CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 1
Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Seat of Police Power
MMDA vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOC. Neptune Street / Police Power The MMDA
sent a Notice to the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) ordering for the opening of
Neptune Street (privately-owned by BAVA) to public vehicular traffic and that the perimeter
fence separating said street from Kalayaan Ave. was to be demolished. The order was
claimed to be in the exercise of police power.
The powers of the MMDA are administrative in nature, and the MMDA Law (RA No. 7924)
grants the MMDA neither police power nor legislative power. It is only a development
authority organized for the purpose of laying down policies and with coordinating w/ the
various government organizations for the delivery of basic services w/in the metropolitan
area. Police Power is lodged in the National Legislature and was delegated to the Local
Government Units through the Local Government Code. Police power was not conferred
by Congress to the MMDA.
Hierarchy of Rights
PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS CASE Hierarchy of Rights Human Rights are imprescriptible
and hold primacy over property rights. These include the right to free speech, religion, free
assembly, the press, and the right to petition. A law that restricts the exercise of property
rights is valid as long as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. However, a law restricting the
basic human rights must satisfy a very strict criterion namely that there must be a grave
and immediate evil that the state has the right to prevent. It must also pass the balancing
of interest test.
DUNCAN ASSOC vs GLAXO WELCOME - The prohibition against personal or marital
relationship with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is
reasonable under the circumstances. Glaxo has a right to protect its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and economic interests.
STAR PAPER vs SIMBOL - There is NO valid reasonable business necessity for the 1995
SPC policy. Such policy is premised on management fear that employees married to each
other would be less efficient. Allowing SPC to continue on with this policy without just
cause violates the employees right to security of tenure.
Procedural Due Process
BANCO ESPAOL vs. PALANCA due process / notice by mail Actual Notice need not
be sent to the absentee-owner of a mortgaged property subject to foreclosure. It is not
absolutely necessary under the law. Rationale: property is presumed to be in the
possession of the owner or his agents, and it is his duty to be vigilant and aware when his
property is called to requisition. If he fails to gain notice through the ordinary publications,
then it is his misfortune and he must abide by the consequences.
The requisites of Due Process in Judicial Proceedings:
1. Court or tribunal clothed w/ judicial power to hear & determine the matter
before it
2. Jurisdiction acquired over the person or property subject of the proceedings
3. Defendant must be afforded the opportunity to be heard
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4. Judgment must be rendered after lawful hearing
FABELLA vs CA - The contention that government employees are prohibited from
undergoing strikes is not the question in the present case, but rather were the respondents
robbed of due process of law in the proceedings after their strike.
In administrative proceedings, due process includes the following:
1. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondent's legal rights
2. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights
3. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality
4. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known
to the parties affected
ESPELETA vs. AVELINO right to be heard / cross-examination of witness The
respondent judge disregarded and struck from the records, in its entirety, the testimony of
a witness for the defense (w/c is indispensable to his case) for failure to appear on the
scheduled date despite motions for continuance by the defendant counsel. By denying
defendant the right to present evidence indispensable to his defense, he was practically
denied the opportunity to be heard. This is a violation of due process. His right to his day in
court was eroded.
ANG TIBAY vs. CIR Administrative Due Process Although the Court of Industrial
Relations is not bound by strict rules of technicality in order to settle and prevent further
agricultural and industrial disputes, still it cannot do away with the basic and fundamental
principles of due process. The requisites of Administrative Due Process are as
follows:
1. The right to hearing & presentation of his own case
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. Decision must be supported by evidence
4. Evidence must be substantial, reasonable, and adequate not mere hearsay
5. Decision must be based on the evidence in the record & disclosed to the
parties
6. The judge must decide on his own and not merely adopt those of his
subordinates
7. The parties must be informed of the issues involved and the reasons behind
the decisions rendered
PHILCOMSAT vs. ALCUAZ notice & hearing / quasi-judicial functions Commissioner
Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued motu propio an
Order requiring the provisional reduction by 15% of the rates that may be charged by the
petitioner for the delivery of its services, w/o the benefit of a hearing. It was based upon a
report submitted by the Gen. Auditing Office. Notice & hearing are not essential for
administrative action if it is exercised as an executive, administrative, or legislative
function. But if the administrative agency exercises a quasi-judicial function, notice &
hearing is necessary.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
The Order pertains exclusively to the petitioner and it involves questions of fact. It was thus
issued in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. That the said Order is interlocutory is
immaterial. PHILCOMSAT is likewise entitled to controvert the report upon w/c the Order
was based. The Public Service Act likewise requires notice & hearing before the NTC may
fix service rates. The power of the government to regulate property rights and franchises
must be reasonable and must not be arbitrary and confiscatory and must be in accord with
the best interest of the public.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS vs. NTC notice & hearing / provisional rates PLDT applied
for the approval of rates for Digital Service Transmission Facilities w/ the NTC w/c granted
the PLDT provisional approval. No notice was sent to the other telecom providers except
to PT&T w/c notified the others (petitioners herein) of the provisional approval. The
petitioners thus allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and violation of
due process. Under the Public Service Act, the NTC can provisionally approve rates
proposed by public services w/o need for hearing, but subject to hearing 30 days
thereafter. It applies to both initial and revised rates.
Provisional rates are, by their nature, temporary and subject to adjustment after final
hearing. No notice is required therefor. It is also noteworthy that it is impossible for the
NTC to send notices to all affected parties. The law does not require the impossible. Rates
are likewise presumed reasonable and the courts will not interfere w/ administrative action
in the absence of gave abuse of discretion.
NON vs. JUDGE DAMES rallying students / school discipline Ariel Non and 12 other
students of the Mabini College participated in unruly mass actions within school premises.
They violated their rally permits w/c only allowed them to rally in the school basketball
court. It resulted to the disruption of classes. They were thus denied re-enrollment for the
next semester. The following are the requisites for due process in school disciplinary
actions:
1. students must be informed in writing of the nature & cause of the accusations
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges, w/ counsel should they so
choose
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
5. school authorities must decide based on evidence
6. penalty imposed must be proportional
The penalty of denying Non and the other petitioners re-enrollment is clearly excessive
and disproportionate to the offenses committed.
LAO GI alias CHIA Jr. vs. CA due process / deportation Deportation proceedings
must be conducted in accordance w/ the principles of due process. There must be a
preliminary investigation to determine the existence of probable cause. The alien must be
informed of the specific ground for deportation. Hearing must be in accordance w/ the rules
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. The Rules of Criminal Procedure govern
the issuance of search warrants, warrants of arrest, bail, motion to quash, and the trial.
Private prosecutors cannot intervene in deportation proceedings in order to avoid
harassment and oppression, hence there are special prosecutors tasked to prosecute
deportation.
PEOPLE vs. NAZARIO vague law / fish ponds case Nazario was charged for violating
certain municipal ordinances w/c he assails as vague. The said ordinances impose a P
3.00 tax per square hectare of fishpond, w/c starts 3 years from the approval by the
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Bureau of Fisheries, or starting from the year 1964 in case it was opened beyond the said
year. He likewise claims that, being a lessee, he is neither owner nor manager w/in the
scope of the definition of the law.
In order for a law to be vague, its obscurity must be evident on its face such that it cannot
be clarified by a saving clause or by construction. It is distinguished from laws couched on
imprecise language or laws that are fairly ambiguous but nevertheless applicable. In the
case at bar, the ordinances are not vague and merely poses a simple mathematical
problem as to the dates of the payment w/c may nevertheless be computed. Being the one
who benefits and profits from the fishponds, the petitioner likewise falls squarely w/in the
coverage of the term operator or manager of the said fishpond for the purpose of the
tax.
CORONA vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS occupation / property rights The Phil. Ports
Authority (PPA), in the exercise of its control power, enacted an Admin. Order, ordering
that all appointments to harbor pilot positions shall be for a term of only 1 year, subject to
renewal or cancellation yearly after rigid evaluation of performance. The Office of the
President, through Exec. Sec. Corona, affirmed the validity of the said resolution.
However, it was nullified by the trial court.
Procedurally, the Admin. Order is valid despite the lack of notice & hearing prior to its
enactment, because it was enacted through the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
However, substantially, it is unreasonable and superfluous and amounts to deprivation of
property w/o due process of law because it restricts the harbor pilots from enjoying their
profession before their compulsory retirement. The right to ones occupation is a vested
property right and can only be restricted or denied with due process of law.
ARMY & NAVY CLUB vs. CA property rights / historical landmarks The City of Manila
attempts to evict the Army & Navy Club for its failure to comply w/ contractual obligations.
The latter asserts that it is a historical landmark for being so declared by the Natl Historical
Commission and thus, its existence allegedly cannot be undermined by a simple ejectment
suit.
When properties are classified into historical treasures, it imposes limits on ownership
hence it must be done in accordance w/ due process. As an exercise of the police power,
such authority is lodged in the legislature and the governing laws are RA No. 4846 and PD
No. 374 providing the manner by w/c said properties are to be classified. Hence, it must
follow the prescribed procedure first before being so classified.
SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD vs. TORCITA conduct unbecoming of officer / notice
& hearing PO Torcita was charged w/ several counts of conduct unbecoming of an officer,
grave threats, and abuse of authority. All charges were dismissed. However, he was
instead convicted of Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty for w/c he was not
specifically charged. Petitioners allege that the offense of Simple Irregularity (w/c includes
being drunk during duty hours) is covered by the more serious offense of Conduct
Unbecoming of an Officer. A person cannot be found guilty of an offense for w/c he was
neither notified nor charged. It violates the rudimentary requirements of due process.
DD: A person cannot be penalized for an offense for w/c he was not charged or one w/c is
not alleged in the information because to do so would violate the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. It is a violation of due
process.
SEC. OF JUSTICE vs. LANTION extradition / notice & hearing Herein respondent
demands that he be furnished a copy of the extradition petition and its supporting papers
pending the evaluation stage w/ the Sec. of Justice, to w/c the latter refuses. He claims
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
that such refusal violates the right to notice and hearing. The implementing law, PD No.
1069 provides that the notice shall be given at the same time as the warrant of arrest. The
same rule is likewise provided in the treaty to w/c both the US and the Philippines agree
and to w/c other countries have expressed the same interpretation. For the purpose of
notice and hearing, a criminal procedure cannot be equated w/ an extradition proceeding
and it follows that the evaluation process is not similar to preliminary investigation.
Also applying the balancing of interests test, considering that the case is only in its
evaluation process, the nature of the right being claimed is nebulous in character and the
degree of injury is minimal. The balance is thus tilted in favor of the State. Such procedural
protection has not yet become due given the extent to w/c the defendant is to suffer loss or
injury.
DD: Notice and hearing for extradition cases is not required during the Executive Phase of
the proceedings, but it is required in the Judicial Phase thereof. Considering that the
petition is still under the evaluation of the Secretary of Justice, then it is still in the
Executive Phase hence no notice and hearing is yet required.
LAZATTA vs. STATE OF NEW JERSEY gangster / vague law The State of NJ enacted
a criminal statute penalizing w/ a fine and imprisonment any person not engaged in a
lawful occupation who is a member of a gang of two or more persons and has been
convicted at least 3 times. A statute, especially a penal statute, must explicitly prescribe
the rule to govern conduct and warn against transgression. The law is vague and leaves
even persons of common intelligence to speculate as to its meaning and differ in its
application. A vague law violates due process.
DD: The word gang is vague and was not properly defined in the statute. If a law is
vague, there is no way by w/c common people may be certain as to how to conduct
themselves so as not to violate the law. It would be unfair considering that it is presumed
that the people know the law and ignorance of the law excuses no one.
PEOPLE vs. DE LA PIEDRA vague law / illegal recruitment Carol de la Piedra was
convicted of illegal recruitment on a large scale. She challenges the constitutionality of the
Labor Code provision penalizing the same for being vague. When recruitment or
placement is undertaken by unauthorized persons it is deemed to be illegal recruitment
and if the same is perpetrated against 3 or more persons, then it is deemed to be on a
large scale. She likewise asserts overbreadth. The concept of overbreadth is peculiar to
free expression cases and is inapplicable to the case at bar.
An act will be declared void for vagueness only upon a showing that defect or vagueness
is to such an extent that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of
certainty, what the legislature intended. The said law is capable of reasonable
construction, hence it cannot be declared void.
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN plunder law / vague law / series or combination
Former Pres. Estrada is prosecuted under the Plunder Law (RA No. 7080) as amended by
RA No. 7659. He challenges the constitutionality of the said law for being vague claiming
that the words combination and series in the phrase combination or series of obvert CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY billboards regulation Act No. 2339 allows the Collector of
and criminal acts are vague. A statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. Words in a statute are understood in their plain and common meaning, unless
the legislature otherwise intended. It can very easily be understood that what the law
punishes is the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P 50 million through
the series or combination of criminal acts. It is, in fact, clear and free from ambiguity.
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The concept of overbreadth, peculiar to free expression cases, is not applicable to the
case at bar.
GONZALES vs. NLRC & ATENEO DE DAVAO removal of teacher / due process
Lorlene Gonzales, a teacher, was investigated pursuant to complaints from 2 parents
alleging that she resorted to corporal punishment to discipline students. She called for the
amendment of some school rules, particularly that w/c limited the participation of her
counsel to advice only w/o direct participation. She was terminated upon notice; the
NLRC sustained the termination. Opportunity must be afforded the accused to defend
herself either personally or through counsel, to be informed of the nature and causes of the
accusations against her, and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses. The adamant
refusal of the committee to accede to the demand to amend the rule and allow her counsel
to participate has led to her failure to successfully confront and cross-examine the
accusers ultimately vitiating the investigation.
Substantive Due Process
UNITED STATES vs. TORIBIO slaughter of carabao / restraint on property use The
appellant was prosecuted for slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered a carabao, against
the provisions of Act No. 1147 w/c is now assailed either as an invalid exercise of
eminent domain or police power. The legislature may regulate and restrain the use of
property as would be inconsistent or injurious to the rights of the public. Great discretion is
vested upon the State to determine not only what the interests of the public require but
also what measures are reasonably necessary to such interests. It does not amount to
taking of private property for public use.
YNOT vs. IAC carabeef / valid purpose, invalid means Ynot transported 6 carabaos
from Masbate to Iloilo and was caught and penalized under EO No. 66-A prohibiting the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos and carabeef & authorizing the immediate
confiscation of the said carabaos & distribution of the same to deserving farmers
(charitable institutions in the case of carabeef) as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit. The purpose of the law was to protect carabaos as a
national energy resource given the prevailing energy crisis. Take note that the carabao is
said to be the poor mans tractor.
There is no connection between prohibiting inter-province transport of carabaos / carabeef
& preventing their slaughter. They can be slaughtered nevertheless w/o having to transport
them. It is an unreasonable exercise of the police power. It orders the immediate
confiscation and forfeiture of the said property w/o due process and w/o affording the
defendant the opportunity to be heard. The objective may be valid, but the means amount
to deprivation of property w/o due process of law. The EO also encroaches upon the
powers of the judiciary in violation of the principle of the separation of powers by
allowing the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission to dispose of the
confiscated properties as he may see fit.
Internal Revenue, after due investigation, to decide that any sign or billboard exposed to
the public view is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and empowers him to
summarily order the its removal. If not complied with w/in 10 days, he may cause the
removal himself. The plaintiffs contend that it constitutes deprivation of property w/o due
process of law. The regulation of billboards falls squarely w/in the police power of the
State.
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Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell, or hearing, may be suppressed by the
State especially those situated in thickly populated districts. The people are entitled to
protest against the indiscriminate and wholesale use of the landscape by advertisers
especially if they are offensive to the senses under certain conditions. The State has the
duty to promote a healthy social and economic condition and the comfort and
convenience of the people fall squarely w/in its coverage. The prevailing public sentiment
likewise militates against the erection of billboards w/c are offensive to the sight.
DD: Aesthetics may now be regulated by the police power of the State, although usually
justified by the public interest and safety.
PEOPLE vs. FAJARDO view of the plaza / deprivation of property Juan Fajardo was
convicted for having constructed a building, w/o permit from the Municipal Mayor, that
obstructs the view of the Plaza from the Highway, contrary to an Ordinance enacted for
that matter. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. The purpose of the law may
be valid; however, the means employed is arbitrary. An ordinance w/c permanently
restricts the use of property such that it can no longer be used for any reasonable purpose,
is beyond regulation and constitutes taking of property. It clearly oversteps the boundaries
of the exercise of police power and amounts to confiscation and deprivation of property
w/o just compensation. The use and enjoyment of the property is an element of ownership.
DD: If the State will restrict the use of private property such that it can no longer be used
for any reasonable purpose or for the purpose for w/c it is intended then it amounts to
taking of the property. In this case, the State must expropriate the property and pay the
owner just compensation.
ACEBEDO OPTICAL vs. CA business permit vs. professional license Acebedo Optical
applied w/ the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit w/c was granted, anent opposition
from local optometrists, but subject to various burdensome condition such that it is
limited to a commercial store, that it cannot examine or prescribe reading glasses & cannot
sell the same w/o prescription of independent optometrists, that it can only advertise Ray
Ban and similar frames.
Although police power is vested in the legislature and is granted to local government units
(including the power to issue permits), a business permit cannot be equated w/ a license to
practice a profession, the issuance of w/c is lodged in a board of commissioners tasked
specifically to regulate the said profession in this case, the Board of Examiners in
Optometry. The local government does not have authority to regulate the profession or
practice of Optometry. Further, a corporation such as Acebedo has all the contractual
rights of a person and may employ qualified optometrists it is not against public policy or
the law.
LAWRENCE vs. TEXAS sodomy / form of liberty The Houston police, responding to a
weapons disturbance report, entered Lawrences apartment and saw him and another man
engaging in sexual acts. They were thus prosecuted under a Texas Law prohibiting
sodomy. The fact that the majority perceive something to be immoral is not, by itself,
sufficient to justify a law prohibiting the same. Furthermore, individual decisions concerning
the intimacies of physical relationships are a form of liberty protected by the due process
clause. The case involves two consenting adults, not minors or persons that may be
injured or coerced, or prostitution, such that would warrant the States interference.
DD: The State has no business meddling w/ the sexual preferences of consenting adults
for as long as they pose no danger to the ublic health or interest. It is guaranteed by their
right to liberty.
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ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS vs. CITY OF MANILA hotel
regulation To address the increase of prostitution and other activities offensive to the
public morals, the City of Manila enacted an Ordinance burdening the hotel / motel
operators (petitioners) with certain regulations such as that lessees are to be required to fill
up registration forms, imposing a prohibition against the lease of rooms to minors, or for
more than twice w/in 24 hours, that the said establishments must be open for inspection by
the Mayor of Chief of Police, and classifying said establishments into 2 classifications (1st
class & 2nd class) and imposing certain minimum requirements therefor.
Petitioners assail the Ordinance for invading their right to privacy. Police power is the
power of the State to enact regulations to promote the health, morals, peace and order,
and welfare of the society. The said ordinance is enacted precisely for that purpose: to
prevent the deterioration of the public morals. The standard for the validity of its exercise is
its responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It must
not be arbitrary and oppressive. The additional taxes imposed are reasonable and may be
imposed as an exercise of police power for so long as it is just and uniform. In the absence
of a clear showing of infirmity, the presumption of constitutionality prevails.
CITY OF MANILA vs JUDGE LAGUIO - An ordinace that prohibited that include but not
limited to the following:l1. Sauna Parlors 2. Massage Parlors 3. Karaoke Bars 4.
Beerhouses 5.Night Clubs 6. Day Clubs 6. Super Clubs 7. Cabarets 8. Discotheques 9.
Dance Halls 10. Motels. 12. Inns was declared unconstitutional.
It is an arbitrary use of government power because it inhibits the use of property by way of
legislation. Govt cannot seize, forfeit, and destroy property without trial and conviction by
the ordinary mode of judicial procedure. The goal of the City of Manila can be achieved by
less restrictive means and regulations rather than absolute prohibition. These
establishments by themselves/per se do not contribute to the social ills the City of Manila
wishes to cure. Absolute prohibition of legitimate businesses will not stop prostitution,
fornication, adultery, and the spread of STDs.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA - The case assailsthe validity of
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 An Ordinance Prohibiting ShortTime Admission, Short-
Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. In the case,
the goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the establishments for
illicit sex, prostitution, drug use, among many others. However, the end does not
necessarily justify the means. There is a probability that legitimate activities such as sexual
behavior between spouses and consenting adults, which are actually protected by the
constitution, will be curtailed in the process. The ordinance makes no distinction as
between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in
legitimate actions. The ordinance violates the right to property of the establishments as
well as the right to privacy of their clients. The rights involved in this case fall within the
ambit of the rights to liberty.
BALACUIT vs. CFI half-priced seats for kids / no public interest served The City Board
of Butuan enacted Ordinance No. 640 mandating that admission seats for children
between 7-12 years old should be sold for half the price, apparently to lessen the
economic burden of parents whose kids are lured by the so-called attractive nuisances. It
provides for penalties for violators. Police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare. A reasonable relation between end and means must exist. No
public interest at all is served by the ordinance. Ascertaining the ages of children for the
purpose of the discount is likewise difficult. It is not at all practicable, as the Council
asserts, to require children to present birth certificates while purchasing theater tickets.
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MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES legal gambling / LGU police power Because of
the success of its Casino business, the PAGCOR planned to establish a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. They leased a portion of a building from Pryce Properties for that
purpose. A wave of strong protest from the local officials, organizations, and other citizens
followed w/c led the local Sanggunian to enact the assailed Ordinance prohibiting the
establishment of casinos w/in its territory. While it is generally considered illegal, the
Constitution does not prohibit gambling outright. It is up to Congress to decide, based on
its own wisdom, whether or not to prohibit the same outright or some forms of it.I
Although the local governments are imbued w/ police power, they may only prohibit
gambling that is illegal, but not forms of gambling allowed by law in this case by the
PAGCOR Charter.
The following are the requisites for a valid ordinance:
1. It must not contravene any law or the Constitution
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory
4. It may not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. It must be general and consistent w/ public policy
6. It must not be unreasonable
AGUSTIN vs. EDU early warning devices / road safety Pres. Marcos, pursuant to the
Vienna Convention on Road Signs & Signals, enacted PD No. 229 requiring, as a pre-
registration requisite, the installation of an Early Warning Device for vehicles, which may
be procured from any source provided that it substantially complies with the specifications
therein contained. The statute was enacted in the exercise of the police power to promote
road and traffic safety clearly in the interest of the public. In the absence of a clear
factual foundation of record to overthrow the validity of the said law, then the presumption
of validity must prevail.
BENNIS vs. MICHIGAN confiscated car / deterrent against illegal use The car jointly
owned by the Bennis spouses was confiscated by the Michigan Court as a public nuisance
because the husband, John, used it to engage in sexual activity with a prostitute along a
Detroit City street. He was convicted of gross indecency. The wife, Tina, claims that, being
the co-owner and innocent spouse without knowledge or consent to her husbands illegal
activity, she has been deprived of her property w/o due process of law. It is a well settled
rule in jurisprudence that the acts of the possessor bind the interests of the owner, whether
he is innocent or not. It is a defense of the State against forbidden use and the evasion
from liability by dispensing with the necessity of conducting judicial inquiry regarding
possible collusion.
The government is NOT required to compensate the owner of the property it has lawfully
taken unless the taking was done in the exercise the power of Eminent Domain. In this
case, the forfeiture was exercised through the police power of the State. The confiscation
of the said property is in the nature of a penalty, hence no compensation is due. The
purpose of the law is to deter illegal activities leading to the deterioration of the
neighborhood and to unsafe streets.
CRUZAN vs. MISSOURI DIRECTOR OF DOH euthanasia / State interest to protect life
Nancy Cruzan, due to an automobile accident, is in persistent vegetative state. The state
trial court authorized the termination of death-delaying procedures at the instance of her
close family but the State Supreme Court reversed. Generally, a competent person has the
constitutionally-protected right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition. However, it
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does not follow that the same applies to an incompetent person. The State has a general
interest in the protection and preservation of human life. It must guard against potential
abuses by surrogates who may not act according to the interests of the patient. For this
reason, the State of Missouri can apply a clear and convincing evidence standard to
determine whether or not the proposed termination of the death-delaying mechanisms is in
accordance w/ the will of the patient.
In this case, the evidence adduced in trial (based on the testimony of her friend that she
once remotely expressed not wanting to live further in a vegetative state) does not suffice
to meet the said standard. The Due Process Clause does not require the State to accept
the substituted judgment of close family members in the absence of clear proof that
they reflect the same views of the patient.
BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH - RA 7719s purpose is to supply safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donations and regulating blood banks in the country and in
doing so Section 7 of RA 7719 calls for the phasing out of commercial blood banks.
(Section 23 is the process of the phasing out of commercial blood banks). Police power is
validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally requires the interference of the
state and (b) means employed are reasonably necessary. In this case, in order to
adequately supply the country with safe blood through voluntary donations it would require
the interference of the state to change the blood banking system of the Philippines. And in
serving public interest the Legislature deemed it NECESSARY to phase out commercial
blood banks
MANALO vs. PNP CHIEF - During the May 2007 elections, five unidentified malefactors
bearing high-powered firearms suddenly appeared at the Pinagbayanan Elementary
School in Taysan, Batangas. The school grounds is polling area for the 2007 national and
local elections. The investigation of the incident yielded that all six petitioners, who are all
members of the PNP Regional Special Operations Group (PNP-RSOG), failed to timely
respond. Because the petitioners are implicated of the crime, a memorandum stating their
restrictive custody and monitored movements was issued. The "restrictive custody"
complained of by petitioners is nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas
corpus. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the
police officers concerned are always accounted for.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. vs. JAC LINER - This is a Petition for
review to assail the decision and resolution of the CA which declared that that the City
Ordinance No. 1778 of Lucena in which it denies all the other temporary terminals in the
City of Lucena the right to operate as an invalid exercise of police power.There are two
requisites for an ordinance to be considered as a valid exercise of police power: (1) Public
interest, which requires state interference and (2) Means employed are reasonably
necessary, for the attainment of the objection.
The first requisite is obviously present since it involves the public interest in relieving the
terrible traffic congestion inside the City of Lucena While the first requisite is present, the
second is considered absent as the disputed ordinances went beyond what is reasonable
to solve Lucenas traffic problems.
Equal Protection Clause
PEOPLE vs. CAYAT prohibited liquors for natives Cayat was a member of the non-
Christian tribes of Benguet. He was charged and sentenced (under RA No. 1639) for
possession of intoxicating liquors other than the so-called native wines. He challenges the
constitutionality of the said act. The guarantee of equal protection is not violated by
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
legislation based on a reasonable classification. The free use of the said liquors by the
natives has resulted in lawlessness and crimes hampering the efforts of the government to
prepare them for integration w/ the mainstream community. When the public safety so
requires, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance
despite inconveniences that some members of a particular class may suffer.
The following requisites must be complied with to satisfy equal protection:
1. It must rest on substantial distinctions
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. It must apply equally to all members of a class
DD: The distinction made in this case may no longer be valid under the present state of
society.
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ retail trade law / aliens vs. citizens The assailed law aims to
nationalize the retail trade industry by restricting engagement in retail trade to Filipinos and
providing prohibitions against alien participation, as well as the transition of the retail trade
towards Filipinization. Chinese retail businessmen challenge the law for being
discriminatory. The constitutional guarantees are not limited to citizens but are extended
towards aliens as well. Equal protection does not demand absolute equality but merely that
persons similarly situated be treated similarly, both w/ regard to the conferment of
privileges and imposition of liabilities.
It is undeniable that in many communities, the alien retailers have replaced the natives,
and have gradually exercised control and dominance, and it is the responsibility of the
government to step in to prevent the economic subjugation of the nation. It is apparent that
aliens have repeatedly engaged in pernicious and intolerable practices. For the purpose of
engaging in retail, there is a sufficient distinction between citizens and aliens, who do not
owe the same degree of allegiance and loyalty to the country. It is a reasonable
classification that justifies unequal treatment and preference for the Filipino trader.
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC 65 year old candidate / age distinction / accused vs. convict
Patricio Dumlao, a candidate for Governor of Nueva Vizcaya assails the validity of a
provision of BP No. 52 that prohibits retired elected officials over 65 years old from seeking
re-election for the same position from which he retired. The rationale for the said provision
is the necessity for new blood and the policy of the State to promote its emergence in local
governments. (Justice Teehankee dissents from the classification stating that it does not
further the aim of the law, because the retiree can run for a position other than that from
w/c he retired)
Another provision of the law prohibits persons charged with crimes from seeking public
office. It contravenes the constitutional provision on presumption of innocence and in effect
classifies those merely charged with those already convicted.
DD: A person merely charged for a crime cannot be put in the same level as a person
already convicted for the purpose of disqualifying him from office. It is an invalid
classification.
FARIAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ipso facto resignation / elective vs. appointive
officials The Fair Elections Act repealed the provision of the Omnibus Election Code
declaring those officials holding elective positions ipso facto resigned upon filing their
candidacy for other positions. It, however, retains the rule against appointive officials. In
short, an elective official retains his position even upon his filing of a certificate of
candidacy for another position; while an appointive official is deemed ipso facto resigned
6|Mik e e Retirado 1-C
upon filing the same. There is a substantial distinction between elective and appointive
officials. Appointive officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activities or
from taking part in elections except to vote.
DD: Cabinet members are not covered by the rule considering that they hold office by
virtue of the mere confidence of the Chief Executive and are thus, essentially, partisan in
his favor. This case abandons the ruling in the Dimaporo Case which was based on the
Omnibus Election Code.
GOESART vs. CLEARY wife or daughters of tavern owner only / unwise but valid The
assailed Michigan law states that no female may be licensed to be a bartender unless she
is the wife or daughter of the male owner. While Michigan may deny to all women the
opportunity for bartending, they cannot play favorites with women w/o rhyme or reason.
The legislature apparently believes that the wives or daughters of male bar owners are
less susceptible to the hazards of the said job due to the oversight afforded by the owner
of the bar. The law may be questionable insofar as its wisdom, but the court cannot
gainsay the belief of the legislature.
DD: It is not the province of the Judiciary to rule upon the wisdom of legislation only its
legality may be ruled upon. This is in keeping with the principle of the separation of
powers.
ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL vs. ORMOC CITY tax imposed on the said company only /
uniformity The Municipal Board of Ormoc imposed a tax on all sugar productions milled at
the Ormoc Sugar Central Company (the only sugar central existing in Ormoc City during
that time) at 1% per export sale. It taxes only the sugar produced in the said company and
none other. The classification, in order to be reasonable, must be applicable to future
conditions as well. While Ormoc Sugar Central is the only sugar central in the City of
Ormoc during that time, the ordinance will not affect other sugar centrals established
thereafter. Taxing ordinances should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar centrals.
SISON Jr. vs. ANCHETA taxation / professionals & businessmen vs. compensation
earners BP No. 135 imposed a higher tax rate for net income of professionals and
businessmen as opposed to the gross income tax at a lower rate applied to compensation
or fixed-wage earners. Taxpayers may be classified into different classes or categories
and such classification must rest upon substantial distinctions. There is a significant
distinction between compensation earners and professionals / businessmen. Wage
earners have no overhead expenses and are not entitled to make deductions for taxing
purposes. Businessmen and professionals, on the other hand, are not uniform as to their
expenses necessary to produce their income. There is thus ample justification for the
classification.
HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE preventive suspension / PNP vs. ordinary accused Himagan,
a member of the PNP, was charged for the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr. and the
attempted murder of Barnabe Machitar. For this he was preventively suspended on the
basis of the DILG Act for such period until the termination of his case. He contends that the
90-day maximum period for preventive suspension under the law should apply to him.
There is ample distinction between members of the PNP and other ordinary people
charged w/ offenses. Policemen carry weapons and a badge that can be used to harass or
threaten witnesses. The legislative intent, based on the record of deliberations, is clear.
The 90-day suspension period was not meant to apply to members of the PNP charged w/
crimes. Their suspension is valid for such period prior to the termination of their case.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. vs. PARDO franking privilege / judiciary vs. other
departments RA No. 7354, through its repealing clause, withdraws the franking privilege
from the Judiciary but retains it for the other branches of the government, such as the
executive and the legislative, even in favor of former first ladies and the AFP Ladies
Steering Committee. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged based on the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice,
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. It is the Judiciary that
needs the franking privilege the most. If the problem is loss of revenue for the Phil. Postal
Corp. then the remedy is to withdraw the privilege from all branches of government. The
distinction between the grantees of the privilege and the Judiciary is simply superficial.
TIU vs. CA SBMA businesses tax incentives RA No. 7227 and EO No. 97-A grant
several forms of tax incentives in favor of businesses and residents w/in the secured area
of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) but denies them to those businesses located
outside the said zone. The policy of the law is to develop the SSEZ into a self-sustaining
commercial and financial investment center. There is clearly a substantial difference
between the big investors being lured in to establish their business w/in the SSEZ and the
present small merchants doing trade outside the area. The establishments outside of the
said zone do not have any impact on the purpose of the law to turn the former military
base into an industrial and commercial hub; hence there is hardly any reasonable basis to
extend to them the benefits under RA No. 7227.
DE GUZMAN vs. COMELEC re-assignment of election officers / singled out The
Voters Registration Act declared that election officers who have served for more than 4
years w/in a said municipality or city are to be re-assigned to a different area. This has
resulted to the re-assignment of De Guzman and the other herein petitioners. They aver
that they have been singled out. The policy of the law in singling out the said election
officers is to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place assignment. Hence it does not violate the equal
protection clause.
PT&T vs. NLRC company policy against marriage Herein respondent, a married
woman, was dismissed from her work at PT&T due to concealment of civil status and
defalcation of company funds. The record, however, discloses that her termination was, in
reality, primarily caused by the companys policy against married women. The policy
against accepting women workers who contract marriage runs afoul to the right against
discrimination of women protected by labor laws and the Constitution. The companys
policy is highly discriminatory. It is the policy of the State to protect labor as well as the
fundamental right to equality before the law of women and men.
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE vs. QUISUMBING foreign hires vs. local hires
Respondent International School employs both foreign and locally-hired teachers but
grants the foreign-hires additional salary of 25% and other benefits such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, travel allowances, and the like. The local-hires cry
discrimination. Discrimination, especially in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor
Code. Employees should be given equal pay for equal value of work. Local hires perform
basically the same functions and services as foreign hires and are thus entitled to the
same compensation. Thus, the dislocation factor is not a valid basis for distinction in
salary rates but may be adequately compensated by the other benefits granted by the
school to w/c it is more directly related.
DD: It appears in this case that the Bill of Rights was invoked against a private entity as
opposed to the common and general rule that the Bill of Rights regulates the exercise of
State power.
7|Mik e e Retirado 1-C
PARRENO vs. COA - There was NO denial of due process in this case. When petitioner
lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension in
accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638. Petitioners loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes
a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino
citizenship. Thus, PD 1638 is compliant with the requisites for reasonable classification.
The State has the right to require all citizens to render personal and military service. This
would include even those have retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his
Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the State. Thus, he may no longer
be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises.
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES vs. BANGKO CENTRAL - Central Bank (now BSP)
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing
the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional. The provision makes an unconstitutional classification between two
classes of employees in the BSP: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the
coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file
(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL
(non-exempt class.
The classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, is
constitutional. The equal protection clause allows for valid classification. The enactment,
however, of subsequent laws exempting all other rank-and-file employees of Government
Financial Institutions (GFIs) from the SSL renders the continued application of the
challenged provision a violation of the equal protection clause.
Concept of relative constitutionality - A statute valid at one time may become void at
another time because of altered circumstances.
SERRANO vs. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES - All monetary benefits should be
enjoyed by workers equally and all monetary obligations borne by them equally. There are
three (3) levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law.
In order to review the constitutionality of a classification, the Court undertakes three (3)
levels of scrutiny:
Deferential or Rational Basis Scrutiny - challenged classification needs only
to be shown rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest.
Middle-tier or Intermediate Scrutiny government must show that the
challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest
Strict Judicial Scrutiny legislative classification which impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage
of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional and the government must prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and it is
the least restrictive means.
NOTE: Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the rational basis
test and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. But if the
challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favoured by the Constitution with special
protection, then judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACO vs. CAMACHO - R.A 8240 was enacted on October 1
1996, which states that those companies found in Annex D are taxed using their net retail
price in 1996. This provision in the law is also called the classification freeze provision.
In order to clarify the classification freeze provision RA 9334 was enacted which states that
new brands, those introduced after the enactment of RA 8240, are taxed based on their
present day net retail prices. In upholding the assailed provisions as valid, the Supreme
Court used the rational basis test. The classification freeze provision was a result of
Congress earnest efforts to improve efficiency and effectivity of the tax administration of
sin product. They simplified the classification of the sin products in order to remove
potential areas of abuse and corruption. Thus, its provisions are germane to the purpose of
the law and the RA satisfies all the requirements of rational basis test.
QUINTO AND TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC - Respondents in this case are assailing the
previous Decision of the SC declaring unconstitutional Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 of
the COMELEC (appointive officials are ipso facto resigned upon filing of COC). The
resolution does not violate the equal protection clause. There is substantial difference
between appointive officials and elective officials. The former occupy their office by virtue
of the mandate of the electorate while the latter by the virtue of their designation by an
appointing authority. Under the administrative code, appointive officials are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 2
Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
whatever purpose shall be inviolable, and so search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
When intrusion is a "search"
VALMONTE vs. GEN. DE VILLA - checkpoints / not per se illegal Due to the alarming
lawlessness and violence prevalent in urban areas and the threat of the NPA, LOI No. 02-
87 created the NCR District Command (NCRDC) to establish an effective territorial
defense and to provide an atmosphere of peace and order in Metro Manila. It mandated
the creation of checkpoints placed in various strategic locations manned by military
personnel. It conducted regular searches and check-ups of vehicles without a warrant or
court order. There was once an instance when a person was fired at and killed for
speeding off and refusing to submit to the search. Thus, the petitioner challenges the
measure alleging that it serves as a vehicle for harassment or abuse.
The Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed. The petitioner cannot invoke it
for other persons. Mere apprehension that the checkpoints will lead to harassment and
violation of rights is insufficient to declare the checkpoints illegal per se. The inherent right
of the State to protect its existence prevails over an individuals right against a warrantless
search, provided that it is reasonably conducted.
The 6th coup detat against the Aquino Government took place. Checkpoints were once
again instituted. For as long as the search is limited to a visual search and no body search
is conducted, then they do not violate the right against unreasonable search. Check points
8|Mik e e Retirado 1-C
are not illegal per se and under exceptional circumstances, they may be installed by the
government. Where abuse marks the operation of checkpoints, the citizen is not helpless
and may avail of other legal remedies.
Consolidated Dissents (Justices Cruz and Sarmiento):
The checkpoints have basically taken the place of a search warrant in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches. The failure of the government to suppress crimes is not
an excuse to suspend the operation of the Bill of Rights. Constitutional shortcuts should
not be allowed. Probable cause is determined by a judge, not by a soldier or policeman.
The checkpoints allow the officers to fish for probable cause where originally there is
none.
PEOPLE vs. ESCANO firearms found in the trunk / vehicle search A gun was found in
the trunk of Escano (with Usana and Lopez) during a routine vehicle search in a
checkpoint pursuant to the COMELECs gun ban during the election period. They were
charged w/ illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Jurisprudence recognizes the
following valid warrantless searches:
1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest
2. Search of moving vehicles
3. Evidence in plain view
4. Customs searches
5. Consented warrantless searches
6. Stop-and-frisk situations
There are indications that Escano consented to the search because he did not refuse and
freely accompanied the police to the trunk of his car. Checkpoints need not be announced;
and to limit the search to visual searches would defeat the aim of the COMELEC to effect
the gun ban.
DD: The court seemed to have presumed a waiver of rights from the actions of Escano.
This is contrary to the generally accepted principle that waiver of constitutional rights is
never presumed as well as the rule that inspection during checkpoints must be limited to
visual searches only.
Requisites of a valid waiver
ALVAREZ vs. CFI search for money-lenders papers / hearsay / fishing expedition
Suspected for being a loan shark, a search warrant was issued against Alvarez based
solely on the affidavit of Agent Almeda stating that he acquired information from a reliable
source. A search warrant must be based upon an application under oath of the applicant or
the witnesses he may produce; personal knowledge is necessary not mere hearsay. In
the absence of personal knowledge of the complainant, affidavits of witnesses with
personal knowledge must be procured before the warrant can issue. The warrant is thus
void.
On the other hand, a particular description of the things to be seized is necessary, unless,
by the nature of the goods to be seized, they must be described generally. Taking into
consideration the nature of the articles sought (books, receipts, lists, etc. in connection w/
money-lending activities), no better and more accurate description is possible. The
petitioner protested to the seizures from the beginning, hence there is no waiver of rights.
Statutes authorizing searches and seizures must be strictly construed against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
PEOPLE vs. VELOSO parliamentary club / john doe Jose Veloso, a member of the
House of Representatives and manager of the so-called Parliamentary Club (a gambling
den), was arrested pursuant to a John Doe warrant issued based on an affidavit executed
by secret-agent Geronimo. It alleged that John Doe was illegally in possession in the
building (specifically described as 124 Calle Arzobispo, Manila), as well as of certain
effects used in violation of the Anti-Gambling Law. Veloso violently resisted the arrest
alleging that the John Doe warrant is void.
A warrant must specifically describe the persons or things to be seized. But if the name of
the person to be seized is unknown, a John Doe warrant may still be valid provided that a
descriptio personae sufficient to enable the arresting authority to identify the person is
made therein. In this case, the description enabled the police to identify, accurately, the
person sought to be seized. Thus, the warrant is valid. There is likewise no justification for
excessive violence in resisting arrest. Upon a lawful arrest, the officers may likewise take
from the arrested person things or effects used to perpetrate the offense or the fruits
thereof.
PEOPLE vs. MAMARIL marijuana / personal examination of complainant Mamaril was
found in possession of marijuana (and various effects relative thereto) pursuant to a
search warrant. In trial he contended that there was no evidence that searching questions
were asked the complainant during application for the warrant. There were no
stenographic notes in support thereof. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause. The judge must examine the complainant or witnesses
personally, under oath, and it must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions
and answers. Mere affidavits are insufficient. In the absence of such, the search warrant is
void, and all evidence obtained therefrom is deemed inadmissible. Failure to object to the
entry into his house is not tantamount to a waiver of such right. The courts indulge every
presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights.
DD: Take note that under the Rules of Court, in order to justify the issuance of a search
warrant, there must be personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. On the other hand, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, personal
determination suffices.
SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR libel / personal determination An information for libel was
filed against petitioners Soliven & Beltran; warrants for their arrest were issued pursuant
thereto by the judge w/o personally examining the complainant and the witnesses. The
Constitution no longer requires personal examination by the judge of the complainant and
the witnesses. What the Constitution underscores personal determination of the existence
of probable cause w/c is simply the exclusive and personal duty of the judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause.
He must personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause. He may require the submission of supporting
affidavits should he find the report insufficient. The rationale behind the rule is that to
require the judges to personally examine the complainants, judges would be unduly laden
w/ preliminary investigation instead of concentrating on deciding cases.
DD: This is the prevailing rule insofar as warrants of arrest are concerned personal
determination suffices.
PLACER vs. VILLANUEVA supporting affidavits / fiscal report not binding Refer to the
originals for the facts of the case. The judge may rely upon the fiscals report to determine
the existence of probable cause however he is not obligated to issue a warrant on the
basis thereof. If, on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may
9|Mik e e Retirado 1-C
disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of supporting affidavits from
witnesses. The issuance by a judge of a warrant is discretionary and not ministerial.
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO general warrants / fishing expedition A total of 42 search
warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of w/c they are officers for
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff & Customs Laws, the Internal Revenue Code, and
the Revised Penal Code. It mandated the seizure of all papers and documents pertaining
to the businesses regardless of the legality of the transactions. There was no specific
offense charged and no reference to any particular provision. It is thus a general warrant.
General warrants are outlawed by the Bill of Rights. It was impossible for the judges who
issued the same to have found the existence of probable cause.
Particular acts must be alleged. Likewise, no search warrant shall issue except for more
than one specific offense. Things to be seized must likewise be particularly described. The
search warrants are thus void and evidence obtained therefrom is thus inadmissible. To
hold otherwise would render the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
illusory. What was committed was, in fact a fishing expedition. Only corporations,
however, may contest the warrants appertaining to them because they have their
respective personalities.
DD: The right against unreasonable searches is personal and may be invoked only by the
person whose rights have been violated.
