曼昆Mankiw 经济学原理 (微观分册) 第六版译者曹乾

Principles of
Microeconomics6th edition

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

( caoqianseu@163.com)
caoqianseu@163.com

.
2012 3

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IV
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A
V
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VI
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VII
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19
.Alfred Marshall
21
.Johnny Depp
NGregory Mankiw
2010 12

Ron CronvichCarthage College David Hakes

University of Northern Iowa
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Antonio Bos Tusculum College Simran Kahai John Carroll University
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Christopher Richardson Merrillville High School Arja Turunen-Red University of New Orleans
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Richard Risinit Middlesex Community College Kay Unger University of Montana
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Paul Roscelli Canada College Lisa Verissimo-Bates Foothill College
Larry Ross University of Alaska Anchorage Priti Verma Texas A&M University, Kingsville
Jeff Rubin Rutgers University Patrick Walsh St. Michaels College
Allen Sanderson University of Chicago Jing Wang Northeastern University
Jeff Sarbaum University of North Carolina Greensboro Donald Waters Brayant and Stratton College, Virginia
Dennis Shannon Southwestern Illinois College Beach, Virgina Campus
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Mark Showalter Brigham Young University Elizabeth Wheaton Southern Methodist University
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Jonathan Silberman Oakland University John Winters Auburn University at Montgomery
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Gary Smith DYouville College Mark Witte College of Charleston
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Stacy Carlson Daniel Norris

Josh Bookin
Economics 10
Deborah Mankiw
Catherine, Nicholas Peter
NGregory Mankiw
2010 12
Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

1 caoqianseu@163.com
1
economy oikonomos

scarcity

Economics
Ten principles of Economics

scarcity

Economics

1.1

1People face trade-offs

There aint no such thing as a free
lunch

trade-offs

efficiency
equality
aint=is notno

There
is no such thing as a free lunch.
trade-off
trade off

3 trade-off

(efficiency)

(equality)

2The cost of something

is what you give up to get it
opportunity cost


opportunity cost

3Rational people think at the margin

rational people
24
marginal change

marginedge

marginal benefits
marginal costs

200
100,000 500 =100,000/200

500
think at the margin
10 300
average cost 500
marginal cost

rational
people:

marginal
change:

4People respond to incentives

incentive

50
1960 Ralph Nader

.Sam
Peltzman, 1975
incentive

2005 2008
2 4

A320 737

40%
Demetrius Stroud

.Christy LaBadie
30 4

Diddy
hip-hop
20

2008

10

2004
11 23
Ryan Johnson
David Reiley
Juan Carlos Munoz
95%
Austan GoolsbeeSlate.com, 2006 3 16.
1.2

5Trade can make everyone better off


6Markets are usually a good way to

organize economic activity
1980 20
market economy

self-interest

well-being
self-interested
self-interested
well-being


decentralized
.Adam Smith,1776

invisible hand
market
economy:

.

.
.

. 1776

1776


7Governments can sometimes improve market

outcomes
property rights
DVD
market failure

externality
market power

willingness to pay
welfare system
property
rights:

market
failure:

externality:

market
power


1.3

3
8
(A countrys standard of living depends on its ability to produce goods and services)
2008 47,000
10,000 1,400

2%

35 20 8
productivity

20
1970 1980

productivity

CEO
...
unintended consequences
broken window fallacy

...
...

90% 3%
...
Robert D. Mcteer, JR. The Wall Street Journal, June 4,2003.
9(Prices rise when the government

prints too much money)
1921 1 0.3 1922 11

70,000,000
inflation
1920
1970 .
21 2.5%
30

1920
1970

inflation

Luddite19
.Ned Lud
10Society faces a short-run
trade-off between inflation and unemployment
1980 1990
business cycle
.2008 2009

business
cycle:


1.4

1
1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
www.cengage.com/economics/mankiw.
6.
7.
8.
9.

scarcity economics efficiency equality

opportunity cost rational people marginal change
incentive market economy property rights
market failure externality market power
business cycle
productivity inflation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

1.
a. b.
c. d.
e.
2.
3.
4. 100
5%
5. 500
300
100
6. 65
a.
b. 65
7. 1996
a.
b.
8.
9.
a.
b.
c.
d. 90%
e.
f.
10.
a.
b.
11.
12.
13. 2010 .

a.
b.
c.
14.
15.
16.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

2
2.1

scientific method

2.1.1
Isaac Newton 17
2.1.2 the role of assumptions


2.1.3

beachball

2.1.4

1
circular-flow diagram

factors
of production

1 loops
circular-flow diagram:

2.1.5

production possibilities frontier
1000 0 3000
0

600 2200 A
700 2000 B

C
C

efficient
A
D

inefficient
D
300 1000
D A 300 600
1000 2200
A B 100
200
A B 200 100
A 100 200

2
E
F
3

A G

3 A
1000
3
3
A
G 2200 2300
600
650
production
possibilities frontier

2.1.6

microeconomics
macroeconomics

microeconomics:

macroeconomics
:

George H. W. Bush Michael Kinsley

Donald Trump Ben Stein
Meg Whitman eBay CEO Cate Blanchett
Danny Glover Anthony Zinni
Barbara Boxer U.S. Steve Ballmer CEO
John Elway Arnold Schwarzenegger
Kofi Annan Sandra Day-OConnor
Ted TurnerCNN Scott AdamsDilbert
Lionel Richie Mick Jagger
Mick Jagger
Mick Jagger
Keith Richard

2.2

2.2.1

Polly:
Norm:

positive statementsdescriptive

normative statementsprescriptive
set of
beliefs
positive
statements:

normative
statements:

2.2.2
.one-armed
On the one handOn the other hand,

1946

..John Maynard Keynes
1935

..

Larry Summers
21
.Joseph Schumpeter

19
20
20
21
Lawrence H. SummersThe White House Blog, September 21, 2009.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/A-Vision-for-Innovation-Growth-and-Quality-Jobs/
2.2.3


2.3
George
Bernard Shaw
Ronald Reagan
Trivial Pursuit 100
3000

2.3.1

Trivial Pursuit
100 100 3000

2.3.2

100,000 10,000 10%
20,000 4,000 20%
2.3.4

1 20
1
1.93%
2.
93%
3.
90%
4./
90%
5.90%

6.
88%
7.
85%
8.85%
9.
85%
10.
85%
11. 50
85%
12.
84%
13.83%
14.
83%
15.83%
16.
82%
17.79%
18.79%
19.78%
20.78%
Richard M. Alston, J. R. Kearl, and Michael B. Vaughn, Is There Consensus among Economists in the
1990s? American Economic Review (May 1992): 203209; Dan Fuller and Doris Geide-Stevenson, Consensus
among Economists Revisited, Journal of Economics Education (Fall 2003): 369387; Robert Whaples, Do
Economists Agree on Anything? Yes! Economists Voice (November 2006): 16; Robert Whaples, The Policy
Views of American Economic Association Members: The Results of a New Survey, Econ Journal Watch
(September 2009): 337348.
2.4

think tanks
intellectual
framework
,
.Lawrence Goulder

2004 164 2005 36%
4
Environmental Defense
8
.Caroline
Alkine 1991
1960
1980
1990
1980
1990
.Kert Davies
1990

Jessica E. VascellaroThe Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2005.
A
A.1

A.2
A-1 a
pie chart

A-1
a 2008 b

2008 c
1950 2000
bar graph
b

time-series graph
c

A.3
A-1
coordinate system
grade point average
ordered pair
Albert E.25 /3.5

Alfred E. 5 /2.0
x-coordinate y
y-coordinate
x y

origin
x y

scatterplot
A-2

Alfred E. Neuman Madwhat, me
worry?
A-2
positive correlation
negative correlation
A.4

A-2
demand curve

A-1Emma
A-1

A-3 A-4

A-1

3 x y
A-1
5 10
9 9
A-3

negatively related

A-3

D1
4
A-1
D2D1
A-4
shifts
2
D3
movements along a curve

shifts of a curve A-3 3
8 13 7 17

8 4 13
16

A-4
A-4

D1
3 4
D2 2 D3
x
y

x y
x y
A.5
A-5

slope
A-5
21
6
13 8 x y
y -2 x +8-1/4
y
,
x
=
delta
y
y x
y

3
6 21 8 13
y 68 2 1
= = =
x 21 13
=
8 4
A-5
-1/4
A.6

cause
omitted variable
reverse causality A B

B A

Big Brother
A-6
A-6

A-6
A-6

A-7
controlled experiment
A-7

A-7

minivans

circular-flow diagram production possibilities frontier

microeconomics macroeconomics positive
statementsnormative statements
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

1.
a.Selena 1
b.Stuart 4.50
c.Shanna 30
d.Sally 10% 10,000
2.
a.
b.
c.

d.
peace dividend
3. 1
4.LarryMoeCurly
10 1 1
1 2 2 1
a. ABCD
A
B

C
(D)
b.a AB
C D
c.
d. a
5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
6.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
7.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

3
3.1


3.1.1
8
1 Farmer
15 60 Rancher
10 20 1
a
1
aproduction opportunities
bc
bc 8
b 8
32 0
8 0 8
8
4 16
4 b
b 2
b
1 1
1 4
c 8
48 0 8
0 24 8
4 24 12 c

consumption possibilities frontier
b
c
1 A B 16 4
24 12
3.1.2
Rancher B
Farmer
32 15 5
17 5 16 4
[
2 a]
6 2
18 12 5 15
13 27 12 24
[b]
2
sets
of consumption opportunities
A* A a

B* B

[c]
c
.
.

