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G.R. No.

127240 March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,


vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at
the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he
found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four
children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen
under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the RevisedNATURALIZATION Law, as amended.
Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated
in 3 of the law, stated

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction
No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed
as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special
Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that
processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of
petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness
present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense
that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our
part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of
the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the
names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in
violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and
his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed
to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4

Annexed to the State's appellant'sBRIEF was a copy of a 1977 petition forNATURALIZATION filed
by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, 5 in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989
petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 The state also annexed income
tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly
support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner
claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then
again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953

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until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage
contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract 8 and a
Joint-Affidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner
married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance
with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as
husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his
claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.
10
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed
the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to
theIMPORTANCE naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not
presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court held:

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the
petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This
is a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to
come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his
application for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo."SECTION 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires
the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the
Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their
objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the
public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with
his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that
the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the
RevisedNATURALIZATION Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization . . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses,
commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because
he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that
they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by
their children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent, speculative and precarious. . .

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN


NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR

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PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY
SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN
HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT
HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant'sBRIEF and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they
are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule
132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.
13
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides
that

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition forNATURALIZATION . The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented
by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course
of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving
for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively
depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the
reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he
was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court
by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in theBRIEF he filed with the
Court of Appeals. thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the
alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by
the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the
Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for
as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which
was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the
Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than

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this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the
State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income
tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast
doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in
relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all
the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M.
Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A
of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his
petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial
compliance with 7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective
sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the
opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information
regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time
or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473,
7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and
former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization
cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

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SYLLABUS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND


CORRESPONDENCE; A PERSON BY CONTRACTING MARRIAGE, DOES NOT SHED HIS/HER
INTEGRITY OR HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION IS EVER AVAILABLE TO HIM OR TO HER. Indeed the documents and
papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters
knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin,
declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of
plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and
ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the
properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as
moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her
attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as
evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals

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affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared
the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to
return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision,
petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Mantin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled
that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondents comment
in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners
attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this
reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.

Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case,
charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or
gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty.
Felix, Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he


maintains that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting
Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however
having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a
restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial
court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for
petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be
looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence against him in the
legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it
is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin
himself under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore,
receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia
to avail herself of her husbands admission and use the same in her action for legal
separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr.
Martins admission as to their genuineness and authenticity did not constitute a violation
of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case
establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating

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the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time
he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was
temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed
and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers
became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law." 4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007

NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,


vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING,
and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the Decision1 dated February 22,
2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
64122, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental, Branch 60.

The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of
Subdivision plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject lot,

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containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City
of Cadiz.3

On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena
Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in
the name of Nena.5 She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate
taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.6 However, the land remained in
possession of Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title
over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject
property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena
did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled
and the subject property reconveyed to her.7

Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio,
Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.

In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the
sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding
from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. 9 Nena did not
reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.

Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the nullification of
the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name
of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.10 The complaint
also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with leave of court for the
purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, he having died intestate and without issue in March
1991.11 He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as his sole heirs.

In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial court for the award of actual,
exemplary and moral damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. 12

Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14, 1969 (Exh. "Q")
executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID and
further ordering:

1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu thereof to issue a new title in
the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion of the property; Felicidad
Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-
fourth () portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion, all of lot 56
after payment of the prescribed fees;

2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-00672 and in lieu thereof
issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating
Marcella, Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso portion; and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-

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indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well as the house standing thereon be likewise declared in the names of
the persons mentioned in the same proportions as above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;

3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 by way of moral
damages, P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees
and P3,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and to

4. Pay the costs ofSUIT .

SO ORDERED.13

Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC.14

Nenas Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated August 22, 2002. 15

Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided the instant case
without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable Court and
also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is
even against the evidence on record."16

At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA finally
disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion. On the
other hand, the petition actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are the
proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court decided to treat the present
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering that it was filed within
the reglementary period for filing the same.17

As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents rests on the
proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because Danielas
actual intention was not to dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by providing her with a
collateral. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in
holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28,
1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the
lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in evidence,
thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine her.

Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn
Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered only after the
death of Daniela in 1994.18Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would
have taken action against the petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that up to the
time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered a
word of complaint against petitioner.

Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time and
again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance is
required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC and
the CA erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between Daniela and petitioner created a trust
relationship between them because of the settled rule that where the terms of a contract are clear, it
should be given full effect.

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In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner failed to show that the
CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed judgments; that
Danielas Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of sale by and between her
and petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between petitioner and Daniela
created a trust relationship between them.

The Court finds for the petitioner.

The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A
contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the
partiesCONCEAL their true agreement (relatively simulated).19 The primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties.20 Such intention is determined
from the express terms of their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts.21

In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation that
the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of
Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private
respondents evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to this
document.

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.22 The admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade.23Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.25 Moreover, the adverse
party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.26 For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as
she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Danielas sworn
statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated
and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that
Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of
sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material
allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness
of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside from Danielas sworn statement, private respondents failed to
present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses
failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with
petitioner.

In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the
complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of
ownership over the disputed property.30 In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that
petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner has
shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that it
was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and declarations
and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim
against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues

10
to the Government.32 Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 33 On
the other hand, private respondents failed to present even a single tax receipt or declaration showing
that Daniela paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only
Tax Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence, refers only
to the house standing on the lot in controversy.34 Even the said Tax Declaration contains a notation that
herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really reflect
the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never told any of her
relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known
her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the existence of
which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration therein that she is appealing for
help in order to get back the subject lot, she never took any concrete step to recover the subject
property from petitioner until her death more than ten years later.

It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed the subject
Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in petitioners favor. In fact,
Daniela continued to occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime,
petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that ownership and possession
are two entirely different legal concepts.35Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership,
neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil
Code states that when the sale is made through a publicINSTRUMENT , the execution thereof shall
be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with ownership, is transferred
to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. 36 Thus, inLIGHT of the circumstances of
the present case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or
occupation of the disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she
was already able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the subject property.

As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed the validity of the
sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the sworn statement earlier
adverted to, for being hearsay.NATURALLY , private respondents were not able to cross-examine the
deceased-affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.

However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private
respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance of
evidence37 that the contract of sale between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal
presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has the
burden of proving its simulation.38 Since private respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving
their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the presumption
of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.

Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid
and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a
trust relationship was created between them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

11
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25,
sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to
P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:

That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain
KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed
weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the
occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and
violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The facts are:

On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba,
were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel
Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that
morning.3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm
in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told
Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she
would just stay home and wash herCLOTHES or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn
was left alone in the house.4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel.
They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the backDOOR of
the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that
he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the
house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar andBLACK PANTS ,
pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife
used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was
wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the
lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellants eyes were "reddish
and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him.

12
Judilyns husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house
of Isabel.8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house
were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open.
She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She
went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the
door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a
lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A
daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel
Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked
body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of
the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denimPANTS , bag and sandals beside her
naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within
50 meters from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylynss
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar
Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They
suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (Hes running away!). Police Officer
Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away.
Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured
him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant
pleaded "not guilty."

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.

Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In
hisBRIEF , appellant assigns the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF


THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.

13
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant.
This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses
unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent
reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason
being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and
observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of
the case, the trial judges assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest
respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16

The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated inLIGHT of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised,
were found on the victims abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of
her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitms body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at
9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine
(9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of
death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe
within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by
witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan
C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the
victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his
testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done
through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by
the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in
her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellants assault on her virtue.22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen
from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellants gene type.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A persons DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is
the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine,
skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins.25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been
left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and
ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could
also be transferred to the victims body during the assault.27Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving

14
that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim,
crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene
of the crime.28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case,
used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR)
analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially
within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became
possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject
of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene
types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
from the victims vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim
and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in
other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims vaginal canal, the trial
court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang
together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the house because of their
frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife
in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly
Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting
strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the
ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time
wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching;
(7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of
Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house
of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her
intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained
pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed
sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime
scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the

15
DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained
but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator
of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from
him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination,
the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under
duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA,
as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled
that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to
submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post
facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA
typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of
Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and
bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawangs house
during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at
the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay.40 He
lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five
minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error
in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.

16
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a
minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus
value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight
value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value"
may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to
balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its
admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the
court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that
degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment
of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. 42 This
requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the
offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case
passes the test of moral certainty.

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the
culprit.44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the
victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She witnessed the
appellant running down the stairs of Isabels house and proceeding to the back of the same
house.46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to
her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school." 47 The victim told Judilyn
about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body
was found dead in her grandmothers house on June 25, 1998. 48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that
when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar
threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument
between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano
dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were
not contradicted by appellant.

Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a
rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on
the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds
or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. 51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on
the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victims lips by
stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat
or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.52However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the
victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that
actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence
and intimidation.54 The fact that the victims hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was
committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are
invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal
lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age. 56

17
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims aunt. He is seven years older than the victim
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law,
together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents,
approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-laws house. Being a relative by affinity
within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the
victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on
the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their
position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of
the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of
P75,000.0059 should be awarded in theLIGHT of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary
damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances.60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch
25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to
pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00,
P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages
is DELETED.

Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of
admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying
declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny
Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila
on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through
its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005.1

Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the
witnesses who had incriminated him.

18
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan
Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon
was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle
rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told
Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital
at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally
witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time. 2

As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the
warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the
Manila City Jail.

After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:

The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the victim
while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around Bolanons neck stabbing the latter with
the use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanons death. Not only because it
was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estao, the victims uncle who
brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and even on
their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to
say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.3

The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness Mendoza on how
Salafranca had effected his attack

against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the victim on the
latters neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand," Salafranca did not give Bolanon
"any opportunity to defend himself."4 The RTC noted inconsistencies in Salafrancas and his witness
testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his residence the day after the incident and had
stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had he not been hiding,
there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence, especially because he was also
working near the area.5

The RTC disposed thus:

With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby found guilty of the
crime of Murder defined and punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in
relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other aggravating
circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.

His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.

He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 representing death
indemnity.

There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.

SO ORDERED.6

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,7 citing the dying declaration made
to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafrancas positive identification as the

19
culprit by Mendoza.9 It stressed that Salafrancas denial and his alibi of being in his home during the
incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the
stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt. 10

Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The appeal lacks merit.

Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC
and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estao were credible and reliable. The
determination of the competence and credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as
the trial court due to its unique and unequalled position of observing their deportment during testimony,
and of assessing their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a
substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and conclusions reached by the RTC,
the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such assessment and conclusions, 11considering that the
CA as the appellate court could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions without
a persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary
matters that would alter the result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or
omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the
findings of the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.13

Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza as the
assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza
considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to
testify against him unless it was upon the truth.14

Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had "encircled his left
arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the right(hand) and coming from
wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one encircling the blow towards below the left
nipple."15 Relying on Mendozas recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found
treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CAs
concurrence because Mendozas eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained uncontested by
Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca employed constituted a
surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an aggressive physical control of the
latters movements that ensured the success of the attack without any retaliation or defense on the part
of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code,16 treachery is present when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.

The Court further notes Estaos testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying
Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:

Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?

A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.

Q What time was that?

A 12:50 a.m.

Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?

A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."

Q What did you do?

20
A I immediatelyDRESSED up and brought him to PGH.

Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?

A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod
Salafranca.

Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How long have you known him?

A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."

Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Will you look around and point him to us?

A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)

COURT

When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?

A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he will just suffer
more.

Q What happened when you told him that?

A He kept silent.

Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?

A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.

Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?

A He was brought to Emergency Room.

Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?

A He was pronounced dead.17

It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his uncle, to
seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedlyDRESSED up to bring his
nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had
asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been
Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing,
causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at the
emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such
circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res
gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his
death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of
the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.18
21
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the
declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.19

All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao,
identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was
conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to
Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital
emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing.
There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be
shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as theNATURE of his
wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. 20Bolanon would have
been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying
declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the
res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.21

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he
gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his
stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital,
and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of
a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." 22 In a general way, res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to
illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
the idea of deliberation and fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.24 The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the
act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event
that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 25

We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity
of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such
indemnity, because the damages to be awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or
compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages. 26

We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages which were different
from the death indemnity.27 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but
appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.28Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of
the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive
to set an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given the

22
circumstances, the amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of
the heirs mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on humanNATURE
and experience having shown that:

xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of
the victims family.1wphi1 It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a
loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only
steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and
support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. 30

The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-recognition of the right of the
heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual damages for burial and
related expenses are not substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are
warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them compensation
by way of actual damages.31

Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part
of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." 32 The
Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."33 Conformably with such
legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim
to exemplary damages because of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was
an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court
explained so in People v. Catubig:34

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise,
is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged
effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it
causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather
than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of P30,000.00 is deemed reasonable and
proper,35because we think that a lesser amount could not result in genuine exemplarity.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 24,
2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as
death indemnity the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of this decision.

The accused shall further pay the costs ofSUIT .

SO ORDERED.

23
G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA
and LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742 entitled "State Investment House,
Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC Chemical Corporation." The questioned decision affirmed in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case
NO. 84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the following: a) To pay
plaintiff State Investment House, Inc., the sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per annum
reckond (sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount is fully paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount
equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and demandable as attorney's fees and to pay the cost(s)
ofSUIT .

SO ORDERED.1

24
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated February 27, 1997,
denying SCC Chemicals Corporation's motion for reconsideration.

The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman, private
respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State
Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual
interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal
upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo
Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan
when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt
thereof, no payment was made.

On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory
note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or
failure of consideration.

The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle
the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed
upon:

1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it has
jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the
capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;

2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation dated
April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date which were both received by the herein
defendant; and

3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the latter acting
through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December
13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984. 2

The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to the
plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed
several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared
several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was
finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the
case was deemed submitted for decision.

On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 45742.

On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its claim was
insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no showing that he
had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of the
genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these

25
signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out that the
original copies of the documents were not presented in court.

On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.

On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in
its resolution dated February 27, 1997.

Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE


RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVERCAME IT'S BURDEN OF PROOF.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES


TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:

(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private respondent SIHI
had proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and

(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of attorney's fees to SIHI.

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the
testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the
truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of
Sections 363 and 48,4 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals
to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to
have seen the document presented in evidence executed or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its
genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul ofSECTION 2,5 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which
requires proof of due execution and authenticity of private documents before the same can be received
as evidence. Petitioner likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary
evidence presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation
of the requirement of Section 34,6 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part
of the appellate court to consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the
originals of the documents presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence
provided for in Section 3 (e),7 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.

Petitioner's arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.

We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled hearing
dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was
supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges
the appellate court with committing an error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in evidence
of said testimony pursuant to the "hearsay rule" contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

26
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay
evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.8 However, the rule does admit of an exception.
Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.9 The rationale for this
exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to
cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay.10 However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to
cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several
opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to
take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it
sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing
party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI
was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the
requirements ofSECTION 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony
were satisfied.

Respecting petitioner's other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private
respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of
signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must
be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 411 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial
admission requires no proof.

Nor will petitioner's reliance on the "best evidence rule"12 advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no
need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at
pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for
petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was
sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of
payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by
the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil
Code which reads:

ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith.

On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having sustained
the trial court'' award of attorney'' fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of the Philippines v.
Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899, 909 (1990), where we held that when attorney's fees are awarded, the
reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision. Petitioner
submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the same, the award of
attorney's fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court.1wphi1.nt

We find for petitioner in this regard.

It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is necessary
for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within the exception and
justify the grant of the award.13 Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the
rationale for the award of attorney's fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a perusal
of the records shows that the trial court failed to explain the award of attorney's fees. We hold that the
same should thereby be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated November 12, 1996 of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees to private
respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

27
G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut
and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

28
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992,2 as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, 3 the Land Bank of the
Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the property:

Acquired propertyArea in hectares Value

Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19

Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36

P173,918.55

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant toSECTION 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as
amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its
Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination
of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and
the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both
coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.

During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following admissions
of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was
distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation
based on the valuation made by the DAR.5

On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.6

In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial courtCOMPUTED the just compensation for the
coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is
beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest
at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal and Leonidas
Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the
proportion provided by law;

2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of riceland the sum of
FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
and

3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded interest in cash.

IT IS SO ORDERED."7

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in
another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using the
following formula:

For the coconut land

29
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net Income (NI)

2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula under Republic Act No.
38448)

For the riceland

1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the formula
under Executive Order No. 2289)

2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR AO No. 13, Series
of 1994)

Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 52163.

On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision 10 affirming in toto the judgment of the trial
court. The Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial
court's valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.

To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged "primarily"
with "the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands suitable for
agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement" For its part, the
DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Landbank. 12

Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner. 13 If the
landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the
government.14 In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR
adjudicator15 conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the
land by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to
the just compensation for the land.16 These functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-
judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which provides:

"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).

x x x."

A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court17 "for final determination of just compensation."18

In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court19 and, on its own
initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a
written report thereof x x x."20 In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider
several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:

"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn

30
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall
be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and
by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine
its valuation."

