2016 Public Corporation Law

Public Corporation Law
B A S I C L A W S
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the 1987 Administrative Code of the
Philippines.
Republic Act No. 6734, otherwise known as the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Republic Act No. 6766, otherwise known as the Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
Public Corporation Law is the branch of political law which governs the
creation, division, merger and abolition of public
corporations; defines and limits their powers and liabilities; and prescribes their
corresponding liabilities to the public, among others.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
P ublic corporations are entities created as agents of the State in virtue of which
part of sovereignty is delegated. They have dual characteristics: (a) public, as an
agent of the state in virtue of which part of sovereignty is delegated by the state to
the public corporation; and, (b) private, like a private corporation, performing ministrant
functions. Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government
directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case
of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock. 1
There are two basic types of public corporations, namely: (a) quasi-corporations which
are unincorporated territorial subdivisions serving as instrumentalities of local
governments for certain definite purposes; and (b) municipal corporations which are
incorporated entities formed or organized for the government of the territorial and
political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines. The governing law for municipal
corporations is Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991 which was enacted pursuant to the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for Congress to
enact a local government code which shall:2
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through of a system of decentralization and effective mechanism of recall, initiative,
and referendum.
allocate among different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources.
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of local units.
1
E.O. No. 292, Introductory Provisions, Sec. 2
2
The 1987 Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 3.
SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 1

CREATION AND CONVERSION
U nder the 1987 Constitution, these municipal corporations are referred to as

territorial and political subdivisions which have the following concurring elements
and attributes: (a) legal creation (b) corporate name (c) inhabitants, and (d)
territory. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays as well as the autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.3 From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident
from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. 4 Autonomous regions
are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article --- the article wholly
devoted to Local Government. 5 That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution.6
C R E A T I O N E T C .
A local government unit may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in case
of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglunsod concerned in case of a
barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and
requirements prescribed in this code.7 When a new local government unit is created, its
corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification of its chief
executive and a majority of the members of its sanggunian, unless some other time is fixed
therefor by the law or ordinance creating it.8 As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: 9
Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with
the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned.
Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned.
Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified
by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such
basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Barangay10 A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a

population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila
and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such
territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original
barangay or barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities,
barangays may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress,
notwithstanding the above requirement.
3
1987 Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 1.
4
Kida vs. Senate and House, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
R.A. 7160, The Local Government Code, Book I, Title I, Chap. II, Sec.6.
8
Id. at Sec. 14.
9
Id. at Sec. 7.
10
Id. at Book III, Title I, Chapter I, Section 386.

The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on
the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan
shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
concerned for appropriate action.
In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area and other
metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan shall be
prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
Municipality11 A municipality may be created if it has an average annual

income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, of at least Two
million five hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at
least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided,
That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the
original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where
the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of
the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring
income.
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to
exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code
shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
Component City12 A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be

converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least one hundred million
(P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices,
and if it has either of the following requisites: a contiguous territory of at least one
hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or a
population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified
by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the
land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation
to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the
criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate
11
R.A. 7160, The Local Government Code, Book III, Title III, Chapter I, Section 442.
12
Id at Section 450, as amended by R.A. No. 9009.

status of existing cities. Independent component cities shall be independent of the
province. Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. 13
Highly Urbanized City14 Cities with a minimum population of two

hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at least
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city
treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
Cities which do not meet the above requirements shall be considered component
cities of the province in which they are geographically located. If a component city is
located within the boundaries of two (2) or more provinces, such city shall be
considered a component of the province of which it used to be a municipality.
Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for
elective provincial officials.
Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or this Code, qualified voters of
independent component cities shall be governed by their respective charters, as
amended, on the participation of voters in provincial elections.
Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective provincial
officials prior to the classification of said cities as highly-urbanized after the
ratification of the Constitution and before the effectivity of this Code, shall continue
to exercise such right.
It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty
(30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. 15
Province16 A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as

certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites: a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or a population of not less than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided,
That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprise two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers and non-recurring income.
D I V I S I O N & M E R G E R
Division and merger of existing local government units shall
comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided,
however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the
local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original
13
Id. at Sec. 451.
14
R.A. 7160, The Local Government Code, Book III, Title III, Chapter I, Section 452.
15
Id. at Sec. 453.
16
Id. at Book III, Title IV, Chapter I, Section 461.

local government unit or units shall not fall below its current classification prior to such
division.17
A B O L I T I O NA local government unit may be abolished when its income, population,

or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed
for its creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national agencies
mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to the sangguniang concerned, as the case
may be.18 The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the
province, city, municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to
be abolished will be incorporated or merged.19
Plebiscite Requirement No creation, conversion,20 division, merger,

abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. 21 Said
plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting
such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. 22 The creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only province, cities,
and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.23
R E L E V A N T R U L I N G S
1. Will the petition for quo warranto against the

De Facto Corporation Municipality of San Andres, prosper? It was only
after almost thirty years that petitioner challenged
the legality of the creation of the Municipality of San Andres. Public interest demands
that a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be
timely raised. Certain governmental acts pointed to the States recognition of the
Municipality of San Andres. Executive Order No. 174 classified it as a fifth class
municipality. Pursuant to the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the Municipality of San
Andres was included in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Courts. Under the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution and apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives, the Municipality of San Andres was included in the third district of
Quezon. Section 44 (d) of the Local Government Code provides that the municipal
districts created by executive orders shall be considered as regular municipalities.
Congress exercised its power to create political subdivisions when it incorporated Section
44 (d) of the Local Government Code. This is a curative law, which is retrospective and
aimed at giving validity to acts that were invalid under existing law. [Municipality of San
Narciso vs. Mendez, 239 SCRA 11].
2. Is the Municipality of Alicia a de facto municipal corporation? Inasmuch as
respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres
(Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, 239 SCRA 11), it should likewise benefit
from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth
be considered as a regular, de jure municipality. Municipalities existing as of the date of
the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Under Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code, [E]xisting municipal districts organized pursuant
to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
17
Id. at Sec. 8.
18
Id. at Sec. 9.
19
Id.
20
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code, Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1).
21
Id. at Sec. 10.
22
Id.
23

elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. [Municipality of Candijay, Bohol
vs. CA, 251 SCRA 530].
3. Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It
is not. There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San
Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating
Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm
Andongs de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its
nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court
decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties
aggrieved. It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet
the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Camid admits
that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the
fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez,
the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its
share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void
municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in
the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the
State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the
DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting
to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued
upon the request of Camid, to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality
of Andong, Lanao del Sur, thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present
inoperative. [Camid vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 161414, Jan. 17, 2005].
4. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of

Cityhood Laws
the Constitution? The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and
10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills
became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress
shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and
not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of
the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450
of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality
into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written
into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th
Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law
passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were
written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. [League of Cities vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 176951, Nov. 18, 2008].
5. Because they are not written in the Local Government Code, is the exemption
clause in the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional? No, it is not unconstitutional. While
R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency of
conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws,
desiring to become component cities which qualified under the P20 million income
requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. Congress intended that those with
pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and
higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was
amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent
of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the
Cityhood Laws was gauged. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for
quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units

income, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income
requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when
it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from
locally-generated sources, in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood
to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and
autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth
in their respective provinces. [League of Cities vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 176951, Feb. 15,
2011, MR].
Dinagat Province 6. Is RA 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat

Islands, valid and constitutional? It is undisputed that
R.A. No. 9355 complied with the income requirement specified by the Local Government
Code. What is disputed is its compliance with the land area or population requirement.
R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an
approximate land area of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or
802.12 sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47)
islets. R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000
square kilometers. The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the
population requirement of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO.
Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the
Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951. Although the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in Dinagat
Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified
by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover, respondents failed to
prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit
(mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum
requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new province. [Navarro
vs. Sec. Ermita, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010].
7. Is Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR, valid and constitutional? The territorial requirement
in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR). However, the IRR went beyond the criteria
prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the portion that
[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands. Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision
stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance
when the territorial or land area requirement need not be complied with is when there is
already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution requires that
the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria,
must all be written in the Local Government Code. 24 Hence, the Court holds that the
provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that [t]he land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands is null and
void. The provision in Art. 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed province composed of
one or more islands from the land-area requirement cannot be considered an executive
construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an
extraneous provision not intended by the Local Government Code and, therefore, is null
and void. [Navarro vs. Sec. Ermita, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010].
8. Is a province-to-be consisting of one (1) or more islands exempt from the land area
requirement as provided in Article 9(2) of the IRR,? It bears scrupulous notice that with
respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability.
However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces,
the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that when the
local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from
the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC
if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the
24
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, 178056, November 18, 2008, 571 SCRA 263.

creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact,
considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-
created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that
the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities)
and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in
Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in
Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in
order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. [Navarro vs.
Sec. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011, MR].
9. How should contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local
government units be construed? Consistent with the declared policy to provide local
government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land
area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in
order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10,
2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and
impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and
component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and
municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province
would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square
kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted
to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one
composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant
communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This
preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-
kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of
water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass. [Navarro vs. Sec. Ermita, GR
No. 180050, April 12, 2011, MR].
Autonomous Regions 10. Does the creation of the autonomous region

depend on the total majority votes in the
plebiscite called for the purpose of ratifying the organic charter? The creation of the
autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority votes in the plebiscite,
but on the will of the majority votes in each of the constituent units. What is required by
the Constitution is a simple majority votes approving the Organic Act in independent
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes cast in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the independent constituent units. Under the Constitution and
Republic Act 6734, the creation of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao shall take
effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the
Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. And what is required us a
simple majority of votes approving the organic acts in the individual constituent units and
not a majority of the votes in all constituent units put together. [Abbas vs. Comelec,
G.R. 91725-28, Feb. 6, 1990].
11. Was the Autonomous Region of the Cordillera constituted by the ratification of
the organic charter by one province? No. A single province voting for the Organic Act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, which in this case the Ifugao province, cannot
constitute the autonomous region. There must be two or more provinces. Under the
Constitution, the region is made up of more than one constituent unit. The term
region means two or more provinces. It was never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we will have the absurd situation of two
sets of officials exercising power over the same small area. [Ordillo vs. COMELEC, 192
SCRA 100].

12. Is the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as constituted under the Memorandum
of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). valid and constitutional? No. The BJE
is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of
the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even
assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the
concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not
surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. [North Cotabato
vs. GRP Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, etc., Oct. 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402].
13. Can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? No. Under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. There is no
provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative
bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is
another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative in the House of Representatives. The creation of the ARMM, and the
grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest
Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the
Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Nothing in Section 20, Article X
of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress. [Sema vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597,
July 16, 2008].
Plebiscite Requirement 14. Does the downgrading of Santiago City from

an independent component city to a mere
component city under R.A. No. 8528 require the approval of the people of Santiago City in
a plebiscite? Yes, the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component
city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. The
changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as
insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished.
The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial
governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be
reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will
now have to be shared with the province. The registered voters of Santiago City will vote
for and can be voted as provincial officials. It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720
upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component
city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is
neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of
the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city.
Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes
their right. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so
long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected,
especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people. [Miranda vs.
Aguirre, G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999, 314 SCRA 603).
15. Should R. A. No. 9371, An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro is, be submitted for plebiscite? No. On

its face, R. A. No. 9371 is purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in
accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the
Constitution. No division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes
place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its
administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole
and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of
the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.
Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is
necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts. By having two
legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively
has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. The same
goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks increased from 12 to 16
councilors. [Bagabuyo vs. Comelec, G.R. 176970, Dec. 8, 2008].
BAR Questions
2004 BAR
Madako is a municipality composed of 80 barangays, 30 west of Madako
River and 50 east thereof. The 30 western barangays, feeling left out of economic
initiatives, wish to constitute themselves into a new and separate town to be called
Masigla. Suppose that one year after Masigla was constituted as a municipality, the law
creating it is voided because of defects. Would that invalidate the acts of the
municipality and/or its municipal officers? Explain briefly.
2 0 1 4 B A R From an existing province, Wideland, Congress created a new province,

Hundred Isles, consisting of several islands, with an aggregate area of 500 square
kilometres. The law creating Hundred Isles was duly approved in a plebiscite called for
that purpose. Juan, a taxpayer and a resident of Wideland, assailed the creation of
Hundred Isles claiming that it did not comply with the area requirement as set out in the
Local Government Code, i.e., an area of at least 2,000 square kilometres. The proponents
justified the creation, however, pointing out that the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code states that the land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
Accordingly, since the new province consists of several islands, the area requirement
need not be satisfied. How tenable is the position of the proponents?
2015 BAR On August 15, 2015, Congresswoman Dina Tatalo filed and sponsored
House Bill No. 5432, entitled "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
District of the City of Pangarap." The bill eventually became a law, R.A. No. 1234. It
mandated that the lone legislative district of the City of Pangarap would now consist of
two (2) districts. For the 2016 elections, the voters of the City of Pangarap would be
classified as belonging to either the first or second district, depending on their place of
residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to
Congress as well as eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. R.A. No. 1234
apportioned the City's barangays. The COMELEC thereafter promulgated Resolution No.
2170 implementing R.A. No. 1234. Piolo Cruz assails the COMELEC Resolution as
unconstitutional. According to him, R.A. No. 1234 cannot be implemented without
conducting a plebiscite because the apportionment under the law falls within the meaning
of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities
under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Is the claim correct? Explain.
A S S I G N E D C A S E S
In the plebiscite for the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City to a highly

urbanized city, who are qualified to cast their votes: the registered voters of
Cabanatuan City only or the registered voters of the province of Nueva Ecija?
Umali vs. Comelec, Ermita, GR 203974, April 22, 2014

LOCAL AUTONOMY
R esonating in the 1991 Local Government Code is a declared policy of the State
that its territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.25
But does local autonomy mean decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power? The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
decentralization of administration.26 It does not make the local governments sovereign
within the state or an imperium in imperio.27 There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments more responsive and accountable. 28 There is decentralization of
power, as in the case of autonomous regions, when the central government abdicates
political power in favor of local governments declared to be autonomous which is now free
to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.29 Decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since in that event,
the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.30
Local Autonomy.31 The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
General Supervision.32 The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays
shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
Fiscal Autonomy. Local governments shall have a just share, as determined by law,
in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.33 Local
governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner
provide by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct
benefits.34
Devolution. National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local
government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities
enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code.35
As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the national
government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to
perform specific functions and responsibilities. 36
O P E R A T I V E P R I N C I P L E S
The formulation and implementation of policies and
measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles: 37
25
R.A. No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991, Book I, Title I, Chapter I, Sec. 2.
26
Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695.
27
Ibid.
28
Limbona vs. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 786; cited in Pimentel vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 195770 July
17, 2012.
29
Ibid.
30
Lacson vs. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298, 311; cited in Pimentel vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 195770
July 17, 2012.
31
32
Id. at Sec. 4.
33
Id. at Sec. 5.
34
Id. at Sec. 6.
35
R.A. No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991, Book I, Title I, Chapter II, Sec. 17 (e).
36
Id.
37
Id. at Chapter I, Sec. 3.