CENTRAL BANK vs. MORFE unauthorized banking / general pattern of business
Judge Morfe nullified a search warrant issued against the First Mutual Savings & Loan
Organization w/c allegedly engaged in banking practices w/o authority from the Monetary
Board such as extending loans. Morfe stated that the deponent must have stated the
specific illegal acts and transactions, and their respective perpetrators and victims, so that
only books and records pertaining thereto are to be seized from the said Organization.
This contention is untenable. Failure of the witness (Manila Police detective) to mention
the particular individuals does not disprove his knowledge of the specific acts of the
Organization. The records clearly suggest that the illegal transactions constitute the
general pattern of business of the Organization. That no victims were named is immaterial;
the law obviously seeks to protect the public not only from actual but also potential injury
that may be caused by the illegal banking practices of the corporation.
COLUMBIA PICTURES vs. CA copyright infringement / master tapes The seizure of
allegedly pirated video cassettes was assailed on the basis of lack of probable cause.
Based on the 20th Century Fox case, in order to determine the existence of probable
cause in video piracy cases, the original or master tape must be presented in court and
compared with the (purchased) counterfeit in order to determine the existence of probable
cause. The court will not give credence to mere testimony alleging the supposed similarity
w/o the presentation of the originals and the counterfeit copies for the purpose of
comparison. However, this rule is no longer applicable the master tapes are no longer
absolutely necessary to determine the existence of probable cause. They are only needed
if there is doubt as to the true nexus of the infringed material in comparison w/ the original.
The 20th Century Fox Case, in this regard, has already been superseded.
BURGOS vs. CHIEF OF STAFF subversive publication / typo error / general warrants
Two offices of the We Forum publication were searched, pursuant to 2 separate warrants,
for subversion according to PD No. 885. Printing machines, paraphernalia, motor vehicles,
and other effects were seized. The two search warrants, however, pointed to one and the
same place (apparently a typo error). In this case, the executing officer (Col. Abadilla) was
likewise the complainant and the executing officers prior knowledge of the premises to
be searched is relevant. The intent of the judge who issued the warrant is clear that there
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
are two separate places to be searched. Further, should there be ambiguity in the warrant
as to the place to be searched, the executing officer may resort to the affidavit to clarify the
same.
That properties seized are owned by other persons is immaterial. For as long as they are
subject of the offense, or intended to be used in connection therewith, is sufficient. Only
personal property may be seized; and since they do not allege ownership over the land,
then any equipment attached thereto shall be considered as movable property. The
warrant, however, fails on the aspect of its being a general warrant. In warrants directed
against publications, the alleged subversive materials must be specified. Mere
generalizations will not suffice.
CORRO vs. LISING Philippine Times / inciting to sedition / general warrants Warrants
were issued ordering the search and seizure of copies of the Philippine Times, articles,
copiers and typewriters, subversive documents, and other such effects. The libel case filed
against the same was rendered moot by the Agrava Commission report regarding the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Motion for reconsideration w/ the lower court may be
dispensed with where violations of the fundamental rights taint the proceedings.
It is well settled that applications for warrants for subversive publications must specify w/
particularity the alleged offenses and the things to be seized. Allegations that the articles
breed hatred towards the government are mere conclusions of law, not of fact, and cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of the warrants. Likewise, the warrant authorized the
seizure of materials and effects indiscriminately whether they are legal or illegal. It is thus
in the nature of a general warrant abhorrent to the Constitution.
DD: The padlocking of the publications office amounts to prior restraint in violation of the
freedom of expression and of the press guaranteed by Section 4 of the Bill of Rights.
PEOPLE vs. CA adjacent place / particularization of place to be searched Hussain was
allegedly in possession of firearms and explosives in Abigail Store. A search warrant was
thus issued for the said place, but the police instead entered Apartment No. 1, adjacent to
the store resulting to the arrest of 4 Pakistanis and the seizure of chemicals and
explosives, as well as various belongings and money not mentioned in the warrant. The
discrepancy resulted from the inaccurate description of the officers of the said place and
the judge merely entered in the record the information he was provided. The Burgos Ruling
is inapplicable because this case involves not merely a typo error but rather the absence of
the meeting of the minds between applicant and issuing judge as to the place to be
searched. Particularization of the place to be searched is decided by the judge, not by the
executing officers otherwise it opens the door to abuse. Particularization is, in fact, for
the purpose of leaving the executing officer w/ no room for discretion. He must only act
according to his warrant.
Particularity of description
PEOPLE vs. TEE undetermined amount of marijuana / no technical precision required
The accused challenges the validity of a search warrant that specified an undetermined
amount of marijuana for failing to satisfy the requirement of particularity. It is not required
that technical precision of description be applied, especially when, by the nature of the
things to be seized, the description must be general. Otherwise, no warrant can ever issue.
PEOPLE vs DEL NORTE - SPO1 Lumabas and his group were tasked to serve a search
warrant against a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at Caloocan City, for alleged
violation of RA 6425 or The Dangerous Drug Act. Instead of finding Diwa, it was Priscilla
del Norte (appellant) who opened the door. The authorities search the house and found a
10 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
bundle of marijuana wrapped in Manila paper. Appellant argues that the marijuana seized
as a result of the search is inadmissible due to the irregularity of the search warrant which
contained the name Ising Gutierrez Diwa and not Priscilla del Norte
The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be
searched, but also the persons to be arrested.nThe authorities did NOT have personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They did NOT conduct
surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It was only when they implemented the warrant
that they coordinated with the barangay officials. The authorities based their knowledge on
pure hearsay. Except for the drugs taken by Police Officer de Leon and the barangay
tanod, there was NO incriminating evidence to prove that Priscilla del Norte was the
possessor of those illegal drugs.
SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO POEA / only judges issue warrants / deportation The
authority of the POEA to issue warrants was contested in this case. Although Pres.
Marcos, through PD No. 1920 granted the Labor Minister arrest and closure powers, and
through PD No. 2018, gave the same arrest and seizure powers, under the 1987
Constitution, only judges can issue warrants. The said laws were thus impliedly repealed
by the Constitution. Neither can prosecutors issue warrants. The only exception is the
power of the Executive to arrest aliens for the purpose of deportation w/c is an
exceptional power given the supremacy of the Executive in matters of foreign affairs.
DD: The Executive through the Commission on Immigration and Deportation may
issue warrants but only for the purpose of enforcing a deportation order that has become
final and executory.
BACHE & CO. vs. RUIZ tax assessments / personal examination by judge A search
warrant was issued against Bache & Co. for violation of Sec. 46 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. The BIR made tax assessments based on the documents obtained
therefrom. No transcript of the testimony was attached to the questioned warrant. The
complainant (De Leon) and the witness (Logronio) brought with them prepared depositions
and a prepared warrant for signature of the issuing Judge Vivencio Ruiz. After a hearing
he was conducting that day, he simply listened to a few stenographic notes read to him,
gave a warning against the commission of perjury, and proceeded to administer the oath
and signed the warrant.
Examination of the complainant and the witnesses must be conducted personally by the
judge and by none other. Personal examination is necessary for the judge in order to
determine the existence of probable cause. The degree of participation offered by the
respondent judge cannot, in any way, be considered as amounting to personal
examination.
DD: Once again, be careful of the distinction between a search warrant and a warrant of
arrest. For the former, personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is
necessary. For a warrant of arrest, personal determination suffices.
LIM vs. JUDGE FELIX fiscal & judge / power to issue warrant vs. power to prosecute
Refer to the originals for the facts of the case. The determination of probable cause lies at
the discretion of the Judge solely. The Prosecutor may assist him in arriving at his
conclusion, but he is never bound by the fiscals findings. Determination must likewise not
be based solely on the prosecutors report but must be supported by affidavits, transcripts
of stenographic notes (if any) and all other supporting documents. Otherwise, it is as if the
fiscal made the determination and not the judge.
The determination of the existence of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant
is at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, determination of the existence of
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest

probable cause during preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining whether to
file criminal charges is discretionary upon the fiscal. It is an Executive and not a Judicial
function.
Bank secrecy rule
MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO PEA-AMARI / bank secrecy Ombudsman Desierto issued
an Order to Union Bank Julia Vargas Branch Manager Marquez ordering the production of
several bank documents relative to its investigation of the PEA-AMARI controversy.
Marquez failed to submit the documents requested and is thus being charged w/ contempt.
Generally, bank deposits are strictly confidential except for the following instances:
1. Upon authority of the Monetary Board if there is reasonable ground for fraud or
serious irregularity
2. Regular audit of an independent auditor
3. Upon written consent of the depositor
4. Impeachment
5. Upon order of competent court
6. When the deposited amounts are subject of litigation
As held in PNB vs gancayco, in cases of unexplained wealth.
In order for an in camera inspection to be allowed, there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction. In this case, there is none and what the Ombudsman
would wish to do is to conduct a fishing expedition in violation of the rights of the depositor.
The bank personnel and depositor must likewise be notified and should be present during
the inspection.
Warrantless Searches
PEOPLE vs. ARUTA valid warrantless searches Refer to the originals for the facts of to the drop-off spot but aborted the mission given the fact that the suspected receivers
the case. The following are valid warrantless searches:
1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest
2. Search of moving vehicles
3. Evidence in plain view
i. there must be prior valid intrusion
ii. evidence was inadvertently discovered
iii. evidence must be immediately apparent
iv. mere seizure of evidence w/o further search
4. Customs searches
5. Consented warrantless searches
6. Stop-and-frisk situations
DD: A 7th category may be added, which pertains to warrantless searches under
exceptional or emergency situations such as during a coup detat as provided in People
vs. De Gracia.
NOLASCO vs. PAO warrantless search only in place of arrest Mila Aguilar Roque search warrant must have been secured.
was arrested on board a public vehicle for alleged rebellion. The military officers, however,
armed with a void general search warrant, and at the instance of the arrest, searched not
only her person, but also her residence for the recovery of various subversive documents.
They allege that the search was made incident to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search
11 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
can only be made upon the person lawfully arrested, and in the place where the arrest was
made, and not elsewhere. Roque was not even in her house during the time when the
arrest and the search were made. Given the fact that the evidence was obtained clearly in
violation of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, any evidence
obtained therefrom is deemed inadmissible. The so-called exclusionary rule is the only
practical means of preventing violations of the above principle.
DD: A search incidental to lawful arrest may be made only in the person of the arrestee as
well as the area w/in his immediate control. The purpose is to protect the arresting officer
from possible hidden weapons or anything that the arrestee can use to harm him but not
to fish for evidence.
PAPA vs. MAGO customs searches Responding to a counter-intelligence report, the
PNP, through Chief Ricardo Papa (duly deputized by the Commissioner of Customs)
intercepted trucks containing allegedly contraband goods. They were not armed w/ a
search warrant. The Tariff & Customs Code does not require warrants for customs officers
to board and search vessels, beasts, or persons suspected of introducing contraband
merchandise into the Philippines. However, the search of dwelling houses, even for the
enforcement of Customs Laws, requires a warrant. Search of motor vehicles is likewise
valid w/o a search warrant. Vehicles are, after all, not actively used in w/in the home,
where the sanctity of privacy is more safeguarded, but instead is used in public places
such as roads and may facilitate commission of crimes. The PNP, having been deputized
by the Commissioner of Customs, is thus authorized to carry out such searches.
PEOPLE vs. CFI Dodge car chase / exceptional circumstances Relying upon an
intelligence report, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC), w/o a search
warrant, intercepted and chased a blue Dodge car allegedly containing contraband goods
from Angeles to be brought to Manila. In the car were Sgt. Hope and Monina Medina. They
found 4 boxes in the rear seat and 7 more in the compartment containing untaxed
wristwatches. They claimed not to know the contents of the boxes. The RASAC proceeded
never came. The prosecution found the existence of a prima facie case against them, but
the trial court declared the evidence inadmissible.
It is a settled rule that Customs searches do not require a warrant, except for those
conducted in the dwelling of persons. Furthermore, the case is an exceptional case. The
RASAC could not have possibly secured a warrant based on their intelligence reports w/c
are not fully certain. But given the occurrence of the fact, it is easily discernible that the
information, in this case, was more than just hearsay. In extraordinary events involving
warrantless arrests, their reasonableness becomes purely a judicial question. When the
officials see the existence of probable cause, coupled w/ the fact that the case involves
motor vehicles, searches need not be justified by a warrant.
Separate Opinion of Justice Teehankee:
In the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant must be procured. Given that they had
the information one week in advance, there was ample time to procure a warrant and not
simply rely on bare information given by an unidentified source. They could have delayed
actual seizure until the warrant has been secured because they already had actual
possession of the vehicle. In this case, the search was remote to the arrest and hence a
The doctrine relied upon by the majority called superior property rights (contraband) has
already been abandoned by the Supreme Court. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects is w/o distinction, whether the effects to be
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
seized are contraband or otherwise. What was committed was a typical shortcut in
enforcing the law.
PEOPLE vs. LO HO WING undercover agent / taxi / warrantless search The Phil.
Constabulary (PC) received info regarding importation of illegal drugs. The services of
Reynaldo Tia were employed to be the undercover agent. Tia spied on the accuseds Lim
and Peter Lo from China all the way until arriving at Manila, w/ the supposed drugs
stashed in tea cans. Upon their arrival, the PC took strategic positions, followed and cut
the taxis they were riding, arrested the accuseds, and took custody over the suspected
illegal drugs. They did not have a warrant. That the authorities had reasonable grounds to
suspect the importation of illegal drugs is sufficient probable cause given that the arrest
and search involved a moving vehicle. Their knowledge and information clearly was
insufficient for a valid search warrant to issue, w/c justifies their failure to procure one prior
to the arrest.
DD: In the above cases we will see how the arresting officers exploit the moving vehicle
exception to the requirement of a valid warrant. The Supreme Court seems to tolerate the
short-cut method.
CABALLES vs. CA jeep covered w/ leaves / no probable cause / intrusion Two officers
flagged a jeep suspiciously covered by kakawati leaves and found that it contained 700
kilos of conductor wires owned by the NAPOCOR. They were stolen wires. The officers
arrested the driver and took custody of the said wires for evidence. They did not have a
search warrant. Generally, mere routine checks of vehicles do not violate the right against
unreasonable searches. But when the officer goes beyond the portion of the vehicle
viewable from the outside, such already constitutes an intrusion into the domain protected
by the Constitution and hence must be justified by the existence of probable cause. Mere
suspicion because some vehicle appears be uncommon does not amount to probable
cause.
DD: Routine traffic checks must be limited to visual searches only. An extensive search
cannot be conducted unless there is probable cause. This case may be reconciled w/ the
Valmonte Ruling.
OBRA vs. CA truck moving into mining area Facts of the case are very limited; refer to
the originals for accurate statement of facts. A truck was flagged and searched extensively
upon its entry into a mining zone. It was not leaving the area nor was it transporting
minerals. In the absence of probable cause, moving vehicles cannot be subjected to an
extensive search in the absence of probable cause.
DD: Take note that the truck was moving into the mining zone, not leaving it.
PEOPLE vs. MALMSTEDT Caucasian w/ marijuana / search pursuant to lawful arrest
Responding to certain intelligence reports (regarding a Caucasian carrying drugs), the
NARCOM set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose. Without any warrant, they
stopped the bus that Malmstedt was riding and conducted a search therein. One of the
soldiers noticed a bulge in Malmstedts waist. Their suspicion was aroused as well by his
failure to present valid IDs. They found hashish in his pouch. There were some that were
likewise stashed inside teddy bears in his luggage. He was thus arrested and prosecuted
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Majority Opinion:
There is no search warrant required for that made incidental to a lawful arrest. Given the
bulge in his waist and his suspicious behavior, as well as the intelligence reports, there is
probable cause to suggest that Malmstedt was committing a crime that would justify the
12 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
warrantless search and seizure. Also, the officers were only making a routine search, not
an extensive search.
Consolidated Dissents of Justices Narvasa & Isagani Cruz:
There was no probable cause in this case hence there is no valid arrest; and when there
is no valid arrest, any search made incidental thereto is void. Malmstedt has not
committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime in the soldiers presence
when he was searched. There is no probable cause yet. The mere bulge in his waist does
not suffice. Upon searching and finding the hashish, that is the only time that they arrested
Malmstedt a typical fishing expedition. The arrest must first be made; then the incidental
search follows. The process cannot be reversed; otherwise it amounts to a fishing
expedition. According to Justice Cruz, in this case, it was the fruit of the poisonous tree
that washed clean the tree itself.
DD: This is another notorious case, so take note of the dissents. A search incidental to a
lawful arrest must come after the arrest, not before the arrest. Otherwise, a fishing
expedition is being committed.
ROAN vs. GONZALES wrong guns / hearsay Respondent Judge issued a search
warrant based on the mere affidavit of Capt. Quillosa and some witnesses w/o taking their
depositions in writing. Quillosa did not have personal knowledge but relied upon the
statements of the witnesses. They stated that they saw 8 men deliver arms to Roans
house. Upon search, the officers did not find any of the articles mentioned in the warrant
but instead found a Colt Magnum Revolver. A search warrant must not be issued based on
mere hearsay. The judge must not merely rehash the statements but must examine them
closely and ascertain the existence of probable cause. The search warrant is thus
defective and void and the gun and bullets of the petitioner were confiscated illegally. That
the said guns are illegally possessed is of no moment. Just because they are illegal items
does not mean that they can just be summarily seized w/o due process.
PEOPLE vs. TABAR marijuana buy-bust / kid and aunt / plain view Police officers
conducted a buy-bust operation involving the sale of marijuana. The child who sold the
marijuana to the undercover agent entered a shanty where his aunt was. Acting nervously
and suspiciously, the aunt was caught w/ a white pair of pants w/c, upon order of the
officers, she spread out revealing packs of marijuana. The crime was committed in the
plain view of the officers. Even assuming that there was no warrant, there was a waiver of
the right when the aunt submitted to the search and seizure. in this case, a valid
warrantless search and arrest was justified.
ANIAG vs. COMELEC Batasan Checkpoint / gun ban / intrusion Pursuant to the gun
ban, the petitioner ordered his driver to return his 2 issued firearms to the HR. His driver,
however, was flagged and searched in a checkpoint 20m away from the Batasan entrance
and was detained and charged accordingly. In the absence of probable cause, the PNP
could not extensively search the car w/o violating the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The driver was not, in any way, acting suspiciously,
and the guns were neatly wrapped and placed in their cases and kept in the trunk of the
car. He did not have instant access to the guns. Nothing could have triggered their
suspicion and instead, they intruded upon a persons privacy. Note: I think this case may
somehow indicate a re-consideration of the Valmonte ruling. D.D.
PEOPLE vs. TUDTUD marijuana in King Flakes boxes / arrest before search / waiver
On the basis of reports made by a civilian asset Bobong Solier, the police suspected
Tudtud for being responsible for the proliferation of marijuana. They received a report that
Tudtud will arrive from Cotabato w/ a supply of marijuana, thus they posed undercover.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
They saw 2 persons (one matching the reported looks of Tudtud) helping each other
unloading boxes. They approached and introduced themselves as police and asked if they
may look into the boxes to w/c Tudtud did not contest. Among the contents was indeed
marijuana leaves. For this, they were arrested and charged accordingly.
It is now accepted that the arrest must come before the search, and not the other way
around. Nevertheless, if there is probable cause, and the search is substantially
contemporaneous to the arrest, it may precede the same. In this case, there was
absolutely no hint that they were committing a crime. They were merely unloading some
boxes. Mere reliable information no longer suffices to amount to probable cause.The
mere fact that he did not oppose does not indicate waiver. The courts indulge every
presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights. The following are requisites for
such waiver:
1. the right exists
2. the person had actual or constructive knowledge of the right
3. actual intention to relinquish the right
DD: This case may be an affirmation of the Cruz dissent from People vs. Malmstedt.
VERONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. ACTON mandatory drug test / privacy / negligible
The petitioner school district imposed a Student Athlete Drug Policy w/c authorizes random
urinalysis testing for those engaged in athletic programs. Acton was denied admission to
the football program for refusing to submit to the procedure. He assails the validity of the
measure claiming that it amounts to an intrusion upon privacy. There are special needs
attendant to the school setting that justify the measure such as the interest to prevent
drug use among students and athletes. Students who participate in such athletic programs
have a reasonably lesser degree of privacy, particularly w/ medical examinations and
procedures. The intrusion in requiring a urine sample is negligible.
DD: It likewise does not violate the right against self-incrimination w/c covers only
testimonial compulsion, not the taking of specimens from the body of the person.
PEOPLE vs. COMPACION marijuana plant used for migraine / no valid intrusion
Compacion was put under surveillance for maintaining marijuana plants in his yard. The
NARCOM tried to procure a warrant but was unable to (due to office hours) and
nevertheless proceeded to Compacions house to make the search and arrest. The
marijuana plants were allegedly for the use of his wife medicinally. He did not contest their
entry given they were heavily armed and intimidating. He was charged for violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Mere passive conformity and failure to object to their entry cannot
be construed as a waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizures. The
courts indulge every presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights. The plain
view rule cannot likewise apply because the NARCOM had no authority to enter the
dwelling w/o a valid warrant. The following requisites must concur:
1. valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest
2. evidence was inadvertently discovered / they have the right to be where they
are
3. evidence must be immediately apparent
4. seizure w/ no further search
PEOPLE vs VALDEZ - Respondent was caught in flagrante delicto and without a search
warrant of cultivating 7 fully grown marijuana plants. plain view doctrine does not apply to
the case at bar. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
13 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
(a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; and
(c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search
The seizure of evidence in plain view applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object
PEOPLE vs. DE GRACIA coup detat / exigent situations In the event of a coup detat
the Eurocar Building was put under surveillance for housing large quantities of
ammunition. One time, the car of the surveillance team was fired upon by 5 persons from a
crowd w/in the vicinity. The team raided the building one night w/o a warrant. The court
at that time was closed due to the disorder. The raiding team was able to seize de Gracia
along w/ 2 janitors and plenty of explosives and ammunition. The case is an exceptional
one and there was more than sufficient probable cause to justify their intrusion. The arrests
were impelled by the exigencies of the situation w/c concerned the very survival of
society itself and the government. The arrests were in the nature of capturing enemies of
the State, and if the officials are justified in killing them given the dangerous situation so
much more are they justified in depriving them temporarily of their liberty.
BOARDS OF EDUC. vs. EARLS urine test for extra-curricular activities / negligible
intrusion The Tecumseh School District implemented mandatory urinalysis testing for
students engaged in extra-curricular activities. It was to test whether the students are
engaged in drug use. Some students oppose claiming that it violates their right to privacy.
The schools, as custodians of the children, are possessed w/ a high degree of tutelary
responsibility. Students who engage in extra-curricular activities likewise have less to
expect regarding privacy. The measure is reasonable and the intrusion brought about by
the testing is pretty much negligible. It is exercised pursuant to a legitimate policy w/c is
to curb the proliferation of drugs in campuses and among the youth.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD - There are 3
consolidated petitions attacking the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities
What the Philippine court deduced from these two US cases:
1. schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students
2. minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to
the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools
3. schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-
being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty
4. schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that
are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
Guided by these cases, the Court holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory, RANDOM, and SUSPICIONLESS drug testing of students are
CONSTITUTIONAL.
Of whatever nature or for any purpose
MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.) INC. v. NATIVIDAD - Lope Sarreal filed a complaint
(to include Harry Lyons) seeking a money judgment against petitioners. Petitioners then
moved for reconsideration on the grounds of Article 46 of the Code of Commerce which
prohibits the delivery, communication and general examination of the correspondence of
merchants, a substantial right, as well as the petitioners' right to the inviolability of their
correspondence as guaranteed by the Constitution would be violated by the order requiring
the production of the documents.
The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not be
violated, because the trial court has power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the
production and inspection of the books and documents in question in virtue of the
constitutional guarantee making an express exception in favor of the disclosure of
communication and correspondence upon lawful order of a court of justice.
CAMARA V. MUNICIPAL COURT - Inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the
San Francisco Department of Public Health entered the apartment building of Camara for
a routine Annual Inspection for possible violations of the Housing Code. The building
manager informed the inspector that Camara, a lessee of the ground floor, was using the
rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector confronted Camara and
claimed that the buildings occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground
floor. Inspector demanded Camara to permit him an inspection. Camara refused because
there was no warrant.
The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches is that the public
interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously argued that the health and safety of entire
urban populations is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing, and
sanitation standards, and that the only effective means of enforcing such codes is by
routine systematized inspection of all physical structures.
Warrantless Arrests
IN RE: UMIL vs. RAMOS Rebellion / continuing crime Rolando Dural, a member of the
NPA, shot and killed two policemen in furtherance of rebellion. He was confined in the St.
Agnes Hospital when he was arrested w/o a warrant. Mere membership w/ the NPA is a
continuing crime w/c is set apart from common crimes hence, warrantless arrests are
justified on its basis. Dural was no less subversive just because he was confined in a
hospital; and the nature of the offense impels repetition of the same acts of lawlessness
until the objective of overthrowing the government is attained.
DD: A rebel will not stop until the overthrow of the government is achieved. Thus, he is
said to be always in flagrante delicto even when he is asleep. Hence a warrantless arrest
can be effected against him anytime.
PEOPLE vs. DE LA CRUZ buy-bust / search incident to lawful arrest Respondent was
apprehended through a buy-bust operation and was charged for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. He challenges the constitutionality of such operation. It is true that buy-bust
operations are prone to abuse; however they have proven to be the most effective means
of addressing drug trafficking. It is more a question of implementation. Through it, the
arresting officers catch the malefactor in flagrante delicto. A search warrant is not
14 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
necessary because a search pursuant to a buy-bust operation is one made incidental to a
lawful arrest.
DD: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment w/c is not illegal per se. What the
Constitution proscribes is Inducement, where the arresting officer induces an otherwise
innocent person to commit a crime, and arrests him thereafter.
PEOPLE vs. AMINUNDIN just disembarking from a ship / no warrant / no probable
cause Based on a tip from an informant, the officers of the Philippine Constabulary waited
for Aminundin to disembark from a the M/V Wilcon 9, accosted him, searched his
belongings, and found what was later confirmed to be marijuana. They were not armed w/
any warrant. Aminundin was not in flagrante delicto when he was arrested and searched
he was merely disembarking from a ship. Hence, there is no probable cause. Mere
information does not constitute probable cause. The PC had 2 days to procure a warrant
but they did not even exert any effort to comply w/ the law. Since the arrest was invalid, the
search made incidental thereto was likewise invalid.
HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO pedophiles / deportation is not a criminal
procedure Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout are aliens arrested upon Order by the
Commissioner of Immigration (Miriam) for having engaged in pedophilia. Various effects
such as videotapes were seized therefrom. They were under close surveillance for 3
months. Deportation proceedings were then instituted against the said aliens. Since the
deportation proceedings have already been instituted, then, their detention has become
legal, even assuming that to begin with, it was not. Hence, habeas corpus can no longer
apply. The probable cause was likewise affirmed by the 3 months of close surveillance.
The Commissioner of Immigration & Deportation is authorized by the Revised Admin.
Code to issue warrants. The warrant however must give the alien sufficient info about the
charges and there must still be due regard for his basic rights. The rule that only judges
issue warrants does not apply to deportation proceedings it is not a criminal but only a
preventive measure. Since it is only administrative in nature, bail is not mandatory but is
discretionary upon the CID.
DD: The Commissioner of Immigration & Deportation may issue warrants only for the
purpose of carrying out a deportation order that has become final and executory.
PEOPLE vs. SUCRO sale of marijuana in chapel / personal knowledge Fulgencio, a
police officer, monitored the activities of Sucro who was allegedly selling marijuana. Under
surveillance, Sucro 3 times sold marijuana along a chapel to 3 different buyers. On the 3rd
time, the police zeroed in on him and the buyer who tried to escape, threw a tea bag to the
ground w/c was found to contain marijuana. The illegal act was committed in the presence
of the arresting officers. He was caught in flagrante delicto, and the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest; hence no warrant is necessary. The arresting officers were
near enough to see the movements of the appellant and the buyer.
PEOPLE vs. RODRIGUEZA big mistake in buy-bust; a certain Don Responding to
intelligence reports regarding the on-going trafficking of drugs, the police conducted a buy-
bust operation. Taduran posed as the buyer and purchased from a certain Don 100g. of
marijuana for P 200 (marked money). However, instead of arresting him on the spot,
Taduran returned to Headquarters and reported the incident. Thereafter, a team was
formed and, w/o a warrant, stormed through Rodriguezas house, confiscated various
effects of marijuana, and arrested both Rodrigueza and his father. For there to be a valid
warrantless arrest, the person arrested must have been caught in the act. Taduran should
have arrested him on the spot and such would have been a valid warrantless arrest. The
raid of the house w/o a search warrant is likewise illegal. Otherwise, a warrant was
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
necessary. Further, even if Rodrigueza waived his rights under custodial investigation, the
said waiver should have been in the presence of counsel.
PEOPLE vs. BAGISTA similar to Malmstedt / probable cause / moving vehicle / 23 yr
old woman curly hair Responding to reliable information stating that there is a woman w/
curly hair around 52 who will be transporting drugs from the north, the NARCOM
established a temporary checkpoint. They flagged a bus and boarded the same, noticed a
woman of the same description, and inspected her bags revealing marijuana. Searches of
moving vehicles are allowed w/o a warrant provided that there is probable cause. The
NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop ad search the vehicles given the information
report that they received. The accused likewise fit the description made by the informant.
DD: It would seem from the foregoing and from some other similar cases that mere
information may suffice to constitute probable cause provided that the search was made
of a moving vehicle. The courts seem to tolerate such short-cut arrests or searches even
w/o a valid warrant.
PEOPLE vs. MENGOTE looking from side to side / no probable cause Based on a
phone call regarding suspicious persons, the police stationed a surveillance team who
noticed two men (Mengote & Morellos) looking from side to side and one of them holding
his abdomen. The police approached, and introduced themselves but the men tried to run.
They were caught and a search thereafter yielded a .38 cal gun. There was no probable
cause because at the time when the accused was arrested he was merely looking from
side to side while holding his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination was he
committing a crime. Furthermore, the police did not have personal knowledge to justify the
warrantless arrest and search because all they had was hearsay info from the phone call.
GO vs. CA murder due to traffic mishap / warrantless arrest 6 days after the fact While
driving, Go nearly collided w/ Maguan who was driving in the opposite direction on a one-
way street. Go shot Maguan and sped away but his plate number was identified by the
security guard who, upon being shown a sketch of the perpetrator, confirmed that it
matched the appearance of Go. The police launched a manhunt. Six days after the
shooting, Go showed up at the Station and inquired as to what was going on; he was
accompanied by 2 lawyers. Immediately he was arrested. There is no valid warrantless
arrest if the crime had not just been committed. In this case, it was 6 days ago. None of
the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the circumstances of the offense.
Warrantless arrest must immediately follow the commission of the crime. Murder is not a
continuing crime that would justify the warrantless arrest anytime.
PEOPLE vs. MANLULU 1 a.m. killing, 7 p.m. arrest / personal knowledge, not
gathering of info Manlulu was arrested w/o warrant for having killed another person at
around 1:00 a.m. The warrantless arrest, however, was made around 7:00 p.m. some 19
hours later. For there to be a lawful warrantless arrest, the arresting officer must have
personal knowledge of the offense w/c has in fact just been committed. Further, that Pat.
Perez personally gathered the info does not suffice what the law states is personal
knowledge, not personal gathering of the information.
DD: Even if an arresting officer has personal knowledge of the facts constituting the crime,
he can only effect a warrantless arrest if the crime has just been committed. If a sufficient
amount of time lapses as to allow him to procure a warrant, then he must do so.
PEOPLE vs. BOLASA peeping through the window Tipped by an anonymous caller
PO3s Salonga and Carizon parked their car 300 m. from the alleged den, and then
proceeded to peep through the window where they saw a man and woman packing
marijuana. They entered the premises and seized the various effects therein. Solely on the
15 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
basis of the tip they received, the arresting officers did not have personal knowledge of the
crime. There was likewise no valid intrusion and the marijuana was not inadvertently
discovered hence the plain view doctrine cannot apply. They had to intentionally peep
through the window. They should have 1st conducted a surveillance and then proceeded
to secure a proper warrant before making the intrusion.
PEOPLE vs. ESCORDIAL arrested while watching basketball Escordial allegedly
committed a crime but was arrested while watching a game in the local basketball court 1
week after the commission of the crime. Since the warrantless arrest was effected 1 week
after the offense, the arresting officers could not possibly have personal knowledge of the
facts constituting the offense. Further, the offense should have just been committed. The
arresting officers thus have no reason for not securing a warrant first before proceeding w/
the arrest. However, the fact that Escordial pleaded not guilty and did not question the
arrest amounts to a waiver of right.
PEOPLE vs. JAYSON ihaw-ihaw case / pointed to by the bystanders Jayson was a
bouncer of the Ihaw-Ihaw Nightclub who shot Nelson Jordan. The police officers arrived at
the scene responding to a radioed order pertaining to the said crime. The bystanders
pointed to Jayson who was seen running from the crime scene. He was apprehended and
searched, and seized form him was the .38 cal pistol. The assailant was pointed to by the
by-standers only moments after the shooting and such suffices to give the arresting
officers personal knowledge of the facts constituting the commission of the offense.
Jurisprudence has repeatedly upheld such rule.
PEOPLE vs. SALVATIERRA waiver by submitting to jurisdiction Salvatierra was
charged for the murder (by stabbing) of Charlie Fernandez. He never raised the legality of
his arrest in his pleadings. He is thus estopped from questioning the legality of the arrest
because he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and participated in
the trial.
PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ failure to quash / plea of not guilty amounts to waiver
Hernandez was arrested w/o the benefit of a warrant but he does not file for a Motion to
Quash prior to arraignment. Instead, he enters a plea of not guilty and participates
voluntarily in trial. Failure to file a Motion to Quash prior to arraignment amounts to a
waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest. Also, filing a bail bond amounts to
such waiver.
DD: Under the present state of law, filing a Bail Bond no longer amounts to a waiver of the
right to question the validity of the arrest (Okabe vs. Judge de Leon).
Entrapment
PEOPLE vs. DORIA entrapment / objective & subjective test PO3 Manlangit posed as
a buyer of marijuana; the informant initially contracted the accused Doria to deal w/ him.
As a result, Doria was apprehended as he handed a brick of marijuana to Manlangit.
Entrapment in US jurisprudence is equivalent to Instigation in our jurisprudence. In
Philippine law, instigation is prohibited while entrapment is generally allowed. In
entrapment, the criminal impulse originates from the mind of the accused; while in
instigation, it is the arresting officer who encourages the perpetrator to commit the crime.
Instigation is a good defense in criminal proceedings, entrapment is not.
Both objective phase and subjective phase must be applied to test the validity of the
entrapment. In the objective phase, it is necessary to determine if the arresting officers
conducted themselves w/in permissible bounds. In the subjective test, the circumstances
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
of the accused, such as previous criminal records, must be considered. Given the
circumstances of the case, clearly Doria is guilty of selling marijuana.
Stop and frisk
TERRY vs. OHIO stop and frisk Detective McFadden was observing 2 persons who
were suspiciously walking back and forth and pausing to stare at the same store and
conversing suspiciously amongst themselves. They converged w/ a 3rd person and it was
at this time that McFadden approached them and introduced himself. They mumbled
something; then McFadden spun them around, frisked them, and found concealed pistols
w/in their outer clothing. When a reasonably prudent officer believes that there exists a
threat to the public, he may make searches for weapons against persons whom he
believes to be harmful and dangerous.
The reasonableness is determined based on the circumstances of the case. In this case,
the actions of the accuseds reasonably corroborate the officers theory that they were
planning a daylight armed robbery. The search was limited to what was reasonably
required by the circumstances; hence it is a valid search.
MALACAT vs. CA fast eyes / no genuine belief In response to a bomb threat, Rodolfo
Yu of the WPD and other officers stationed themselves near the Mercury Drugstore in
Plaza Miranda where they observed 2 groups of Muslim-looking men who were acting
suspiciously and with eyes moving very fast. As the officers approached the said groups,
they ran but were apprehended and a search of their persons yielded a hand grenade and
a .38 cal pistol. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade. They were charged w/ illegal
possession of explosives. The trial court sustained the search. The alleged perpetrators
were not in flagrante delicto when they were arrested and searched. The allegation that
they had eyes moving very fast was very doubtful and could not have justified the
existence of probable cause. Hence, since the arrest was invalid, any search made
incidental thereto, is likewise illegal.
While probable cause is not necessary to stop-and frisk, mere suspicion will likewise not
validate it. A genuine reason must exist to warrant a belief that the person has weapons
concealed. Nothing in the accuseds behavior then would warrant such suspicion.
PEOPLE vs. CHUA Zest-O Box / no stop-and-frisk / no in flagrante delicto As Chua
arrived w/in the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel carrying a Zest-O box, he was hurriedly
accosted by the police, searched and arrested for possession of drugs. There was no
probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest; hence any search incidental thereto is also
void. He was not in flagrante delicto. There is likewise no valid stop-and-frisk. For it to
apply, the police must 1st approach and introduce himself, ask initial questions, and
restrain a person who manifests unusual conduct and search for possible weapons. The
accused did not manifest any unusual conduct. In stop-and-frisk, the introduction must be
before the search, not thereafter.
Given the fact that the accused has been under surveillance for 2 years, there absolutely is
no excuse for not obtaining a valid warrant of arrest.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 3
Section 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when the public safety or order requires
16 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Right to Privacy & the Exclusionary Rule
PEOPLE vs. MARTI package of marijuana / intrusion by private person Marti & Shirley
Reyes employed the services of Manila Packaging & Export Forwarders for the purpose of
sending a package to a friend in Switzerland. Shirley refused to have the box inspected
and claimed that it contained merely cigars and books. However, Job Reyes, a co-
proprietor, opened the boxes during a routine inspection and suspected that the contents
were illegal drugs. Thus, he forwarded the contents to the NBI w/c confirmed that they
were marijuana. The NBI proceeded to the exporters and supervised the complete opening
of the package. Marti assails the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him.
The protection conferred by the Bill of Rights is intended as a restraint against the State,
not against private persons. The contents of the box came to the possession of the State
w/o transgressing the right to privacy because it was a private individual who opened the
package. The NBI made no search and seizure it was Reyes who did it. Mere presence
of the NBI during the search does not make it the kind of search prohibited.
DD: When a private individual violates another persons right to privacy, the evidence
obtained therefrom is admissible; however the violator could be held civilly liable under
Article 32 of the New Civil Code.
RAMIREZ vs. CA tape recorded slandering A verbal altercation ensued between
Garcia and Ramirez, who was allegedly vexed and humiliated by the former. On the
occasion of a confrontation, Ramirez tape-recorded the altercation w/o the knowledge and
consent of Garcia. Garcia thus sues for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA No.
4200). Sec. 1 of the said law clearly makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by the
parties to a private conversation, to secretly record such communication using a tape
recorder. Either the parties themselves, or 3rd persons who invaded their privacy may be
liable for therefor the law does not distinguish. However, the use of a telephone
extension does not violate the RA No. 4200 because its use is not expressly enumerated
therein; penal laws are strictly construed.
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL V. SOLUTA -Coronel Floro Maniego who was the General
Manager of the hotels security agency had been receiving reports that sale and/or use of
marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were going on in the union office at the hotel
and that there was a theft syndicate. In the present case, the reports regarding illegal
activities had been arriving since late 1987 which gives the petitioners ample time to obtain
a search warrant prior to their search.
Waiver of rights
PEOPLE vs. DAMASO personal right / may be waived only by the injured party The
group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso w/o a valid warrant when the latter
was absent. Only Tancianco and Morados were there, the latter being a mere helper.
When they opened the door, the authorities saw copier machines, an M-14 rifle,
ammunition, and other items used for the purpose of committing subversion. The right
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be waived by anyone except by the
person whose rights are injured or one who is expressly authorized to make the waiver in
his behalf. Morados, being a mere helper, does not qualify as a person authorized to waive
such right in representation of her employer. The search thus being invalid for lack of
warrant evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
SPOUSES VEROY vs. LAYAGUE qualified consent and waiver The Veroy Spouses
moved to Quezon City and left their Davao City house to a caretaker who only had keys
only up to the kitchen thereof. They maintained possession of the keys to the bedrooms.
Capt. Obrero raided the said house based on a report that rebel soldiers are allegedly
hiding therein. They only entered up to the yard since they did not have a warrant. They
contacted Ma. Luisa Veroy, the wife, who allowed entry to their house subject to the
condition that it be monitored by Major Macasaet a personal friend. The consent was
only for the purpose of finding out if rebel soldiers were indeed hiding there.
However, despite the qualified consent, the officers however entered various rooms,
including the childrens room, and confiscated various subversive items such as a
handgun, printed materials w/ subversive indicia, ammunition, and other such items. The
permission was granted only for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of rebel soldiers.
In order for them to be allowed to conduct a search therein, they should have obtained a
warrant. Just because the items were allegedly subject to an offense mala prohibita
(subversion) it does not mean that they can be summarily seized w/o a valid warrant.
PEOPLE vs. EVARISTO gunshot sounds / personal knowledge / inadvertent discovery
Officers Vallarta and Romeroso, among others, were on routine patrol when they heard
bursts of gunfire. They proceeded to where the sound came from and saw Rosillo who ran
to the house of Evaristo. Vallarta noticed the bulge on Evaristos waist and frisked him
revealing a .38 cal revolver. Romeroso sought the consent of Evaristo for the entry into the
latters house to w/c he consented. Upon entry they found various firearms,
paraphernalia, and other effects.
The plain view doctrine will apply to the seizure of the firearms & effects because their
discovery was inadvertent. The purpose for the entry (w/c was consented to by Evaristo)
was to search for Rosillo, hence the discovery of the firearms was accidental. The arrest
and search upon the person of Evaristo was likewise justified. The gunfire, the bulge in his
waist, and the peace officers professional instinct more than suffice to grant him personal
knowledge of the facts of the crime that has just been committed.
For there to be a valid waiver of rights, the following requisites must attend:
1. The person must be possessed of such right
2. He must know of the existence of the right
3. He must have actual intention to waive his right
OKABE vs. JUDGE - Respondent Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging petitioner
Teresita Tanghal Okabe with estafa. Petitioner questioned the irregularity of the
determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation.Respondent judge
ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from
questioning the same. The respondent judge considered the bail filed by the petitioner as a
waiver of her right to assail the warrant issued for her arrest.
The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is
curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. There
must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish
her right to question the existence of probable cause. The posting of a personal bail bond
was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as
a waiver of her right to assail her arrest.
BILL OF RIGHTS
17 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
SECTION 4
Section 4.No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
Prior Restraint
NEAR vs. MINNESOTA Saturday Press / scandalous criticism / prior restraint The
Session Law of Minnesota (1925) mandated the abatement, as public nuisances, of
malicious, scandalous, and defamatory publications. Enjoined from publication as a result
of this provision is The Saturday Press, owned by the petitioner Near, w/c published
articles critical of certain local public personalities such as Mayor Leach, Chief of Police
Brunskill, and County Attorney Olson, among others. The articles allege that the said
officials are not energetically performing their duties in preventing gambling, racketeering,
bootlegging, and other crimes allegedly controlled by a certain Jew.
The statute does not aim to provide remedies for any wrong that may be committed
through publication; rather it is aimed towards prevention. Its object is not punishment but
rather suppression. The very nature of criticism implies that the imputations be to some
extent scandalous. Although no penalty is provided, continued publication would make the
publisher liable for contempt. Authority to resume publication thus becomes discretionary
upon the court and would require presentation of evidence to substantiate whatever
allegations are contained therein and this typically amounts to prior restraint. It is a form
of censorship repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and of
the press.
NEW YORK TIMES vs. US Vietnam Files / national security The US Government
sought to enjoin the NY Times & Washington Post from publishing the History of US
Decision-Making on Vietnam Policy based on national security considerations. Any prior
restraint upon the freedom of the press bears a heavy presumption against its
constitutionality. The Government must clearly make out a case to overcome this
presumption and in this case, it failed.
The First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior restraints upon the press predicated
upon beliefs that untoward consequences may result therefrom. The press must be left
free to publish news, whatever the source, w/o censorship or restraint. Only a free and
unrestrained press can effectively expose government deception to the people. There is no
informed populace w/o an informed press. There is, also, no act of Congress relied upon
by the State to justify the restraint. Congress itself has opted not to enact such laws.
Since the Executive possesses unshared power to regulate national defense and conduct
foreign relations, it is likewise its responsibility to protect the confidentiality of its own
records. Only in times of war may prior restraints possibly be justified.
DD: According to the dissent, the Executive possesses the wisdom to determine up to
what extent publication of such information will prejudice the national interest. This is in
keeping w/ the principle of the separation of powers.