These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of
1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR's
rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended. 21

The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:

"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income

CS = Comparable Sales

MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = MV x 2"

Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in
determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely
ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the
determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified
inSECTION 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:

1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;

2. the current value of like properties;

3. itsNATURE , actual use and income;

4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;

5. the assessment made by government assessors;

6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
government to the property; and

7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land, if any.
31
Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing
wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate
nature of determining the valuation of the land,SECTION 58 of the same law even authorizes the
Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely
took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and
applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or
consent of the parties, thus:

"x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants determined the
average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez
vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for
coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-
entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for
coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In
the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be very
low considering that farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also
comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in average
production per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of
Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year
as average gross production. In the Rodriguez case, the defendants fixed the average gross
production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The court is also constrained to apply this
yearly palay production in the Rodriguez case to the case at bar.

xxx xxx xxx

"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land taken under
CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross production a year of 506.96
kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez case which was
1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines
Norte, compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross production a year of
the coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is the value
that Landbank fixed for this case.

"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net income of the
coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the capitalization formula
of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest,
equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore, the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares
is P657,137.00.

"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an area of .7600
hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross production of 3000 kilos or 60
cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the
riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.22

"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted interest on the
compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is
199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the compounded interest
is P79,732.00."23 (emphasis added)

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge.24 They may only do so "in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of
the opposing party,"25 which are not obtaining here.

32
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts. In this regard,SECTION 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on
the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.

"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of
a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case." (emphasis added)

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 228 26 and
R.A. No. 3844,27 as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting
compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. 28 It must be
stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while
R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person whoFURNISHES the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same."29 Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve
agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.

As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order No. 13,
Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree
No. 2730 and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the
property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional
compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.

While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion, however, such
discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A.
6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).

In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the subject
land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits wherein the parties
may present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial
court shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, mentioned
earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended
by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the valuation of the land.
Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint
one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC,
Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to
observe strictly the procedures specified above in determining the proper valuation of the subject
property.

SO ORDERED.

33
[G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998]

HE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS


@ Commander Falcasantos, AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @ Commander Kamlon, MAJID
SAMSON @ Commander Bungi, JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN
DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE
MANUEL @ Ajid and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The trial courts erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.

The Case

On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061,
10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and
10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed[1] before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina
Hassan de Kamming,[2] Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam[3] Taruk Alah,

34
Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for
ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the
person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060][4] and for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario,[5] a male public officer of the City Government of
Zamboanga, who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being
ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and brought
said Felix Rosario[6] to different mountainous places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur,
where he was detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when
he was released only after payment of the ransom was made to herein accused, to the damage and
prejudice of said victim; there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense
was committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise
alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation
of person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and
detain the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] [7] a male public officer
of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons who
insure or afford impunity.

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani,
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah,
Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel.[8]
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the
merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this Court renders its
judgment, ordering and finding:

1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias AJID and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the eight charges
of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless detained for some other
offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA and


HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of armed men who insured
impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them shall be at their maximum period.

WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant to Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

35
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and pursuant to Art. 267,
Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad,
Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)

For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and their kidnapping not
having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the same four accused - Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih - are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms ranging from ten (10)
years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of [k]idnapping and she is
acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).

But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges of [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom.

WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5) imprisonments, ranging
from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as Jalina Hassan de
Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore,
ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as accomplices in the five charges
for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being minors, they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority which lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to serve five
imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY OF prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders convicted of an offense
punishable by death or life by Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of
which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.

Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced further to return
the following personal effects taken on December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in
money, their liability being solidary.

To Jessica Calunod:

One (1) Seiko wrist watch P 250.00

One Bracelet P 2,400.00

One Shoulder Bag P 200.00

Cash P 200.00

To Armado C. Bacarro:

One (1) wrist watch P 800.00

One Necklace P 300.00

36
One Calculator P 295.00

Eyeglasses P 500.00

One Steel Tape P 250.00

To Edilberto S. Perez

One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00

One Wrist Watch P 1,800.00

Cash P 300.00

To Virginia San Agustin-Gara

One (1) Wrist Watch P 850.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be extended to those
sentenced.

The cases against Majid Samson, alias Commander Bungi Awalon Kamlon a.k.a. Commander Kamlon
Carlos Falcasantos and several John Does and Jane Does are ARCHIVED until their arrest.

Costs against the accused convicted.

SO ORDERED.[9]

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.[10] In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same
appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for amnesty. In our
March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the
consideration of this Court.[11]

The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution

The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government agencies, organized
themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was
composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission
on Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government; Edilberto Perez, representing the City
Assessors Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the
driver from the City Engineers Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to check on two of its
classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not
able to reach the place because on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed
their guns at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).

The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their personal belongings.
They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed men who introduced
himself as Commander Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.)

37
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government troops which caused their
group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men
joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).

The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their captivity, the victims
were able to recognize their captors who were at all times armed with guns. The wives of the
kidnappers performed the basic chores like cooking. (pp.9-10. TSN, ibid.)

Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which demanded a
ransom of P100.000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p.15, TSN, ibid.)

On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 oclock noontime, the victims were informed that they would be
released. They started walking until around 7:00 o clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o
clock midnight, the victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the
ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same was reached
after several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of
the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)

x x x.[12]

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves:
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and
Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense

The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:[13]

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o clock in the morning, while weeding their farm in Sinaburan,
Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by soldiers and brought to a
place where one army battalion was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were already
detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan
were brought to the battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8)
accused were transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined
by accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.

At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the captivity of Carlos
Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought her to the mountains. Against their will,
she stayed with Falcasantos and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos
as aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other errands for
everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-
treatment of Falcasantos other wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not
looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-
15)

Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was thirteen years old at the
time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by
Daing Kamming and brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less
than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing housekeeping errands for Kamming
and his men. She made good her escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming and
military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a bachelor bus in
going back to her mothers house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at
around 2:00 o clock in the afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of

38
Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment.
From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her
arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)

Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga
del Sur. At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of a day in May, while she and her husband were in their
farm, soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were
they shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck. There were no
other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside
the building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six co-
accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and
Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali;
and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six nights. On the
seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp.
6-11)

The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was arrested with his
wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals
that followed in the wake of their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN,
January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count
of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of life
imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility - both of the witnesses and their version of what had
happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence
to [p]rosecution witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing.
No taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court,
who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by
[a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.

Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis. The individual
testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what happened to each of them on May 27, 28
and 29, 1990. None of the accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused were
keeping the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.

The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of the captivity of the
five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4)
Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and Imam Taruk Alah. These
two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as conspirators as charged
in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping
group to which the seven accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the
purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from established
communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in order to hide their
hostages. The wives of these armed band moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs,

39
giving them material and moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims,
sleeping with them or comforting them.

xxxxxxxxx

II) The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds
these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused,
these male accused were armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the
military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and in guarding the kidnap
hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among the nine armed men
who had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is supported by the rulings of
our Supreme Court quoted below.

(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. It may be
shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and circumstances which may vary according to the
purposes to be accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common
design, understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense charged.
(People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)

(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the
sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible for the murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)

(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).)[14]

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:


I

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which allegedly
captured the accused-appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right
to cross-examine him.

II

On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken judicial notice of, the trial court,
nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for being highly improbable and contradictory.

III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as
accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom cases.

IV

40
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan the benefits of
suspension of sentence given to youth offenders considering that they were minors at the time of the
commission of the offense.[15]

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal,
and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt
with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice
of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In
addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of
the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the
government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts.[16] Because he was allegedly deprived
of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that
the latters testimony should not be used against him.[17]
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and
are actually pending before the same judge.[18] This is especially true in criminal cases, where the
accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on
the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellants counsel. At best, then, the trial courts mention of Lieutenant Felicianos
testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially
prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latters testimony:


CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with the group?
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four days.
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we came to know first our
foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some food.

41
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of you?
A Yes.
Q And to whom were you assigned?
A To lla Abdurasa.
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to, who else did you come to
know?
A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander Falcasantos - Mating
and Janira - another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really came to know them. Will
you still be able to recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?
A Yes, maam.
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you mentioned are here?
A Yes, they are here.
Q Some of them are here?
A Some of them are here.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine armed men who took us
from the highway.
RTC INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his name as JAILON
KULAIS.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you alight, what else was he
doing while you were in their captivity?
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong.
x x x x x x x x x[19]
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarros testimony pointing to appellant as one of the
culprits:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxxxxxxxx
Q And what happened then?
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us.
Q [To] whom were you assigned?
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.
xxxxxxxxx

42
Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember how he looks like?
A Yes.
Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and his wife are here?
A Yes, maam.
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?
A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself] as Jailon Kulais.
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?
A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was one of those who
stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?
A I did not mention but I can remember his face.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell you that he [was] one of
those who stopped you, you would not recognize him?
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong, your Honor.
x x x x x x x x x[20]
Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez candid narration:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Who else?
A The last man.
Q Did you come to know his name?
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified himself as Jailon
Kulais.)
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
A The same, guarding us.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way from [the] Licomo to
[the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
Q They did not fire any shots?
A But they were pointing their guns at us.

