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Pointers in Remedial Law


By Professor Victoria V. Loanzon
With the Assistance of Atty. Zarah Suarez

PART I: The Velasco Cases

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY (Mendoza et al., v. Villas, et al)

Question: X filed a Petition with the Supreme Court but failed to cite the particular rule upon which
the petition was based. What are the corresponding effects if the petition will be treated as one filed
under Rule 65 or one filed under Rule 45?
Answer: If the petition is to be treated as a petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
petition must be dismissed outright for having been filed prematurely. The principle of hierarchy of
courts should be applied. Verily, a direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. On the other hand, direct recourse to
this Court has been allowed for petitions filed under Rule 45 when only questions of law are
raised. Thus, the Court ruled in Barcenas v. Tomas that Section 1 of Rule 45 clearly states that the
following may be appealed to the Supreme Court through a petition for review by certiorari: 1)
judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or similar courts, whenever authorized by law. The appeal must involve
only questions of law, not of fact. In this case, the Court exercised liberality and considered the
instant petition as one filed under Rule 45. In Artistica Ceramica, Inc. v. Ciudad Del Carmen
Homeowners Association, Inc., citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court noted that with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, it has the discretion to treat a
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary
period for filing a petition for review.


(Rombe Eximtrade vs. Spouses Peralta)
Question: X Corporation filed a Petition for the Declaration of a State of Suspension of Payments
with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan with the RTC (RTC A) which then issued a stay
order in X Corporation's favor. Thereafter, RTC A dismissed the petition for rehabilitation of X
Corporation because of misrepresentations about its financial status in its petition. On the other
hand, respondent Z Corporation initiated a foreclosure proceeding against X Corporation's
properties. However, Z Corporation was prevented by the issuance of TRO and injunction issued by
another RTC (RTC B) filed by X Corporation Did RTC B interfere with the jurisdiction of RTC A in
issuing the TRO and injunction?
Answer: No. The rehabilitation case is distinct and dissimilar from the annulment of
foreclosure case, in that the first case is a special proceeding while the second is a civil action.
xxx Indeed, the two cases are different with respect to their nature, purpose, and the reliefs
sought such that the injunctive writ issued in the annulment of foreclosure case did not
interfere with the rehabilitation case. The purpose of the rehabilitation case and the reliefs prayed
for by Rombe are the suspension of payments because it "foresees the impossibility of meeting its
debts when they respectively fall due," and the approval of its proposed rehabilitation plan. The
objective and the reliefs sought by Rombe in the annulment of foreclosure case are, among others,
to annul the unilateral increase in the interest rate and to cancel the auction of the mortgaged

Question: May subject matter jurisdiction be conferred by the acquiescence of the parties?
Answer: No. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within the
penumbra of a statutory conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of
whether or not the suitor will be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted.


(Baltazar vs. Ombudsman)
Question: X was hired by Y to serve as a fishpond watchman over Y's 7-hectare fishpond.
However, X's salaries and 10% share in the harvest as agreed upon by them remained unpaid. X
then filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) a Complaint for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Collection of Sum of Money and Supervision of Harvest,
alleging that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected
from it. The case was assigned to a Provincial Adjudicator of DARAB. Y contends that the issue
does not present an agrarian dispute; that X is not an agricultural tenant as alleged, but is a
watchman and therefore, the case is outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Should DARAB take cognizance of the case?
Answer: Yes. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss .
Given that X's complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations that he is
an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, the
Provincial Adjudicator could not be faulted in assuming jurisdiction as said allegations characterize
an agricultural dispute. Besides, whatever defense asserted in an answer or motion to dismiss is not
to be considered in resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the
allegations of the defendant.


Question: X was the accused in a criminal case for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 (Cutting,
gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license; Forestry Reform Code), as
amended by EO 277 filed before the RTC. The offense is punished with the penalty of prisin
correccional in its medium and maximum period, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
During the proceedings, Republic Act 7691, a law expanding the jurisdiction of the MTCs to
include criminal cases punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment, took effect. X was
convicted by the RTC. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA granted X's appeal and dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. Is the CA correct?
Answer: No. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Where a court has already
obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before
its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it
cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute. Where a court
acquired jurisdiction over an action, its jurisdiction continues to the final conclusion of the
case. Such jurisdiction is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such dispute
in another court or tribunal unless the statute provides for retroactivity.

SUPREME COURT (Star Electric Corp vs. R&G Construction)
Question: In what instances may the Supreme Court resolve not only questions of law but questions
of fact as well?
Answer: It is an established rule that in the exercise of its power of review under Rule 45, the
Supreme Court only resolves questions of law and not questions of facts. However, this rule is not
absolute. Jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved
by the Supreme Court, such as: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (4) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (5) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (7) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (8) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (9) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

REVIEW OF FACTUAL FINDINGS (Estate of the late vda. De Panlilio v. Dizon)

Question: May the Supreme Court review the factual findings of the PARAD, DARAB and the
Answer: No. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not tasked to calibrate and
assess the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over again.
However, in rare occasions, exceptions are allowed. One exception is when there are competing
factual findings by the different triers of fact, such as those made by the quasi-agencies on the
one hand and the CA on the other, this Court is compelled to go over the records of the case, as
well as the submissions of the parties, and resolve the factual issues.


COURT OF APPEALS (Diesel Construction v. UPSI)
Question: May the Court of Appeals annul the findings of a highly specialized agency such as the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)?
Answer: Yes. The CA was correct in holding that it may validly review and even overturn such
conclusion of the facts by the CIAC when the matter IS NOT adequately supported by substantial
evidence duly adduced on record comes to the fore and is raised as an issue.
In context, what the appellate court said is that the said members do not really enjoy a special
advantage over the members of the CA in terms of fleshing out the facts from the evidence on
record. The fact remains that the CA stands justified in reviewing the CIAC decision.


Question: UHC shares were sequestered by the PCGG for being the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos and Cuenca. A civil case was filed with the RTC involving the
performance of contractual obligations relative to the said UHC shares, particularly, the transfer of
stock and subscription rights thereof. Does the RTC have jurisdiction to decide the case?
Answer: None. Under EO 14, Section 2: The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall
file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive
and original jurisdiction thereof.
Thus, it is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC that has
jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca. The benchmark is whether said
UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their perceived cronies. More
importantly, the interests of orderly administration of justice dictate that all incidents affecting the
UHC shares and PCGGs right of supervision or control over the UHC must be addressed to and
resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the law and courts frown upon split jurisdiction and
the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result in much lost time, wasted effort, more
expenses, and irreparable injury to the public interest.


PECUNIARY ESTIMATION (Surviving heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo, et al)
Question: Is a complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent a civil action incapable of
pecuniary estimation, hence within the jurisdiction of the RTC?
Answer: Yes. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, the Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are
incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs. The instant
cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance. It is clear that his action is for
specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of
specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC. Having fully participated in all stages of the
case, and even invoking the RTCs authority by asking for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no
longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court. Simply put, considering the extent of their
participation in the case, they are, as they should be, considered estopped from raising lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the action.


(Tomawis v. Balindong)
Question: Private respondents filed with the Sharia District Court (SDC) an action for quieting of
title of a parcel of land against Tomawis who argued that SDC does not have jurisdiction over the
case. The respondent judge asserted that SDC has original jurisdiction over the case, concurrently
with the RTC by force of Article 143, paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1083 or the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Is the judge correct?
Answer: Yes. The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the elimination of
the cloud of doubts on the title of ownership on the subject land, are within the SDCs jurisdiction to
grant. We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in
pari materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving
effect to both. In the instant case, we apply the principle generalia specialibus non derogant. A
general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the special law in the
specific and particular subject embraced in the latter. BP 129 and PD 1083 must be construed
together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two laws.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up
in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the
allegations of the complaint

Development Corp) (Please read carefully)
Question: What are the requirements to establish a cause of action in an easement complaint under
Article 649 (Easement of Right of Way) of the Civil Code?
Answer: For a complaint to state a cause of action in an easement case, more specifically, Art. 649
of the Civil Code has laid down the following requirements: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) there is
payment of proper indemnity; and (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of
the dominant estate. The Complaint, first, asserts that petitioners have a right to an easement of
right-of-way that cuts across respondents property; second, it refers to respondents correlative
obligation not to fence off and close the single gate which is used as the only entry and exit points
of the school population; and third, it refers to respondents expansion and excessive terms and
conditions, constituting the acts violating petitioners right. Hence, the Complaints material
allegations are enough to entitle petitioners to a favorable judgment if these are assumed to be true.

FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION (Vitangcol v. New Vista Properties)

Question: Is a lack of cause of action a ground for dismissal under Rule 16?
Answer: No. Lack of cause of action is not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of
action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure
of the complaint to state a cause of action. The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant
hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the
plaintiffs complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action,
a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.

DEFINITION OF CAUSE OF ACTION (Basic information that you need to remember.)

(BF Corp v. MIAA)
Question: X Corporation, Y Corporation and two other corporations formed the MTOB
Consortium, a distinct corporation, for purposes of bidding for the construction of the NAIA II
Project. The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) awarded the contract to MTOB
Consortium. Later, the members of MTOB had serious business differences. X Corporation filed a
complaint against the other corporations to receive what it alleged to be its share in the project. X
Corporation likewise filed a complaint against MIAA to enjoin it from directly paying Y corp. Does
X Corporation have a cause of action against MIAA?
Answer: None. A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another. It has three elements: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty
on the part of the defendant to respect the right of the plaintiff, and (3) a breach of the
defendants duty. BF Corp has no right of action against MIAA for the following reasons:
(1) There is no contractual relation between MIAA and BF Corp. The agreement over the NAIA
Terminal II Project was between MIAA and MTOB Consortium, as the contractor. From the
start, MIAA recognized MTOB Consortium as a corporation with a distinct personality from
its component corporations.
(2) The reliefs prayed for by BF Corp. are based on the consortium agreement, which is a
contract among BF Corp. and the other members of the consortium. MIAA is not privy of,
and is therefore a stranger to the consortium agreement. If BF Corp. wants its share in the
consortium, its recourse is against MTOB Consortium, not MIAA.