(a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of
their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources.
(b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient,
and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the
priority needs and service requirements of its communities.
(c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials and employees paid
wholly or mainly from local funds shall be appointed or removed, according to merit
and fitness, by the appropriate appointing authority.
(d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall
be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their
powers and effectively carry out their functions: hence, they shall have the power to
create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in
national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth within their respective areas.
(e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
(f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their
efforts, services, and resources commonly beneficial to them.
(g) The capabilities of local government units, especially the municipalities and
barangays, shall be enhanced by providing them with opportunities to participate
actively in the implementation of national programs and projects.
(h) There shall be a continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy not only by
legislative enabling acts but also by administrative and organizational reforms.
(i) Local government units shall share with the national government the responsibility
in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial
jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this Code and national policies.
(j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to
their respective constituents shall be strengthened in order to upgrade continually
the quality of local leadership.
(k) The realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through improved coordination
of national government policies and programs an extension of adequate technical
and material assistance to less developed and deserving local government units.
(l) The participation of the private sector in local governance, particularly in the
delivery of basic services, shall be encouraged to ensure the viability of local
autonomy as an alternative strategy for sustainable development.
(m) The national government shall ensure that decentralization contributes to the
continuing improvement of the performance of local government units and the
quality of community life.
1. Does the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the

Cordilleras contemplate the grant of administrative autonomy to these regions? The
creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not
just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution
for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an
executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family
and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Yaranon vs.
COMELEC, G.R. 82217, Jan. 29, 1990].

2. Are the guidelines and mechanisms imposed by the Oversight Committee and the
GAA on the release of the Local Government Special Education Fund [LGSEF], valid and
constitutional? To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the distribution and
release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or
just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to
the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as
sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and
statutory mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to
them. The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee. [Province
of Batangas vs. Romulo, G.R. 152774, May 27, 2004].
3. Does Sec. 2.19, Art. I of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, making reclassification of
agricultural lands subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion,
violates Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7160, and contravene the constitutional mandate on local
autonomy? No. DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of
agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion
procedure or that DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification,
did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs. The power of the LGUs to reclassify
agricultural lands under Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7160 is not absolute. The authority of the
DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160
by explicitly providing therein that, nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
[CREBA vs. Agrarian Reform Secretary, G.R. 183409, June 18, 2010].
4. Does Governor Salappudin have the option not to absorb a devolved position? It
was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its
incumbent, Dr. Fortunata Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the
word shall both in Section 17 (i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No.
503,38 which connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. 39 The only instance that the
LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not
administratively viable, meaning, it would result to duplication of functions, in which
case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government. [CSC vs. Yu, G.R.
No. 189041, July 31, 2012].
5. What is the extent of the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy? The Court
has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art.
X, Sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority. 40 It does not make
local governments sovereign within the State. 41 Administrative autonomy may involve
devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or
standards,42 and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local
governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the
different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution
in the hands of Congress43 under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. [League of
Provinces vs. DENR, G.R. No. 175368, Apr. 11, 2013].
6. Does the Congressional Pork Barrel go against the constitutional principles on
local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development? Yes, the
38
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and Assets, Liabilities and Records of National
Government Agencies Whose Functions Are To Be Devolved To The Local Government Units And For Other Related
Purposes.
39
Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 144256,
June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 578, 600.
40
Cordillera Board Coalition v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 495.
41
Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52.
42
Jose N. Nolledo, The Local Government Code of 1991 Annotated, 2004 edition, p. 10.
43
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.., The Constitution of the Philippines A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988, page 377.

Congressional Pork Barrel undermines local autonomy. With PDAF, a Congressman can
simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even
take sole credit for its execution. The Court finds an inherent defect in the system which
actually belies the avowed intention of making equal the unequal. In particular, the Court
observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district
the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based
on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been
taken into consideration. Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to
intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional. [Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 208566, etc, Nov. 19, 2013].
7. Is Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams,
consistent with local autonomy? Yes. The constitutional mandate for local autonomy
supports petitioner citys issuance of Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating
change management teams as an initial step for its organization development masterplan.
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner citys issuance of
Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams as an initial
step for its organization development masterplan. Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (c) on
the rules of interpretation emphasize the policy of local autonomy and the devolution of
powers to the local government units. Designing and implementing a local government
units own organizational structure and staffing pattern also implies the power to revise
and reorganize. Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to
the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the
local government level require rational and deliberate changes planned and executed in
good faith from time to time. Local autonomy allows an interpretation of Sections 76 and
16 as granting petitioner city the authority to create its organization development
program. [City of General Santos vs. COA, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014].
8. Petitioners assert that giving the DSWD full control over the identification of
beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered or conditionalities are
to be complied with, instead of allocating the P21 Billion CCTP Budget directly to the
LGUs that would have enhanced its delivery of basic services, results in the
recentralization of basic government functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local
autonomy and the avowed policy of decentralization. Is the contention of the petitioners
tenable? No. The essence of the express reservation of power by the national government
under Sec. 17 (c) of the Local Government Code is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations
act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code
itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a
direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs
especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.
[Pimentel vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 195770 July 17, 2012].
9. Is a barangay protection order [BPO] an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials? No. the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability,
by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman
or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
enforce all laws and ordinances, and to maintain public order in the barangay. 44 We
have held that (t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
44
People v. Tomaquin, 478 Phil. 885, 899 (2004), citing Section 389, Chapter 3, Title One, Book III, Local Government Code
of 1991, as amended.

constitute an exercise of judicial powers. 45 In the same manner as the public prosecutor
ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof, the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an
imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to
recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The
same holds true with the issuance of a BPO. [Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. 179267, June 25,
2013].
BAR Questions
2007 BAR
The Provincial Governor of Bataan requested the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) to release its Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA) of P100 million
for the current budget year. However, the General Appropriations Act provided that the
IRA may be released only if the province meets certain conditions as determined by an
Oversight Council created by the President. Is this requirement valid? Explain.
2015 BAR Congress enacted R.A. No. 14344 creating the City of Masuwerte which
took effect on September 25, 2014. Section 23 of the law specifically exempts the City of
Masuwerte from the payment of legal fees in the cases that it would file and/or prosecute
in the courts of law. In two (2) cases that it filed, the City of Masuwerte was assessed legal
fees by the clerk of court pursuant to Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The City
of Masuwerte questions the assessment claiming that it is exempt from paying legal fees
under Section 23 of its charter. Is the claim of exemption tenable? Explain.
Did the act of respondent [DENR] in cancelling the small-scale mining permits
amount to executive control, not merely supervision, and usurpation of the
devolved powers of provinces?
League of Provinces vs. DENR , G.R. 175368, Apr. 11, 2013
Do the assailed DILG Memorandum Circulars violate LGUs local and fiscal
autonomy?
Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. 195390, Dec. 10, 2014
45
Lovina and Montilla v. Moreno and Yonzon, 118 Phil 1401, 1406 (1963).

POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES
E very local government unit created or recognized under the Local Government
Code is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in
conformity with law.46 As such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision
of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory.47 Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare.48 Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units have the delegated power of sovereignty, to wit: police power, inferior domain
and local taxation.
Police Power Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local

government units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants.49
Inferior Domain A local government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain
may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property. 50
Local government units shall have the power to create their

Local Taxation own source of revenues and levy taxes, fees and charges
which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition
and which shall be retained by them.51 But the exercise of these taxing powers shall not
extend to the levy of income taxes, documentary stamp tax, excise tax, among others. 52
The grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and
the LGC does not, however, affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to
certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. 53 The legal effect of the
constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory
46
R.A. No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991, Book I, Title I, Chapter II, Sec. 15.
47
Id.
48
Id. at Sec. 16.
49
Id. at Sec. 16.
50
Id. at Sec. 19.
51
Section 18, R.A. 7160.
52
Sec. 133, R.A. 7160.
53
PLDT vs. City of Davao, 363 SCRA 522 (2001).

provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations.54
55
P O W E R T O R E C L A S S I F Y
A city or municipality may, through an ordinance
passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the
reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2)
where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned.
Agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic
Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657) otherwise known as
"The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the said
reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes and shall be
governed by Section 65 of said Act.
Such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total
agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%).
2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent (10%).
3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%).
56
P O W E R T O C L O S E & O P E N
A local government unit may, pursuant to an
ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square
falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such
ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure is provided.
No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without
making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus
permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose
for which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may
be lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be
closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.
Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an
actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs,
or an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and
waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief
executive concerned in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local
road, alley, park, or square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic
activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government
unit concerned.
Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily
close and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public
place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be
established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of
commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.
57
C O R P O R A T E P O W E R S
Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have
the following powers:
1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name.
2) To sue and be sued.
54
Ibid.
55
Id. at Sec. 20.
56
Id. at Sec. 21.
57
Id. at Sec. 22.

3) To have and use a corporate seal.
4) To acquire and convey real or personal property.
5) To enter into contracts.
6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the
limitations provided in this Code and other laws.
Police Power 1. Cite some valid local police power legislations?

A zoning ordinance, reclassifying a residential area into commercial, is a valid
exercise of police power and cannot be proscribed or delimited by the non-
impairment clause of obligations and contracts. The Local Autonomy Act empowers
municipal council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulation. The
area where the two lots are located has become industrial and commercial. It would
now be hazardous to health and comfort to sue the lots for residential purposes.
[Ortigas vs. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533].
Ordinance No. 142, which prohibited selling perishable foodstuffs outside the public
markets, is a valid regulatory ordinance. Ordinance No. 145, which required all
perishable foodstuffs to be inspected by the City Health Officer, is intended to
promote the general welfare. Ordinance No. 150, which prohibited anyone other
than the city to operate a public market, is valid and constitutional. The claim of
petitioner that her market is not public, because it is privately owned is
unmeritorious. The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of the
general public and not its ownership. [Javellana vs. Kintanar, 119 SCRA 627].
The city ordinance of Manila, which prohibited the operator of a barber shop from
conducting the business of massaging customers in any adjacent room of the barber
shop or in a room in the same building where the barber shop is located, is valid
exercise of police power. The objectives behind its enactment are to impose the
license fees for engaging in the operation of massage clinics, a business entirely
different from that of barber shops, and to prevent immorality which might arise
from the construction of separate rooms for the massage of customers. [Velasco vs.
Villegas, 120 SCRA 968].
Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, which prohibited the construction of warehouses
that store inflammable materials within 200 meters from any block of house, is a
valid exercise of police power. Its purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in
case of fire. The municipal resolution, which declared the warehouse of petitioner
built within the 200 meter radius as a nuisance and directed petitioner to transfer it,
is valid and constitutional. [Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157].
The establishment of a camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the municipality.
The municipality has the power to adopt a zoning plan which may include a camino
vecinal, which is a municipal road. By approving the zoning plan, the municipality
determined the location of the camino vecinal. [Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals, 216
SCRA 33].
Ordinance No. 19-92, which banned the shipment of all live fishes and lobsters,
except sea bass, catfish, mudfish and milkfish, outside Puerto Princesa, and
Ordinance No. 2-93, which prohibited the catching and gathering, possessing,
buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling organisms --- are valid and
constitutional. The centerpiece of the Local Government Code is the system of
decentralization as mandated by the Constitution. One of the devolved powers is
the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters. This includes the enactment of
ordinances to carry out such fishery laws. The local government units have the
power to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology
and to penalize by ordinance the deleterious methods of fishing. The Local

Government Code imposes upon local government units the duty to enact
ordinances to protect the environment. [Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 144].
2. Is Lucena City Ordinance No. 1631, which grants Lucena Grand Terminal and
exclusive franchise to build and operate a common bus and jeepney terminal in the city, a
valid exercise of police power? Ordinance No. 1631 have been enacted with the objective
of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, thus, it involve public interest
warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of
police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the
means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective
were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. With the aim of
localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject
ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal
located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The
common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down
their existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner. As in De la Cruz58 and
Lupangco59, the ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go
beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the
compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to
fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the
appellate court. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of
traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from
that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem, this Court has not been enlightened. [Lucena Grand Terminal vs. JAC Liner,
G.R. 148339, Feb. 23, 2005].
3. In closing motels, saunas, etc, can Mayor Lim invoke police power pursuant to the
zoning ordinance? Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure: An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Establishment or Operation of Businesses Providing Certain
Forms of Amusement, Entertainment, Services and Facilities in the Ermita-Malate Area, as
a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which
limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it
constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property
which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we
know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received
broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without
infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power
that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts
to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance.
In this regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right
to liberty and property. [Lim vs. Malate Tourist Dev. Corp., G.R. 118127, April 12,
2005].
4. Is the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and
regulations, purportedly under Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924, a valid exercise of
police power? The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle
is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or
revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety
and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. However, Rep. Act No.
58
In De la Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983), this Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance characterized by
overbreadth. In that case, the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan prohibited the operation of all night clubs, cabarets and
dance halls within its jurisdiction for the protection of public morals.
59
In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 60 SCRA 848 (1988), this Court, in declaring unconstitutional the resolution subject
thereof, advanced a similar consideration. That case involved a resolution issued by the Professional Regulation Commission
which prohibited examinees from attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the like three days
before the date of examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy.