43
Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge, you stated [that] one
of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?
A Yes.
Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
A Yes.
Q Will you please identify?
A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified himself as Jailon
Kulais.)
xxxxxxxxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word Tangkong.
ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours another will be on duty
guarding us.
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.
x x x x x x x x x[21]
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from December
12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of
armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the victims during
the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial court
that he was a conspirator.

Kidnapping
for Ransom

That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also apparent
from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating the
circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these meetings for possible
negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by this? What were you supposed to
negotiate?
A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms.[22]
Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander Falcasantos to write the letter,
the ransom letter.
Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for your ransom?
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.

44
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
A Because I was the one who wrote it.
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?
A Yes.
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano
Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 - there are five letters all handwritten.
COURT:
Original?
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the ones you were asked to
write.
A (Witness going over [letters])
This one - 2 pages. This one - 2 pages. No more.
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what else will make you
remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?
A The signature is there.
Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
A And over it is a signature.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, maam.
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?
A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q There are names - other names here - Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie
Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did you come up to know who signed this one?
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic]
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the signature above the
same. Did you come to know who signed it?
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Jessica, I am going over this letter ... Could you please read to us the portion here which says the terms?
...
A (Witness reading) Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo and kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo
sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989).[23]
xxxxxxxxx
INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20
sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
xxxxxxxxx

45
Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21, 1988. [24] Now, could you
please explain to us why it is dated January 21 1988 and the other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31,
1989?
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned? Please go over this.
A (Going over the letter)
Yes, maam.
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
A (Witness reading)
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7 colors marine type
wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size. [25]
xxxxxxxxx
INTERPRETER:
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors, marine-type not
including the shoes), one half medium, one half large.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed by your companions and
all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you know only.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor
that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already - I was asked again to write, we were ordered to
affix our signature to serve as proof that all of us are alive.[26] [sic]
Calunods testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro [27] and Edilberto
Perez.[28] The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the
release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor
Vitaliano Agan[29] and Teddy Mejia.[30]
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code,[31] having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly
identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial courts finding of appellants guilt on five
counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Kidnapping of
Public Officers

Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the
government monitoring team abducted by appellants group. The three testified to the fact of
kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellants identity as one of
the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara,
Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours [32] does not matter. In
People vs. Domasian,[33] the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before his
parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of
kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at

46
all.[34] Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he
was restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense
consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any
manner, of his liberty.[35] Likewise, in People vs. Santos,[36] the Court held that since the appellant was
charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of
liberty which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers[37] -- Gara was a fiscal analyst for the
City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineers Office, and Francisco was a barangay
councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under
Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,[38] which held that the crime committed was
not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that case had
tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however,
were foiled, when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court noted
that the victims testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the appellant wanted to
detain her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the
victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping
took place, and that appellant was a member of the armed group which abducted the victims.

Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi

The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive
narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense. [39] Between positive
and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the
other, the former generally prevails.[40] Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified
in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material
points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial courts observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against him
head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on subsequent
days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during the questioned dates (December 12,
1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him
as one of their kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty
for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum
penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua.Life imprisonment is not synonymous
with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties
provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is
invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is
prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.[41]
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for
ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED
as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five

47
convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the
kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other
accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their monetary
value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000
representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.

48
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution
dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of Flight
Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company [herein
private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a
contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two (2) years
commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20,
1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July
21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years
effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a flight,
committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307,
Rec.).

Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or
touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was investigated by
board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at
Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed and passed
the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300
and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over
Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17)
expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July
6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation
and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)

Realizing that the recession would not be for aSHORT time, defendant decided to terminate its
excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300
pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess
Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and that
he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.).
Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to
afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only
two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint
was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of
contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).

49
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a
money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff
was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed
in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall
have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).

In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in a
complaint are theNATURAL consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not labor
benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field
of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the employee's
dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case falls under
the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)

On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its motion to
dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the
complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and against
defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of

SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time of
payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid;

SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time of
payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED.2

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction,
validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,

. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee
only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

50
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN
INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER
ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS


EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE


EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine
law, thus:

Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore
Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this
case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial
notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to
this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law
should be applied.4

Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said
court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from
raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of
the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was
based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10
years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article
1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the action
for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn,
then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:

Art. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employee-employer relations accruing during
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

xxx xxx xxx

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In
illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9

More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written
contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

51
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money claims
specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an employee-
employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .

It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to money claims
arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil
Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11

In theLIGHT of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's
action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years
after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appelle only
on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November
1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription period
at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this
claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International,
Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the running
of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves
in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all."12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the
appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment the same
is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but
also to all consequences which, according to theirNATURE , may be in keeping with good faith, usage
and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms
and conditions set forth in the contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear and readily
understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.

xxx xxx xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the Agreement, as he is
not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's employment
was confirmed, he applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the
signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning
the legality of the said agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry resulting in a
slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus
300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services,
number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n.,

52
July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-
appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed. 14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination
from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to
be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be
attributed to respondent appellate court.1wphi1.nt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV
No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review
the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution 1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC)
of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applyingSECTION 44 of
the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is
being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is
solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

53
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen /NATURALIZED Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. 9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he
is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnados US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum aCOMPUTER -generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and
returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying
that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger
manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

54
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April
2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and
Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and
that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his familys ancestral house in
Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June
2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United
States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of
Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964
to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a
registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Baluas
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention," 16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government
Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnados claim that
he is a Filipino citizen.18

55
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
9225, Arnados act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April
2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run
for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnados unexplained use of
a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his
US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign
countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of
privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados proclamation as the
winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the
order of succession underSECTION 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and


the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the
evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law." 21 He
raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not
tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance
to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine
passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First
Divisions treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case;
and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should
have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed
before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados

56
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest
number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited
after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost
the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the
case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that underSECTION 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry
or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been
rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnados Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April
3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Divisions reliance in the case of
In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner
in the said case is aNATURALIZED citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are
not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The
Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the
present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener
pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of
Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not
on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not
notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3)

57
months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already
used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondents submission of
a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following
dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4,
2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine
passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the
respondent used whatever is within his control during that time. 25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign
passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through
which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this
case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is
assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American
passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship." 26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the
United States. The latters continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US
citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his
declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents submission with the
twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for
the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is
lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at
the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve
as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post
cure the latters failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application
of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it
is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the
Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law. 27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as
the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for
ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks
to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Divisions
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability ofSECTION 44 of the

58
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as
the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable
to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a


disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against
private respondent is clear fromSECTION 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate

59
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. 29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has
already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer
rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation
of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon
the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against
Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify
one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he
applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and
again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however,
he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the
effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession
of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his

60
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date
he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for theRENEWAL of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some
act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No.
63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" 37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself
as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive
act of applying forNATURALIZATION . This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of
birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. 39 Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for
public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by

61
the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, 40 he was not qualified
to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3
April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his
American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x. 41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just
at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the
oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." 42 This does not mean, that he
failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant toSECTION 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective
public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign
citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain
his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport
less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation
as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his
Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on
24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation,
his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to ones flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full
and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

62
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has
recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.SECTION 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming
a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring
of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This
doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-
recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of
municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing
candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election
upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office
of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having
intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the
two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some
other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers
actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the
board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the
election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received
a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns
or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only
result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the
word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful
candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that
another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case,
there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality
of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally
cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a
single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)

63
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the
highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one
had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town
on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected
and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional
issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered. 49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing
upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal
mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon
prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots
cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of
eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the


ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that

64
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified
is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule
otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate
is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that
the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x
x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements." 53

We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis
to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the
candidates certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy
are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that
mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v.
COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We
say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be
fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice
about a candidates eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made isSECTION 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78
may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To
state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election
victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula
to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he
can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its
exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the

65
electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1wphi1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as


he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications
of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be
ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any
of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates
who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes
the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates disqualification is not necessary
before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.
The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

SECTION 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15
June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

66
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen
disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the
enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to
the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En
Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO
y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING
is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010
elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

67
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman,
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476
and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants
namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and

68
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to
reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death
Penalty).

Statement of Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:

On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus
terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to
7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop,
the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the
conductor obliged and let them in.

According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men,
because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other one sat two seats
behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers
inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the
person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked
dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave PhP20.
Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers.
At this point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there
might be a holdup.

Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus
was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be
slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as
if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at
him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the police.