Magsasaka v. Mosquera)
Question: An association of farmer-beneficiaries filed a case against Z alleging that the land they
tilled was sold to Z without a DAR clearance, in violation of Section 6-D of CARL. Z applied for
exemption from the coverage of CARL alleging that the property is above 18% slope and unfit for
cultivation. The Executive Secretary exempted the property from CARL coverage. The case
subsequently reached the CA where it ruled that the association is not a real party-in-interest and
has no legal standing to sue; that it is not an actual grantee of the land but mere qualified
beneficiary. Is the CA correct?
Answer: Yes. According to Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to
the reliefs of the suit. The Supreme Court stood by its ruling in Fortich v. Corona that farmer-
beneficiaries, who are not approved awardees of CARP, are not real parties-in-interest for being
mere recommendees. In the case at bar, members of petitioner Samahan are mere qualified
beneficiaries of CARP but they have not yet been approved as awardees, actually awarded lands, or
granted CLOAs.


A TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE (Please read carefully)
(Heritage Park Management v. CIAC)
Question: Public Estates Authority (PEA) was designated to develop the Heritage Park in Taguig.
PEA entered into an agreement with X where X undertook to perform all landscaping works on the
Heritage Park. Due to delays, the contract period was extended and among the causes of delay was
PEAs inability to deliver to X some 45 hectares of the property due to the presence of squatters and
a public cemetery. X filed a Complaint with the CIAC seeking to collect from PEA damages. PEA
executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Heritage which then filed a petition for
prohibition/injunction with TRO against the CIAC and X, claiming that when PEA transferred its
rights and obligations over the project to Heritage Park, the CIAC lost its jurisdiction. Is Heritage
Answer: No. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, it would be the height of injustice to allow
parties that disagree with the decision of a judicial tribunal to annul the same through the expedient
of transferring their interests or rights involved in the case. A transferee pendente lite stands in
exactly the same position as its predecessor-in-interest, the original defendant, and is bound
by the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to it.


COMPLAINT (Locsin, et al vs. Sandiganbayan)
Question: What are ultimate facts under Section 1 of Rule 8?
Answer: Sec. 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides: Every pleading shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the
party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts. Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which either
directly form the basis of the plaintiffs primary right and duty or directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.


Question: X is a credit card holder. For failure to pay the charges and balance under his credit card,
the bank initiated a complaint against X. X failed to file an Answer. Thus, the bank eventually won
the case after judgment was rendered in accordance with the Rule on Summary Procedure. When
the case reached the CA, the CA modified the amount due. X filed with the SC a petition asking for
the dismissal of the case or its remand to the lower court for a more appropriate disposition. Is X
Answer: No. A plaintiff should not be made to suffer for the respondents failure to file an
answer and concomitantly, to allow the latter to submit additional evidence by dismissing or
remanding the case for further reception of evidence. Based on the records, the summons and a
copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner Macalinao and her husband failed to file their
Answer despite service of summons. Thus, respondent BPI moved that judgment be rendered
accordingly. Thus, a dismissal of the case would cause great injustice to respondent BPI. Similarly,
a remand of the case for further reception of evidence would unduly prolong the proceedings
of the instant case and render inutile the proceedings conducted before the lower courts.


Question: X obtained a loan from Metrobank secured by a real estate mortgage. For failure to pay
despite demands, Metrobank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Notwithstanding foreclosure, Metrobank alleged that there remained a deficiency balance plus other
charges as agreed in the REM. For failure to pay the deficiency, Metrobank filed a collection suit.
The RTC ruled in Metrobank's favor. The CA however reversed the decision and ordered
Metrobank to refund an amount representing an alleged remainder in the proceeds of the foreclosed
property, which X alleged in his appeal brief before the CA. Is the CA correct?
Answer: No. Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim. A counterclaim is
compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim; (b) it does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and
nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered
compulsory regardless of the amount. It is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the
bid price vis--vis the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action
for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both
cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their respective claim. Second,
adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are absolutely
incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time.
Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions. And finally, if these two
claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and needless
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same
parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence.

RES JUDICATA (Clark Development v. Mondragon)

Question: What are the requisites of res judicata?
Answer: Res judicata means a matter or thing adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled
by judgment. Its requisites are: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the
judgment or order must be one on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) between the first and second
actions, there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

FORUM SHOPPING (Cuenca v. Atas)

Question: X was the incorporator and President of ABC Corporation which was granted a franchise
to construct the toll facilities of North Luzon/South Luzon Expressways. In the course of its
operations, ABC incurred credit obligations from various Government Financial Institutions (GFIs).
Then President Marcos issued a Letter of Instruction directing the creditor GFIs to convert into
ABCs shares of stock. X filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a case to
determine whether the GFIs are stockholders of ABC Corporation and their respective number of
shares. X likewise filed a civil case for the enforcement and compliance of the said Letter of
Instruction. Did X commit forum shopping?
Answer: Yes. There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." Forum shopping is an
act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and
abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already
congested court dockets. A close perusal of both the Amended Complaint in SEC and the
Amended Complaint in Civil Case shows that both cases are derived from the same factual issues
involving substantially the same parties. Although the actions seem to be different, yet it can be
seen that there is a splitting of a cause of action.


Drug Corp. v. CIR)
Question: Which officials and employees of a company may validly sign the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping even without a board resolution?
Answer: The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2)
the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel
Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. This complies with Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure
The rationale applied in the foregoing is to justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping,
being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.

(Subic Telecom v. SBMA)
Question: What factors will indicate that there exists litis pendencia?
Answer: For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites or elements must concur: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with
respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case

ELEMENTS OF LITIS PENDENCIA (Forbes Park Assoc v. Pagrel, Inc.)

Question: What are the elements of litis pendentia?
Answer: The essential elements of litis pendentia are as follows: (1) identity of parties or
representation in both cases; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for; (3) reliefs
founded on the same facts and the same basis; and (4) identity of the two preceding
particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other action,
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under


Question: PhilBank was the assignee of two promissory notes issued by X Corporation. Upon due
date, X Corporation failed to pay PhilBank which promoted the latter to file a collection case. X
corp. answered that the complaint stated no cause of action because the parties executed a Dacion
en Pago with the intention of extinguishing X Corporation's obligations, as evidenced by a
Confirmation Statement. PhilBank did not file any Reply. X corp. claims that the failure to file a
Reply to the Answer which raised the defense of Dacion en Pago constituted an admission of the
genuineness and execution of the documents such as the Confirmation Statement. Is X corporation
Answer: Yes. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written
instrument and provides the manner of denying it which must be under oath and specifically
denies the instrument otherwise its genuineness and due execution shall be admitted. It is more
controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply which
is all the new matters alleged in the Answer were deemed controverted. Thus, where the defense in
the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be
made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted


Question: Is a Motion to Dismiss a responsive pleading the filing of which will preclude the
amendment of the Complaint?
Answer: No. According to Sec. 2 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Responsive pleadings
are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses. A motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading. According the Sec. 2 Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more
than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis
for determining proper venue.


Question: What are the requirements for a valid substituted service of summons?
Answer: The following are the requirements for substituted service of summons to be valid: (1)
Impossibility of prompt personal service; (2) Specific details in the return; and (3) Substituted
service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants house or
residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place of
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made
on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with
the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons.
Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was
made not at petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen.
Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted
service of summons was made. It was also held that Garcia did not voluntarily appear before the
court, because the pleadings filed by petitioner were filed solely for special appearance with the
purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over her person and that of her three

INVALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS (Manotoc v. Court of Appeals)

Question: A foreign courts judgment involving the death of X committed by the Philippine
Military Intelligence Officials allegedly under the command of Imelda Manotoc was sought to be
enforced. The trial court issued the summons which, along with the copy of the Complaint, was
served by the sheriff upon Manotoc's resident caretaker. The trial court declared Manotoc in default
for failure to file her Answer. Manotoc moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons which the court denied.
Is the position of Manotoc tenable?
Answer: Yes. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a
reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons
is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service."
Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances
authorized by the rules. For the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to
apply, the Sheriffs Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally
serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the
Return. It must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age
and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant.
MOTION TO DISMISS (Quintos v. Nicolas)
Question: The court dismissed an action for partition for failure of the parties and their counsels to
appear despite notice. It was not mentioned in the decision whether the dismissal was with or
without prejudice. May a co-owner later ask for partition of the property by way of a counterclaim
in a case for Queting of Title, or should the counterclaim for partition be considered already barred
by the prior judgment of dismissal?
Answer: The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment. Dismissal with
prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to
ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares
yet. Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners
under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the
substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Substantive law
cannot be amended by a procedural rule. The Court held that Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is
silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.


Realty Corp v. ALS Management)
Question: Is absolute identity of parties necessary for res judicata to apply?
Answer: No. Absolute identity of parties is not required for res judicata to apply; substantial
identity is sufficient.


Question: What are the requisites for the application of Res Judicata?
Answer: Res judicata operates as bar by prior judgment if the following requisites concur: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3)
the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second action, identity of parties,
of subject matter and of causes of action.

RES JUDICATA, INTERPLEADER (Bliss Development v. Diaz)

Question: BDC sold its property to Sps. Melgazo, both of whom are now deceased. Diaz claimed
to be the transferee of the said property and traced his right from one Domingo Tapay. Diaz then
paid BDC the amortizations due on the property, and BDC issued a permit to occupy the property in
favor of Diaz. Diaz then introduced improvements on the property. A contract to sell was later
issued in favor of Diaz. Arreza however claims that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold to him the rights
over the property. To resolve the conflicting claims, BDC filed a complaint for Interpleader. The
RTC ruled that Arreza had a better right over the property, which decision became final and
executory. Later, Diaz filed a complaint for sum of money against BDC, Arreza and Tapay. Arreza
filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing res judicata. Is the complaint barred by res judicata because of the
previous decision of the court in the interpleader case?
Answer: No. The essential elements of res judicata are not present. First, the interpleader case was
between Arreza and Diaz. While it was BDC that initiated the interpleader case, the opposing
parties in that prior case is, in fact, Arreza and Diaz. Second, the issues resolved in the interpleader
case revolved around the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, and not whatever claim either of
them may have against BDC. Thus, there is no identity of parties, nor identity of subject matter,
between the interpleader case and the one at bar.