7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all
its functions are administrative in nature. 60 Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the
City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid. We restate here the doctrine
in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. [MMDA vs.
Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005].
5. Is Manila City Ordinance No, 8027, which re-classified the Pandacan area from
commercial to residential, a valid exercise of police power? Ordinance No. 8027 was
enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle
described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional
limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society. This
is evident from Sections 161 and 362 thereof. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the
Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11,
2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The
objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed. [SJS vs. Atienza,
G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2005, 546 Phil. 485 (2007)].
6. Did Manila City Ordinance No. 811963 impliedly repeal Ordinance No, 8027?
Ordinance no. 8119 did not impliedly repeal ordinance no. 8027. There is no conflict
between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from
Industrial II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, in Section 23, designated it as a
Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). In its Annex C which defined the
zone boundaries, the Pandacan area was shown to be within the High Density
Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD): which means that it should be used primarily
for high-rise housing/dwelling purposes and limited complementary/ supplementary
trade, services and business activities. There is no conflict since both ordinances actually
have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119).
Besides, Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain area
described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be
considered a general law as it covers the entire city of Manila. The special act and the
general law must stand together, one as the law of the particular subject and the other as
the law of general application. The special law must be taken as intended to constitute an
exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision. [SJS vs. Atienza, G.R. No.
156052, Feb, 13, 2008, 568 Phil. 658 (2008)].
7. Is Manila Ordinance No. 8027, valid and constitutional? In G.R. No. 156052,64 the
validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as a guarantee for the
protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. There, the Court
said that the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with the
concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject to safeguard the rights to life,
60
G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000, 328 SCRA 836. The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed
that it had the authority to open a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. to public traffic because
it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this premise,
the MMDA argued that there was no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the
public.
61
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare
of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by
the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and
Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in
the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino
Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
62
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under
Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to
cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
63
An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the
Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto.
64
SJS vs. Atienza, 546 Phil. 485 (2007). Decision and Resolution 568 Phil. 658 (2008).

security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila; and a lawful method the enactment
of Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial, which
effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots in Pandacan. The issue of whether or
not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has already been
passed upon in G. R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is
imminent. Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very
nature of the depots where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile
products, regardless of whether or not the composition may cause explosions, has no place
in a densely populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil depots, be it related
to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise, would definitely cause not only destruction
to properties within and among the neighboring communities but certainly mass deaths
and injuries. [SJS vs. Lim, G.R. Nos. 187836, etc., Nov. 23, 2014].
Inferior Domain 8. Is the city ordinance of Manila invalid for discrimina-

ting against the petitioner, a corporation? The city
ordinance of Manila, which limited the sale and re-sale of the city-acquired-subdivision
of Barrio Obrero to Filipino laborers who are bona fide residents of Manila and whose
wages do not exceed PHP180 a month, is valid and constitutional. The resolution was
issued to implement the provision in the city charter giving the city the power to acquire
lots for subdivision for laborers and low-salaried employees. The resolution applies both
to voluntary and forced sales, like foreclosure sales. Petitioner is not qualified, not only
because it is not a low-salaried employee but more so because it is a corporation.
[Citizens Surety Insurance Co. vs. Puno, 199 SCRA 216].
9. Are local government units required to seek DAR clearance before expropriating
an agricultural land? The Local Government Code, which grants local government units
the power of eminent domain, does not require local government units to first secure the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform for conversion of lands from agricultural
to non-agricultural use before they can institute expropriation proceedings on agricultural
lands. There is also no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of
the Department of Agrarian Reform. To sustain the Court of Appeals (which order the
trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the petitioner should have
obtained approval from the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification
of the properties from agricultural to non-agricultural), would mean that it would be the
Department of Agrarian Reform which would determine whether or not the expropriation
is for public use. [Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173].
10. Is Cebu City Expropriation Ordinance No. 1843 valid and constitutional? No. For
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a
substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. 65 Ordinance No. 1843
failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear case of
constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify
the subject ordinance. We recapitulate: first, as earlier discussed, the questioned
ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, R.A. 7279 and R.A.
7160; second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression
masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance; third, the fact that petitioners small property was
singled out for expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a few
squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners; and, fourth, the ordinance
failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end sought and the means
adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum
65
Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157.

dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal,
sensible and called for by the circumstances. [Lagcao vs. Labra, G.R. No. 155746, Oct.
13, 2004].
11. What there necessity in the taking made by the City of Pasig? The City of Pasig
has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners
property. The Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of
having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest
vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public.
The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative
facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the
Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small
community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding
that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot be
considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. [Masikip vs. City of
Pasig, G.R. 136349, Jan. 23, 2006].
12. Can an expropriation be authorized by a mere resolution of the sanggunian? In
the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo. In its
stead were Resolution Nos. 61-95 and 88-95. It has been categorically stated in the cases
of Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation 66 that a local government unit
cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its
lawmaking body. These resolutions cannot partake of a supervening event so as to
suspend the writ of execution in the ejectment proceedings. They merely express at most
an intention to expropriate. Private respondent correctly maintained that there was no
positive act of instituting the intended expropriation proceedings. Assuming arguendo
that instead of resolutions, an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan, we still
find for private respondent. There is no dispute that a local government unit possesses
the power of eminent domain. But the taking of private properties is not absolute. The
power of eminent domain must not be exercised arbitrarily, even if purposed for resolving
a critical problem such as urban squatting.. The safeguards afforded by law require strict
observance. [Antonio vs. Geronimo, G.R. No. 124779, Nov., 2005].
Subpoena Power? 13. There is no provision in the Constitution or in the

Local Government Code granting local legislative
bodies the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to cite them for contempt. Such
powers cannot be implied from the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as a
mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. Since the existence of he
power of contempt in connection with the power to issue subpoenas poses a potential
derogation of individual rights, i.e., compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal
to testify, such power cannot be deemed to have been impliedly granted to local legislative
bodies. Besides, inquiry upon the efficiency of the service off petitioner is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete City. Such power is within the
jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration. [NORECO II vs. SP of
Dumaguete City, 155 SCRA 421].
14. Cite some jurisprudence on the power of a local

Close-Open Power
government unit to permanently or temporarily close
or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction?
Who has the power to close city streets and provincial roads? The closure of city
streets is within the powers of the city council while the closure of provincial roads is
within the powers of the provincial board. [Cabrera vs. CA, 195 SCRA 314].
66
Mun. of Paraaque vs. VM Realty Corp., G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998, 292 SCRA 678.

After closing a city street, can the same be leased? After closing its city street, the
City of Baguio can lawfully lease the same to third persons as the property has
become a patrimonial property. [Favis vs. City of Baguio, 27 SCRA 1060].
After closing a city street, can the same be sold? The sale by the City of Cebu of the
city street is valid because at the time of the sale, the property has ceased to become
a property of public domain as it was withdrawn for public use after its closure. The
charter of Cebu City empowers it to close a city road. Upon withdrawal of the road
from public use, it became patrimonial property and could be the object of and
ordinary contract, well-within the commerce of man. 67 [Cebu Oxygen Acetylene
Co., Inc. vs. Berceles, 66 SCRA 481].
If not permanently closed, can roads and streets of local government units be leased
or otherwise sold to private persons? Properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of
men and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private
persons. Roads and streets which are available to the public in general and
ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are considered public property devoted to public
use. [Macasiano vs. Diokno, 212 SCRA 464].
15. Who has the right to own and the power to administer Plaza Real upon
conversion of Municipality of Naga to an independent city? Plaza Rizal partakes of the
nature of a public park or promenade. As such, Plaza Rizal is classified as a property for
public use. In Municipality of San Carlos, Pangasinan v. Morfe,68 the Court recognized
that a public plaza is a public land belonging to, and, subject to the administration and
control of, the Republic of the Philippines. Camarines Sur had the right to administer and
possess Plaza Rizal prior to the conversion of the then Municipality of Naga into the
independent City of Naga, as the plaza was then part of the territorial jurisdiction of the
said province. Said right of administration by Camarines Sur was governmental in nature,
and its possession was on behalf of and in representation of the Republic of the
Philippines, in the performance of its political functions. Thereafter, by virtue of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 305 and as specified in Section 2, Article I thereof, the City
of Naga was created out of the territory of the old Municipality of Naga. Plaza Rizal,
which was located in the said municipality, thereby ceased to be part of the territorial
jurisdiction of Camarines Sur and was, instead transferred to the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Naga. Theretofore, the local government unit that is the proper agent of the
Republic of the Philippines that should administer and possess Plaza Rizal is the City of
Naga. [Camarines Sur vs. City of Naga, G.R. No. 175064, Sept. 18, 2009].
Corporate Powers: 16. Can local governments settle and compromise a

litigated case in court? The City of Cebu has the
To Sue and Be Sued power to sue and be sued. It has the authority to
compromise suits. The compromise was within the
authority of the City of Cebu. While the Sangguniang Panlungsod stated that the
appropriation was a form of financial assistance to the family of the victim, in reality it was
made pursuant to a compromise agreement. [Osmena vs. Commission on Audit, 238
SCRA 463].
17. Can the municipality be represented by private counsel? The matter of
representation of the municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs.
CA.69 Collaboration of a private law firm with fiscal and the municipal attorney is not
allowed. Only the provincial fiscal or municipal/provincial attorney can represent, unless
both of them are disqualified to represent, thus, authorizing the municipality to employ a
private lawyer. In this case, the controversy involved a fight between the provincial
governor and the members of the provincial board. The provincial governor cannot be
expected to secure authority from the provincial board to employ respondent to file a case
against themselves. The provincial board disqualified the provincial fiscal from
67
See also Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 314.
68
115 Phil. 608 (1962).
69
108 SCRA 728.

representing the province when it directed him to appear for its members and defend its
actuation. In fact the answer of the provincial fiscal filed in behalf of the provincial board
defended the legality of the donation. How could the province be represented by the
provincial fiscal? Neither could a prosecutor be designated by the Department of Justice,
since the President approved the donation. [Province of Cebu vs. IAC, G.R. 72841, Jan.
29, 1987, 147 SCRA 447].
18. Can local government officials be represented by private counsel? In Alinsug v.
RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City,70 the Court ruled that in instances like the present case where
personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly
secure the services of private counsel explaining, thus: It can happen that a government
official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to
have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been
underwritten by the peoples money which ordinarily should have been his personal
expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his
having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. Municipal
corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the
extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the
requirements thereof. In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by
private counsel. Where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in
court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring
of a private counsel would be proper. Likewise a local government official sued in his
official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when the complaint contains
other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must
be satisfied by them in their private capacity. [Gontang vs. Alayan, G.R. No. 191691, Jan.
16, 2013].
19. Do the city mayor and vice mayor have inherent power to enter into contracts in
behalf of the local government unit? The city mayor, and not the city vice mayor, has the
inherent power to enter into contracts in behalf of the local government unit. Under
Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority on
the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government
unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.71 Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to
enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance
granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter
into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law
to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a
continuing authority for any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter
into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. [Vicencio vs. Villar, G.R. No. 182069, July 3,
2012].
Corporate Powers: 20. Does the power of the local government unit to
Acquire & Convey acquire and convey real properties, include the power
to sell or lease a public plaza? No. A public plaza is
beyond the commerce of man. It cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking. The lease of a public plaza in favor of a private person is null and void. Any
contract entered into by the local government in connection with a public plaza is ultra
vires. Every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it
contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal
order. And this power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the
contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion of the general welfare. Such an
act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power. [Villanueva vs. Castaeda, G.R. 61311, Sept. 11, 1987].
70
G.R. No. 108232, August 23, 1993, 225 SCRA 553.
71
R.A. 7160, Sec. 456 (b) (1)(vi) provides: (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall: (vi) Represent the city
in all its business transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon
authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance; x x x.

21. Will the favorably vote of the majority of all
Corporate Powers: members of the Sanggunian present during the
session be sufficient for a resolution authorizing
To Enter Into Contract
the governor to enter into a construction
contract? No. For a resolution authorizing the
governor to enter into a construction contract to be valid, the vote of the majority of all
members of the Sanggunian, and not only of those present during the session, is required
in accordance with Section 46872 of the LGC in relation to Article 107 73 of its Implementing
Rules. Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was then the Acting
Presiding Officer, Resolution No. 07 is still invalid. Applying Section 468 of the LGC and
Article 107 of its Implementing Rules, there being fourteen members in the Sanggunian,
the approval of eight members is required to authorize the governor to enter into the
Contract with the Allado Company since it involves the creation of liability for payment
on the part of the local government unit. 74 [Zamora vs. Gov. Caballero, et. al., G.R. No.
147767, Jan. 14, 2004].
BAR Questions
1987 BAR
In January 1984, Pasay City filed expropriation proceedings against
several landowners for the construction of an aqueduct for flood control in a barangay.
Clearly, the residents of that barangay would be benefited by the project. As
compensation, the city offered to pay only the amount declared by the owners in their
tax declarations, which amount was lower than the assessed value as determined by the
assessor. The landowners opposed the expropriation on the ground that the same is not
for public use. If you were the judge, how would you rule on the issue? Why?
1 9 8 9 B A R Pedro bought a parcel of land form Smart Corporation, a realty firm

engaged in developing and selling lots to the public. One of the restrictions in the deed of
sale which was annotated in the title is that the lot shall be used by the buyer exclusively
for residential purposes. A main highway having been constructed across the subdivision,
the area became commercial in nature. The municipality later passed a zoning ordinance
declaring the area as a commercial zone. Pedro decided to construct a commercial bank
building on his lot. Smart Corporation went to court to stop the construction as violative
of the building restrictions imposed by it. The corporation contends that the zoning
ordinance cannot nullify the contractual obligation assumed by the buyer. Decide the
case.
1990 BAR XYZ, a corporation organized under the laws of Hongkong, with 100%
foreign equity, obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission a license to
operate a prawn hatchery project on a piece of land leased from the City of Dagupan. The
land was formerly a park and a plaza belonging to the City and was converted by the City
to derive much needed funds.
(1) May the City of Dagupan lawfully convert the park to prawn ponds and lease the same?
Explain your answer.
72
Section 468. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) (iii) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code and
applicable laws and upon majority vote of all members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, authorize the provincial governor
to negotiate and contract loans and other forms of indebtedness; (Italics in the original.
73
Article 107. Ordinances and Resolutions. The following rules shall govern the enactment of ordinances and resolutions:
(g) x x x Any ordinance or resolution authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating liability, shall require the
affirmative vote of a majority of all the sanggunian members for its passage.
74
On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it issued Resolution No. 05 declaring the
entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and Resolution No. 07 ] authorizing the Governor to, on
behalf of the province, enter into a construction contract (Contract) with Allado Construction Company, Inc. (the Allado
Company) for the completion of Phase II of the construction of the capitol building. During the same session, the
Sanggunian accepted the letter of irrevocable resignation submitted by Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto. While only
eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the commencement of the session on February 26, 2001, the Journal of the
Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 showed that a total of thirteen members attended it.

(2) May the City of Dagupan and XYZ Corporation validly enter into the lease contract for
the prawn ponds? Answer with reasons.
1 9 9 0 B A R The City of Cebu passed an ordinance proclaiming the expropriation of a

ten (10) hectare property of C Company, which property is already a developed
commercial center. The City proposed to operate the commercial center in order to
finance a housing project for city employees in the vacant portion of the said property.
The ordinance fixed the price of the land and the value of the improvements to be paid by
C company on the basis of the prevailing land value and cost of construction.
(1) As counsel for C Company, give two constitutional objections to the validity of the
ordinance.
(2) As the judge rule on the said objections.
1 9 9 1 B A R The province of Palawan passes an ordinance requiring all owners/operators

of fishing vessels that fish in waters surrounding the province to invest ten percent (10%)
of their net profits from operations therein in any enterprise located in Palawan. NARCO
fishing Corporation, a filipino corporation with head office in Navotas, Metro-Manila,
challenges the ordinance as unconstitutional. Decide.
1 9 9 1 B A R The Municipality of Sibonga, Cebu, wishes to enter into a contract involving

expenditure of public funds. What are the legal requisites therefore? Explain.
1 9 9 3 B A R Mayor Alfredo Lim closed the fun houses in the Ermita district suspected of
being fronts for prostitution. To determine the feasibility of putting up a legalized red
district, the city council conducted an inquiry and invited operators of the closed fun
houses to get their views. No one honored the invitation. The City Council issued
subpoenas to compel the attendance of the operators but which were completely
disregarded. The council declared the operators guilty of contempt and issued warrants
for their arrest. The operator come to you for legal advice, asking the following questions:
(1) Is the council empowered to issue subpoenas to compel their attendance?
(2) Does the council have the power to cite for contempt?
1 9 9 5 B A R The Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal, passed a resolution authorizing the

operation of an open garbage dump site in a 9 hectare land in the Reyes Estate within the
Municipalitys territorial limits. Some concerned residents of Binangonan file a complaint
with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) to stop the operation of the dump
site due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents. The LLDA conducted an on-
site investigation, monitoring, testing and water sampling and found that the dump site
would contaminate Laguna de Bay and the surrounding areas of the Municipality. The
LLDA also discovered that no environmental clearance was secured by the Municipality
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the LLDA as
required by law. The LLDA therefore issued to the Binangonan municipal government a
cease and desist order to stop the operation of the dump site. The Municipality of
Binangonan filed a case to annul the order issued by the LLDA.
(1) Can the Municipality of Binangonan invoke police power to prevent its residents and
the LLDA from interfering with the operation of the dump site by the Municipality?
Explain.
(2) Can the LLDA justify its order by asserting that the health of its residents will be
adversely affected?
Explain.
2003 BAR The municipal council of the municipality of Guagua, Pampanga, passed
an ordinance penalizing any person or entity engaged in the business of selling tickets to
movies or other public exhibitions, games or performances which would charge children
between 7 and 12 years of age the full price of admission tickets instead of only one-half of

the amount thereof. Would you hold the ordinance a valid exercise of legislative power by
the municipality? Why?
2003 BAR Can a Barangay Assembly exercise any police power? Explain.
2004 BAR
The City of San Rafael passed an ordinance authorizing the City Mayor,
assisted by the police, to remove all advertising signs displayed or exposed to public view
in the main city street, for being offensive to sight or otherwise a nuisance. AM, whose
advertising agency owns and rents out many of the billboards ordered removed by the
City Mayor, claims that the City should pay for the destroyed billboards at their current
market value since the City has appropriated them for the public purpose of city
beautification. The Mayor refuses to pay, so AM is suing the City and the Mayor for
damages arising from the taking of his property without due process nor just
compensation. Will AMs suit prosper? Reason briefly.
2 0 0 4 B A R The City of Cebu expropriated the property of Carlos Topico for use as a
municipal parking lot. The Sangguniang Panglunsod appropriated PHP10 million for
this purpose but the Regional Trial Court fixed the compensation for the taking of the
land at PHP15million.
(1) What legal remedy, if any, does Carlos Topico have to recover the balance of
PHP5million for the taking of his land?
(2) If the City of Cebu has money in the bank, can it be garnished?
2 0 0 5 B A R The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur passed