FREEDMAN vs. MARYLAND Revenge at Daybreak / delay amounts to restraint /
safeguards Freedman, a theatre owner, was convicted for having shown Revenge at
Daybreak w/o having submitted the same to the Board of Censors for review. The
Maryland Motion Picture Statute requires the time-consuming appeal to the courts once
exhibition of a proposed film is denied by the Board. Further, no time limit is imposed upon
the Board to decide whether to allow the showing of a film submitted to it for review. In the
area of freedom of expression, one has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
particular regulation if it allegedly delegates excessively broad licensing ability upon an
administrative office. Likewise, restraint always bears a heavy burden against its
constitutionality.
Adequate safeguards to obviate dangers of censorship must be put in place. Final decision
regarding the suitability for publication must be in the hands of the judiciary, not an
administrative branch. The procedure must also assure prompt decision and quell the
deterrent effects of interim or erroneous denials of license. The Maryland Statute fails to
meet the criteria.
It requires recourse to the court and the exhibitor assumes the burden of proof to establish
that it is protected expression. Pending approval, the film cannot be exhibited; otherwise it
may give rise to contempt. There is no assurance of prompt judicial action, hence the
statute is unconstitutional. All the circumstances put together paints a clear picture of prior
restraint.
AYER PRODUCTIONS vs. JUDGE CAPULONG EDSA 4-Day Revolution / public
figure Ayer Productions produced the Four Day Revolution depicting the events that
transpired during the EDSA people power revolution. It combined fictitious characters w/
real-life ones in order to portray the Filipino culture and the historic events that transpired.
It was a docu-drama production for television viewing in coordination w/ HBO. FVR himself
gave his consent to the showing of the film, but Juan Ponce Enrile objected and invoked
his right to privacy. The freedom of expression is granted both to locally-owned and
foreign-owed production companies. That the exhibition of said film is for profit is of no
moment.
There is no dispute that Enrile is a public figure given the role he has played in EDSA and
the fact that he is a Senator. A limited intrusion upon the privacy of a public person is
permissible if the info sought to be elicited from him is a matter of public concern.
The rules of clear and present danger as well as the balancing of interest are applied.
There was no clear and present danger since there was no knowledge yet of the actual
contents of the film. With regard to the balancing of interest test, the intrusion is fairly
reasonable in order to keep the film a truthful historical account. The producer, however,
assumes the responsibility not to divulge intimate or purely private matters pertaining to
Enrile or any of the characters therein, and there must be due regard for the truthfulness
and accuracy of the events.
EASTERN BROADCASTING vs. DANS summary closure Radio Station DYRE was
summarily closed for national security reasons for allegedly having aired subversive
programs. The said programs were geared more towards public affairs. It is a recognized
rule that broadcasters have to be licensed. They do not possess the same scope of
freedom as that of publications. The rules on administrative due process under the Ang
Tibay Ruling must govern. In this case, there was no opportunity to be heard, and there
was mere summary closure. Public officials do not posses the power to simply summarily
close down broadcasting stations or arbitrarily deny its license. This amounts to
curtailment and prior restraint.
The clear and present danger rule must be applied. After all, the government has the
right to be secure against broadcasts intended to incite persons to overthrow it. There was
clearly no such danger in this case. Mere criticism of public officials does not amount to
inciting to sedition or subversive acts. IN the case at bar, there is no grave and imminent
danger of a substantive evil that the government has the right to protect against.
18 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
In the absence of substantial compliance w/ the requirements of due process and in the
absence of clear and present danger, the summary closure is deemed null and void.
TOLENTINO vs. SEC. OF FINANCE VAT on publications The enactment of the VAT
Law (RA No. 7166) in effect removed the tax exemptions previously conferred by the
National Internal Revenue Code upon print media. The Finance Secretary enacted a
Regulation exempting circulation income but not income acquired through advertising.
There is no violation of press freedom in this case. The press is not immune from the
general regulations by the State. They must pay equitable taxes just like all other
businesses. Imposition of reasonable taxes does not amount to prior restraint. The press is
not being singled out; instead the State merely takes back what it had once conferred tax
exemption.
Allegations that such taxes will drive some publications out of business are unfounded.
The imposition of registration fees likewise violates no right; it is not a pre-condition to the
exercise of any right but is merely an administrative fee.
ALEXANDER vs. US porno guy / prior restraint vs. subsequent punishment Ferris
Alexander was engaged in the adult entertainment industry for more than 30 years. He
was convicted for obscenity as well as for violation of the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt
Organizations Law (RICO Law). As a result, several of his assets amounting to millions of
dollars, including his porn and adult stores and enterprises were foreclosed. He alleges
that the foreclosure amounts to prior restraint against his future expression.
The concepts of prior restraint and subsequent punishment are different. The foreclosure
imposed upon him is a punishment for criminal conduct, not a prior restraint against his
freedom of expression. The foreclosure does not impose a ban on any future expression
he might make; it only deprived him of specific assets w/c were found to be related to his
previous racketeering violations. He may return to his porno businesses anytime w/o being
cited for contempt; it is just that he cannot finance those activities using assets derived
from racketeering.
DD: In this case. Alexander was being punished, not for the expression of his ideas, but
rather for his having derived proceeds from racketeering. Free expression was never the
issue in this case.
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING vs. DY - Petitioners are broadcasting networks which
run Bombo Radyo and Star FM. However, it was upon their application for renewal in 2002
that the petitioners were denied the mayors permit.
The restriction made by the respondents was arbitrary and was not content-neutral but
content-based. Only content-neutral regulations are allowed. Content-neutral regulation is
concerned with incidents of speech or control over the time, place, manner. Regulations
that can be across similar businesses while Content-based restraint refer to control over
the subject matter of the speech.
Subsequent Punishment
GONZALES vs. COMELEC campaign law / early nomination / political campaigning
Responding to the undesired reality of prolonged political campaigns, RA No. 4880 was
enacted containing 2 assailed provisions, Sec. 50-A prohibiting the early nomination of
candidates by parties, and Sec. 50-B limiting the period of campaign and partisan political
activity. It does not, however, prohibit the common expression of thoughts or the mention
of names relating to the elections. Freedom of expression, and the right to freely associate
are not absolute. They are both affected in this case. The right to associate is not impaired;
the scope of activities is merely limited.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
The dangerous tendency doctrine permitted the application of restrictions once there is a
rational connection between the speech and the danger apprehended, and the tendency of
one to create the other is shown. This doctrine has already been abandoned.
In the clear and present danger rule, the court must find that the evil sought to be avoided
is both serious and imminent to a high degree. It must be present and inevitable. The
balancing of interest test, on the other hand, mandates the court to determine w/c of the
two conflicting demands particular speech or conduct against that of the public order
demands greater protection based on the circumstances. In the case at bar, it was the
balancing of interest test that was applied in determining the validity of Sections 50-A and
50-B of RA No. 4880. While the Court has expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of
the provisions insofar as they are vague and defective, the required 2/3 vote to declare it
unconstitutional was not attained.
PEOPLE vs. PEREZ lets cut off Woods head w/ bolos! / seditious Isaac Perez, the
Municipal Secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, was charged for inciting to sedition for having
uttered seditious words while engaged in a discussion, where he said that the Filipinos
should all get bolos and cut of Gov. Gen. Woods head for recommending bad things for
the Filipinos and for killing the independence. He was charged for violating certain
provisions of the Penal Code. Free speech is permitted even if critical of the government,
but when the intention and effect is seditious, they are not protected speech. In the case at
bar, there was a seditious tendency in the words used, and it could easily cause
disaffection among the people. It was made to stir up the people to rise against the lawful
authorities.
DD: This is a very old case decided during the American Occupation. The rule applied
here is the dangerous tendency doctrine. This rule no longer holds ground under the
present state of law.
DENNIS vs. UNITED STATES conspiring communists / advocacy vs. discussion
Dennis and the other petitioners were convicted for conspiring to organize the Communist
Party of the United States, w/c advocates the destruction and overthrow of the
government. They transformed the Communist Political Association into the Communist
Party and changed its policy from peaceful cooperation to that of violent overthrow. There
is no doubt that it is w/in the power of Congress to enact measures to protect the security
of the State from armed rebellion.
However, given the fact that the crimes sought to be prevented contain elements of free
speech, they deserve special and careful consideration. The clear and present danger rule
must be applied in order to sustain a conviction based on evidence taking the form of
speech and expression. In the case at bar, the prohibition is directed against advocacy, not
discussion. The right of the people to free discussion is not impaired. The probability of
success of the rebels is of no moment; what is important is that the requisite danger exists.
We cannot bind the government to inaction until it is too late and in this case, there was
clearly a group ready to make an attempt at any time.
US vs. OBRIEN burning of certificate / incidental restriction OBrien and 3 other
companions burned their Selective Service Certificates outside of a Boston Courthouse, in
front of a crowd, in order to influence them to accept his anti-war beliefs. It must be noted
that there is an existing law penalizing the intentional destruction of the said certificate; he
assails the validity of such law for violating his right to symbolic speech.
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if (Obrien Test):
1. It is within the constitutional power of the Government
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest
19 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
4. The incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
DD: In this case, the impairment of free speech was merely an incidental effect of the
enforcement of the law. The law was not targeted towards free speech.
BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE vs. JUDGE MAJADUCON gross ignorance / no
malignant intent Pursuant to Resolutions filed by Sen. Ople and Sen. Sotto, the Blue
Ribbon Committee conducted inquiries regarding a possible coup detat as well as alleged
mismanagement of military retirement and benefit funds. It probed the purchase of a lot
from Atty. Flaviano for P 10,500 per sq.m. The Registry of Deeds disclosed that the
purchase price is only P 3,000 per sq.m. Flaviano refused to appear during the inquiries
after having been summoned and filed for a TRO w/ Judge Majaducon, w/c the latter
granted. The Committee, through Sen. Pimentel, countered w/ a petition for certiorari w/c
alleged gross ignorance of the law on the part of Majaducon. It was published in the
Philippine Star and as a result, Majaducon, motu propio, found Pimentel guilty of indirect
contempt.
The term gross ignorance of the law is a description of normal usage in law to describe
acts of lower courts that are challenged before higher tribunals. There is no malignant
intention behind its usage. It does not constitute improper conduct that tends to obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice. Further, the contempt power should be used
correctively, and not in a retaliatory manner. Publications, likewise exercise discretion as to
what material they would publish and Pimentel or the Committee cannot be faulted for the
Philippine Star articles.
DD: The TRO issued by Judge Majaducon against the appearance of Atty. Flaviano during
the Senate inquiries was a clear violation of the separation of powers. That is why Sen.
Pimentel alleged gross ignorance of the law on his part.
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC plebiscite / restraint / no legal basis The COMELEC
promulgated Res. No. 2167 to govern the conduct of the plebiscite for the approval of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region Organic Act. It prohibits the use of columns or
commentaries from campaigning for or against plebiscite issues during the campaign
period. It uses BP No. 881 as basis, w/c prohibits the sale or granting of and space or air
time to candidates during the election period and requires leave of absence of candidates
engaged in the broadcast or print media business.
In a plebiscite there are no candidates, only issues are voted upon hence BP No. 881
cannot apply. While the restriction does not absolutely bar the freedom of expression, it is
still a restriction upon his choice of where to express his views, and no sufficient
justification has been advanced in support of the prohibition.
DD: Free discussion of the issues pertaining to the plebiscite must, in fact, be encouraged
rather than curtailed so as to allow the voters to cast enlightened and well-informed votes.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMELEC ban on political ads [The law banning
political ads has since been repealed but the Court made this important observation which
is still pertinent] The technical effect of Article IX (C) 4 ofThe COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution banning political ads other than those dedicated to the COMELEC time or
COMELEC hour. The freedom of expression is a preferred right and may not be curtailed
except on the basis of a substantial and clear government interest in this case, to
prevent the evident degradation of the electoral process. The right to expression is not
absolutely curtailed but is merely regulated in the interest of the public. The regulation is
thus valid.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
Speech and the electoral process
ADIONG vs. COMELEC no posters, decals,stickers allowed / restraint / property rights
The COMELEC promulgated Res. No. 2347 w/c provides that decals and posters may only
be posted on authorized posting areas such as campaign headquarters, candidates
residences, common posted areas, etc. It also prohibits the exhibition of stickers and
decals in mobile places such as vehicles. The regulation unduly infringes upon a citizens
right to free speech. There is no adequate government interest endangered that would
justify the curtailment; there is no clear and present danger. It likewise strikes at the
freedom of the individual to express his preference and support and sweeps too broadly
invading the area of protected freedoms. It is also too loosely worded such that even
posting in ones residence (non-candidate) or car is illegal. It infringes upon the lawful use
of private property. That the law intends to equalize the playing field in favor of the poorer
candidates is immaterial as it is merely of a marginal significance.
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC exit polls / speculative The COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution to enjoin the ABS-CBN from conducting and reporting the results of exit polls,
claiming that it could prejudice the results of the election, promote bandwagon mentality,
and impair the secrecy of the ballot. Even if the governments purpose is legitimate, it
cannot be pursued by means w/c broadly stifle fundamental liberties. There must be a
substantial government interest involved to justify restrictions upon free expression, not
mere speculations. There is no showing of any chaos or confusion brought about by the
conduct of exit polls. The secrecy of the ballot is not exposed because participation in the
exit polls is voluntary and the actual ballots are not exposed.
SWS vs. COMELEC surveys / direct & total suppression / disproportionate The Fair
Election Act prohibits the publication of election surveys 15 days before the national
elections, and 7 days before local elections, allegedly to prevent the manipulation of the
electoral process by the publication of erroneous and unscrupulous surveys. The SWS and
Kamahalan Publishing (Manila Standard) assail the validity of such provisions. While the
prohibition may be for a limited time only, it is direct and absolute and constitutes the total
suppression of a category of speech: publication of surveys. The suppression is clearly
greater than that w/c is necessary to further the government interest. The Admin. Code
provides ways by w/c the purpose may be more narrowly pursued such as by punishing
unlawful acts instead of punishing or prohibiting free expression itself. It likewise
constitutes prior restraint.
Commercial Speech
CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELEC. CORP. vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
commercial ads, law against electricity ads is void -The NY Public Service Commission
banned the electric utility from advertising to promote the use of electricity the aim being
to promote energy conservation. It is true that commercial expression is afforded a lesser
degree of protection; however, it is still protected against unwarranted government
regulation. The following are guidelines for the States regulation of commercial
speech and expression:
1. The advertisement must not be misleading
2. There must be a substantial government interest
3. The regulation must directly advance the government interest
4. It must not be more extensive than necessary.
20 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
There is not even any allegation that the ads are misleading. Although there is a legitimate
government interest in this case, the government went overboard by employing means that
are too sweeping and curtail fundamental liberties.
B. PHARMACEUTICAL vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH - Milk Code, banning of ads
alternative to breastfeeding is invalid - Although the advertising and promotion of breast
milk substitutes fall within the ambit of commercial/economic speech which is not accorded
the same level of protection like the protected speeches in our Constitution, it is
nonetheless entitled to protection. The absolute ban on advertising of breast milk
substitutes is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed
governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young children.
CITY OF LADUE vs. GILLEO law against Residential Signs is invalid / Peace in the
Gulf Respondent was a resident of Ladue who placed a sign by her residence saying For
Peace in the Gulf expressing her opposition to a war in the Persian Gulf. Discrimination is
assumed because the ordinance restricts too little speech and the exemptions provided
are on the basis of the signs messages, or on the ground that it prohibits too much
protected speech.
RUBIN vs. COORS BREWING strength wars / direct advancement of interest The
Federal Alcohol Admin. Act prohibits the display of alcohol content in the beer labels and
hence rejected the respondents application for the approval of its labels. The aim is to
curb the so-called strength wars, where brewers compete on the basis of the strength of
alcohol content. The government has a significant interest in preserving the health and
safety of the citizens, however, the said labeling cannot directly and materially advance the
governments aim because there are provisions in the same act that tend to undermine the
means employed. For example, the law allows liquors to be identified as malt liquors to
emphasize the strength of its alcohol content. There are more direct ways to achieve the
aim of the government w/o intruding upon the right to free expression, such as directly
regulating alcohol content, etc.
CINCINNATI vs. DISCOVERY NETWORK news racks / reasonable fit standard The
State of Cincinnati authorized Discovery to maintain free-standing news racks for the
purpose of distributing free magazines for the advertisement of its services. It was later
revoked on the basis of an old ordinance prohibiting news racks for aesthetic reasons. The
city has failed to discharge its burden to establish a reasonable fit between its interest in
safety and aesthetics and the means it chose to attain those ends w/c intruded upon free
speech. Commercial and non-commercial publications are equally responsible for the
clutter but the city failed to justify the differential treatment between the two types of news
racks. There were equal protection issues involved in this case.
Speech and Judicial Process
IN RE: REQUEST FOR TV COVERAGE OF ERAP TRIAL rights of the accused prevail
/ prohibiting the live telecast of hearing is valid A request for possible TV coverage of the
Estrada plunder trial in the Sandiganbayan was filed but was rejected by the same court.
Live video coverage is prohibited in order to protect the right of the parties to due process,
prevent the distraction of proceedings, avoid the miscarriage of justice, and to avoid
prejudice and pressure during the trial. In case of seeming conflict, the rights of the
accused under criminal trial prevail over the rights of others to free expression or
information on matters of public concern.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
IN RE: PETITION TO ANNUL 98-7-02 SC prohibiting demonstrations in vicinity of
courts is invalid The said Resolutions prohibit demonstrations along premises w/in a
200m. radius of the Supreme Court or other courts because such activities interrupt and
hamper the working conditions in the said courts. It is for the purpose of assuring the
people impartial and orderly administration of justice. The court is, after all, empowered by
the Constitution to promulgate rules for the purpose of protecting rights.
US vs. GRACE prohibition of display of flags & banners in SC sidewalks is valid /
protected speech Title 40 of the USC prohibits the display of such devices w/in the vicinity
of the US Supreme Court or any of its grounds including sidewalks constituting the outer
bounds of the premises. Persons bearing picket signs or distributing leaflets were
threatened w/ arrest on the basis of the said law. Picketing and leaflet distribution are
covered by protected speech. An absolute prohibition of a particular type of expression will
only be upheld if based on compelling governmental interests. Such prohibition likewise
does not serve substantially the purpose to maintain law and order on Court grounds.
DD: This is a United States case; in case of conflict, local jurisprudence must be favored.
Additional Cases
IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. CA attacks against other sects / no clear and present danger
Certain programs of the Iglesia were given an x-rating by the MTRCB for attacking the
dogmas of other religions and were thus prevented from being aired. Thus this petition.
The right to religion has been accorded a preferred status and involves both the freedom
to believe, and the freedom to act upon ones beliefs. The free and outward exercise of
religion may be regulated by the State when it will bring about a clear and present danger
of some substantive evil and if it is inimical to society.
The conduct of the MTRCB clearly amounts to prior restraint in this case. Simply criticizing
other religions does not pose a clear and present danger, and the MTRCB cannot prohibit
such criticisms, no matter how unclean they are, in the absence of such danger. The clear
and present danger test was not properly applied in this case.
DD: Mudslinging is common to the free market of religious dogmas. These expressions, no
matter how odious they are, cannot be curtailed unless they begin to pose a clear and
present danger.
MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN Prosti-tuition / jurisdiction of MTRCB / all TV shows The Inside
Story, produced and hosted by Loren Legarda, aired the segment Prosti-Tuition depicting
female students moonlighting as prostitutes. The name of Philippine Womens University
was mentioned and the faade of the PWU Building was used as background for the said
show. It caused uproar w/in the said school, particularly its administration, leading to the
filing of suit before the MTRCB. The show was not submitted for approval to the MTRCB;
hence the ABS-CBN was penalized for showing it.
The MTRCB is empowered by law to disapprove the show or the exhibition of various
forms of media w/c are immoral, indecent, contrary to law or good customs, derogatory to
the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines, or w/c tend to encourage the commission of
crimes or violence. ALL television programs, whether religious, documentary, or otherwise
are subject to the MTRCBs review powers. The only exceptions are those programs aired
by the Government and newsreels w/c is simply straight news reporting. The Inside Story
cannot be considered a newsreel because it contains analyses, commentaries, and
opinions.
DD: Despite the doubtful constitutionality of the existence of the MTRCB or its exercise of
prerogatives, particularly because it exercises prior restraint on a regular basis, the
21 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Supreme Court has yet to rule upon the matter of its legality arguing that the Philippines
is not yet ready to adopt the more liberal policy enunciated in Freedman vs. Maryland.
Libel
POLICARPIO vs. MANILA TIMES publications must be true, fair and in good faith,
otherwise, it may be libelous / sensationalized news / unfair Lumen Policarpio was the
Exec. Secretary of the local UNESCO National Commission. She terminated Herminia
Reyes from the service; and the latter countered by filing a case for estafa thru falsification
and malversation of public funds against her. The issue was published by the Manila
Times, but it reported that the case was filed by the Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission (PCAC) pursuant to an administrative investigation. It did not indicate that the
alleged stencils Policarpio used for private purposes amounted to only P54.00 and that the
reimbursements she made were for certain trips. In short, the Manila Times
sensationalized the issue and made them appear to be far more serious than they actually
are putting Policarpio in an unfavorable light.
In order to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory info must be both TRUE
and FAIR, and must be made in GOOD FAITH, w/o comments or remarks.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious if there is no good intention or
justifying motive, except for the following:
(1) private communication and
(2) a fair and true report made in good faith, w/o comments and remarks (Art. 354
RPC).
In the case at bar, the article was clearly unfair; and even if they acted in good faith under
a misapprehension of facts, Manila Times is still guilty of negligence. Even assuming that a
subsequent article was published to rectify the error, it does not wipe out the responsibility
arising from the publication of the 1st article although it mitigates liability.
LOPEZ vs. CA hoax of the year / wrong guy! / negligence / classificatory article will only
reduce liability, not absolve Fidel Cruz was a sanitary officer assigned in Babuyan Islands
who made a distress signal to the passing USAF plane, w/c dropped an emergency-
sustenance kit w/ a radio. He used the radio to contact Manila, concocting a story that a
mad killer s on the loose, prompting the authorities to send a rescue squad. An article was
published by the Manila Chronicle, but erroneously used the picture of Fidel G. Cruz, a
businessman from Bulacan, who then sued for libel. The Chronicle published a
subsequent article expressing their sincere regrets for the mistake, w/c was displayed
conspicuously. Generally, a newspaper should not be held to account for honest mistakes
or imperfection in the choice of words to the point of suppression. However, in this case,
they were not even under the pressure of a deadline, as the article was published in a
weekly magazine. Hence they failed to observe reasonable care and are thus held liable
therefor. Subsequent rectification does not erase the liability for the previous article.
Dissent of Justice Dizon:
There is no evidence of actual malice in this case, and it clearly falls w/in the ambit of
excusable negligence. Hence, the Chronicle should not be held liable.
DD: The Supreme Court seems to have departed from the Policarpio and Lopez Rulings
and has been very lenient towards the media as illustrated by the succeeding cases. Even
when the media is guilty of sensationalizing or even negligence, the Supreme Court
absolved them in the absence of clear and actual malice unless they clearly intrude upon
the personal lives of private individuals.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
NY TIMES vs. SULLIVAN criticism of officials / factual errors & defamatory language /
no actual malice A public official brought an action for damages arising from the
defamatory criticisms made in an article of the NY Times. The action was grounded upon
an Alabama statute declaring that it is libelous per se if the published material brings the
official in contempt or tends to injure his reputation. Factual error, or the effect of injuring
official reputation, or even the utterance of half-truths and some misinformation, do not
suffice to justify the repression of free speech. Officials may not recover damages from the
publication unless they can establish ACTUAL MALICE. In this case, what was made was
effective criticism w/c constitutes protected speech.
DD: Actual malice means either (1) intentionally publishing the imputations knowing that
they are false, or (2) reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the imputations published.
BORJAL vs. CA blind item / qualified privileged communication Arturo Borjal, in his
column w/ the Philippine Star called The Jaywalker, alleged anomalous activities of a
conference organizer w/o naming any person specifically alleging that the person has
engaged in dubious ways, or is thick faced, or engages in shady deals. Francisco persons are more protected. They have not voluntarily exposed themselves to the risk of
Wenceslao, the organizer of the First National Conference on Land Transport (FNCLT),
apparently thinking that the article is targeted towards him, filed a complaint before the
National Press Club, as well as a criminal complaint for libel. The libel case was dismissed
but he later filed a civil case for damages. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is necessary
that the person targeted is named. It is not sufficient that Wenceslao identified himself. The
articles did not name him, and there are, in fact, several organizers of the said event.
Privileged communication may be absolute (like statements made by legislators in
Congress) w/c are never actionable, or qualified w/c are not actionable if found to have
been made in good faith or for justifiable motive. The above article belongs to the category
of qualified privileged communication. Further, Wenceslao is a public official as organizer
of the FNCLT being an entity imbued w/ public interest; he cannot dissociate himself from
media scrutiny. While generally every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious, if the
communication is privileged, the presumption does not arise. The plaintiff assumes the
burden of proving malice as in this case. In the absence of clear malice, the action for
damages thus cannot prosper.
ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS INC. allegedly raped vs. in fact raped /
leeway Emelita Despuig, in the police station and in the presence of a reporter Morales,
executed an affidavit stating that she was abducted and raped on one instant, and the
same crime has in fact just been attempted upon her that same night again by a certain
Director Arafiles of the National Institute of Atmospheric Studies. Morales interviewed the
complainant, and submitted the report to his editor; the article was published the same
night saying Govt Exec Rapes Coed and the article stated that the girl WAS ABDUCTED
and RAPED. It did not qualify that the said acts were merely alleged. Thus, Arafiles filed an
action for damages claiming that the articles were overly sensationalized.
The alleged libelous material should be viewed as a whole. Reference to other sections of
the report indicates that the narration of the events was based only on an account made by
Emelita. Newspapers must be given a certain degree of leeway and tolerance to enable
them to perform their duty courageously and effectively. They should not be held
accountable for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
VASQUEZ vs. CA barangay official denounced / elements of libel / public official /
malice A citizen denounced a barangay official of the Tondo Foreshore Area for alleged
misconducts in office. The barangay official thus sued for libel. The following are the
elements of libel:
22 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
1. allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another
2. publication of the charge
3. identity of the person defamed (at least a 3rd person or stranger may identify)
4. malice (there must be ill will)
Considering that the person criticized is a pubic official, no liability may be imposed unless
the statement was made with actual malice or w/ knowledge that it was false, or w/
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements.
GERTZ vs. ROBERT WELCH INC. alleged frame-up / public officer / public figure A
Chicago cop named Nuccio was convicted of murder. The respondents magazine alleged
that the petitioner who is neither a public official nor public figure was responsible for
the frame-up, and implied that he has a criminal record and is a Communist fronter. The
protection imbued by the NY Times Ruling does not apply to defamation or falsehoods
committed against persons who are neither public officials nor public figures. Private
defamation and are more vulnerable, w/ fewer avenues to rebut the allegations. In this
case, mere appearance as an attorney at the coroners inquest does not make him a
public official. He has likewise not attained any degree of notoriety or general fame and
involvement in societal affairs to qualify him as a public figure. Hence, he is more protected
by the law. Damages may be claimed, but only for actual injuries.
TIME vs. FIRESTONE divorce issue / public official / public figure Respondent sought
separate maintenance from her husband who countered w/ a suit for divorce on the ground
of adultery and extreme cruelty. Time reported that the divorce was in fact granted based
on the said grounds. Respondent was neither public official nor figure as she did not
occupy any role of special prominence in the society; hence the NY Times Ruling
(requiring actual malice as an element) does not apply. She is entitled to greater protection
from unwarranted defamation. Further, no finding was ever made by the divorce court
regarding adultery. Two criteria must be followed in determining civil liability in libel
cases:
1. Compensatory awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning
the injury
2. Liability cannot be imposed w/o actual fault.
Since the court did not find actual fault on the part of the petitioner, no damages are due.
HUSTLER MAGAZINE vs. JERRY FALWELL Jerry Falwell talks about his first time /
incestuous rendezvous Hustler Magazine featured an ad parody portraying Falwell (a
known commentator in politics and other public affairs) engaged in a drunken sexual and
incestuous rendezvous w/ his mother in an outhouse. It was modeled after actual Campari
ads featuring celebrities interviewed about their 1st times drinking Campari. Falwell filed a
libel claim alleging outrageous and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In the absence of a false statement of facts made w/ apparent malice, public officials or
public figures, such as Falwell, cannot recover damages for the tort or intentional infliction
of emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature. The caricature was not
reasonably believable; hence, it cannot be interpreted as having stated actual facts.
JAL vs. SAMINGAN Japan Airlines Jesus Samangan bought a ticket going to the US
via Japan Airlines (petitioner). While on board the MLA-JPN flight, respondent was
suspected by petitioners crew of carrying falsified travel documents and he was only using
that flight in order to be a TNT in Japan. Respondent was ordered to leave the plane. It
turned out that his documents were in order. He filed a case for moral and exemplary
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
damages. He won it both in RTC and CA. He publicized his grievances on his own through
the newspaper.
JAL is a common carrier, which deals with the travelling public. Thus, it drew public
attention when it bumped off respondent without a valid reason. The subject complaint
relates to a public issue, thus the public has the right to be informed. Samangan may not
be held liable for damages for publication. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech and of the press includes fair commentaries on matters of public interest.
Obscenity & Indecency
MILLER vs. CALIFORNIA hardcore sex / contemporary community standards
Miller conducted a mailing campaign for the promotion of adult material. Some
brochures were received unwillingly by a restaurant owner and his mother in
Newport Beach, prompting them to file a complaint. The Court has decided to
abandon the Memoirs Doctrine requiring the material to be utterly w/o any
redeeming social value, it being a burden almost impossible to discharge. In
order to be benefited by the protection conferred by the 1 st Amendment, the prurient
and patent display of sexual conduct must have some serious literary, political, or
scientific value. Forms of expression may be considered obscene if the following
characteristics attend:
1. the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find the work, taken as a whole, to appeal to the prurient interests
2. It depicts patently offensive sexual conduct
3. It lacks some serious literary, political, or scientific value.
No one may be punished for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless they depict patently hardcore sexual conduct. Such material can be
regulated by the state but need not be utterly devoid of redeeming social value.
What the 1st Amendment protects is the commerce of ideas, w/c must be
distinguished from the commercial exploitation of obscene material w/c is
not a protected form of expression.
DD: The Memoirs Doctrine requires that a form of expression must be utterly
devoid of literary, scientific, or political value. In this case, that a form of expression
lacks serious literary, scientific, or political value is sufficient to classify it as a form
of obscenity. Notice that in the former case, the burden is almost impossible to
discharge.
GONZALES vs. KALAW-KATIGBAK Kapit sa Patalim / classification / parens
patriae The Board of Review classified the movie Kapit sa Patalim as being For
Adults Only, for containing some sexually explicit scenes, such as naked women
dancing, or lesbian action, among other things. The Board ordered the deletion of
the said scenes and delayed the issuance of permit to exhibit. The power of the
Board is limited to that of classification to determine what films are for
general patronage, and what are suitable for adults only. Although the law
23 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
requires a clear and present danger for the limitations upon freedom of expression,
it generally frowns upon obscenity.
To determine what is obscene, it is based upon the perception of an average
person applying contemporary community standards to determine if the
theme of the material caters to the prurient interest. Although the standard
applied by the Board is unduly restrictive, the Court failed to muster the required
number of votes to find grave abuse of discretion. Although the State must not
meddle w/ the sexual preferences of consenting adults, it has an interest in guiding
the development of the youth pursuant to the parens patriae doctrine.
SORIANO vs LAGUARDIA Ang dating daan Petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against the Iglesia Ni Cristo.
There is NO prior restraint and an abridgement of his exercise of religion and freedom of
expression. The sanction imposed on the tv program does not constitute prior
restraint but a subsequent punishment. As regards petitioners contention on the
primacy of his freedom to exercise his religious belief over the right and duty of the
state as parens patriae, petitioner failed to consider that the medium he used to
make his statements was a television broadcast which is accessible to children. The
statements simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and
foul language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his
detractors but opted for the low road.
Dissent: Abad - Suspending the Ang Dating Daan television program is the equivalent of
closing down their churches to its followers. Petitioner Sorianos Bible ministry has been on
TV continuously for 27 years since 1983 with no prior record of use of foul language. For a
15-second outburst of its head at his bitterest critics, it seems unfair for the Court to close
down this Bible ministry to its large followers altogether for a full quarter of a year.
PITA vs. CA Pinoy Playboy / due process / unwarranted search / judicial
determination Pursuant to an Anti-Smut Campaign, the Manila WPD seized from
the sidewalks, stores, and peddlers copies of allegedly obscene materials, including
the so-called Pinoy Playboy. They were ordered destroyed. It is recognized that the
right of the press in not absolute and the State may protect the people from
pornography. However, the requirements of due process and the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be compromised. The
following procedure must have been applied:
1. Application for a warrant from a judge
2. Authorities must convince the court that the material to be seized is
obscene and pose a clear and present danger
3. The judge will determine if they are indeed obscene through exercise of
sound discretion
4. Issuance of the warrant
5. Proper suit is brought to court under the provisions of the RPC
6. Conviction subject to appeal. The court determines whether or not
the materials are indeed obscene.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
BARNES vs. GLEN THEATER pasties / government interest in morality /
incidental effect The Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theater are two establishments
that seek to exhibit totally-nude-dancing, and thus assail an Indiana statute that
requires dancers to wear pasties and a g-string. They claim that the statute violates
the 1st Amendment. The court applied the O Brien Test and ruled that the
objective of the law is to protect the societal order and morality against
public nudity. It is not specifically targeted against free expression and the
restriction is merely an incidental limit upon the said expressive activity. The
interest in unrelated to free expression and requiring the wearing of pasties and g-
strings does not deprive the performances of whatever expressive or erotic
messages they convey.
Dissent of Justice White:
The OBrien Test is not applicable in this case. The Indiana Statute clearly is
targeted, not towards public nudity in general w/ incidental effect upon expression,
but against a particular form of expression itself w/c is the communicative aspect
of an erotic dance. The nudity of the dancer is an integral part of the emotions and
thoughts that the nude dance evokes. And where government prohibits conduct
precisely because of its communicative attributes, the regulation should
definitely be unconstitutional.
They do not punish nudity in stage plays, or ballets, or operas, but only the
nudity committed w/in the said go-go bars. The States interest, allegedly, is to
prevent offense to the public, but all of the customers of such go-go bars are
consenting adults who are there precisely for the enjoyment of the said
performances.
DD: It appears that the regulation specifically targeted the go-go bars and was not
concerned with public nudity at all; the US Supreme Court nevertheless sustained
the regulation.
FCC vs. PACIFICA FOUNDATION words you wouldnt say ever / offensive /
nuisance Pacifica aired a 12 minute monologue by George Carlin where he
uttered extremely vulgar language depicting sexual and excretory activities,
broadcast during the daytime when children could have been listening. It was
reviewed by the Commission and put on the record of Pacifica w/ a warning that
further acts would result to the non-renewal of their license. Although the law
does not confer upon the Commission the power to censor the material
prior to broadcast, there is nothing to preclude them from reviewing the
same and to impose sanctions. Obscenity is different from indecency the
latter being simply non-conformance w/ accepted standards of society. Prurient
appeal is an essential element of indecent language; it offends in the same
manner as obscenity offends. It is not accorded absolute constitutional
protection.
Given the intrusive nature of broadcasting, w/c can reach into the privacy of the
home and tap the young audience; the broadcaster may be deprived of his rights
if he transmits such shocking and vulgar material. It is just as harmful to children
24 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
as obscenity is. It is quite similar to a nuisance, possibly the right thing in
the wrong place.
Consolidated Dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall:
The stance of the majority of the court would effectively empower a majority to
silence dissidents. The interest of the majority was upheld but to the detriment of
the minority who equally have the right to listen. Further, the courts have
maintained the trend that obscenity, w/c the minors must be protected against,
must partake of an erotic nature and in this case, this is not evident.
The parents have the time-honored right to raise their children as they see fit.
Lastly, the speakers choice of words cannot be divorced from the ideas he
wishes to express. A sanitized message would not deliver the same message as
effectively as the author intended.
RENTON vs. PLAYTIME THEATERS - zoning / legitimate interest / content-neutral
The City of Renton planned to enact a zoning ordinance for the purpose of
regulating adult-oriented establishments. The council issued a moratorium on
licensing and a issued a regulation that no adult theater shall be situated w/in
1,000 feet from a school, residential dwelling, church, or park. Playtime
Theaters acquired property and intended to open 2 adult movie houses and thus
challenged the said enactments. The ordinance does not ban adult theaters
altogether but merely regulates the time, manner, and place of their
operations. Generally, laws enacted for the purpose of regulating speech or
expression based on its content are void, however, there is a legitimate and
substantial government interest to preserve the quality of urban life in this
case. The proximity of such adult theaters to wholesome areas has produced
various ill effects and the city must be given reasonable opportunities to
formulate solutions to such problems.
BETHEL SCHOOL vs. FRASER lewd speech / school setting / loco parentis
Matthew Fraser, during a speech to support his candidate for the school
elections, and before a crowd of some 600 14-years-olds, made use of lewd and
sexual innuendo. As a result he was suspended for 2 days and disqualified from
being the graduation speaker. Represented by his father, he sued the school for
violating his freedom of speech. Through the exercise of the right to speech,
one must also consider the sensibilities of others. The right conferred to
adults to utter certain forms of offensive expressions does not necessarily
extend to children. The right to speech does not prevent the school from
determining the extent of allowable conduct w/in school premises; likewise,
school authorities, acting in loco parentis, have the right to protect students from
sexually explicit and indecent speeches.
DD: It is also part of the academic freedom of the school to determine what
disciplinary measures to impose and what policies to implement pursuant to its
mission and vision. Unlike public forums that enjoy greater constitutional
protection, expression in schools may be regulated according to the principles
and policies of the institution.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
HAZELWOOD SCHOOL vs. KUHLMEIER school paper / school policy / less
rights Principal Reynolds of Hazelwood School deleted 2 pages from the
proposed issue of the school paper, Spectrum, one of w/c deals w/ teenage
pregnancy, and the other dealing w/ the effects of divorce upon the students. He
alleged that the identities of the students were not adequately protected and the
parents and families must be afforded the right to be heard. The authors thus sue
the school for violating their right to speech. A school need not tolerate speech
or publication inconsistent w/ the school policy or mission. In this case, the
paper Spectrum was but a part of the Journalism class curriculum and the school
exercises discretion as to its content. It is not a public forum. A students right
to expression is not co-extensive w/ an adults rights under the 1st
Amendment.
DD: Unlike speech in public forums that enjoys greater constitutional protection,
expression of ideas in schools may be regulated according to the principles and
policies of the institution.
RENO vs. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION internet regulation is invalid /
vagueness / problematic application The Communications Decency Act of
1996 (CDA) sought to protect minors from the harmful effects of the internet by
criminalizing the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any
person below 18 years old. The description is void for vagueness. It differs
from other laws in that it failed to define indecent or it does not allow parents
consent to the use of restricted material, and omits the standard of lack of
socially redeeming value. Further, given the complexity of cyberspace, the
factors recognized for broadcast and other mediums are not applicable. It
is likewise not content-neutral. Internet forums are open to all comers making
its applicability very difficult especially given the growing complexity and diversity
of the internet.
ASHCROFT vs. FREE SPEECH UNION child & virtual porno / overboard / fails the
miller test / Ferber test no record, no victim The Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) penalized ANY visual depiction of what appears
to be, or in any way depicts, minors engaged in explicit sexual conduct
including virtual CG renderings. The law is gravely overboard and is thus
unconstitutional. The regulation proscribes ANY form of depiction, even if
it is not patently offensive. Many otherwise legitimate and artistic films would
fall w/in its prohibition and would be penalized. The presence of a single explicit
scene will criminalize a certain expression and as a rule, the work must be
considered as a whole.
Further, virtual porn is not intrinsically related to the abuse of children.
Even assuming that watching virtual porn will whet the appetites of pedophiles
and encourage them to commit such acts, that reason alone is insufficient to
justify the prohibition and the penalty. The overbreadth doctrine disallows the
government from banning a certain unprotected speech if, as a result,
certain protected speech will likewise be proscribed.
25 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
DD: Regulation of free expression in the internet is a problematic issue
considering the rapid development of cyberspace. There is a very easy tendency
for regulations to go overboard considering that access is available to both
minors and adults. Jurisdiction is also a problem.
US vs. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOC. surfing for porn in the library / conditions
imposed / imposing the installation of anti-porn software is valid Due to
the fact that the free internet services in the public libraries have been used for
searching for porn, the Congress enacted the Childrens Internet Protection Act,
requiring libraries to install software to filter or block obscene or pornographic
websites. Otherwise, their internet service will not be maintained. The Congress
may impose certain conditions when it appropriates funds for the public
benefit. Internet access in libraries should be for educational or research
purposes. There is likewise a substantial government interest at stake that
of protecting young internet users from inappropriate material.
DD: The library computers are public property made available to the people; thus
the government may impose reasonable regulations for their utilization.
ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda (valid
exercise of discretion; no denial of right) Navarro applied for a permit to hold a rally at
Plaza Miranda on 26 February 1970 from 4PM to 11PM. Mayor Villegas granted the permit
to hold the rally at the Sunken Gardens instead and at an earlier time. Navarro filed a
petition for mandamus to compel Villegas to release a permit for the desired rally and
alleged that his right to assembly has been violated. The SC held that the Mayor, as the
licensing authority, possesses reasonable discretion to specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly: (1) To secure convenient use thereof by others (2)
To provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain
public safety.In other words, another place may be designated by the licensing authority
should there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil.
Concurring opinion of Justice Villamor: The right to freedom of assembly is neither
unlimited nor absolute. In this case, the Mayor did not refuse to grant the permit applied
for, but simply offered an alternative.
Dissenting opinion of Justice Castro and Fernando: The offering of the alternative
constitutes a prior restraint to a constitutional right. Also, the Ordinance empowering the
Mayor lacks a narrow, objective, and definite standard, making it unconstitutional.
Phil. Blooming Mills EMPLOYEES V. PBM Company - Strike against Pasig Police
(unlawful termination of employment; denial of right to assembly) Petitioner is a labor union
composed of employees of the PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS and it decided to stage a
mass demonstration at Malacanang to protest against the alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police. The Union informed the respondent company of the intended demonstration but the
company warned the union that the workers, especially those part of the first shift, without
leave of absence who fail to report for work, shall be dismissed for violation of the NO
LOCKOUT, NO STRIKE in the CBA. The company then filed charges against petitioner for
violation of the CBA. The COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ruled in favor of the
company and found the Union guilty for having bargained in bad faith. The SC held that
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
the rights of free expression, assembly, and petition are civil and political rights and, thru
the said freedoms, the citizen can participate:
In the periodic establishment of the government
In the administration of public affairs
In the discipline of abusive public officers
The SC also held that a valid infringement of human rights requires a stringent criterion,
namely the existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil that the State
has the right to prevent. There was no grave and immediate danger in the case at bar. In
fact, the Company should have stepped in and rally to the defense of its employees, so
that the latter can report to work free from harassment or vexation and perform their work
more efficiently. The pretension of the Company that it would suffer loss by reason of the
absence of its employees from 6AM to 2PM is a plea for the preservation merely of its
property rights. The SC further held that the primacy of human rights freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly, and of petition for redress of grievances over
property rights has been sustained in jurisprudence. In this case, to regard the
demonstration as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and, hence, a violation of
the CBA and a cause for termination would unduly stretch the compass of the CBA and
turn it into a potent means of inhibiting free speech. Thus, it was the company that was
guilty of unfair labor practices for restraining its employees from exercising their basic
rights
JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING - Anti-Bases Coalition rally (unlawful denial and
modification of
permit; no clear and present danger) Retired Justice Reyes, in behalf of the members of
the ANTI- BASES COALITION, sought a permit to rally from LUNETA PARK until the front
gate of the US EMBASSY, which is less than two blocks apart. The permit was denied by
Manila Mayor Bagatsing, but the latter offered the RIZAL COLISEUM instead. The Mayor
claimed that there were intelligence reports, which indicated that the rally would be
infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance 7295 to prohibit the staging
of rallies within the 500-meter radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was
his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in
pursuant to Art 22 of the VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. Reyes
filed a suit for mandamus. The SC held that free speech is identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully matters of public concern without censorship or punishment.