RES JUDICATA, LABOR CASE (Oriental Ship management v. Bastol)

Question: X, a seaman who was repatriated because of heart disease, won in the Labor Arbiter level
on his claim for disability benefits against his employer ABC. The NLRC however remanded the
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case to the Labor Arbiter for the conduct of clarificatory hearings for a more certain determination
of the state of health of X. Later, the Labor Arbiter still ruled in favor of X and granted him
disability benefits, but the NLRC on appeal, reversed the decision. X appealed to the CA which
reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision. The employer ABC claims that the decision of the NLRC
ordering the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter has attained finality; hence the CA violated the
principle of Res Judicata and the law of the case. Is the employer correct?
Answer: No. The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. The July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision cannot
and does not constitute res judicata to the instant case. Res judicata has two concepts: (a) bar by
former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. These concepts of the doctrine of res
judicata are applicable to second actions involving substantially the same parties, the same subject
matter, and cause or causes of action. In the instant case, there is no second action to speak of,
involving as it is the very same action albeit the NLRC remanded it to the Labor Arbiter for further


Question: May the judge validly consider or treat an ordinary hearing to be the pre-trial conference
between the parties?
Answer: No. Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure unequivocally requires that
the notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The
notice of pre-trial seeks to notify the parties of the date, time and place of the pre-trial and to require
them to file their respective pre-trial briefs within the time prescribed by the rules. Its absence,
therefore, renders the pre-trial and all subsequent proceedings null and void.
In the case at bar, the order issued by the trial court merely spoke of a hearing and required PNB
to prepare a complete statement of account. The order does not mention anything about a pre-trial
to be conducted by the trial court. The CA aptly held that the Order which declared the haring to be
a pre-trial and allowed the Spouses to adduce evidence ex parte, is void. Similarly, its ruling that the
Decision and all subsequent orders issued pursuant to said judgment are also null and void, is


EFFECT OF FAILURE TO APPEAR (Spouses Leyba v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao) (Please take
note of this case.)
Question: Sps. A and B filed a complaint for Nullification of Real Estate Mortgage and Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) against Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. (RBCI) and Reyes alleging that A
was made to sign an SPA, granting Reyes the authority to mortgage a land; that Reyes used the SPA
to obtain loan from RBCI guaranteed by a real estate mortgage over the subject land. During the
pre-trial, Sps. A and B and their counsel failed to attend. Citing Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of interest to prosecute the case. Is the RTC
Answer: No. It is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to
enable them to have their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities.
The Court noted that the subject matter of the complaint is to petitioners a valuable parcel of land
measuring 259 square meters. Petitioners stand to lose a lot on account of a mere technicality. They
have manifested their interest to pursue the case even on appeal. They also have adequately
explained their failure to attend the pre-trial conference. In the interest of substantive justice, we
allow the petitioners an opportunity to present their side during a trial on the merits, to
obviate jeopardizing substantive justice. This liberality underscores the importance of an
appeal in our judicial grievance structure to give party-litigants the amplest opportunity for
the just disposition of their cause freed from the noose of technicalities.

Question: What is the mode of appeal in assailing the RTC decision that confirmed an arbitral
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Answer: The proper mode of appeal assailing the decision of the RTC confirming an arbitral award
is an appeal before the CA pursuant to Sec. 46 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known
as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, or completely, An Act to Institutionalize the Use
of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for
Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for other Purposes, promulgated on April 2, 2004 and became
effective on April 28, 2004 after its publication on April 13, 2004.


Question: Is a stipulation requiring voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or
quasi-judicial agencies a valid contractual stipulation?
Answer: Yes. Availment of voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or quasi-
judicial agencies of the government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to
by the parties. In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of voluntary
arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on motion of the
defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such contractual provision for
arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall then
order the enforcement of said provision.


V. Lerma)
Question: X entered into a contract with Y whereby the former shall construct a liquefied gas
cylinder manufacturing plant. It was stipulated in the contract that in case of conflict between the
parties, the parties should first attempt to settle their dispute through arbitration. A conflict erupted
between the parties. Y was reminded of the arbitration stipulation in their contract and filed an
Application for Arbitration before the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board pursuant to Article 15
of the Contract. X contends that the arbitration stipulation in their contract is null and void for being
against public policy as it ousts the local courts of jurisdiction over the instant controversy. Is X
Answer: No. The Court, reiterating its ruling in LM Power Engineering Corporation v. Capitol
Industrial Construction Groups, Inc., held: Being an inexpensive, speedy and amicable method
of settling disputes, arbitration along with mediation, conciliation and negotiations
encouraged by the Supreme Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also
hastens the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind. It is thus regarded as the wave
of the future in international civil and commercial disputes. Brushing aside a contractual agreement
calling for arbitration between the parties would be a step backward. The arbitration clause was
mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. Submission to arbitration is a contract and that
a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to
arbitration is a contract.

Question: The trial court approved the Petition for Rehabilitation and appointed a Receiver for X
Corp. X Corp. filed its own counter rehabilitation plan and submitted it for the consideration of the
court. Other creditors filed their respective comments on the petition and the Receiver submitted his
recommended rehabilitation plan which the court approved. From this order by the Rehabilitation
Court sprung several appeals filed with the CA. Should the CA consolidate the appeals filed?
Answer: Yes. Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court. The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the
trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the
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parties-litigants. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of
affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts.
Further, it results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
courts in two or more cases, which would otherwise require a single judgment.


Question: DMCI entered into a construction contract with Duvaz but after completion, the
contractual price remained unpaid. Duvaz filed a petition for the declaration of a state of suspension
of payments with the SEC which SEC granted. This prompted DMCI to file with the RTC a petition
for the annotation of contractors lien on the property of Duvaz which the RTC granted. When
DMCI learned that Duvaz withdrew its petition with the SEC, DMCI made demands from Duvaz
which proposed settlement in the amount of 1million for the next three years which DMCI found
unacceptable. DMCI filed a collection suit against Duvaz. In its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaims, Duvaz specifically denied DMCI's averment and by way of affirmative defenses to
support its counterclaims, Duvaz alleged serious defects in the construction. Later, DMCI moved
for summary judgment alleging that Duvaz' counterclaims have already prescribed. Is summary
judgment proper in this case?
Answer: No. Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for summary
judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for
the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must
be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In this case, genuine issues exist. DMCIs posture on
estoppel is untenable. Far from containing an admission of liability, Duvaz Answer contained a
specific denial of petitioners claim. Such doubt should be resolved against the grant of the motion
for summary judgment. When faced with a motion for summary judgment, should resolve doubts in
favor of the party against whom it is directed, giving such party the benefit of all favorable
With the parties conflicting postures on, among others, the issues of estoppel, prescription, and
DMCIs liability and Duvaz corollary right for damages arising from the alleged mal-execution of
the construction works, the only way to ascertain whose position jibes with facts on the ground is
obviously through the presentation of evidence by the parties in a full blown trial on the merits.


Manila Bay)
Question: In 2008, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering
various government agencies to clean up Manila Bay which decision had attained finality. To
implement the Decision, the Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate
the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the said agencies and to monitor its
execution. However, due to the absence of specific completion dates within which to accomplish
the assigned tasks given to the agencies, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for
the said purpose. Hence, Resolutions were issued by the SC to implement the Decision. This was
viewed as an encroachment on the power and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the
President. Did the Court encroach on the power and function of the President?
Answer: No. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of
judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but
an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. While additional activities are
required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives
are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been
so adjudged but also those matters actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
With the final and executory judgment in the MMDA case, the writ of continuing mandamus issued
means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the Court
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exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.


Question: Explain the principle of immutability of judgment vis-a-vis a final decision.
Answer: A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly
administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a
court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute
once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there
would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be
maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such
principle, must immediately be struck down.

FINALITY OF JUDGMENT (Spouses Coloso v. Garilao)

Question: May the DAR Secretary modify a final and executory judgment of the court?
Answer: No. A decision that acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the


Question: X prayed for partial partition of a parcel of land but the court ordered a complete
partition thereof with accounting. Is the court's order proper?
Answer: Yes. The Philippine judicial system requires courts to apply the law and grant remedies
when appropriately called for by law and justice. In the exercise of this mandate, courts have the
discretion to apply equity in the absence or insufficiency of the law. In the instant case, a disposition
only ordering partial partition and without accounting, as petitioners presently urge, would be most
impractical. Courts have been cautioned against being dogmatic in rendering decisions, it
being preferable if they take a complete view of the case and in the process come up with a
just and equitable judgment, eschewing rules tending to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice. Verily, courts should always strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seed of future litigation.


Cabrera, et al.)
Question: What are the exceptions to the rule on immutability of judgments?
Answer: As a rule, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law,
rules, and regulations. The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no longer be
modified in any respect are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.


Question: When may the Supreme Court allow the filing of a second Motion for Reconsideration
of its decision?
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Answer: The concurrence of the following elements are required for a second motion for
reconsideration to be entertained:
a. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher interest of
b. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality;
c. If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its Divisions, at
least three (3) members of the said Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En Banc;
d. The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Bancs actual membership must be
mustered for the second motion for reconsideration to be granted. Unfortunately for respondent-
movants, the foregoing requirements do not obtain in the case at bench.

APPEALS IN GENERAL (Silverio, Jr. v. Court of Appeals)

Question: What is the rationale for the rule disallowing appeals from interlocutory orders of the
Answer: The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order
is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by
having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a
single appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order
and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.


Question: X and Y were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay. X was proclaimed the
Punong Barangay. Y filed an election protest and claimed that there was a misappreciation of seven
ballots. MCTC rendered its Decision finding that X and Y had garnered an equal number of votes.
Aggrieved, X timely filed his Notice of Appeal of the decision elevating the election protest before
the Comelec. X paid the PhP 1,000 appeal fee to the trial court within the five-day period from
receipt of the decision and the additional PhP 3,200 appeal fee to the Comelec Cash Division within
15 days from the filing of his notice of appeal. The Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal,
and the Comelec En Banc denied his motion for reconsideration for X's failure to pay the appeal fee
and because of Verification issues. Is the Comelec correct?
Answer: No. In the instant case, we find that Batalla already perfected his appeal by filing his
Notice of Appeal and by paying the PhP 1,000 appeal fee, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, within
the five-day reglementary period, to the MCTC; and by paying the additional appeal fee of PhP
3,200 to the Comelec Cash Division on March 5, 2008..

Question: May the Supreme Court under Rule 45 review the exercise of discretion of the
Ombudsman in determining whether probable cause exists?
Answer: No. An appeal under Rule 45 should be limited to questions of law only, not questions
of facts. The main issue of whether probable cause exists that will warrant the filing of the
appropriate complaint is a question of fact. In this case, resolving the issues presented by petitioner,
however, would require a review of the factual findings of the Ombudsman. Thus, it is beyond the
ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or
dismissing a complaint filed before it. However, while the Ombudsmans discretion in determining
the existence of probable cause is not absolute, nevertheless, petitioner must prove that such
discretion was gravely abused to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsmans findings by this Court. In
this respect, petitioner fails. This Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-
interference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause,
provided there is no grave abuse of discretion.