3.2

3.2.1

absolute
advantage
20 60 10
15
absolute
advantage

3.2.2

1
opportunity cost
8
1 a 1
10 10 10
1 20 10 1/2
1 1/2
1 15 1
60 15 1/4 1
1/4
1
1 1/2 1
2 1 1/4 1
4
comparative advantage

X X
X
1 1/4
1/2
1 2 4

opportunity
cost:

comparative advantage:

3.2.3

40 44 16 18
15 5
3
1 4
5 15
1/3 1
1/2
3.2.4

3 1
1 2 1
4
2 4
2
4 2
2 4
10
. 1

Friday
30 2
1

.
..
.

1776
.
1817
..
3.3

3.3.1 .
.Tom Brady

2 2 20,000
.Forrest Gump 4
4 40

20,000 40

40 20,000
3.3.2

imports
exports
2 1

1 2 1
1 1 1/2
imports

exports

3.4

gold famers
12
12 7 23
wandering 250

avatars
27 20
40% 50%

David Barboza: New York Times, December 9, 2005.
absolute advantage opportunity costcomparative

advantage,imports exports
1.
2.
3.
4. 3
5.
6.
7.
1.Maria 1 20 1 50
5
a.
b. 100
2. 4 10
5 1
a. 1
b.
c. 1 1 1
d.
e.
f.
g.
3.(Pat)(Kris)
root beer
4
2 6 4
a.
b.
c.
4. 1000 2 30
a. 1 1
b. 1000
c. 1000 20
1000
5. 50 1
40 2
a.
b.
c. 1
6.Baseballia

3 3
2 1
a.
b.
c.
d.
7. 100 20
100 10
a.
b.
c.

d. 100 20
8. 20 60
50 75
a.
b.
c.
d. 2 1
9.
a.
b.

c.
d.
e.
10.
11. 1 1
1 2 3 10
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.(c)(d)(e)

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

4.
4.1

4.1.1

market
market:

4.1.2

competitive

market
perfectly competitive

:1
2

price taker

monopoly
competitive
market:

4.2

4.2.1
quantity demanded

20
0.20
law of demand
1 Catherine
12 0.50 10
3 0
demand
schedule
demand curve

quantity
demanded:

law
of demand:

demand
schedule:

demand
curve:

4.2.2
1
market demand
2

2
Catherine 4 Nicholas 3
7

4.2.3

increase

in demand
decrease in demand

normal good
inferior good

substitutes
DVD
complements
tastes

4 a
4

a D1 D2 2
20 10 A B
b 2 4
20 12 A C
shift
move
shiftmove

4 b

10% 4%
10% 12%

(normal
good):

inferior
good:
,
,

substitutes:
,

complements:
,

4.3

4.3.1
quantity supplied

law of supply

5 Ben
1
supply schedule
supply curve

quantity
supplied:

law
of supply:

supply
schedule:

supply
curve:

4.3.2
6
6

2
Ben 3 Jerry 4
7
4.3.3

7
increase in supply

decrease in
supply

4.4

4.4.1
8
equilibrium price
equilibrium
equilibrium quantity 2

market-clearing price
8

2 7
7
9
a2.50

10 4
b1.50
10 4
9 (a) 2.50
10 4
surplus:

excess supply
9 b
1.50
shortage:
excess
demand
law of supply and demand:

equilibrium:

equilibrium
price:

equilibrium
quantity:

surplus:

shortage:

law
of supply and demand:

4.4.2
3

1.
2.
3.
1.taste

2. 10
D1 D2

3.2
10 2 2.50 7 10
10

D1 D2 2 2.50
7 10
a shift in the supply curve

a movement along a fixed supply
curve

11

S1 S2 2
2.50 7 4
1.
2.
11 S1 S2
3.2
11 2 2.50 7
4
1.

2. 12
3. 12
a
b

12

a P1 P2 Q1 Q2b
P1 P2 Q1 Q2
4
P
Q

P Q P Q P Q
P Q P Q P Q
P Q P Q P Q

competing uses
decentralized system

2010

price gouging

.Martha Coakley
.Deval Patrik

2004 Charley

A
0.69 B 2.99
A
0.69 A
B

.
Polar Beverages
Jeff JacobySource: The Boston Globe, May 4, 2010.

market competitive market; quantity demanded;

law of demand; demand curve; normal good;
inferior good
substitutes; complements
quantity supplied; law of supply; supply schedule;
supply curve equilibrium; equilibrium price
equilibrium quantity; surplus; shortage; law
of supply and demand
1.
2.
3.tastes
4.Popeye
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

1.
a.

b.

c.
2.

3. minivans
a.
b.
c.
d.sports utility vehicles, SUVs
e.
4. DVD
a.
DVD
DVD

b.
c. DVD
5. 30
6.
a.
b.
c.
d.
7.


a.
b.
8. 2015 2020 2030
5 15
9.
10.

4 135 26
5 104 53
6 81 81
7 68 98
8 53 110
9 39 121
a.
b.
c.
11.
12.bagels
a.
b.
13. :

4 10,000 8,000
8 8,000 8,000
12 6,000 8,000
16 4,000 8,000
20 2,000 8,000
a.
b.
c. 5,000

4 4,000
8 3,000
12 2,000
16 1,000
20 0
14. QD=1,600-300P QD
P QS=1,400+700P QS

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

5

elasticity
10% 2.5%
6%.
5.1
4

5.1.1

price of

elasticity of demand

elastic

inelastic
elastic inelastic

rules-of-thumb

butter
(margarine)
necessities(luxuries)
elasticity:
price elasticity of demand:
1 1
0

5.1.2

10% 20%
=20%/10%=2.
2 2

10%

20%
5.1.3

A B B A
A 4 120
B 6 80
A B 50%=6-4/4 33%=80-120
/120
33/50 0.66 B A 33%=4-6/6
50%=120-80/80
midpoint method

P Q P Q
Q / Q Q P
=
P / P P Q
=
( P, Q )


4 6 5
4 6 40%6-4/5=40% 6
4 40%

A B
=5 =100
A B 40% 40%
B A 40% 40%
1.
(Q1 , P1 ) (Q2 , P2 )
(Q2 Q1 ) /[(Q2 + Q1 ) / 2]
( P2 P1 ) /[( P2 + P1 ) / 2]
=
5.1.4
1
elastic 1
inelastic 1
unit elasticity
1
a
perfectly inelastic
b
cde
perfectly elastic
inelastic
Inelastic II 1
a

0.1
0.2
0.5
0.7
1.6
2.3
4.4
5.1.5
total
revenue
P Q 2
P Q P Q 2
P = 4 Q = 100 = 4 100 = 400
3 a

P P Q Q Q
( P P) Q A

P (Q Q) B

A B
4 5 100
90 400 450
2

P Q 2 4 100 400

3 a

P P Q Q Q
( P P) Q A

P (Q Q) B

A B
4 5 100
90 400 450
3 b

B A 4
5 100 70 400 350
3

a
b
total revenue:
5.1.6
4
1 2

1 2 5
6 3 4
5.1.7

income elasticity of demand

Q / Q Q P
=
P / P P Q
=
Q / P
P / Q
P / Q
Q = AP

4
normal goods

inferior goods:
necessities

luxuries

cross-price elasticity of demand 1

2 1
2
1
=
2
income elasticity of demand
cross-price elasticity of demand

5.2
4
5.2.1
price elasticity of supply

elastic

inelastic
price elasticity of supply:
5.2.2


2.85 3.15 9,000

10,000
=3.15-2.85/3=10%;
=11000-9000/10000=20%.
=20%/10%=2.
2 2
1% 2%.
5.2.3

5
0a

perfectly
inelastic
e
perfectly elastic
6 3 4 100
200 29% 67%
1 12 15
500 525 22% 5%
1.
6

3 4
100 200. 29% 67%
12 15 500 525
22% 5%
5.3

OPEC
5.3.1


20%.
7 S1 S2
100 110 3 2
7

S1 S2
3 2
100 110 40% 9.5%
300 =3100 220 =2110

P Q
Q
P
300 220
1950 1000
17%. 300 2%.
70%
1950
5.3.2 OPEC
1970
OPEC
1973 1974
50%. OPEC 1979 1981
OPEC 1982 1985
10%OPEC 1986 OPEC
45%1990 1970
1990 21
OPEC
21
2008-2009
OPEC 1970 1980
8 a
S1 S2 P1 P2
8

a S1 S2
b
S1 S2
OPEC
8 b
S1 S2
b
OPEC OPEC
OPEC
OPEC
OPEC
5.3.3

9 S1 S2a

D1 D2b

9 a S1 S2
P1 P2 Q1 Q2
9 b D1 D2
Q1 Q2 P1 P2
5.4

4 5

1
1

1
1
elasticity; price elasticity of demand; total revenue
income elasticity of demand cross-price

elasticity of demand; price elasticity of supply

1.
2.
3.
4. 1 0
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.root beer
2.