Resolution No. 1 authorizing its Mayor to initiate a petition for the expropriation of a lot
owned by Christina as site for its municipal sports center. This was approved by the
Mayor. However, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur disapproved the Resolution
as there might still be other available lots in Santa for a sports center. Nonetheless, the
Municipality of Santa, through its Mayor, filed a complaint for eminent domain. Christina
opposed this on the following grounds: (a) the Municipality of Santa has no power to
expropriate; (b) Resolution No. 1 has been voided since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved it for being arbitrary; and (c) the Municipality of Santa has other and better
lots for that purpose. Resolve the case with reasons.
2 0 0 7 B A R Batas Pambansa 880, the Public Assembly Law of 1985, regulates the
conduct of all protest rallies in the Philippines. Salakay, Bayan! held a protest rally and
planned to march from Quezon City to Luneta in Manila. They received a permit from the
Mayor of Quezon City, but not from the Mayor of Manila. They were able to march in
Quezon City and up to the boundary separating it from the City of Manila. Three meters
after crossing the boundary, the Manila Police stopped them for posing a danger to public
safety. Was this a valid exercise of police power? Explain.
2 0 0 9 B A R The Municipality of Bulalakaw, Leyte, passed Ordinance No. 1234,

authorizing the expropriation of two parcels of land situated in the poblacion as the site of
a freedom park, and appropriating the funds needed therefor. Upon review, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte disapproved the ordinance because the municipality
has an existing freedom park which, though smaller in size, is still suitable for the
purpose, and to pursue expropriation would be needless expenditure of the peoples
money. Is the disapproval of the ordinance correct? Explain your answer.
2 0 1 0 B A R True or False. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is

authorized to confiscate a drivers license in the enforcement of traffic regulations.
Explain.
2010 BAR True or False. A valid and definite offer to buy a property is a pre-

requisite to expropriation initiated by a local government unit. Explain.
2010 BAR True or False. Re-classification of land by a local government unit may
be done through a resolution. Explain.
2 0 1 0 B A R ABC operates an industrial waste processing plant within Laoag City.

Occasionally, whenever fluid substances are released through a nearby creek, obnoxious
odor is emitted causing dizziness among residents in Barangay La Paz. On complaint of
the Punong Barangay, the City Mayor wrote ABC demanding that it abate the nuisance.
This was ignored. An invitation to attend a hearing called by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
was also declined by the president of ABC. The city government thereupon issued a cease
and desist order to stop the operations of the plant, prompting ABC to file a petition for
injunction before the Regional Trial Court, arguing that the city government did not have
any power to abate the alleged nuisance. Decide with reasons.
2 0 1 0 B A R The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Pasay City passed an ordinance requiring

all disco pub owners to have all their hospitality girls tested for the AIDS virus. Both disco
pub owners and the hospitality girls assailed the validity of the ordinance for being
violative of their constitutional right to freely choose a calling or business. Is the
ordinance valid? Explain.
2011 BAR The city government filed a complaint for expropriation of 10 lots to build
a recreational complex for the members of the homeowners' association of Sitio Sto.
Tomas, the most populated residential compound in the city. The lot owners challenged
the purpose of the expropriation. Does the expropriation have a valid purpose? _____.
(A) No, because not everybody uses a recreational complex.
(B) No, because it intends to benefit a private organization.
(C) Yes, it is in accord with the general welfare clause.
(D) Yes, it serves the well-being of the local residents.
2 0 1 5 B A R Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of Sinagtala. Roads and bridges

were destroyed which impeded the entry of vehicles into the area. This caused food
shortage resulting in massive looting of grocery stores and malls. There is power outage
also in the area. For these reasons, the governor of the province declares a state of
emergency in their province through Proclamation No. 1. He also invoked Section 465 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which vests on the provincial
governor the power to carryout emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the same proclamation, the
governor called upon the members of the Philippine National Police, with the assistance
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct
general searches and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure
public safety. Was the action of the provincial governor proper? Explain.
Is Marikina City Ordinance No. 192, insofar as imposing a five-meter set back, a
valid exercise of police power?
Fernando vs. St. Escolastica College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013
Is amendatory Manila Ordinance No. 8187, which would allow the continued stay
of oil depots in Pandacan, valid and constitutional?
SJS vs. Lim, G.R. Nos. 187836, etc., Nov. 23, 2014
Can LGUs establish no-build-zones? Does the LGU have the power to demolish
structures which are nuisance per se and per accidens?
Aquino vs. Mun. of Malay, G.R. 211356, Sept. 29, 2014

LOCAL LEGISLATI VE POWER
A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the
legislative power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the
legislative bodies of local government units, e.g., the Sangguniang Panglunsod of
a local government, which as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power. 75
Local legislative power shall be exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan for the
province; the sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the
municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay. 76
Presiding Officer.77 The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the
sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the
municipal vice-mayor, of the sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the
sangguniang barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie. In the
event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian
session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten (10) days from
the passage of ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the
session over which he temporarily presided.
Internal Rules.78 On the first regular session following the election of its members
and within ninety (90) days thereafter, the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or
update its existing rules of procedure. The rules of procedure shall provide for the
following: the organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers as well
as the creation of standing committees; the order and calendar of business for each
session; the legislative process; the parliamentary procedures which include the
conduct of members during sessions; the discipline of members for disorderly
behavior and absences without justifiable cause for four (4) consecutive sessions, for
which they may be censured, reprimanded, or excluded from the session, suspended
for not more than sixty (60) days, or expelled: Provided, That the penalty of
suspension or expulsion shall require the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3)
vote of all the sanggunian members: Provided, further, That a member convicted by
final judgment to imprisonment of at least one (1) year for any crime involving moral
turpitude shall be automatically expelled from the sanggunian.
Sessions.79 On the first day of the session immediately following the election of its
members, the sanggunian shall, by resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its
regular sessions. The minimum numbers of regular sessions shall be once a week for
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan,
and twice a month for the sangguniang barangay. When public interest so demands,
special sessions may be called by the local chief executive or by a majority of the
members of the sanggunian. All sanggunian sessions shall be open to the public
unless a closed-door session is ordered by an affirmative vote of a majority of the
members present, there being a quorum, in the public interest or for reasons of
security, decency, or morality. No two (2) sessions, regular or special, may be held
in a single day. In the case of special sessions of the sanggunian, a written notice to
the members shall be served personally at the member's usual place of residence at
least twenty-four (24) hours before the special session is held. Unless otherwise
concurred in by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the sanggunian members present, there
being a quorum, no other matters may be considered at a special session except
those stated in the notice. Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its
proceedings which may be published upon resolution of the sanggunian concerned.
75
NORECO II vs. Sangguniang Panglunsod of Dumaguete City, G.R. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987.
76
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title II, Chapter III, Sec. 48.
77
Id. at Sec. 49.
78
Id. at Sec. 50.
79
Id. at Sec. 52.

Quorum. 80 A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected
and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. Should a
question of quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall
immediately proceed to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the
results. Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess until
such time as a quorum is constituted, or a majority of the members present may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the immediate attendance of any member
absent without justifiable cause by designating a member of the sanggunian to be
assisted by a member or members of the police force assigned in the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, to arrest the absent member
and present him at the session. If there is still no quorum despite the enforcement of
the immediately preceding subsection, no business shall be transacted. The presiding
officer, upon proper motion duly approved by the members present, shall then
declare the session adjourned for lack of quorum.
Local Legislation In the exercise of its delegated legislative power, the local
Sanggunian may enact a resolution or an ordinance. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature.81 An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment
or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 82 Additionally, the two are enacted
differently --- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.83 For an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact
but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. 84 It must be in
accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. 85 These
principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4)
must not prohibit but regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy,
and (6) must not be unreasonable. 86
87
A P P R O V A L O F O R D I N A N C E S
Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the
provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief
executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page
thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned may
override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members,
thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.
The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian
within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a
municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.
Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of
all its members, be signed by the punong barangay.
88
V E T O A N D O V E R R I D E
The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the
sanggunian panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan on the ground
that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in
writing. The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or
80
Id. at Sec. 53.
81
Mun. of Paraaque vs. VM Realty Corp., G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998, 292 SCRA 678.
82
Id., citing Mascuana vs. Provincial Board of Negros Occidental, 79 SCRA 399, 405, October 18, 1977.
83
Id., citing Article 107, pars. a and c, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7160.
84
Lagcao vs. Labra, G.R. No. 155746, Oct. 13, 2004.
85
Id.
86
Id., citing Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157.
87
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title II, Chapter III, Sec. 54.
88
Id. at Sec. 55.

resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an
ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto
shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall
not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided;
otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year
corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted. The local chief
executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override
the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members,
thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief
executive concerned.
89
O R D I N A N C E R E V I E W
Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the
sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang
panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the
local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local
development councils. Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such
ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents
or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall,
within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang
panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered
by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision. If the sangguniang panlalawigan
finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance
or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its
action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of
the action it has taken. If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan
within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall
be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
90
E F F E C T I V I T Y O F O R D I N A N C E
Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the
resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the
same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a
bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall,
as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local
government unit concerned. The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the
posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the
provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous
places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval
thereof. The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in
Filipino or English and in the language understood by the majority of the people in the
local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such
fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting. The gist of
all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the
absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such
ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the
sanggunian of origin is situated. In the case of highly urbanized and independent
component cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or
adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of
general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or
resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.
89
Id. at Sec. 55.
90
Id. at Sec. 55.

1. Can a presiding officer vote? Yes, but only to break a

Presiding Officer tie. This Court is faced with an act clearly intended to
circumvent an express prohibition under the law a
situation that will not be condoned. 91 The LGC clearly limits the power of presiding
officers to vote only in case of a tie, to wit: Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-
governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan x x x. The
presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie. (b) In the event of inability of the
regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian session, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.
While acting as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio may not, at the same time, be
allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board member including that of voting even
when there is no tie to break. A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the
shoes of the presiding officer could not have greater power than that possessed by the
latter92 who can vote only in case of a tie. [Zamora vs. Caballero, et. al., G.R. No.
147767, Jan. 14, 2004].
2. Petitioners insist that the vice-mayor, as presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, should not be counted in determining whether a quorum exists since he is
not a member of the Sanggunian. Are petitioners correct? No. RA 7160 clearly states
that the Sangguniang Panlungsod shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding
officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng
mga barangay, the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members. Blacks Law Dictionary defines
composed of as formed of or consisting of. As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor
can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes when it matters the most,
that is, to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is mandated under Section
49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and
absurd situation where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian
session is not considered a member of the Sanggunian. [La Carlota City vs. Atty. Rojo,
G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012].
Quorum 3. What is quorum? Quorum is defined as that number of

members of a body which, when legally assembled in their proper
places, will enable the body to transact its proper business or that number which makes a
lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act.
Majority, when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half or
more than half of any total. In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in
computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the constitution
merely states that majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, Section 53 of the
LGC is more exacting as it requires that the majority of all members of the sanggunian . . .
elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum. [Zamora vs. Caballero, et. al., G.R.
No. 147767, Jan. 14, 2004].
4. Under Section 53 of the Local Government Code, a majority of all the members of
the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to
transact official business. How should elected and qualified be construed? The
difference in the wordings of the Constitution and the LGC is not merely a matter of style
and writing as respondents would argue, but is actually a matter of meaning and
intention. The qualification in the LGC that the majority be based on those elected and
qualified was meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof
have been proclaimed. And, while the intent of the legislature in qualifying the quorum
requirement was to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof
have been proclaimed and have assumed office, the provision necessarily applies when,
91
Perez v. Dela Cruz, 27 SCRA 587 (1969).
92
Ibid. at 602.

after all the members of the sanggunian have assumed office, one or some of its members
file for leave. What should be important then is the concurrence of election to and
qualification for the office. And election to, and qualification as member of, a local
legislative body are not altered by the simple expedient of filing a leave of absence.
[Zamora vs. Caballero, et. al., G.R. No. 147767, Jan. 14, 2004].
5. Petitioner challenged the validity of the acts of the Sanggunian of Compostela
Valley, alleging that while the Journal and Resolutions indicated the presence of 13
members, the Sanggunian nonetheless conducted official business without a quorum as
only seven of its fourteen members were actually present when the irrevocable letter of
resignation of Board Member Sotto was noted, and the motions to declare the entire
province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and to authorize the Governor to
enter into the Contract with the Allado Company were approved. Is the challenge
tenable? Yes. The determination of the existence of a quorum should be based on the
total number of members of the Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave of
absence by Board Member Sotto. The fear that a majority may, for reasons of political
affiliation, file leaves of absence in order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is
already addressed by the grant of coercive power to a mere majority of sanggunian
members present when there is no quorum.93 A sanggunian is a collegial body. The acts
of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions
aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null
and void. And all such acts cannot be given binding force and effect for they are
considered unofficial acts done during an unauthorized session. [Zamora vs. Caballero,
et. al., G.R. No. 147767, Jan. 14, 2004].
Vote Required 6. Can the local Sanggunian prescribe for vote requirement
higher than simple majority in the enactment of an
ordinance? Yes. Although the city charter provides that a simple majority is sufficient for
the enactment of an ordinance, local authorities may provide for a more stringent
requirement to attain the purpose of the law. The more stringent requirement, i.e. the
proviso that any amendment thereto must be approved by majority of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod, was imposed to forestall any attempt to reclassify the area as recreational
from residential pursuant to a zoning plan adopted under SP Resolution No. 49. [Casio
vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 449].
Approval/Veto 7. Does the mayor have the ministerial duty to approve a

Sanggunian resolution? The grant of veto power accords the
mayor the discretion to sustain a resolution or veto it. It is not a ministerial duty but a
power involving an exercise of discretion. [De los Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan, 281 SCRA
631].
8. Was the act of the provincial board in disapproving
Ordinance Review the municipal ordinance which allows moviehouses
within the 200-meter radius, valid? No. The
disapproval by the provincial board of the resolution is illegal, because it can disapprove
the resolution only if the resolution is beyond the power of the municipal council.
Moviehouses are not within the enumeration of the places of entertainment which cannot
be established within the 200 meters of public buildings, schools, hospitals and churches.
Night clubs, cabarets, bars, and saloons are prohibited within that area because they are
sources of boisterous behavior. Dancing schools, cockpits and bowling alleys are also
prohibited because of their noise. None of these conditions are present in the case of
moviehouses. [Velasco vs. Blas, 115 SCRA 540].
9. Can the implementation of a Sanggunian resolution

Judicial Review for the construction of the capitol building be enjoined
by the court? Yes. Respondents contention that the
construction of the capitol building cannot be enjoined in light of Malaga v. Penachos,
93
Section 53 (b), Local Government Code.