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation
and discussion of matters of public concern. Thus, the general rule is that a permit should
recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice,
but another place may be designated by the licensing authority, if it be shown that there is
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. In this case, there was no compelling
justification to deny the exercise of peaceful assembly. Fear of disorder or injury alone
cannot justify a denial. The SC further held that there is freedom of access to public
places, especially parks and streets, which have immemorially been held in trust for the
use for purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts between citizens. Finally, the SC
held in applications to hold an assembly:
The applicant must inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where, and the time when the rally will take place
The application should be filed well ahead in time
The standard or indispensable condition to a refusal or modification is the test of
clear and present danger
26 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
If the licensing authority is of the view that there is such an imminent and
gravedanger, the applicants must be heard on the matter
The decision of the licensing authority must be transmitted to the applicants at
the earliest opportunity
The applicants may have recourse to the proper judicial authorities
But if it were a private place, only the consent of the one entitled to its legal
possession is required
MALABANAN V. RAMENTO - Rally in school premises (yes, there was a violation, but
the punishment was too severe) Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council
of the GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION. They were granted a permit
to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled
date, the students continued the rally beyond the allowed time and held it in a different
place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed their opposition in a vehement
language and, as a result, classes and office work were disturbed. Petitioners were
eventually found guilty of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation, meriting a 1-
year suspension as punishment. Petitioners maintained that the University failed to accord
respect to their constitutional rights. The SC held that the invocation of the freedom of
peaceable assembly implies that the right to free speech has been disregarded. Right to
peaceably assembly and free speech are embraced in the concept of freedom of
expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss any matter of public interest
publicly and truthfully without censorship or punishment and that is not to be limited, much
less denied, except upon a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent. The SC also held that while educational institutions have
authority over the conduct of students, it cannot go so far as to violate constitutional
safeguards. Except when conduct by the student, in class or out of it:
Materially disrupts classwork
Involves substantial disorder
Invades the rights of others
The SC further held that the rights to peaceably assemble and free speech are guaranteed
for students and their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest cannot be subject to prior restraint or subsequent punishment, unless there is a
showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil. But even so, the utmost
leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. If
the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from the school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request unreasonably or arbitrarily.
In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly
to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. But
should there be a violation of the terms, the penalty incurred should be proportionate to the
offense. In this case, it was conceded that there was a violation of the permit, but the
penalty of 1-year suspension was too harsh, so the SC lowered it to 1-week instead.
BAYAN V. ERMITA - BP 880 (public assembly act valid; calibrated preemptive response
invalid) Petitioners assailed the PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT of 1985, which requires a permit
to be issued by the Mayor, who must be informed of the date, time, and place of the rally.
The mayor may deny the issuance of the same if, to his judgment, there exists a clear and
present danger. It also mandates the designation of freedom parks where protesters may
organize peaceful actions without the need of a permit. The CALIBRATED PREEMPTIVE
RESPONSE was also implemented by the Executive Department to strictly enforce the
provisions of BP 880, particularly the no permit-no rally policy, but it resulted to the violent
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
dispersal of various protest actions and assemblies, which led to the assault upon its
constitutionality. The SC held that petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged
because their rights as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and petition are directly
affected by BP 880. The SC also held that jurisprudence has upheld the primacy of
freedom of speech over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.
However, the right is not absolute and it may be regulated so that it shall not be injurious to
a) the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights and b) the rights of the community or
society. The SC further held that it has been recognized that a statute requiring persons
using the public streets for assemblies to procure a special license from local authorities is
valid when:
The licensing authorities are strictly limited to a consideration of the time, place,
and
manner of the assembly
With a view to conserve public convenience
With a view to provide proper policing
The licensing authority is not vested with arbitrary discretion
In this case, BP No. 880 is not an absolute ban on public assemblies, but is merely a
content neutral restriction that regulates the time, place, and manner of assemblies to
avoid clear and present danger. Its reference to lawful cause is not content-based
because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
entitled to constitutional protection. There is no prior restraint because the content of the
speech is not relevant to the regulation. The clear and present danger stated in Section
6(a) is substantially the same as imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in
Section 6(c) and is consistent standard. BP 880 requires maximum tolerance, which is the
highest degree of restraint that the peacekeeping authorities must observe during
assemblies. Dispersal should be the last resort and all peaceful means of conciliation
between the police and the protesters must first be pursued. Thus, the CPR serves no
valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and it is illegal if it means
something else because what is to be followed is that which is mandated by BP 880 itself.
The SC also required the designation of freedom parks from the various LGUs, as
provided for in BP 880, otherwise all public parks within the said LGUs will be.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Non-Establishment Clause
AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ Eucharistic Congress stamps / no religious purpose /
incidental effect Act No. 4052 authorized the Director of Posts to issue postage
stamps commemorating the Eucharistic Congress celebrated in Manila and
organized by the Catholic Church. The government appropriated money for it and
expected to generate around P 1.6 million from the sale of such stamps. Gregorio
Aglipay of the Phil. Independent Church sought to prohibit the issuance and sale of
27 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
such stamps for violating separation of church and State. The law contemplates
no religious purpose; the stamps were not sold for the benefit of the Catholic
Church but merely to advertise the Philippines as the seat of the Eucharistic
Congress. Resulting propaganda possibly in favor of the church is merely
incidental and should not frustrate the main purpose of the law to generate
profit and boost tourism.
TARUC vs BISHOP Taruc, a lay member of the Phil Independent Church, clamored for
the transfer of their parish priest, Fr. Rustom Florano for the reason that Fr. Florano's wife
belonged to the political party that opposed him. Things worsened when Taruc conducted
an open mass without the consent of Bishop Dela Cruz during the town fiesta. Bishop Dela
Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the PIC on the following
grounds: disobedience to duly constituted authority in the church, inciting dissension and,
for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and fear among the
general membership The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution
or organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and
canons, of said institution or organization.
GARCES vs. ESTENZO quarrel over San Vicente Ferrer idol / no favor to church /
private funds In preparation for the town fiesta, the Barangay Council enacted
resolutions (ratified through plebiscite) authorizing the purchase of a wooden image
of San Vicente Ferrer, patron saint of Valencia, Ormoc. The image was to be
acquired through sale of tickets and cash donations and was to be placed in the
custody of the hermana mayor. It was temporarily placed at the altar of the church
but the parish priest Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay claiming
that it was property of the church; hence the barangay filed a Replevin case.
Osmea countered by assailing the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The
resolutions were not enacted for the purpose of favoring the church or any
religion, nor did it authorize the allocation of public funds for religious
purposes. In fact, private funds were used to purchase the image. Since the
Barangay is the owner of the said image, then it has the right to determine who
shall exercise custody over it.
SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. SCHEMPP mandatory prayers / violation of neutrality and
rights Various states required the reading of certain verses from the Bible as well
as the recitation of The Lords Prayer to begin each school day; thus some students
represented by their parents assail the constitutionality of the said policies. The
government should be neutral about religion; it protects all but cannot
promote or favor any. The State cannot forbid but it cannot likewise aid in the
performance of religious functions. Ceremoniously reading from the Bible and
reciting The Lords Prayer are clearly exercises of religion, and to require
their performance would violate the rights of the students. Objective study of
the Bible for academic purposes such as for its historic or literary qualities may be
made part of the curriculum as a secular activity, but the aforesaid activities clearly
partake of a religious exercise and cannot be made mandatory w/o violating
constitutional rights.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
LEMON vs. KURTZMAN LEMON TEST / salary subsidy to parochial schools /
excessive entanglement Rhode Island statutes provide a salary subsidy of 15%
of the teachers annual wage in favor of non-public elementary schools including
parochial schools. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, provides financial support for
salaries reimbursement, textbooks, and other instructional materials to such
schools. There are 3 thin evils sought to be avoided by the Establishment
Clause: sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement. There are
likewise 3 requisites that must be satisfied so as not to run afoul to the
Establishment Clause:
1. the statute must have a secular legislative purpose
2. its principal effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion
3. it must not foster excessive entanglement of government w/
religion
The parochial schools have a significant religious mission; they foster an
atmosphere of religious instruction and vocation. They maintain substantial
religious activity and are under church supervision and control; and the teachers
therein have, in an understatement, the difficulty of being religiously neutral. In
order not to run afoul to the Establishment Clause, the teachers subsidized
must not inculcate religion, and ensuring compliance would cause the
government to be excessively entangled w/ the church.
They likewise provide financial aid directly to church-related schools clearly
in violation of the Constitution, and to ascertain if the proceeds are dedicated to
secular purposes would likewise entail further excessive entanglement.
TILTON vs. RICHARDSON construction grants is valid / 20 yr. limitation void /
less entanglement The Higher Education Facilities Act authorized federal grants
and loans to colleges and universities for the construction of various buildings and
facilities such as libraries, laboratory, theatre, and science buildings subject to the
condition that they must be used for secular purposes only for the period of 20
years after construction. Should this condition be violated, then the State is
entitled to recover the amount proportionate to its grant based on its present value.
As opposed to that of Lemon vs. Kutzman where teachers were subsidized,
the facilities themselves are religiously neutral; hence there is less tendency
for entanglement as inspection requires minimal contact.
Further, evidence disclosed that the colleges and universities are more inclined to
providing the students w/ secular education, unlike the primary and secondary
parochial schools that require participation w/ religious activities; hence there is less
risk of support for religious activities.
However, the 20 year restriction opens the door for religious use after the
grace period; hence it violates the Establishment Clause. After the 20 year
grace period, the properties partially or fully subsidized by the government may
28 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
already be used for religious purposes; this is a violation of the Establishment
Clause. The grace period should thus be struck down.
ZOBREST vs. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL interpreter - valid / child is the
beneficiary The respondent school district refused to provide an interpreter for a
deaf student as allowed by the Individuals w/ Disabilities Education Act because he
attends a Roman Catholic school. The school district claimed that it would promote
his religious development and benefit the parochial school at the expense of the
Establishment Clause. Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to
citizens w/o reference to religion do not violate the Establishment Clause.
The child is the primary beneficiary, not the school; and whatever benefit may
accrue to the latter is merely incidental.
AGOSTINI vs. FELTON public school teachers in parochial schools valid /
neutral / no presumption NY Citys program sent public school teachers to
parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children. It was
declared unconstitutional in Aguilar vs. Felton and the petitioners pray that the court
re-examine the ruling. Such government-funded programs are neutral and are
made to favor the disadvantaged children regardless of their religion;
presence of public school teachers in parochial schools does not violate the
Establishment Clause provided that adequate safeguards are in place. The
presumption that the presence of public employees in parochial institutions tends to
benefit the latter has been abandoned, hence, pervasive monitoring is no longer
required. Overall, the program does not result in indoctrination, it does not
discriminate based on religion, and it does not create excessive entanglement;
hence it is not abhorrent to the Establishment Clause.
MITCHELL vs. HELMS materials and educational aids valid / neutral application
/ no indoctrination The Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA)
channels federal funds to schools lending educational, media, and library materials
including software and computers to implement secular, neutral, and non-
ideological programs. Around 30% of the funds spent have benefited religiously
affiliated schools, thus the program was challenged for violating the Establishment
Clause. Just because some of the beneficiaries of the program are religiously-
affiliated, it does not automatically make it a law respecting an establishment
of religion. It passes the Agostini Test; it does not result in governmental
indoctrination (religious indoctrination attributable to governmental action), it is
made available neutrally and equally among beneficiaries regardless of
religious affiliation, and it neither impairs nor promotes the same, and it allocates
aid based on the private choices of the students as to w/c schools to attend.
ZELMAN vs. SIMMONS-HARRIS tuition aid program valid / neutral application
Ohios Pilot Project Scholarship Program provided tuition aid for certain students
who chose to remain enrolled in public schools; both religious and secular schools
were participants but a significant majority (82%) of the participating private schools
was religiously-affiliated. The purpose of the law was to provide educational
assistance to poor students. The law was neutral regarding all aspects towards
religion and confers assistance to a broad class of persons regardless of
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
their religious affiliation. Whatever incidental advancement of the religious
missions of the parochial schools cannot be attributed to the government whose
sole aim was to distribute benefits among the students.
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY vs. AMERICAN CLU Christmas & Chanukah greeting
signs / affiliation The County Courthouse displayed a nativity scene crche
(invalid) donated by Holy Name Society w/c bore the words (in Latin) Glory to
God, while the City-County Building displayed an 18-foot Chanukah menorah
(valid) beside a Christmas tree and a sign bearing the mayors name. The
American Civil Liberties Union sought to enjoin the county and the city from
displaying the said symbols invoking the Establishment Clause. The
Establishment Clause prohibits the government from appearing to take
positions regarding religious belief. The government must remain secular; it may
recognize the holidays secular aspects but it cannot go as far as to suggest that
the people praise the Christian God for the birth of Jesus Christ.
Consolidated Dissents:
The symbols merely recognize that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the
winter season and have attained a secular status in the society; it merely
recognizes cultural diversity. The Christmas Tree is widely viewed today as a
secular symbol of the Christmas Holiday, and such symbols cannot be interpreted
as an endorsement of Christianity or Judaism. There is no apparent risk of
establishment and there also is no coercion. If opening prayers are allowed
before convening Congress, there should be no obstacle to displaying the said
symbols.
CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW & ADVISORY BOARD vs. PINETTE The Klan! /
protected speech / reasonable observer The Ku Klux Klan applied w/ the
petitioner Board for a permit to display an unattended cross in Capitol Square, a
forum for public questions and discussions the use of w/c was regulated by the
latter according to Ohio State Law. They were denied based on the theory that,
given the proximity of the square to the seat of government, the symbol could be
interpreted to mean that the government was endorsing a said religion.
The display sought by the Kluxers belongs to protected speech as a secular
private expression. Given the fact that Capitol Square is a public forum, the
expression sought should be allowed therein. Further, it is private expression,
not one made by the government. The reasonable observer could not possibly
interpret the symbol to be endorsed by the government given the public
nature of the place. Also, other alternative means could have been sought w/c will
not infringe upon the free exercise of religion and of expression, such as the
posting of disclaimers.
ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL vs. EXEC. SECRETARY halal certification / religious
act EO NO. 46 created the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme, w/c designated
the respondent OMA to oversee its implementation granting it exclusive authority
to issue halal certificates to guarantee that food products do not contain pork or
any of its derivatives. All other halal certificates not issued by the OMA were
29 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
deemed illegal. The Islamic Dawah Council is a non-government organization
engaged in the issuance of such certifications (among other social functions).
Manufacturers stopped seeking their certifications resulting to loss of income,
hence the petition for prohibition. Classifying food products as halal is a
religious function drawn from the Koran and other Islamic beliefs; hence the
government, in granting the OMA exclusive authority to perform the said act,
clearly encroached upon the free exercise of religion. Infringement of religious
freedom can only be curtailed on the basis of a compelling State interest w/c in this
case is not present.
DD: The issuance of halal certificates is a religious practice and the government
has no business meddling with the exercise.
SORIANO vs LAGUARDIA see section 4
Free Exercise of Religion
CANTWELL vs. CONNECTICUT annoying people w/ a phonograph / council
approval / restraint Newton Cantwell and his 2 sons, allegedly Jehovahs
Witness ministers, were walking from house-to-house soliciting and carrying books
and pamphlets and a phonograph record w/c they played upon permission of their
interviewees. Entitled Enemies, the content attacked other religions, especially
Catholicism. Around 90% of the residents of the neighborhood were Catholics.
They annoyed many people along the way. They were charged for inciting breach
of the peace under a Connecticut statute prohibiting solicitation for alleged
religious or charitable purposes w/o the approval of the Public Welfare Council. It
was enacted for the purpose of protecting the citizens against solicitation for bogus
religious, philanthropic, or charitable purposes.
The statute sweeps though a vast array of conduct, renders an indefinite
characterization therefor, and gives the Council too much discretion in its
application; it is obnoxious to the free exercise of religion. It also amounts to
prior restraint. The functions of the Council (in approving or denying authorization)
were not merely ministerial but were discretionary. There was no apparent threat
or menace to the public peace and order; there was only an attempt to persuade
willing listeners to embrace, or at least, contribute to his religious cause.
US vs. BALLARD I am St. Germain! / fraud / false powers / no proof needed /
good faith is the only question Guy Ballard organized the I Am Movement and
claimed to be some sort of divinity, or master or the medium through w/c St.
Germain would transmit his message to mankind or something to that effect. He
claimed to have cured various persons w/ ailments and performed such other
supernatural deeds. He was convicted for conspiring to use the mails to commit
fraud, by making 18 different misrepresentations, and the trial court ruled that such
claims were false and were concocted mainly to defraud other persons. The ONLY
question that must be resolved is whether or not Ballard honestly and in
good faith believed such things. It is not for the Jury, as a trier of facts, to test the
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
veracity of his claims, but merely to determine if he acted in good faith. No man
may be put to the proof of his religious beliefs or doctrines. The law knows
no heresy. Case is remanded for further proceeding.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA Bibles for sale / non-profit /
prior restraint The Acting Treasurer of Manila informed the American Bible
Association (ABA), w/c was selling bibles and pamphlets for 25 and 5
respectively, that it was engaging in the business of general merchandise w/o
Municipal License and Mayors Permit and assessed certain taxes against them.
The right to the free exercise of religion carries w/ it the right to disseminate
its beliefs. Any restraint can only be justified by clear and present danger. In
this case, the sale of bibles and pamphlets was clearly not for business, even if the
prices were a bit higher, but rather for the purpose of dissemination, w/c cannot
be subjected to prior restraint in this case, the procurement of a license or
permit. Hence, the Ordinances requiring for permits as well as imposing taxes for
such exercise cannot be applied in this case.
DD: But if the sale of religiously-inspired merchandise is for profit, reasonable taxes
may be imposed.
EBRALINAG vs. SUPERINTENDENT salute to the flag / no clear & present danger
/ exceptions Students who were members of the Jehovahs Witness were
expelled from school for refusing to take part in the flag ceremony, where they
supposed to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge. They claim that it contradicts their religious beliefs. They were expelled on
the basis of RA No. 1265 and Order No. 8 of the DECS. The SC has decided to
abandon the Gerona Ruling. The only justification for restraints or limitations
upon the free exercise of religion is the presence of a clear and present
danger.
In this case, the students did not manifest any disrespect and merely stood silently
and in attention. Forcing the children to salute the flag violates their right to religion
and is hardly conducive to fostering love of country. Expelling them on the basis of
such conduct will likewise violate their right to receive education. When the laws
conflict w/ the scruples of conscience, certain exceptions may be granted,
provided that no compelling state interest intervenes.
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION vs. SMITH drug-use during a ritual / law is neutral Smith
and Black were both fired by the Private Drug Rehabilitation Organization for
ingesting a hallucinogenic drug called peyote, for sacramental purposes during a
ceremony at the Native American Church. They were likewise denied
unemployment compensation. They invoke the free exercise clause. The
dangerous drugs law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is
applied equally to all, regardless of whether they do the act for religious or
non-religious purposes. Hence, the law does not offend the free exercise clause.
To hold otherwise would create an extraordinary right to ignore general laws in the
name of religion for as long as no compelling state interest intervenes.
30 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
LONG & ALMERIA vs. BASA expulsion from church / conclusive upon courts A
person was expelled from his Church, hence he seeks reprieve in the civil courts.
The by-laws of the Church merely require that the Board of Directors be informed
that a member has failed to observe any of the regulations and by-laws or has
conducted himself in any manner dishonorable to the Church; then they shall issue
the corresponding Resolution for his expulsion. No prior notice was required. The
internal rules of churches and other denominations may be peculiar, but
decisions of church authorities pertaining to such internal matters are
conclusive upon the civil courts. There is usually no room for dissent in a
religious corporation.
DD: Admission to or excommunication from churches is a matter left entirely upon
their discretion and the State has no business meddling therewith. This doctrine
was later affirmed in the Philippines in the case of Taruc vs. Bishop.
AUSTRIA vs. NLRC pastor terminated from service / employer-employee relation /
secular matter Dionisio Austria was a pastor for the Seventh Day Adventist
Church. He was terminated after 28 years of service for misappropriation of funds,
breach of trust, gross misconduct, and habitual neglect of duties, among other
reasons. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate him prior to his
termination. He sued the Adventist Church before the NLRC for reinstatement and
backwages plus damages. The Adventist Church invokes the separation of church
and state. The principle of separation of church and state does not apply in this
case. The case does not concern purely ecclesiastical or religious affairs, but
rather that of employer and employee, w/c is governed by labor laws. It is a
purely secular matter. It is not as if Austria was expelled or excommunicated; he
was terminated from his employment. The act of terminating Austria was an
exercise of management prerogatives, not religious prerogatives. The provisions
of the Labor Code apply to all establishments, whether religious or not.
CENTENO vs. VILLALON-PORNILOS poor old men / religious vs. charitable /
incidental effect The Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay is an
organization composed of elderly men who engaged in solicitation for the
renovation of their barrio chapel. They did not have the necessary permit from the
DSWD. They tried to solicit from Judge Adoracion Angeles who sued them for
violating PD No. 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law). The said law, however, mentioned
only solicitations for charitable or public welfare purposes and requires a permit
therefor, w/o making any mention of religious purposes. The terms religious
purpose and charitable purpose are separate and cannot be interchanged.
The acts of the elderly men cannot be punished under the said law because the law
does not contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.
Nevertheless, the State has the right and duty to protect its people from fraudulent
solicitations, and a general law w/c does not involve any religious test cannot
be deemed invalid even if there are some incidental effects upon the free
exercise of religion. The concurring opinion goes as far as to state that requiring a
permit before solicitation for religious purposes would amount to prior restraint.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
WISCONSIN vs. YODER compulsory education / free exercise prevails / no
compelling reason Members of the Old Amish Religion and the Conservative
Amish Mennonite Church were charged under a Wisconsin law on compulsory
school attendance for refusing to send their children to school after graduating the
8th grade. They claim that it violates their beliefs and endangers their salvation. The
Amish religion and community believe in seclusion from the modern life and
recourse to the simple country life as part of their religious beliefs; and they have
sufficiently established their sincerity towards such beliefs. The States claim of
parens patriae cannot prevail over the free exercise claim of the Amish
Community in the absence of a compelling state interest. The Amish Sect has
established that there is no apparent danger to the welfare of the children should
they be deprived of the 2 years of additional education.
DD: Take note that the duty of the State to raise and educate the youth is only
subsidiary to the primary right and duty of their parents.
PAMIL vs. TELERON priest-slash-mayor / religious test / religion vs. profession
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga (priest) was elected to the position of municipal mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol. A suit for quo warranto was filed against him for violating the
separation of church and the state. The court rendered a divided decision hence
the vote is indecisive. The Revised Admin. Code expressly disallows ecclesiastics,
soldiers, contractors engaged w/ the government, among others, from holding
public office. The required majority to nullify the assailed provision, however, was
not attained.
DD: Under the 1973 Constitution, it requires a majority of all members of the
Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional; under the 1987 Constitution, it
only requires majority vote of all members who took part in the deliberations and
voted thereon.
Majority Opinion:
The ban imposed by the Admin. Code is incompatible w/ the Constitution because
it amounts to a religious test for the exercise of a political right. However, the
prohibition against appointment to public office remains valid.
Separate Opinion of Justice Makasiar:
The separation of church and state shall be inviolable. The assailed provision does
not impose a religious test; it merely defines a disqualification. One is not
disqualified from office on the basis of his beliefs or religion, but rather
based on his profession or vocation. The contractors, soldiers, and other
persons disqualified therefrom all somehow profess a certain religion. There is even
a provision in the Constitution that prohibits religious organizations from registering
as political parties. This manifests the intent of the Constitution to bar religious
organizations from holding office in the government. There is a dangerous
tendency for such officials to use the government to further whatever
interests their respective churches or religions may have.
31 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
McDANIEL vs. PATY constitutional delegate / exercise of right conditioned upon
religion Paty, a constitutional commission candidate, sought the disqualification of
McDaniel, a Baptist minister and a rival candidate, for the same position, invoking
the Tennessee Constitution w/c disqualifies ministers of whatever denomination
from holding the said office. While it may be said that the Tennessee
disqualification targets not religious belief but rather the status, and conduct of the
clergy, it nevertheless violates the free exercise clause. It has the effect of
conditioning the exercise of his right upon the surrender of his religious
vocation. It thus, establishes a religious classification w/c inhibits religion in
violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
GOLDMAN vs. WEINBERGER skullcap / uniformity in military Goldman was an
Orthodox Jew and member of the US Air Force. He was prohibited from wearing his
yarmulke (a skullcap of sorts), indoors in accordance w/ Air Force regulations.
According to their beliefs, it serves to cover their heads before the Omnipresent
God. Goldman spent most of his duty indoors. The Free Exercise Clause does
not require the military to accommodate such practices as wearing the
yarmulke at the expense of its policy to evenhandedly regulate dress in the
interest of military uniformity.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brennan:
The rules of the Air Force itself nevertheless allow expressions of individuality;
excluding however those extreme, unusual, or fad forms of expression. The rules
tolerate manifestations of religious diversity such as wearing of crosses, some
forms of religious garments, among others. There is no reasonable and striking
basis for prohibiting the wearing of yarmulkes.
LEE vs. WEISMAN rabbi invited to graduation day - invalid / coercion / State
cannot support religion Lee, a middle school principal, invited a Jewish rabbi to
offer a prayer during the graduation ceremony of his public middle school;
Weisman, a father of one of the students, sought to enjoin the practice, during the
present case, and for future cases. The government may not coerce anyone to
support any religion or participate in any of its ceremonies w/o violating the
Establishment Clause. The actions of the principal are attributable to the State,
w/c cannot place the dissenter in the dilemma of silent participation or protest. A
graduation ceremony, w/c is a personal milestone, cannot be equated w/ routine
sessions of Congress w/c have opening prayers.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Scalia:
Prayer has been a prominent and accepted part of ceremonies and
proclamations. It has been a long established practice in public events, such as
graduations. There is likewise no reasonable and discernible trace of coercion
in the absence of any threat of penalty. Hence, the practice should be allowed.
CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI vs. CITY OF HIALEAH animal sacrifices allowed / not
neutral and general The Church of the Lukumi practices the Santeria religion, w/c
practices animal sacrifices. After leasing some property in the respondent city and
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
signifying their intent to establish a chapel therein, the City suddenly enacted
ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifices, or the unnecessary and cruel slaughter of
animals during rituals or for purposes other than for food. A law that burdens
religious practice can only be justified if it is neutral and is of general
applicability. In such a case, it need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest. In this case, the Ordinances, though seemingly neutral,
were actually targeted towards repressing the Santeria practices hence, they
violate the free exercise clause. There is likewise no compelling state interest
enough to justify the restriction.
LAMBS CHAPEL vs. CENTER MORICHES use of school premises for film
allowed / rule must be neutral NY Law authorizes school boards to regulate the
use of school facilities after school hours and for purposes other than religious
purposes. Lambs Chapel evangelical church made requests for the use of the said
premises for the purpose of showing a film about family values and such topics.
The school board denied them access based on the statute. Denying the church
access to public school premises violates the Freedom of Speech Clause. It
discriminates based on viewpoint. It permits the use of such school premises for
other purposes but denies the same to religious groups. The film was to be shown
after school hours and would have been open to the public, hence, there is nothing
there to indicate that the State endorses or benefits any religion. Access to such
forum can be based on subject matter, but the distinction must be religiously
neutral.
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR concubinage / church approval / sincerity / compelling
state interest / benevolent neutrality Soledad Escritor was an interpreter for the
Las Pias RTC, who was charged administratively for immoral conduct for co-
habiting w/ Quilapio w/o the benefit of marriage over the last 20 years, their union
bearing a child. At the time they started co-habiting, Escritor was still married, but at
the time she entered the judiciary, she was already a widow. Escritor and Quilapio
were members of the Jehovahs Witness. They secured a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness signifying their churchs approval of their union in accordance w/ their
religious beliefs.
Indeed, the case at bar has put a burden upon her free exercise of religion,
and she likewise appears to be sincere in her religious beliefs. She procured
the certificate 10 years after their union began, and not merely after being
implicated or before entering the judiciary. Apparently nothing from her
actuations would constitute grossly disgraceful and immoral acts so much as
to warrant administrative sanction.
The State undertakes the burden of satisfying the compelling state interest
test to justify any possible sanction to be imposed upon Escritor. There are 3
tests that have to be determined in this case:
1. The sincerity and centrality of religious beliefs
2. The right to free exercise may only be overcome by a compelling state
interest
32 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
3. The means adopted by the State should be least restrictive of free
exercise
The case is thus REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator to determine
the case based on the above considerations. The Solicitor General is likewise
ordered to intervene.
Consolidated Dissents:
Escritors conduct constitutes the felony of concubine clearly w/in the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code. Religious beliefs, no matter how sincere, cannot
exempt from liability under the RPC for criminal acts.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 6
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided
by law.
Liberty of Abode & Right to Travel
MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS right to return to ones country / residual powers /
paramount interest In his deathbed, the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos
signified his intention to return from exile and die in his native country. At that time,
the local situation was rather volatile, given the repeated coup attempts, the
secessionist movement in Mindanao, communist insurgency, accumulated foreign
debt, and the devastated economy. President Aquino thus refused to allow Marcos
to re-enter the country. The case is in a class by itself; it should not create any
precedent.
The Marcoses invoke the constitutional guarantee of liberty of abode and freedom
to travel, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, w/c both provide for the right
against being arbitrarily deprived of right to enter his own country. They also
invoke the incorporation clause. The President, on the other hand, invokes her
residual powers as well as her duty to maintain peace and order and the protection
of the people.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
This is how the Supreme Court decided the issue. The right to return to ones
own country guaranteed under International Law is separate and distinct
from the constitutional right to liberty of abode and travel. The Bill of Rights
makes no mention of the right to return to ones own country.
Such guarantees are not inflexible and may be subject to limitation should
the paramount national interest so require. The President possesses residual
powers inherent in her duty to protect the general welfare. The extent of her powers
is not limited to those expressly conferred by the Constitution. The prohibition
imposed by the President is thus sustained.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Interpreting the Constitution for only one person smacks of unequal protection. The
liberty of abode and of changing the same cannot be impaired except upon
lawful order of the COURT. This provision speaks of the Judiciary, not the
Executive.
Furthermore, the right to travel cannot be impaired except in the interest of
the national security, public safety, or public health, AS MAY BE PROVIDED
BY LAW. This speaks of the Legislature, not the Executive. There has bee no law
passed for this particular purpose.
Likewise, the deposed president is in life-support. There may be local disturbances
present, but not to such an extent as to compel the Supreme Court to ignore a plea
under the Bill of Rights. Also, the Legislature, although recognizing the Presidents
residual powers, nevertheless proposed, through a Resolution, for the President to
allow entry in the spirit of reconciliation and goodwill.
DD: This is a very exceptional case. For the purpose of deciding future cases (or
answering exam questions), I suggest that the rules laid down in the dissenting
opinion must be followed unless the case is as extraordinary as the Marcos Case.
Also, the right to travel may be impaired or regulated even by administrative
agencies, for as long as the regulation is provided for or allowed by the law and
is in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health. Restrictions on
the liberty of abode or of changing the same, however, require court order.
See the case of Villavicencio vs. Lukban where the Manila Mayor deported
the Ermita prostitutes to somewhere in Mindanao. It was deemed a violation of their
liberty of abode.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 7
33 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
prescribed by law.
The Right to Information
LEGASPI vs. CSC eligibility of sanitarians / / right to info / only Congress may
deny such right Valentin Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission
info regarding the civil service eligibilities of certain government sanitarians. The
CSC refused to divulge the information, thus Legaspi filed a case for mandamus.
The people have the right to information on matters of public concern, and
access to official records shall be allowed to citizens as may be provided by
law. It is a self-executing provision. The right to information is a public right
and every citizen is entitled thereto. Civil service eligibility is a matter of public
concern; there is nothing secret about it.
Limitations upon the right to access information are discretionary upon the
Legislature, not the agency in question. Administrative agencies may only
regulate, but may not prohibit access, unless otherwise authorized by law. Granting
access is not discretionary upon the agencies of the government but only upon the
Legislature.
VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE GSIS loans / public funds / no law authorizing
confidentiality Valmonte, among other petitioners, was a member of the press
who requested from the GSIS a list of Batasang Pambansa who have been able to
avail of loans, through the intervention of Imelda Marcos. They also asked for
access to the official records. The GSIS refused to prepare the list and denied them
access thereto invoking right to privacy and privileged confidentiality. There is no
such law granting the GSIS confidentiality w/ regard to its documents.
Likewise, corporations such as the GSIS have no right to privacy. They cannot
invoke the right to privacy of their borrowers because such right is personal in
nature. Further, the funds of the GSIS assume a public character. It is a matter
of public interest; information pertaining thereto cannot be denied unless
provided by law.
The petitioners are thus entitled to access official records pertaining thereto.
However, the right to information does not confer upon the citizens the right
to compel agencies to prepare lists, summaries, or other such documents.
Only access to the records is permitted. Otherwise, they would unduly burden the
agencies w/ the preparation of their requested lists or summaries.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MORATO MTRCB voting / public nature, functions, and
character Sarmiento is an employee of the MTRCB who requested from the latter
permission to examine the voting slips made by the board members in rating the
films submitted for review. Chairman Manoling Morato denied her request claiming
that the manner of voting should be kept confidential as they are supposedly
conscience votes. The rest of the board members agreed w/ Morato; hence this
petition. It is the general policy of the state to adopt full public disclosure of all
transactions involving matters of public interest. The very existence of the
MTRCB is public in nature thus, there can be no valid claim to privacy.
The decisions of the board are made in the exercise of public functions;
hence they assume a public character. Access to records pertaining thereto
must thus me allowed. As a matter of public right, access to information or official
records cannot be made dependent upon the discretion of the agency involved,
unless the law itself provides otherwise.
GONZALES vs. NARVASA multiple positions / self-executing / matters of public
concern Gonzales requested Exec. Secretary Zamora to answer his letter, asking
who are the officials holding multiple positions in the government, and for copies of
their appointments, receipts of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs,
among other pieces of information. The right to information is self-executing
and may be invoked by any citizen before the courts. For as long as the
information pertains to matters of public concern, the public must be
allowed access thereto. Zamora thus has the responsibility and the duty to
answer the letter and to allow inspection of official records and documents.
CHAVEZ vs. PEA negotiations / official recommendation / cannot compel
agencies to make lists Petitioner Chavez seeks to compel the Public Estates
Authority (PEA) to disclose information regarding its negotiations with potential
holders of the said estates even prior to final agreement. The PEA refuses to
disclose the information claiming that the right to info does not include intra-agency
communications and recommendations. Chavez thus filed a case to compel the
PEA to divulge the same. While evaluations and reviews are on-going, there
are still no official acts, transactions, or decisions. However, the moment the
committee makes its official recommendation, there is now a definite
proposition, and the right to information begins to attach. It does not require
that the contracts be consummated first before the right to information to be
invoked.
The right covers 3 categories of information:
1. Official records
2. Documents pertaining to official acts, transactions, and decisions
3. Research data used in formulating policies
On the other hand, the following are not covered by the right to information:
34 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
1. Military and diplomatic secrets
2. Information affecting national security
3. Information on investigation of crimes before prosecution of the accused
4. Presidential communications and correspondences during closed-door
Cabinet meetings
5. Internal deliberations of the courts
6. Executive sessions of Congress
7. Other limitations w/c Congress may impose by law
The right to information includes official info on on-going negotiations before
final contract as long as there is already a definite offer or proposition.
However, the right does not include that of compelling the government to
prepare lists, reports, summaries, or other documents.
DD: Take note that the constitutional right is conferred to citizens.
DD: Under the recent case of Hilado vs. Judge, the right to access public records
covers orders and decisions or verdicts of the courts, but not accesses to the
pleadings upon w/c decisions are based.
HILADO V. JUDGE REYES - Access to court records (access to official records vs.
good cause; purpose
of access and prejudice to parties) Julita, the surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto
Benedicto, was appointed administratrix of the latters estate. Petitioners filed 2 complaints
for damages against Roberto. For a while, the RTC allowed petitioners to regularly
examine the records of the case and to secure certified true copies, but the associate of
petitioners counsel was denied access to the last folder-record of the case. The SC held
that in determining whether particular information is of public concern, there is no specific
test because, ultimately, it is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis. The SC
also held that decisions and opinions of a court are matters of public concern
because the same are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws.
But pleadings and other documents filed by parties need not be matters of public
interest, as the same are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which
judgment may be rendered. Thus, not all judicial records are matters of public
interest. The SC further held that the right to access public or official records may be
restricted on a showing of good cause. To determine good cause, the judge must balance
the rights of parties based on the particular facts of each case. In other words, access to
judicial records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory power of
the court after considering:
The actual use or purpose for which access is sought
The obvious prejudice to any of the affected parties
In this case, the petitioners are interested parties who have a legitimate purpose for
accessing the said records, which was to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules
governing the preservation and proper disposition estates assets.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
BA-RA 7941 V. COMELEC - Party-list nominees According to COMELEC, Section 7 of
RA 7941 prohibits the appearance of the names of the party-list nominees on the certified
list, not to mention that party-list elections must not be personality-oriented. The SC held
that the right to information and the right to access to official records are not absolute and
are limited to: matters of public concern and matters that are not regarded by law as
confidential. The SC also held that the policy of full public disclosure is limited to: state
transactions involving public interest and subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law. In this case, no national security concern or the like is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups. Also, the prohibition under RA 7941
extends only to the certified list and there is absolutely nothing to prevent
COMELEC from disclosing the names through another medium.
GUINGONA, JR V. COMELEC - May 2010 elections (invalid denial to access;
mandamus of public right) Several media reports divulged that the preparations for the
May 2010 elections were fraught with controversies, among others.
SMARTMATIC supplied the wrong ultraviolet ink, but COMELEC still shouldered
the replacement
2 million ballot secrecy folders were bought at an overpriced rate and without
public bidding
The indelible ink of TEXAS RESOURCES was immediately washable, but
COMELEC still awarded the contract to the same
Certain PCOS machines in HK for the overseas absentee voting failed to accept
the ballots
The SC held that for mandamus to be successful. The information must be a matter of
public concern. In this case, the May 2010 elections, as well as the alleged wastage of
public funds brought about by bungled contracts attendant therein, is a matter of public
concern.The information must not be among those exempted by law. In this case,
COMELEC failed to cite any law exempting the info sought from the Constitutional
command. Thus, due to the Constitutional provisions, relevant jurisprudence, and various
Election Laws, COMELEC must accede to petitioners requests.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 8
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Right to Form Associations, Unions, or Societies
UNITED PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORY UNION vs. LAGUESMA managerial
employees not covered The petitioner (United Pepsi) is a union of supervisory
employees filing for Certification Election on behalf of the route managers of Pepsi-
Cola. Their petition was denied by the Secretary of Labor based on Art. 245 of the
Labor Code w/c provides that managerial employees are not eligible to join,
35 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
assist, or form labor organizations; supervisory employees are not allowed to
join rank-and-file organizations, but may form their own unions.
Managerial employees are generally classified into 3 groups
1. Top Managers, who are policy-determining and are in charge of overall
management
2. Middle Managers, who direct the conduct of other managers and
balance the demands of superiors and workers, and
3. First-line Managers, who directly supervise the workers and are
deemed the supervisory employees.
Route managers are, by all means, managerial employees; they hold a great
deal of responsibility in determining the success of the company through
planning, operation, and evaluation. They belong to the category of middle
managers.
The Constitution only intended to restore the right of supervisory employees
to form unions. It does not confer the same right to middle managers. The
ruling was based on the observation that Delegate Lerum made repeated
reference to supervisory employees (as well as government employees and
security guards) in proposing for the restoration of the right to unionize. The
rationale supposedly was that managerial employees act in a confidential capacity
and may thus lead to conflict of interest; the unions might also become company-
dominated. The route managers being managerial employees, are not eligible to
unionize; and the assailed Labor Code provision remains valid.
Dissent of Justice Davide:
Delegate Lerum expressly stated that he intended Articles 245 (assailed
provision) and 246 of the Labor Code to be automatically abolished. There
is no ambiguity or vagueness in his statements that would warrant implying
anything else. The intent was clearly to grant to all persons, whether rank-and-file
or managerial, the right to associate and form unions. Where the intent is clear,
there is no room for interpretation.
TUCP vs. NHC right to unionize granted to government employees The NHC is a
government-owned and controlled corporation w/o an original charter. Questioned
in this decision is the application by the NHC workers for a Certification Election for
the purpose of forming a union. The Constitution explicitly recognizes the right
of the people employed in both government and private sectors to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law. Further,
under Art. 9-B Sec. 2 of the Constitution, the right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees. The government is an employer is every sense,
and the unions have in fact, functioned as effective watchdogs against graft and
corruption. They have also served as effective forums where dialogue as well as
professional and self-development are promoted.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
SSS EMPLOYEES vs. CA no right to strike for government employees Employees
of the SSS staged a strike; the RTC enjoined the said employees and ordered them
to return to work; thus this petition before the Supreme Court. The Constitution is
silent as to whether government employees have the right to strike. Reference to
the Deliberations as well as to applicable laws (RA No. 875) reveals that the right
to form organizations does not include the right to strike.
Art. 13 Sec. 3 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of workers to self-
organization, negotiations, xxx including the right to strike in accordance w/ the
law. For as long as there is no law allowing government employees to strike
and regulating the same, any strike made by them is illegal. Relations between
private employers and employees rest on a voluntary basis subject to certain
requirements provided by law, but public employees are governed by Civil
Service Laws. It is the government that, by law, fixes the terms and
conditions of their employment not any collective bargaining agreement.
EO No. 180 allows public employees to negotiate the terms and conditions of
employment not fixed by law. If negotiations fail, their unions may bring the matter
before the Public Sector Labor Management Council. They may likewise lobby in
Congress for the terms they want; but they do not have the right to stage strikes,
walk-outs, or other temporary work stoppages.
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS vs. LAGUIO teachers on strike / SSS ruling
/ dissents A strike was staged by Manila public school teachers praying for
decent wages and protesting against the general lack of concern of the government
for their pressing grievances. The DECS summarily dismissed 20 teachers, 40
were suspended for 1 year, 33 for 9 months, 122 for six months. Many teachers
were placed on preventive suspension beyond the 90-day statutory limit. The
majority of the court applied the doctrine laid down in SSS Employees vs.
Court of Appeals in enjoining the strike. It was met by a barrage of dissenting
opinions.
Dissent of Justice Gutierrez
The suspensions meted against the teachers were cruel, arbitrary, and punitive,
being beyond the allowable 90-day period. This amounts to denial of substantive
due process. The SSS Ruling remains good law; however, what was involved
here was the right of the teachers to peaceful assembly, to free speech, and
to petition the government for redress of grievances not the right to strike.
Dissent of Justice Cruz
The teachers should be ordered reinstated in the meantime pending their
administrative investigations. They should not be indefinitely suspended. The SSS
Ruling should not be used as an excuse by the government to flatly ignore
the legitimate complaints of its employees. Just because teachers are governed
by Civil Service Law, it doesnt mean that they are deprived of their rights to free
speech and to peaceably assemble. Further, the prohibition against strikes
made by government employees must be re-examined.
36 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Dissent of Justice Feliciano
The prohibition on strikes is not even statutory in nature; it is only administrative
and regulatory in character. The Constitution itself is silent on the matter. It could
not be made an absolute rule. The court failed to balance the rights and
legitimate interests of the teachers on the one side, against the effective
maintenance of government on the other.
Dissent of Justice Padilla
There is also a violation of procedural due process. The dismissals and
suspensions were handed out in rapid succession characterized by
arbitrariness and undue haste. Further, the court dismissed the case because it
supposedly involved a question of fact, but proceeded, on the other hand to declare
that it was illegal and his could only be done if the facts were duly considered.
Dissent of Justice Sarmiento
There was clearly grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DECS, and the
court should not shirk based on the handy excuse that it cannot try facts. It
must be resolved before the court whether there was indeed due process or
arbitrariness in handing out their suspensions and dismissals. There is no harm in
listening to our educators.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 9
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Eminent Domain
Nature
BARDILLON vs. BARANGAY MASILI RTC jurisdiction / legality & necessity The
jurisdiction of the MTC questioned over the course of expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation suits are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC, regardless of the
value of the property. The subject of the action is the governments exercise
of eminent domain w/c is beyond pecuniary estimation. It does not involve the
recovery of a sum of money. The question that must be resolved in such cases is
the propriety of the expropriation whether it complies w/ the requisites for the valid
taking of private property. The Local Government Code provides requisites for
valid immediate entry as follows:
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
1. Filing of a complaint, sufficient in form and substance, for the purpose of
expropriation
2. Deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value (FMV) of
the property based on its current tax declaration
The RTC has authority to inquire about the legality as well as the genuine
necessity for expropriation. The amount is then determined only after the RTC is
satisfied w/ the validity and legality of the expropriation.
