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WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec.

13 and 15)

Caunca v. Salazar
GR NO. L-2690, January 1, 1949

FACTS:

Estelita Flores, who is an orphan and illiterate, is working to Julia Salazar, in which the latter is running the Far
Eastern Employment Bureau. Estrelita wanted to leave the house of Julia Salazar and to go along with her cousin
Bartolome Caunca, but Julia Salazar (resp) and Estrella Justro (resp) did not allow Estrelita to leave without paying first
the sum of P83.85 advanced for the fare and other transportation expenses of Estelita from Buruanga to Manila.

Estrelita did not leave the house of Julia Salazar despite the fact that no physical force has been used against her.
Bartolome testified that Estrelita did not leave the house because the respondents opposed about it. Moreover, due to
Estrelitas low mentality and social superiority, the respondents have successfully deprived Estelita of her personal liberty
and of the freedom to go with her cousin.

From this, Bartolome, in behalf of Estrelita Flores, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

RULING:
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

Alcantara v. Director of Prisons


G.R. No. L-6 November 29, 1945

FACTS:

Aniceto Alcantara (pet) was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical
injuries on the CFI of Ilocos Sur. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon modified sentence to an
indeterminate penalty of from arresto mayor to prison correccional.

Alcantara (pet) now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the ground
that said court was only a creation of the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the
Islands; that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that
only the two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in question.

Alcantara (pet) does not question the validity of said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of General
Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944, which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5 (p. 113, ante), does not refer to judicial processes.

From this, Alcantara (pet) filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the
petitioner on the ground that the he is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the Director of Prison (resp) in
the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

ISSUE:

WON the judgement of CA is valid.

RULING:

The SC held that the judgement of CA were good and valid because the sentence of which the petitioner is
serving has no political complexion. He was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law
of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, as
modified by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable.

A penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws,
or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and
penalized as a new offenses committed against belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the
control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier.

They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor
the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes
against national security , such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc.,
were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were made
crimes against the belligerent occupant.

Moreover, the SC also held that the Court of Appeals was the same Court of Appeals existed prior to the
Japanese occupation and does not have a substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.

the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.


WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons


G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

FACTS:

Mario Gumabon, Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares, Epifanio Padua, and Blas Bagolbagol (pets) were
convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping penalized with reclusion
perpetua. Each of them has been imprisoned and served for more than 13 years.

While serving their sentences of reclusion perpetua, the SC promulgated People vs Hernandez in 1956, ruling
that there could be no complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery, as it is not warranted under Article 134
of the RPC.

From this, Gumabon and the other petitioners invoked the Hernandez ruling through a petition for habeas corpus.
They prayed that they be released from incarcerations based on equal protection of law and on the doctrine that judicial
decisions favoring the accused must apply retroactively. Moreover they did invoke the codal provision that judicial
decisions shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines, 3 necessarily resulting in the conclusion that the Hernandez
decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to penal
laws having such character even if at the time of their application a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is
serving the same.

ISSUE:

W/N a petition for habeas corpus is the available remedy in this case

RULING:

Yes. The SC held that the writ of habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive
character of a favorable decision

The SC held that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
detention.

Moreover, the US Supreme Court also said that the writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ, its capacity
to reach all manner of illegal detention, its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes have always
been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be
administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced
and corrected.

In this case, petitioners shows that they were deprive of a constitutional right, specifically, the denial of equal
protection given that on People v Hernandez, Hernandez has been convicted for the same offense as they have.

The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at
war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would
happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the
Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment, then this would be repugnant to equal protection,
people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.

What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed.

"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some
in the group equally binding on the rest."

Moreover, the invoked doctrine relies on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment
be given a retroactive effect. . The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution
forms part of our legal system.

Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the
RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is not a habitual
criminal.

Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying their release.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that petitioners be forthwith set at
liberty.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

Tijing v. CA,
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest child, Edgardo
Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered Angelita Diamante to
immediately release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his parents. CA reversed
and set aside the decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in this
case.

Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing (pets) have six children and their youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

Bienvenida (pet) served as the laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante (presp).

In August 1989, Bienvenida left her four-month old son, Edgardo Jr., to Angelita when the latter went to her house
for a laundry job. But when Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone

According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
On October 1993, Bienvenida saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez (who was the
common-law husband of Angelita) was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to
her the boy despite her demand to do so.

Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing (pets) filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from Angelita
(resp) and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. On the other hand, Angelita (resp) claimed that she is the
natural mother of the child.

The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of the
impossibility of the birth of John Thomas because Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children,and that
the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. They ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners.

