(V) and

105

were

smart chaff.

GEN-X,

APPENDIX B TRANSMISSION

The

infrared emission

As can be seen

in

from a body

is

IN

THE ATMOSPHERE

dependent on

its

temperature and emissivity.

Figure B-1 the total radiated power increases with increased

temperature while the wavelength for the peak decreases. The

tail

pipe of a jet engine has

a temperature of approximately 800 K, which represents a peak wavelength of 4 \xm.


emissivity describes

how much power

black body, the emissivity

is

the

body

radiates.

For a perfect emitter, called a

equal to one.

Figure B- 1

Spectral Radiant Emittance of a

106

The

Blackbody

When IR

radiation propagates through the atmosphere

scattered or absorbed.

transmission of IR

is

some of it

is

reflected,

These phenomena are wavelength-dependent which means

better for

radiation transmission over a

that the

some wavelengths. Figure B-2 shows

the percentage of

nautical mile path for a given sea level

atmosphere as a

function of wavelength. Because of this phenomenon, the detector technology

is

concentrated to wavelengths where the atmosphere has a high transmittance, so called

windows.

Near infrirw) fc|

|<

Middle minred

100

>^

Faf inlnred-

20

J_\
3

L
6

10

11

12

Wavelength (microns)

Figure B-2. Atmospheric Attenuation of IR Radiation

107

13

1*

15

APPENDIX C JOINT ELECTRONICS TYPE DESIGNATION SYSTEM (JETDS)

The JETDS
classification

number

is

a designation system used by the

of equipment. The code consists of the

and, in

some

The

cases, another letter.

for the piece of equipment and the letter following

common

Below

is

letters

letters

AN

it

gives a brief

followed by three

following

The number

platform installation, equipment type and purpose

the most

DoD; which

is

AN

represent, in order,

the designated

modifications.

list

of the most commonly-used designations for

EW equipment

JOINT ELECTRONICS TYPE DESIGNATION SYSTEM


Installation
Type
Purpose
5

A: Piloted aircraft

A: Invisible

light,

heat

D: Direction finder,
reconnaissance or

radiation

surveillance
F:

Fixed ground

L:

Countermeasures

M: Mobile ground

N: Sound

P: Portable

P;

in air

Radar

E: Ejection or release

G: Fire control
H: Recording or

reproducing
S:

number

provides additional information about

73]

TABLE

letters,

Water

R: Radio

Q: Special combination

of purposes
T: Ground,

S:

transportable

of types

detecting

U: General

V; Visual and visible

T: Transmitting

utility

Special combination

R; Receiving, passive

light

V: Vehicular ground

W: Armament

Y: Surveillance and
control

Z: Piloted-pilotless

airborne vehicle

combination

108

[Ref

APPENDIX D FORMULAS FOR ECM

This appendix gives the most commonly used formulas regarding

The purpose with

the calculations

visible to the radar or

remember
result

is

to find either at

what jamming power

is

section and

among

what range the platform

necessary to hide

that these formulas only give an estimate

dependent,

of the

it

It is

real result

to signal ratio (J/S).

and that the

The

factor to determine the effectiveness of noise


ratio express the

By

setting J/S to the

PBG47iR^
J

PGaB
r

J= Power of the noise

S= Power of the echo


Power of the

radar

Pj= Power of the jammer


B-,=

real

jamming

Bandwidth of the jammer

Br= Bandwidth of the

radar overlapping the

0;= Gain of the jammer antenna

is

the

jam

jammer's power intercepted by the radar

to that intercepted from the target

Pj-=

be

other things, on attenuation, fluctuations in the radar cross

self-screening the J/S will be as follows.

will

important to

minimum

conceal the target the burn-through distance, R, can be found. If the jammer

systems

ECCM techniques used by the radar.

The most important

compared

is

ECM

jammer

in the direction

109

of the radar

required to
is

used for

Gy= Gain of the

radar antenna

in

the direction of the target

cr=

Radar cross section of the

R=

Distance between the jammer and the radar

If the

jammer

is

target

used as a stand-off jammer,

this

means

that the

jammer and

target to be protected are different platforms, the J/S will be as follows.