ESTATE OF JBL REYES vs. CITY OF MANILA statutory requisites / order of
priorities Heirs of JBL Reyes filed a case for unlawful detainer against Abiog &
Maglonso; they obtained a writ of execution. However, during the pendency of the
case, the City of Manila sought to expropriate the same properties. The CA issued
protective orders, requiring the parties to maintain the status quo until the
expropriation is resolved. The heirs question the legality and validity of the
expropriation. The Local Government Code and the Charter of the City of
Manila empower the same to expropriate private property for its urban land
reform and housing program; however there are other laws to be complied
with. RA No. 7279 (Urban Development & Housing Act) lays down the mandatory
priority in the acquisition of lands:
1. Those owned by the government
2. Alienable lands of the public domain
3. Unregistered, idle, or abandoned lands
4. Those w/in declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement,
Slum Improvement, or Resettlement Program sites
5. Bagong Lipinan Improvement Sites and Services (BLISS) w/c have not
been acquired
6. Privately owned lands (last in the priority)
Further, the same Act provides that expropriation is to be resorted to only
when other modes of acquisition (community mortgage, land swapping, land
assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation, joint venture, negotiated
purchase) have already been exhausted. The City of Manila failed to comply w/
any of the aforesaid requirements. The exercise of eminent domain cannot override
the guarantees of due process conferred upon the property owners.
Elements of Taking
REPUBLIC vs. CASTELLVI requisites for taking / computation from date of filing
Castellvi was the owner of real properties w/c she leased to the AFP the year 1949.
On the year 1959, the government sought to expropriate the properties, but
contended that actual taking commenced during 1949; hence, just compensation
should be based on the value of the property in 1949, not 1959.
The following are the requisites of a valid taking of property:
37 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
1. The expropriator must enter the property
2. Entry must be for more than a momentary period
3. Entry should be under warrant or color of authority
4. The property must be devoted to a public use, informally appropriated, or
injuriously affected
5. Utilization of the property for public use must be to such an extent
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof
The 2nd and 5th elements are missing. The entry was by virtue of a contract of
lease, renewable every year; it is for a momentary or limited period only.
Possession was merely transitory. Further, Castellvi remained the owner of the land
and was not deprived of any benefit therefrom she was paid rentals. The taking
of the property commenced from the time the complaint for expropriation was
filed (1959 and not 1949); just compensation must be determined based on
the date of the filing of such complaint.
CITY GOVERNMENT vs. ERICTA - cemetery lots for paupers / police power /
confiscation The City of Quezon City passed Ordinance No. 6118; Sec. 9 thereof
provides that the at least 6% of memorial parks or cemeteries should be set aside
for the burial of paupers who have been residents of QC for more than 5 years. The
City Council then issued a Resolution ordering the City Engineer to stop the selling
of such memorial park lots for failure to donate the said 6% portion. Among those
ordered was Himlayang Pilipino Inc. w/c assailed the constitutionality of the said
Ordinance. The City argues that it is a valid exercise of police power.
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. It
does not include the power to take private property for public use. If property
is to be taken under the authority of the police power, it must for the purpose
of being destroyed for the protection of the public welfare. The case at bar is
not one of regulation, but one of outright confiscation and w/o any just
compensation. The Ordinance must be struck down for warranting deprivation of
property w/o due process of law and w/o just compensation.
DD: If property is seized in the exercise of police power, then it must be destroyed
and no compensation is due. If property is taken for public use, then it is the power
of eminent domain that is exercised and just compensation must be made.
US vs. CAUSBY too near the runway / deprived of any use / indirect intrusion
Causby owned 2.8 acres of land situated very near to an airport used by the
government. The path of glide of the said airport passed directly over his property.
Various forms of aircraft used the airport, from bombers, to transport aircraft, to
fighters. They fly low enough to barely miss the top of the trees and blow the leaves
off; the noise is startling and the glare from the planes is disturbing. Causby was
forced to close his chicken business because many of his chickens were killed. He
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and his family have been deprived of sleep and the value of the property has
greatly depreciated.
If by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, Causby could not use
his land for any reasonable purpose, the loss would be complete and it is as
if the government entered into the land and took possession of it altogether.
It was as if the lands were used as runways themselves. Even assuming that the
airspace is deemed a public highway, still the landowner must have exclusive
control over the immediate atmosphere. The fact that the planes do not touch the
surface is immaterial because there was intrusion nonetheless w/c was so
immediate and deprives the owner of any beneficial use of his property. The flights
of the planes were the direct and immediate cause for depreciation of his properties
as well.
PEOPLE vs. FAJARDO view of the plaza / deprivation of property Juan Fajardo
was convicted for having constructed a building, w/o permit from the Municipal
Mayor, that obstructs the view of the Plaza from the Highway, contrary to an
Ordinance enacted for that matter. He assails the validity of the Ordinance. The
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. The purpose of the law may be valid;
however, the means employed is arbitrary. An ordinance w/c permanently
restricts the use of property such that it can no longer be used for any
reasonable purpose, is beyond regulation and constitutes taking of property.
It clearly oversteps the boundaries of the exercise of police power and amounts to
confiscation and deprivation of property w/o just compensation. The use and
enjoyment of the property is an element of ownership.
DD: If the City Government wishes to deprive Fajardo of any beneficial use of his
property to preserve the view of the plaza from the highway, then the city will have
to expropriate the property.
Take note that for a LGU to expropriate private property, an Ordinance for that
matter is necessary; mere Resolution is insufficient. This is according to the Local
Government Code.
REPUBLIC vs. PLDT telephone service disputes / expropriation of services The
PLDT entered into a contract w/ RCA Communications for the reception /
transmission of telephone messages to and from the US. The Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own telephone system and rented the trunk lines of
the PLDT subject to the condition that their use was not to be dedicated to private
use. Later the Bureau contracted w/ RCA for a joint overseas service; PLDT
objected stating that the Bureau was using their own trunk lines to compete w/
them. PLDT threatened that should the Bureau refuse to desist therefrom, in
violation of the agreement, PLDT would sever the telephone connections. The
Bureau refused to comply; thus, the PLDT severed the connections. The
Philippines was thus disconnected from the rest of the world except from the US.
As the PLDT and the Bureau failed to arrive at a compromise, the Bureau sought to
compel the PLDT to enter into a contract for the lease of the said trunk lines.
38 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Obviously, parties cannot be compelled to enter into contracts. The courts
cannot make contracts for the parties where there is none.
However, the government may exercise the power of eminent domain and
require the PLDT to permit interconnection w/ the government telephone
system subject to the payment of just compensation. It even imposes a mere
burden w/o loss of title and possession; the more should it reasonably be allowed.
The lower court should have just treated the case as one for expropriation.
NPC vs. JOCSON procedure / amount of deposit no longer discretionary /
assessed value This case enunciates the proper procedure for filing complaint
and deposit of corresponding amount of compensation. Under the OLD RULE, for
the purpose of expropriation, the court has authority to determine the provisional
value w/c must be deposited to the Treasurer before possession may be effected.
Under the NEW RULE, the courts no longer have such discretion. What is to be
deposited was the amount equivalent to the assessed value for taxation
purposes as reflected in the tax declaration. No hearing is required for the
purpose but the owner of the property must be duly notified. After the filing of
the complaint and compliance w/ the abovementioned deposit, the government can
now take possession of the property.
BENNIS vs. MICHIGAN confiscated car / police power / no compensation due
The car jointly owned by the Bennis spouses was confiscated by the Michigan
Court as a public nuisance because the husband, John, used it to engage in sexual
activity with a prostitute along a Detroit City street. He was convicted for gross
indecency. The wife, Tina, claims that, being the co-owner and innocent spouse,
without knowledge or consent to her husbands illegal activity, she has been
deprived of her property w/o due process of law. It is a well settled rule in
jurisprudence that the acts of the possessor bind the interests of the owner,
whether he is innocent or not.
The government is NOT required to compensate the owner of the property it
has lawfully taken unless the taking was done in the exercise the power of
eminent domain. In this case, the forfeiture was exercised through the police
power. The confiscation of the said property is in the nature of a penalty, hence no
compensation is due.
PENN CENTRAL vs. NEW YORK landmark designation / office over the terminal /
mere regulation The Landmarks Preservation Law created the Landmark
Preservation Commission w/c was empowered to designate buildings as
landmarks, and particular areas as landmark sites. Before alterations to such
landmarks may be made, the owner must acquire approval from the Commission.
Penn Central was the owner of Grand Central Terminal, w/c was designated as a
landmark, and the area around it as a landmark site. Penn Central sought to build a
multi-story office building over the terminal but was refused permission by the
Commission. Thus, Penn Central claims that such law deprives them of the use of
their property w/o due process of law.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
There was no taking because the City did not take possession or control of
the premises, but only regulated the exploitation of it. It simply prohibits Penn
Central from occupying certain features of the space above it, but allowing the use
of the other portions. The law does not interfere w/ the terminals present use
nor does it prevent Penn Central from any reasonable use and benefit
therefrom, as opposed to US vs. Causby, where the owner was almost completely
deprived of any reasonable benefit from his property. There is no showing that a
smaller and more harmonizing structure cannot be authorized.
Public Use
SUMULONG vs. GUERRERO socialized housing / public purpose The NHA
sought to expropriate 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal; among those sought
were properties of Sumulong & Balaoing. They assail the validity of the
expropriation, alleging that it does not satisfy the public use requirement since it
would benefit only a handful of people. The public use requirement is a
flexible, comprehensive, and evolving concept. Whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement; the construction
of low-cost housing (socialized housing) is recognized as a public purpose.
The fact that not all of the public but only some beneficiaries may avail thereof does
not deprive the expropriation of its public character. It is made pursuant to the
States mandate to promote social justice in all phases of national development.
The NHA is likewise vested w/ broad discretion to designate particular properties to
be taken for socialized housing purposes.
CAMARINES SUR vs. CA pilot farm & housing / public use / no need for DAR
approval Camarines Sur sought to expropriate certain parcels of land contiguous
to the capitol site to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional crops and
a housing project for government employees. It was assailed on the basis of public
use; the Solicitor General further opined that Camarines Sur should first secure the
approval of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform to convert the subject land from
agricultural to non-agricultural lands. Under the old concept of public use the
condemned property must actually be open to use by the general public;
however, under the new concept, public use simply means public
advantage or benefit or that it is intended to contribute to the general welfare
and prosperity.
The pilot farm and housing project more than satisfy this requirement by enhancing
livelihood of farmers and fishermen and for benefiting government employees.
While the power of local governments to exercise eminent domain may be
limited by the legislature, such limitation must be made expressly. There is
nothing in the Local Government Code that requires approval from the DAR before
properties may be expropriated by local government units.
MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG - Sports and recreational facility (no genuine necessity)
PASIG CITY sought to expropriate property of MASIKIP to construct a sports facility for the
poor residents of BARANGAY CANIOGAN. MASIKIP, although conceding that the same is
for a public purpose, claimed that there is no genuine necessity to justify the condemnation
39 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
of her property, as there is already an established sports development and recreational
activity center in PASIG CITY. The SC held that judicial review of the exercise of eminent
domain is limited to the following areas of concern:
The adequacy of the just compensation
The necessity of the taking
The public use character for the purpose of the taking
The SC also held that the right to take private property for public purposes a)
necessarily originates from the necessity and b) the taking must be limited to the
said necessity. In other words, the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity, which must be of a public character, provided that the
ascertainment of the necessity must precede the taking of the property and not following it.
The SC further held that necessity does not mean an absolute, but only a reasonable or
practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent
with such benefit. In this case, PASIG failed to establish that there is genuine necessity to
expropriate MASIKIPs property, as there already an established facility and the intended
beneficiary is the MELENDRES COMPOUND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION, not the
residents of CANIOGAN, such that the purpose is not clearly and categorically public. Last
but not least, the SC held that the right to own and possess property is one of the most
cherished rights of men and unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation
of ones property is clearly established, then it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the
rights of individuals to their private properties. The purpose of the taking of private property
must be specified and the genuine necessity for the taking must be shown to exist.
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT V. LOZADA, JR. - Lahug Airport ceased
to exist (constructive trust; commit to the use) Subject of the proceeding is a lot located in
Lahug, Cebu which was owned by Anastavio Deiparine when the same was subjected to
expropriation proceedings for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The
projected expansion and improvement was not pursued so respondents requested to
repurchase the land, the Civil Aeronautics Administration however replied that the lot might
still be needed as an emergency DC-3 airport but reiterated that should it not be used for
the said purpose, the respondents will have the right to repurchase. President Aquino
issued an order directing the transfer of aviation operations of the Lahug airport to the
Mactan airport and so it became clear that the lot would no longer be used for the purpose
agreed upon by the parties. The rights of the respondents may be enforced based on a
constructive trust constituted on the property held by the government in favor of the
respondents. Since the Republic failed to keep its bargain, it may be compelled to
reconvey the land because if not then the respondents will be deprived the right to use
their properties because of a purpose that was not contemplated when the expropriation
was granted.
Just Compensation
EPZA vs. DULAY just compensation / court discretion The Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA) sought to expropriate certain properties and presented tax
assessments made by the city assessor during martial law (way back) as basis
for computing just compensation. The EPZA further claims that the owners are
estopped from questioning the said assessments because they had prior
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
opportunities to do so. EPZA invokes PD Nos. 76, 464, 794, and 1533 claiming that
the courts no longer have discretion to determine just compensation.
Under the Rules of Court, the estimation of just compensation is discretionary upon
the courts. The assailed PDs have later been enacted taking away this discretion,
stating that the basis for determining just compensation shall be the market value
declared by the owner, or determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
The said Decrees are unconstitutional. They encroach upon judicial
prerogatives. Final determination of just compensation is incumbent upon
the courts. The PDs deprive the courts of discretion to determine what is just and
fair. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of its
taking; it requires a full equivalent of the loss sustained. In order to arrive at
such value, all the pertinent facts and circumstances, as well as
improvements must be considered. The rule laid down by the PDs can serve as
a guideline at most but cannot bind the courts. Due process also requires that the
owners be given the chance to dispute the valuations made in the tax assessments
w/c no longer reflect the true value of the lands.
DD: Determination of amount of just compensation is a judicial function.
CITY OF MANILA vs. ESTRADA determining just compensation / present and
future use Facts of the case are not provided. Determining the amount of just
compensation is usually a difficult task. The market value is attained by a
consideration of all those facts w/c make it commercially valuable. The same
considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private
parties in the regular course of business. The present use of the properties must
be considered as well as the possible future uses to w/c it is suitable.
MADDUMBA vs. GSIS Land Bank bonds / must be accepted at face value A Land
Bank bondholder purchased a residential house from the GSIS using the said bond
(acquired as just compensation). He seeks to compel the GSIS to accept the said
bonds in their face value; GSIS seeks to negotiate and secure a discount
therefrom. The Land Bank bonds are fully-guaranteed by the government and
their values cannot be diminished directly or indirectly. They are not ordinary
commercial papers subject to discounting. The mere acceptance of Land Bank
bonds as just compensation already entails some sacrifice on the part of the
landowner; to reduce their value would impose yet another burden. The purpose of
the law (RA No. 3844) is precisely to cushion the impact of dispossession upon the
landowner. That there is no explicit provision regarding the matter is immaterial; the
intent of the law prevails. GOCCs such as the GSIS thus may be compelled under
the law to accept such bonds at their face value.
DD: Generally, just compensation must be made in cash; however, the Supreme
Court made an exception in case the property is expropriated under the Agrarian
Reform Program. In this case, the SC allowed compensation in the form of Land
Bank bonds, among other modes. This entails sacrifice on the part of the
40 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
landowners. To allow government to discount the value of the bonds would
augment the sacrifice of the landowners; thus, they must be accepted at face value.
NAPOCOR vs. CA computed based on date of filing of complaint / exception
Facts of the case are not provided. At issue in this case is the point from w/c just
compensation is to be computed. The general rule is that the taking coincides
w/ the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Thus the value of the property
at the time of the filing of the complaint serves as basis. The same applies if
the complaint is made prior to entry into the property.
The exception to the rule is when such would give undue incremental
advantages to the landowner arising from the use by the government of the
said property. In this case, just compensation is computed on the basis of the
entry or the taking of the property, not from the filing of the complaint.
DD: If the entry took place before the filing of the complaint, and as a result the
value of the property increased, then the value of the property at the time of the
taking shall be basis for computing just compensation, plus legal interest. In all
other cases, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint
shall be basis.
Under the present state of law, the State must make a down payment of 15% of
the fair market value based on the tax declaration before entering the property.
Full payment is not required before entry to the property can be effected (Iloilo vs.
Legaspi).
MERALCO vs. PINEDA Board of Commissioners is mandatory Respondent judge,
during the expropriation proceedings, arrived at the valuation of P 40.00 per sq.m.
based on a Joint Venture Agreement submitted before him and w/o the reception of
evidence before a Board of Commissioners. There are 2 stages in an
expropriation proceeding:
1. Determination of legality of the exercise of eminent domain, and
2. Determination of just compensation.
A trial before the Board of Commissioners is a mandatory requirement. It is
indispensable and allows parties to present evidence regarding just
compensation. The court should appoint 3 competent and disinterested persons to
act as the Board upon the entry of the order of condemnation. The court may rely
upon the report of the Board or may reject the same, but nevertheless cannot
dispense w/ the said requirement w/o violating the right of the landowners to due
process and just compensation. The Joint Venture Agreement relied upon is
incompetent to determine just compensation.
DE KNECHT vs. BAUTISTA EDSA extension / into residential district / arbitrary
The government, through the DPWH sought to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard;
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
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the said extension was to pass through Cuneta Avenue. However, subsequently,
the DPWH decided to change the course of the extension to make the same pass
through Fernando Rein & Del Pan Streets, w/c are lined w/ old and substantial
houses among the owners was Cristina de Knecht who sought to enjoin the
government from proceeding w/ the expropriation. It is not disputed that the
government may take private property for public use upon just
compensation; however, this power cannot be exercised capriciously or
arbitrarily. The landowners are covered by the mantle of protection of due process.
It is odd why the DPWH decided to suddenly change the course of the extension
when the previous course through Cuneta Avenue was subject to careful study and
consideration. Likewise, the Human Settlements Commission, tasked by the
President to investigate the matter, found that the choice of Fernando Rein and Del
Pan Streets was indeed arbitrary and ill-advised.
payments or the propriety of the expropriation. The value of the property should
also be determined in appropriate proceedings. There is no showing that the
said premises are even blighted areas other than the declaration of the President.
Expropriation must be exercised based on public necessity. There is no
showing why the said properties were singled out for expropriation. At least,
expropriations in Congress are attended by debates and deliberations; this was
issued by the President w/o justification for the choice of properties sought. Also,
private property may not be expropriated for private use, even despite full
compensation. The government cannot just take private property and transfer
ownership thereof to another private individual. The government has to justify the
expropriation on the basis of public use and necessity.

REPUBLIC vs. DE KNECHT last man standing / supervening events / no longer

arbitrary A few years after the ruling in De Knecht vs. Bautista, the legislature
enacted BP No. 340 expropriating the same properties along the Fernando Rein-
Del Pan Streets. However, certain factual changes have taken place. The
government has already acquired, though negotiated sale 80% to 85% of the said
lands from their respective landowners; only a few landowners including De Knecht
vigorously opposed. The social impact w/c persuaded the court to consider the BILL OF RIGHTS
extension arbitrary under the previous ruling has already disappeared. De
Knecht remains as the sole obstacle to the project. SECTION 10

De Knecht even offered armed resistance through her private guards. If the said
property was not to be taken, traffic will continue to clog EDSA and Taft Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
intersections and the drainage and flood control programs would be paralyzed. The
Legislature thus no longer acts w/ arbitrariness in deciding to expropriate De
Knechts property. According to Justice Cruz, BP No. 340 is not a reversal of the
The Impairment Clause
ruling in De Knecht vs. Bautista because this case was tried under a different set of
facts.
HOME BUILDING & LOAN ASSOC. vs. BLAISDELL mortgage moratorium /
remedies modified / reserved powers In order to address an economic crisis,
MANOTOK vs. NHA expropriated by Presidential Decree / no proceedings
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law was passed allowing parties to a contract
whatsoever LOI No. 555 & 557 declared the Tambunting Estate and Estero de
to judicially avail of postponement of auction sales or extensions of periods of
Sunog-Apog blighted communities. PD No. 1669 & 1670 declared the said
redemption; effective only during the existence of the emergency. It was assailed
properties expropriated, and authorized the NHA to immediately possess and
for allegedly impairing the obligation of contracts. The means of enforcing the debt
control them. The President declared that the actions of the NHA pursuant thereto
is material to the obligation; but while the obligation may generally not be
are beyond review by the courts. The said PDs decreed maximum compensation
impaired, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the
at P 17 million and P 8 million for the respective properties, payable in 5 annual
legislature may direct, provided substantive rights are not diminished.
installments. The 1st annual installments were deposited w/ the PNB; notice was
given to the owners of the said properties. Manotok, one of the landowners,
assailed the validity of the said PDs. The assailed PDs suffer several The prohibition against impairment of obligations of contracts is not
constitutional defects. absolute. Certain powers are reserved to the State to protect public safety, or
in this case, the economic interests. The legislature cannot bargain away the
public health or the public morals. They cannot be removed from the regulative
The estates were summarily declared blighted areas and expropriated w/o
powers of the State. The test is whether the legislation is addressed to a
any proceedings whatsoever. This violates due process for many reasons.
legitimate end, and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate. In
The landowners are not afforded the opportunity to be heard, or question the
41 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
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this case, there was indeed an economic emergency to be addressed, threatening
the massive loss of homes and lands. The law was enacted for the interest of the
society and was effective for a limited period only, w/c by all means is not
unreasonable. The integrity of the mortgage was not impaired; the conditions and
terms attendant to mortgage are preserved except that the remedies are slightly
modified.
DD: Since impairment of the obligation of contracts is necessarily an exercise of the
police power, the standards of substantive due process are applicable. The
impairment must be for a valid and lawful purpose, and the means must be
reasonable, not arbitrary or oppressive.
RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN debt moratorium / 8-year period is oppressive / no
emergency RA No. 342 provides debtors in contracts entered into prior to World
War 2, who have suffered from the ravages of the said war, a period of 8 years to
settle their debts upon filing a claim before the Phil. War Damage Commission. The
debts cannot be enforced until after the lapse of the said period. The purpose
allegedly was to enable the pre-war debtors to rehabilitate themselves and to keep
them from being victimized by their creditors.
The 8-year period is unreasonable and oppressive. The application of the
reserved powers of the State may postpone the enforcement of the
obligation, but the restriction must not be unduly burdened w/ conditions or
the extensions should not be so piled-up as to make the remedy a shadow.
Some of the investments were pending as early as 1941, and the law would require
the creditors to wait for some 12 years before they may claim what is due to them.
The debtor is not even required to pay legal interest. Further, in the context of the
prevailing circumstances, development has spurred after the war as evidenced by
national economic developments. The contemplated emergency thus is no longer
existent. The said law should thus be struck down.
DEL ROSARIO vs. DE LOS SANTOS tenancy-leasehold agreements / social
justice Victorino & Tomas de los Santos, as farmer-tenants of landlord Ernesto
del Rosario, filed petitions before the Court of Agrarian Relations to take advantage
of Sec. 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, w/c empowers the tenant to change the
tenancy contract from share tenancy to leasehold and vice versa, and from one
crop sharing agreement to another. Del Rosario assailed the validity of the said law
for violating the impairment clause. The obligation of contracts must yield to the
proper exercise of the police power for a lawful and reasonable purpose
provided that the means used are not arbitrary and oppressive. The validity of
the measure is beyond question; it is for the improvement of the conditions of the
oppressed farmer-tenants. It is mandated by the social justice provisions of the
Constitution. Those who have less in life should have more in law. The means
adopted was not arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive.
ABELLA vs. NLRC hacienda employees / separation pay / protection of workers
Abella leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona for a period of 10 years extended for
another 10 years. She hired Dionele and Quitco, who have been employed for 33
42 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
and 14 years respectively, both promoted to the position of Cabo. As her lease
expired, Abella closed her business and terminated the services of Dionele and
Quitco, who then demanded overtime pay, reinstatement, and separation pay
based on Art. 284 of the Labor Code. The NLRC sustained separation pay but
since the cessation of the business was a valid cause for termination, the other
remedies were denied. Abella alleges that when she leased the Hacienda, she and
the lessor never contemplated any separation pay to workers at the end of the
lease.
The impairment clause is not absolute; it only prohibits impairment that is
unreasonable. Appropriate legislation may modify or abrogate contracts
already in effect, provided that there is a lawful purpose to justify it, and the
means employed is legitimate. The purpose of the law, in this case, is obvious: to
afford protection to the workers. The means employed is likewise not unreasonable
or oppressive. Also, to come under the prohibition, the law must affect the
rights of the parties among each other and not w/ reference to third parties.
Even though Dionele and Quitco were absorbed by the new management, there is
no showing that the new management absorbed the responsibilities of the former;
thus they are deemed terminated from previous employment and employed as new
workers under the new management. Thus they are entitled to separation pay.
VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES vs. PHIL. VETERANS BANK power to regulate
banking system The Phil. Veterans Bank, created under special law, was placed
under receivership by virtue of Res. No. 334 of the Monetary Board, w/c eventually
ordered its liquidation. It was opposed by the Phi. Veterans Bank Employees as
well as the Veterans Federation of the Phils. alleging that the Bank was created
under special law and a contract now exists between the government and its
stockholders (veterans), and to disturb that relation would violate the Impairment
Clause.
Even assuming that the charter created a contract between the government
and the stockholders, it does not follow that the relationship cannot be
altered altogether. The Central Bank Act expressly empowered the Central
Bank to regulate the banking system and to step in and salvage the
remaining assets of the Bank to prevent their further dissipation. Contracts
cannot, by express agreement, fetter the authority of Congress. It is the duty of
the government to preserve the public faith in the banking system. The mere
fact that the Bank was created under special law does not confer upon it
extraordinary privileges above those granted to other banks w/ similar charters.
DD: Non-impairment is now actually the exception rather than the general rule,
because all contracts somehow affect the public interest and thus cannot be
severed from the police power. Better stated, the rule now is that Congress may
impair any obligation, provided that it is done for a lawful purpose and carried out
through reasonable means.
ORTIGAS & CO. vs. FEATI BANK zoning regulation / valid purpose and means
Ortigas & Co. was selling lots, particularly those of Highway Subdivision Hills, along
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
EDSA. It sold Lots 5 & 6 to Augusto Padilla, who transferred his rights to Emma
Chavez. The sale was subject to the condition that the said lots were to be used
exclusively for residential purposes. The conditions were annotated in the
respective TCTs. The lots later were acquired by Feati Bank w/c started to build a
Bank; Ortigas sought to enjoin the construction. Feati alleges that Resolution No.
27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declared the said area (including Lots
5 & 6) a commercial and industrial zone. Ortigas asserts that the Resolution impairs
the obligation of contracts.
The non-impairment clause is not absolute; it must be reconciled w/ the
exercise of the police power of the State. The Local Autonomy Act
empowered the LGUs to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances and
regulations. It does not even require an ordinance for a mere resolution
suffices. The Resolution was enacted for a valid purpose, w/c was to promote the
development of the area into a commercial district; and the means used to carry it
out were neither arbitrary nor oppressive. In fact, the lots front EDSA, where
industrial and commercial complexes have flourished already.
JUAREZ vs. CA rental regulation / housing problem / public interest BP No. 877
was enacted regulating rental rates, especially in urban areas. It prevents the lessor
from increasing the rentals arbitrarily, and at the same time prevents the lessee
from insisting on paying inordinately low rentals. It covered all residential units w/ a
monthly rental less than P 480 and applied retroactively. Juarez assails its
constitutionality on the basis of the impairment clause. Housing is one of the
most serious social problems of the country and the lease of residential units
affects the public welfare; thus the police power prevails over the impairment
clause in this case in the absence of arbitrariness. Most private contracts
nowadays have for their subject matter things necessarily imbued w/ public interest
and are thus subject to the police power of the State.
CITY OF SAN PABLO vs. MERALCO franchise tax / local autonomy / taxing
power San Pablo imposed a local franchise tax upon Meralco through Ordinance
No. 56. Meralco asserts that it enjoys tax exemptions based on its franchise. The
Local Government Code empowers the LGUs to impose franchise taxes
notwithstanding any exemption granted by law. The franchise tax is thus
imposable in spite of any exemption either under general or special law. The
purpose of the LGC is to further the constitutional policy of local autonomy and to
enable the LGUs to attain the fullest development as self-reliant communities. Thus
it does not violate the impairment clause; franchises are subject to alterations
through the reasonable exercise of the police power. Further, the power to
tax, like police power, cannot be bargained away by the legislature.
Additional Case
CHAVEZ vs. COMELEC product endorsements / pre-mature campaigning Frank
Chavez entered into endorsement contracts w/ the 96 North, Konka International
Plastics, and G-Box companies for the advertisement of the latters products. As a
43 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
result 3 billboards were erected along the Balintawak Interchange of North
Expressway bearing his name and picture endorsing the products of the said
companies. Based on Res. No. 6520, the COMELEC ordered Chavez to remove
the said billboards. The said provision requires the removal of posters, streamers,
and other forms of media bearing the name or picture of candidates for public office
w/in 3 days after its effectivity. The objective of the Resolution is to prevent pre-
mature campaigning and to level the playing field between candidates w/
substantial war chests and those who are less wealthy. Chavez assails the validity
of the said Resolution based on the impairment clause (among other grounds).
The impairment clause is not absolute and must be reconciled w/ the police
power of the State. In this case, the Legislature, through the Omnibus
Election Code, expressly empowered the COMELEC to prohibit pre-mature
campaigning, either directly or indirectly. The moment Chavez filed his
certificate of candidacy, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed a
partisan political character; and brought Chavez under the coverage of the
prohibition. It amounts to indirect campaigning.
The Omnibus Election Code and the Implementing Rules of the COMELEC are
enacted for a valid purpose, w/c is to preserve the integrity of the electoral process
and to level the playing field among candidates for public office; this particular
means to carry out the objective is neither arbitrary nor oppressive.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 11
Section 11. Free access to courts and to quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
Free Access to Courts, Quasi-Judicial Bodies, and Adequate Legal Assistance
MIJARES vs. JAVIER-RANADA P 472 million docket fee! The petitioners in this
case represent the human rights victims during martial law. They were able to
secure a favorable judgment in the US District Court of Hawaii, w/c rendered a final
judgment awarding them some $ 1.9 billion from the Marcos Estate. They thus filed
a petition before the Makati RTC praying for the execution of the said judgment.
They paid P 410.00 in docket and filing fees; the Marcos heirs contested invoking
SC Circular No. 7 pertaining to the proper computation of filing fees. On the basis
thereof, the Makati RTC assessed and required the petitioners to pay a
whopping filing fee of P 472 million. Thus, they appeal to the Supreme Court.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
The ruling is patently unjust. To preclude the filing an action for enforcement of
a foreign judgment due to exorbitant assessment of docket fees runs afoul to
the general principles of justice as well as international law. The respondent
judge should have relied on Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in assessing
the docket fees, the action falling under the category all other actions not involving
property. Thus, only the minimal blanket filing fee should be required.
The free access to courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. This is
provision gives rise to a demandable right as part of the guarantees under
the Bill of Rights.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 12
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations
of this section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Rights under Custodial Investigation
MIRANDA vs. ARIZONA The Miranda Rights In this case, the US Supreme Court
examined and discussed the common practice of ominously securing extra-judicial
and incriminating confessions from persons under custodial investigation. The
accused was placed in a secluded room w/ no access to the outside, in an
obviously police-dominated atmosphere. Interrogators are often directed to use
trickery or threat to extract confessions. The persons are misinformed that their
44 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
refusal to talk may suggest guilt. The person is deprived of any outside support; his
will is undermined and he is led into affirming a preconceived story concocted by
the police. Many people succumb to this tactic and render self-incriminating
statements. The US Supreme Court laid down the following rules to be
observed during custodial investigation:
1. The person must be informed of his right to remain silent
2. That any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him
3. That he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed
4. Any waiver should be made voluntarily and knowingly
Evidence obtained in violation thereof is inadmissible. The said rules intend to
protect the person against self-incrimination and to keep the arresting officers from
taking short-cuts to secure convictions. The rules intend to preserve the publics
faith in the justice system.
MAGTOTO vs. MANGUERA prospective effect Two persons under custodial
investigation were not informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel; extra
judicial admissions were obtained therefrom. The said investigation took place
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution where no such right had yet existed.
The Constitutional provisions on the right to remain silent and to counsel, as
well as the right to be informed of such, are to be applied prospectively. Since
the confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, then
the admissions are still admissible as evidence, even if they were presented
thereafter. Had the admissions been obtained after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, they would have been inadmissible.
PEOPLE vs. MAHINAY Updated set of rights The following rules must be complied
with while the accused is under custodial investigation, he must be informed of:
1. The reason for his arrest and must be shown the warrant
2. His right to remain silent
3. His right to counsel, preferably of his own choice
4. That if he has no lawyer, one will be provided for him
5. That no custodial investigation can be conducted except in the presence
of counsel
6. That at any time he is allowed to confer w/ his lawyer, immediate family,
priest, etc.
7. That he may waive the said rights knowingly and intelligently
8. That should he waive such right, it must be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel
9. That he may refuse, at any stage of the process, to answer interrogations
10. That any previous waiver of such rights is not a bar to invoking them
again
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
11. That any evidence obtained in violation of such rules is inadmissible
against him
PEOPLE vs. TAYLARAN the granny killer / voluntary surrender / no custodial
investigation yet Taylaran surrendered to the police and admitted to Pat. Basilad
that he killed a certain Ofremia Atup (an old woman) because of her alleged vow to
kill him through witchcraft. The confession was made even before the police
investigation could be initiated. He now questions the admissibility of the said
confession for not having complied w/ the constitutionally mandated procedure. The
statement was not made while under custodial investigation; hence the
statement is admissible and Section 12 does not yet operate. The
constitutional safeguards thus cannot yet be invoked. He voluntarily admitted the
killing for the exact purpose of surrendering to the police.
PEOPLE vs. MAQUEDA Miranda Rights / any time prior to arraignment /
PEOPLE vs. JUDGE AYSON statement during administrative proceedings Felipe
Ramos was a PAL ticket freight clerk. He was investigated for irregularities in the
sale of plane tickets. He executed a handwritten statement during the investigation
saying that he is willing to settle the irregularities charged against him. It was not
executed in the presence of or w/ the assistance of a lawyer, nor was he informed
of his right to remain silent. He was then charged for estafa. He assails the validity
of the statements he made during the administrative investigation for violating
his right against self-incrimination and his Miranda Rights. While the right against
self-incrimination may be invoked during civil, administrative, or criminal
proceedings, the Miranda Rights apply only to persons under custodial
investigation for the commission of offenses. The person must be taken into
custody or must otherwise be deprived of liberty in a significant way. The
abovementioned statement was not made under custodial investigation; thus is
not protected by the Miranda Doctrine. Ramos even voluntarily answered the said
questions during the administrative investigation.
There is a different set of rights for persons once the case is filed in court,
such as follows:
1. Right to refuse to testify
2. Right not to be prejudiced as a result of his refusal
PEOPLE vs. BALISTEROS Miranda Rights are personal Galvante executed a
3. Right to testify in his own behalf subject to cross examination
4. Once he testified, the right against self-incrimination for other offenses
than those for w/c he is being prosecuted
DD: The rights under prosecution are discussed extensively under Section 14.
PEOPLE vs. MARRA spontaneous statement / admissible Sgt. De Vera reported to
crime scene to conduct an investigation and was informed that a man wearing a
security guards uniform perpetrated the incident. He was directed to Marra who
was eating in a nearby carinderia. Marra informed him that his gun was at his
house. They proceeded to the house. De Vera asked Marra why he killed Tandoc,
but the later initially denied. Eventually though, he admitted the same and claimed
45 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
self-defense. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he informed of his Miranda
Rights. The admissibility of the admission was thus questioned in this case.
Marra was not under custodial investigation when he made the statement;
thus they are admissible in evidence even if Marra has not been informed of
his rights. He was never subjected to any form of restraint. Marra could have
validly refused to answer the questions from the very start, instead he the
statement spontaneously; De Vera was merely probing the possibilities.
DD: Take note that Marra was not deprived of liberty and he made the confession
spontaneously.
admission vs. confession Maqueda was prosecuted for the commission of an
offense; evidence adduced against him included (1) a Sinumpaang Salaysay as
well as (2) extra-judicial admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate
for the purpose of negotiating his privileges as a possible state witness. The
Sinumpaang Salaysay was not made in the presence of counsel and was executed
after Maqueda has been arrested and prior to arraignment.
As opposed to the ruling in People vs. Judge Ayson, the Miranda Rights cover
not only custodial investigations, but also apply to persons not in custody at
any time prior to arraignment. Thus the Sinumpaang Salaysay, executed prior
to arraignment, is inadmissible as evidence for not having been executed w/
assistance from counsel. The Sinumpaang Salaysay, however, was merely an
extra-judicial admission, NOT an extra-judicial confession. An admission pertains
only to pertinent facts, while a confession is a declaration by the accused of
his own guilt.
The admissions before the prosecutor, however, are admissible. They were made
freely and voluntarily and not during the course of an investigation but merely for
the purpose negotiating immunity as a state witness. They are not covered by the
exclusionary rule under the Bill of Rights.
sworn statement under pressure categorically admitting guilt w/o the assistance of
counsel and in the presence of the opposing counsel, the brothers of the deceased
(whom he allegedly killed), and a stranger. The appellants (not Galvante, but other
accused) assail the validity of Galvantes confession as having been made in
violation of the Miranda Rights. The objection can only be raised by the
confessant or the person whose rights have been violated, and not by other
persons. The right is a personal right.
DD: Simply put, an extra-judicial admission or confession made by the confessant
in violation of the Miranda Rights is inadmissible as evidence against him
(confessant), but is admissible against other persons.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
GAMBOA vs. JUDGE CRUZ police line-up / vagrancy / no interrogation Gamboa
was arrested and detained w/o warrant for vagrancy. He was lined up w/ 5
detainees and the complainant pointed to him saying that ones a companion. He
was then made to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being
interrogated. The line-up was made w/o the presence of counsel; thus its validity
is being assailed. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of investigation,
when the officers start to interrogate and elicit information or confessions
from the accused. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest,
hence no right to counsel yet attaches. Gamboa did not have to give any
statement to the police nor was he interrogated. It was actually the complainant
who was being interrogated by the police. However, the moment that there is
even a slight move to elicit information, then the accused should then be
assisted by counsel.
PEOPLE vs. LOVERIA police line-up / hold-up men / no custodial investigation
Upon learning that certain hold-up men were being detained, Manzanero
proceeded to the detention facility and identified to Pat. Bill Ayun the perpetrator
Loveria during a police line-up. He made a sworn statement to that effect w/c was
presented in court. Loveria was not entitled to counsel yet when he was in the
process of being identified, because at that time he was not being
interrogated. The Miranda Rights may only be invoked by a person under
custodial investigation, w/c Loveria was not.
PEOPLE vs. DIMAANO same thing A confrontation was arranged by the Caloocan
City Police between the complainant and her witnesses and the alleged
perpetrators for the purpose of identification. The person had not yet been held
to answer for a criminal offense; there was still no confrontation between the
State and the individual. A police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest;
hence no right to counsel yet accrues.
PEOPLE vs. HATTON line-up / may be part of custodial investigation / but not in
this case Hatton was subjected to a police line-up and invokes US vs. Wade in
asserting that his Miranda Rights, particularly to counsel, were violated. In the case
of US vs. Wade, a lawyer was present during the police line-up to be identified by
the prosecution witness. In the Wade Case, even if he was subjected to a police
line-up, such line-up was already part of the custodial investigation because
Wade was also being interrogated; thus his right to counsel accrued. It was
conducted already 15 days after his arrest. In this case, Hatton was only brought
for the purpose of identification by a witness for the killing of Algarme; hence he
was not yet under custodial investigation.
PEOPLE vs. FRAGO line-up / exception inapplicable / no peculiar circumstances
here Orlando Frago was identified by a certain Jicelyn during a police line-up
composing of 10 men; most of them were mustachioed. He invokes People vs.
Hassan asserting that he ought to have been assisted by counsel during the police
line-up. In the Hassan Case, there was a peculiar factual milieu. Hassan was the
only person brought for identification, w/c was held in the funeral parlor, amidst the
grieving relatives of the victim. It is as tainted as an uncounselled confession. As a
46 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
result, what purported to be a mere identification was actually a
confrontation; hence Hassan had the right to counsel. No such facts are
attendant in this case.
In short, the Hassan Case was attended by exceptional and anomalous
circumstances. In this case, there was nothing to show that during the police line-
up, the police sought to extract any information from Frago; hence his right to
counsel had yet to accrue.
DD: From the foregoing we deduce the general rule that police lineups are not part
of custodial investigation because the accused is not asked questions. He just has
to be identified. But from the moment he is interrogated or asked questions
pertaining to the crime, the right to counsel attaches.
PEOPLE vs. GAMBOA paraffin test / not testimonial compulsion / no right to
counsel Gamboa was subjected to a paraffin test to determine if he indeed had
fired a gun. The results turned out positive. He asserts that he should have been
assisted by counsel and that it amounts to self-incrimination. The rights against
self-incrimination as well as the right to counsel extend only to testimonial
compulsion, and not when the body of the accused is examined.
PEOPLE vs. LINSANGAN marked money / not basis for liability / no self-
incrimination Linsangan initialed the P 10.00 bills found tucked in his waist w/o
the presence of counsel. He acquired the marked money for the sale of marijuana
during a buy-bust operation. His possession of the marked bills did not
constitute the crime; what constituted the crime was his act of selling
marijuana. Thus his right against self-incrimination was not violated by his
possession of the marked bills. Law enforcers are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner in the absence of convincing evidence to the
contrary.
PEOPLE vs. DE LAS MARIAS Receipt signed by accused / right to remain
silent De Las Marias and Torres were made to sign a Receipt for Property
Seized, acknowledging that they are the owners of the things seized in connection
w/ the commission of a felony. It was a clear violation of the right to remain
silent because it had the effect of an extrajudicial confession of the
commission of the offense albeit not verbally expressed. They practically
admitted possessing certain articles in connection w/ an offense. It should be the
police who should have signed the receipts, not the accused. It was merely a clever
ploy to incriminate the suspects.
PEOPLE vs. ENRIQUE signed name in marijuana sticks/ tantamount to
admission During investigation, Enrique was made to sign his name on rolled
marijuana cigarettes w/o the assistance of counsel. The arresting officers did not
even inform him of his Miranda Rights. In effect, the act was obviously
tantamount to an admission in clear violation of the Constitution.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
PEOPLE vs. BANDIN Booking Sheet / mere record / not basis for conviction
Bandin was arrested for possession of drugs. He signed the Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report at the Station. He also signed the Receipt of Property Seized w/o
the assistance of counsel. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the
accuseds being booked as well as the date of his arrest. It cannot, by any
stretch of the imagination, be the basis for a judgment of conviction.
The accuseds signature on the Receipt (seizure of drugs) was tantamount to an
admission because mere possession of drugs is a crime in itself. It was an extra-
judicial and uncounselled admission made in clear violation of the Bill of Rights.
ESTACIO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN waiver of rights / last minute arrival of lawyer /
ratified While Estacio was under investigation, he was briefed by the investigator
of his rights under custodial investigation. When asked if he wished to waive the
said rights, he agreed and signed a waiver. He then proceeded to make certain
extra-judicial statements. Then, his lawyer, at the last minute, arrived, read the
waiver, and confirmed w/ Estacio whether indeed he sought to waive his rights.
Estacio confirmed the waiver. While the accused was validly informed of his
rights, the waiver was initially invalid for having been made w/o the presence
of counsel. However, when his counsel arrived at the last minute and Estacio
signed the waiver in his presence, the defect was cured. The statements were
thus held admissible as evidence.
DD: This ruling no longer holds under the present state of law. Counsel must be
present at every stage of the investigation, not only during the closing stages as
will be illustrated by the next cases.
PEOPLE vs. DE JESUS reduced to writing w/ counsel / right accrues at start of
investigation Tupaz and De Jesus were turned over to the investigating officer by
the CID for investigation. They were interrogated w/o the presence of counsel for a
certain robbery hold-up w/ homicide. The facts and statements were reduced in
writing and signed in the presence of a CLAO lawyer, Atty. Saldivar. The right to
counsel attaches from the START of the custodial investigation, when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information or
confessions from the accused. Thus, there was a clear violation of the accuseds
right to counsel in this case and the evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible.