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Question: May a party change his cause of action or theory of the case on appeal? Is there an
exception to the rule?
Answer: The settled rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of
action on appeal. It affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a
question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate
something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and
invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. Nevertheless, such rule admits of
an exception as enunciated in Canlas v. Tubil(G.R. No. 184285, 2009) to wit: When the factual
bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, as in this case, the Court may give due
course to the petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein


Question: The CIR filed with the Supreme Court a petition introducing an entirely new matter
which it did not raise in its pleadings filed with the lower courts. May the Supreme Court entertain
the new matter?
Answer: No. During the proceedings in the CTA, the CIR never challenged Puregold's eligibility to
avail of the tax amnesty under RA 9399 on the ground that its principal place of business, per its
Articles of Incorporation, is in Metro Manila and not in Clark Field, Pampanga. Neither did the CIR
present the supposed Articles of Incorporation nor formally offer the same in evidence for the
purpose of proving that Puregold was not entitled to the tax amnesty under RA 9399. Hence, the
Court cannot take cognizance, much less consider, this argument as a ground to divest Puregold of
its right to avail of the benefits of RA 9399.


(Sps. Curata v. PPA)
Question: In what instances may the strict requirement of payment of docket fees for the perfection
of appeal be loosened up?
Answer: Among the grounds that pertinent jurisprudence has recognized as justifying the loosening
up of the stringent requirement on payment of docket fees are: (1) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (2) good
faith of the defaulting party by paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
(3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is frivolous and dilatory; (6) no unjust prejudice to the other party; and (7) importance of the
issues involved. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort
on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.


Question: May the Court of Appeals entertain questions of fact raised in a Rule 41 appeal?
Answer: Yes. Section 9 of Bates Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, categorically states that the CA has, inter alia, the power to try
cases, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised
in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction. It is also worthy to note that the
appellate court's reliance on the factual findings of the trial court is hinged on the latter's firsthand
opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their demeanor during the trial. However, when
such findings are not anchored on their credibility and their testimonies, but on the assessment of
documents that are available to appellate magistrates and subject to their scrutiny, reliance on the
trial courts factual findings finds no application.

16 | P a g e
v. Hernandez)
Question: What is the remedy to question the Ombudsman's decision in administrative disciplinary
Answer: The nature of the case before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) determines the proper
remedy available to the aggrieved party and with which court it should be filed. In administrative
disciplinary cases, an appeal from the OMBs decision should be taken to the CA under Rule 43,
unless the decision is not appealable owing to the penalty imposed. In the case at bar, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of his administrative disciplinary jurisdiction had, after due
investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and meted the
corresponding penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the proper mode of appeal.
Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.


Question: Astra Corp. acting through its minority stockholder, Dalida, instituted a derivative suit
for accounting/receivership with TRO against Naguit because of Naguit's unauthorized withdrawal
of corporate funds. The parties filed a compromise agreement that mandated the dismissal of the
derivative suit and criminal complaints. The RTC granted Dalida's Motion for Execution but Naguit
filed an Urgent Motion to Recall/Quash Writ of Execution on account of supervening events
Astras loss of revenues after the approval of the compromise agreement made it impossible for
them to comply. The court stayed the execution. Is the stay of execution proper?
Answer: No. The court may stay immediate execution of a judgment where supervening
events bring about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution
inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not
justified by the prevailing circumstances. However, the reason put forward by respondents is
insufficient to merit a stay of execution. Respondent Eliseo Naguit cannot renege on his obligation
under the compromise agreement by claiming an inability to pay. It would be an anathema to the
orderly administration of justice if such an easy excuse is entertained to abrogate a final decision
based on a compromise agreement. Neither is there any supervening event which materially and
substantially altered the situation of the parties such that execution would be unjust and inequitable.
The compromise agreement has the force of law between the parties unless it is void, there is a
vice of consent, or there is forgery, or if the terms are so palpably unconscionable, none of
which applies in this case.


v. PPA)
Question: Is execution pending appeal applicable to expropriation proceedings.
Answer: No. Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 39
does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. PPAs monies, facilities and assets are
government properties. PPA is a government instrumentality charged with carrying out
governmental functions through the management, supervision, control and regulation of major ports
of the country. It is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication
pursuant to PD 505. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or
pending appeal. Funds of PPA partake of government funds, and such may not be garnished absent
an allocation by its Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot be garnished and its
properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution pursuant to
a final judgment, then the trial court likewise cannot grant discretionary execution pending
appeal, as it would run afoul of the established jurisprudence that government properties are
exempt from execution. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.


Question: What are the instances when the issuance of a writ of execution may be appealed?
17 | P a g e
Answer: The following are the instances where a writ of execution may be appealed: 1) the writ of
execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties
making execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is sought to be enforced against property
exempt from execution; 4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the
judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains
room for interpretation thereof; or 6) it appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party,
or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some
mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of
elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.


Question: May the sheriff exercise discretion whether or not to execute the judgment?
Answer: Well-settled is that the sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial;
he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute
the judgment or not. there was no legal impediment preventing respondent sheriff from performing
his responsibility of enforcing the writ of execution. Since Rafols failed to comply with the
requirements under the Rules, Cua Beng who prevailed in the unlawful detainer case is entitled as a
matter of right to the immediate execution.

PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (Republic v. Estate of Lim)
Question: The Republic filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint averring that Lim, Sr. and
Lim, Jr., acted in unlawful collusion with the Marcoses, and took undue advantage of their
relationship with the latter. The Republic then prayed for the reconveyance of all funds and property
acquired by them in abuse of power through unjust enrichment. When Lim, Sr. passed away, his
estate filed a motion to lift the sequestration over certain real properties. Such motion was opposed
by the Republic alleging that the sequestered lots stand as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment the Republic may obtain against the estate of Lim, Sr.
The Sandiganbayan then lifted the sequestration order. The estate of Lim, Sr. then filed a demurrer
to evidence alleging that the Republics evidence did not prove or disprove that the defendants on
their own or in concert with the Marcoses, amassed ill-gotten wealth. The Republic also filed a
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against respondents in the amount of
its claims, to counter the effects to the lifting of the sequestration order. However, the
Sandiganbayan, stating that bare allegations of the commission of fraud by respondents in incurring
the obligations are not sufficient for the granting of the writ of preliminary attachment, denied the
motion. Is the Sandiganbayan correct?
Answer: No. For a writ of attachment to issue under Sec.1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court,
the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought. The Court
ruled that the Republic has sufficiently discharged the burden of demonstrating the commission of
fraud committed by the respondents as a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. The main supporting proving document of the Republic was unqualifiedly
admitted in evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It is incongruous, therefore, for the Sandiganbayan to
deny the writ of preliminary attachment when the pieces of evidence on record which it used and
based its findings and conclusions in denying the demurrer to evidence were the same ones which
demonstrate the propriety of the writ of preliminary attachment. The denial of the prayed writ, thus,
evidently constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan.

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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (St. James College v. Equitable PCI Bank)
Question: Spouses Jaime and Myrna Torres, owner of St. James College, defaulted in their loan of
PhP25M secured by REM in favor of EPCIB. EPCIB made a counter proposal on the restructuring
of the loan. Jaime Torres chose and agreed to pay the equal annual amortizations of PhP 6,100,000
payable every May. However, they failed to pay. Thereafter, partial payment was accepted by the
bank. EPCIB reminded Spouses that its receipt of the check payment is without prejudice to the
bank's rights considering the overdue nature of Spouses loan. The Spouses ordered stop payment of
the check. The bank demanded full settlement of spouses loan which was unheeded. And so the
bank filed a Petition for Sale to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property. However, RTC
issued an Order granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Spouses. Was the RTC
Answer: No. The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of
the applicant which should be protected, the writ being the strong arm of equity, an
extraordinary peremptory remedy which can be availed of only upon the existence of well-
defined circumstances. Foreclosure proceedings will not preclude the property to owner participate
in the auction; title does not ipso facto pass title to the winning bidder over the mortgaged property;
and the same is subject to the right to redeem within one year from the auction sale.
The one-year redemption period is another grace period accorded petitioners to pay the outstanding
debt, which would be converted to the proceeds of the forced sale pursuant to the requisites under
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 3135, as amended, for the redemption of a property sold in an
extrajudicial sale, also in accordance with Sec. 78 of the General Banking Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1828. It is only upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the
judgment debtors having made use of their right of redemption, does ownership of the land sold
become consolidated in the purchaser or winning bidder.


Question: Did the trial court's refusal in this case to grant injunction amount to grave abuse of
Answer: No. The requisites of preliminary injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory are
the following: (1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in
esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent need
for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy,
and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency
demands it. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence
of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary
compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the
case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. Extreme caution must be
observed in the exercise of such discretion


Question: What should the applicant comply with before an injunctive relief may be issued by the
Answer: In order that an injunctive relief may be issued, the applicant must show that: (1) the right
of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. All of these elements must concur and the absence of even
one of them would be fatal in petitioners application for the writ.


Question: The Supervision and Examination Department (SED) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
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(BSP) conducted examinations of the books of the respondent banks. Thereafter, SED sent separate
letters to the Board of Directors of each bank, informing them that the SED found that the banks
failed to carry out the required remedial measures. The banks noted none of them had received the
Report of Examination (ROE) which finalizes the audit findings. Thus, the respondent banks filed a
complaint for nullification of the BSP ROE with application for a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC. The RTC ruled that the banks were entitled to the writs of preliminary
injunction prayed for, holding that the banks are entitled to copies of the ROEs. Is the RTC correct?
Answer: No. The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right sought
to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is an unwarranted
interference with the powers of the Monetary Board. The actions of the Monetary Board under
Sections 29 and 30 of RA 7653 may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for
certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse
of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.


Question: Should the court grant a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction if it will result
in a premature resolution of the case, or will grant the principal objective of the parties before
merits can be passed upon?
Answer: No. Sec. 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted provided that 1) the applicant must
have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse; 2) there is a material and
substantial invasion of such right; and 3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
The purpose of the ancillary relief is to keep things as they peaceably are while the court passes
upon the merits. Where a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction will result in a premature
resolution of the case, or will grant the principal objective of the parties before merits can be passed
upon, the prayer for the relief should be properly denied.