150 2,100 1,000
200 2,000 800
250 1,900 600
300 1,800 400
a. 200 250
b.
3. 0.2 0.7
a. 1.80 2.20

b.
4. 30% 15%
5.
6. DVD
=1 =1.2
8 40 50
10 32 45
12 24 30
14 16 20
16 8 12
a. DVD 8 10 i 1
ii
1.2
b. 1 1.2 i 12
ii
16
7. X Y
X -3.
X Y 2.
Y X
8. 1/3
a.
b.
c.tastes 1/4
9.1996 2 17
1995 12 1.25 1.50
400 4.3%

a.
b.
c.
10.
10
10
11.
a. 0.4 2
20%
b.
c.
12.
13.
2 2
a.
b.
c.
d.
14.
a.
b.
15.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

6.
6.1
4
3 cutthroat competition
price
ceiling
price floor
price ceiling:
price floor:
6.1.1

1 a
4 3

not binding

1a 4

3

100 b 2
3 2 125
75 50
binding constraint(non-binding constraint)
2 3
binding
constraint
125 75
50

ration
1973 OPEC
OPEC OPEC
2 OPEC P1
a
S1 S2b
rationing

P1 P2
QS
QD
2

a
P1 b
S1 S2 P1 P2
QD
QSQD-QS

3 a
3

a
3 b

6.1.2
3
4a 2

3

100 b 4
4 120
3
80 40
3
2 4 a
4 b 4
3
120 80

1938

2009 7.25
5 a
5b

5

a
10% 1% 3%.
10% 10%.
1% 3%

2006 47%
14% 38%

2009 7.25
40
30,160 2/3
1/3

M..M.
Patricia Smith

.J.
Nancy J. Leppink
Steven GreenhouseNew York Times, April 2, 2010.
6.1.3
1
earned income tax credit

6.2


0.50
0.25
tax incidence
tax incidence:
6.2.1

1 0.50
4
1
2
3
0.50 2
1.50 P P-0.50
0.50 6 S1
S20.50

6 3 3.30 100 90
6

0.50 S1
S2 0.50 100 90 3
3.30 3 2.80

3 3.30
0.30
3.30

3 2.80 =3.30-0.50
6.2.2

1 0.50
7

0.50 D1
D2 0.50 100 90 3
2.80 3 3.30
0.50
0.50
2 2.50
PP+0.50
0.50
D1
D20.50

7 3 2.80
100 90
3
3.30
6 7

0.50
0.50
0.50 0.50

FICAFederal Insurance Contributions Act
payroll tax
FICA

2010 FICA 15.3%.
0.50
==3 =3.30 =2.80

6.2.3


9

a
9 a
9 b
1990

1993

1000

1000

6.3


price ceiling; price floor; tax incidence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1. 40

2.
a.
b.
c.
3.

11 1 15
10 2 12
9 4 9
8 6 6
7 8 3
6 10 1
a.
b.
2
c.
1
4. 2

a.
b.
5.
6. 500
500
7.
0.50
a.
b.
c.
d.
8.
a.
b.
c.b
d.
b
9.
a.
b.
c.
10. 39,000
5
11. 0.50
0.50
a. 0.50
b.
12. 2008 ..
2008
a.

b.a

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

7.
welfare economics

benefits

welfare economics:
7.1

7.1.1

1
willingness to

pay
value

10
10 80 80
80
80

100 80 20

consumer surplus

20 80 100
70 70
70
30 10
40

willingness to pay:
consumer surplus:
7.1.2

1
1 100 0
80 100 1
70 80 2
1

1

marginal buyer
4

50 3
70
a 80
80 1. 80 20
1 20
1
2
a
80 20
b 70 40
2 b 70 70
70
30 10 40
2
7.1.3


a P1 ABC
2
a
80 20
b 70 40
P1 P2b ADF
BCFD
P1 Q1
BCED

Q1 Q2 CEF
7.1.4


7.2

7.2.1

cost

600 600
500 600
500
600 100
Producer
surplus
800 800
800
300
200 500
cost:
producer surplus:
7.2.2

4 2
500 0
500 600 1. 600
800 2
4

2
marginal
seller 4 900
3 800
5a 600 100

b 800 500
5
a 600
1. 100.
5 b 800
500
7.2.3

a P1
ABC
6a P1 Q1

ABC P1 P2b Q1 Q2
ADF BCFD
BCED
CEF
b P1 P2 ADF
P1 Q1

BCED
Q1 Q2 CEF
7.3

7.3.1

total surplus
=.
=.
:
=.

efficiency
equality
7.3.2
7
AE
EB
CE
ED
1.
2.
3.
Q1
Q2

laissez faire
8

Q1
Q2


.Chip Case
Wellesley College
.Margaret Mead
1984
11
1000

3000
eBay
1984
.Mike Tice
Kenmore
Square

1000

2000 Fenway
Park
7 15
2000
Charles SteinBoston Globe, May 1, 2005.
7.4

market power


externalities
market failure


welfare economics; willingness to pay;

consumer surplus; cost; producer surplus; efficiency;
equality
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1. 120 iPod 80
a.
b. iPod 90
c. iPod 250
2.
3.French bread
4.Bert 7
5 3 1
a.
b. 4
c. 2
5.Ernie
1 3
5 7
a.
b. 4
c. 6
6. 4 5
a. 2 4 6
b.
c.
d.
7.
a.
b.
c.
8.
7 2 8 5
A3 B: 6 C4 D2
9.
a.
b.
c.
d..
10. A 120
B 1
QD=150-50O P
a. A B
b.a A
B
c. A B
d. A B
e.
11. 100
20 80

a.
100
b. 20
100
c.
d.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

8 :
1776
..
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.

8.1
6

8.1.1

T
Q TQ
2
T Q TQ
2 T Q TQ

3
A F

P1 Q1
A+B+C
D+E+F
A+B+C+D+E+F
7
3 1
P1 PB
A
P1
PS F
Q1 Q2 B+D

A+B+D+F 3 2
3 B+C

D+E
B+D
C+E
3 3
B+C
D+E
B+D
C+E

deadweight loss
C+E
3 Q1 Q2
JoeJane
100 80
120 20 40
50
120
70 80
80 130 120
40 20
40
3 C+E
4
PB
PS Q1 Q2 4
Q1 Q2
Q1 Q2
4 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2

8.2
5
a
b
5
c
b
5
5

ab

cd

marginal tax rate
40%.

40%

underground economy


8.3

a
bc

2
2
4 3 9
6
a
bc
6 d
e
6

a
b
c
d
e
U

1974 .Arthur Laffer
6 e U
Laffer cure.Ronald Reagan

.David Stockman
[]

90%

1980
supply-side economics
1980
1980
80%.

0 100%.
1980
30%
6%. 14 8% 1%.
.Mathias Trabandt.Harald
Uhlig 10%
2%.
self-financing rate 32%

54%. 50% 79%.
14
Brian BlackstoneWall Street Journal, Real Time Economics blog, April 21, 2010.
8.4

7

deadweight loss
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
a.
b. 1
c.
2.
a.
b.
3.
a.
b.
a
4.
a.
b.
5.
6. ..Daniel Patrick Moynihan
hollow-tipped bullets 10,000%

a.
b.
7.
a.
b.
c.
8.widgets 1 1
gadgets 10 1
2
9.
2
10.Smalltown 100 1,000
a. 10
108 900
=1/2
b. 2 20 116
800 2
11.
QS=2P
QD=300-P
a.
b. QD=300-P+T
(mushroom)

c. TQb T T
0 300
d. T
T 0 300
e.
200


Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

9
3
3
9.1
Isoland
9.1.1

1 1
1

9.1.2

world price

world price:
Autarka
3 1 2
1

9.2

price takers
9.2.1
2

C
B+C+D
A+B A
D

A+B
C A+B+C
A
B+C+D
A+B+C+D

B+D B
D
9.2.2

3

A
B+C A+B+C A+B+D
C A+B+C+D

B+D B
D

A
A+B+D
B+C C D

can

will

9.2.3

tariff

Q1D Q2D Q1S Q2S

A+B+C+D+E+F
G
A+B+C+D+E+F+G

A+B C+G
E A+B+C+E+G

D+F
deadweight loss
4

D+F
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q1S Q2S
Q1D
Q2D
D F
tariff:
9.2.4


9.2.5

economies of scale


Autarka
3 2

35%
United Steelworkers

2001

market disruption

[]
Edmund L. Andrews Keith BradsherNew York Times,
September 11 and 14, 2009.
9.3

9.3.1



5
20
Steven E. Landsburg; New York Times, January 16, 2008
9.3.2

national security

1960

Thinkpad
(Wal-Mart)

1990

1990 GDP 2.5% 2006
6%
1990 25%
11% 3%~4%.
.PauL KrugmanNew York Times, December 28, 2007.
9.3.3

2002

20
infant-industry
argument
9.3.4

Neighborland
9.3.5


unilateral
19
multilateral
North American Free Trade Agreement,

NAFTA 1993
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT

1930 GATT
GATT
40% 5%
GATT World Trade Organization, WTO

1995 2009
153 97%
Autarka

9.4
2008

26% 50%


world price
tariff
1.
2.
3.-
4.
5.
6.
1.
a.
b.
2.
a.
b.
a
3.
4.
a.
b.
c.ab
5.
6.
a.
b.
7..Ernest Hollings

8.Textilia T
20 300 .