The Constitutional requirement was not sufficiently satisfied.
DD: This is the more accurate rule as opposed to the Estacio Case provided above.
PEOPLE vs. BOLANOS confession on board police jeep / already custodial
investigation While Bolanos and Magtibay were boarded in the police jeep, and
on their way to the station, Bolanos confessed killing the victim. This was the only
evidence relied upon to convict him. As Bolanos was already on board the
police jeep, he was already under custodial investigation and should have
47 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
been informed of his Miranda Rights already. Given that the extra-judicial
confession is inadmissible, the accused must be acquitted.
DD: From the moment the accused is in any way significantly deprived of liberty, he
cannot be asked questions unless he is assisted by counsel and was well informed
of his rights. Otherwise, any confession or admission made by him is inadmissible.
PEOPLE vs. LUCERO left by lawyer during interrogation / denial of right to
competent counsel While Lucero was under custodial investigation, he was
provided w/ a lawyer from the CIS Legal Department (Atty. Peralta). Peralta
explained all his rights under custodial investigation and stated that even had he
made certain statements therein, he could still refuse to sign the same. Atty. Peralta
gathered the impression that Lucero understood. When the investigation started,
Atty. Peralta then left to attend the wake of his friend and gave word that should he
be needed, he could be reached at his residence. The next day, Lucero,
accompanied by CIS agents arrived at Peraltas residence carrying a signed
statement by Lucero. Peralta explained the implications of such statements but
Lucero nevertheless consented thereto. Later, Lucero claimed that he signed the
statement under duress and in the absence of his lawyer.
When the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it means effective and
vigilant counsel. Peralta left the accused during the most crucial point of the
investigation. The result was an uncounselled confession. The right to counsel
attaches from the start of the investigation. In this case, Lucero was practically
denied his right to competent legal counsel.
PEOPLE vs. PAJORINOG choice of lawyer / acquiescence Pajorinog, who was
arrested for triple murder, claims that the lawyer assigned to him, Atty. Fuentes,
was not of his choice and was only forced upon him. The evidence however reveals
that Atty. Fuentes was nevertheless w/ him throughout the investigation; he
complained regarding the matter only during trial. While the initial choice of a
lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused has the
final choice and may reject the same and ask for a new lawyer. However, in
this case, all throughout the proceedings, the accused never voiced any
objection as to the choice of his counsel. He thus acquiesced to the choice of
the investigators and raised the matter only during trial, which was too late.
DD: From the foregoing, it is clear that while generally the choice of counsel
devolves upon the accused, the investigators may provide him w/ counsel if he
consents thereto. If he distrusts the counsel appointed, he has the right to refuse
and may request counsel of his own choosing. However, if he acquiesces or does
not object to the counsel appointed, and the latter performs his duties properly, the
accused cannot, all of a sudden, aver that his right to choice of counsel was
violated. Definitely, the matter cannot be raised only during trial.
PEOPLE vs. PAMON lawyer appointed by investigator / conformity of confessor /
valid confession Pamon asserts that Atty. Ligorio was not his choice of counsel
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
and that he was merely forced to sign a paper w/c turned out to be a letter to Atty.
Ligorio. Atty. Ligorio, however, was present during the time when Pamons
confession was made and sworn to and has participated nonetheless during the
investigation. If the counsel is appointed by the investigators, generally,
admissions made before said counsel are inadmissible unless the
appointment was made w/ the conformity of the confessor. The rule is
otherwise if the accused acquiesced to the choice of counsel. Pamon never
signified that he had a lawyer of choice, hence he was merely provided w/ one and
he clearly acquiesced thereto.
PEOPLE vs. BAELLO failure to ask for new counsel While Baello was under
custodial investigation, he stated that he could not afford the services of a lawyer;
hence he was provided w/ one in Atty. Generoso. No objection was voiced by
Baello during the entire proceedings. Atty. Generoso informed him in detail of his
rights and the implications of his confessions. He even advised against such but
Baello insisted in confessing to robbery. Baello later on asserts that he was not fully
and duly assisted by counsel engaged by him. Every lawyer is presumed to be
knowledgeable about the law as well as training in procedure. Baellos failure
to request for new counsel during the proceedings negates his claim for
denial of the right to choose his lawyer.
PEOPLE vs. AGUSTIN Ilocano farmer / lawyer foisted upon accused / associate of
the fiscal Agustin, a farmer who understood only Ilocano, was unlawfully arrested
by military officers and was taken into custody for investigation. He asserted that he
wished to be assisted by counsel; automatically Atty. Cajucom was foisted upon
him and was to represent him. Atty. Cajucom was an associate of the prosecutor
in charge of interrogating him. Cajucom informed him of his rights in English and
Tagalog. He was interrogated in the presence of military officers. An extra-judicial
confession was extracted from him under threat where he attested that he knew a
certain Jun and Sonny and had participated in the crime.
Atty. Cajucom could not have possibly been voluntarily and intelligently
accepted by the accused. Atty. Cajucom was merely foisted upon him. It is even
doubtful if he understood Atty. Cajucoms briefings in English and Tagalog and
there are likewise special circumstances w/c cast doubt upon the integrity of his
representation being a close associate of the fiscal. The extra-judicial admissions
(not confessions) are thus inadmissible as evidence and they being the sole basis
for conviction, the accused must be acquitted.
PEOPLE vs. BALISTEROS Miranda Rights are personal Galvante executed a
sworn statement under pressure categorically admitting guilt w/o the assistance of
counsel and in the presence of the opposing counsel, the brothers of the deceased
(whom he allegedly killed), and a stranger. The appellants (not Galvante, but other
accused) assail the validity of Galvantes confession as having been made in
violation of the Miranda Rights. The objection can only be raised by the
confessant or the person whose rights have been violated, and not by other
persons. The right is a personal right.
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DD: Simply put, an extra-judicial admission or confession made by the confessant
in violation of the Miranda Rights is inadmissible as evidence against him
(confessant), but is admissible against other persons.
PEOPLE vs. GUILLERMO cavalier treatment of constitutional requirements
Guillermo was sentenced to death for the murder of a certain Keyser. Upon being
arrested he was only made to read his rights posted in the wall, he was not
provided counsel (allegedly because it was a Sunday and there were no lawyers in
touch), and there was no showing of any waiver of the said rights other than the
fact that he said that he regrets nothing. These facts are actually affirmed upon
testimony by the arresting officer SPO1 Reyes. In short, the arresting officers
made no serious effort to comply w/ the constitutional requirements. A
confession, in order to be admissible must be:
1. Voluntarily made
2. Made w/ the assistance of counsel
3. Expressly made
4. It must be in writing
There was no showing that Guillermo waived his rights; but even if he so intended,
the waiver is still invalid because it was not made in the presence of counsel. The
right to be informed likewise entails an obligation on the part of the
investigators to explain the said rights and ensure that the accused
understood the same. However, even assuming that his extra-judicial admissions
during custodial investigation are inadmissible, Guillermo spontaneously made
confessions to private individuals. Such evidence is admissible.
PEOPLE vs. MOJELLO right to counsel / final choice / acquiescence When the
accused is granted the right to counsel preferably of his own choice it does not
preclude other equally competent lawyers from handling his case. Otherwise, the
accused could impede the progress of investigations. The initial choice is lodged w/
the investigators, but the final choice is the accuseds. If the accused fails to
object to the appointment of his lawyer during the course of the investigation,
or subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer,
then the accused is deemed to have acquiesced thereto.
PEOPLE vs. SAYABOC silent lawyer / violation of right to competent counsel
Sayaboc was convicted for the murder of Joseph Galam. During the custodial
investigation, he was represented by PAO lawyer Atty. Cornejo who remained silent
during the entire proceedings. As a result, Sayaboc made extra-judicial admissions
that led to his conviction. Extra-judicial confessions are presumed to be
voluntary provided that the prosecution establishes that all constitutional
safeguards are complied with.
Sayaboc was not afforded his right to competent legal counsel. It is Atty.
Cornejos task to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his actions at
each stage of the proceeding. He should be aware when his client ought to
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
remain silent and advise the same. Instead. Atty. Cornejo just remained silent all
throughout. If the advice given is useless, then the voluntariness of the accuseds
confession is impaired.
The court likewise found a violation of the right to be informed. The investigating
officers merely mechanically recited the said rights to the accused w/o
making sure if the latter understood the same. It should allow the suspect to
contemplate the consequences of his actions. The same especially applies in the
case at bar, where Sayaboc finished only Grade 4.
PEOPLE vs. MARLENE OLERMO absent lawyers / right to choose counsel not
absolute Marlene Olermo was first represented by Atty. Domingo, since Atty.
Yuseco, her counsel of choice, was in Cagayan. During subsequent trials, she was
represented de officio by Atty. Perez, because her preferred lawyers were likewise
unavailable. This prejudiced her case; and she then asserts that she was deprived
her right to competent legal counsel because her lawyers were not familiar w/ her
case. When the accused is granted the right to counsel preferably of his own
choice it does not preclude other equally competent lawyers from handling
his case. Otherwise, the accused could impede the judicial process by
choosing lawyers who are unavailable just as in the present case.
PEOPLE vs. PINLAC right to information / must be explained and understood
The right to be informed is complied w/ not merely by mechanically and
ceremonially reciting to the accused the constitutional provisions, the investigator
must also explain the effects of the same in simple and practical terms. The
accused must be made to understand the implications of his actions. The rights of
persons under custodial investigation are reiterated:
1. The reason for his arrest and must be shown the warrant
2. His right to remain silent
3. His right to counsel, preferably of his own choice
4. That if he has no lawyer, one will be provided for him
5. That no custodial investigation can be conducted except in the presence
of counsel
6. That at any time he is allowed to confer w/ his lawyer, immediate family,
priest, etc.
7. His right to waive the said rights knowingly and intelligently
8. That should he waive such right, it must be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel
9. That he may refuse, at any stage of the process, to answer interrogations
10. That any previous waiver of such rights is not a bar to invoking them
again
11. That any evidence obtained in violation of such rules is inadmissible
PEOPLE vs. ROUS right to remain silent / waiver w/o counsel / may be ratified
Even if the waiver of the right to remain silent was not made in the presence of
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counsel, the same may be ratified when the lawyer arrived at the closing stage of
the investigation and verified w/ the accused whether or not he understood the
implications and the accused nevertheless decided to proceed w/ the admission.
DD: Under the present state of law, counsel must be present at every stage of the
investigation.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 13
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Right to Bail
PEOPLE vs. NITCHA appeal / right vs. discretion Facts are not provided. Even if
the accused has posted bail, once the decision of conviction is promulgated, the
accused is subject to re-incarceration. Bail must not be granted during the
pendency of appeal, because it implies that the trial court established guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Rules to remember:
1. Bail is a matter of right if the offense charged is punishable by any
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.
2. If the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, bail is a
matter of discretion depending on whether evidence of guilt is
strong.
DD: Under the present state of law, when the case is on appeal, bail becomes a
matter of discretion.
CARDINES vs. ROSETE illegal recruitment / life imprisonment / bailable under
1985 Rules Judge Rosete is being charged for misconduct and ignorance of the
law for granting bail to Erlie & Emilio Claro, both charged for illegal recruitment in
large scale constituting economic sabotage, punishable by life imprisonment under
the Labor Code. The applicable law then was the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Under the said rules, the only exceptions for denying the right to bail are
offenses punishable by capital punishment, or reclusion perpetua in both cases
evidence of guilt must be strong. There was no mention of life imprisonment.
Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous. Reclusion
perpetua is covered by the Revised Penal Code, has a definite duration, and has
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
accessory penalties; life imprisonment is covered by special laws, and has neither a
definite duration nor accessory penalties. Thus the accuseds are entitled to bail.
DD: Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amended the said rules; life imprisonment is
no longer bailable provided evidence of guilt is strong, but the same cannot apply
retroactively as it is not favorable to the accused.
PADERANGA vs. CA must be under custody / constructive custody When Ely
Roxas was implicated for multiple murder, his counsel was Miguel Paderanga, his
former employer. Strangely, Roxas implicated Paderanga alleging that he was the
mastermind behind the Bucag Massacre. An arrest warrant was issued for
Paderanga but before the same can be served, he filed a Motion for Admission to
Bail. He was, however, then confined in a hospital and manifested that he was
submitting himself to the custody of the law; the prosecution offered no objection.
He managed to appear before the court to post bail as well as attend the hearings.
Bail cannot be posted unless custody is acquired, either through arrest or
voluntary surrender. Its purpose is to relieve the accused from the rigors of
imprisonment until his conviction, and yet secure appearance during trial.
While it is true that Paderanga posted bail before he was actually arrested,
nevertheless, given the factual circumstances, he was constructively under
custody. He voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of the law and the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Given that the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher, the grant of bail is discretionary upon the court depending on
the strength of evidence. A trial, summary in nature, must thus be held so that the
prosecution may present evidence, and the court must justify the grant or denial of
bail based on the evidence.
YAP vs. CA P 5.5 million bail / excessive Francisco Yap was convicted by the trial
court for estafa; he appealed the decision and prayed for provisional liberty pending
appeal. The court required him to post bail amounting to P 5.5 million
corresponding to the amount he allegedly embezzled. He was also required to
secure a certification from the mayor that he was a resident of that area, and that
should he transfer, he should inform the court and the complainant. He prays that
the amount be reduced to P 40,000 according to the Bail Bond Guide, but the
appellate court denied his petition.
The apparent rationale is to prevent him from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case considering that he himself admitted having gone out several
times. While the condition requiring him to present a mayors certification is
reasonable, the amount of bail is clearly excessive. Imposing excessive bail
renders illusory the right to bail altogether. The Supreme Court reduced the
amount of the bail to P 200,000.00.
NARCISO vs. STA. ROMANA-CRUZ parricide / hearing is mandatory / duties of
the judge Narciso was charged w/ parricide, punishable by reclusion perpetua. He
was granted bail by the trial court only 10 minutes after he filed his motion to post
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bail. The prosecution objects. In order to determine whether evidence of guilt is
strong, a hearing is necessary whether summary or otherwise. This affords
the prosecution the opportunity to submit the evidence before the court. Ten
minutes could not have possibly been sufficient to receive or evaluate any
evidence. The judge practically denied the complainant the opportunity to be
heard, in violation of due process. The following are the duties of the trial judge in
an application for bail when the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, capital
punishment, or life imprisonment:
1. To inform the prosecution or require him to submit a recommendation
2. To conduct a hearing, even if the prosecution refuses or fails to present
evidence
3. Decide if evidence of guilt is strong based on the evidence presented
4. Approve or deny provisional liberty based on the strength of the evidence
PEOPLE vs. CABRAL evident guilt / great presumption / reviewable by the SC
Cabral was charged w/ rape qualified w/ the use of deadly weapon w/c is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The grant of bail is thus discretionary
upon the court depending on whether evidence of guilt is strong. The test is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether the evidence shows
evident guilt or great presumption of guilt depending on the facts,
circumstances, and evidence presented. While the same is discretionary upon
the trial courts, the SC will not hesitate to overturn the decision of there is grave
abuse of discretion.
Evident proof means clear and strong evidence w/c leads a well-guarded and
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed and
the accused is the guilty agent and that he will be punished capitally if the law is
administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances manifest a
strong and convincing inference of guilt excluding any other probable conclusion.
SERAPIO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN arraignment is not a prerequisite to bail The
Sandiganbayan erred in ordering the arraignment of Serapio before proceeding w/
the hearing for bail. As soon as a person is deprived of liberty, either through
arrest or surrender, the right to bail accrues. He need not await arraignment
before filing a petition for bail. In case the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, capital punishment, or life imprisonment, the petition for bail may
be heard ahead of arraignment.
LEVISTE vs CA - In the exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to
those convicted by the trial court, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised NOT with laxity BUT with grave caution and only for strong reasons,
considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. Pending
appeal of a conviction by the trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary. The discretion to allow or to disallow
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
bail pending appeal in a case such as the one at bar where the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged in the appellate court.
US vs. JUDGE PURUGANAN Mark Jimenez / extradition is not criminal in nature /
no bail While his case was pending in the US, Mark Jimenez fled to the Phils.
Thus, the US seeks to extradite him. During the extradition proceedings, Jimenez
applied for bail. Extradition proceedings are sui generis. They are not criminal
proceedings w/c call into operation the rights of the accused under the Bill of
Rights. Thus the right to bail does not accrue. The only question that has to be
resolved in such proceedings is whether he is extraditable and the extraditing
country complied w/ the treaty. It is only a measure of international judicial
assistance, usually summary in nature, and requires merely a prima facie case.
Final discretion lies w/ the President. It is not concerned w/ his guilt or innocence,
w/c will be tried separately by the extraditing country. Further, Jimenez has
demonstrated the capacity and will to flee, w/c is precisely what the Extradition
Treaty guards against.
The general rule is that in extradition proceedings, bail is NOT a matter of
right. It may only be granted as an exception if:
1. The defendant can demonstrate that he is not a flight risk, and
2. Exceptional, humanitarian, or compelling circumstances.
Jimenez bears the burden of proving the existence of any of the 2 exceptions.
Dissent of Justice Puno
From the moment a person is arrested, the guarantees under the Bill of
Rights operate, including his right to bail. This is more in accord w/ the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
RODRIGUEZ vs. JUDGE extradition / cancellation of bail, notice & hearing / not
flight risk / special circumstances Eduardo and Imelda Rodriguez offered
themselves for voluntary extradition; they posted a cash bond worth P 1 million
each. They were granted bail by the trial court. The US government moved for
reconsideration; the SC directed the trial court to decide the matter based on the
outcome of the Mark Jimenez Case. Following the ruling therein, the trial court
cancelled the bail without prior notice and hearing and issued the
corresponding warrants of arrest. Eduardo, meanwhile was already in the US
attending to his case, thus the case is moot as far as he is concerned. It is Imeldas
case that stands to be affected by this decision.
The cancellation of Imeldas bail, w/o prior notice and hearing, is a violation
of her right to due process. She is not a flight risk and does not pose any danger
to the community; hence her bail could not be cancelled w/o notice and hearing.
While, it is true that notice and hearing is not required before issuance of a warrant
51 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
of arrest for extradition cases because it would only tip the extraditee and cause
him to flee, the same principle does not apply here.
Special circumstances must be considered. Imelda is in her sixties and under
medical treatment, she offered herself for voluntary extradition, she surrendered her
passport and there is an existing hold-departure order against her.
She falls clearly w/in the 2 exceptions where a bail may be granted to an extraditee:
(1) she is not a flight risk, and (2) the attendance of special and humanitarian
considerations such as her health and age.
DD: A flight risk is a person who demonstrates the capacity and the will to escape.
PEOPLE vs. JUDGE DONATO & RODOLFO SALAS if matter of right, no hearing
needed / waiver Rodolfo Salas, along w/ Josefina Cruz & Jose Conception were
arrested and charged for robbery. At that time, the applicable law prescribed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. EO No. 187 was enacted w/c reduced the
penalty to prision mayor, thus making the same a bailable offense. In this case, bail
has become a matter of right. If bail is a matter of right, the prosecution loses
the right to present evidence for the denial thereof. The court has also
repeatedly held that the right to bail may be availed even during the pendency
of the appeal. However, the court erred in fixing the bond to P 30,000 and then
later changing it to P 50,000 w/o hearing the prosecution. There are guidelines that
must be complied with. To this extent, a hearing should be held but only for the
purpose of determining the amount of bail.
However, the right to bail can be waived; and there is such a waiver in this
case made by Rodolfo Salas. A compromise was entered into whereby the arrest
warrants for Cruz & Conception were to be lifted but Salas was to remain in legal
custody. Custody means nothing less than physical custody. Such a waiver is not
contrary to law, good customs, public order, and public policy and is not
prejudicial to any third person. The right to bail is a personal right. The waiver
was intelligently and knowingly entered into and w/ the assistance of counsel.
DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE mayor / murders / excessive bail / guidelines for
computing Mayor Ricardo de la Camara of Magsaysay, Misamis was arrested for
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. He applied for bail claiming that
there was no evidence to link him to the crime. The prosecution failed to present
evidence but Judge Enage fixed the bail at some P 1.2 million. De la Camara
assailed the order of the judge; however, he later escaped from jail. His petition to
nullify the said order has thus become moot. Nevertheless, the court found that the
amount of bail fixed was clearly excessive. It has the effect of rendering
nugatory or illusory the right to bail. At most, the bail should have been fixed at
P 50,000.00, P25,000.00 for each charge.
The following rules must be considered in fixing the amount of bail:
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest

functioning otherwise the rights of the accuseds to due process are

1. Ability of the accused to give bail
2. Nature of the offense
3. Penalty for the offense charged
4. Character and reputation of the accused
5. Health of the accused
6. Character and strength of evidence
7. Probability for the accused to appear on trial
8. Forfeiture of other bonds
9. Whether accused was a fugitive when arrested
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance in other cases
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 14
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused:
Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Rights under Prosecution
OLAGUER vs. MILITARY COMMISSION military tribunals / judicial power / due
process Olaguer and several others were arrested and charged for subversion
and several other crimes before a Military Tribunal created under martial law. The
military tribunal found them guilty only after a 25 minute recess and sentenced
them to death. They filed a case for habeas corpus and sought to enjoin the military
tribunal from trying their case. The due process clause of the Constitution
contemplates trial by JUDICIAL process. The military tribunals are not part of
the judicial system but rather fall under the Executive Branch. Court Martial
proceedings are intended primarily for ensuring military discipline. Judicial power
resides in the courts, not the Executive. Even during the existence of martial
law, military tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses
properly cognizable by the civil courts for as long as the same are
52 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
violated.
The lifting of Martial Law effectively divested the Military Tribunals of any supposed
authority. Further, the grave national emergency that once justified their existence
no longer exists. Thus, all cases pending under such tribunals should be
transferred to the civil courts.
TAN vs. BARRIOS acquitted by military tribunals / operative fact Pursuant to the
rulings in Olaguer as well as Cruz vs. Enrile, declaring the military tribunals functus
officio and the proceedings therein null and void, several persons convicted by the
military tribunals during martial law prayed for a re-trial of their case. The courts
thus directed the Secretary of Justice to file the necessary informations in the
proper civil courts. However, pursuant thereto, Fiscal Barrios re-filed informations
against Tan and other persons who have been ACQUITTED by the military
tribunals. The lower courts then issued the warrants for their arrest. The ruling in
Cruz vs. Enrile should not prejudice persons who are not parties thereto;
otherwise it could be used as an instrument for oppression. The military
tribunal hearings as to the following cases should stand:
1. Persons who had finished serving their sentences thereunder
2. Persons who have been granted amnesty
3. Persons who have been acquitted by the said tribunals
Thus, the rule laid down in Cruz vs. Enrile should be applied prospectively.
Even assuming that proceedings under military tribunals are void, operative
fact applies. This bars the re-filing of informations against the herein accuseds; to
rule otherwise would violate their rights against double jeopardy and the enactment
of ex post facto laws or rulings.
US vs. LULING prima facie evidence of guilt / legislative power of the State Luling
was a wharf watchman who was charged under Act. No. 335 for having solicited
and received the sum of P 100 from Rufino Elord so that he may secure the
delivery and importation of certain rolls of paper containing opium. He assails the
validity of Sec. 316 of the said law for making the mere receiving of certain gifts
from importers or exporters prima facie evidence of violation, alleging that it violates
his right to presumption of innocence by transferring the burden of proof to the
accused. Since the State has the right to declare what constitute criminal acts,
it likewise has the right to define what proof constitutes prima facie evidence
of guilt and to pass the burden to the defendant to prove that his acts were
innocent. The constitutional provision on presumption of innocence is not violated
by such statutes.
PEOPLE vs. MINGOA malversation / overcome by contrary presumption /
reasonable Mingoa, a public officer entrusted w/ funds, failed to account for the
same alleging that the said monies were lost. He was charged for malversation.
Under the Revised Penal Code, mere failure to account for public funds or property
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
amounts to prima facie evidence that he has put the said funds or property to
personal use. He assails Art. 217 of the RPC for violating the constitutional
guarantee of presumption of innocence. There is no constitutional objection to
the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be
overcome by a contrary presumption and what evidence suffices to raise
such presumption. Further, the law establishes a mere presumption; it affords the
accused the opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is
reasonable and founded upon experience of human conduct.
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC election disqualification / charged vs. convicted / not
synonymous BP No. 52 disqualifies a candidate CHARGED either before the civil
or military tribunals for acts of disloyalty, subversion, insurrection, rebellion, and
such other crimes. There is a distinction between a person who is charged and
a person who is convicted. The same cannot be equated. A person merely
charged cannot be put in the same footing as a person already convicted. The
law violates the constitutional right to presumption of innocence. Further, evidence
regarding such acts of disloyalty should be presented before the courts, not the
administrative bodies such as the COMELEC. Legislative or administrative
determination of guilt cannot substitute for judicial determination of guilt.
(This is the same case under Section 1)
MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC fugitive from justice / disqualification Defeated
candidate Bienvenido Marquez sought the disqualification of Edgardo Rodriguez for
the governorship of Quezon Province for being a fugitive from justice based on
Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code. Rodriguez was charged for 10 counts of
insurance fraud and grand theft in a Municipal Court of Los Angeles, but he fled
from the US to evade prosecution. The term fugitive from justice embraces
not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but also those
who flee to avoid prosecution. It is well supported in jurisprudence.
Concurring Opinion of Justice Davide
The said prohibition does not infringe upon the right to presumption of
innocence because one is not being disqualified for his guilt (or the lack of
it), but rather for his act of fleeing from justice. As opposed to Dumlao vs.
COMELEC, the person was disqualified due to a presumption of guilt even when he
was merely charged; the same does not attend in this case.
PEOPLE vs. HOLGADO duties of the judge Holgado was charged for slight illegal
detention for kidnapping and detaining Artemia Fabreag for 8 hours w/o justifiable
reason. During arraignment, he was asked Do you have an attorney or are you
going to plead guilty? He did not have an attorney and pleaded guilty, saying that a
certain Mr. Ocampo had instructed him to do so. During arraignment, if the
accused is unaccompanied by counsel, the court has the following duties:
1. Inform the defendant of his right to counsel
2. Ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney
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3. If he chooses to avail but is unable to employ an attorney, the court must
assign an attorney de oficio to defend him
4. If the defendant chooses to procure an attorney of his own, the court must
grant him reasonable time to do so
None of these duties have been complied with. The right to be heard would be
of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
DD: If the victim is a woman, the offense should be serious illegal detention, not
merely slight illegal detention.
US vs. ASH history of right to counsel / stages of proceedings Under the old
English Common Law Rule, the right to counsel was limited to trial; however, this
notion has been gradually disregarded. There was a growing recognition of the
fact that an unaided layman, even if educated or learned, may not be able to
defend himself intelligently given the intricate procedural system. Thus counsel
was necessary as a guide through the complex legal technicalities. The creation of
the Office of the Prosecutor further necessitated the presence of counsel. The
prosecutor was dedicated primarily for the purpose of prosecuting defendants and
is incomparably more familiar w/ procedures, idiosyncrasies of juries, and the
personnel of the court. There was thus the need to minimize the imbalance.
The development of pre-trial proceedings further necessitated the assistance of
counsel; otherwise trials could become mere formalities. These involve critical
stages where the accused may make mistakes or his reasoning dimmed by
emotional tension; thus he needs a spokesman or advisor in his lawyer. Counsel
was further extended to police line-ups under the Wade Case to prevent the
prosecution from taking advantage of the accused during such stages. The more so
that during trial the accused must be aided by counsel so as to be able to plead
his case intelligently w/o surrendering his right against self-incrimination.
PEOPLE vs. LIWANAG effective counsel / reasonableness Liwanag was provided
w/ counsel de oficio in Atty. Uy who assisted him during arraignment and trial, and
who cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. Liwanag contends that Atty. Uy
was not intelligent counsel for not being able to safeguard his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures for not having contested his warrantless
arrest, and that Atty. Uy failed to secure a reversal of his conviction. He contends
that this in fact amounts to a violation of his right to counsel. The right to counsel
under the Constitution simply means effective counsel. The Supreme Court found
that the services of Atty. Uy were sufficiently effective. In the Philippine setting,
counsel assisting the accused is presumed to be providing all the necessary
legal defenses w/c are reasonable under the circumstances in accordance w/
the said norms. The Strickland Standards cannot be applied in our jurisdiction.
The proper standard here is mainly reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
PEOPLE vs. LARRAAGA choice of counsel / counsel de oficio / prevent dilatory
tactics During trial, Larraagas counsel de parte unceremoniously withdrew. He
asked for a continuance of 3 weeks to 1 month wanting to procure counsel of his
own choice. In order to prevent any dilatory maneuvers on the part of the defense
counsel, the court appointed counsel de oficio and refused to suspend the trial.
Thus, Larraaga contests that he was denied the right to counsel. The preference
of counsel pertains more aptly to persons under custodial investigation, but
nevertheless, such preferential discretion is not absolute so as to allow the
accused to choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of all others equally
capable. Otherwise, it allows the accused to dictate the tempo of the
prosecution and delay the resolution of the case. Further, the period of
extension requested was unreasonably long. The right to counsel is, to some
extent, subject to the supervision of the trial court, especially after the trial has
already commenced.
PEOPLE vs. REGALA assault / knowledge not alleged in information / cannot
convict Regala and Flores were charged for murder w/ assault upon an agent of a
person in authority for having stabbed and killed Sgt. Desilos. However, the
information failed to allege the crucial element of knowledge that the accuseds
had knowledge of the fact that the victim was indeed an agent of a person in
authority. Thus, the accuseds cannot be convicted of the said crimes. The fact that
the victim was engaged then in the exercise of his duties does not suffice.
Knowledge must be alleged in the information. There are no other allegations in
the information that would clearly point to the fact that the accuseds had
knowledge. The fact that the accuseds did not object thereto likewise does not cure
the defect. To rule otherwise would be to convict the accuseds of a crime not
properly alleged in the body of the information. This would violate his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
DD: The facts must be alleged in the information so as to allow the defense to
prepare evidence or arguments to contradict the same. The defense should not be
surprised by the introduction of new averments during trial that they were not given
the chance to prepare for.
ENRILE vs. SALAZAR alleged: simple rebellion Sen. Enrile was arrested and
charged w/ the complex crime of rebellion w/ murder and multiple murder
committed during the failed coup attempt. He alleges that he is being charged for
an offense that does not exist in the statute books. The Supreme Court held in the
case of People vs. Hernandez that rebellion cannot be complexed w/ murder or
homicide. However, the information does charge a crime defined and
punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
DD: Simply put, the facts averred in the information suffice to form the elements of
simple rebellion. The information should contain statements of fact, not conclusions
of law w/c are for the courts to decide.
PEOPLE vs. LEGAZPI 2 separate informations / separate crimes complexed w/
each other Pamela was charged under 2 separate informations, one for double
54 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
murder, the other for violation of RA No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act). She was
convicted of the complex crime of robbery w/ double homicide, combining and
complexing the two crimes alleged in separate informations. While the court can
hold a joint trial of two or more cases and can render a consolidated
decision, the court cannot combine 2 crimes charged in 2 separate
informations to form a complex crime and convict the accused therefor. It
violates the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him.
PEOPLE vs. DE LA CRUZ conclusions of law De La Cruz was charged for
committing sexual abuse on his daughter, either by raping her or committing acts
of lasciviousness on her. The validity of the information was questioned. The
information contained conclusions of law, not averments of facts. It does not
cite w/c provisions of RA No. 7610 were violated by De la Cruz. It did not state
the acts and/or omissions constituting the offense of the attending
circumstances.
DD: The information went ahead to conclude that he committed the felony of acts of
lasciviousness w/o mentioning what particular acts he committed constituting the
same as well as the applicable provisions of law violated. Conclusions of law are for
the judge to make.
PEOPLE vs. ESPERANZA qualifying circumstances must be alleged Nelson was
charged for the rape of his 13 year old niece. Supposedly, minority (under 12 years
of age) and relationship (w/in 3rd civil degree of consanguinity) are qualifying
circumstances in the crime of rape. However, the information does not allege that
he is related to her w/in the 3rd civil degree of consanguinity, and he was charged
under paragraph 1 of Art. 335 of the RPC (intimidation), not under paragraph 2 or 3
(minority / deprivation of reason). While the victim turned out to be 11 years old as
proved during trial, the crime cannot be qualified by minority (under 12 years of
age) because the information alleged that she was then 13 years old. To
appreciate these qualifying circumstances against Nelson w/o having
properly alleged the same in the information would violate his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
DD: Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved during
trial.
PEOPLE vs. PURAZO time not an essential element of rape / need not be alleged
accurately Purazo was charged and convicted of rape (incestuous). He alleged
that the information failed to state w/ particularity the time when the rape was
committed, thus violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him. It provided merely sometime in the Month of March
1997. Date is not an essential element in the crime of rape; thus it need not
be accurately stated. It satisfies the 2 requirements that: (1) it is as near to the
actual date of commission as permissible, and (2) the time ultimately proved
should be alleged in the complaint.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
GARCIA vs. PEOPLE basis is nature of the crime, not the designation Garcia was
charged for estafa under Art. 315, Section 2 (a), w/c penalizes false manifestations
or fraudulent machinations, but was convicted based on Art. 315 Section 2 (d) for
having issued post-dated checks that were not funded or insufficiently funded. The
real nature of the crime is determined by the facts alleged in the information
and not by the title or the designation of the offense contained therein.
CONDE vs. RIVERA unreasonable delays / mandamus to dismiss the case
Aurelia Conde had to respond to 5 separate informations and had to make court
appearances for over a year already. Even so, there has still yet to be any
resolution of the case. Thus she came before the SC to seek redress. When the
prosecuting officer secures postponements of trials beyond reasonable time,
the accused may file a case for mandamus to compel the dismissal of the
case. It is also a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; it is practically an
acquittal. She may likewise petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to
obtain freedom is her liberty s retrained. Every person has the right to have a
speedy trial.
NEPOMUCENO vs. SEC. OF DEFENSE own fault / delay must be unreasonable
Nepomuceno along w/ several others have yet to be arraigned for their respective
offenses before the Military Tribunal. This is due to the fact that they filed a Motion
to Quash, and then a Supplemental Motion questioning the constitutionality of the
Military Commissions, and even asked for preliminary injunction to suspend the
trials. Then they assert that their right to a speedy trial is violated and seek the
dismissal of the case. Any delay in the disposition of Nepomucenos case is
attributable to his own actions. Further any delay in filing the charges was
brought about by the exigencies of martial law and by the circumstances of the
case. What the constitution prohibits are unreasonable and capricious delays.
The delays in this case are neither unreasonable nor capricious and were brought
about by the accuseds own actions. Further, the right may be waived.
MATEO vs. VILLALUZ notarized by judge / under intimidation / to be decided by
him Mateo, among others, was tried before Judge Villaluz for robbery in a band w/
homicide. Later on, a certain Rolando Reyes executed an extra-judicial statement
implicating Mateo; the statement was subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Villaluz. However, Reyes later repudiated the said statement claiming that he
made the statement under intimidation from a government agent. In short, it is
possible that Judge Villaluz had something to do about it. Mateo thus prayed that
Judge Villaluz disqualify himself from the case to w/c the latter refused. Due
process requires that every litigant be entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. Through the exercise of sound discretion, a
judge may disqualify himself from a case.
While discretion lies w/ the judge, the Supreme Court exercises corrective
authority. In this case, clearly the refusal of the judge to inhibit himself amounts to
grave abuse of discretion. He is being called upon to decide a matter w/ w/c he is
involved; this casts serious doubts upon his impartiality.
55 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
IN RE: OLIVER public trials Secret trials are a menace to liberty. They are
instruments for the repression of religious and political heresies and allow the
government to act arbitrarily. An effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial
power is the knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion. Besides the accused
should at least be entitled to have his friends, relatives, or counsel present no
matter what offense is charged.
GARCIA vs. DOMINGO trial in the chambers of the judge / public trial / public not
precluded The trials in this case, on 14 separate instances, were held in the air-
conditioned chambers of the trial court judge, for the purpose of convenience. The
defendants offered no objection. Later on, they assert that their right to a public trial
has been violated. Generally, trials should be held in public in order to offset
any danger of conducting them in an illegal or unjust manner. This only
means that any person interested in observing the proceedings may do so,
even if not a party to the case or a relative of any party thereto. In this case,
there is nothing to show that other persons are prohibited from observing the
proceedings; hence there is no violation of such right. It even suffices that the
relatives, friends, or counsel of the accused are allowed to be present.
FAJARDO vs. GARCIA written interrogatories / not embraced by compulsory
process Fajardo, along with other accuseds, were charged for murder. Evidence
of the prosecution disclosed that during the night of the murder, the accuseds were
wounded. They presented medical certificates issued by Dr. Academia. However,
when the judge asked where the doctor was, it turned out that he left for the United
States. Counsel for the accuseds asked the judge to allow them to send
interrogatories to Dr. Academia in the United States, invoking the expanded
guarantee of compulsory process to produce evidence. The judge refused, and
thus they appeal alleging grave abuse of discretion.
The service of written interrogatories is worlds apart from the compulsory
process guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Such is not embraced therein.
Evidence of their stay in the hospital, besides, could be easily obtained from the
testimony of nurses or the records of the hospital w/o having to resort to sending
the interrogatories all the way to the United States to Dr. Academia.
CARREDO vs. PEOPLE waiver of right / duty to appear Carredo was charged for
malicious mischief. After arraignment, he posted bail and waived his right to appear
during trial. During trial, the prosecution witnesses were presented but hearing was
postponed because they could not identify the accused; thus the trial judge
summoned Carredo. After his failure to appear during trial, the judge ordered his
arrest and the forfeiture of his cash bond. In the bail system under our constitution,
the accused is granted provisional liberty subject to the condition that he appears
during trial; his failure to do so would make the previous warrant of arrest sufficient
for his re-confinement.
The accused may waive his right to meet the witnesses face to face, but he
cannot waive his duty to appear in court for the purpose of being identified by
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
the prosecution witnesses. It is possible that the witnesses do not know him by
name but only by appearance. Further, if he is to be allowed to be absent during all
hearings, he may, in his defense, say that he was never identified as the person
charged in the information and thus entitled to acquittal.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 15
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it.
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS a writ directed to a person detaining another commanding
him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the
day and cause of his caption (capture) and detention, to do, submit to, and receive
whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.
Limitations on the Power to Suspend the Privilege of the Writ under the 1987
Constitution
1. The President may suspend the privilege for a period not exceeding 60 days,
2. Congress may revoke the suspension w/c the President cannot set aside
(Congress may also extend the suspension upon the initiative of the President)
3. The Supreme Court, at the instance of ANY CITIZEN may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension and must promulgate its
decision w/in 30 days from its filing.
4. The suspension is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The power of the SC is
no longer restricted to determining if the President acted w/ arbitrariness; the SC
is now empowered to:
a. review the sufficiency of the factual basis
b. determine whether the public safety requires the suspension
5. The only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that
the challenger is a CITIZEN; he need not even be a taxpayer
56 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
6. Insurrection is no longer a ground for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ
7. Imminent danger of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion is no longer a ground
for the suspension
8. The grounds for suspension are now limited to:
a. ACTUAL INVASION
b. ACTUAL REBELLION, when the public safety requires it
9. In case the privilege is suspended, the suspension shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion, such as Crimes against National Security and the Law of Nations.
Examples: treason, espionage, communication in wartime w/ hostile country, and
giving information to hostile country.
10. Simply put, for a person to lose the privilege of the writ, he must first be
judicially charged.
11. The person must be judicially charged w/in 3 days after being arrested or
detained, otherwise he shall be released. The purpose is simple: to require all
those detained to be immediately turned over to the judicial authorities.
12. Even if the person is arrested on the basis of a valid warrant, he must still be
judicially charged w/in the said 3 day period, otherwise he must be released
13. The suspension of the privilege of the writ DOES NOT SUSPEND THE
RIGHT TO BAIL
Additional Notes from the Isagani Cruz Book:
1. The purpose of the writ is to test the validity of a persons detention
2. A Petition for Habeas Corpus takes precedence in the calendar of courts and
must be acted upon immediately
3. Even moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of the writ, such as when a
housemaid is prevented from leaving her employ because of the person
detaining her
4. Habeas corpus may also be resorted to in case of unlawful denial of bail, or in
case of denial of the right to speedy trial
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
5. After the lapse of 60 days, unless otherwise extended by Congress at the
instance of the President, the suspension is automatically lifted
6. There is a catch. Since Congress may extend the period of the suspension at the
initiative of the President, the extension may be indefinite depending on the will
and discretion of the legislature. The Supreme Court then would be the only hope
depending upon the courage of that body.
Additional Reminders:
1. In revoking the suspension of the privilege, the Congress votes jointly. A
majority vote is required and it may be conducted during regular or special
session.
2. If Congress is not in session, it is mandated by the Constitution to convene w/in
24 hours after the suspension of the privilege of the writ
3. The imposition of Martial Law does not automatically suspend the privilege
of the writ
4. During the suspension of the writ, any person arrested or detained must be
charged w/in 3 days, otherwise he must be released.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 16
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Speedy Disposition of Cases
LOPEZ vs. OMBUDSMAN Certain complaints have been pending before the
Sandiganbayan for almost 4 years. This interval prior to the resolution finding the
existence of probable cause came w/o any explanation; thus the accused therein
prayed for its dismissal invoking his right to speedy disposition of his case.
Eventually, after the prolonged delay, the appropriate informations were filed. The
subsequent filing of the information does not cure or correct the unexplained
delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints. There has been, in this
case, an unreasonable delay in the resolution of the case, thus the right
accrues. The case is thus ordered Dismissed.
57 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Notes on Speedy Disposition:
1. The guarantee covers the period before, during, and after trial
2. It is a flexible concept and various factors must be considered, such as the length
of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and the
prejudice caused by the delay
3. The right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements are asked for and secured, or when an unreasonable time
elapses without the partys case being tried. Not all delays are unreasonable.
4. The remedy in case of unreasonable delay is dismissal obtained through
Mandamus
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 17
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Right against Self-Incrimination
US vs. NAVARRO guilt due to mere silence / presumption of innocence Subject
to review in this case were 2 provisions of the Penal Code. Art. 481 punishes
unlawful deprivation of liberty, while Art. 483 provides that a person who detained
another, who fails to give info as to his whereabouts or does not prove that the
same has been set free shall be punished by a higher penalty. Therefore, in order
for the accused to lessen the penalty he stands to incur, he is forced to divulge the
whereabouts of the detainee or declare that the same has been set free this is
practically an admission that he in fact detained another. If he opts not to speak, he
incurs a more severe criminal liability. Simply put, the evidence required to absolve
him under Art. 483 has the effect of convicting him under Art. 481.
This violates the right against self-incrimination. Under Art. 483, the fact of guilt
follows the mere silence of the accused; this cannot be permitted. Refusal to
testify should not create a presumption against the accused otherwise it
amounts to a law adjudging w/o evidence. The accused has the right to rely
on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution establishes his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
US vs. TAN TENG physical test for gonorrhea / only testimonial evidence
Prosecuted for rape, Tan was physically examined after his arrest and a substance
was taken from his body for the purpose of testing him for gonorrhea. He tested
positive. He assails the admissibility of the evidence claiming that it was obtained in
violation of his right against self incrimination. The right against self-incrimination
is a prohibition against extracting from the defendants own lips, against his
will, an admission of guilt. It does not cover all forms of compulsion but only
testimonial compulsion. The examination does not call upon the accused to be a
witness, nor does it compel him to render testimony or answer questions; the
evidence obtained from him is not testimonial in nature and is not covered by the
right.
BERMUDEZ vs. CASTILLO expanded right The right against self incrimination has
By analogy, a physical examination for evidence is similar to introducing stolen
property taken from the person of the thief. Also, Tan never objected to the
extraction from his body of said substances.
VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS examination of womans privates / dura lex sed lex
Emetria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged for adultery. The trial court
ordered Villaflor to be examined by physicians to determine if she was pregnant;
the latter refused, thus she will be cited for contempt. She invokes her right against
self-incrimination. While to compel a woman to submit to the examination of
her private parts indeed amounts to great embarrassment and shame,
nevertheless, the court must apply the constitutional provision in accord w/
the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by sentimental influences. The
prohibition against self-incrimination is, and remains to be, limited to
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. Physical examinations are not
covered by the right. However, due care must be exerted at least not to embarrass
the accused any more than necessary in carrying out the test.