As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men
insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off
the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops.
Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got
off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire
quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to
where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A
few hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.

The prosecution presented documentsFURNISHED by the Department of Justice, confirming that


shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced
over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentines Day "gift" for former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview
some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In
another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the
explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused
Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on
the evening of 14 February.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad,
Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other "John"
and "Jane Does" were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only
Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.

69
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and
Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder
charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not
guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the
following:

1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.

2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted knowing one another
before February 14, 2005.

3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG bus while the bus
was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial
Center.

4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he claims taught him how to
make explosive devices.

5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14 bombing incident.

6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb explosion inside the
RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or less forty persons injured.

7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-24 each gave
separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network admitting their participation in the commission of
the said crimes, subject of these cases.

8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes, because they were
guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus that they had entered.

9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a television news
interview in which he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices which resulted in this explosion
inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of these charges.

10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members of the Abu Sayyaf.1

In theLIGHT of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad
were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder,
considering that they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and
explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies
and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan
and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder. 2

After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the Abu
Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make
bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against the government in
the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and
other parts of Metro Manila.

As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership,
specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum
powder, a tester, and ChristmasLIGHTS , all of which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He
then recalled that sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of
TNT that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad
would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly placed in two buses
sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.

70
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got
another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from Abu
Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by
Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali,
repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from accused
Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission.3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky
specifically said, "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."

Assignment of Errors

Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt despite insufficiency of
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.

II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the crimes charged had
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.4

First Assignment of Error

Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry
after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The transcript of stenographic notes
during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:

Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that were agreed upon
during the last hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated murder
charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered
pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not guilty for the frustrated
multiple murder charges remain [I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were
entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they admitted to have caused the
bomb explosion that led to the death of at least four people and injury of about forty other persons and
so under the circumstances, Atty Pea, have you discussed this matter with your clients?

Atty. Pea : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I havent conferred with them
about this with regard to the multiple murder case.

Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the two accused because if they are
interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.

Atty. Pea : Yes, your Honor.

(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)

I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of their pleas, your
Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple
murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.

Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?

Atty. Pea : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the murder case, then
they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now ready,
your Honor, for re-arraignment.

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INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a clearer
way and asked both accused what their pleas are).

Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.

COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have withdrawn their pleas
of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are
there any matters you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial
and accommodate5

As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges must refrain
from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy
administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and theIMPORT of an inevitable
conviction."6 Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis
supplied)

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People
v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was "not guilty," the trial court
should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to "guilty." 7 According to the
Court:

The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the
death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that
the accused might have misunderstood theNATURE of the charge and the consequences of the
plea.8

Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in
which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as
it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of
guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused
understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been
intimidated, bribed, or threatened.9

We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of
judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under
coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea.10 This requirement is stringent and mandatory.11

Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of
the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused
Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same
act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change
of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one
through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused
during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing
circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this

72
instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was
not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration. 12

Second Assignment of Error

In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry
was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made loses much of great
significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission by
the person accused of the offense charged."13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused
but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. 14 (Emphasis supplied.)

In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely circumstantial,
while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.

Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the prosecution,
in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the
testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali.
Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously
while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who
had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali
testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in
Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these
corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and
extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that
they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the
findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of accused-turned-
state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on the state
prosecutors direct examination of state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:

Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he train you, Mr.
Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?

A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo Trinidad and myself be
the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.

Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?

A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two weeks.

Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at Mr. Cararao, is there
any mission that you undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?

A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila, sir.16

The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and Trinidad.

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Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the 2 kilos of bomb that
Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in November 2004?

A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.

Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?

A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.

Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to you by Trinidad?

A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.

Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date, December 29,
2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?

A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could detonate a bomb

Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with respect to the taking
of the explosives from you?

A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?

A : He told me that "this is your first mission."

Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring to?

A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.

Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the bomb explode?

A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me until after I was
caught, because I was told by the policeman that interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos
were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.

Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get
an explosive for you, Mr. witness?

A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.


74

Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?

A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.

Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?

A : No, sir.

Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives, which were taken from
you by Trinidad and Tapay?

A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.

Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?

A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me not to leave the
house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad exploded.

Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?

A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that he took exploded
already, sir.

Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded at Makati, beside the
call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?

A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with the bombing in General
Santos.

A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was sometime in February
2005.

Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing exploded in Makati,
any other call?

A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?

A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.

A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."

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Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky called you up the
following day, that was February 15, and congratulating you for the success of the mission. My
question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the relation of that mission, wherein you were
congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt.
Cararao, Mr. witness?

A : They are connected, sir.

Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?

A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf should not wage war
to the forest, but also wage our battles in the city.

Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?

A : The government, sir.17

What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to sow
terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger towards the Christians."18 It can also be
seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines
Day bombing incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make
bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was to plant
bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29
December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were "about to
commence" their "first mission."19 They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila,
but to no avail. The day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from
Asali. On Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for the former
President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the
bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali
then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko
sayo."20

In theLIGHT of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article
17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished

Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on "principal
by inducement." The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs coupled with
their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission prove the finding
that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the crime. 21 Such
"command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have
materialized."22lawphi1

Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would
not have been performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact
that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the

76
criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-
conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for
all the resulting crimes.24 The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.

The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan, Trinidad,
and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the "collective acts of the accused-appellants
before, during and after the commission of the crime." As correctly declared by the trial court in its
Omnibus Decision:

Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major points, coupled with the
judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient to prove the
existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist
group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately killing and injuring
civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.

While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted by accused
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latters participation in the
commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned
evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable participation of
accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators criminal design would be realized.

It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, which clearly
manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud,
352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy
is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643). 25

In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding that the
defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the defendants by their acts aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a
view to the attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments."26

Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in
People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes
a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. 27 Thus, in People v.
Palijon, the Court held the following:

[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the
declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.SECTION
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to
testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is
admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together
for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence
against the latter.28

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed
with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

77
G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H.
NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted
by his heirs), Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set aside the
February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution)2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the petitioners Motion to
Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V. Bane) (3rd motion).

THE ANTECEDENTS

78
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa,
Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce
Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the
respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings ofCABLE and Wireless
Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose
Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they
organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.4

Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the
late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009.5

Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among them, Civil Case No. 0130.7 The
present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.

I. Civil Case No. 0130

In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of


directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders
meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and
officers were elected.8

Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No. 0130),
seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed
Africa:

[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights
on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from
representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or
indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.9

During the pendency of Africas petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally exercising the
rights of stockholders of ETPI,"10especially in the election of the members of the board of directors.
Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders
meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourts control and supervision and prescribed guidelines." 11

In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africas motion in this wise:

WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be held on
Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room, Telecoms Plaza,
7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The stockholders meeting shall be
conducted under the supervision and control of this Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr.
[O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their
corresponding shares.

The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final judicial
resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a proper case the
underlying assets of the corporation concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.]12

The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
10778913(PCGGs petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding, inter
alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.14 In our November 26, 1992
Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution.

79
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil
Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the
former merely an incident.15

During the pendency of PCGGs petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very
Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing
[ETPIs] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this
Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate resolution.16 The
Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.17

In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director
and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the petitioners instance and after serving notice of the
deposition-taking on the respondents18 on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral
examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in
London, England.

InvokingSECTION 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose
Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their answer, the
notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set
forth in his affidavit19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish
the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPIs] Class A stock in support of the [Urgent
Petition]."20 The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in evidence in
the main case of Civil Case No. 0009."21 On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present
and he cross-examined Bane.

On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the
PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of
increasing ETPIs authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein the sequestered Class A shares of
stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as previously scheduled, on March 17, 1997
and the increase in ETPIs authorized capital stock was "unanimously approved."23 From this ruling,
Africa went to this Court via a petition for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africas petition).

We jointly resolved the PCGGs and Africas petitions, and ruled:

This Court notes that, like in Africas motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board of
directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGGs petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to amend the
articles of incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock), again failed to apply the two-tiered
test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the PCGG in the stockholders
meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with no other choice
but to remand these questions to it for proper determination.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception
of evidence to determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the sequestered shares
in question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote
them in a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors and to amend the ETPI Articles of
Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock of ETPI.

The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
Resolution and in conformity herewith.

II. Civil Case No. 0009

Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and March
17, 1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded.25

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26
In its Pre-TrialBRIEF dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following
witnesses:

WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES

(1) Maurice V. Bane representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time ETPI was
organized.

xxxx

(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto x x x

(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson x x x

(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. x x x

(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x

(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque x x x

(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x

IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition

At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that

1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050, 0130,
014628 the following witnesses were presented therein:

a. Cesar O.V. Parlade

b. Maurice Bane

c. Evelyn Singson

d. Leonorio Martinez

e. Ricardo Castro; and

f. Rolando Gapud

2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the documentary
exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and the said documentary exhibits
are very relevant to prove the case of the [petitioner] in [Civil Case No. 0009].