T 16 T
400 T 100
a.
b.
9.2008
a.
b.
c.
d.
10.
a.

b.

c.
11.Kawminjelly beans
1
QD=8-P
QS=P
P Q
a.
b.
c.
1
d.
12.
a. 4
b. 4
c.
13. 100
40 60
a. 100
b. 120 20
100
c. 100
d. 100
14.pro-trade


Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

10

10
dioxin
4 9
externality
negative externality
positive externality

externality:
10.1
10.1.1
7
1

1 QMARKET

1

QMARKET
10.1.2

social costprivate cost
2
external costs

2

QOPTIMUM QMARKET
QMARKET QOPTIMUM
QMARKET
internalizing the externality


internalizing the externality
10.1.3

3

QOPTIMA QMARKET

.Ed Glaser

(Once-ler)
Lorax

19

.Matthew Kahn

2
Nashvill 3
1/3
2 3
Westchester 7
Marin
..Henry David Thoreau
300
Edward L. Glaeser New York Times, Economix blog, March 10, 2009.
technology spillover


industrial policy
patent protection
property right
10.2

command-and-control policies

market-based policies

19.2.1

Environmental Protection Agency, EPA
10.2.2 1

corrective taxed
Pigovian taxes
.1877-1959
500
300

300
sport-utility vehicles, SUV

5


2007
2.10
0.40
3.49 /
10.2.3

300
400
500 200 500
100

4 ab

600
600
1990

cost-effective
4
a

b
10.2.4
Edmund Muskie

2008 .

10 9890
2760
2007 7
N..New York Times, August 9, 2009.
10.3

10.3.1


Sierra Club
10.3.2
Ronald
Coase
Coase theorem
Dick
(Spot)Jane


500
800 600
1000
800 1000
800
Coase theorem
10.3.3


transaction
costs
500 800
750
550
10.4


externality; internalizing the externality
corrective tax; Coase theorem; transaction costs.
1.
2.-
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
2.
a.
b.
3.
a.
b.
c.
d. 10
4.
a.
5
b.
c.

d.
e.
6.
a.
b.
c.
7. WhovilleZlurp

5
4
3
2
1
0
a. 1.50
b. 1 a
c..Cindy Lou
d.Grinch 1
e.
8. RingoLuciano
a.
b.
c.
9. 4
a. 4
b.
10.
a.
b.
11.Happy Vally
1
A 70 20
B 80 25
C 50 10
120 40
a.
b.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

11

11
11.1

7
10

excludable
rival in consumption

1.
private goods
4~6 7~9

public goods
2.
1

1
2
3.
common resources
4.
club goods
15 natural monopoly

excludability:
rivalry in consumption:
private goods:
public goods

common resources:
club goods:
11.2

11.2.1
Smalltown7 4
500 10
5000 1000 5000 1000


free
rider

2
8
10 2
free rider
11.2.2

2009 6610
2150

20

19
11.2.3

cost-benefit analysis

1.6% 1.1%

1000
0.5
5 =0.0051000
1
cost-benefit analysis:
11.3

tragedy of the
commons
11.3.1


17
11.3.2

10


.

2005
38 1982
14

405 55 /

variable
tolling
Lexus
lanes


pilot
toll I-394 I-15
45 /

167
5 21 5.75
27 6
Eric A. MorrisFreakonomics blog, January 6, 2009.

19 1900
400
11.4

property rights
excludability rivalry in consumption; private goods
public goods; common resources; club goods;
free rider; cost-benefit analysis;
Tragedy of Commons
1.

2.
3.
4.
1.
a. 1 :
b.
2.
a.
b.
3.
a.
b.
c.
4. Communityville
a.
b.
c.
5.

7 5 3 2
6 4 2 1
5 3 1 0
4 2 0 0
3 1 0 0
a.
b. 8
c.b
d.
e.
f.
6.
a. 1
b.
c.a
7.
8.Wicknam 5
2
X X NX=6-N
a. X N
b.
c.
N 0 5
d.
T

c T
e.
9.
10.
11.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

12

12
.Al Capone 1920

.Ben Franklin
1789 5%
20
1/3
8 deadweight
losses
efficient(equitable)
12.1
1
1902 7% 30%
scarface. FBI

. 11

1
1
GDP

GDPGDP
Historical Statistics of the United States; bureau of economic Analysis; and authors calculations.
%
49 28
44 28
37 21
36 20
33 15
32 14
30
1 GDP
OECD, united nations.
12.1.1
2/3
2 2009 21050
2009
3.07 2009 6846
10
915 2,978 43
891 2,899 42
138 449 7
161 524 8
2,105 6,846 100
2 2009
Economic Report of the President, 2010, Table b-81.
4 15
tax liability

taxable
income

marginal tax rate
100 8375 10%

$8,375 10%
$8,375-$34,000 15%
$34,000-$82,400 25%
$82,400-$171,850 28%
$171,850-$373,650 33%
$373,650 35%
3
2010

25,000 8375 10%
15%
payroll tax

2
social insurance taxes

social security
Medicare
2 2009 2899

corporation
2003
15%
2 8%
excise taxes

excise taxes

4 2009 35,180 11,441
4

transfer payment2009
19%
10
683 2,221 19
661 2,150 19
533 1,733 15
430 1,398 12
334 1,086 9
187 608 5
690 2,244 20
3,518 11,441 100
42009
Source: Economic Report of the President, 2010, Table b-81.
2001 17% 2009 19%
4
(Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
TANF)
2006 2009 13% 15%
4
Medicaid

5%
2 4 14,130
budget deficit

budget surplus
budget deficit
budget surplus:
2009 14,310 2007 8
GDP
GDP
1950 65 13 16
17 20 1950
3 2
2 a
1950 working-age population 14%
21%50 40%
1950 7 2050 2.5
2 a 65 20-64

b
GDP
congressional budget office.

2010
2 b GDP
1950 1% 10%

GDP
1
GDP 10% GDP 30%
1/3
12.1.2
40%
5 2007 23,290
7,574
10
439 1,426 19
383 1,246 16
289 941 12
61 197 3
468 1,521 20
690 2,244 30
2,329 7,574 100
5 2007
sales taxes
property
taxes
1/3
6 2007
10
777 2,526 34
389 1,266 17
145 471 6
955 3,105 42
2,265 7,367 100
6 2007

2007
1/3
6

12.2

deadweight loss
administrative burdens
12.2.1

Joe 8
Jane 6
5
3 1 4
2 7
1
2 3 4 1

3 2
1
1 1
0

25 1000 8%
65 21,720

25% 6%=8%75% 6%
40 10,290
the basis of taxation

consumption
-
8% 1000 10001+0.08
=1080 10001+0.082 40 10001+0.0840=21720
tax

401K

Value-Added
Tax, VAT
2005
Alan Greenspan

2010 1
2011 1 1
2009

2010 1 1

.Joshua Rubenstein
401K 401K 1978 401 K
401K

5,500 15
2001 2010
2011
.Andrew
Katzenstein
1 1

2010
Laura SaundersWall Street Journal, December 30, 2009
12.2.2
4 15

12.2.3

average tax rate

marginal
tax rate
50,000 20%
50,000 50% 60,000
15,000 50,00020%+60,000-50,00050%=15,000
25%=15,000/60,000
50%

50% 0.50
average tax rate:
marginal tax rate:

40,000 40,001
50,000
20% 20% 50000
40%
12.2.4
4000
4000

lump-sum tax

4000 20,000 20% 40,000
10%

lump-sum tax:
12.3

.Russell Long
//

12.3.1
benefits principle

11
benefits principle:
12.3.2

ability-to-pay principle
equal sacrifice
1000 10,000

vertical

equity
horizontal equity
proportional

regressive
progressive

quintiles 8
1%
8 congressional budget office. 2006 .
8 2 1/5 17,200
1/5 248,400 1% 170
8 3
1/5 4.3% 1/5
1% 25.8% 31.2%.
4 5 1/5 3.9%
0.8% 1/5 55.7% 69.3%
1% 100
18.8% 28.3%

1/4
1/5 4.3%

30%
30%
SmithJones 10
4 4
6
12.3.3

6

flypaper theory


ability-to-pay principle:
vertical equity:
horizontal equity:
proportional tax:
regressive tax:
progressive tax:

2010

.A.Paul A. Volcker

1 2
3 1

1+1+1=3
3

10% 0.30
10% 1.10
2.20 3.30
10%

25
.C.
Edward C. Prescott
flat tax

.E.Robert E. Hall.
Alvin Rabushka 1981
flat taxproportional tax
N. Gregory MankiwNew York Times, April 30, 2010.
12.4

progressivity

1980
. 50%
70%
1981 1986
1989 28%
. 1992
1993
40%.W.
35%.
2008

budget deficit; budget surplus; average tax rate;

marginal tax rate; lump-sum tax; benefits principle
ability-to-pay principle vertical equity
horizontal equity; proportional tax; regressive tax;
progressive tax
1. GDP
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.