B G G

P
^

(r;^

47[

(G^^aB
J

fR^^
V

Gjr= Gain of the jammer antenna

in

Gy\= Gain of the radar antenna

the direction of the

in

Rf^ Distance from radar

to target

R\= Distance from radar

to

the direction of the radar

jammer

no

jammer

the

APPENDIX E LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAED

Active Airborne Expendable Decoy

AEB

Active Electronic

AFV

Armored Fighting Vehicle

AIEWS

Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare

AG

Acousto-Optic

AOCMS

Airborne Optical Counter-Measures System

ASCM

Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

ASE

Aircraft Survivability

ASPJ

Airborne Self-Protection Jammer

ATOM

Anti

ATIRCM

Advanced Threat InfraRed Counter-Measures

ATRJ

Advanced Threat Radar Jammer

CM

Counter-Measures

CVR

Crystal Video Receiver

CW

Continuous

DF

Direction Finding

DSP

Digital Signal Processing

EC

Electronic

ECCM

Electronic Counter Counter-Measures

ECM

Electronic Counter-Measures

ECR

Electronic

EGCM

End Game Counter-Measures

Buoy

Tank Guided

Suite

Equipment

Missile

Wave

Combat

Combat Reconnaissance

111

EIDF

Electronic Intercept and Direction Finding

ELINT

ELectronic INTelligence

EME

Electro-Magnetic Environment

EO

Electro-Optic

EOB

Electronic Order of Battle

EP

Electronic Protection

ERP

Effective Radiated

ESM

Electronic Support Measures

EW

Electronic Warfare

EWS

Electronic Warfare Support

FFT

Fast Fourier Transform

FPA

Focal-Plane Array

GBCS

Ground Based Common Sensor

HARM

High-Speed Antiradiation Missile

HOJ

Home On Jam

lEWCS

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

IFM

Instantaneous Frequency Measurement

IFM

Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver

InfraRed

LRCM

InfraRed Counter-Measures

IRMWS

Infrared Missile

LOB

Line

LPI

Low Probability

LWS

Laser Warning System

MAW

Missile

Power

Common

Warning Subsystem

Of Bearing
of Intercept

Approach Warning

112

Sensor

MMIC

Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit

MMW

Milli-Meter-Wave

MSAS

Multifunction Strike Avoidance System

MWS

Missile

MWS

Missile Warning System

OBCM

OfF-Board Counter-Measures

PD

Pulse Doppler

PFM

Pulse Frequency Modulation

PMAWS

Passive Missile Approach Warning System

POI

Probability

PRF

Pulse Repetition Frequency

PRI

Pulse Repetition Interval

PW

Pulse Width

RF

Radio Frequency

RWR

Radar Warning Receiver

SAWS

Silent Attack

SEAD

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

SEW

Surface Electronic Warfare

SHR

Superhetrodyne Receiver

SIGINT

SIGnal INTelligence

SSDS

Ship Self Defense System

TDOA

Time Difference Of Arrival

TO A

Time Of Arrival

TRF

Tuned RF Receiver

TWT

Travelling

Warning System

Of Intercept

Warning System

Wave Tube

113

TWTA

Travelling

UAV

Unmanned

VCO

Voltage Controlled Oscillator

Wave Tube

Amplifier

Air Vehicles

114

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OF FIGURES

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Figure 3-11.

AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving

Set,

Hughes

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AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving

Set,

Hughes

Aircraft

Company.
Figure 3-12.

Company.
Figure 3-13.

AAR-47

Figure 3-14.

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Figure 3-19.

Figure 4-1

Figure 4-2.

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1

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AN/ALQ- 84(V)
1

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121

Figure 4-12.

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Figure 4-13.

ASM

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THORN EMT

Figure 4-14. Launch of Carmen Decoy,

Figure 4-15

Carmen Decoy,

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Figure 4-20.

Unmanned

Aerial Vehicle, Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 4-21. Typical Locations of Dispenser Units, Celsius Tech

Decoy System,

Figure 4-22

Shield Tactical

Figure 4-23

BOL

Chaff Dispenser, Celsius Tech.

Figure 4-24.

BOP

Pyrotechnical Dispenser, Celsius Tech.

Figure 4-25.

TACJAM-A Blockdiagram

Figure 5-1

Blockdiagram

for Integrated

for

Jane's

Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems.

ECM section,

EW

Sanders.

System, Western-Mountain Region

EW

Technical Symposium.

Figure 5-2

Electronic Warfare System

EW 400, Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare

Systems.

Figure 5-3. Prinicpal Diagram over

INEWS, Western-Mountain Region

EW Technical

Symposium
Figure 5-4. Blockdiagram over

APR-39A(V)2

Technology.

122

as Integrated

EW system,

Litton Applied

SEAD,

Figure 6-1. Tornado Aircraft Equipped for

Aviation

Week

&

Space Technology.

Figure 6-2. High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, Texas Instruments.

HARM in Preemptive Mode,

Figure 6-3.

Western-Mountain Region

EW Technical

Symposium.
Figure 6-4. Radar

Figure 7-1

Homing

Seeker, E-Systems.

Example of possible deployment of beam weapons, FOA-Tidningen.

Figure 7-2. Wavelengths for Different Sensors and Potential Laser Weapons.
Figure 7-3. High Energy Laser Air Defense Armoured Vehicle, Jane's Land-Based Air

Defence.

Block diagram

Figure 7-4

for

HPM

system

Figure 7-5. Electromagnetic pulse weapon, FOA-Tidningen

Figure B-1

John Wiley

Spectra! Radiant Emittance of a Blackbody, Infrared Systems Engineering,

&

Sons.

Figure B-2. Atmospheric Attenuation of IR Radiation, Infrared Systems Engineering,

John Wiley

&

Sons.

123

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