3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-examine them.

The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion; 29 in turn, the petitioner filed a
Common Reply30 to these Oppositions.

On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying the
petitioners 1st motion, as follows:

Wherefore, the [petitioners] Motion x x x is

1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on oral deposition of
Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the reason
81
that said deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available for cross-examination in this
Court by the [respondents]. (emphasis added)

2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case, insofar as plaintiff
prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio
Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary exhibits which said witnesses have identified in
incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject to the following conditions :

1. xxx

2. xxx

3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be cross-examined on their
particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx [by the respondents].

IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice

The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of
Evidence on December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its
offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that:

1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiffs case and setting the same for trial any day in
April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and limited only to the marking and
offering of the [Bane deposition] which already forms part of the records and used in Civil Case No.
0130 x x x;

2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts established by the
[Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. [emphasis ours]

On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000 resolution) denying the
petitioners 2nd motion:

Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved." Apparently, this
provision refers to the Courts duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in
the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is
mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being the
case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need
not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant.

On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer of
exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by
law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis ours]

On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their respective
demurrers to evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 2000
resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its April 3, 2001 resolution 37 (2001 resolution).

IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of


Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)

On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of the
Bane deposition.38 On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents demurrers to
evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 resolution, 40 denying the petitioners
3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:

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But in the courts view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested its case as
to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the non-appearing
defendants are deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine Bane as to qualify the admission of
the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not see any need to dwell on these
matters in view of this Courts Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which already denied the
introduction in evidence of Banes deposition and which has become final in view of plaintiffs
failure to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period.
Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands and for this court to grant plaintiffs motion at this point in time
would in effect sanction plaintiffs disregard for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for
almost two years and it was only in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a
motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and offer Banes deposition as additional
evidence, or in the alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition.
But how can such a motion be granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition
is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the
resolution has attained finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a
motion, which though purporting to be a novel motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of
this courts 1998 ruling. [emphases ours]

The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.

THE PETITION

The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion:

I.

x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME FINAL.

II.

x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION WHICH WAS ALREADY


ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) AS PART OF
PETITIONERS EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0009).

III.

x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT ANDIMPORTANT PIECE OF EVIDENCE


FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.

The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory order;
thus, the petitioners failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have given it a character of
"finality" so long as the main case remains pending.42 On this basis, the petitioner concludes that the
Sandiganbayans denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

On the issue of the Sandiganbayans refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial notice of or to
admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil Case No. 0130
(where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a "child"
of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any
of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent" case.

Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucialIMPORTANCE of the Bane deposition, the
Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on "flimsy grounds," considering that:

1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it would be used as
evidence in Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the parties concerned, they

83
must accordingly be deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine the witness when they failed
to show up.

2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its allegation that
the respondents interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the government.

3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioners formal offer of evidence was
obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the case was filed and the
voluminous records that the present case hasGENERATED .43

THE RESPONDENTS COMMENTS


and THE PETITIONERS REPLY

In the respondents Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 2002 45 ), they
claim that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary period
prescribed underSECTION 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.46 This assertion proceeds from the view
that the petitioners 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner,
likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. Along the same line, they posit that the
petitioners 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.47 They likewise assert, on the assumption that the 1998 resolution is
interlocutory in character, that the petitioners failure to contest the resolution by way of certiorari within
the proper period gave the 1998 resolution a character of "finality."

The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a supplemental
offer of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial court; the
Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to reopen the case since the evidence
sought to be admitted was "within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and available to [it] before [it] rested
its case."48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing of the petitioners 3rd motion i.e., after
the respondents had filed their respective demurrers to evidence.

On the petitioners claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their right to
cross-examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution and the
petitioner never questioned this recognition. They also assert that the allegations in the Bane
deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The
respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the petitioner
failed to comply with the requisites for admission under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a party may
opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the
Sandiganbayans 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should be
done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in
considering the petitioners 3rd motion as a proscribed motion for reconsideration. The petitioner
generally submits that the dictates of substantial justice should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule
otherwise.

The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer of
evidence. A party normally rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he formally
offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to present further evidence to substantiate his theory of
the case should the court reject any piece of the offered evidence.50

The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is
sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is not an ordinary
witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and
his advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and notSECTION 47, Rule 130,
of the Rules of Court should apply to the present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the
deposition-taking.

84
To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their
respective comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we required their comments,
we resolve to dispense with the filing of these comments and to consider this petition submitted for
decision.

THE ISSUES

On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:

1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;

ii. In holding that the petitioners 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion for reconsideration;

iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the criticalIMPORTANCE of the Bane deposition to the
petitioners cause; and

iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior consolidation of Civil Case No.
0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.

3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -

i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; and

ii. The principle of judicial notice.

THE COURTS RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

I. Preliminary Considerations

I (a). The interlocutoryNATURE of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.

In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order,
resolution or decision must first correctly identify theNATURE of the order, resolution or decision he
intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998 resolution is "final"
or "interlocutory" in nature.

Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an interlocutory
one on the basis of the disposition made.52 A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes
of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such
case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely
resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case,
the order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved partys remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:

As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an
order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for
future determination.

85
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings
yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the
parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is
basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis supplied)

Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The
Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a time
when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the
motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this end.

We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is finally
resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds
shown at any time before final judgment.55 In thisLIGHT , the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution
which merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009
could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final order resolving the case on the
merits does) despite the petitioners failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal. 56

I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.

We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed third
(actually second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. AsSECTION 5,
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second motion for
reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final order." Although a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash" of the
arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on the ground that it is
forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.57

I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment or final
order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of Court declares to be
appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is
afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment, order,
resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.

On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory inNATURE , the respondents insist that the
60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioners notice of the
Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. They argue that since this ruling had long been rendered by the
court, the petitioners subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a devious attempt to resuscitate
the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.

We do not find the respondents submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory
order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the claim that
the 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not
totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed
interlocutory ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper,SECTION 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ
of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy
is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order
complained of.59

We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet concluded
the presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this stage of the
case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to question the admission of the
Bane deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy available to the

86
petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission of
the Bane deposition. The petitioner could introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this as
evidence in its formal offer61 as the petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130.

Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the denial of the
1st motion could not have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a petition.

II. The Sandiganbayans ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but
did not constitute grave abuse of discretion

InLIGHT of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a
question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction.62 Without this showing, the Sandiganbayans erroneous
legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave
one. For this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.

Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition inLIGHT of the
unique circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not availing of the
remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature, is undoubtedly endowed with public
interest and has become a matter of public concern.63 In other words, we opt to resolve the petition on
the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in the course of completely
resolving the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.

Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has
inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the order of
presentation of a

partys evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the Rules of Court.
UnderSECTION 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of discharging
the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer
rebutting evidence only.66Whether a party has rested his case in some measure depends on his
manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation of evidence. 67

In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due to oversight,
[the petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the presentation of its
evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the face of these categorical judicial admissions,70 the
petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and insist on the introduction of evidence out of the
usual order. Contrary to the petitioners assertion, the resting of its case could not have been
conditioned on the admission of the evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition,
which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this present petition, was not among the pieces of
evidence included in its formal offer of evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by
the trial court.

The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the petitioner
had firmly denied having rested its case.71 Before then, the petitioner never found it appropriate to
question on certiorari the Sandiganbayans denial of its 2nd motion which prayed, inter alia, for
the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioners case.

Although the denial of the petitioners first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse to the
corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of action. The
petitioners non-observance of the proper procedure for the admission of the Bane deposition, while
seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having been rebuffed on its first attempt to
have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without seeking reconsideration of the
denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of evidence and eventually rested its case. This time,
the petitioner forgot about the Bane deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its
formal offer of evidence.

87
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its case. In
resolving the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 2000 resolution, the
Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has "become part and parcel" of Civil Case No. 0009.
This pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane deposition as evidence (considering
that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioners attempt to adopt the Bane deposition
as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be cross-examined in court). Nevertheless,
the Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioners motion to reopen the case. Having judicially
admitted the resting of its case, the petitioner should have already questioned the denial of its 2nd
motion by way of certiorari, since the denial of its attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all
avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the
petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.

Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having rested its case
and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the petitioner filed the
present petition, inviting our attention to the Sandiganbayans resolutions, 72 which allegedly gave it
"mixed signals."73 By pointing to these resolutions, ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized
that they were then already ripe for review on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized was
that its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further evidence
consisting of the Bane deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not
have been prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the
resolutions.

On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioners motion to
reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does not
prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after it has
rested its case. Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional
evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of the exercise
of this discretion that the Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of introducing,
"marking and offering" additional evidence) should be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan
action invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.