http://www.cbo.gov
2.

http://www.gpo.gov
a. 1
b.
c.
3.
a.
b.
c.
d.a~c
4.
4%
15.3%
3
20,000
40,000
5.
6.
a.?
b.
c.
7. 5% 6%
20%
8. 1986
9.
a.
b.
c.
10.
a. 7
50,000 100,000 200,000
7
b.
50,000 100,000 100,000
200,000
c.
11. 8
a.
b.
c. b
d.
e.
12.
a. b. c.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

13

13

industrial organization
Delta
13.1

13.1.1


total
revenue
total
cost
profit
=-

1
2 2
total revenue:
total cost:
profit:
13.1.2
1
1
1 1
explicit costs
implicit costs
100
100

100 500
explicit costs:
implicit costs:
13.1.3

30
5% 1.5
1.5

1.5

30 10
20 5%
1
1.5
1 0.5
13.1.4


economic
profit
accounting profit
economic profit:

accounting profit:
.McDonald 20
10 100

200 .
13.2

13.2.1
1
0 0 1 50 2
90 2 a
production function

+
0 0 30 0 30
50
1 50 30 10 40
40
2 90 30 20 50
30
3 120 30 30 60
20
4 140 30 40 70
10
5 150 30 50 80
5
6 155 30 60 90
1:

1
b 1 marginal
product 1
2 50 90 40
2 3 90 120 30
1
2

a
1 1
1 1
40
30 20
diminishing marginal product

2
marginal product:
diminishing marginal product:
13.2.2
1
30 10 1 40
2 50 1
1
2 b

total-cost curve
ba
Jones

1 3 2 5
3 6 100

13.3

2
Conrad
2.
2
0~10
3 2
2
3

2
2 2
13.3.1

fixed costs
2 3
variable costs
2 0
0 1 0.30 2 0.80
fixed costs:
variable costs:
13.3.2

3.80 1.90 =3.80/2
(
)average total cost

average
fixed cost
average variable cost

2
marginal cost 2 3
3.80 4.50 4.50 3.80 0.70
2
=/ ATC=TC/Q
=/ MC = TC / Q .
delta
average total cost:
average fixed cost:
average variable cost:
marginal cost:
13.3.3

2
4 4 4
ATC
AFCAVC
MC
4

ATCAFCAVCMC
2
1
2 U 3

U
U 4

1 2
5
1.30 6
tug of war U
U
efficient scale 5 6
1.30
1.30
1.30
4 2


efficient scale:
13.3.4

5 ATCAFC
AVCMC


4 22.5 5
25 5

13.4


long-run
short-run 6
6 U
U
on or above
6
1000 1200
6

6 1000
1 1.2
1
13.4.2

economies of scale
diseconomies of
scale

constant returns to scale

specialization
coordination problems
1200 1
9 900

10 950

Jack of all trades, master of none.

20 1
13.5

3

3

FC
VC
TC=FC+VC
AFC=FC/Q
AVC=VC/Q
ATC=TC/Q
MC = TC / Q

total revenue; total cost

profit;
explicit costs; implicit costs; economic profit
accounting profit; production function;
marginal product; diminishing marginal product;
fixed costs variable costs average total cost;

average fixed costs; average variable cost;
efficient scale; economies of scale;
diseconomies of scale; constant returns to scale.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.
a.
b.

c.
d.
f.
2. 50
5
a.
b. 51
3.

0 0
1 10
2 18
3 24
4 28
5 30
a.
b.
c. 10 5
4.Nimbus

0 0 ---- ----
1 20
2 50
3 90
4 120
5 140
6 150
7 155
a.
b. 100 200
c. ATC=TC/Q
d. MC = TC / Q
e.
f.
5.

600 300
601 301
600
550
6.
=12
0 300 0
1 350 50
2 390 90
3 420 120
4 450 150
5 490 190
6 540 240
a.
b.
7. 200 0.50
a.
b. 0 10 16
8.Vinnie 200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 20 40 80 160 320 640
9.
a.
b.
10.
300
a.
b.
11.Jane

0 0 30
1 10 40
2 25 55
3 45 75
4 70 100
5 100 130
6 135 165
a.
b.
12.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
B 11 24 39 56 75 96 119
C 21 34 49 66 85 106 129

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

14

14
20%
20%
market power
14.1

14.1.1
competitive market
perfectly competitive

market
price takers
14.1.2

Vaca
Q P PQ
6 1000 6000
2000 12,000
1
6 6
1

Q P TR=PQ AR=TR/Q MR = TR / Q
1 6 6 6 6
2 6 12 6 6
3 6 18 6 6
4 6 24 6 6
5 6 30 6 6
6 6 36 6 6
7 6 42 6 6
8 6 48 6 6

1
average revenue
1
6
PQ
Q

1 5
marginal revenue
1 6
PQP
Q P

competitive market:
average revenue:
marginal revenue:
14.2

14.2.1
2 2
6
3
2

(Q) (TR) (TC) (TR-TC) MR = TR / Q MC = TC / Q MR-MC

0 0 3 -3
1 6 5 1 6 2 4
2 12 8 4 6 3 3
3 18 12 6 6 4 2
4 24 17 7 6 5 1
5 30 23 7 6 6 0
6 36 30 6 6 7 -1
7 42 38 4 6 8 -2
8 48 47 1 6 9 -3
2 0
3
1 1 2
4
4 5 7

2
6
2 4 -3 1

6 3 3 1 4
5 6 7
1 7 6 5
1
12 3
6,7 8
14.2.2
1
MCATC U
ARMR
1
MC

ATCAC
P
MR

AR Q1 MR1 MC1
Q2 MC2 MR2
QMAX
1 Q1
1 MR1
MC1
Q1
Q2
1 MC2MR2
Q2
Q1
Q2
QMAX
1 QMAX
2

P1 P2
Q1 Q2
2
P1 Q1
P2 Q1
Q2

14.2.3

shutdown

exit
sunk cost
TR VC
TR<VC .
TR/Q < VC/Q .
TR/QPQ Q P
VC/Q AVC
P<AVC .
3

AVCMC

14.2.4
,Dont cry over spilt milk

Let bygones be bygones
sunk cost

the irrelevance of sunk costs

15 10
20
15 10
10
sunk cost:

miniature-golf course
14.2.5

TR TC
TR<TC .
TR/Q < TC/Q .
TR/Q P TC/Q
ATC
P<ATC .

P>ATC .
4.
4

ATCMC
14.2.6

TRTC
=TR-TC.
Q Q
=TR/Q TC/QQ.
TR/Q PTC/Q ATC
=P-ATCQ.
5 a
P-ATC
QP-ATCQ
5

P-ATC Qa
b
5 b
QATC-PQ
ATC-P
14.3


14.3.1
1000
6 a
1000
6 b 1000.
6
b

1000
a
1000.
14.3.2


=P-ATCQ.
efficient scale
7 a P
MC ATC
7

a
b
7b

14.3.3

100
5
3
8
14.3.4

8 a A
Q1 P1
D1
D2b A B Q1 Q2
P1 P2

S1 S2c

P1
C
Q3
8
a
A
b D1
D2 A B P1 P2
Q1 Q2
S1 S2c
P1 Q3
C
14.3.5

marginal firm
14.4
1

()competitive market; average revenue; marginal

revenue sunk cost
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.
a.
b.
2. 40
3.
27 280 30 10

4.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 13 19 27 37
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56
a.
b.
2 3 2.5
a
c.
5..Ball Bearings

0 100 0
1 100 50
2 100 70
3 100 90
4 100 140
5 100 200
6 100 360
a.
b. 50 CEO
c.CFO CEO
6.
a.
b.
c.