Question: S was the father of J and T. J and T had an oral partition of the properties left by their
father. Upon T's death and believing that T did not receive his full share in the estate of S, his
executor and remaining heir, (petitioners) filed for Partition and Recovery of Real Estate.
Petitioners later filed a Motion to Place Properties in Litigation under Receivership alleging that to
their prejudice, J had, without prior court approval, sold to third parties and transferred in his own
name several common properties. J filed his Opposition denying that he had fraudulently transferred
any property of the estate of S and asserting that any transfer in his name of said properties was a
result of the oral partition between him and T that enabled the latter as well to transfer several
common properties in his own name. The court appointed a receiver. Is the court correct?
Answer: No. The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with
extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is
satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater
than the injury sought to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the
parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or
injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of
others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant.
In Descallar v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the appointment of a receiver is not proper where the
rights of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, are still to be determined by the
trial court.

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Question: Are Orders issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions
covered by Rule 64?
Answer: No. The Court has consistently held that the phrase "decision, order, or ruling" of
constitutional commissions, the COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the
Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those
rendered in the commissions' exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of
the COMELEC, this would limit the provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued
pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices. Consequently, Rule 64, which
complemented the procedural requirement under Article IX-A, Section 7, should likewise be read in
the same sensethat of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings, and orders rendered by the
COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions.

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (Francisco Motors v. Court of Appeals)

Question: What are the exceptions to the rule that errors not relating to jurisdiction nor involving
grave abuse of discretion shall not be decided upon by the court in a Petition for Certiorari?
Answer: The Court has consistently held that where the error sought to be corrected neither relates
to the courts jurisdiction nor involves grave abuse of discretion, review of the error through
certiorari will not be allowed. This rule, however, admits exceptions such as (1) when it is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, (2) where the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, (3) where there may be danger of failure
of justice, (4) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, (5) where the issue
raised is one purely of law, (6) where public interest is involved, and (7) in case of urgency.
(Parma, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman)
Question: Several complaints were filed against councillor X before the Office of the Ombudsman:
First was a complaint-affidavit for falsification of official documents, second was a complaint-
affidavit for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, third was another
complaint for falsification of official document and a fourth, for the same crime and offense charged
in the first and second complaint. X, however, failed to file a counter-affidavit. The OMB issued a
resolution finding probable cause for Falsification of Official Document and recommended the
filing of information for said crime against X. The OMB later dismissed the second and third
complaints. X accused the OMB of committing grave abuse of discretion against the OMB in
recommending the filing of information for Falsification of Official Document despite the OMB's
dismissal of the other complaints filed. Did the OMB's act amount to grave abuse of discretion?
Answer: No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may
only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion when the act was performed
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In
this case, the imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman cannot be
sustained in the instant case because, Parma veritably latches his case on the lame argument that had
the Ombudsman duly considered its findings on the second and third complaint, it would have
found no reason to give due course to the fourth one.


Question: Is execution pending appeal applicable to expropriation proceedings?
Answer: The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under
Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.
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As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, the Court held: When the
Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an order merely requiring the
payment of the award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a personal judgment
against the Government could not be realized upon execution. In Commissioner of Public Highways
v. San Diego, no less than the eminent Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee explained the rationale
behind the doctrine that government funds and properties cannot be seized under a writ of
execution, thus: The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
Question: In a complaint for forcible entry, is the MTC correct in dismissing the same for failure of
the plaintiff to prove her ownership over the subject premises?
Answer: No. Owing to the summary nature of an action for forcible entry, courts should resolve the
issue of possession, avoiding, as a rule, the issue of ownership. In actions for forcible entry, only
prior possession de facto and deprivation thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth
needs to be proved. Naturally, the complainant may recover such possession even from the owner
himself. In any case, the issue of ownership can be properly resolved in a separate and more
appropriate proceeding. Here, Flora through her agents and her predecessors-in-interest have prior
possession over the lot, and it was established that the Sps. Quitalig unduly deprived Flora of her
possession. Hence, the complaint should be granted.


(Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals)
Question: X had been leasing his land to Y for over 40 years. When a fire gutted the dwelling of Y,
X made several verbal demands for her to vacate the lot, but Y refused. The subject lot was
eventually bought by Z who filed an ejectment complaint against Y. In turn, Y argued that MeTC
had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one
year had elapsed from Y's forcible entry. Does the MeTC have jurisdiction over the complaint for
Answer: Yes. Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te's ejectment
complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted that petitioner Dela Cruz
was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4) decades. Thus, initially petitioner as lessee is the
legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her house, the
Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to the lot
and occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the owners. The Reyeses however
tolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus, when the lot was sold to respondent
Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with respect to the lot, were transferred to their subrogee,
respondent Tan Te, who for a time also tolerated the stay of petitioner until she decided to eject the
latter by sending several demands, the last being the January 14, 1997 letter of demand. Since the
action was filed with the MeTC on September 8, 1997, the action was instituted well within the one
(1) year period reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence, the nature of the complaint is one of
unlawful detainer and the Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint. Thus, an ejectment
complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan Te's complaint, is a species of
unlawful detainer cases.


(Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals)
Question: What are the two mandatory allegations that should be found in a complaint for forcible

22 | P a g e
Answer: For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the complaint must contain two mandatory allegations:
(1) prior physical possession, possession de facto, not possession de jure, of the property by the
plaintiff; and (2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth. The purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession. The person claiming rightful possession cannot be permitted to exclude the actual
possessor and thereby disturb social order and violate individual security. The burden of instituting
an action to try the property right is upon he who claims rightful possession
The proper remedy in the instant case is to file an accion publiciana case which differs from a
forcible entry action in that it does not require prior physical possession in order to prosper.

CONTEMPT (Buildner v. Ilusorio)

Question: Y filed various manifestations and motions in relation to her appeals from the decision of
the CA denying the petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband. First, Y moved for its
reconsideration. She followed this with a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Conference. An
Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Clarification was filed thereafter. The CA once again denied
the MR and resolved to expunge from the records her repetitive motions, with the caveat that no
further pleadings shall be entertained. However, represented by Dela Cruz Albano & Associates, she
sought leave to file an urgent MR. Moreover, she addressed two letters to then Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. Another letter was given where she called the decision in the case Ramon K. Ilusorio
v. Baguio Country Club, appalling, unilaterally brazen, and unprecedented. Also, she published On
the Edge of Heaven, a book carrying Y's name as author and which contained her commentaries on
the aforesaid habeas corpus case was also alleged to be contemptuous. Are Y's acts contemptuous?
Answer: Yes. With regard to Erlindas authorship of the On the Edge of Heaven, she is found guilty
of indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is a deliberate act to bring the court or judge into
disrepute. Her statements pose a different threat to the Courts repute. Statements such as Was
justice sold? and How can the highest court of our land be a party to the breakup of my
family and, disregarding the Family Code, when taken together went beyond the permissible
bounds of fair criticism. While most of her statements were in the form of questions instead of
categorical assertions, the effect is still the same: they constitute a stinging affront to the
honor and dignity of the Court and tend to undermine the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the highest tribunal of the land. Litigants, no matter how aggrieved or dissatisfied
they may be of courts decision, do not have the unbridled freedom in expressing their frustration or
grievance in any manner they want. However, the various motions and manifestations filed by
Erlinda Ilusorio which neither contained offensively disrespectful language nor tended to besmirch
the dignity of the Court are not contemptuous. The letters to the Chief justice were also found not to
be contumacious in character, but only a sleigh but sub-rosa attempt to influence the letter-

Question: May issues on heirship be decided in a civil action?
Answer: It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that
recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a
good and compelling reason for such recourse. Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule
requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon
the issues it defined during the pre-trial.


Question: Florentino and Engracia were married with an adopted son, Samuel. Florentino and
23 | P a g e
Samuel predeceased Engracia. Engracia filed an illegal detainer suit against Diosdado, who claimed
to be the illegitimate son of Florentino. Engracia won the case and the decision has become final
and executory. Upon the death of Engracia, Diosdado filed with the court a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration in his favor. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino
Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. The RTC appointed him as Special Administrator. Is
the RTC correct?
Answer: No. While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the
directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that
the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed.
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the
heirs. To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It
must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings
of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not
an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its
value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Tujanmilitante v. Cada-Deapera)

Question: X filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking Y
to produce before the court her biological daughter, minor C and to return to her the custody over
the child. RTC granted the same. Since the writ cannot be served despite diligent efforts, RTC-
Caloocan directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ upon Y at the Office of the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. Will RTC-Caloocan acquire jurisdiction over Y if the latter is served
with a copy of the writ in Quezon City?
Answer: Yes. The National Capital Judicial Region consists of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig,
Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela. In view thereof, it is
indubitable that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a
family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be
enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as here. In the case at bar, respondent filed
the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both
belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in
Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the
above rule.

CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN (Gamboa- Hirsch v. Court of Appeals)

Question: What are some of the instances when the mother may be declared unsuitable to have
custody of her children?
Answer: The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother is declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, and drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.


Question: What is the general rule in the appreciation of the legal standing of a party to the case?

24 | P a g e
Answer: The Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has
accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a
Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake.
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a direct
injury as a result of a government action, or have a material interest in the issue affected by the
challenged official act.
The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in
a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act.


Question: Under what circumstances can courts decide a moot case?
Answer: Instances where courts can decide a moot case:
(1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved;
(3) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
(4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review

Question: What is the remedy of a party who failed to include an indispensable party to case?
Answer: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy in non-joinder of a party is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

Question: What constitutes sufficiency of cause of action?
Answer: A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements
of a cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right


Question: What factors must be considered in determining the appointment of a receiver?
Answer: Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection and only in
extreme situations. Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the
injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than
the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will
imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as those
of the person requesting for receivership.
Velasco & Co. v. Gochico & Co is instructive: The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and
should be exercised with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or
where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be
far greater than the injury sought to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of
the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice
or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of
others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the
25 | P a g e
vs. RAMOS, G.R. NO. 193723 (2011))
Question: Under what circumstances may an appellate court proceed with resolving an issue in the
absence of assignment of errors?
Answer: In Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, we explained that an appellate
court has a broad discretionary power in waiving the lack of assignment of errors in the following
(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter;
(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a
just decision and complete resolution of
the case or to serve the interests of a justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters
of record having some bearing on the
issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;
(f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned, is dependent.


G.R. NO. 192217 (2011))
Question: Cite instances when a Writ of Execution can be a subject of an appeal?
Answer: Instances where a writ of execution may be appealed:
(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
(3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
(4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;
(5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or
(6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party,
or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some
mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of
elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

Question: What will trigger a review of findings of facts in a criminal case?
Answer: It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the findings of fact of the trial court are not
disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have materially affected the outcome of
the case.
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and bare denials
of the accused, on the other hand, the former must prevail. Moreover, the Supreme Court accords
the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves in the absence of any compelling
reason to discredit the same.