III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the case
for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition

The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence isSECTION 5, Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 5. Order of trial. Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for
special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and
shall proceed as follows:

xxxx

(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good
reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original
case[.] [emphases ours]

Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the
evidence he relies upon74 and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.75 The obvious rationale of the
requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the
administration of justice.76

A partys declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from
introducing further evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for
instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other;78 or where the
evidence sought to be presented is in theNATURE of newly discovered evidence,79 the partys right to

88
introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy
of certiorari.

Largely, the exercise of the courts discretion80 under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of the Rules
of Court depends on the attendant facts i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a "good
reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing court to properly interfere with
the lower courts exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower courts action was
attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all
in contemplation of the law.81 Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported
imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors
of judgment82 or mere abuse of discretion.83

In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:

After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may
permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is
allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The omission
to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a
misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted; emphases ours)

Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:

The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation
of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the exercise of this
discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material testimony should not be
excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in
rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant
and affecting his case injuriously."

These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly recognized,
the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the order of the trial,
and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to offer evidence upon their
original case." These exceptions are made stronger when one considers the character of registration
proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and
abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be expected. Even at the risk of
violating legal formul, an opportunity should be given to parties to submit additional
corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require.
(emphases ours)

In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:

However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to offer
evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion
appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed
where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.86

The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence. 87

Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioners 2nd motion to avoid any uncertainty on
the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayans action actually left the petitioners

89
concern in limbo by considering the petitioners motion "redundant." This is tantamount to a refusal to
undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside the
contemplation of law.

It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents
had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been
prejudiced by allowing the petitioners introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly
omitted "through oversight."88 The higher interest of substantial justice, of course, is another
consideration that cannot be takenLIGHTLY .89

In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied Section 5,
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioners request to reopen the case for the submission of the
Bane deposition.

On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The state of
the parties submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil Case No. 0009,
however, dictate against this obvious course of action. At this point, the parties have more than
extensively argued for or against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-
year old sequestration case that is now crying out for complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue
that would have again been raised on remand and would surely stare us in the face after remand. 90 We
are thus left with no choice but to resolve the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and
now.

IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition

IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with
the usual requisites of admissibility

In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence
without observing the provisions ofSECTION 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.91 The petitioner
claims that inLIGHT of the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among
others,92 the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.

Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130 were
consolidated provided that:

Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance

Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)

Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket
are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy
while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the consolidation and a
single trial of several cases in the courts docket, or the consolidation of issues within those cases.95

A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31 is
completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and the
causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated cases. Second, while
Rule 31 gives the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the actions
consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used generically and even
synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes.96 In fact, the title "consolidation" of Rule 31
covers all the different senses of consolidation, as discussed below.

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These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is basically a
function given to the court, the latter is in the best position to determine for itself (given theNATURE
of the cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties affected, and the courts capability and
resources vis--vis all the official business pending before it, among other things) what "consolidation"
will bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.

To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and convenient
premise that the deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation is to
beg the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules of Procedure and the dearth of applicable case
law on the effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel this Court to determine the kind of
"consolidation" effected to directly resolve the very issue of admissibility in this case.

In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses:97

(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in
the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such.
(quasi-consolidation)98

(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions
are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one
complaint. (actual consolidation)99

(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and
requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge theSUITS into a
single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)100

Considering that the Sandiganbayans order101 to consolidate several incident cases does not at all
provide a hint on the extent of the courts exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the consolidation
it ordered in view of the function of this procedural device to principally aid the court itself in dealing
with its official business we are compelled to look deeper into the voluminous records of the
proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that would even suggest that the
Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action, parties and evidence. 102 To be sure,
there would have been no need for a motion to adopt (which did not remain unopposed) the
testimonies in the incident cases had a merger actually resulted from the order of consolidation, for in
that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take judicial notice of the same.

Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a consolidation for
trial.103Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded to the Sandiganbayans
1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioners 1st Motion on the ground that the witnesses, whose
testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, "are not available for cross-examination in" the
Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses again in the main case, so that the respondents
can cross-examine them.

These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayans order of consolidation
had actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases with the main case, in the sense of
actual consolidation, and that the parties in these consolidated cases had (at least constructively) been
aware of and had allowed actual consolidation without objection. 104

Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and the fact
that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for reconveyance,
accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed
by an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidation and, together with the parties affected,105 acted
towards that end - where the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one another and where the
evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated in another action must find support in the
proceedings held below. This is particularly true in a case with the magnitude and complexity of the

91
present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which
find no clear support in the provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence, 106 and even in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan itself and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in
an outright deprivation of the petitioners right to due process. We reach this conclusion especially
where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the several cases,
but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed
by specific provisions on our rules on evidence.

We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993 (that is,
before the deposition was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the Sandiganbayan in
1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any reference, formal or substantive, to Civil Case No.
0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-TrialBRIEF dated August 30, 1996,109 the petitioner even made a
representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.

IV (b). Use of deposition underSECTION 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under Section
47, Rule 130

Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit incidental, case,
the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against the requirements of
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court the rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition
taken in a different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court (then Rule 24)110 must, at any rate, prevail over Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.

At the outset, we note that when the petitioners motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the incident
cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to the
Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court,112 and, in fact, again presented some of the witnesses. The petitioners about-face two years
thereafter even contributed to the Sandiganbayans own inconsistency on how to treat the Bane
deposition, in particular, as evidence.

Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene esse)
provides for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing of a motion
or an interlocutory proceeding.

SEC. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due
notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:

xxxx

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if
the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than
one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it
appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is
unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party
offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5)
upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interest of justice and with due regard to theIMPORTANCE of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a


witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party
who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

92
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioners position that the Bane
deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements ofSECTION 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.

Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also
requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even Section
4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner
failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be
consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130. 113 In determining the admissibility of
the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the
other; both provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence
in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a witness testimony in open court but to a deposition
taken under another and farther jurisdiction.

A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of
the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.

A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings for
the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate
factual basis during the preparation for trial.114 Since depositions are principally made available to the
parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not meant as
substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be
presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on
evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.115

Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or


hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated
to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of
the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule
i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that
his testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the
deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a
party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or
hearing of a case.116 However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand.117

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or
deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or
deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded.118 A fundamental characteristic of
hearsay evidence is the adverse partys lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.
However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony
or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the
deponent in the prior proceeding.

This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination119 afforded an adverse
party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in the direct examination or connected
therewith."SECTION 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-
examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity
of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or
deposition is sought to be introduced.

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Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially the
same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was - or would have been -
sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do so.120 (The requirement of similarity
though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should be the same. 121 Although some
issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue
which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.122)

These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and
therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of
depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or
disregarded.

Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for
purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan
found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under
Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of
depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under
Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the
same deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The
aching question is whether the petitioner complied with the latter rule.

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a
testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.

1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;

2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;

3. Involving the same parties;

4. Relating to the same matter;

5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123

The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the
necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.124 However, before the former testimony or
deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper
predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in
the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and resolve.

IV (c). Unavailability of witness

For the admission of a former testimony or deposition,SECTION 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
simply requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased or unable to testify." On the other
hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with the actual testimony of the
deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the deponents inability to attend
or testify, as follows:

(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment[.]
[emphases ours]126

The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a
physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony. 127 Hence notwithstanding the
deletion of the phrase "out of the Philippines," which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the

94
Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the petitioners excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in
open court - may still constitute inability to testify under the same rule. This is not to say, however, that
resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be upheld. Where the deposition is
taken not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be
rejected in evidence.129

Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding between the
parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The witness
himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were testifying de novo since his testimony
given at the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is also
inadmissible for the same reason.

Indeed, the Sandiganbayans reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case No. 0130) is
an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of the present case
(Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis to presume, and neither can
or should we, that the previous condition, which previously allowed the use of the deposition, remains
and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another case or proceeding, even if the
other case or proceeding is before the same court. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane
deposition, in principle, being necessity,131 the burden of establishing its existence rests on the party
who seeks the admission of the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the
continuity of the previous condition or conditions inLIGHT of the general rule against the non-
presentation of the deponent in court.132

IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of parties;
and identity of subject matter

The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on
direct examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an essential
safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-
examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness may be
called.134 This right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination of
witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for
the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing
where the present adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise
that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.

In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has been
satisfied, we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the present opponent to the
admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is imputed
may not after all be the same "adverse party" who actually had such opportunity.

To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first
proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however, is not
required; substantial identity136 or identity of interests137 suffices, as where the subsequent proceeding
is between persons who represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in blood, or in
estate. The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationships to the same rights of property. 138

In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest or privity
between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. While Africa is the
son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the deposition should be admissible only against him
as an ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case No. 0130 (and,
unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the
respondents are all ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all any privity between
them for purposes of binding the latter to the acts or omissions of the former respecting the cross-
examination of the deponent. The sequestration of their shares does not result in the integration of their
rights and obligations as stockholders which remain distinct and personal to them, vis-a-vis other
stockholders.139

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IV (d1). The respondents notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver

The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine the
deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent to
them.140

In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996, 141 the
petitioner originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed to
specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Banes deposition, the petitioner sent a Second
Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it likewise
moved the scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.