7. 500 10
8. 100
10 8 200
a.
b.
c.
d. 100
9.
a.
b.
c.
10. Ectenia
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 1
9
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 4 6 8 10 12
a.1 6
b. 11
c.b
d.
11.
30
a.
25
b.
c.
12. 100 16
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6
a.
b. 10
c.
d.
13. 1000
pretzel
U
a.
b. 800
c. 800
d. 800

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

15

15
Windows
100

monopoly
price taker
(price

maker)
1994
Intuit
1998
15.1

barriers to entry
monopoly

monopoly:
15.1.1
Old West
DeBeers

.Cecil Rhodes 1888
80% 100%
15.1.2

20
15.1.3

natural monopoly
11

15.2

15.2.1

2 a
2

a
b

2 b

15.2.2
1
1 1 10
2 9
3 8
1
total revenue

average revenue
1
marginal revenue

3 24 4
28 4 4 =28 24

3 4
4 7
4 3 1
3 3 4 7 4 4

PQ
0

1

15.2.3

1
4
3
4
A

B
Q1
1

Q2
1
QMAX

4
A
P=MR=MC.
P>MR=MC.
4 B
15.2.4

TRTC

=TRTC.
=TR/QTC/QQ.
TR/Q PTC/Q ATC
=PATCQ.
5

BCDE BC
DC
5 BCPATC

DC QMAX


fluoxetine
2001
Prozac
15.3

15.3.1



8
15.3.2


15.4

price discrimination
price discrimination:
15.4.1
Readalot
200
200

die-hard fans 10 30
40 5

30 10 5
50 30 300 =30
10 250 =550 100 =300
200 50 =250 -200

40 5
30 200
10
30 40 5
300 200 500
300 30 200
15.4.2

arbitrage

30 40
15.4.3

perfect price discrimination
9

a

9
a
b
15.4.4

0.50
0.50

0.50 12 5
quantity discount
TKTS

.Hal Varian

2.5
1998 31% 24%
two-for-one deals
TKTS

.Phillip LeslieRand
Journal of Economics2004
1996
14 17

40%
199
TKTS
TKTS 50%

1991 10% 2.5 3.5 10%
1.5 1990

Donald Trump TKTS

TKTS
TKTS
TKTS ticket boothsTKTS
TKTS
47 12 TKTS ticket
T-K-T-S

Hal Varian; New York Times, January 13, 2005.
15.5

15.5.1

1994 Intuit
1890
1914
15.4.4

1984 AT&T

synergies
120
.Lisa Richard
1980

.W.
2008

.Christine Varney
White
& Case.Joseph Angland
2007 Leegin PSKS Leegin

Creative Leather Products v. PSKS

5:4 100
retail price maintenance
Herb Kohl
Arlen Specter
2007
.Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

AT&TProcter & Gamble Verizon
Leegin PSKS Leegin 2002
Leegin PSKS Leegin 20%Leegin PSKS

PSKS PSKS Leegin Leegin Leegin
Leegin 5:4
Twombly Bell Atlantic Twombly
2007

Verizon .John
Thorne
test cases
1914 5
1914
30
(Jon Leibowitz)
Thomas Catan; The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2010.
15.5.2

marginal-cost pricing
13
10
deadweight loss
average-cost pricing
10

15.5.3
public ownership
first-class mail

15.5.4

.George Stigler
market failure
15.6

2
13

TaurusCamry
Ben & JerrysBreyers
15.2

P=MC MR=MC

MR=P MR<P
P=MC P>MC


monopoly; natural monopoly; price discrimination

1.
2.
3.
4.
5. 4
6.
7.
8.
1.

200
100 0
10
90 10
80 20 a.
70 30
60 40
50 50
b. MR = TR / Q
40 60

30 70
20 80 c.
10 90
0 100
d.
e. 300 200
f.
2.
a.
b.
3..Johnny Rockabilly CD
CD

24 1
22 2
20 3
18 4
16 5
14 6
CD CD 5
a. CD 1 2 CD 1
b. CD
c.
4. 200
a.
b.
c.
d.

8 0
7 10
6 20
5 30
4 40
3 50
2 60
1 70
0 80
5.
6.Ectenia
240 10
Q D = 10 P P
a.
b. 24
c.
2345
d.c
e.
7.AT&T
a.
b.
AT&T

c.
8.
a.
?
b.
c.
9.per-unit
tax
10. 300 200

2000

10 0 0
9 100 0
8 200 0
7 300 0
6 300 0
5 300 100
4 300 200
3 300 200
2 300 200
1 300 200
0 300 200
a.
b.
c.
d. 2500 2000 a
bc
11.Wiknam
P=10-Q
MR=10-2Q
TC=3+Q+0.5Q2
MC=1+Q
Q P
a.
b. 6
c. 9

ab
d. 6 a
12. Ectenia
DVD
P=1000-10Q
TR=1000Q-10Q2
MR=1000-20Q
MC=100+10Q
Q DVD P DVD
a.
b.
c.
d.
i. 2000 ii. 50%iii. DVD 150 iv.
50%.
13.
a.
b. X Y
Z
c.b X
Y Z

d.
XY Z
e.
C X
YZ C
f.
XYZ C
g.ef

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

16

16
Sue Grafton
.Stephen King.David McCullough
...Stephenie Meyer

25 5

monopolistic competition
oxymoron
16.1
14
15
14

15


imperfect competition

oligopoly
concentration ratio
50%
78%

81%89%
93%95%
monopolistic competition

DVD

14

oligopoly:
monopolistic competition:
16.2

14
16.2.1

a
b
a
b
16.2.2
2 a

16.2.3
4 14

4 a
4 b
efficient scale

excess capacity

4 ba


4

a
b
16.2.4


the product-variety externality

the business-stealing externality:


.Joel Waldfogel

..the tyranny of the majority
. 1962

12

2/3 3%

album-rock
Foot Locker
1.5%
10
Joel WaldfogelSlate, Thursday, October 4, 2007.
16.3
Larry the Cable Guy Daniel Lawrence Whitney

10%
20%
2%
16.3.1


1972 .Lee Benham

1960

33

1963 1963
7 26
20%
16.3.2

PostKellogg
3
3 1000 100

100
1000 300

1000 3600
300

..John Kenneth Galbraith.Friedrich

Hayek 20
1958
The Affluent Society
1944 The Road to Serfdom

1961

1974 2000
16.3.3

Bayer
.Edward Chamberlin
16.4

MR=MC MR=MC MR=MC

P=MC P>MC P>MC


oligopoly; monopolistic competition
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
2.
a. 2
b.
c.
d.
e.
3.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
4.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
5.

a. P<MC, P>ATC
b. P>MC, P<ATC
c. P=MC, P>ATC
d. P>MC, P=ATC
6. Sparkle
a.
b.
c.
d.
7. N
Q=100/NP
MR=100/N2Q
TC=50+Q2
MC=2Q
a. N
b. N
c.
d.
e.
8.Nutville
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
9.
a.
b.
c.
10.Sleek
a.
b.
c.
d.c
11..Frank Perdue
a.
b.
12.
a.
b.a
c.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

17

17

Wilson, Penn, Dunlop, or Spalding

oligopoly
game theory

strategic
tic-tac-toe
oligopoly:
game theory:
17.1

17.1.1

duopoly
Jack
Jill
1
10 110 20
100
17.1.2

120
1
60 60
120
collusion
cartel
15
60 60
120

60
30
60 1,800
collusion:
cartel:

bright-line rule

100 X
95
Alistair Lindsay; The Wall Street Journal, december 13, 2007.
17.1.3

30

30 60 60
1800 =3060 40
70 50 2000 =4050
40
80 40

40
40 1600
1600 50
90 30 1500
40
40
.
Nash equilibrium
40 40
40 40

17.1.4

JohnJoan
1
4 10 40
41 40
10

17.2

prisoners
dilemma
17.2.1
Bonnie
Clyde

20
8

1
1
8 8

88 020
200 11
8 20
dominant strategy

17.2.2

30

40 30

40 1600 1600 2000 1500

30 1500 2000 1800 1800
30

40
30
2000 1800
40 1600
1500
40

40
40

jointly rational

prisoners dilemma:
dominant strategy:
OPEC

Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC 1960
1973 8
OPEC
OPEC
OPEC OPEC
OPEC
OPEC 1973 1985

1972 3 1974 11 1981 35
1980 OPEC
1986 13
OPEC
2007 2008
OPEC
OPEC

17.2.3


11
ExxonTexaco
1200 100
500 =600 100
600 =800 200

300
=400 100

200
400

400400 600300

300600 500500
17.2.4

non-cooperative equilibrium
3
4
17.2.5

2
30
40
40 40

1800 2000
1600

.Robert Axelrod
tit-for-tat
an eye

for an eye, a tooth for a tooth
17.3
1
17.3.1
common law
1890
1914
15

18 .

1980 1983 2 24
.Robert Crandall.
Howard PutnamBraniff Airways
@#%#$%
$%*& 20%
@#$%&*#@
17.3.2

resale price maintenance

Superduper DVD 300

350
350

DVD
DVD
11
CoyoteRoadrunner
20% 80%
predatory pricing
80%

tyingMakemoney
2
2

City 1.5 0.5

Country 0.5
1.5
1.5

1998
.
.Franklin Fisher
.Richard Schmalensee

Windows

CD
80%
Mac Linux
50 3%
1999 10
.Penfield Jackson
2000 6
2001 9
2002 11

Google

Google
Google
Google business-to-business, B2B
.
Christine Varney Google
.Dana Wagner Google

Google
.Adam Kovacevich
Google

Google 2.66%
Google
Google Google
70%
Google

Google
30%operating
marginGoogle 1990
Google
64 .Learned Hand
Google
Google .
Gary Reback.Carr & Ferrell
1990

spit on the sidewalk

Jeff HorwitzWashington Post, June 7, 2009.
17.4

price fixing

oligopoly game theory collusion; cartel;

Nash equilibrium; prisoners dilemma; dominant
strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

1. 1,000
8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000

5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 11,000 12,000
a.
b.
c.
1000
d.c
2.
1993 11 30 OPEC
[] 1990 6
a. OPEC
b. OPEC
c. OPEC OPEC
do their share OPEC
3.
a.
b.
c.1994
4.
10

2525 1030
3010 2010
a.
b.
c.1993
d. 3 9
5.SynergyDynaco

30, 20 70, 0

030 5040
a.
b.
c.