26 | P a g e
Question: Is judgment valid despite the fact that the judge who rendered it was not the one who
heard the case?
Answer: The fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
does not adversely affect the validity of conviction. The new judge can rely on the transcripts of
stenographic notes and calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to
common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate
substantive and procedural due process of law.

(PEOPLE vs. ALFREDO, G.R. NO. 188560 (2010))

Question: Can a conviction be sustained despite the fact that the same was rendered by a judge who
did not hear the case?
Answer: The circumstance that the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one, who heard
the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. The trial judge who
rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous,
especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. As this Court held in
People v. Competente, 207 SCRA 591 (1992): The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the
judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict
of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence
presented during trial and that it was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross
examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon.

(PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA, G.R. NO. 188601 (2010))
Question: What is the general rule in appreciating the testimonies of witnesses in case which is a
subject of an appeal?
Answer: It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and
their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court. The trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grilling examination. This rule admits of exceptions, however, such as when the trial courts
findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or when certain facts
of substance and value, likely to change the outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower
court, or when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.

RIGHT TO BAIL (QUI vs. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 196161 (2012))

Question: When is bail a matter of right?
Answer: Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

Question: When can the appellate court grant bail?

Answer: Bail pending appeal is governed by Sec. 5 of Rule 114. The appellate court can deny
petitioners application for bail pending appeal on the ground that she is a flight risk, a bail-
negating factor under Sec. 5 (d) of Rule 114. The appellate court anchored its denial on several
circumstances, pointed out by the OSG, which showed petitioners propensity to evade the
law, as when she failed to attend the hearings before the RTC, which compelled said court to issue
three warrants for petitioners arrest. There is no dispute, and petitioner does not deny the fact, that
on various dates, the RTC issued warrants for her arrest.
This fact alone should weigh heavily against a grant of bail pending appeal.
Petitioners argument that she has the constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of guilt
against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly one is convicted by the trial court, the presumption of
27 | P a g e
innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends.


PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 201620 (2013)
Question: Will an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party violates
petitioners constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her,
thus, entitling her to an acquittal?
Answer: No. In offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the
offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently
described and identified.
Variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution
does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal, more so if the variance relates to the designation
of the offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial
rights of the accused.
In case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110,
Sec.12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information not its dismissal.


G.R. NO. 184681 (2013))
Question: What is the determination of probable cause?
Answer: The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system, an executive
function that the courts cannot interfere with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise,
a violation of the basic principle of separation of powers will ensue.

Question: Will a valid extrajudicial confession bind his co-accused?
Answer: An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted
against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them under the principle of res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.

Tamargo vs. Awingan elaborated on the reason for this rule, viz.: [O]n a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So
are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a
party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him. The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court to the rule allowing the admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the
conspiracy by evidence other than the confession.

Question: When may a law enforcer effect a valid warrantless arrest?
Answer: In People v. Alunday, 564 SCRA 135 (2008), the Court held that when a police officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at
once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.
In flagrante delicto arrest must consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding
the arrest of accused- appellants.

Question: Can an accuse claim sweetheart defense in a rape case?

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Answer: Yes, the sweetheart defense can be claimed as an affirmative defense but it must be
supported by convincing proof.
The theory that Cias and AAA were having an illicit affair is unsupported by evidence. As held in
People v. Cabanilla, 635 SCRA 300 (2010), the sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense that
must be supported by convincing proof. In the case at bar, accused-appellant relied solely on
his testimony and that of his wife. He did not offer any other evidencesuch as a love letter, a
memento, or even a single photographto substantiate his claim that they had a romantic
relationship. Besides, granting they had an illicit affair, this fact alone does not rule out rape as it
does not necessarily mean that consent was present. As the Court held, A love affair does not
justify rape for a man does not have an unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires
against her will.


188705 (2011))
Question: What factors will support a conviction based on circumstantial evidence?
Answer: Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence shall be sufficient
for conviction when the following requisites are complied with:
(1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
As held in Salvador v. People:
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to
support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or
series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to
circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result
in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community


COMBATE, G.R. NO. 189301 (2011))
Question: Can denial prevail over positive identification of the accused?
Answer: Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial. Accused-
appellant was positively and categorically identified by the witnesses. They have no reason to
perjure and accused-appellant was unable to prove that the prosecution witnesses were moved by
any consideration other than to see that justice is done. Thus, the presumption that their testimonies
were not moved by any ill will and bias stands, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.


186120 (2011))
Question: Will minor inconsistencies invalidate a conviction?
Answer: Minor variances in the details of the witnesses accounts, more frequently than not, are
badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood and they often bolster the probative value of their
Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details
concerning the principal occurrence.
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able
to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
The trial court explained that the inconsistencies found in the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution were minor and even made their testimonial evidence more believable and unrehearsed.
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Minor discrepancies in their testimonies are, in fact, to be expected; they neither vitiate the essential
integrity of the evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the credibility of witnesses.


Q. Is venue synonymous with jurisdiction?
A. No. Hon. [Justice] Florenz D. Regalado differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a)
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be
heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c)
Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation
between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law
and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the
parties. (Nocum v Lucio Tan, 2005)

Q. Can inanimate objects be parties in environmental cases?

A. The Supreme Court invoked the newly-adopted Rules on Environmental Cases holding that since
the resident mammals of Tanon Strait are represented by natural persons acting as stewards of
creation, the Court may take cognizance of the case to protect the interests of the mammals. In the
case, Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States case Sierra
Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton, wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting to the conventional
thought on legal standing, opined:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we
fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or
federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by
roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage, x x x.
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction
found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an
acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for
purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or
charitable causes. (Resident Mammals v. Reyes, 2015)

Q. A filed a case for forcible entry before a first level court of Manila against B praying that the
latter be ejected from a parcel of land situated at the boundary of Manila and Quezon City. B
filed a motion to dismiss claiming venue was improperly laid as the larger part of the real
property is situated in Quezon City. Is B correct?
A. No. Section 1. of Rule 4 states that actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. It is also worth pointing out
that B should not have filed a motion to dismiss based on an objection to venue as said motion is a
prohibited pleading in an ejectment case under Sec. 13 Rule 70.

Q. What if A filed a motion to dismiss based on the fact that resort to conciliation had not been
previously resorted to?
A. The motion to dismiss may be allowed as the rules allow said motion if based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and failure to comply with the conciliation
requirement under Section 12, Rule 70. (Sec. 13, Rule 70 in relation to Section 12, Rule 70)

Q. What are the factors to determine which court has jurisdiction?

A. Nature of action and amount claim will determine jurisdiction in civil actions while nature of the
offense, imposable penalty, and territorial jurisdiction will determine jurisdiction in criminal
actions. In some criminal cases, you will have to consider who the accused is (ex. Sandiganbayan
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has jurisdiction over some offenses of public officers regardless of where the crime was committed)
or who the victim is (where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of
the offense, family Courts have jurisdiction over the criminal case, RA 8396, Sec. 5)

Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction over cases involving real property?

A. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts [include] "all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) [outside Metro
Manila or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs.

Q. Suppose an action for reconveyance of real property valued at P19,999.99 is filed before a
Municipal Trial Court, would it be correct to ask for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter as reconveyance is incapable of pecuniary estimation?
A. No. In a number of cases, the Court has held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation
of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that
involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein. (San Pedro v. Asdala, 2009)
This means that the jurisdiction over the case will be determined based on the assessed value of the
real property involved. *Please refer to previous question.

Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction over money claims and personal property?
A. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property exceeds Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) outside Metro Manila or Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00)
in Metro Manila, the Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction. (Section 19 (8) of BP 129, as
amended - paraphrased)

Q. What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?

A. If a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge
of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort
to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. Note that the
courts of law HAVE jurisdiction but will defer to administrative bodies because of their expertise.
(Euro Med Laboratory v. Province of Batangas, 2006)

Q. What is the doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction?

A. Once the court acquires jurisdiction by virtue of a valid complaint, that jurisdiction shall
continue up to the end of the case. Intervening facts will not deprive the courts of jurisdiction.
(Example: when a public officer resigns during the pendency of a case against him before the
Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan should not dismiss the case because of this principle as it had
already acquired jurisdiction.)

Q. What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

A. The court will defer to the administrative agency before taking cognizance of the case.
Otherwise stated, a party must exhaust all remedies before administrative bodies before judicial
recourse unless case falls within the exceptions.

Q. What are the exceptions?

A. x x x (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where
the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where
31 | P a g e
the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable
damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings
(Republic v Lacap, 2007.)

Q. When may the Supreme Court En Banc take cognizance of a case?

A. (a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
(b) criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty or reclusion perpetua;
(c) cases raising novel questions of law;
(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
(e) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;
(f) cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of a
lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year, or a fine exceeding forty
thousand pesos;
(g) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of a
dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judges
suspension or a lawyers suspension from the practice of law;
(h) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice, or any Associate
Justice of the collegial appellate court;
(i) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a Division may be
modified or reversed;
(j) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;
(k) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
(l) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on businesses or affects the
welfare of a community;
(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion of at least three
Members of the Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the Court en
(n) Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention; and
(o) all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all courts and their
personnel. (Sec. 3, Rule 2 A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC)
Please take note of letter (n) just in case you forget any specific ground.

Q. How do you determine the sufficiency of a cause of action?

A. The test is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint (Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs. David).
To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and
circumstances or other matter aliunde are not considered but the court may consider in addition to
the complaint the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in
the records (Zepeda v. China Banking Corp, 2006).

Q: May the Supreme Court look into or determine questions of fact?

A. As a general rule, the Supreme Court may not look into the questions of facts passed to it on an
appeal. However, the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the lower courts in the
following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
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when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.