CHAVEZ vs. CA accused cannot be compelled to take the witness stand Chavez,
US vs. ONG SIU HONG morphine in the mouth / not testimonial compulsion Ong
was forced to discharge a certain amount of morphine from his mouth. The
substance was appreciated as evidence against him. He thus assails the
admissibility of such evidence, invoking his right against self-incrimination. The
purpose of the constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination is to
prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination, in order to extort
unwilling confessions implicating the accused. The case of Ong was no
different from the Tan Case where the accused was subjected to a test to obtain
substances from his body as evidence to prove his guilt. The evidence is obviously
admissible.
BELTRAN vs. SAMSON handwriting specimen / testimonial act Beltran was
ordered by the respondent judge to appear before the fiscal for the purpose of
taking a sample of his handwriting to determine if he was the one who wrote certain
falsified documents. There was yet no information filed against him; it was merely
an investigation, not a prosecution. Nevertheless, he invokes his right against self-
incrimination. The prohibition is not limited to declaration, but rather to be a
witness against oneself or to give or furnish evidence. Any pressure
towards relaxing the said prohibition must be appreciated w/ suspicion.
58 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Writing is something more than a mechanical act; it requires application of
intelligence and attention. Compelling a person to produce a specimen of his
handwriting is treated more seriously that compulsion to produce mere documents
and chattels which themselves are covered by the privilege. Here the person is
compelled to produce evidence that previously did not even exist evidence
that causes him to be identified as a falsifier. He is being compelled to
perform a positive and testimonial act. The respondent judge and fiscal are thus
ordered to cease and desist therefrom.
been expanded to cover other forms of proceedings or compulsion, such as:
It now extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law
It now extends to both accused as well as mere witnesses in a
prosecution
It protects equally in civil cases when incriminating questions are
asked
It covers litigious or non-litigious proceedings
It covers proceedings ex parte or otherwise
It covers all forms of interrogation before the courts
It now extends to investigations conducted by legislative bodies
It now prohibits rendering incriminatory handwriting specimens (Beltran vs.
Samson)
along w/ several others, was charged for qualified theft of a motor vehicle. During
trial, the fiscal called upon Chavez to testify as an ordinary witness (not a state
witness), to w/c the trial judge acceded amid strong objection by the defense
counsel and the refusal of Chavez. The judge said that the act of testifying, by itself,
does not necessarily incriminate him, and it is the right of the prosecution to ask
anybody to act as witness including the accused. Thus the accused was
compelled to take the witness stand. The accused occupies a greater degree of
protection than an ordinary witness. He may altogether refuse to take the
witness stand or answer any questions. After all, the purpose of the prosecution
for calling a witness to the stand is to secure a conviction. This rule applies even to
a co-accused in a joint trial. The damaging facts forged in the decision of the lower
court were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez and are inadmissible.
Forcing the accused to testify likewise violates his right to remain silent.
Actual violence need not be employed to amount to compulsion; moral coercion, as
in this case, is sufficient. Chavez did not waive his rights to remain silent and
against self-incrimination. His objection in the beginning is a continuing one; waiver
must be unequivocal and certain, and should be made willingly and
intelligently. The courts indulge every presumption against waiver of constitutional
rights.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
DD: A witness can also invoke his right against self-incrimination, but only when an
incriminating question is already asked. As stated above, the accused, on the other
hand, can refuse to take the witness stand altogether.
CABAL vs. KAPUNAN forfeiture proceedings / criminal in nature / rights accrue
Col. Jose Maristela of the Army filed a letter-complaint to the Sec. of National
Defense, charging Chief of Staff Manuel Cabal for graft and corruption, unexplained
wealth, and other reprehensible acts. Maristela did not seek the removal of Cabal
but rather the forfeiture of Cabals unexplained wealth. The President ordered the
formation of a Committee to investigate the matter. The Committee then ordered
Cabal to take the witness stand, but the latter refused to be sworn and invoked his
right against self-incrimination. Forfeiture is imposed by way of punishment. It is
a penalty. While technically civil in nature, such proceedings are actually
criminal in nature thus the rights to remain silent and against self-
incrimination accrue. In criminal proceedings, the accused may refuse to take
the witness stand altogether.
Generally, forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature; but when the forfeitures are
imposed as a vindication of the public justice as in this case the proceedings
acquire a criminal nature. The properties may be forfeited only by proving a breach
of the laws. The same rule applies to administrative cases where the person
charged is sought to be dismissed.
PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS medical malpractice
proceedings Pascual was being tried administratively before the Board for
alleged immorality and malpractice. The result could be the cancellation of his
license to practice his medical profession. He was then ordered by the Board to
take the witness stand; he refused and invoked his right against self-incrimination.
The ruling in Cabal vs. Kapunan is applicable in this case. The Board, in an
administrative proceeding that could result to the loss of the privilege to
practice the medical profession, cannot compel the respondent therein to
take the witness stand w/o his consent. The cancellation of license to practice
medicine, as a consequence, acquires the nature of a penalty; thus the right
against self-incrimination and the right to refuse to take the witness stand accrue.
The provision on self-incrimination should be liberally construed in favor of the
person invoking the same. The guarantee also protects the right to remain
silent. Silence should not be used to raise a presumption of guilt.
DD: Remember that the right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings
sanctioned by law, w/c include investigations conducted by special boards or
committees. If the proceedings are criminal in nature and may result to the
imposition of penalties, the accused may refuse to take the witness stand
altogether.
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BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 18
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 19
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Right against Excessive Fines
Cruel & Degrading Punishment
Death Penalty
PEOPLE vs. ESTOISTA possession of firearms / standard for cruel & excessive
As punishment for illegal possession of firearms, the term of imprisonment for 5 to
10 years is neither cruel nor unusual, especially considering the prevalent
circumstances such as rampant lawlessness, and the promiscuous carrying of
weapons. Just because the punishment imposed is severe, it does not mean
that the same is cruel and degrading. To fall under the ban, the punishment
must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community. If in a
given case the imposition of the full extent of the penalty would be too harsh
considering the degree of malice of the perpetrator, the courts are allowed to
recommend to the Chief Executive for clemency.
Guides in determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual (Furman vs.
Georgia):
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest

2. Congress must penalize by death only those crime that qualify as

1. It must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity heinous, and
2. It must not be applied arbitrarily 3. Congress must be motivated by compelling reasons.
3. It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society
4. It must not be excessive Heinous crimes are those crimes w/c by their wickedness or viciousness, are
completely repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of decency
and morality. The provisions on the aggravating circumstances under the RPC
Note: Fines are excessive when, given the circumstances, they are subsist and affect criminal liability. Rape, especially one perpetrated against ones
disproportionate to the offense. own daughter, is an intrinsically evil act and is outrageous to dignity and decency
and deserves to be punished by death.
Criteria according to Justices Marshall and Brennan:
PEOPLE vs. PURAZO consolidated separate opinions RA No. 7659 and its single
1. There are certain forms of punishment w/c involve too much mandatory penalty of death for certain offenses should not preclude the courts, in
pain and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them the exercise of sound judicial discretion, from considering the facts and
2. There are unusual punishments in the sense that they have circumstances and to determine whether the crime committed is heinous, and
never before been known whether there are compelling reasons to impose the death penalty. The SC must
vote twice in reviewing cases where the death penalty was imposed:
3. A penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive
and serves no legislative purpose
4. A punishment that is not excessive and possessed of a 1. First, to decide whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
legislative purpose may nevertheless be invalid if popular doubt of the heinous crime charged, and
sentiment abhors it 2. Second, to decide whether to impose the death penalty.

DD: Notice that under the 1987 Constitution, the prohibition against unusual If less than a majority of the court choose to impose the death penalty, then
punishment has been removed to allow the government some leeway in reclusion perpetua will be automatically imposed.
developing penology.

PEOPLE vs. MUOZ computation in the absence of death penalty The 1987
Constitution had the effect of barring the imposition of the death penalty until the BILL OF RIGHTS
same is reactivated by the Congress. The manner of computing penalties was
discussed in this case in case the range of the penalty adjudged includes the death SECTION 20
penalty. The only thing to remember is that the death penalty cannot be
imposed. The three-grade scheme of the original penalty (such as reclusion Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll
temporal to death) is maintained, except that the maximum penalty of death tax.
cannot be imposed. After all the death penalty was not abolished. It was merely
ordered not to be imposed subject to the wisdom and subsequent enactment of Imprisonment for Debt
Congress.

LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ BP No. 22 / bouncing checks / liability ex delicto In this

There is no need to adjust the 2 remaining periods by dividing them into 3 shorter
periods. Its just that the maximum penalty of death will not be imposed.
PEOPLE vs. ECHEGARAY rape / heinous crimes / power of Congress The
Constitution confers upon the Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty
subject to certain requisites:
1. Congress must define what are heinous crimes
case, the constitutionality of BP No. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law, was assailed for violating the Constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for non-payment of debt. It is allegedly a bad debt law rather than a bad check
law. The debts covered by the constitutional prohibition are debts arising
from contractual relations; they are liabilities arising from actions ex
contractu. The inhibition was never meant to include damages and
imprisonment arising from actions ex delicto, or those arising from crimes.
Such fines are imposed as punishment for a crime and do not arise out of
contractual obligations

60 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
What the law punishes w/ imprisonment is not the failure to pay the debt, but
rather the act of making and issuing worthless checks. The purpose of the law
is to protect the public interest from the deleterious effects of the proliferation of bad
checks which then amounted to some P 200 million worth in circulation per day.
Acceptance of checks is based on confidence; they are not legal tender. Thus, if
that confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as substitutes for currency
would be greatly diminished. A check flasher injures not only the payee but also the
public interest.
BP No. 22 was enacted by Congress as a valid exercise of the police power. It is a
valid law and does not infringe upon the Constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt.
IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS (GR No. 154037) rentals / civil debt /
covered The petitioners were tenants of a land. They were ordered by the court to
pay their rentals to Eleuteria Bolano the Administratrix of the estate of the late
Anselma Allers. They failed to pay the necessary rentals because they were then
uncertain as to the rightful person to whom they should pay. Thus, Bolano sought to
have them cited for contempt for their failure to comply w/ the orders of the judge to
pay the appropriate rentals.
The debt covered by the Constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt pertains to civil debt. It means any liability to pay arising out of a
contract express or implied. The payment of rent is covered by the
prohibition. It is a contractual debt, not one arising from a crime. Thus,
petitioners cannot be imprisoned for their failure to pay rent w/o violating their
constitutional right against imprisonment for non-payment of debt.
DD: Poll taxes are no longer allowed under the Constitution; it amounts to a
property qualification for the exercise of the right to vote w/c is prohibited under
Article 5.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 21
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Right against Double Jeopardy
61 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Requisites for the defense of Double Jeopardy:
1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second
2. The first jeopardy must have been terminated
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first
DD: To determine if the offenses charged are the same, it is important to observe if
the offense alleged is merely an ingredient or element of the other, or is merely an
attempt for frustration of the other.
PEOPLE vs. YLAGAN when does jeopardy attach For a person under prosecution
to be placed in jeopardy, he must be placed on trial under the following conditions:
1. Court of competent jurisdiction
2. Upon a valid complaint or information (sufficient in form and substance)
3. After he has been arraigned
4. After he has pleaded to the complaint or the information (issue is properly
joined)
Purpose: the right against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the
peril of second punishment, but rather against the burden of being tried again
for the same offense so that after being notified of the dismissal of his case, the
accused can rest assured that he will not have to prepare for yet another litigation
or prosecution.
PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN plea of guilty but acquitted / no valid 1st jeopardy
Aurelio Balisacan was charged for homicide for attacking and stabbing one Leoncio
Bulaoat. Upon being arraigned, he pleaded guilty. Upon motion of his counsel de
oficio, he was allowed to present evidence to mitigate liability. Thereafter, he
claimed that he merely acted in self-defense and alleged voluntary surrender. On
the basis thereof, the trial judge rendered a decision acquitting him; the prosecution
thus appealed. Balisacan invokes his right against double jeopardy.
A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt and leaves the court no
alternative but to impose the appropriate penalty. Balisacan was allowed to
testify only to present evidence to mitigate liability thus such testimony cannot be
taken as a trial on the merits. What the trial judge should have done was to take the
defendants plea anew because his testimony of self defense had the effect of
vacating his pervious plea of guilty.
There was thus no valid plea one of the requisites for jeopardy to attach at
the time the court rendered its decision of acquittal. The acquittal is null and
void. Jeopardy did not attach the first time in the absence of a valid plea; thus
appeal by the prosecution cannot violate the accuseds right against double
jeopardy. Further, the prosecution was deprived of its day in court an evident
violation of the right of the People to due process.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
DD: What element is lacking? A valid plea.
PEOPLE vs. ESPINOSA conditional arraignment / waiver must be clear and
express Espinosa, among others, was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
estafa and attempted corruption of public officers. Espinosa motioned to have his
case re-investigated before the Ombudsman, and then later filed a motion for leave
to travel abroad. The Sandiganbayan had the accused conditionally arraigned
where the latter pleaded not guilty. The condition apparently was for the accused to
waive his right against double jeopardy for him to be allowed to travel abroad
pending re-investigation. The Ombudsman then moved to withdraw the charges ex
parte. Later on, the Ombudsman filed w/ the same court informations for
Malversation of Public Funds; Espinosa argued double jeopardy.
Conditionally arraigning an accused is a practice not recognized in regular
rules of procedure. Arraignment, being an indispensable element of due process,
cannot be regarded lightly or be brushed aside. Espinosa made a simple and
unconditional plea of not guilty. There was no express or manifest intention on
his part to waive his right against double jeopardy; such waiver cannot be
implied or assumed from the proceedings. It must be clear and categorical.
The dismissal of the case was likewise secured by the Ombudsman w/o the
consent of Espinosa; this bars a subsequent prosecution.
BULAONG vs. PEOPLE rebellion & subversion / first jeopardy is still pending
Agaton Bulaong, a.k.a. Ka Era, was charged for rebellion before the CFI of Laguna.
Trial did not proceed until 1958 because he remained at large. The Anti-Subversion
Act took effect the year 1957, and he was charged before the CFI of Manila for the
crime of subversion. While his case for subversion was pending, he was convicted
of the crime of rebellion; he thus invokes his right against double jeopardy alleging
that the facts alleged in both charges were the same. The defense of double
jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was either convicted or
acquitted or the case against him was terminated or otherwise dismissed w/o
his consent. Ka Era was not convicted or acquitted of subversion, neither
was the case terminated or dismissed w/o his consent. Thus, double jeopardy
does not attach.
DD: Simply put, when Bulaong was convicted for Rebellion, his jeopardy for
Subversion has yet to be terminated. One of the requisites for invoking the right
against double jeopardy is that the first jeopardy must have terminated.
BUSTAMANTE vs. MACEREN service of sentence / finality / bar to re-opening of
case Albaro Gregorio was charged for serious physical injuries caused through
reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and was sentenced to 1 month and 1 day
imprisonment. That same day, he paid the necessary fines and he began serving
his sentence. Decision has become final and executory due to his service of
the sentence. On that same day also, the trial judge rescinded the decision and re-
assigned the case for a new trial allegedly based on new findings of fraud on the
62 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
part of the accused. This time, he pleaded not guilty and raised the defense of
double jeopardy.
The decision becomes final upon:
1. The expiration of the period to perfect an appeal, or
2. When the offense has been partially or totally satisfied, or
3. When the defendant expressly waived his right to appeal.
In this case, Gregorio has already begun serving sentence; thus the decision has
become final. A judgment of conviction can only be modified or set aside
before it has acquired finality. The act of re-opening a case that has already
become final violates the accuseds right against double jeopardy. The trial
judge thus erred in not accepting the plea of double jeopardy; and considering that
Gregorio has already served the full term, he is entitled to be released already.
PEOPLE vs. OBSANIA rice fields / motion to dismiss / estoppel / no jeopardy
Willy Obsania was charged for having raped a 14-year old girl, while armed w/ a
dagger, and in the rice fields along the street. The information failed to expressly
allege the existence of lewd designs w/c is inherent in all crimes against chastity.
Obsania was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and moved for the dismissal of the
case due to a defective information, averring that the subsequent info filed by the
fiscal did not cure the defect in the first information. The court granted the motion
and dismissed the case. First of all, lewd designs need not be expressly alleged
in the information it is a mere superfluity because lewd designs are manifest from
the very act of rape. Thus, the initial complaint is valid.
If the dismissal of the case was upon motion of the accused, this is not a bar
to subsequent prosecution. He is barred by estoppel from raising the defense
of double jeopardy. In such a case there is no trial on the merits. The accused
cannot question the jurisdiction of the court in moving for the dismissal of the case
and then later invoke double jeopardy w/c requires among others that the case be
brought before a court of competent jurisdiction. In this case, the accused motioned
for the dismissal of the case; he cannot now raise the defense of double jeopardy,
because the dismissal of the case was w/ his consent in fact, at his instance.
If the dismissal was due to failure to prosecute or due to a violation of the
right to a speedy trial, then it amounts to an acquittal and double jeopardy
can be invoked. Such a circumstance does not attend in this case.
RIVERA vs. PEOPLE verbal order / must be written / may still be set aside Rivera
was arrested for allegedly attempting to transport marijuana to Manila. Upon
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. During trial, no witnesses were available;
neither was the confiscated marijuana presented. Capt. Sarmiento, the Forensic
Chemist, on repeated occasions, failed to appear during trial. On the 3 rd instance
that Capt. Sarmiento failed to appear, the respondent judge verbally granted
the motion to dismiss and ordered Riveras immediate release. Barely an hour
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
later, Capt. Sarmiento arrived, and upon satisfactory explanation, the judge set
aside the verbal dismissal and ordered the case re-scheduled. Rivera now invokes
double jeopardy.
For the order of dismissal to become final. it should be reduced in writing and
signed by the judge. Generally, an order of dismissal due to failure of the
prosecution to present witnesses has the effect of acquittal and becomes
immediately executory; however, it must be reduced in writing to attain the status of
finality. In this case, the judge still had the power to set aside the verbal order;
double jeopardy has yet to attach.
PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN & VELASCO insufficiency of evidence / same
effect as acquittal Velasco was charged before the Sandiganbayan. After the
prosecution had rested its case, he filed a Demurrer seeking to dismiss the case
based on insufficiency of evidence; it was initially denied but eventually granted
upon his Motion for Reconsideration. He now invokes double jeopardy to bar
subsequent prosecution. The prosecution contends that the dismissal was void for
failing to state a summary of facts. The trial court (or Sandiganbayan) may
dismiss a case based on insufficiency of evidence and such dismissal
amounts to an acquittal. Thus even if the same has been granted at the
instance of or w/ the consent of the accused, it serves as a bar to subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. Double jeopardy attaches.
CONDRADA vs. PEOPLE temporary dismissal Condrada was charged w/ rape.
Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty. On two separate occasions, the
complainant and the witnesses failed to appear during trial. On the third instance
the court ordered the sub poenae to be coursed through the NBI, but still the
complainant and the witnesses failed to appear; the prosecution yet again
requested for postponement. The court denied the accuseds motion to dismiss
based on the right to a speedy trial; but allowed the temporary dismissal of the
case subject to revival w/in 30 days therefrom, otherwise, it shall be dismissed
permanently. Upon revival of the case, Condrada invokes double jeopardy. A
provisional dismissal is a dismissal w/o prejudice to reinstatement or revival
before the order becomes final, or w/o prejudice to the subsequent filing of a
new information. It is not a permanent dismissal w/c bars subsequent
prosecution or revival based on double jeopardy.
Dismissal bars subsequent prosecution when:
1. There was conviction or acquittal (trial on the merits)
2. Dismissal due to failure to prosecute
3. Dismissal due to unreasonable delays in violation of the right to speedy
trial
4. Dismissal without the consent of the accused
5. Dismissal due to insufficiency of evidence (People vs. Sandiganbayan &
Velasco)
63 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
PEOPLE vs. PANFILO LACSON Kuratong Baleleng Panfilo Lacson, among others,
was charged for multiple murder for the annihilation of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
particularly 11 members thereof. The case was provisionally dismissed by Trial
Judge Agnir on the basis of Sec. 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The said rule was about provisional dismissal. It provides that a case
shall not be provisionally dismissed, except:
1. With the express consent of the accused, and
2. Due notice to the offended parties (or their heirs, since the
victims here were all killed).
If the offense is punishable by imprisonment of more than 6
years (as in this case), the provisional dismissal shall become
permanent if the case is not revived w/in 2 years after the
issuance of the order.
Thus, the People move for reconsideration. The prosecution seeks to revive the
case, even despite the lapse of the 2 year period, and pray that the Resolution of
Judge Agnir dismissing the case be set aside, contending that the abovementioned
requisites for provisional dismissal are not present; hence, according to them, Ping
Lacson should not be entitled to the immunity granted after 2 years from the
provisional dismissal, since the provisional dismissal was invalid in the first place.
Lacson did not pray for the provisional dismissal; he never consented thereto
and never sought it neither expressly nor impliedly. What he sought in his
motion was merely judicial determination of probable cause and examination of the
witnesses so that should the court find the absence of probable cause, the arrest
warrants should then be cancelled. Thus, the 1st element is missing.
Likewise, no notice of the motions for provisional dismissal were ever served
to the heirs of the victims, at least 3 days before the said hearing as required by
the rules of court; thus the 2nd element is likewise missing. The rationale behind
such rule is to afford the victims or their heirs the chance to object to the motion on
valid grounds.
Since none of the elements required above attend, then the Rule on Provisional
Dismissal does not apply. The dismissal does not fall w/in the aforesaid rule on
Provisional Dismissals; therefore the case may be revived beyond the
prescribed 2 year period subject to the right of the accused to oppose the
same on the basis of Double Jeopardy or the Statute of Limitations.
DD: I believe that even though the Rule on Provisional Dismissal does not apply,
nevertheless, the accused should be entitled to the defense of double jeopardy.
The case was dismissed clearly w/o his consent; and by no stretch of the
imagination can his motion for judicial determination of probable cause be taken as
consent to the dismissal w/c must be given unequivocally, positively, and clearly.
If dismissal was made w/o the consent of the accused, it acquires the status of
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
finality, and such dismissal bars subsequent prosecution for the same offense in
accord w/ the right against double jeopardy.
Dissent of Justice Puno:
The underlying reason why Sec. 8 of Rule 117 was formulated, in the first place,
was to prevent the prosecution from arbitrarily reviving or re-animating an case that
has become dormant due primarily to the prosecutions own failure or inaction w/o
justification. It confers new rights independent of but related to the rights to a
speedy trial and against double jeopardy. The prosecutors should thus be
constrained to work within the prescribed timeline and not unduly burden the
accused w/ the hassles of prolonged and protracted prosecutions.
PEOPLE vs. CA (GR No. 142051) review disguised as certiorari / acquittal is final
Respondents Francisco and Pacao were acquitted by the Court of Appeals. The
People, through a writ of certiorari, allege errors of judgment or misappreciation of
evidence on the part of the CA, not errors of law or jurisdiction. This is an erroneous
application of the extraordinary writ of certiorari because the Supreme Court cannot
inquire into factual matters unless there is a blatant abuse of authority on the part of
the lower court. Regardless of its nomenclature, the petition is actually one for
an ordinary review of the factual findings of the lower court. It was practically
an appeal disguised as a petition for certiorari and for the SC to entertain
such would violate the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Unless
there is a mistrial, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable pursuant to
double jeopardy. This is regardless of whether it is decided by the trial court or the
CA.
DD: A decision of acquittal becomes final immediately and bars the re-opening of
the case. The exception is when the prosecution was denied due process.
PEOPLE vs. RELOVA ordinance & law / if based on same act, double jeopardy
applies Manuel Opulencia was charged for violating Ordinance No. 1 Series of
1974 of Batangas City for having made unauthorized installations and wirings in his
ice plant to lower his power bill fraudulently (typical jumper). He pleaded not guilty
although he admitted to the presence of such unauthorized installations w/in his ice
plant. However, given the fact that the case against him has prescribed the trial
court was constrained to dismiss the case against him on the ground of
prescription. Being a light felony, it prescribed 2 months after the discovery the
asst. fiscal filed the case 9 months thereafter, way beyond the prescriptive period.
Later on, the fiscal filed a case against Opulencia, this time for Theft of electric
power, punishable under the Revised Penal Code. Opulencia answered w/ a
Motion to Quash.
Double jeopardy operates when an ACT is prosecuted under an ordinance,
and then later the same act is prosecuted under a statute and vice versa.
The 2nd sentence of the provision makes reference to ACTS, not offenses as
provided in the 1st sentence. Conviction or acquittal under either constitutes a bar
to prosecution for the same act. Thus, even if the offenses charged under the
ordinance and the law are different, if the charges under the law and ordinance are
64 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
based on the same act, double jeopardy applies. In this case, there is obviously
only one act sought to be punished although different offenses are alleged. Thus,
double jeopardy protects the accused.
MELO vs. PEOPLE supervening event / offense acquires new character /
amended complaint Conrado Melo was charged for frustrated homicide for
stabbing and inflicting fatal wounds to one Benjamin Obillo. He pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, the victim died; thus, the next day, an amended information was filed
against him charging him this time w/ consummated homicide. Melo invokes double
jeopardy. In this case, the second offense was not in existence during the time
of the 1st prosecution because the accused could not possibly have been
convicted of an offense that was still inexistent. The victim then was still alive;
thus no case for consummated homicide could prosper. It was at most frustrated
homicide.
Even assuming that the second offense is identical to the first the first being a
mere frustration of the second nevertheless, the right against double jeopardy is
not violated by the filing of the amended complaint in this case. Supervening
events took place that changed the character of the offense, thus the accused
cannot be said to be placed under double jeopardy for being prosecuted for
the new offense. The amended complaint should thus be allowed to stand. His
service of the first penalty however should be credited in case of conviction of the
second offense.
DD: Take note also that the first jeopardy has not yet terminated; thus no double
jeopardy can attach.
PEOPLE vs. BULING fractures later discovered / no supervening events
Buenaventura Buling was charged for less serious physical injuries for having
inflicted wounds upon Isidro Balaba. The findings of the medical examination
showed that the Balaba was to be incapacitated and would require medical
attendance for some 10 to 15 days. Buling pleaded guilty and served sentence that
same day. Prior to the filing of the subsequent amended complain, he has in
fact fully served his sentence. Later on, Balabas wounds did not heal. A second
medical exam was committed, this time an x-ray machine was used; fractures were
found in the victims hand w/c would take him some 90 days to heal. An amended
information was filed against Buling, this time for serious physical injuries. The
prosecution invoked supervening events to justify the filing of the new complaint.
There were no supervening events here that would justify the filing of an
amended complaint. The fractures already existed during the time of the first
examination; it is just that they were only discovered during the subsequent
examination. Thus, an amended complaint cannot be validly filed against the
accused w/o violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. In this
case, the court warns that before filing appropriate informations in such cases,
thorough medical examinations must be conducted to avoid such circumstances
where the accused could not be held liable for the more severe but rightful liability
as he is shielded by the guarantee against double jeopardy.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
DD: Take note that the first jeopardy has already terminated; the accused had, in
fact, fully served his sentence.
Important reminders:
Always take note of the elements of double jeopardy. If the first jeopardy has yet
to attach due to the lack or defect of any of the elements (court of competent
jurisdiction, valid information, arraignment, valid plea), then double jeopardy
cannot yet be invoked.
Even if the first jeopardy has attached, the same would have to terminate,
otherwise to invoke double jeopardy would be premature (Bulaong vs. People).
If the dismissal of the case is with the consent of the accused, the dismissal
does not bar a subsequent prosecution, unless, the dismissal was based on the
merits such as failure to prosecute or lack of evidence.
If the dismissal of the case was due to a violation of the right to speedy trial, it
amounts to an acquittal and bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 22
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Ex Post Facto Law & Bill of Attainder
LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY two-tiered appeal / right to appeal
preserved / SC reviews The accuseds in this case are being prosecuted as
accessories for multiple murder w/ regard to the Kuratong Baleleng rubout. Under
the old law, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC; however, RA No. 8249
was enacted expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Before only
principals for offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may be tried by it; under
the new law, accomplices and accessories may also be tried by the
Sandiganbayan, not only principals.
RA No. 8249 was made to apply to cases pending in any court over w/c trial has
not yet begun such as the case of the accuseds where evidence has yet to be
presented. Their case was thus transferred to the Sandiganbayan; they now
65 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
allege that the law is an ex post facto law because the new law deprives them of
the two-tiered appeal before recourse to the SC.
It is w/in the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to certain
constitutional limitations. RA No. 8249 is not a penal law; it is merely a
substantive law on jurisdiction. Even though the law deprives the accuseds
of the two-tiered appeal, it nevertheless preserves the right of the accuseds
to appeal before the Supreme Court. The SC still has the power to review the
case to determine if the presumption of innocence is overcome. It thus is not an ex
post facto law.
DD: Cases decided by the Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court;
while cased decided by the RTC may be reviewed first by the Court of Appeals
before being reviewed by the Supreme Court. It must be noted, however, that the
CA may determine questions of fact; the SC generally may only rule upon
questions of law.
PEOPLE vs. FERRER Anti-Subversion Act The Anti-Subversion Act outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines and other subversive organizations, and
punishes any person who knowingly and by obvert acts affiliates himself, becomes,
or remains a member of the said Party or any similar subversive organization. It is
alleged to be a bill of attainder. A Bill of Attainder is a law w/c inflicts
punishment w/o trial. It substitutes a legislative act for a judicial
determination of guilt. The issues are resolved as follows:
1. The mere fact that it singles out the CPP and imposes a burden upon it is
insufficient to deem it as a Bill of Attainder nevertheless, the said law
does not apply solely to the CPP but to any other organization organized
for the purpose of overthrowing the government. Under the law, the guilt
of the accuseds must still be judicially determined. The court must
still prove that the accused joined knowingly and w/ intent to
attain its specific objective to overthrow the government; hence it is
not an ex post facto law.
2. The judgment expressed in the legislation regarding the criminal nature
of the CPP is so universally acknowledged as to be certain and
judicially noticeable. The SC on many occasions has found the CPP to
be an illegal organization, engaged in armed struggle for the purpose of
overthrowing the government, etc.
3. If a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is necessarily also an ex post
facto law. The said law, however, punishes acts committed AFTER the
enactment of the law. It applies prospectively, not retroactively. Members
of the CPP have the opportunity to renounce their affiliation or discontinue
their criminal acts; hence the penalties are not inescapable. The law is
not an ex post facto law; neither is it a bill of attainder.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (GR No. 101724) longer prescriptive period /
cannot retroact Paredes committed a violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act (RA No. 3019) for w/c he was prosecuted. He committed the said
offense the year 1976. The prescriptive period then under existing law was 10
years. Subsequently, BP No. 195 was enacted (1982) w/c extends the prescriptive
period for offenses punishable under RA No. 3019 from 10 years to 15 years.
Paredes is now being prosecuted due to the extended prescriptive period, although
under the old law, his liability therefrom must be extinguished.
The provisions of BP No. 195 regarding the longer prescriptive period for
prosecution of offenses cannot be applied retroactively against Paredes
because it is not favorable to him as the accused. To do so would make it an
ex post facto law, contrary to the Constitution. It would punish him for a crime
w/c should have already been extinguished through prescription.
CO vs. CA rubber checks / operative fact I have arranged the facts chronologically
as follows:
YEAR 1981: The Ministry of Justice issued a Circular declaring that the issuance
of rubber checks was not covered by BP No. 22 (Anti-Bouncing
Checks Law). Hence it was NOT PROHIBITED by law.
YEAR 1983: Albino Co issued the rubber check subject of this
prosecution. He relied upon the Circular of the Ministry of
Justice.
YEAR 1984: The said Circular was reversed by the Ministry of Justice declaring
that the issuance of rubber checks was covered by BP No. 22 and
hence IS PUNISHABLE under the said law.
YEAR 1987: The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Que vs. People that the
issuance of rubber checks was indeed prohibited by law and
PUNISHABLE under BP No. 22.
Co is now being prosecuted for the issuance of the said rubber
check in violation of BP No. 22.
Not only laws must be applied prospectively. Administrative issuances
interpreting the laws, as well as judicial decisions laying down new doctrines
must also be applied prospectively. They cannot retroact especially if
prejudicial to the accused. In this case, Co relied upon the interpretation of the
Minister of Justice; the Que vs. People Ruling was promulgated already after his
act of issuing the rubber check. Thus the same cannot retroact and apply to his
case because it is not favorable to him as an accused.
66 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
ARTICLE 4
CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under
the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law.
DD: RA No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act allows former Filipinos who have been naturalized in foreign countries to re-
acquire their Filipino citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance and the
registration thereof. The irony is that the Constitution deemed dual allegiance
inimical to the public interest and mandated Congress to deal with the matter. What
the Congress did in response was to legalize dual allegiance!
VALLES vs. COMELEC jus sanguinis / waiver must be express Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez was a candidate for public office. Her eligibility was challenged on the basis
of citizenship. She was born in Australia to a Filipino father (Telesforo) and an
Australian mother. She was born the year before the 1935 Constitution took effect
thus the Philippine Bill and Philippine Autonomy Act were the applicable laws.
Under both Acts, all inhabitants of the Phils. who were Spanish subjects on April
11, 1899 and who resided therein, including their children, are deemed Filipino
Citizens. Telesforo, her father, qualifies as a citizen under the said laws.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
The Philippines adheres to the jus sanguinis doctrine, where the citizenship
is determined based on blood relationships. Rosalind, thus, being a child of a
Filipino father, is deemed a Filipino citizen. The mere fact that she was born
in Australia does not suffice to make her lose her citizenship. Assuming that
Australia adheres to the jus soli doctrine, then she is at most a dual-citizen.
Even assuming that Rosalind possesses an Australian Passport and Alien
Certificate of Registration, this does not suffice to amount to a waiver of her
citizenship, because waiver must be made expressly. Further, when the Local
Government Code disqualifies dual-citizens from office, it speaks of dual
allegiance. Even so, by her act of filing her certificate of candidacy, Rosalind
in effect renounced her Australian citizenship, because she declared herself a
Filipino citizen and swore to uphold the Constitution and maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Thus, she satisfies the citizenship requirements for eligibility for
local public office.
TECSON v. COMELEC = FPJ - FPJ filed his CoC for President in the 2004 election,
where he represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. FORNIER sought to
disqualify FPJ on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen because (a) his
parents were both foreigners, as his mother was an American and his father was
Spanish and (b) even assuming that his father was Filipino, the same could not
transmit the citizenship to FPJ because he was an illegitimate child. Under the
history on citizenship, during the Spanish occupation, there was no such term as
Philippine citizens, but only Spanish subjects and it was only upon the
ratification of the TREATY OF PARIS that the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects, as the Philippine Bill of 1902 described the same
as Citizens of the Philippine Islands. Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. The SC held that, in this case, FPJ was born
during the time when 1935 Constitution prevailed, which meant that the
concept of jus sanguinis was the primary basis of citizenship. Thus, FPJs
citizenship would depend on whether or not ALLAN, his father, was a Filipino
citizen. In this case, the citizenship of LORENZO POU (grandfather) could be
drawn from the presumption that, having died in 1954 in PAMPANGA, he
wouldve have been born in 1870 when the RP was still under Spanish rule
and, thus, LORENZO would have benefitted from the en masse Filipinization
that the PHILIPPINE BILL enacted in 1902. In turn, that citizenship, if
acquired, would extend to his son, ALLAN, the father of FPJ. The SC also held
that the supposed doctrine that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of the
mother has not been duly established as a doctrine because the same is merely
obiter dictum from past decisions. BERNAS, as amicus curiae, opined that such a
doctrine would have no textual foundation in the Constitution and is violative of the
equal protection clause, making an unreasonable distinction between a legitimate
and illegitimate child. Thus, the 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino, regardless of whether they are born legitimate or
illegitimate.
CO vs. HRET born of Filipino mother, still natural born / election through actions
Jose Ong Jr. was proclaimed Representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar;
67 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Balinquit and Co, his losing competitors, challenge his natural-born citizenship
before the HRET, w/c upheld the same, hence this petition for certiorari. Family
history goes as follows:
Ong Te (grandfather) arrived from China the year 1895, established residence in
Samar, and was able to obtain a Certificate of Residence under the Spanish
Colonial Administration. He qualified as a Filipino citizen under the Phil. Bill of 1902.
Even so, his citizenship was questioned in this case in a collateral approach. An
attack upon a persons citizenship can only be done through direct action for
nullity not collaterally.
Jose Ong Chuan (father) on the other hand was brought to the Phils. the year
1905 and married a natural born Filipina (mother). The CFI of Samar, after trial,
declared him a Filipino Citizen. Jose Ong (respondent) was then born the year
1948 under the 1935 Constitution.
Emil Ong (brother) was a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, which
affirmed his citizenship and other qualifications as a member of the said body.
Jose Ong was thus born of both a Filipino father and mother. There is thus no
question that he was a Filipino citizen. However, even assuming that he was
born merely to a Filipino mother and under the 1935 Constitution, and that he would
have to elect or choose to be a natural born Filipino citizen, he likewise satisfies the
requirement albeit not expressly. To expect Ong to elect his citizenship
expressly would be a mere superfluity (after all he was already a Filipino citizen).
Election is both a formal and INFORMAL process. He exercised his right to
vote, lived in the Philippines since birth and established a life here, held
sensitive positions in the government (Central Bank), exercised a profession
(CPA) reserved only to Filipinos, and embraced the Philippine customs and
values. He was voted for overwhelmingly by his constituents. These acts in
themselves suffice to constitute electing to be a citizen of the Philippines.
Having elected citizenship and being of a Filipina mother, then he is deemed as a
NATURAL BORN Filipino citizen and thus eligible for public office. The HRET did
not commit grave abuse of discretion.
DD: The Constitution requires that a person must be natural-born in order to be
eligible as a Representative in Congress. Take note, however, that only the
Constitution can distinguish between natural-born and naturalized citizens in
conferring rights and privileges. Naturalized citizens are, after all, not second class
citizens and possess the same rights as a natural-born citizen.
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO actions manifest renunciation / executive
process Willie Yu was originally issued a Portuguese Passport the year 1971. He
was naturalized as a Filipino citizen the year 1978, but by the year 1981, he once
again applied for and was issued a Portuguese Passport. As a naturalized Filipino,
he even declared his nationality as Portuguese in public and commercial
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
documents, despite his oath to maintain true allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Yu pleads that he has never formally renounced his Filipino citizenship.
All the foregoing acts, such as procurement of a foreign passport, or
representing oneself as a citizen of another country, all suffice as an express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. The
decision in this case was summarily rendered by the Executive Branch (I believe by
the Commission on Immigration & Deportation) in an executive proceeding, not a
judicial proceeding.
Consolidated Dissents:
The pieces of documentary evidence, which consist primarily of photocopies of
certain documents, are insufficient to indicate a categorical and unequivocal
renunciation of citizenship. Further, Yu deserved to have his day in court; a
judicial proceeding must be held to afford him his right to due process. A
summary executive proceeding is not sufficient. The proper procedures laid
down by law must be observed.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC loss of US citizenship / no automatic restoration to Phil.
citizenship Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor elect of Sorsogon. His
eligibility was challenged before the COMELEC on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized as an American the year 1983, and that he
has not re-acquired his Filipino citizenship on the day of the elections. He claims
that he acquired American citizenship only to protect himself from the Marcos
Regime and that the same was merely forced upon him to avoid persecution that
it was not impressed w/ voluntariness. This feeble excuse must be rejected
outright. If he really wanted to disavow his US citizenship and re-acquire
Philippine citizenship, he should have done so in accordance w/ the law
either by act of Congress, naturalization, or repatriation.
He claims to have been repatriated by participating in the elections in the
Philippines and filing his Certificate of Candidacy, but assuming that he may have
lost his American citizenship through such acts, this does not automatically
restore him to his Filipino citizenship w/c he had earlier renounced. He must
still comply w/ the requirements of the law. He is thus at most a stateless
person. Considering that public officials owe allegiance to the State at all times, the
court cannot tolerate the anomaly of having an incumbent governor who owes
allegiance to another country.
LABO vs. COMELEC Aussie naturalization / res judicata / no compliance w/
procedures Labo was proclaimed Mayor of Baguio City. According to an
unrefuted statement from the Australian Embassy, it turns out however, that
sometime prior to his election, he married an Australian woman and acquired
Australian citizenship by naturalization. He was required to swear an oath or make
an affirmation renouncing all other allegiance. He also swore true allegiance to the
Queen of Australia.
He even categorically stated that he was an Australian in a number of sworn
statements. Subsequently, his marriage to his Aussie wife was declared void for
68 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
being bigamous. He applied for Immigrant Cert. of Registration. The COMELEC
affirmed his citizenship stating that the said acts were all mistakes, while the CID
declared that he was not a citizen. He invokes res judicata. The doctrine of res
judicata obviously does not apply to questions of citizenship.
The fact that his marriage to the Aussie was declared void and had the effect of
divesting him of his Aussie citizenship is a matter between him and the State of
Australia. It does not automatically restore him to his status as a Filipino
citizen. The fact is that he lost his Filipino citizenship by committing all of the
following acts:
1. Naturalization in a foreign country
2. Express renunciation, and
3. Subscribing an oath of allegiance to a foreign country.
He must thus first re-acquire his lost citizenship through the processes
required by law, such as by:
1. Act of Congress,
2. Naturalization, or
3. Repatriation
He has not complied w/ any of the modes for re-acquiring citizenship. The fact that
he was elected by his constituents does not cure the defect. He was ineligible
according to the Local Government Code and should thus be ordered to vacate his
position as Mayor.
DD: An example of naturalization by an Act of Congress is the case of Ronnie
Nathanielsz, who was naturalized by virtue of a Presidential Decree, w/c has the
force and effect of law.
ANZAR vs. OSMEA Alien Registration / does not follow that there is
renunciation Lito Osmea was a candidate for governor for the Province of Cebu.
Aznar, sought to disqualify him as candidate alleging that he was an American
citizen based on a Statement issued by the CID affirming the existence of the
following documents: (1) Application for Alien Registration, (2) Alien Certificate of
Registration, (3) Permit to Re-enter the Philippines, and (4) Immigration Cert. of
Clearance all under the name of Osmea, who was eventually proclaimed as
winning candidate. From the get go, the case may be dismissed for not being filed
w/in the 25-day period required by law from the filing of the Cert. of Candidacy;
nevertheless, the Court decided to decide the case based on the merits.
There is no substantial and convincing evidence to find that Osmea is not a
Filipino citizen. There was no proof that Osmea lost his citizenship by (1)
naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation, or (3) by subscribing to
an oath of allegiance to a foreign country. Osmea vehemently denied having taken
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
an oath of allegiance to the US. Being the son of a Filipino father, Osmea was
presumed to be a Filipino, and Aznar failed to discharge the burden.
From the mere fact that Osmea possessed a Certificate of Alien Registration
as an American, it does not follow that he is no longer a Filipino. It is a
classic case of non sequitur. It is possible that he possesses both nationalities. It
cannot be implied that he actually renounced his Filipino citizenship. The statement
under the Constitution against dual allegiance has no retroactive effect and is to
be dealt w/ by law; but no law has yet to be enacted.
Consolidated Dissents:
When a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that
he is not a citizen. Simply put, how can a person claim to be both an alien and a
citizen at the same time? Obtaining an Alien Certificate is a clear and unambiguous
act of declaring that one is not a citizen. It was a voluntary act for the purpose of
insulating oneself from the jurisdiction of the State over its nationals. Express
renunciation on the one hand and naturalization on the other are separate
modes of losing citizenship. One need not be naturalized to actually have to
renounce his citizenship.
All the documents that Osmea requested from the CID are predicated upon the
fact that he is an alien under Philippine laws especially his Permit to Re-enter.
Entry to the country is a right conferred to citizens; if he believed himself to
be a citizen, seeking permission would not be necessary. Osmea also made
several sworn statements declaring himself to be a US citizen. Treating Osmea
different from Frivaldo and Labo smacks of unequal treatment.
Citizenship is like a jealous wife. When a person rejects and divorces his wife to
enter into a second marriage, he cannot say that he still loves her despite his
desertion. Isagani Cruz
BENGZON vs. CRUZ US Marine service / repatriation / restores old status
Teodoro Cruz was born the year 1960 of Filipino parents. He was a natural born
Filipino citizen. However, in 1985, he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and took an
oath of allegiance to the US. He thus lost his Filipino citizenship. He was then
naturalized as a US citizen the year 1990. However, by 1994, Cruz had reacquired
his Filipino citizenship by virtue of Repatriation under RA No. 2630. Then he ran
for and was elected as Representative of 2nd District of Pangasinan. Bengzon, his
losing competitor, assailed his citizenship qualification claiming that he is no longer
a natural born citizen because he had to perform an act to acquire or perfect his
citizenship.