Angelita filed her notice of appeal. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court
because the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. The
appellate court also expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CAs decision but such reconsideration was denied.

Petitioners filed an instant petition to the SC alleging that the CA committed a grave error when it declared that the
petitioners' action for habeas corpus is merely secondary to the question of filiation and they erred (have mistaken) in
reversing the decision of the RTC in dismissing the petition for "habeas corpus" and directing that the custody of john
thomas lopez be returned to the private respondent

ISSUE:

Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?

RULING:
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

Yes. habeas corpus is the proper remedy


The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Therefore, it is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas
corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as
to identity of the person.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to
establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. There are no clinical records, log book or
discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son.
Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to
him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. . Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after
almost 15 years of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.
Third, The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities because it was filed by Thomas
Lopez instead of the midwife.
Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth.
Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child.
Moreover, the status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were typed in as legally married, which is false
because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a "common-law wife."
Fourth, the child and Bienvenida had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of
petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ
of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

Jackson v. Macalino
G.R. No. 139255, November 24, 2003

FACTS:

An information was filed against an American citizen, Raymond Jackson (pet) for violation of Article 176 of the
Revised Penal Code. Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) against the petitioner. However, he could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of
deportation with the CID which had not yet been resolved.

The CID then issued an order for his arrest for being an undesirable alien, based on the hold departure order in
one of the criminal cases. From this, the petitioner was arrested.

Jackson filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the CID. The court directed its issuance
as well as a return of the writ by the respondents.

In their return, the respondents alleged inter alia that the detention was on the basis of the summary deportation
order issued and the hold departure order of the Makati RTC, and that the petitioners petition for habeas corpus was
premature as there was a pending petition to lift the summary deportation order before the BOC filed by him.

RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the SC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the reversal of the
RTC decision. He also contended that Rodriguez cannot issue warrants of arrest since only judges can issue the same;
warrants of arrest can only be issued to enforce a final order of deportation; however, in the instant case, there is no final
order of deportation; and petitioners right to due process has been violated.

ISSUE:

WON the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest and if so, WON such warrants can only be issued
to enforce a final order of deportation.

RULING:

Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from
unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a
writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained. The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies
like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What
is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas
corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such
supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches
such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the
petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such
process. If it appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return
shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint.

In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, Jackson was arrested and detained based on the
order of the BOC which had become final and executory. His passports were also cancelled by the US consul on the
ground that they were tampered with. Based on previous jurisprudence, such constitute sufficient grounds for the arrest
and deportation of aliens from the Philippines. Hence,the petition was dismissed.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby orders the summary deportation of
NORMAN LLOYD @ RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON @ STEVEN BERNARD BATOR to his country of origin subject to
compliance with the 1997 Deportation Rules of Procedures-Office Memorandum Order No. ELM-97-013.

the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. 10948 is AFFIRMED.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

Feria v. CA
G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000

FACTS:

Norberto Feria y Pacquing (pet) has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present 1 by reason of his
conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps
Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.

After 12 years, Feria (pet) sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City. However, it was discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were
missing.

After discovering that his entire criminal records was lost or destroyed, Feria (pet) filed a Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the
ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due
process.

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court of Manila. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere
loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner,
and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which
rendered the decision.

Petitioner appealed to CA but it affirmed the trial court decision with the modification that "in the interest of orderly
administration of justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements without prejudice to the reconstitution of the
original records. The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari to the SC and he argues that his detention is illegal because there
exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the
evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the
contents of such judgment.

In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal
ground for petitioners continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioner's
remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the reconstitution of judicial
records.1wphi1.nt

ISSUE:

WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal records.

RULING:

Yes. There is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal records.

Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to
establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".
Petitioner's declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless
such declaration were true,18 particularly with respect to such grave matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he
deny making such admissions.

The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 198519 of then Judge Rosalio
A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985.
Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.

The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to
have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to
whether he is held under lawful authority.

Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has
been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose
the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.

Petitioners claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention,
notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the
fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face
shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that
tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public
authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of
proof to show that the restraint is illegal.

When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or
decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.

The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the
judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110, 26 the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the
inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. 27 Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether they refer to
pending cases or finished cases. 28 There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as
important as pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated.

Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to reconstitute the missing records of
the trial court. We reiterate, however, that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the
defense."30 Petitioner's invocation of Ordoez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since the grant of
the petition for habeas corpus therein was premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of Informations against the
prisoners, and therefore "[t]he government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Sec. 13 and 15)

conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In this case, the records
were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. Further,
the same incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case
for Illegal Possession of Firearm,31 the records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.