Jr.94 fails to convince. In Malaga, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No.
1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects,
the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law,
this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts. 95 This Court fails to see the essential difference
between Malaga and the instant case. In both cases, the defect in the Contract relates to
the non-compliance with the mandate of a law respecting requirements before validly
entering into a contract. In Malaga, the defect pertained to bidding. In the present case,
the alleged defect pertains to the required number of votes necessary to authorize the
Governor to enter into a construction contract. Clearly then, what is at issue in this case is
not the propriety or the wisdom of entering into the Contract for the construction of the
capitol building, which is beyond the power of this Court to enjoin, but the Sanggunians
compliance with the requirements prescribed under the LGC before it may grant the
Governor authority to enter into the Contract, which issue falls under the exception to the
proscription against injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, as held in
Malaga. [Zamora vs. Caballero, et. al., G.R. No. 147767, Jan. 14, 2004].
Invalid Ordinances 10. Cite some invalid ordinances?
The city ordinance of Manila, which required anyone who wanted to work in Manila
to obtain a mayors permit, is void because it does not contain any standards to guide
the issuance of permits. Requiring the permit from the mayor who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to the right of the people to engage in a means of
livelihood. [Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270].
The municipal ordinance of Urdaneta, which prescribed a speed limit for vehicular
traffic of twenty kilometers per hour through crowded streets approaching
intersections at blind corners, passing school zones or thickly populated areas, is
invalid. An essential requisite for an ordinance to be valid is that it must not
contravene the law. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, a municipal
council intending to regulate traffic is supposed to classify the streets first and mark
them with proper signs, with the approval of the Land Transportation
Commissioner. In this case, there is no showing that such approval was secured.
Besides the ordinances does not distinguish between passenger cars and motorcycles
on one hand and motor trucks and buses on the other hand. [Primicias vs.
Municipality of Urdaneta, 93 SCRA 462].
The city ordinance of Baguio, which declared all public lands occupied by squatters
as a city government housing project to be sold to them, is a patent nullity. No
disposition of public land can be made by the City of Baguio without prior legislative
authority. The law has given the Director of Lands the exclusive power of disposition
of public lands. [Baguio Citizens Association, Inc. vs. City Council, 121 SCRA
368].
The municipal ordinance of Mandaluyong, which authorized the removal of license
plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations, and the ordinance of the Metropolitan
Authority, which authorized the removal of the license plates of motor vehicles
which are unattended, illegally parked, or obstructing the flow of traffic --- are void
for they contravene the law. Presidential Decree No. 1605 does not allow the removal
of license plates for traffic violations. [Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila
Authority, 204 SCRA 837].
The municipal ordinance of Bayambang, which appointed private respondent as
manager of fisheries for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, under the condition
that he would pay the municipality 10% of the gross income which should not be less
94
213 SCRA 516 (1992).
95
Id. at 523-524.

than PHP200,000.00 annually --- is invalid. The ordinance is clearly against the
Fisheries Decree for it granted fishery privileges to private respondent without
benefit of public bidding. Moreover, under the law, the municipality may not
delegate to a private individual the use or disposition of the fisheries. Neither can
the municipality grant the exclusive privilege of fishing for a period of more than 5
years. [Terrado vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 373].
Ordinance No. 3353 of Cagayan de Oro City, which bans the operation of casinos
[operated by PAGCOR pursuant P.D. 1869] within its locality, is invalid as it
contravenes a national statute enacted by Congress of the Philippines. While the
Local Government Code authorized local government units to prevent gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, but gambling should be interpreted as referring
only to illegal gambling. The ordinance contravenes Presidential Decree No. 1869,
which authorized the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation to operate
casinos. PD No. 1869 should not be deemed to have been repealed by the Local
Government Code. Implied repeals are not lightly presumed. [Magtajas vs. Pryce
Properties Corp., 234 SCRA 255].
11. Can a city zoning ordinance impose a service fee and a fine or imprisonment? A
city ordinance which requires that before a subdivision plan is submitted for approval by
the Bureau of Lands or the Land Registration Commission it must first be submitted to the
city engineer who shall see to it that the zoning ordinance is observed, and which imposes
a service fee of PHP.30 per square meter of lot in subdivision plan, and a fine of PHP200 or
imprisonment of not exceeding six months, in case of its violation is ultra vires and is void.
It is an invalid exercise of police power delegated by the national legislature under the
general welfare clause. It suffers from the defect of violating delegated authority for
legislation by adding requirements to national laws. [Villacorta vs. Bernardo, G.R.
31239, Aug. 19, 1986].
BAR Questions
96
2 0 0 3 B A R Can the Liga ng mga Barangay exercise legislative power? Explain.
1 9 9 6 B A R (1) How does the local legislative assembly override the veto by the local
chief executive of an ordinance?
(2) On what grounds can a local chief executive veto an ordinance?
(3) How can an ordinance vetoed by a local chief executive become a law without it being
overridden by the local legislative assembly?
1987 BAR State whether or not the following city ordinances are valid and give
reasons in support of your answers:
(a) An ordinance prescribing the use of the local dialect as medium of instruction in the
primary grades;
(b) An ordinance on business establishments to raise funds for the construction and
maintenance of roads in private subdivisions, which roads are open for use by segments of
the public who may have business inside the subdivision.
(c) An ordinance prohibiting barbershop operators from rendering massage service to
their customers in a separate room.
1 9 8 8 B A R Tawi-Tawi is a predominantly Moslem province. The Governor, the Vice-

Governor, and members of its Sangguniang Panlalawigan are all Moslems. Its budget
provides the Governor with a certain amount as his discretionary funds. Recently,
96
In the case of Bitonon vs. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732 (2001), the Supreme Court ruled that the Liga ng Mga Barangay is not
a local government unit and its primary purpose is to determine representation of the liga in the sanggunians; to ventilate,
articulate, and crystallize issues affecting barangay government administration; and to secure solutions for them through
proper and legal means. It has no legislative powers.

however, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed a resolution appropriating PHP100,000.00
as a special discretionary fund of the Governor, to be spent by him in leading a pilgrimage
of his province mates to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, Islams holiest city. Philconsa, on
constitutional grounds, has filed suit to nullify the resolution of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan giving the special discretionary fund to the Governor for the stated purpose.
How would you decide the case? Give your reasons.
1 9 8 8 B A R Jose Y. Sabater is a real estate developer. He acquires raw lands and

converts them into subdivisions. After acquiring a lot of around 15 hectares in
Cabanatuan City, he caused the preparation of a subdivision plan for the property. Before
he was able to submit the subdivision plan to the Bureau of Lands and/or Land
Registration Commission for verification and/or approval, he was informed that he must
first present the plan to the City Engineer who would determine whether the zoning
ordinance of Cabanatuan City had been observed. He was surprised when he was asked to
pay the city government a service fee of P0.30 per square meter of land, covered by his
subdivision plan. He was even more surprised when informed that a fine of PHP200.00
and/or imprisonment for not exceeding six months or both, have been fixed in the
ordinance as a penalty for violation thereof. Believing that the city ordinance is illegal, he
filed suit to nullify the same. Decide the case with reasons.
1 9 9 1 B A R The municipality of Alcoy, Cebu passed Ordinance No. 10, series of 1991,
requiring owners, administrators, or tenants of buildings and premises to keep and
maintain them in sanitary condition, and should they fail to do so, cause them to be
cleared and kept in sanitary condition and the cost thereof to be assessed against the
owner, administrator or tenant, as the case may be, which cost shall constitute a lien
against the property. It further penalizes violation thereof with a fine not exceeding One
Thousand Pesos (1,000.00) or imprisonment for one (1) year at the discretion of the Court.
Is the ordinance valid?
2 0 0 9 B A R The Municipality of Bulalakaw, Leyte, passed Ordinance No. 1234,

authorizing the expropriation of two parcels of land situated in the poblacion as the site of
a freedom park, and appropriating the funds needed therefor. Upon review, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte disapproved the ordinance because the municipality
has an existing freedom park which, though smaller in size, is still suitable for the
purpose, and to pursue expropriation would be needless expenditure of the peoples
money. Is the disapproval of the ordinance correct? Explain your answer.

LIABILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
L ocal government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or
injury to persons or damage to property. 97 As provided in Article 2189 of R.A. 386,
otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, provinces, cities,
and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision. The extent of liability for damages
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delict.98
1. Are cities exempted from liability for damages or injuries arising from the failure of
their officers to enforce the provisions of their respective charters, or any other law or
ordinance? There is a common provision in the charters of all chartered cities in the
Philippines, with the exception of Dumaguete City, expressly exempting them from
liability for damages or injuries arising from the failure of their officers to enforce the
provisions of their respective charters, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence
of said officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. But this
exemption from civil liability may be waived by a chartered city. Where the city, by and
through its agents, appropriates funds and makes payment, its exemption from liability is
waived and it cannot bring an action to recover such amount paid. [City of Cebu vs.
Piccio, G.R. L-13012, Dec. 31, 1960].
2. Does the doctrine of respondeat superior apply to local government units? The
doctrine of respondeat superior or corporate liability for the negligence of torts of its
officers applies only where the government is engaged in proprietary or business
functions.99 When a municipality is engaged in governmental functions, as the
construction and maintenance of roads, the doctrine does not apply. The reason for such
exemption is that the government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the
infidelity of the officers and agents whom it employs, since that would involve in all its
operations endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses subversive of pubic interest.
The construction or maintenance of roads is admittedly a governmental activity and the
provincial government is not liable for the negligent act of its drivers while in the
performance of his duties as such. The prevailing rule in the law on municipal corpora-
tions is that a municipality is not liable for the torts committed by its regular employees in
the discharge of governmental functions. The municipality is answerable only when it is
acting in a proprietary capacity. [San Fernando vs. Firme, 195 SCRA 692].
BAR Questions
1 9 9 4 B A R Johnny was employed as a driver by the Municipality of Calumpit Bulacan.

While driving recklessly a municipal dump truck with its load of sand for the repair of
municipal streets, Johnny hit a jeepney. Two passengers of the jeepney were killed. The
Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance appropriating PHP300,000.00 as compensation
for the heirs of the victims.
(1) Is the municipality liable for the negligence of Johnny? Explain.
(2) Is the municipal ordinance valid? Explain.
2 0 0 9 B A R The Municipality of Pinatukdao is sued for damages arising from injuries

sustained by a pedestrian who was hit by a glass pane that fell from a dilapidated window
frame of the municipal hall. The municipality files a motion to dismiss the complaint,
invoking state immunity from suit. Resolve the motion with reasons.
97
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title I, Chapter II, Section 24.
98
Art. 471, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991.
99
Palafox vs. Ilocos Norte, G.R. L-10659, Jan. 31, 1958.

100
LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFIC IALS
T he governor, vice-governor, city mayor, city vice-mayor, municipal mayor,

municipal vice-mayor, and punong barangay shall be elected at large in their
respective units by the qualified voters therein. However, the sangguniang
kabataan chairman for each barangay shall be elected by the registered voters of the
katipunan ng kabataan. The regular members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan shall be elected by district, as may be
provided for by law. Sangguniang barangay members shall be elected at large. The
presidents of the leagues of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities
shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. The
presidents of the "liga ng mga barangay and the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan" elected by their respective chapters, shall serve as ex officio members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan. In addition
thereto, there shall be one (1) sectoral representative from the women, one (1) from the
workers, and one (1) from any of the following sectors: the urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, disabled persons, or any other sector as may be determined by the
sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days prior to the holding of the next local
elections as may be provided for by law.
Date of Election.101 - Unless otherwise provided by law, the elections for local
officials shall be held every three (3) years on the second Monday of May.
Term of Office.102 (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after
the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30,
1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay
officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections
immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon
of June 30, 1992.
No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected.
The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
Qualifications.103 An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age
on election day.
Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day.
100
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title II, Chapter I, Sec.39-43.
101
Id. at Sec. 42.
102
Id. at Sec. 43.
103
Id. at Sec. 49.

Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age
but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
Disqualifications.104 The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence.
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic.
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code.
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Qualification 1. Is the phrase not more than twenty-one years old the same
with less than twenty-two years old? The Local Government
Code provides that the maximum age of an elective sangguniang kabataan official is
twenty-one years on the date of his election. When the law speaks of years, it is
understood that years are of 365 days each. It means twenty-one 365 day cycles. The
phrase not more than twenty-one years old is not equivalent to less than twenty-two
years old. Thus, petitioner is disqualified for he was more than twenty-one years old.
Garrido vs. Sales, 271 SCRA 767].
2. When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,105 the Court ruled that the citizenship
qualification must be construed as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected
official and at the start of his term. Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, the Court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of
the filing of his application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared
that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The
retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified
by the Court. Republic Act No. 8171106 has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No.
725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born
Filipinos. The Courts ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation
retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for repatriation subsists for the same
reasons quoted above. Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he
filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty
position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was
cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying
104
Id. at Sec. 40.
105
257 SCRA 727 (1996).
106
Republic Act No. 8171 took effect on January 12, 1996.

petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. [Altajeros vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
163256, Nov. 10, 2004].
3. In his application for the immigrant visa, respondent
Disqualification stated that he would stay in the United States of America
permanently. The immigrant visa issued to him identified
s
him as a resident alien. His immigration to the US constituted an abandonment of his
residence in the Philippines. In accordance with Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, he is not qualified to run for public office. His act of filing a certificate of candidacy
did not amount to a waiver of his status as a permanent resident of the United States of
America. The waiver must be done by some prior act independent of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. [Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 229].
4. The Commission on Elections properly disqualified the respondent. There is no
evidence that she and her husband were maintaining separate residences. Rather,
respondent established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband. The fact that she
occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte did not signify an intention to continue her residence
there. The evidence also showed hat respondent is not a registered voter of Kananga,
Leyte. Respondent was supposed to have applied of her registration as voter in Ormoc
City but minutes indicated no revision made. The argument of respondent that the
charter of Ormoc City only prohibited the voters of Ormoc City from voting in the
election of the provincial officials of Leyte but did not disqualify them from running for
public offices is untenable. Independent component cities are those whose charters
prohibit their voters from electing elective provincial officials. Likewise, voters of
independent component cities are prohibited from running for an elective office of the
province where it is a part of. [Abella vs. Comelec, 201 SCRA 508].
5. For a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, intent to evade prosecution
or punishment must have been the motive for his flight from a particular jurisdiction.
There can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment where the fleeing person
knows of an instituted indictment or a promulgated judgment of conviction. Petitioner
left the United States almost five months before the filing of the complaint. It would
have been impossible for him to have known of the complaint at the time he left.
[Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, 259 SCRA 296].
6. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good faith. Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law involves moral
turpitude. A conviction thereof, even if he qualified for probation, is a valid basis to
disqualify the petitioner who ran for mayor. The only legal effect of probation is to
suspend the execution of the sentence. The petitioner of petitioner is subsistent. [De la
Torre vs. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483].
7. Even assuming arguendo that the conviction of respondent Ferdinand Marcos II
is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the failure to file an
income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The failure to file an income
tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the mere omission is already a
violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual. This
conclusion is supported by the provisions of the NIRC as well as previous Court decisions
which show that with regard to the filing of an income tax return, the NIRC considers
three distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2) a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax,
and (3) failure to file a return. [Republic vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 130371 & 130855, Aug. 4,
2009].
8. Does the three-term limitation apply to service by
Term Limits automatic succession, as in the case where the Vice Mayor
took over the position of Mayor which became
permanently vacant? In providing for term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so
on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of their election.
The constitutional intent is to cover only the term of office to which the local elective

officials may have been elected for purposes of the three-term limit, disregarding for this
purpose service by automatic succession. [Borja vs. Comelec, 295 SCRA 157].
9. Where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-
mayor by operation of law, is he qualified to run again (as his fourth term) as councilor?
Yes, he can. His assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as councilor
that would place him outside the operation of the three-term limit rule. The elective
official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by
operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that
effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule. [Montebon v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 50].
10. Whether or not a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive
terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality
into a city under a cityhood charter which provided that the elective officials of the
municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions
until elections were held for the new city officials? No, he cannot. The conversion of the
municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local
government post different from the office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of
the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of
voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same
inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years. [Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417
SCRA 601].
11. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run
for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that immediately followed his third
term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor.
Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates assumed the functions of the office, recall
proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn
filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his
disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to
the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of the three-term limit
rule. Is Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election? Yes. What the Constitution
prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms.
The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as
long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A
recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate reelection after the third term. Neither does the
Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is
a consecutive fourth term. [Socrates vs. Comelec, 440 Phil. 106 (2002)].
12. Whether or not the disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular
election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that
term? The assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is
not the term contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43
(b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). As the Court observed, there was a
break in the service of private respondent Ramon T. Talaga as mayor. For nearly two
years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term. He was a private citizen for a
time before running for mayor in the recall elections. [Adormeo vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90].
13. Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007 term is
not his fourth because his second term, July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 to which he was
elected and which he served, may not be counted since his proclamation was declared
void by the RTC, Branch 57 of Angeles City. Is Morales correct? He is wrong. Morales
was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position and served
as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the
Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him as

mayor. As held in Ong v. Alegre,107 such circumstance does not constitute an interruption
in serving the full term. Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June
30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. Morales
maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a caretaker of the office
or as a de facto officer. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its
purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms.
Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him to stay on indefinitely. [Rivera vs.
Morales, G.R. 167591, May 9, 2007].
14. Does the conversion of a municipality to a city interrupt the three (3) term
limitations of a Punong Barangay? No. While it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the
municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby
abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said
that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the
office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now
be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of Punong Barangay
of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the
barangay are the same. They are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their
Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and
authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt
Lacedas term. In Latasa v. Commission on Elections, 108 which involved a similar question,
this Court held that where a person has been elected for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such three-year term the
municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the city charter interrupting
his term until the end of the three-year term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from
running for the fourth time as city mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity
of the terms. [Laceda vs. Limena, G.R. 182867, Nov. 25, 2008, 571 SCRA 603].
15. What does interruption involve? The interruption of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his
office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to
be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully
served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and standard of what
does not constitute an interruption. Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by
operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term, as
we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an
effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at
least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is
simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
[Aldovino vs. Comelec, G.R. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009].
16. Was Asilos 2004-2007 term interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed
preventive suspension in 2005? No. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve
an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-
term limitation. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because
the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator
of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement
and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. To allow a
preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close
our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by
equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption
107
G.R. Nos. 163295 & 163354, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473.
108
G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601.

of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. An interruption occurs when the
term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot
be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holders
term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons
established by law. [Aldovino vs. Comelec, G.R. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009],
17. Who has the power to fix the term of barangay officials as well as the application
of the three-term limit? The Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 8
show that the authority of Congress to legislate relates not only to the fixing of the term of
office of barangay officials, but also to the application of the three-term limit. Congress
has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the
duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the application to them of a
consecutive term limit. Congress invariably exercised this authority when it enacted no
less than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987. Through all these statutory changes,
Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of the term of office of barangay
officials and their term limitation. [Comelec vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 186616, Nov. 20, 2009].
18. Is the three term limitation, a limitation on the right to run for the same elective
office or the right to serve after winning? Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code
requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election.
Thus, Section 74 states that the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing is
eligible for said office. The three-term limit rule was enacted to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorates freedom of choice.109
After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election because
he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not
eligible for [the] office. As used in Section 74, the word eligible means having the
right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the
ineligibilities to run for the public office. [Aratea vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 195229, Oct. 9,
2012].
BAR Questions
2005 BAR In the May 8, 1995 elections for local officials whose terms were to
commence on June 30, 1995, Ricky filed on March 20, 1995 his certificate of candidacy for
the Office of Governor of Laguna. He won, but his qualifications as an elected official was
questioned. It is admitted that he is a repatriated Filipino citizen and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. To be qualified for the office to which a local official has been
elected, when at the latest should he be: (a) A Filipino Citizen? Explain. (b) A resident of
the locality? Explain.
2005 BAR Manuel was elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tuba in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998. He fully served his first two terms, and during his third term, the
municipality was converted into the component City of Tuba. The said charter provided
for a hold-over and so without interregnum Manuel went on to serve as the Mayor of the
City of Tuba. In the 2001 elections, Manuel filed his certificate of candidacy for City
Mayor. He disclosed, though, that he had already served for three consecutive terms as
elected Mayor when Tuba was still a municipality. He also stated in his certificate of
candidacy that he is running for the position of Mayor for the first time now that Tuba is a
city. Reyes, an adversary, ran against Manuel and petitioned that he be disqualified
because he had already served for three consecutive terms as Mayor. The petition was not
timely acted upon, and Manuel was proclaimed the winner with 20,000 votes over the
10,000 votes received by Reyes as the only other candidate. It was only after Manuel took
his oath and assumed office that the COMELEC ruled that he was disqualified for having
ran and served for three consecutive terms.
109
Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 356 Phil. 467 (1998).

(a) As lawyer of Manuel, present the possible arguments to prevent his
disqualification and removal.
(b) How would you rule on whether or not Manuel is eligible to run as Mayor of the
newly-created City of Tuba immediately after having already served for three (3)
consecutive terms as Mayor of the Municipality of Tuba?
(c) Assuming that Manuel is not an eligible candidate, rebut Reyes claim that he
should be proclaimed as winner having received the next higher number of votes.
2 0 0 8 B A R Abdul ran and won in the May 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections for Vice-
Governor of Tawi-Tawi. After being proclaimed Vice-Governor in the 2004 elections, his
opponent, Khalil, filed an election protest before the Commission on Election. Ruling with
finality on the protest, the COMELEC declared Khalil as the duly elected Vice-Governor
though the decision was promulgated only in 2007, when Abdul had fully served his 2004-
2007 term and was in fact already on his 2007-2010 term as Vice Governor. Abdul now
consults you if the can still run for Vice-Governor of Tawi-Tawi in the forthcoming May
2010 election on the premise that he could not be considered as having served as Vice-
Governor from 2004-2007 because he was not duly elected to the post, as he assumed
office merely as a presumptive winner and that presumption was later overturned when
COMELEC decided with finality that had lost in the May 2004 elections. What will be your
advice?
2 0 1 1 B A R Alfredo was elected municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms. During his
third term, the municipality became a city. Alfredo ran for city mayor during the next
immediately succeeding election. Voltaire sought his disqualification citing the 3 term
limit for elective officials. Will Voltaire's action prosper?
(A) No, the 3 term limit should not apply to a person who is running for a new position
title.
(B) Yes, the 3 term limit applies regardless of any voluntary or involuntary interruption in
the service of the local elective official.
(C) Yes, the 3 term limit uniformly applies to the office of mayor, whether for city or
municipality.
(D) No, the 3 term limit should not apply to a local government unit that has assumed a
different corporate existence.
2 0 1 1 B A R Adela served as Mayor of Kasim for 2 consecutive terms. On her third term,
COMELEC ousted her in an election protest that Gudi, her opponent, filed against her.
Two years later, Gudi faced recall proceedings and Adela ran in the recall election against
him. Adela won and served as Mayor for Gudi's remaining term. Can Adela run again for
Mayor in the next succeeding election without violating the 3 term limit?
(A) No, she won the regular mayoralty election for two consecutive terms and the recall
election constitutes her third term.
(B) No, she already won the mayoralty election for 3 consecutive terms.
(C) Yes, her ouster from office in her third term interrupted the continuity of her service
as mayor.
(D) Yes, the fresh mandate given her during the recall election erased her disqualification
for a third term.
Does the service of a term less than the full three years considered as full service of
the term for purposes of the three term limit rule?
Abundo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, Jan. 8, 2013
By using his foreign passport after renouncing his foreign citizenship, is a dual
citizen divested of his Filipino citizenship and, thus, disqualified to hold public
office?
Maquiling vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, Apr. 16, 2013
Will a landslide election victory override eligibility requirements?
Arnado vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 210164, Aug. 18, 2015

110
VACANCIES AND S UCCES SION
I f a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or
vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-
governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office
shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking
as defined herein. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the
highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay. A tie
between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the
drawing of lots.
Permanent Vacancy. A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official
fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.
Unexpired Term. The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired
terms of their predecessors.
Ranking. Ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.
S A N G G U N I A N V A C A N C I E S
Where automatic succession does not apply,
permanent vacancies in the sanggunian shall be filled by appointment in the following
manner: 111
The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities. The governor, in the case of the sangguniang
panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan. The city or municipal
mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the
sangguniang barangay concerned.
Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under
which the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to
the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be
appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the
same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and
shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein
mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the
highest official of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any
appointment without such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab
initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official responsible
therefore.
In case or permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of
the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. In case of
vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said
110
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title II, Chapter II, Sections 44-47.
111
Id. at Sec.45.

vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the organization
concerned.
112
T E M P O R A R Y V A C A N C I E S
When the governor, city or municipal mayor, or
punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal
reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from
office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking
sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the powers and perform the
duties and functions of the local chief executive concerned, except the power to appoint,
suspend, or dismiss employees which can only be exercised if the period of temporary
incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days.
Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate
sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he
has reported back to office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal
causes, the local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents
showing that said legal causes no longer exist.
When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside
his territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3) consecutive days, he
may designate in writing the officer-in-charge of the said office. Such authorization
shall specify the powers and functions that the local official concerned shall exercise
in the absence of the local chief executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or
dismiss employees.
In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to
issue such authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the
highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be, shall have the
right to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the said office on the fourth
(4th) day of absence of the said local chief executive.
Except as provided above, the local chief executive shall in no case authorize any
local official to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the office, other than the
vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member, as the case may be.
L E A V E O F A B S E N C E
Whenever the application for leave of absence is not acted
upon within five (5) working days after receipt thereof, the application for leave of absence
shall be deemed approved. Leaves of absence of local elective officials shall be approved
as follows: 113
Leaves of absence of the governor and the mayor of a highly urbanized city or an
independent component city shall be approved by the President or his duly
authorized representative;
Leaves of absence of vice-governor or a city or municipal vice-mayor shall be
approved by the local chief executive concerned: Provided, That the leaves of
absence of the members of the sanggunian and its employees shall be approved by
the vice-governor or city or municipal vice-mayor concerned;
Leaves of absence of the component city or municipal mayor shall be approved by
the governor; and
Leaves of absence of a punong barangay shall be approved by the city or municipal
mayor: Provided, That leaves of absence of sangguniang barangay members shall be
approved by the punong barangay.
112
Id. at Sec.46.
113
Id. at Sec.46.

1. Petitioners argument that he should have been the one designated as acting vice-
governor because he obtained the highest number of votes from those who actually voted
is untenable. The law is clear that the ranking of senior Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Member shall be determined on the basis of the total number of registered voters in each
district.114 [Victoria vs. 229 SCRA 269].
2. Under paragraph (a) Section 45 of the Local Government Code, it is the governor
who fills any permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan by appointment. The
appointee should be nominated by the political party to which the member of the
Sangguniang Bayan to be replaced belongs. In case the member of the Sangguniang Bayan
does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive should appoint a qualified
person to fill the vacancy upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang Bayan concerned.
While the petitioner was appointed by the Governor, he was not recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan. And although the respondent was recommended by the Sangguniang
Bayan, he was appointed by the Mayor. Neither the petitioner nor the respondent is
entitled to the vacant seat. [Farias vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396].
3. A vice-governor does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title, as such,
vice-governor by merely becoming an acting governor but for purposes of exercising the
legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed a non-member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for the time being. [Gamboa vs. Aguirre, G.R. 134213, July 20, 1999].
4. Since the Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in case of
temporary vacancy in the position of Vice-Governor, because of the exigencies of public
service, the President, through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may
extend temporary appointment. The contention that it is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
which should make the appointment has no merit. As between the President, who has
supervision over local governments, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
who are junior to the vice governor, the former should prevail. Even if the President had
no power to appoint petitioner, at the very least he is a de facto officer and is entitled to
compensation. [Monzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251].
BAR Questions
1995 BAR
The Vice Mayor of a municipality filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same office in the last elections. The Municipal Mayor was also running for re-election.
Both were official candidates of the same political party. After the last day for the filing of
the certificates of candidacy, the Mayor died. Under these facts
(a) Can the Vice Mayor succeed to the office of the Mayor pursuant to the provisions of
the Local Government Code? Explain.
(b) Assuming that the Vice Mayor succeeds to the position of Mayor after the incumbent
died, which position is now different from the one for which he has filed his certificate of
candidacy, can he still continue to run as Vice Mayor? Explain.
(c) Is there any legal impediment to the Vice Mayor to replace the re-electionist Mayor
who died? Explain.
2 0 0 2 B A R A vacancy occurred in the sangguniang bayan of a municipality when X, a

member, died. X did not belong to any political party. To fill up the vacancy, the
provincial governor appointed A upon the recommendation of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. On the other hand, for the same vacancy, the municipal mayor appointed B
114
Section 44, R.A. 7160.