Q. What is forum shopping?

A. Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum,
other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable decision. x x x It is expressly prohibited xxx because it trifles with
and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congest our court dockets. A
wilful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary
dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct contempt. (Orpiano v. Spouses Tomas (2013)

Q. Atty. Santos filed a pleading before the trial court. In the Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, he signed it on behalf of his client. Atty. Reyes, opposing counsel, moved to dismiss the
case. As judge, will you grant the Motion to Dismiss?
A. I will grant the Motion to Dismiss. The Court held in a decided case: In this light, the Court
finds that the CA correctly dismissed Andersons Petition for Review on the ground that the
certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any
authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting
an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this does not
automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a defective certification is
generally not curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true that in some cases the Court
considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it did so only on sufficient and
justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the
intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. (Anderson v. Ho, 2013)

Q. What would suffice as compliance to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum

A It is settled that the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping are not
jurisdictional. Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Non-compliance with
the verification requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective, and is
substantially complied with when signed by one who has ample knowledge of the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true ad correct. On the other hand, the certification against forum shopping is
required based on the principle that a party litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different fora. While the certification requirement is obligatory, non-compliance or a
defect in the certificate could be cured by its subsequent correction or submission under special
circumstances or compelling reasons or on the ground of substantial compliance.(Sps. Eugene L.
Lim and Constancia Lim v. CA, 2013)

Q: Distinguish question of law from question of fact.

A. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
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For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.49 Civil Procedure. As a general rule, subject
to exceptions, a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) shall raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth. One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has
been misled by the representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of
reasonable care and circumspection (F.A.T Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks
International, Inc., 2011).
Note: Liberal Application of the Rule in the following instances:
It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with
the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case. (Estel v. Diego, 2012)

Q. May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a case without conducting any proceeding without
violating the principle of due process?
A. Yes. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss
the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res
judicata; and (d) prescription of action.

Q: X was the Chancellor for University of Science and Technology (UST). He retired as
chancellor and was subsequently hired by Aliga, the Dean for the College of Law, in the same
University, to teach Law subjects as a substitute professor. Musli, the new chancellor, wrote a
letter addressed to X requiring him to retire. X then filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC. The
case was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the case is an
illegal dismissal complaint. X then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied,
prompting him to file a petition under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA granted the petition filed by
X and reversed the omnibus motion dismissing the complaint directing the RTC to hear the case.
The case being remanded back to the RTC, X filed an amended complaint impleading UST as a
defendant. X then filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC then granted the summary
judgment ruling in favor of X and subsequently the motion for execution pending appeal. Musli,
aggrieved, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari in his personal capacity. The CA denied the
petition. Musli then filed a motion for reconsideration. UST then decided to intervene. May UST
A. No. While undoubtedly, UST has a legal interest in the outcome of the case, it may not avail
itself of the remedy of intervention in this particular case where Musli filed the present appeal in his
personal capacity; and not on behalf of UST. Therefore, UST is not a third party in the proceedings
herein. Jurisprudence describes intervention as a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. The right to intervene is not
an absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant establishes facts which
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing it. In X's Amended Complaint before the RTC, UST
was already impleaded as one of the defendants in the first civil case. UST came under the
jurisdiction of the RTC when it was served with summons and participated in the case. Evidently,
the rights and interests of UST were duly presented before the RTC in the former Civil Case.
Intervention requires that they were not impleaded in a former proceedings so as not to enable them
to protect or preserve their right. (The Board of Regents of Mindanao State University v. Osop,

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Q. An election protest was filed by Montilla against Datu. The service of summons has been done
through registered mail: this is according to their internal rules: In cases filed before the
Tribunal involving distant legislative districts and provinces, it has been its practice to serve the
summons through registered mail, it being impracticable to send the same by personal service to
protestee or respondents who reside in said far provinces. Datu was unable to file his answer to
counter the protest even after 43 days so HRET entered a general denial for him. When Datu
learned this, he filed a motion for reconsideration to accept his answer but it was denied. May
summons in HRET cases be served by registered mail?
A. The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should be served on the
protestee. Significantly, Rule 80[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules provides that the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure applies by analogy or suppletorily in so far as the latter may be applicable and not
inconsistent therewith as well as with the orders, resolutions and decisions of the HRET. In view of
the failure of the HRET Rules to specify the authorized modes of service of summons, resort then is
necessary to Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:

SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be

served handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and
sign for it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within
a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made through registered mail, which
is not among the allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In Federico S.
Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Aurora Rosario A.
Oreta, this Court has held that in the matter of service of summons, Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rules of the HRET. If in ordinary civil cases (which
involve only private and proprietary interests) personal service of summons is preferred and service
by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and due process grounds, with more reason
should election cases (which involve public interest and the will of the electorate) strictly follow the
hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court. (Mangudadatu v. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 2008).

Q. What are the elements of res judicata?

A. 1) an identity between the parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both
actions; 2) a similarity of rights asserted and relief prayed for (that is, the relief is founded on the
same facts); and 3) identity in the two particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered
in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, fully adjudicate or settle the issues
raised in the action under consideration (RCBC v. Hilario, 2012).

Q. Under the Rules, what are the two concepts of res judicata and when can each be applied?
A. Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior
judgment as enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of judgment as
explained in Section 47(c) of the same Rule.

Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res
judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two cases, only
identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
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conclusiveness of judgment applies.

Identity of parties is a requisite in the application of conclusiveness of judgment. So long as the

parties or their privies are identical, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment
is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same. For res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of cause of
action is not required but merely identity of issue. For purposes of conclusiveness of judgment,
identity of issues means that the right, fact, or matter in issue has previously been either directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action45by a competent court (Heirs
of Miguel v. Heirs of Angel Miguel, 2014).

Q. May a minute resolution be considered for purposes of res judicata?

A. Yes. A "minute resolution may amount to a final action on the case but it is not a precedent x x x
x it cannot bind non-parties to the action. Corollary thereto, we can conclude that a minute
resolution, while not a precedent relative to strangers to an action, nonetheless binds the parties
therein, and calls for res judicatas application. x x x x for purposes of the application of res
judicata, minute resolutions issued by this Court are as much precedents as promulgated decisions,
hence, binding upon the parties to the action. (PNB v. LIM, 2013)

Q.Valentino Development Co. moved to dismiss the case filed by Production Bank against it since
the new complaint raises the same issues in a prior case which has become final and executory?
As judge, will you grant the motion?
A. Yes. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is binding and conclusive on the parties.
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity
for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them .(LZK Holdings and Development
Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, 2014)

Q: What are the elements of litis pendentia?

A: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration (PND v. Gateway Property Holdings, 2012).

Q. What is the Neypes Doctrine?

A. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court ruled that a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration should be given to litigants (Neypes v. CA,2005)

Q. Is the Neypes Doctrine applicable to criminal cases?

A. Yes. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a
"fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure . First, BP 129, as amended, the
substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to
appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. Third, while the Court did not
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consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals
(CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this
Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Yu v. Samson-Tatad, 2011)

Q. Is the Neypes Doctrine applicable to administrative cases?

A. No. The Neypes ruling applies to judicial proceedings only as the reason for such ruling also
known as the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules of Court.
(Panolino v. Tajala, 2010)

Q: Members of the Ibaloi Tribes of Baguio City claim that their parents inherited from their
ancestors several parcels of land in the Busol Watershed Reservation. They then applied for a
TRO before the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) seeking to enjoin The
Baguio Cleaning Movement Inc. and others from fencing the Busol Watershed Reservation. The
NCIP granted the TRO application. It also ruled that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims
and dispute involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous
Peoples, and thus may issue injunctive writs. The Baguio Cleaning Movement Inc. argued that
NCIP has no jurisdiction over the case. Does RA 8975, the law which prohibits TROs against
national government project cover TROs issued by NCIP?
A. No. The law provides:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court,
shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary in junction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any
person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments direction, to
restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project; Bidding or awarding of cont ract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof; Commencement, prosecution, execution,
implementation, operation of any such contract or project; Termination or rescission of any
such contract/project; and The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract/ project.

Should a judge violate the preceding section, RA 8975 provides the following penalty:
Section 6. Penal Sanction. In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he or she may
incur under existing laws, any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3 hereof,
shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions of RA. 8975 that the prohibition against government
projects covers only judges, and does not apply to the NCIP or its hearing officers. In this respect,
Republic Act No. 8975 conforms to the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 605and Presidential
Decree No. 1818, both of which enjoin only the courts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, cannot
nullify the preliminary injunction order issued by NCIP on the ground of violation of said laws (The
Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng, 2013).

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Q: Under the foregoing facts, is Baguio Cleaning Movement, Inc. entitled to its own application
of injunction against the tribes?
A: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced that the tribes were entitled to the
relief granted by the Commission. 23 Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of the tribes ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested
rights over the same. Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that
claimants show the existence of a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately
granted the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued therein.

The conclusions of this Court in both the case at bar and that in G.R. No. 180206 as regards
private respondents ancestral land claim should therefore be considered provisional, as they are
based merely on the allegations in the complaint or petition and not on evidence adduced in a
full-blown proceeding on the merits by the proper tribunal. The tribes are therefore not barred
from proving their alleged ancestral domain claim in the appropriate proceeding, despite the
denial of the temporary injunctive relief prayed for (The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v.
Masweng, 2013).

Q. Esteban is not a party to a case which has become final and executory. He was forewarned
that the sheriff is about to execute the judgment which would adversely affect his substantive
right. What remedy is available to Esteban?
A. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies
of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property
not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent separate action to vindicate
his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person other
than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded
from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. The right of a third-party claimant to file a
terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can
exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the
restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his
ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil. 401 [1990]) we
declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently
establish his right on the property. (Villasi v. Garcia 2014)

Q. What is the nature of orders covering support pendete lite?

A. They are interlocutory in nature. The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent
lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on
the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage and are therefore interlocutory. They did not
finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners
claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support,
and conjugal assets. (Calderon V. Baldevia v. Roxas, 2013)

Q. May orders pendente lite be appealed?

A. No. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the
subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioners appeal was correctly dismissed by the
CA. (Calderon V. Baldevia v. Roxas, 2013)

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Q. Distinguish a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 from a petition for review under Rule 43.
A. A petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil action for certiorari is an
extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the two
remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is
proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without
or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. A petition for review, on the other hand, seeks to
correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer (Dee Ping Wee v. Lee Hiong
Wee, 2010).

Q. If a decision is rendered with grave abuse of discretion, should there always be resort to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65?
A. No. The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the
merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering
the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess
thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision
(Sawadjaan v. CA, 2005) Besides, the Rules expressly provide: Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.