6.
A 40
B 30
D 10
25
a.

b.
c.b
d. B 50 A 80
ab
7.
100 100 200

200 100
200
a.
b.
c.
8. 1
X
a. 22
b. X
c. X
9.Little KonaBig Brew

2, 3 1, 1

07 02
a.
b.a
c.

d.
10.
80
a. 80
b. 10

c.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

18

18.
2010 14
3/4
fringe benefits 1/4
2
factors of
production

derived demand
19 20

factors of production:
18.1
1
ab
1

a
b

final
goods
18.1.1


competitive
profit maximizing

18.1.2
1
1

production
function
1 100
2 180
2 1

marginal product of labor
1 2 100 180
80 =180-100

diminishing marginal product

production function:
marginal product of labor:
diminishing marginal product:
18.1.3

10 80
800

value of the marginal product

1
10
1

marginal revenue product:
500
1 1000 500
800 300 600
100
400 500
100 3
3
3
3

value of the marginal product:
18.1.4


1960 2009 183%

labor-saving

labor-augmenting
150% 87%
14

marginal product of labor,

MPLmarginal cost, MC 500
50 50 500
10 =500/10 W
MPL MC=W/MPL

MPL

MC

PMPLW PMPL=W
MPL P=W/MPL W/MPL MC

W/MPL=MC
P=MC.
14
19
.Ned Ludd
1813 17

Luddite
18.2

21
18.2.1
1
15 15
20
15
20
slope backward
21
18.2.3

1950 34% 2009

59%tastes
18.3


18.3.1
5
S1 S2 W1
W1 W2
5

S1
S2 W1 W2 W2
L1 L2
1980
1967
1988
50%

.Pia Orrenius

12.5% 3800
1100 1200
80%
100 200
40%
GDP

25

1%~3%
Originally published in Southwest Economy, March/April 2006. Data updated for this edition by Dr.
Orrenius.
18.3.2

6 D1
D2 W1 W2 L1 L2

6 D1 D2

W1 W2 L1 L2

2 1959
2009 2.1%
1.9% 2%
35
2

% %
1959-2009 2.1 1.9
1959-1973 2.8 2.8

1973-1995 1.4 1.2
1995-2009 2.6 2.3
2010 B-49
implicit price deflator

2
1973
1995
2.8% 1.4% 2.8% 1.2%
1995

1995 2009 2.6% 2.3%

monopsony

15
18.4

capital
18.4.1

purchase price

rental price

7
a
7

ab

capital:
dividends
stockholder
18.4.2

14 bubonic plague
black death


50%
18.5

neoclassical theory of distribution
15

factor of production; production function;

marginal product of labor; diminishing marginal product;
value of marginal product; capital
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
a.
b.
c.
2.
a.
b.
c.
3.

0 0
1 7
2 13
3 19
4 25
5 28
6 29
7 29
a.
b. 10
c. 0 100
d.
e. 10 12
4. 4 100

0 0
1 50
2 85
3 115
4 140
5 150
6 155
a.
b.
c.
d.
5.Ectenia 20 2
Q=100LL2
MPL=1002L
Q L MPL
a. W

b. 200 W
c. 4
6. 7 6
3
7.
a.
b. 2 30%

c. 30% 50%
8.Leadbelly
150
a.
b. 30
c. 4

3

d.c
9. 20 1980 1990
a.
b.
10.
a. 3
b.
c.
d. 6
11.
a.
b.
c.
d.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

19

19
20 5
2
18
19.1

19.1.1

compensating differential


compensating differential:
()

19.1.2

capital
human capital

human capital:
1
1980 44% 2008
88% 35% 71%
1
1980 2008

45,310 43,493
65,287 81,975
+44% +88%

27,324 31,666
36,894 54,207
+35% +71%
2008
18

1970
5% 2009 14% 1970 6%
2009 11%
19.1.3


omitted variables
.Keira
Knightley
.Daniel
Hamermesh.Jeff Biddle 1994
12

5% 5%~10%
beauty premium
19.1.4

16
19.1.5

Johnny Depp
Serena Williams

9/11

.C.Richard
C. Reid
selection bias
.Efraim Benmelech.Claude
Berrebi

2000 ~2005
30

21
18% 26 60%

12%
35
Reid
9/11 26
.Mohammed Atta
33
Austan Goolsbee; New York Times, September 14, 2006.
19.1.6


16
market
power
union
strike
10%~20%.

efficiency
wages
turnover
union:
strike:
efficiency wages:
19.2

discrimination
19.2.1

2

47,370 37,253 21%
36,198 31,509 13%
24% 15%
2008 14
2 median
21% 13%
24%
15%

75%
11%

.Marianne Bertrand.
Sendhil Mullainathan
1300 5000
.
Lakisha Washington.Jamal Jones

.Emily Walsh.Greg
Baker
2004 9

50%
19.2.2


20
1986 .Jennifer Roback
19.2.3


1988
20%
1960
1990
10% 13%

.
Muriel Niederle.Lise Vesterlund

Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?
2 2 20
piece-rate basis 0.5

4
2 25%
25%2

0.5

75% 35%

38%

75% 43%

.Terrance Odean
Hal R. Varian; New York Times, March 9, 2006.
19.3

20

compensating differential; human capital; union;

strike; efficiency wages; discrimination
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.
a.
b.
c.
2. 6

subminimum
3.
[(job tenure)]
4.
a.
b.
5.
6.
7.
[merit pay]
a.
b.
c.
d.
8..Alan Greenspan
1960
9.
a.combined labor market
b.
a
10.

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

20

20
.Mary Colum.Ernest

Hemingway

3/4

inequality
20.1

human capital
compensating differentials
compensating wage differential


1/5, 1/5 1/5
1/5 1/5 1 5%
12008

1/5 27,800
1/5 27,800~49325
1/5 49,325~75,000
1/5 75,000~113,205
1/5 113,205
5% 200,000
U.S. Bureau of the Census.
2 2
2008 1/5
4% 1/5 47.8% 1/5
1/5 1/5 1/5 12
2
%

1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 5%
2008 4.0 9.6 15.5 23.1 47.8 20.5
2000 4.3 9.8 15.5 22.8 47.4 20.8
1990 4.6 10.8 16.6 23.8 44.3 17.4
1980 5.2 11.5 17.5 24.3 41.5 15.3
1970 5.5 12.2 17.6 23.8 40.9 15.6
1960 4.8 12.2 17.8 24.0 41.3 15.9
1950 4.5 12.0 17.4 23.4 42.7 17.3
1935 4.1 9.2 14.1 20.9 51.7 26.5
2 1/5 5%
U.S. Bureau of the Census.
2 2008 5%
20.5% 40%
2 1935
1/5 4%~5% 1/5
40%~50% 1935 1970
1/5 4.1% 5.5%
1/5 51.7% 40.9% 1970
2008 1/5 5.5% 4.0% 1/5
40.9% 47.8%
19
20.1.2

1

10%
10%
2009Human Development Report 2009
.
1 12
4.5
40.6
20.1.3
poverty rate

poverty
line
2008
median 61,521 22,025
13.2%13.2%
2 1959
1959 22.4% 1973 11.1%
50%
.F.John F. Kennedy
1970
1973
2 2

frequency 3
%
13.2
8.6
24.7
23.2
11.8
18 19.0
64 9.7
5.5
31.4
3

2008
poverty rate:
poverty line:
20.1.4

in-kind transfers
10

50 65
life cycle
transitory income

permanent income

life cycle:
permanent income:
.Michael Cox.
Richard Alm 2008
1/5 1/5
2006 1/5 149,963 1/5

9,974 15

1/5
1/5 14
1/5 1/5 3.9
1/5 3.1 1/5

1.7 2.1

.Mollie
Orshansky 1964 1955 1960

1.3
1995

21,818 20,444
26,138
1960

18% 23%
Rebecca M. Blank; Los Angeles Times, September 15, 2008.
20.1.5

mobility

10 1/4
3%
20% 8%

4/5
1/5
20.2

positive

normative

20.2.1

utilitarianism
.1748-1832..1806-1873

utility
diminishing marginal

utility
PeterPaul 8 2
1

10

utilitarianism:
utility:
20.2.2

liberalism.John
Rawls 1971
just

an original position behind a veil of ignorance
maximin criterion

social insurance
liberalism:
maximin criterion:
social insurance:
20.2.3

libertarianism
.Robert Nozick

unfair
just

fairunequal

equality
PamPauline

20.3


20.3.1
minimum-wage laws
20.3.2

welfare
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF
Supplemental Security Income, SSI

1996
1970
welfare:
20.3.3

12
negative income tax

=1/3 1 .
6 1 9 2
3 0 1.5 -0.5
0.5
Earned Income Tax
Credit, EITC

20.3.4

food stamps

Medicaid

2008 2009

Fannie MaeFreddie
Mac
1970 90 90th percentile
50
40

2004
20

Raghuram Rajan; Project Syndicate, July 9, 2010.
20.3.5

2
2
100%
100%
100%

1 0.3 30%

workfare
1996
20.4

.
.
.