The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended deposition
of Maurice Bane.142 On the other hand, among the respondents, only respondent Enrile appears to
have filed an Opposition143to the petitioners first notice, where he squarely raised the issue of
reasonability of the petitioners nineteen-day first notice. While the Sandiganbayan denied Africas
motion for protective orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was ever handed down on respondent Enriles
Opposition.145

It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral examination
is not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound thereby. In
Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that -

The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken
connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion conferred by law is
not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always see to it that the safeguards for the
protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:

. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection against
abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer
said: "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs prying that is quite justified if it is
to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this reason, courts
are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to
annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours)

In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enriles Opposition
(which is equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide even the bare minimum
"safeguards for the protection of," (more so) non-parties,147 and to ensure that these safeguards are
firmly maintained. Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the petitioners assertion (that the taking
of Bane deposition is a matter of right) and treated the lingering concerns e.g., reasonability of the
notice; and the non-party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident
(docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane deposition was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of
the respondents.

In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioners reliance on the prior notice on the
respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party status of
the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 the effect of consolidation being merely for trial. As non-
parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be bound by the
taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their right of cross-
examination.148 Opportunity for cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence, cannot be singled
out as basis for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition since such admissibility is also
anchored on the requisite identity of parties. To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan considered the
Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its action was premised on Africas status as a party
in that case where the Bane deposition was taken.

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Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through itsSECTION 5
which provides:

Effect of substitution of parties. Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositions
previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and another action involving the same
subject is afterward brought between the same parties or their representatives or successors in
interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if
originally taken therefor. [italics and underscoring ours]

InLIGHT of these considerations, we reject the petitioners claim that the respondents waived their
right to cross-examination when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition. Incidentally, the
respondents vigorous insistence on their right to cross-examine the deponent speaks loudly that they
never intended any waiver of this right.

Interestingly, the petitioners notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
Section 15 of this rule reads:

Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. A party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every
other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the
name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. On motion of
any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.

Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the individual
notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the then opponents
(Africas) cross-examination since, to begin with, they were not even parties to the action. Additionally,
we observe that in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously absent was any indication
sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their inexcusable failure to appear at the deposition
taking would amount to a waiver of their right of cross-examination, without prejudice to the right of the
respondents to raise their objections at the appropriate time.149 We would be treading on dangerous
grounds indeed were we to hold that one not a party to an action, and neither in privity nor in
substantial identity of interest with any of the parties in the same action, can be bound by the
action or omission of the latter, by the mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce
a resultant waiver from the respondents mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite notice sent
by the petitioner.

Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil Case No.
0009 the principal action where it was sought to be introduced while Bane was still here in the
Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines was no longer under the Marcos administration
and had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No. 0009 was filed. In fact, the
petitioners notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and
testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit," which Mr. Bane had long executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro
Manila.150 Clearly, a deposition could then have been taken - without compromising the respondents
right to cross-examine a witness against them - considering that the principal purpose of the deposition
is chiefly a mode of discovery. These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added to the
deficient handling of the present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner in the
handling of Civil Case No. 0009.

After failing to take Banes deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case,
the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and
proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling thereon. On that occasion,
where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the respondents cannot avoid a resultant
waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail to appear at the deposition-taking. Fundamental
fairness dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not only were the respondents non-
parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they likewise have no interest in Africas certiorari petition asserting his
right as an ETPI stockholder.

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Setting aside the petitioners flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court can only express
dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his deposition despite
having knowledge already of the substance of what he would testify on. Considering that the testimony
of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the petitioners case against the respondents, the Court is left to
wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a
time when it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so.

V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice

The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced and
admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of the Bane
deposition as part of its evidence.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
because these facts are already known to them.152 Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a
fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and
expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute
and are not bona fide disputed.153

The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or
notoria) non indigent probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense with
the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it would not be disputed.

The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129
either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x judicial
departments of the Philippines,"155or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters
"ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions."156 On the other hand, a party-litigant
may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be heard
on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved.157 In the present case, after the
petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard
through their corresponding oppositions.

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same
judge.158 This rule though admits of exceptions.

As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of, andabsent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when
the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the
court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the
record of the case then pending.159

Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis
exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. 160

The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice;
neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather,
the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating
whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases Civil Case 0130 as evidence in the
"parent" case Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases."161 To the petitioner, the supposed
relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice.

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We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because
these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts
from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases.163 Second, the petitioners
proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the
present case hasGENERATED a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying
complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioners argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion
by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found
competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the
duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in
support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the petitioners
attention to our prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164

Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the Judge in
trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case,
except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the
judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to
establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)

We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioners argument that we should take
judicial notice of the Bane deposition.

VI. Summation

To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 3rd motion the Motion
to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) was a legal error that did
not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case at the
petitioners instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3) notwithstanding the grave
abuse of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is not admissible under the
rules of evidence.165

VII. Refutation of Justice Carpios Last Minute Modified Dissent

At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition. His
covering note states:

I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the public will
understand what the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining added)

InLIGHT of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.

First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at issue in
this case i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned with the competence
and relevance166 of the evidence, whose admission is sought. While the dissent quoted at length the
Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of the Bane deposition (or, to adopt
the dissents characterization, whether "Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness") is not an issue here unless
it can be established first that the Bane deposition is a competent evidence.

Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine Jurisprudence, the
consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are
adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our discussion on consolidation, we
footnoted the following in response to the dissents position, which we will restate here for emphasis:

In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Franciscos Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:

The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions consolidated into
a single action, in the same manner as if the different causes of actions involved had originally been
joined in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of competent jurisdiction, is

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binding upon all the parties to the different actions until it is vacated or set aside. After the consolidation
there can be no further proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation
discontinued and superseded by a single action, which should be entitled in such manner as the court
may direct, and all subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties
adjudicated in a single action (1 C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).

At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris Secundum, the
following caveat appears:

The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are combined into
one and lose their separate identity and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered;
second, where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where several actions are ordered to be tried
together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. The
failure to distinguish between these methods of procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two latter,
strictly speaking, not being consolidation, a fact which has not always been noted, has caused some
confusion and conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).

In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the term
"consolidation" is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477 (Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Franciscos statement out of
context. As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled matter that
requires the approach we did in the majoritys discussion on consolidation. 167

Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose of
consolidation to "expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases" and
"the simplification of the proceedings." It argues that this can only be achieved if the repetition of the
same evidence is dispensed with.

It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is primarily
addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be in keeping with
the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on what consolidation would actually
bring168 (especially where several cases are involved which have become relatively complex). In the
present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would suggest that the Sandiganbayan or
the parties themselves (the petitioner and the respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyond joint
hearing or trial. Why should this Court which is not a trial court impose a purported effect that has
no factual or legal grounds?

Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation only resulted
in a joint hearing or trial, the "respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition considering that they
were given notice of the deposition-taking." The issue here boils down to one of due process the
fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the rigor of cross-examination) is
generally excluded in the realm of admissible evidence especially when read inLIGHT of the
general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony, in open court, of a
party or witness.

Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning the
reasonableness thereof an issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the Sandiganbayan
failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayans omission worse, the Sandiganbayan blindly relied on
the petitioners assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter of right and, thus, failed to address the
consequences and/or issues that may arise from the apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner
(that it intends to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not
Africa, are the parties).169 There is simply the absence of "due" in due process.

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Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayans Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the
Sandiganbayan "granted" the request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the Sandiganbayan did
not "grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted that the deposition-taking was a matter
of right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues that these consolidated cases have reached.
Considering the consolidation of cases of thisNATURE , the most minimum of fairness demands upon
the petitioner to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a ruling
thereon (including the opposition filed by respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-
respondents). The burgeoning omission and failures that have prevailed in this case cannot be cured
by this Court without itself being guilty of violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.

Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions, contrary to the
petitioners claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure involve
technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical rules deserve. But the resolution of
the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as the preceding discussions show. They
involve issues of due process and basic unfairness to the respondents, particularly to respondent
Enrile, who is portrayed in the Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these
shares should be deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They involved, too, principles upon which our
rules of procedure are founded and which we cannot disregard without flirting with the violation of
guaranteed substantive rights and without risking the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in
the course of their evolution.

In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a conclusive
decision because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote resulted in the re-
voting of December 13, 2011. In thisLIGHT , the ponencia is deemed sustained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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