Q. Y was adjudged loser in an ejectment case. Considering that ejectment is summary

proceeding, what remedy is available to Y to postpone the effectivity of the judgment?
A. As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately
executory in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is
pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the
defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the
rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty
of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant
perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment
would automatically follow.
Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the
appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for
the perfection of the appeal. In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an
appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the
pendency of the appeal. (Acbang v. Hon. Luczon, Jr. 2014)

Q. Gabby filed an unlawful detainer case against Ali and won. Ali filed a petition for relief from
judgment before the same MTC that rendered the decision in the unlawful detainer case. Was Ali
A. No. A Petition for relief from judgment is a prohibited pleading in an ejectment case
under Section 13(4) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Q. May Ali file his petition for relief from judgment before the RTC?
A. No. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition. Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
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SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. - When a judgment
or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set

Q. What is Alis remedy? What court has jurisdiction?

A. The remedy is to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC. (Agdal v. Carlos, 2010)
*Note that the Court treated the petition for relief from judgment before the RTC as a petition for
certiorari in this case.

Q. Rosario filed a suit in the Small Claims Court. The judge ruled in her favor. When can she
ask for execution of the judgment?
A. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision
shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
thereof forthwith served on the parties.

Q. Can Fernando, the losing party appeal the ruling of the Small Claims Court?
A. No, because said decision is unappealable. To question the decision, a petition for certiorari must
be filed. Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their
corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for
certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. (A.L. Ang
Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, 2014)

Q: May the determination of heirs be made in an action for recovery of ownership of property?
A. No. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in
a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.

Q. What is criminal jurisdiction?

A. It is the power of the State to try and punish a person for a violation of its penal laws.

Q. What is the rule on jurisdiciton and venue in criminal cases?

A. In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in the
course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or
territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of

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its departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of
international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed(the case must be filed,
generally, where the crime is committed exceptions are provided by law and the rules such as the
venue of actions for libel under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides multiple

Q. What are the requisites for a valid exercise of jurisdiction?

1. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter - the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to
take cognizance of.
2. Jurisdiction over the Territory - the offense must have been committed within its territorial
3. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused - the person charged with the offense must have been
brought to its presence for trial, by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court.

Q. What are the distinctions between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts?
A. The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant,
while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. Applying this
analogy to [a case under BP22 or the Bouncing Checks Law], knowledge of insufficiency of funds is
the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check
presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge. (Bautista v. CA,

Q. What is the relevance of the distinction between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts?
A. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence as
distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense do not need to be alleged.

Q. Does it, then, follow, that a motion for bill of particulars cannot be used by an accused to
request that he be furnished with evidence?
A. Yes. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution.
Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people
intend to prove any item of factual information included in the bill of particular. (Enrile v. People,

Q. When should a motion to quash be filed instead of a bill of particulars?

A. If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order.
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot
prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper
remedy. Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and
separate remedies, the latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an
offense. (Enrile v. People, 2015)

Q. How must a conspiracy be alleged?

A. A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all
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the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of
the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of
the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his
acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts (People v. Quitlong)

Q. What are the elements of a prejudicial question?

A. (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed (Sec. 7, Rule 111).

Q. Is it possible that an action before an administrative body may be the basis to suspend a
criminal case due to a prejudicial question?
A. Yes. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet,
contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak
of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific
performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings
determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but
could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was
exclusive and original. (San Miguel v. Perez, 2013)

Q. What are the elements of double jeopardy?

A. Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches
only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the
accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment. (Ocampo v. Hon. Abando, 2014)

Q. When is bail a matter of right and when is it discretionary?

A. The general rule is x x x x that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The grant of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph
3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

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(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015)

Q. Is it the trial court that determines whether the evidence of guilt is strong?
A. Yes. For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,

Q. What must the trial judge consider in granting bail in favor of an accused charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment?
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:

In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
1. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8,)
2. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution; and
3. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19) Otherwise petition should be denied. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,

Q. Can bail be granted based on humanitarian grounds, independent of the legal merits of the
A. Yes. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during
the trial. Granting bail x x x on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already
held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court: x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in
the particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a
circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the
charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the
prisoner to bail;47 x x x [G]ranting provisional liberty to [ill accused] will then enable him to have
his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. [The grant of bail is proper if it will aid in accuseds] adequate preparation
of his defense [and], more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. 1. (Enrile
v. Sandiganbayan, 2015)

Q. Gerry, Ricky and Nikki were charged with violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Upon finding probable cause, the Ombudsman directed that a case be filed against the three
accused. During trial, the Ombudsman wanted to grant the request for immunity sought by Gerry
and Ricky so that they may testify against the mastermind of the corrupt act, Nikki. Is the power
of the Ombudsman to grant immunity still subject to the provisions of the Rules of Court?
A. Yes. RA 6770 provides: Sec. 17. Immunities. x x x. Under such terms and conditions as it may

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determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may
grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and
production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing,
inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the
performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The
immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness
from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or
removal from office. (Quarto v. Ombudsman, 2011)

Q. What are the requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness? What is the
effect of an order granting the discharge of an accused as a state witness?
A. The requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are provided under Section
17 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly charged
with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case,
the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence
and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that: (ADSuMM)
(a) There is Absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
(b) The is no other Direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be Substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the Most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving Moral
turpitude. (Baviera v. Zoleta, 2006) or an order granting immunity to an accused (Quarto v.
Ombudsman, 2011) and there is grave abuse of discretion, the party may question the orders
or resolutions before the Supreme Court via Rule 65.

Q: Can the courts interfere in the COMELEC's finding that probable cause exists?
A: Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELECs exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election
laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. The established rule is
that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence. It is for the presentation of only such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed, and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Q. What is the Best Evidence Rule?

A. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record
of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or
the record.

Q. Mr. Cayetano is the custodian of the record of birth of Charie Mae. He executed an affidavit
attesting to the truthfulness of the fact of birth of Charie Mae and he attached her duly-
authenticated birth certificate of birth to his affidavit. Must Mr.Cayetano affirm his affidavit in
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open court?
A. No. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that
entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
officials attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
The documents trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. (Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 2014)

Q. What is the Parol Evidence Rule?

A. The Parol Evidence Rule applies to the parties and their successors in interest. Conversely, it
has no application to a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol Evidence Rule, a person
who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui in a contract (such as
petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It has been held that a third party who avails
himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract becomes a party to that contract. This is why
under Article 1311, a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui is required to communicate his
acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. Moreover, to preclude the application
of Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown that at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a
privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. A beneficiary of a
stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a
stranger to the contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule. Thus, even assuming
that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed stipulations pour autrui,
still petitioners claim cannot prosper, because they are barred from proving them by oral evidence
under the Parol Evidence Rule. (Heirs of Pacres vs. Heirs of Ygoa, 2010)

Q. Does a Protection Oder issued by a Barangay Chairman have any efficacy?

A. Yes. The issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such
function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under
the Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances, and to maintain public order in
the barangay.

Q. Can a trial court issue a Temporary Protection Order without hearing without violating the
constitutional guarantee to due process?
A. Yes. Since time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented, the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order
is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a
perpetrator to the victim. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative
of the right to due process. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests. (Tua v. Hon.
Mangrobang, 2014)

Q. What is the nature of search warrant proceedings?

A. A search warrant proceeding is a special criminal and judicial process akin to a writ of discovery.

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It is designed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure to respond only to an incident in the main case, if
one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since it is at most incidental to the main
criminal case, an order granting or denying a motion to quash a search warrant may be questioned
only via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Q: After receiving a complaint from PLDT of the illegal activity of X Corporation of using
Mabuhay card and other equipment capable of receiving and transmitting calls from the USA to
the Philippines without these calls passing through the facilities of PLDT, PAOCTF filed two
applications for the issuance of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the RPC for Theft
of Telephone Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of telephone
communication. The trial court issued two search warrants for the said violations. In
implementing the search warrants, the police team searched the premises of X Corporation and
seized the articles specified in the search warrants. Subsequently, the prosecutor conducted a
preliminary investigation and found that the officers of X Corporation were probably guilty
thereof. X Corporation and its officers sought to quash the search warrants on the grounds that
there was no probable cause; and that the search warrants were general warrants and were
wrongly implemented. Should the trial court grant the Motion to Quash? What is probable
cause? Are the search warrants in this case in the nature of general warrants
A. The court should not grant the Motion to Quash the search warrants on the ground that there was
no probable cause. Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such
reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched. PLDT was able to produce pieces of evidence that, if taken together, are more than
sufficient to support a finding that probable cause necessary to engender a belief that X
Corporation, et al. had probably committed the crime of Theft through illegal activities. Evidence to
show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from proof beyond reasonable
doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required.
The subject search warrants are not general warrants because the items to be seized were
sufficiently identified and specifically identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged
which are Theft and Violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 through the conduct of illegal ISR
activities. A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which
is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution.
In Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, the Court explained the purpose of the aforementioned requirement for a
valid search warrant, to wit: A Search Warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things
to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - what articles they
shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, - that abuses may
not be committed (HPS Software and Communication v. PLDT, 2012).

Q: Does the issuance of a Hold Departure Order impair one's right to travel and is the violation
of the right to travel covered by the Writ of Amparo?
A. A Hold Departure Order does not automatically impair a person's right to travel. There should be
proof to establish that the right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009).

Q: May a writ of amparo or other reliefs granted by the writ be filed in another court if a
criminal action has been filed or is pending?
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A. No. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed.
The writ or any relief available under the writ should be filed by filing in the same court where the
criminal action was pending (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009).

Q: Does failure to photograph or inventory the seized illegal drugs render them inadmissible as
evidence against the accused? May this failure be raised as a ground for the first time on appeal?
A. Failure to photograph or inventory the confiscated illegal drugs is not fatal to the prosecution of
the case against the accused. The seized items may still be admitted in evidence as long as the
evidentiary value thereof is preserved. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA9165 reads:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.-The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof [.]

On the other hand, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
9165, which implements said provision, stipulates:
(a)The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/ or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds
may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with
Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of
the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of
Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first
time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in
the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise
the question for the first time on appeal (People vs. Taculod, 2013).

Q. Can an action to rescind a donation be joined with an action for partition?

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A. As a general rule, no. An action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary
rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in
the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in
a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the
proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular
cause of action.

Q. Is the foregoing rule absolute?

A. No. [I]f there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a
severance, and then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined
causes of action. x x x It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court
trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the
misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of
action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if
not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.
(Ada v. Baylon, 2012)
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court
denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The effect of the discharge of an accused as a state witness is that of an acquittal under Section 18
which states: Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. The order indicated in the
preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future
prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-
accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge.

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