.

poverty rate; poverty line; in-kind transfers;
life cycle; permanent income; utilitarianism;
utility; liberalism; maximin criterion;
social insurance; libertarianism; welfare
negative income tax
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1. 2 1970 19
2. 3
3.
4.
a.
b.
c.
5. 10 10 2
10 20 10 2.2
10
a.
b.
c.
d.
6.
a.
b.
7.
3 1 2.5
a.
b.
c.
8.
Medicaid
7000
a. 7000
2
b.a
ab
c.a
ac
9.TANF
EITC

a. TANF
TANF
b.EITC
c. TANF TANF EITC
10. 2010 .

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

21

21
14
21.1

constrained

1000 10
2
1
100
consumption bundle:90
50 1000
1

1000
10 2
1
A 100 0 B
0 500 C 50 250
C A B
500

AB
budget constraint

A B 500
100 5 /

5 5
51 5
budget constraint:
1000 5 10

21.2

21.2.1

indifferent
indifference curve
2 A B C
A B
B C
marginal rate of substitution, MRS

2

I2
I1MRS
1
2 I2 I1

D A
D
D
A D C
D D
C D C D
indifference curve:

marginal rate of substitution:
21.2.2

1

2

3
A B
B C
A C
C A

3

AB C C A
4

MRS

bowed
inward 4 A
1 6
6 / B
1 1
1 /

4

MRS
A
6
/ B
1 /
21.3


5 1

2 5 1 1 5 1
2.
5 a
perfect substitutes
5

5 1
a
b

5 7
5
5 b
5 5 5 7 7 5
perfect complements
5 1
perfect substitutes:
perfect complements:
21.3

21.3.1

6
I2
optimum A


tangent
I2 I3 A
B B

utility
marginal utility

diminishing marginal utility:

X Y 2 1 X 2
Y 2.

MRS=PX/PY
MUX/MUY=PX/PY
MUX/PX=MUY/PY
X
Y

21.3.2


initial optimum(new optimum)
7
4
normal good
inferior good 8

21.3.3

2 1
set of buying opportunities

9
1000
A 1000 1000
500 B D
2 1 10
10 5
normal good:
inferior good:
21.3.4
income effect
substitution effect
10
A C
I1 A
B B
B
I2 B C
B C
I1 B I2 C
10

I1 A B
I1 B
I2 C
B
A B
B C
A B B C
21.3.5


11 a 2 1
250 750
b
11 a 2 1

A B 250 750 b
21.4

21.4.1

law of demand

12 AB
C AD E
12

C
E
Giffen good

.Robert Giffen

Giffen good:
19
.Robert Jensen.Nolan Miller
21.4.2

Sally
100
50 50
50
13 100
100 5000
40 60 2000
13

13
50
I2
50 60 14
BC1 BC2BC2 BC1

ab
14

BC1 BC2
a
b

14 ab

a
backward
6 5
5 25%
9% 100
40%
1993
15
2.5 19 .Andrew Carnegie
21.4.3

Sam
10
15

10% 1 1.10
15 10
0 10 0 11
15
5 5.5
10% 20% 16
16
aba

b
16 ab
ab
a
b

21.5

2
budget constraint; indifference curve; marginal
rate of substitution; perfect substitutes; perfect complements
normal good; inferior good
income effect;
substitution effect; Giffen good
1. 3,000 3 6
2.
3.
4.
3 6
5. 3,000 4,000
6. 6 10 3
3,000
7.
1.
a.
b.
c.
2.

a.
b.
c.
3.
a.
b.
c.
4.
a.
b.
5.
a. 100 2 4
b. 10%
6.
a.

b.

7. 6 Cup O Soup 1.50

60
a.
A
b. 2 a
30% B
c.
d. A B
8.
a. 15%
b.
9.Sarah 100
6 8 10
6 8
8 10
10.
11. A
100 A 20 2
a.A
3 A
3 A
A 25
b.
12. 20
10 2
a.
b. 12
c.
13..George Stigler

14.
a.
b.
c.b
15.

12 6
6 6
6 3
3 6
12 3
2 1

Principles of

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University

22

22
asymmetric information

political economy
behavioral economics

22.1

information asymmetry

hidden action

hidden
characteristic)

2001 . George Akerlof

Michael SpenceJoseph Stiglitz
22.1.1

agent
principal
moral
hazard
efficiency-wage theories 19

moral hazard:
agent:
principal:

-
CEO

compensation packages
2005 -Enron
TycoWorldcom
22.1.2

adverse
selection

adverse

lemon
adverse selection:
22.1.3

signaling
Adverse selection, anti-selection, or negative selection
lemon
private information

16
20

as seen on TV
public information

22.1.4

signaling

screening
deductible 1000 1000

1000 1500 500


screening:
22.1.5

market successmarket failure

7
.
10 11
15 17
20
22.2


political economy
public choice theory
22.2.1

18
Marquis de Condorcet
AB C
1

1 2 3
35 45 20
A B C
B C A
C A B
1

AB C
A BB CC A
B C
1 2 BB A B
1 3 AA A BB C
A
A C
2 3 CC

pairwise
majority votingA BB CC A
transitivity: A B B C A C
Condorcet paradox

A B C C B
C A A A C
B B
22.2.2

1 2
1 B

Borda
count 18
.Kenneth Arrow 1951
ABC
unanimity:
A B A B
transitivity:
A BB C A C
independence
of irrelevant alternative: A
B C

Arrows
impossibility
theorem

1
B C
A B A C
A B A B
C
Arrows impossibility theorem:
instant runoff
281

20%
79%
squeaky-wheel phenomenon
The squeaky-wheel gets oil.
21%
20% 2000
.Al Gore.Ralph Nader
.W.
.Michel Balinski
.Steven Brams

.Rida Larakimajority judgment
1~6
range voting
.D.Warren D. Smith
-

49 6 4 1 3
4 49 3 1
4 3

1936
.Bruce Davis 15

Rocky
Network

.Pedro Martinez
Carl BialikThe Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2009.
22.2.3

1 100 200
1

100
0 200
100

10
median voter theorem

median voter
50 100

100 90
modal
15 1

100 100
100
80 100 100
100 120 100
100

150
100 150
50% 20 100
15 50 25
60
40%
60%
median
,,
100 50 51
100 1

150 100 35
1 50 25 75
100 150 200 50 50

1
50 100
40 60 100 150
60 40 100

median voter theorem:
22.2.4

-
20% 9:1, 25% 10:1, 15%
11:1, 40% 12:1

22.3

range

behavioral economics
22.3.1
Homo economicus

Homo sapiens

.Herbert Simon

satisficers

90%
90%
90%

X
1000

1000
1001
X
Homo economicus Economic human Homo reciprocans, or

Reciprocal human

401K 401K
22.3.2

ultimatum
game
100
A B A B 100 A
B B A B
A

A B

A 99 B 1 B
A B B
A B B A B 1
17 99-1

B B 1
A B 1
B 30 40
B
99-1
70-30

18 19
B
A
22.3.3

1.A 50 B 60
2.A90 50 B91 60
1 B 2 A
2
1
2 90
50
1
-

inconsistency over time
76%
sin taxes


.A.David A.
Paterson
2
5 2 /

18
N. Gregory Mankiw; New York Times, June 6, 2010
22.4


moral hazard; agent; principal; adverse

selection; signaling;
screening; political
economy; Condorcet paradox; Arrows impossibility
theorem; median voter theorem; behavioral economics
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
a.
b.
c.
2. 5000
6000
3.
4.
HIV HIV HIV
5.
6.Ken

7.

a.
b.
c.ab
8.

Dexter
Glee
House
a.
b.
c.
d.
9.

14 10 8 4 2
12 8 4 2 0
10 6 2 0 0
6 2 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
15 3
a.
b.
c.median
d.
e.d
f.
10.
A B B C
A C
A B A B
11. 1
1
12.
a.
b.

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Tammy Batson Northern Illinois University Rita Callahan Keiser University

Carl Bauer Oakton Community College Michael G. Carew Baruch College

Robert Beekman University of Tampa Kalyan Chakraborty Emporia State University

Xudong Chen Baldwin-Wallace College Monica Galizzi University of Massachusetts Lowell

Maria DaCosta University of Wisconsin Elias C. Grivoyannis Yeshiva University

Diane de Freitas Fresno City College Mike Haupert University of Wisconsin

Fisher Donna Georgia Southern University Mark Holmes University of Waikato

Harold Elder University of Alabama Carl Hooker Community College of Vermont

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Mark Frascatore Clarkson University Edward McGrath Holyoke Community College

Mahbubul Kabir Lyon College William Mertens University of Colorado

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Tom Lehman Indiana Wesleyan University Jan Palmer Ohio University

Volodymyr Logovskyy Georgia Institute of Technology Joe Quinn Boston College

Min Lu Robert Morris University Mahesh Ramachandran Clark University

Gennady Lyakir Champlain College Ratha Ramoo Diablo Valley College

Rubana Mahjabeen Truman State University Scott Redenius Brandeis University

Imke Reimers University of Minnesota Julie Trivitt Arkansas Tech University

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曼昆Mankiw 经济学原理 (微观分册) 第六版译者曹乾

曼昆Mankiw 经济学原理 (微观分册) 第六版译者曹乾