A person who, at the time of birth was a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural born citizen thereof. In repatriation, the person recovers his
ORIGINAL citizenship. In this case, since Cruz was once a natural-born
citizen, repatriation had the effect of restoring his natural-born status. It is
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not a grant of new citizenship. RA No. 2630 indicated repatriation; it did not require
the long and tedious process of naturalization. All that it required was for Cruz to
once again swear allegiance to the Philippines, renounce any other allegiance, and
for the same to be recorded in the Civil Registry.
There are thus only 2 classifications of citizens: (1) natural born citizens, and
(2) naturalized citizens. Only naturalized citizens are deemed not natural
born.
Dissent of Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez:
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation, or legislation, the
citizenship cannot be considered natural-born. The person would still have to
make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state
and reaffirming is allegiance to the Philippines. The patriotic intent of the
Constitution is to impose a more stringent requirement for those aspiring to hold
high offices in the government particularly Congress. The majority has adopted a
liberal and cavalier approach to the meaning and import of natural-born citizenship.
DD: Take note that for Repatriation to be effective, it must be registered w/ the Civil
Registrar as well as the Bureau of Immigration (Altajeros vs. COMELEC). It is
likewise not a matter of right but merely a privilege granted by the State.
ARTICLE 5
SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age,
and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and
in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the
illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then,
they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of
the ballot.
AKBAYAN vs. COMELEC two-day extension Akbayan, along with other civic
organizations and claiming to represent the youth sector, requested the COMELEC
for a two-day extension to register as voters especially for those who have
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
failed to register before the deadline of Dec. 27, 2000. After deliberating the issue,
the COMELEC denied their request, claiming that under Sec. 8 of RA No. 8189, no
voters registrations shall be conducted w/in 120 days before the election, and that
the conduct of the said registration was now operationally impossible to be
accomplished before the 120 day bar arrives. Thus, Akbayan filed a case for
certiorari and mandamus, claiming that the COMELEC undermined their right to
vote and that Sec. 8 of RA No. 8189 was unconstitutional for disenfranchising
voters.
The right to vote is not absolute and must be exercised w/in the framework of
the Constitution and applicable laws providing for procedural and
substantive requirements. One of the indispensable procedural requirements
is registration. The State, in the exercise of police power, may enact laws to
safeguard the credibility of elections. The aforesaid provision serves to secure the
elections against flying-voters, non-qualified registrants and the like; to void the
same would compromise the integrity of the voters list and the entire election.
Although RA No. 8436 allows the COMELEC to fix other dates and periods for
activities regarding suffrage, such as registration, registration must still be done
before the 120 day period laws must be harmonized. The law likewise does not
require that the impossible be done and aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on
their rights. The petitioners had every opportunity to register, but they were
remiss and slumbered on their rights.
ROMUALDEZ vs. RTC asylum / no intent to abandon / hardly voluntary / no
change of residence Phillip Romualdez, son of Former Leyte Gov. Kokoy
Romualdez and nephew of Imelda Marcos, established his residence in Bgy.
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte sometime in the early 1980s. He once served as Bgy.
Captain and was campaign manager for Kilusang Bagong Lipunan. After the EDSA
Revolution, and fearing for their safety, the Romualdezes fled to the US where they
sought asylum. In the year 1991, he was ordered to depart from the US by the
Immigration Dept. He arrived in the Philippines December, 1991 and went back
to his residence in Tolosa. He then registered to vote for the May 1992
Elections; Donato Advincula filed a petition to exclude Romualdez from the voters
list; Romualdez had been physically present in Tolosa for only around 5 months
while the Constitution requires at least 6 months residence in the place where he
proposes to vote.
In election cases, domicile and residence are treated synonymously. It
imports not only an intention to reside in the place, but also personal
presence coupled w/ conduct indicative of that intention. Domicile connotes a
fixed permanent residence to w/c when absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return. In order to change domicile, the following requisites must
concur:
1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality
2. Intention to remain there (indefinitely)
70 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
3. Intention to abandon the old domicile
4. The change of residence must be voluntary
In this case, their sudden departure from the country is hardly voluntary and
cannot constitute abandonment of residence. They went into self-exile under
fear for their safety, which is perfectly understandable. Thus, their residence,
which is Tolosa, remains the same. It cannot be said that they intended to abandon
it in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. Romualdez is thus eligible to
vote in Tolosa, Leyte.
MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC Absentee Voting / exception to the residency
requirement Atty. Romulo Macalintal, through certiorari and prohibition, and as a
lawyer and taxpayer, sought to declare certain provisions of the Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 (RA No. 9189) unconstitutional claiming that it circumvents the
residency requirement of the Constitution for the exercise of the right to vote.
Under the said law, Filipinos residing abroad who are not otherwise disqualified,
even immigrants or permanent residents, may vote for the national elections
provided that they execute an affidavit stating:
1. That they will return to the Philippines not later than 3 years from the
approval of their voters registration under the said Act
2. That they have not applied for citizenship in a foreign country
3. Failure or refusal to return w/in the said period shall be penalized by
perpetual disenfranchisement
The presumption of constitutionality prevailed.
While Section 1 provided for a residency requirement (1 year in the Philippines and
6 months in the locality where one will vote), the doctrine of necessary
implication was applied. The strategic location of Section 2, mandating
Congress to provide for a system of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos
abroad, makes Absentee Voting the exception to the general rule under
Section 1. The residency requirement was thus not applicable to Absentee
Voting.
Assuming arguendo that the residency requirement applies, the concepts of
residence and domicile are synonymous for purposes of Election Law. By their act
of executing the affidavit, the Absentee Voter manifests that he intends to
return to his original residence in the Philippines thus, he is presumed to
have retained his domicile in the Philippines despite his physical absence.
Failure to return w/in the 3-year period is a ground for perpetual
disenfranchisement.
The intent of the Constitution is to confer the right to vote to as many Filipinos
abroad and grant Congress the power to define the parameters for the exercise of
such right.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
DD: How can a person be a PERMANENT resident of one country and still be
domiciled in another?
Notes:
Qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage:
1. Philippine citizenship
2. Age of 18 years or over (at the time of the election)
3. Residence in the Philippines for at least 1 year (domicile)
4. Residence in the place where they propose to vote for at least
6 months preceding the election (may be temporary
residence)
5. Freedom from disqualifications prescribed by law
Reminders:
The right to vote beings on a citizens 18th Birthday
A person may register even if not yet 18 years old, provided
he is 18 years old at the time of the date of election
Registration of a voter in a place other than his residence
of origin does not suffice to cause the loss or
abandonment of such residency
DD: If a person has resided in one locality for 6 months or more and is at the same
time domiciled in another, come election time, he has the option to choose the
place where he will vote whether his current residence or his domicile.
NICOLAS-LEWIS vs. COMELEC dual-citizens / absentee voting RA No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention & Re-acquisition Act allowed citizens
who have been naturalized in other countries to re-acquire their Filipino citizenship
by taking the oath of allegiance, among other requirements. It restores them to
their civil and political rights. Loida Nicolas-Lewis, a dual-citizen under the said
law, among other persons, applied for registration to be an Absentee Voter. The
COMELEC wrote them through the Philippine Embassy that the Absentee Voting
Law was not intended for them and thus, they are not eligible to vote unless they
comply w/ the residency requirement in Sec. 1 of Art. 5 of the Constitution.
For as long as they comply w/ the requirements under the Absentee Voting
Act (such as the affidavit requirement), the dual-citizens may avail of their
right to vote through the said law. They need not satisfy the residency
requirement, Absentee Voting being the exception to the general rule
requiring residency. The intent of the Constitution and the law is to enfranchise all
71 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Filipino citizens living abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin and
manifest their intention to return to the same. RA No. 9225 merely expanded the
scope of the Absentee Voting Law to include the dual-citizens.
JAPZON vs COMELEC- Japzon filed a petition to disqualify Tys Certificate of Candidacy
on the ground of material misrepresentation when the latter falsely represented therein that
he was a resident Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and that he was not a
permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. Ty admitted that he was a natural-
born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized
American citizen. He further claims that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through Ra 9225, which grants dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, and subsequently
renounced his American citizenship through an execution of a duly notarized Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship. Ty complied with the requirements for a natural-born Filipino who
reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 to run for public office.
ARTICLE 13
SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS
(Pertinent Sections & Cases Only)
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to
expansion and growth.
Labor
SSS EMPLOYEES vs. CA no right to strike for government employees Employees
of the SSS staged a strike; the RTC enjoined the said employees and ordered them
to return to work; thus this petition before the Supreme Court. The Constitution is
silent as to whether government employees have the right to strike. Reference to
the Deliberations as well as to applicable laws (RA No. 875) reveals that the right
to form organizations does not include the right to strike.
Art. 13 Sec. 3 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of workers to self-
organization, negotiations, xxx including the right to strike in accordance w/ the
law. For as long as there is no law allowing government employees to strike
and regulating the same, any strike made by them is illegal. Relations between
private employers and employees rest on a voluntary basis subject to certain
requirements provided by law, but public employees are governed by Civil
Service Laws. It is the government that, by law, fixes the terms and
conditions of their employment not any collective bargaining agreement.
EO No. 180 allows public employees to negotiate the terms and conditions of
employment not fixed by law. If negotiations fail, their unions may bring the matter
before the Public Sector Labor Management Council. They may likewise lobby in
Congress for the terms they want; but they do not have the right to stage strikes,
walk-outs, or other temporary work stoppages.
REPUBLIC vs. CA (180 SCRA 428) The National Parks Development Committee
(NPDC) is a government agency; hence its employees are governed by Civil
Service Rules & Regulations. Therefore, the disputes between the NPDC and its
employees are cognizable by the Public Sector Labor-Management Council,
NOT the Dept. of Labor and Employment.
EAGLE SECURITY vs. NLRC contractor & employer liable for unpaid wages Phil.
Tuberculosis Society Inc. (PTSI) contracted the services of Eagle Security Agency
for the service and assignment of security guards. Eagle security failed to pay the
16 guards assigned thereto their wages and allowance increases according to
Wage Orders 2, 3, 5, and 6, thus the latter filed a case before the labor arbiter who
ruled in favor of the guards. It held both PTSI and Eagle solidarily liable to the
security guards for the payment of the latters wages. The PTSI argues that
liability for unpaid wages should be born exclusively by Eagle as per their contract.
The Labor Code provides that in case of failure by the contractor or sub-
contractor to pay wages to their workers, the employer (as well as any person
or association employing such services) shall be liable with the contractor as
indirect employer thereof. The purpose of the law is to afford protection to the
workers; the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State and
does not violate the Impairment Clause.
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DE VERA vs. NLRC separation for cause but w/ separation pay / compassion De
Vera violated Company Rules by hitting Ocampo in the head. He was thus
dismissed. While it is true that the company was itself prejudiced by De Veras
conduct and disturbed its peace, the penalty of dismissal was not commensurate to
the offense committed. De Vera has been working w/ the company for 14 years and
performed well and seemed to have patched up his differences w/ Ocampo.
Nevertheless, since reinstatement would not be practical, the court sustained his
dismissal but required the Company to render separation pay. In certain
cases, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable
under the social justice policy in even if his dismissal was for cause. The
social justice policy mandates a compassionate attitude towards the working class
in its relations w/ management and urges a moderation of sanctions. However, if
the cause of separation is serious, then the generosity of the law must be more
discerning.
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
Section 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers' organizations
to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and
shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research,
and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other
natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers,
and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. The State may
resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall
be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
Section 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen
through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and
marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just
share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
Section 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds
of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation,
and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as
payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
Agrarian Reform
ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM CARP
case Agrarian Reform in the Philippines underwent a steady evolution through
various enactments including: (1) PD No. 27, requiring the compulsory acquisition
of private agricultural lands for distribution to farmer-tenants and specifying
retention limits, (2) EO No. 228 declaring full ownership in favor of the beneficiaries
of PD No. 27, (3) Proc. No. 131 & EO No. 229 instituting the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, and (4) the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or
CARL (RA No. 6657). It was subjected to bitter attacks against its constitutionality
in several cases. The issues raised are resolved as follows:
The President did not usurp legislative powers in enacting EO No. 228 &
229 as well as Proc. No. 131. The said enactments were made during
the time when the President enjoyed extraordinary legislative
powers under the Freedom Constitution and before Congress was
convened. They were later authorized by the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution.
PD No. 27 was likewise enacted by Pres. Marcos in the exercise of his
then legislative powers during Martial Law. The enactments will continue
to be in force until repealed or declared unconstitutional.
The enactments were not appropriation measures; hence they are not
bound by the more stringent requirements of appropriation. Even if it
creates a Fund and the appropriations therefor were uncertain (at least P
50 billion) the same is nevertheless valid. Appropriation was not the main
objective of the law, which is agrarian reform.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause. All the requisites
have been satisfied. The argument that not only landowners but also
owner so of other property must suffer the burden must be outright
rejected.
The CARL was enacted in the exercise not only of the police power
but also of eminent domain thus just compensation is due. It
requires the surrender of the physical possession of the land as well as
73 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
title thereto. The contention that the government must first pursue
public lands before expropriating private agricultural lands is a
POLITICAL QUESTION. The SC refuses to interpose its authority unless
the acts were clearly illegal w/c supposedly is not the case here. The
public use requirement was also obviously satisfied.
The fact that determination of just compensation is initially vested in
the DAR does not amount to usurpation of judicial powers. It is only
an initial determination w/c may be brought to the proper court in case of
disagreement.
The said laws require the landowners to accept compensation not in the
form of cash money. Only the initial deposit was required to be in cash.
While jurisprudence, both local and US, is consistent in stating that
compensation must be in the form of cash, the Agrarian Reform
Program is an exceptional circumstance, a revolutionary
expropriation, w/c would require a more pragmatic approach. The
Constitution supposedly left it to Congress to determine the manner of
payment. Payment in LBP bonds, tax credits, shares of stock, etc. were,
after all, not oppressive.
While jurisprudence was likewise consistent in stating that
ownership only vests upon the full payment of just compensation,
the SC nevertheless sustained the said laws. While not totally in cash,
ownership transfers upon the deposit of the compensation in cash or
bonds w/ the accessible bank. Until then, title remains w/ the owner.
DD: Basically, in this case, we see how the Supreme Court was willing to
make considerable exceptions even to well-settled rules, all in the interest of
social justice.
MADDUMBA vs. GSIS Land Bank bonds / must be accepted at face value A Land
Bank bondholder purchased a residential house from the GSIS using the said bond
(acquired as just compensation). He seeks to compel the GSIS to accept the said
bonds in their face value; GSIS seeks to negotiate and secure a discount
therefrom. The Land Bank bonds are fully-guaranteed by the government and
their values cannot be diminished directly or indirectly. They are not ordinary
commercial papers subject to discounting. The mere acceptance of Land Bank
bonds as just compensation already entails some sacrifice on the part of the
landowner; to reduce their value would impose yet another burden. The purpose of
the law (RA No. 3844) is precisely to cushion the impact of dispossession upon the
landowner. That there is no explicit provision regarding the matter is immaterial; the
intent of the law prevails. GOCCs such as the GSIS thus may be compelled under
the law to accept such bonds at their face value.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
TANAKA vs. JAPAN for comparison only In Japan, the amount of just
compensation is not equivalent to the fair market value of the land in the free
market. Rather, the amount of compensation is fixed by law. It is not calculated
based on the existing economic conditions and does not always correspond to the
value so determined. In the interest of public welfare, the use of private
property may be regulated; the use of farm lands cannot be for any other purpose
than agriculture and the rent is fixed by law. However, payment of just
compensation must be in the form of CASH and based on the fixed standard. It is
important to take note of the scarcity of agricultural land in Japan.
LUZ FARMS vs. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM livestock & poultry lands not
included in CAR Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
the DAR promulgated its implementing rules and regulations regarding Production
& Profit Sharing. The CARL included poultry and livestock in the term agriculture,
equated commercial farms w/ the private agricultural lands, and the Implementing
Rules and called upon such farms to execute a production sharing plan allocating
3% of gross sales and 10% of net profits to their workers as additional
compensation. Lutz Farms, a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry, assailed
the validity of the said regulation as well as the pertinent provisions of the CARL.
It was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry w/in the coverage of the Agrarian Reform Program.
There is simply no reason to include them in the coverage, w/c covers only
arable and suitable agricultural lands. Further, the required production and profit
sharing scheme was arbitrary and confiscatory.
DAR vs. DECS not dedicated to education but rather to business / not exempt
The late Esteban Jalandoni donated a portion of the Hacienda Fe to the DECS, w/c
then leased the lands to Agro Agricultural Corp. initially for 10 years but was
renewed for another 10 years. Alpar and other farm workers filed a Petition for
Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program w/ the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office w/c
was later approved by the DAR. The DECS contends that the said land was not
covered by the CARL.
The general policy of the law is to cover as much lands suitable for
agriculture as possible. It includes all alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. The subject lands are
clearly w/in the coverage of the law and there is no legislation or presidential act
converting it to residential, commercial, or industrial classification. For the subject
lot to be exempt, it must be absolutely necessary for national defense or for
school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes. The subject lands were
not exclusively dedicated for educational or research purposes but rather for
business purposes; thus it is not exempt.
DD: The Agrarian Reform Law allows the owners to retain certain portions of land
and the choice of which portions to retain is exclusively vested to them.
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ARCHBISHOP vs SECRETARY
Facts:
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres is the registered owner of several
properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land,
249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining 19.5432
hectares are planted with coconut trees.
Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office petitions for
exemption from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under
Presidential Decree No. 27. Two of these petitions were denied.
Archbishop appealed and sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands
planted with rice and corn which were registered in the name of the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres.
This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao and a
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The petition was dismissed by the CA. Archbishop filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not as administrator of the Roman Catholic properties, these subject
properties should have been exempt from the OLT?
Held:
The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to under what
title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may exercise. There
is no distinction made whether the landowner holds "naked title" only or can
exercise all the rights of ownership. To do so would be to frustrate the
revolutionary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of agricultural land for
the benefit of landless farmers and farmworkers.
The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further
interpretation there is only one right of retention per landowner, and no
multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party.
Archbishop makes much of the conditional donation, that he does not have the
power to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage the transferred
properties. He claims that these conditions do not make him the landowner as
contemplated by the law. This matter has already been answered in Hospicio de
San Jose de Barili, Cebu City (Hospicio) v. Department of Agrarian Reform. In
that case, wherein Act No. 3239 prohibited the sale under any consideration of
lands donated to the Hospicio, a charitable organization, the Court found that the
lands of the Hospicio were not exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Archbishop's claim that he does not have jus disponendi over the subject
properties is unavailing. The very nature of the compulsory sale under PD 27 and
RA 6657 defeats such a claim. Other less scrupulous parties may even attempt
creating trusts to prevent their lands from coming under agrarian reform, and say
that the trustee has no power to dispose of the properties. The disposition under
PD 27 and RA 6657 is of a different character than what is contemplated by jus
disponendi, wherein under these laws, voluntariness is not an issue, and the
disposition is necessary for the laws to be effective.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop cannot claim that the alleged conditions
of the donations would have primacy over the application of the law. This forced
sale is not even a violation of the conditions of the donation, since it is by
application of law and beyond Archbishop's control. The application of the law
cannot and should not be defeated by the conditions laid down by the donors of
the land. If such were allowed, it would be a simple matter for other landowners
to place their lands without limit under the protection of religious organizations or
create trusts by the mere act of donation, rendering agrarian reform but a pipe
dream.
Archbishop's contention that he is merely an administrator of the donated
properties will not serve to remove these lands from the coverage of agrarian
reform. The lands in Archbishop's name are agricultural lands that fall within the
scope of the law, and do not fall under the exemptions.
Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian reform by
stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does not appear under
the list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed status as administrator does
not create another class of lands exempt from the coverage of PD 27 or RA
6657, and The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. does not
create another definition for the term "landowner."
Petition Denied.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 17.
There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on
Human Rights.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who
must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be
members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of
the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee
on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers.
The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and
functions:
Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights;
Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
75 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and
to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their
families;
Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
Section 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights
that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendations.
Commission on Human Rights
CARIO vs. CHR teachers on strike / CHR cannot adjudicate / it can only
investigate Some 800 public school teachers staged mass actions calling for
redress of their grievances but elicited no response from the DECS. They were
instead ordered to return to work or face dismissal. For failure to heed the
instruction, certain teachers were dismissed or preventively suspended by DECS
Sec. Cario. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed a similar petition w/o prejudice
to appeal before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The teachers then submitted
affidavits to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) w/c scheduled a dialogue
and then, in an Order, adjudicated and decided the case on the merits declaring
that the DECS had committed human rights violations against the dismissed and
suspended teachers. The CHR manifested that it was not bound by the SCs
Resolution dismissing the case contending that the same was based on a
different set of facts.
The CHR does not have the power to resolve cases on the merits, which is a
judicial function. It only has investigative powers. It cannot decide cases like
the courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The proper remedy for the teachers is to
appeal their case to the DECS on a motion for reconsideration. If denied, they have
recourse to the Civil Service Commission, and eventually to the SC. The CHR has
no place in the scheme of things.
EPZA vs. CHR The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla! RA No. 1980
designated the Cavite Export Processing Zone (CEPZ). A parcel belonging to
Phase 4 thereof was bought by Filoil Refinery Corp. but later was resold to the
EPZA. However, before the EPZA could take possession thereof, several
individuals unscrupulously intruded thereupon and planted their crops. In order to
convince the intruders to leave, they were paid P 10,000 and made to sign
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
quitclaims. 10 years later they filed a Joint Complaint w/ the CHR claiming that their
human rights were violated. They allege that Engr. Damondamon and his armed
group accompanied by the PNP brought a crane and bulldozer and threatened
them. When they showed an Order from the President to postpone the bulldozing,
the same was crumpled and thrown to the ground by one of Damondamons men
who remarked, The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!
The media men invited by the squatters were likewise beaten and their cameras
were taken and destroyed. The CHR issued an ORDER commanding Gov. Remulla
to desist from the demolition, but 2 weeks later, they bulldozed the area again. The
CHR issued yet another Order for the same purpose. The provision in the
Constitution allowing the CHR to provide preventive measures and legal aid
services cannot be construed as including the power to issue Temporary
Restraining Orders or Writs of Injunction. If that were the intent of the
Constitution, it would have expressly provided for it. Jurisdiction is conferred by the
Constitution or by law. The CHR may petition the court for the writ of injunction but
has no power to be the one to issue the same. Its powers are merely
investigatory in nature, not judicial.
SIMON Jr. vs. CHR no judicial power / no power to issue writs of injunction /
contempt power The Local Government of Quezon City sent notices of
Demolition to members of the North EDSA Vendors Association giving them 3 days
to vacate the sidewalks to give way for the construction of the Peoples Park. The
CHR, at the instance of the hawkers, issued an Order directing Mayor Simon and
the City Government to desist from conducting the demolition while the complaint
was pending resolution w/ the CHR. The City Government ignored the Order and
proceeded w/ the demolition; thus the CHR issued another Order citing the
responsible officials in contempt for violating the Order directing them to desist from
the demolition charging each of them a fine of P 500.00.
Once again, it has been well settled that the CHR was not intended by the
Constitution to be another judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal. It has no
business issuing Writs of Injunction. Its powers are merely vinvestigatory in
nature. Writs of Injunction may only be issued by the court in w/c an action is
pending. It is an ancillary remedy available only in a pending principal action. Thus
the Order to desist being null and void, the Order of Contempt has no leg to
stand on. The contempt power of the CHR must be utilized in relation to its
investigatory powers such as refusal of persons to heed summons, or unduly
withholding information. It cannot be utilized for purposes not w/in the power of the
CHR to pursue.
Reference to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
creation of the CHR was meant to investigate SERIOUS human rights
violations, such as protection of rights of political detainees, prevention of tortures,
disappearances, and the like although Congress may, by law, provide for other
cases cognizable by the CHR, taking into account its recommendation.
76 | M i k e e Retirado 1-C
DD: Take note also that the CHR does not enjoy the same degree of Fiscal
Autonomy as the other Constitutional Commissions.
ARTICLE 14
EDUCATION, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
ARTS, CULTURE, & SPORTS
(Pertinent Sections & Cases Only)
Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.
Section 2. The State shall:
1. Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated
system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
2. Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary
and high school levels. Without limiting the natural rights of parents to rear
their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of
school age;
3. Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan
programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to
deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the
under-privileged;
4. Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well
as self-learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs
particularly those that respond to community needs; and
5. Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training
in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Section 3.
1. All educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as
part of the curricula.
2. They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity,
respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral
character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking,
broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational
efficiency.
3. At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion
shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary
and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated
or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the
children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.
Section 4.
1. The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable
supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
2. Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups
and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require
increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions. The
control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in
citizens of the Philippines.
No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no
group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any
school. The provisions of this sub section shall not apply to schools
established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and,
unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.
3. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions
used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the
corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of
in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned,
may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations
provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for
reinvestment.
4. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments,
donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
Section 5.
1. the State shall take into account regional and sectoral needs and
conditions and shall encourage local planning in the development of
educational policies and programs.
2. Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
3. Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject
to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
4. The State shall enhance the right of teachers to professional advancement.
Non-teaching academic and non-academic personnel shall enjoy the
protection of the State.
5. The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and
ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment.
EDUCATION
MEYER vs. NEBRASKA teaching German / prohibition is arbitrary / right of
parents to educate A Nebraska statute prohibited the teaching of foreign
languages to students unless they have already passed the 8th grade; violation of
such rule amounts to a misdemeanor and is punishable by fine and imprisonment.
The intent of the law apparently was to curb the baneful effects of the settlement of
foreigners who rear their children in their native tongue and inculcate ideas
inconsistent w/ American ideals. Meyer, an instructor at the Zion Parochial School,
was convicted under the said law for teaching the German language to a 10 year
old child.
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While the intent of the law is valid, the means employed is arbitrary. It
infringes upon the right to liberty w/c includes the right of parents and
teachers to instruct the children as they deem proper. Further, mere knowledge
of the German language cannot be said to be harmful. No emergency has arisen
that would require such a drastic prohibition.
PIERCE vs. SOCIETY OF SISTERS compulsory public schooling / violates liberty
of parents The Compulsory Education Act required that every parent or guardian
of a child between 8-16 years old to send their children to a public school for a
certain period; violation thereof amounts to a misdemeanor. The purpose of the law
is to compel general attendance in public schools by normal children who have yet
to complete the 8th grade. The Society of Sisters, a corporation w/c engages in the
business of primary and secondary schooling and w/c owns considerable
educational facilities, assails the validity of the law for violating the parents right to
rear their children. They also stand to lose considerable profits due to the
enforcement of the law.
The law unreasonably interferes w/ the right of the parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of their students. The idea of standardizing
children by forcing them to accept public instruction militates against the
fundamental principle of liberty.
DD: The duty to educate and rear children is primarily vested in their parents; the
State merely has the subsidiary duty to educate and rear the same. The parents
have the right to choose between public schools and private schools for their
children.
WISCONSIN vs. YODER Amish Community Jonas Yoder and the other defendants,
were members of the Amish Religion who, against a Wisconsin compulsory
attendance law, refused to send their children to igh school either private or
public school after finishing the 8th grade. According to them and their expert
witness, their religious dogmas mandate a return to the old Christian life, de-
emphasizing competitiveness and success, and requiring aloofness from the
material world. They allege that high school education goes against their dogmas
favoring manual work and devotion to a life in harmony w/ nature, and so on and so
forth. In fairness, the Amish have demonstrated to be law abiding and productive
members of the society. It is true that the State has a paramount interest and
responsibility for the education of its citizens; however, it must be subjected
to a balancing process whenever it conflicts w/ other fundamental rights.
In order to outweigh a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion and the
right of parenthood, the State must establish that there is a compelling
interest of great magnitude. That burden has not been discharged in this
case. There is no proof that the Amish alternative education causes any harm to
the students; and any argument that it deprives the children of choice as well as the
chance to be competent is largely speculative. Despite their strangeness, the
Amish have proven that adherence to their beliefs has allowed the Amish to survive
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
for the last 3 centuries as productive and self-reliant citizens. There is no
compelling state interest involved here.
GINSBERG vs. NEW YORK Girly Mags! Ginsberg was operating Sams Stationery
and Luncheonette w/c also sold some magazines. He was charged and convicted
for having sold girlie magazines on 2 separate occasions to children less than 17
years old in violation of the NY Penal Law. He attacks the validity of the said law for
impairing the right to liberty. At the onset, obscenity is not protected speech; what
may be protected expression for adults may not be considered protected
expression for dissemination to children. The State has a legitimate interest in
the well-being of its youth; and while it is true that the custody and care of
children reside first in their parents, the State nevertheless has the
responsibility to protect the youth from things that may impair their moral or
ethical development.
There is nothing in the statute to prevent a parent from purchasing the magazine
and allowing his child to read it. But since parents cannot always be expected to
monitor the children, reasonable regulation of the sale of such material by the State
is justified.
DECS vs. SAN DIEGO NMAT Flunker San Diego, a graduate of Zoology from UE,
four times took the NMAT for entry to med school. He flunked the exam as many
times. He was barred by the DECS from taking the NMAT the fifth time on the basis
of the Three Flunk Rule laid down in MECS Order No. 12 w/c allows students to
take the NMAT only 3 times. Should they fail the 3rd time, they will no longer be
allowed to take the exam. In fact he has already been able to take the exam more
times than allowable. He challenges the constitutionality of the Three Flunk Rule for
violating his right to academic freedom and quality education, as well as equal
protection. The Three Flunk Rule was laid down as a valid exercise of the
police power of the State as a reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public.
In order to achieve its goal of upgrading the selection of applicants to the medical
schools, the State may reasonably prescribe such admission tests. It is the duty of
the State to ensure that the medical profession, w/c affects the very lives of
the people, is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives. It likewise does not violate equal protection because the
medical profession requires more careful and vigilant regulation. While San Diegos
persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless
love
NON vs. JUDGE DAMES rallying students / student-school contract / re-
enrollment Ariel Non and 12 other students of the Mabini College were denied re-
enrolment for having participated in unruly mass actions w/o permits from the
school authorities resulting to the disruption of classes in violation of school
disciplinary rules. The SC previously held in Alcuaz vs. PSBA that when a college
student enrolls for one semester, the contract between him and the school is only
for that semester and terminates by the end of the said semester. The school
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cannot be compelled to re-admit the student because the courts cannot make
contracts for the parties. Non seeks a re-examination of the said ruling. The
following doctrines have been laid down or reiterated:
The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the school
gate. The protection in favor of free speech, as well as to due process, among
other rights, is similarly guaranteed to students. While the authority of the school
to discipline students is recognized, it cannot go as far as to violate
constitutional safeguards. The exercise of free expression and assembly cannot
be used as basis for denying re-enrollment.
The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural
due process. The following must be observed:
1. students must be informed in writing of the nature & cause of the
accusations
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges, w/ counsel should they so
choose
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
5. school authorities must decide based on evidence
6. penalty imposed must be proportional
The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract;
it is imbued w/ public interest. The State has power to supervise and regulate
educational institutions pursuant to its constitutional mandate. Assuming that the
contract was only for 1 semester, it does not mean that the re-enrollment of the
student is a matter entirely discretionary upon the school. BP No. 232 likewise
recognized the right of the student to continue his course up to graduation,
except in cases of (1) academic deficiency, or (2) violation of disciplinary
regulations.
In this case, the penalty of refusing re-enrollment is disproportionate to the
offenses committed. Considering that 5 of the students did not have failing marks,
they should be entitled to re-enrollment. 2 students had only 1 or 2 failures w/c
cannot be sufficient deficiency. Since the academic standards of the school were
never pleaded, Non, and the 3 others who had several failures are to be re-
admitted w/o prejudice to any appropriate action if it is shown that they have indeed
failed to satisfy the schools academic requirements.
SUPERINTENDENT v. AZARCON
Respondents AZARCON and ANONUEVO were public school teachers at
GENERAL HIZON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL (GMHES), who joined an
unauthorized mass action of public school teachers
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
DECS SECRETARY CARINO filed charges against the participants and
respondents were among those charged, placed under preventive suspension,
and eventually dismissed
Respondents elevated the case to the CSC, which modified the penalty to 6
months suspension without pay and on the basis of the said ruling, respondents
requested the
SUPERINTENDENT to reinstate them in GMHES
But since there were no more vacancies in the said school, the respondents were
assigned to other schools
Respondents refused to accept their new assignments and moved for
implementation of the CSC Decision
The SC held that under Section 6 of the MAGNA CARTA for PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS, it is provided that no teacher shall be transferred without his
consent from one station to another, except for cause and as otherwise provided
in the MAGNA CARTA
For a transfer or reassignment of a public school teacher to be valid:
o The transfer or reassignment was undertaken pursuant to the
exigencies of the service.
In this case, SUPERINTENDENT not only implemented the
CSC decision by reinstating the teachers, but also addressed
the lack of other teachers in other stations
o The school superintendent previously notified the teacher concerned of
his transfer or reassignment
In this case, the teachers were able to extensively and
exhaustively question the legality of their transfers
o The teacher concerned was informed of the reason(s) for his transfer
In this case, the teachers were apprised of their transfers and
the reasons therefor
o That transfer was not made 3 months before a national or local election
In this case, the teachers were effectively transferred more
than 3 months before the proximate election
The SC also held that the appointment of public school teachers does not refer to
any particular school or station, as the same are not entitled to stay permanently
in one station because their assignments are subject to the exigencies of their
service
o The exigencies of the service should be viewed in light of the
Constitutional mandate of Section 1, Article 15, which provides that the
State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all
o Thus, the accessibility of quality education determines the exigencies of
the service
Assignments undertaken for purpose of improving the
educational system and/or making education more accessible
are valid
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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF APPEALS
YMCA, a welfare, educational, charitable, and non-profit corporation, sought to
remove from the coverage of the income tax its profits derived from the rentals of
its real property
YMCA invoked both Section 28(3), Article 6 and Section 4(3), Article 14
The SC held that under Section 28(3), Article 6 of the Constitution, what is
exempted is not the institution itself, but real estate or property taxes of lands,
buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes
o Moreover, the exemption created by the said provision pertains only to
property taxes
The SC also held that laws allowing tax exemptions are construed strictissimi
juris and to be granted a tax exemption for revenues and assets under Section
4(3), Article 14 of the Constitution:
o The entity must fall under the classification of non-stock, non-profit
educational institution
Educational institution refers to schools that of a school
system, which is normally associated with formal education
Under the EDUCATION ACT of 1982, private auspices, such
as foundations and civic-spirited organizations are ruled out
Educational institution, when used in laws granting tax
exemptions refer to school seminaries, colleges, or
educational establishments
It means a place where systematic instruction in any
or all of the useful branches of learning is given by
methods common to schools and institutions of
learning
o In this case, YMCA had not given any
proof that it is an educational institution
o The income the entity seeks to be exempted from taxation is used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes
In this case, YMCA failed to prove that its rent income from
the lease of its property is actually, directly, and exclusively
used for education purposes, as it is not a school
BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. JUDGE ALFONSO grossly inadequate med
school The Phil. Muslim-Christian College of Medicine, later re-named Rizal
College of Medicine, was ordered by the DECS to be closed down based on
several findings of the Commission on Medical Education. The Commission,
through several tests and surveys, found that the school suffered from serious
deficiencies and lack of facilities and full-time faculty, among others in short,
inadequate in every imaginable aspect. The College was able to obtain an
injunction from respondent judge enjoining the DECS from closing down the
school.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
The courts have no business substituting its judgment against that of the
DECS and the Medical Board regarding matters clearly w/in its competence,
unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The records clearly indicate that there
is nothing to support the idea that the DECS committed grave abuse of discretion;
in fact it was the respondent judge that was guilty thereof. The evaluating teams
came from different sectors of the medical field and have conducted several
studies, all approved by the Office of the President. They also afforded the College
ample opportunities to improve its facilities but the latter repeatedly failed.
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER vs. CA school closes down / no obligation to remain
open Teachers of the Capitol Medical Center College (CMCC) demanded from
the latter vacation & sick leave privileges. Upon being denied, they postponed the
final semestral exam and influenced the students to boycott the school and conduct
mass demonstrations. The school, upon due notice to the DECS and DOLE was
forced to close down after the 1st semester. Thereafter, the students and the
teachers filed an action to compel the school to re-open and admit them for the 2nd
semester alleging that it was a contractual obligation of the school to allow them
enrollment for the next semester.
While it is true that the school may not unduly expel a student or refuse the latter
enrollment w/o a valid cause (academic deficiency or violation of rules),
nevertheless there is no contract between the school and the students for the
former to remain open for the entire duration of the students courses.
Further, the contract between the school and the student creates reciprocal rights
and obligations that is for the school to educate the student, and for the student to
comply w/ the rules and standards of the school.
It was improper for the trial court judge to have issued an injunction for the school
to re-open. Injunctions mandate maintenance of the status quo the status quo in
this case was that the school was closed down.
GARCIA vs. FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE seminary / no obligation to admit
/ academic freedom Epicharis Garcia was admitted for certain summer classes
for credits in the Loyola School of Theology, a seminary. When she applied for
enrollment for the 1st semester, the Faculty decided to bar her admission, thus she
filed a case for mandamus to compel the school to admit her. It must be noted that
the Loyola School merely allowed certain lay persons to attend its classes but
admission to the school rests upon the discretion of the Assistant Dean of the
Graduate School of Ateneo. It is only upon the admission by the Asst. Dean
that the student is deemed admitted to the degree or program. There was
clearly no obligation on the part of the School to admit Garcia. After all, it is a
seminary and she is a woman.
All institutions of higher learning enjoy academic freedom. It includes
discretions as to
1. Who may teach,
2. What may be taught,
3. How it is to be taught, and
4. Who may be admitted to study.
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Academic freedom for the institution is distinguished from the academic freedom of
the scholar w/c is the freedom to discover, publish, and teach the truth as he sees
fit in the field of ones competence. Academic freedom likewise includes discretion
as to the tenure of the academic staff as well as the allocation of income among
different categories of expenditure.
LUPANGCO vs. CA no reviewing before the exams! / academic freedom The
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) issued Res. No. 105, w/c prohibits
examinees from attending review classes or briefings or from receiving handouts,
tips, or review materials from their schools or review centers w/in 3 days before the
licensure examinations. The examinees thus sue to annul the said Resolution. The
Resolution is arbitrary and unreasonable and infringes upon academic
freedom. The PRC had no authority to dictate upon the examinees how to
prepare themselves for the exams, or to restrain them from taking lawful
steps to fulfill their ambitions.
Nor can they interfere w/ the conduct of reviews by the schools unless the
instructions are found to be impractical or riddled w/ corruption. The PRC
should find the sources of the leakages and stop them right then and there; but they
cannot interfere w/ the legitimate means of preparing for exams.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS vs. CA cum laude through mandamus / academic
freedom Jennifer Lee filed a case for mandamus to compel the University of San
Carlos to confer upon her the Degree of BS Commerce major in Accounting, cum
laude. She, in fact, earned a grade of 5 (failure) in 2 of her subjects, more than
enough to disqualify her from honors; although she was able to have her grade
changed through manifold maneuvers. Schools are given ample discretion to
formulate rules and guidelines in granting honors for graduation. This is
guaranteed by their academic freedom and their discretion may not be
disturbed by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion.
Even assuming that she had her failing grades removed, it is still discretionary
upon the school whether they it should confer upon her academic honors.
REYES vs. CA 3 agonizing years of uncertainty The UP College of Medicine
(UPCM) prescribed a passing rate of 70% in the NMAT as the cut-off score for
admission to the College of Medicine; it was approved by the University Council
(UC). Later on, the UPCM changed the passing score to 90% w/o the approval of
the UC. Upon appeal to the Board of Regents (BOR) by the respondent-students
the BOR reverted to the 70% NMAT cut-off score, and the students who attained
scores between 70% and 90% were thus ordered admitted. The Dean of the
UPCM as well as the Faculty did not heed the directive for them to admit the
students. The students filed a case for Injunction before the RTC, and while the
same was pending, they were admitted and had, in fact, completed 3 years
already.
The students then wrote to the UPCM manifesting that they never intended to
question the facultys right to academic freedom and left the case for the
humanitarian consideration of the same; they also sought the dismissal of the case
before the RTC.
CONSTI 2: Bernas Casebook 2010 ed.
Updated Darvins Digest
The BOR, invoking its plenary power regarding matter affecting university affairs,
approved the admission of the respondent-students in the interest of equity and
justice. The Dean and the Secretary of the UPCM, again, refused to follow the
directive. Under the UP Charter, the power to determine the admission
requirements belonged to the UC. When the UPCM fixed the cut-off grade to
90%, it did not have the approval of the UC. The 90% cut-off rate fixed by the
faculty was thus inefficacious. The UC alone, not the Dean or the UPCM, has the
right to protest against any unauthorized exercise of its power. This is by virtue of
an express provision of law.
MIRIAM COLLEGE vs. CA Libog article / power to investigate inherent in
academic freedom Members of the editorial board of Chi-Rho, the school
publication of Miriam College, published the article Libog w/c was described by
the Miriam College community as obscene, sexually explicit, vulgar, and the like.
Complaints against the students responsible for the article have been filed; the
students invoke Sec. 7 of the Campus Journalism Act, w/c states that a student
shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of the article he/she has
written. They likewise aver that the investigation should be conducted by the
DECS.
Imposing discipline is not only the right but also the duty of the school. It is
inherent in academic freedom that the school be allowed to determine who
among its students deserve sanction and to establish rules and regulations
therefor. The power to investigate is adjunct to the power to suspend or
expel. It is inherent in academic freedom. Thus Miriam College has the right to
hear and decide the case.
Also, it is axiomatic that the right to free expression is not absolute, whether
exercise w/in school premises or elsewhere. Sec. 7 of the Campus Journalism Act
should thus be harmonized w/ the Constitution to mean that students should not be
expelled or suspended solely on the basis of the articles they write, provided, they
do not materially disrupt class work or provoke substantial disorder.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS vs. CA plagiarism A. William Margaret Celine was a
candidate for Ph.D. from UP. Dean Paz requested from the Board of Regents
(BOR) the exclusion of her name from the list of graduating students pending
clarifications about her dissertation, but her letter did not reach the BOR on time;
thus Celine was able to graduate. Upon thorough investigation by the External
Review Panel composed of senior faculty, it was found out that her dissertation
contained at least 90 instances of plagiarism. The College Assembly and University
Council unanimously approved the withdrawal of her Ph.D. She then filed a case for
mandamus before the RTC of Quezon City to compel UP to restore her Ph.D.
A writ of mandamus cannot issue against UP w/o violating its right to
academic freedom. The university has the right to determine upon whom it
can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. If it is shown that
the conferment was obtained through fraud, the university has the right to
withdraw or revoke the honor. Celine was likewise afforded her right to be heard
because she was present during the investigations.
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TAN vs. CA severely strained relations / practical approach There was a bitter
conflict between parents and school administration to such an extent that one of the
parents spit in the face of the Vice Principal. The school refused to admit the
children of the adversarial parents. Where relations between parents and
children on the one hand and school administrators and teachers on the
other have deteriorated to the level here exhibited, the private school may, in
the interest of everyone, including the adversarial parents and their children,
require that their students be enrolled elsewhere.
To rule otherwise would unduly jeopardize the morally conducive and orderly
educational environment, to the detriment of the students. It is comparable to
certain labor disputes where relations have become so strained as to make
reinstatement an unfeasible solution.
PARENT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v. METROBANK
In 2001, the SPOUSES ILAGAN applied for and were granted a loan by the
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, which was secured by a real
estate mortgage and upon default thereof, the latter was allowed to foreclose on
the said property
The PARENT-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION assailed the foreclosure, alleging that
the same violated the right of the students to quality education, as well as
academic freedom
The SC held that the Constitutional mandate to protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education at all levels is directed to the State and not to the
schools
In this case, PTA cannot prevent MBTC from acquiring possession of the school
premises by virtue of a valid writ of possession
The SC also held that the academic freedom granted under the Constitution did
not go beyond the concept of freedom of intellectual inquiry:
o The freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover,
publish, and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their
competence, subject to no control or authority, except of rational
methods by which truths and conclusions are sought and established in
these disciplines
o The freedom of institutions of higher learning to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference, save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint
Under the Constitution, the recipients of the said academic freedom are
institutions of higher learning, which means that the school or college is
possessed of the said right
o In this case, PTA failed to show the relevance of the right to quality
education and academic freedom and how the same were violated by
the Order granting the writ of possession