upon the recommendation of the sangguniang bayan. Which of these appointments is
valid? Explain.
2002 BAR Suppose A, a Municipal Mayor, went on a sick leave to undergo medical
treatment for a period of four (4) months. During that time (a) will B, the Municipal
Vice-Mayor, be performing executive functions? Why? (b) will B at the same time be also
performing legislative functions as presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan? Why?
2 0 0 8 B A R On August 8, 2008 the Governor of Bohol died and Vice-Governor Cesar

succeeded him by operation of law. Accordingly, Benito, the highest ranking member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was elevated to the position of Vice-Governor. By the
elevation of Benito to the office of Vice-Governor, a vacancy in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan was created. How should the vacancy be filed? Explain.
Will the Vice Mayor succeed under the law on succession as provided for in Sec. 44
of the Local Government Code?
Talaga vs. Alcala, G.R. Nos. 196804 & 197015, Oct. 11, 2012

115
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
A n elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office on

any of the following grounds: (a) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (b)
culpable violation of the Constitution; (c) dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in
office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) commission of any offense involving
moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor; (e) abuse of authority;
(f) unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan,
and sangguniang barangay; (g) application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or
residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and, (h) such other grounds as
may be provided in this Code and other laws. 116 An elective local official may be removed
from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. 117
Form and Filing.118 A verified complaint against any erring local elective official
shall be prepared as follows: (a) A complaint against any elective official of a
province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city
shall be filed before the Office of the President; (b) A complaint against any elective
official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose
decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and (c) A complaint against
any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.
Notice and Hearing.119 Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is
filed, the Office of the President or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be,
shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof, and commence the investigation of the case within ten (10) days
after receipt of such answer of the respondent. When the respondent is an elective
official of a province or highly urbanized city, such hearing and investigation shall be
conducted in the place where he renders or holds office. For all other local elective
officials, the venue shall be the place where the sanggunian concerned is located.
However, no investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days immediately prior to
any local election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said
period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day period
immediately preceding local election, it shall be deemed automatically lifted upon
the start of aforesaid period.
Preventive Suspension.120 Preventive suspension may be imposed: (1) By the
President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or
an independent component city; (2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective
official of a component city or municipality; or (3) By the mayor, if the respondent is
an elective official of the barangay.
Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is
great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective
officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the
event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he
cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single
115
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title II, Chapter IV, Sections 60-68.
116
Id. at Sec. 60.
117
Id.
118
Id. at Sec. 61.
119
Id. at Sec. 62.
120
Id. at Sec. 63-64.

year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.
Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall
be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the time he was formally notified of the case against him.
However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect, or
request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of termination of the case.
Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized
as abuse of authority.
The respondent official preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary
or compensation during such suspension; but upon subsequent exoneration and
reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or compensation including such
emoluments accruing during such suspension.
Rights of Respondent.121 The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to
appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the
production of documentary process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
Form and Notice of Decision.122 The investigation of the case shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from the start thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end
of the investigation, the Office of the President or the sanggunian concerned shall
render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for
such decision. Copies of said decision shall immediately be furnished the respondent
and all interested parties. The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired
term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense,
nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as
long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. The penalty of removal
from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall be considered a bar to
the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position.
Administrative Appeals.123 Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty
(30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following: (a) The sangguniang
panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod of component
cities and the sangguniang bayan; and (b) The Office of the President, in the case of
decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities. Decisions of the Office of
the President shall be final and executory.
Execution Pending Appeal.124 An appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been
placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event
he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be
paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.
1. Under Administrative Order No. 23, in case of administrative complaints against

elective provincial and city officials, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government is the
investigating authority and may act by himself or through an investigating committee. As
the disciplinary authority, the President has the power to investigate complaints.
Administrative Order No. 23 delegates the power to investigate. This is not undue
121
Id. at Sec. 65.
122
Id. at Sec. 66.
123
Id. at Sec. 67.
124
Id. at Sec. 68.

delegation. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
Moreover, the power of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government to investigate is
based on the alter ego principle. [Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279].
2. The denial of the motion of petitioner for a formal investigation is erroneous. His
right to a formal investigation is spelled out in Administrative Order No. 23. He has the
right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, the right to confront the
witnesses against him and the right to compulsory attendance of witnesses and the
production of documentary evidence. The right of petitioner to a formal investigation was
not satisfied when the complaint was decided on the basis of position papers. [Joson vs.
Torres, 290 SCRA 279].
3. Under the Local Government Code, complaints against elective city officials should
be filed with the Secretary of Local Government, and it is the Secretary of Local
Government, not the provincial Governor, who may impose a preventive suspension. The
order of preventive suspension issued by respondent Governor is, therefore, void.
[Regidor vs. Chiongbian, 173 SCRA 507].
4. While it may be true that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan voted five-to-three to hold
the respondent mayor administratively liable, but the so-called decision that embodied
the voting was only signed by one of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The
decision signed by one member cannot be regarded as the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority. The subsequent voting of
seven-to-two that absolved the respondent mayor and which was reduced into writing and
signed by the members taking part in the decision should be the one considered as the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. [Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616].
5. Under Section 66 of the Local Government Code, the penalty of suspension should
not exceed the unexpired terms of the respondent or six months for every administrative
offense. The suspension imposed for each offense did not exceed six months and there a
was provision that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the
unexpired term of the petitioners. Their suspension did not amount to removal from
office [Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55].
6. While it is true that under Section 66 of the Local Government Code, those who are
removed from office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from running for
any elective local position, but the removal of respondent as deputy sheriff happened in
1981. The Local Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992. Statutes are not to be
construed as intended to have a retroactive effect unless such intent is expressly declared
or clearly implied. [Grego vs. Commission on Election, 274 SCRA 481].
7. Petitioner should have appealed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
which absolved respondent Mayor to the Office of the President as provided for under
Section 67 (b) of the Local Government Code. Certiorari is not available if there is an
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. [Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA
616].
8. Administrative Order No. 18 issued on February 12, 1987, which authorizes the Office
of the President to stay execution of a decision pending appeal, was not repealed by the
Local Government Code, for they are not inconsistent with each other. It cannot be
inferred from Section 68 of the Local Government Code that reviewing officials are
deprived of authority to order a stay of the appealed decision. The provision may be
construed as giving such discretion to the reviewing officials. [Berces vs. Guingona, 241
SCRA 639].
9. Under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension may be
imposed (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of
the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence. Issues are considered joined when the complaint has been
answered and there are no longer any substantial preliminary issues that remain to be

threshed out.125 It would thus appear that the grounds cited by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for recommending the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas were just
general statements unsupported by any evidence. This is contrary to the requisites for a
preventive suspension which require that evidence of guilt must be strong and that given
the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. The haste in issuing the resolution recommending the
preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas is unreasonable considering the gravity of the
effects of such suspension. Suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have voted into office. [Gov. Joson vs.
Vargas, G.R. No. 160652, Feb. 13, 2006].
1o. The re-election of petitioner operates as a condonation of the misconduct during
his previous term, and offenses committed during a previous term furnish no cause for
removal. Each term is separate from other terms. 126 [Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 241 SCRA
639].
The penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public
officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct. An elective officials re-
election serves as a condonation to a previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right
to remove him therefor. Court may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to
have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect them to
officers. [Pascual vs. Prov. Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466].
A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during
a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore.
The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against
petitioner.127 [Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768].
A reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for
misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding
is that when the electorate put him back into office, its presumed that it did so with
full knowledge of his life and character, including his past conduct. If, armed with
such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds. [Mayor Alvin Garcia vs. Mojica, G.R. No.
139043, Sept. 10, 1999].
Does the condonation doctrine apply to administrative infraction of re-appointed
public officer? No, the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials
since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise. [Civil Service
Commission vs. Sojor, 577 Phil. 52, 72 (2008)].
Is the condonation doctrine still a valid doctrine? This Court simply finds no legal
authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. It was a doctrine
adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from
and now rendered obsolete by the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high
time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from
Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima,
Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
[Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015].
125
A. Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key To National Development, 177 (1993).
126
See also Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616 and Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55.
127
People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. 132875-76, Feb. 3, 2000.

128
RECALL
T
he power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters
of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject of recall
belongs. Recall process may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by
the registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective
official subject to such recall belongs. There shall be a preparatory recall assembly [PRA]
in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be composed of the
following: (1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities; (2) City level. - All punong barangay and
sanggunian barangay members in the city; (3) Legislative District level. - In case where
sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials
in the district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are elected by
district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and (4) Municipal level. - All
punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.
PRA Initiation.129 A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may
convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceedings against any
elective official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or
municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a
majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its
session called for the purpose.
Voters Initiation.130 Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay
official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent
(25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit
concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was
elected.
A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his
representative, and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and a
representative of the official sought to be recalled and, and in a public place in the
province, city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the
COMELEC through its office in the local government unit concerned. The
COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall cause the publication of the
petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10)
days nor more than twenty (20) days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity
and genuineness of the petition and the required percentage of voters.
Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized
representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and
thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the
official sought to be recalled.
Election on Recall.131 Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall with
the appropriate local office of the COMELEC, the Commission or its duly authorized
representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall not be later
than thirty (30) days after the filing of the resolution or petition for recall in the case
of the barangay, city, or municipal officials. and forty-five (45) days in the case of
provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall automatically
be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions
and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
128
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title II, Chapter V, Sections 69-75.
129
Id. at Sec. 70.
130
Id.
131
Id. at Sec. 71.

Effectivity of Recall.132 The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only
upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate
receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the
official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him
is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
Prohibition and Limitations.133 The elective local official sought to be recalled
shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress. Any elective
local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office
for loss of confidence. No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election.
Recall Election Expenses.134 All expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne
by the COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for the
conduct of recall elections.
1. Only a petition of at least twenty-five percent of the total number of registered

voters may validly initiate recall proceedings. The Comelec order approving the recall
petition signed by one respondent and directing the signing by the other qualified voters
to garner 25% of the total registered voters, is therefore void. [Angobung vs. Comelec,
269 SCRA 245].
2. While it may be true that the initiation of recall proceedings were commenced by
the Liga ng Mga Barangay, which is not an organization of barangay captains and
kagawads, but it just so happened that the personalities representing the barangay in the
Liga ng mga Barangay were also members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. The
Punong Barangays and the Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as
members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and not as members of the Liga ng mga
Barangay. [Malonzo vs. Comelec, 269 SCRA 380].
3. The intent of Section 74 of the Local Government Code is to subject a local elective
official to recall election once during his term. To interpret the phrase regular local
election to include the Sangguniang Kabataan election will unduly circumscribe the
provision on recall. If the Sangguniang Kabataan election will be held every three years,
no recall election can be conducted. The phrase regular election should be construed as
referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested. [Jariol vs. Comelec, 270 SCRA 255].
BAR Questions
2002 BAR
Suppose the people of the province want to recall the provincial governor
before the end of his three-year term of office,
(a) On what grounds can the provincial governor be recalled?
(b) How will the recall be initiated?
(c) When will the recall of an elective official be considered effective?
Was there legal and factual bases for the Comelec in cancelling the recall election
in Puerto Princesa for lack of funds?
Goh vs. Bayron & Comelec, G.R. No. 212584, Nov. 25, 2014
132
Id. at Sec. 72.
133
Id. at Sec. 73-74.
134
Id. at Sec. 75.

135
HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT
E very local government unit shall design and implement its own organizational
structure and staffing pattern taking into consideration its service requirements
and financial capability, subject to the minimum standards and guidelines
prescribed by the Civil Service Commission. The chief executive of every local
government unit shall be responsible for human resources and development in his unit
and shall take all personnel actions in accordance with the Constitutional provisions on
civil service, pertinent laws, and rules and regulations thereon, including such policies,
guidelines and standards as the Civil Service Commission may establish: Provided, That
the local chief executive may employ emergency or casual employees or laborers paid on a
daily wage or piecework basis and hired through job orders for local projects authorized
by the sanggunian concerned, without need of approval or attestation by the Civil Service
Commission: Provided, further, That the period of employment of emergency or casual
laborers as provided in this Section shall not exceed six (6) months.
Limitation. No person shall be appointed in the career service of the local

government if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
to the appointing or recommending authority.
Compensation. The compensation of local officials and personnel shall be
determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That the increase in
compensation of elective local officials shall take effect only after the terms of office
of those approving such increase shall have expired: Provided, further, That the
increase in compensation of the appointive officials and employees shall take effect
as provided in the ordinance authorizing such increase: Provided, however, That said
increases shall not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations for personal
services provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided, finally, That such
compensation may be based upon the pertinent provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-seven fifty-eight (R.A. No 6758), otherwise known as the
"Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989". The punong barangay, the
sangguniang barangay member, the sangguniang kabataan chairman, the barangay
treasurer, and the barangay secretary shall be entitled to such compensation,
allowances, emoluments, and such other privileges as provided under Title One Book
III of this Code. Elective local officials shall be entitled to the same leave privileges
as those enjoyed by appointive local officials, including the cumulation and
commutation thereof.
Resignation. Resignation of an elective official shall be deemed effective only upon
acceptance by the following: (1) the President, in the case of governors, vice-
governors, mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities; (2) the governor, in the case of the municipal mayors, municipal
vice-mayors, city mayors and city vice-mayors of component cities; (3) the
sanggunian concerned, in the case of sanggunian members; (4) the city mayor, in the
case of barangay officials.
Profession. All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives. Doctors of medicine may practice their
profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency:
Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom. Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That
sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
135
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title III, Sections 76-97.

Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party;
Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office.
Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and
Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the government.
Partisan Political Activity. No local official or employee in the career civil service
shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any
election, initiative, referendum, plebiscite, or recall, except to vote, nor shall he use
his official authority or influence to cause the performance of any political activity by
any person or body. He may, however, express his views on current issues, or
mention the names of certain candidates for public office whom he supports.
Elective local officials may take part in partisan political and electoral activities, but
it shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or
subject these subordinates to any of the prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election
Code.
Political Lame Ducks, etc. No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no elective or appointive local official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Additional or Double Compensation. No elective or appointive local official or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless
specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of Congress, any
present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect
compensation.
1. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed against the city engineer is in effect a
complaint against the city, who was the real employer of the dismissed employees. A
judgment against the city engineer would actually be a judgment against the city. By
serving as counsel of the dismissed employees, petitioner who is a city councilor violated
the prohibition against representing interests adverse to the city. [Javellana vs. DILG,
G.R. 102549, Aug. 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 475].
2. Section 90, R.A. 7160, insofar as it allows Sangguniang members to practice their
professions and engage in any occupation [or teach in schools] except during session
hours, is valid and constitutional. The Local Government Code does not trench upon the
power of the Supreme Courts authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. It simply
prescribes rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the
discharge of their duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances
where the law allows it. [Javellana vs. DILG, G.R. 102549, Aug. 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 475].
3. Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was no quorum
when her letter of irrevocable resignation was noted by the Sanggunian. For the same
reason, Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 are of no legal effect. Even assuming arguendo that
there were indeed thirteen members present during the questioned February 26, 2001
session, Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under state
of calamity is still null and void because the motion for its approval was approved by only
six members. When there are thirteen members present at a session, the vote of only six

members can not, at any instance, be deemed to be in compliance with Section 107(g) 136 of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC which requires the concurrence of the
approval by the majority of the members present and the existence of a quorum in order
to validly enact a resolution. The motion to grant the Governor authority to enter into the
construction contract is also deemed not approved in accordance with the law even if it
received seven affirmative votes, which is already the majority of thirteen, due to the
defect in the seventh vote. For as priorly stated, as the Journal confirms, after all six
members voted in the affirmative, Board Member Osorio, as acting presiding officer,
relinquished his seat to Board Member Arafol and thereafter cast his vote as a member in
favor of granting authority to the Governor. [Zamora vs. Gov. Caballero, G.R. No.
147767, Jan. 14, 2004].
4. Does Manila Ordinance No. 8040, which authorized the conferment to the former
three-term councilors retirement and gratuity pay remuneration, a valid exercise of the
powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod? No. The gratuity pay remuneration is excessive
and tantamount to double and additional compensation. This cannot be justified by the
mere fact that the awardees have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Neither can it be justified that the reward is given as a gratuity at the end of the
last term of the qualified elective official. The fact remains that the remuneration is
equivalent to everything that the awardees received during the entire period that he
served as such official. Indirectly, their salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they
receive half of them at the end of their last term. The IRR of RA 7160 reproduced the
Constitutional provision that no elective or appointive local official or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law,
nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title
of any kind from any foreign government. [Veloso vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, Sept. 6,
2011].
Does the City of General Santos have the power to streamline and reorganize its
local government bureaucrat as well as the authority to create a separate or
supplementary retirement benefit plan?
City of General Santos vs. COA, G.R. No. 199439. April 22, 2014
136
Article 107. Ordinances and Resolutions. The following rules shall govern the enactment of ordinances and resolutions:
(g) No ordinance of resolution passed by the sanggunian in a regular or special session duly called for the purpose shall be
valid unless approved by a majority of the members present, there being quorum. x x x (Italics in the original.
Emphasis supplied)

137
SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES
B
oundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably. To this end: 138
Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.
Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned.
Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the province
concerned.
Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and
a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall
be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60)
days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to
that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian
concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the
certification referred to above.
139
A P P E A L Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party
may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the
appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed
area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
1. Although R.A. 522 is clear as to which territories shall belong to the each
municipality, the law is silent, however, as to the specifications of the boundary line which
will separate the two municipalities. And the law vested the right to settle boundary
disputes between municipalities on the provincial board pursuant to Section 2167 of the
Revised Administrative Code. [Municipality of Sogod vs. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632].
2. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local
unit cannot be overemphasized. The Supreme Court takes judicial notice, however, to the
fact that Congress has refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land
areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. [Mariano vs.
Comelec, 242 SCRA 211].
3. The Regional Trial Court correctly ordered a relocation survey to determine to which
municipality the barangays in question belong. The agreement between he two
municipalities is invalid if the effect would be to amend the area of the Municipality of
Sinacoban as described in Executive Order No. 258. The power of the provincial boards to
settle boundary disputes is limited to implementing the law creating a municipality. Any
137
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title IX, Chapter I, Sections 118-119.
138
Id. at Sec. 118.
139
Id. at Sec. 119.

alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not implementation but
amendment of the law.140 [Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, 265 SCRA 182].
4. Who has jurisdiction to resolve a boundary dispute between a municipality and an
independent component city? Section 118 of the Local Government Code applies to a
situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute
with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is
a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure
referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them. Since there is no legal provision
specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes between a municipality and an
independent component city, it follows that regional trial courts have the power and the
authority to hear and determine such controversy. [Municipality of Kananga vs. City of
Ormoc, G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003].
BAR Questions
2005 BAR There was a boundary dispute between Dueas, a municipality, and Passi,
an independent component city, both of the same province. State how the two local
government units should settle their boundary dispute.
140
President Elpidio Quirino issued Executive Order No. 258 creating the Municipality of Sinacoban. On the basis of the
technical description of its territory in Executive Order No. 258, the Municipality of Sinacoban claimed a portion of a
barangay and four barangays as part of its territory. The adjoining Municipality of Jimenez claimed the same area on the
basis of an earlier agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacoban which fixed their boundary and which was approved
by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. The Regional Trial Court ordered a relocation survey.

141
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
L ocal initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. 142 Local
referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local
government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the
sanggunian.143 The power of local initiative and referendum may be exercised by all
registered voters of the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.144
Local Initiative Procedure.145 Not less than one thousand (1,000) registered voters
in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty
(50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the sanggunian concerned
proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment of an ordinance.
If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned within thirty
(30) days from its presentation, the proponents, through their duly authorized and
registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice
thereof to the sanggunian concerned. The proposition shall be numbered serially
starting from Roman numeral I. The COMELEC or its designated representative
shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition. Two (2) or more
propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
Proponents shall have ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60)
days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice
mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures. (f)
The petition shall be signed before the election registrar. or his designated
representatives, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the sanggunian concerned in a public place in the local
government unit, as the case may be. Stations for collecting signatures may be
established in as many places as may be warranted.
Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the COMELEC, through its office in
the local government unit concerned, shall certify as to whether or not the required
number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number
defeats the proposition. If the required number of signatures is obtained, the
COMELEC shall then set a date for the initiative during which the proposition shall
be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for
their approval within sixty (60) days from the date of certification by the
COMELEC, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of provinces and cities,
forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results
thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the COMELEC.
Effectivity of Local Proposition.146 If the proposition is approved by a majority of
the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the COMELEC
as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the sanggunian and local chief
executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is
considered defeated.
Limitations on Local Initiative.147 The power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year. Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters
141
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title IX, Chapter II, Sections 120-127.
142
R.A. No. 7160, Book I, Title IX, Chapter II, Sec. 120.
143
Id at Sec. 126.
144
Id. at Sec. 121.
145
Id. at Sec. 122.
146
Id. at Sec. 123.
147
Id. at Sec. 124.

which are within the legal powers of the sanggunian to enact. If at any time before
the initiative is held, the sanggunian concerned adopts in toto the proposition
presented and the local chief executive approves the same, the initiative shall be
cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for
initiative in the manner herein provided.
Limitations upon Sanggunians.148 Any proposition or ordinance approved
through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be
repealed, modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned within six (6) months
from the date of the approval thereof, and may be amended, modified or repealed by
the sanggunian within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all
its members: Provided, That in case of barangays, the period shall be eighteen (18)
months after the approval thereof.
1. In delineating the scope of an initiative or referendum, Section 32, Article VI of

the Constitution includes any act of a local legislative body. The Constitution includes not
only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of local initiative. Section 3 (6) of
Republic Act No. 6735 expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiative on local
legislations. Section 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 includes all matters within
the legal powers of the Sanggunian to enact in the scope of initiative. This includes the SB
Resolution of Morong which resolved to be include Morong in the Subic Special Economic
Zone under R.A. 7227, and which is the subject of petitioners initiative for repeal. [Garcia
vs. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279].
2. The process started by respondents was an initiative, but the Comelec made
preparations for referendum. A referendum is different from initiative. Local initiative is
the process of a law-making by the people themselves without the participation of their
elected representatives, while referendum consists of the electorate approving or rejecting
what has been enacted by a local legislative body. [Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. Comelec, 262 SCRA 492].
148
Id. at Sec. 125.

149
LOCAL TAXATION
L ocal government units shall have the power and authority to establish an
organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective
implementation of their development plans, program objectives and priorities; to
create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall
accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them; to
have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to
them without need of any further action; to have an equitable share in the proceeds from
the utilization and development of the national wealth and resources within their
respective territorial jurisdictions including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way
of direct benefits; to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of
real or personal property held by them in their proprietary capacity and to apply their
resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or
furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure
their development into self-reliant communities and active participants in the attainment
of national goals.150
Fundamental Principles. The following fundamental principles shall govern the
exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local government units:
Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall: (1) be equitable and based as far as
practicable on the taxpayer's ability to pay; (2) be levied and collected only for
public purposes; (3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory; (4) not be
contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in the restraint of
trade;
The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be
let to any private person;
The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to
the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the local government unit
levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically
provided herein; and,
Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system
of taxation.
Limitations. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa,
except as otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues,
and all other kinds of customs fees, charges and dues except wharfage on wharves
constructed and maintained by the local government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of,
or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of local government units in the
guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or
charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;
149
R.A. No. 7160, Book II, Title I, Chapter I-VI, Sections 128-196.
150
Id. at Book I, Title I, Chapter I, Sec. 18.

(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal
farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as pioneer
or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively from the date
of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the national Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar
transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in
the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air,
land or water, except as provided in this Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way or reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of
all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as
otherwise provided herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises and
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810 and Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938) otherwise known as the
"Cooperative Code of the Philippines" respectively; and
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units.
1. Cite some invalid local tax measures?

The amount of PHP0.30 per bag of cassava starch flour shipped out of the
municipality, collected under an ordinance is a tax, although denominated as police
inspection fee since its purpose is to raise revenue. And such ordinance is invalid
because it is unjust and unreasonable, even under the guise of an inspection fee,
because the only service rendered by way of inspection, is for the policeman to verify
from the driver of cargo trucks that pass by the police checkpoints the number of
bags loaded per trip based on the trip tickets. The amount is excessive and
confiscatory. [Matalin Coconut Co. vs. Malabang, Lanao del Sur, G.R. 28138,
Aug. 13, 1986].
Section 5(K) of the Local Tax Code prohibits a local government from imposing an
inspection fee on agricultural product. The imposition of an inspection fee of
PHP0.03 per kilo of fish sold within the city will definitely restrict the free flow of
fresh fish to the city because the price of fish will have to increase. [City of Cebu vs.
IAC, G.R. 70684, Oct. 10, 1986].
Ordinance No. 640 of Butuan City, insofar as it required moviehouses or theaters to
increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees and
which required the selling of admission tickets at half the regular price to children
between ages 7 to 12 years, is invalid for being an undue interference of the property
rights of the moviehouse and theater owners. These impositions are not merely
license fees but taxes for purpose of revenue and not regulation which the cities have
no power to exact, unless expressly granted by its charter. [Balacuit vs. CFI, G.R.
38429, June 30, 1988].

2. Has Congress the power to exempt Bayantels properties from realty taxes? In
PLDT vs. City of Davao,151 this Court has upheld the power of Congress to grant
exemptions over the power of local government units to impose taxes. As we see it, then,
the issue in this case no longer dwells on whether Congress has the power to exempt
Bayantels properties from realty taxes by its enactment of Rep. Act No. 7633 which
amended Bayantels original franchise. The more decisive question turns on whether
Congress actually did exempt Bayantels properties at all by virtue of Section 11 of Rep. Act
No. 7633. Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly
aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantels former exemption from realty taxes,
Congress opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11 thereof, exactly the same
defining phrase exclusive of this franchise which was the basis for Bayantels exemption
from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 states
that the grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their
real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or
corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. The Court views this
subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to
once again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power, all of the franchisees
(Bayantels) properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its
franchise. (Quezon City vs. Bayantel, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006).
3. Do local government units have the power to tax the national government, its
agencies and instrumentalities? No. Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly
withdrew the tax exemption of all juridical persons [u]nless otherwise provided in this
Code. Now, Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code expressly provides otherwise,
specifically prohibiting local governments from imposing any kind of tax on national
government instrumentalities. 152 By express mandate of the Local Government Code, local
governments cannot impose any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities like
the MIAA. Local governments are devoid of power to tax the national government, its
agencies and instrumentalities. The taxing powers of local governments do not extend to
the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities, [u]nless otherwise provided
in this Code as stated in the saving clause of Section 133. The saving clause refers to
Section 234(a) on the exception to the exemption from real estate tax of real property
owned by the Republic. [Manila International Airport Authority vs. City of
Paraaque, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006].
4. Is Smart Communications exempted from paying the local franchise tax, in view of
the in lieu of all taxes and most favored treatment clauses of its legislative franchise?
No. jurisprudence153 suggests that aside from the national franchise tax, the franchisee is
still liable to pay the local franchise tax, unless it is expressly and unequivocally exempted
from the payment thereof under its legislative franchise. The in lieu of all taxes clause in
a legislative franchise should categorically state that the exemption applies to both local
and national taxes; otherwise, the exemption claimed should be strictly construed against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Republic Act No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded VAT Law, did not remove or abolish the payment of
local franchise tax. It merely replaced the national franchise tax that was previously paid
by telecommunications franchise holders and in its stead imposed a ten percent (10%)
VAT in accordance with Section 108 of the Tax Code. VAT replaced the national franchise
tax, but it did not prohibit nor abolish the imposition of local franchise tax by cities or
municipalities. The power to tax by local government units emanates from Section 5,
Article X of the Constitution which empowers them to create their own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as
the Congress may provide. The imposition of local franchise tax is not inconsistent with
the advent of the VAT, which renders functus officio the franchise tax paid to the national
151
363 SCRA 522 (2001).
152
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein,
the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
following: x x x x (o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
and local government units.
153
PLDT v. City of Davao, 415 Phil. 764 (2001); Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v. Province of Laguna,
G.R. No. 151899, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 93; Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) v. Province of
Pangasinan, G.R. No. 152534, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 541.

government. VAT inures to the benefit of the national government, while a local franchise
tax is a revenue of the local government unit. [Smart Communications, Inc. vs. City of
Davao, G.R. No. 155491, July 21, 2009].
5. Shall NAPOCOR claim for tax exemption be considered an administrative protest?
No. By claiming exemption from realty taxation, NAPOCOR is simply raising a question
of the correctness of the assessment. A claim for tax exemption, whether full or partial,
does not question the authority of local assessor to assess real property tax. By providing
that real property not declared and proved as tax-exempt shall be included in the
assessment roll, the above-quoted provision implies that the local assessor has the
authority to assess the property for realty taxes, and any subsequent claim for exemption
shall be allowed only when sufficient proof has been adduced supporting the claim. Since
Napocor was simply questioning the correctness of the assessment, it should have first
complied with Section 252, particularly the requirement of payment under protest.
Napocors failure to prove that this requirement has been complied with thus renders its
administrative protest under Section 226 of the LGC without any effect. No protest shall
be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays the tax. [National Power Corporation vs.
Province of Quezon, G.R. No. 171586, January 25, 2010].
BAR Questions
2013 BAR
MCQ. May the power of cities to raise revenues be limited by an executive
order of the President?
(A) Yes, because local government units are under the administrative control of the
President through the Department of Interior and Local Government.
(B) No, because local government units now enjoy full local fiscal autonomy.
(C) No, because only limitations established by Congress can define and limit the powers
of local governments.
(D) Yes, because the President has the power and authority to impose reasonable
restrictions on the power of cities to raise revenues.
(E) Yes, if so provided in a city's charter.
Can LGUs tax the Philippine Export Zone Authority?

City of Lapu-Lapu vs. PEZA, G.R. 187583, Nov. 26, 2014
Can local governments impose interest and surcharges of taxes due?
Did the City of Cabanatuan impose the correct surcharge?
NPC vs. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. 177332, Oct. 1, 2014
Is Section 21(B) of Manila City Ordinance No. 7794, aka Manila Revenue Code, as
amended, insofar as it imposes business tax on businesses already assessed with
percentage taxes, valid and constitutional?
Lim vs. Colet, G.R. 120051, Dec. 10, 2014
Are Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 unconstitutional for violating local fiscal autonomy?
FDCP vs. Colon Heritage, G.R. No. 203754, June 16, 2015
Can the City of Lapu-Lapu tax MCIAA?
MCIAA vs. City of Lapu-Lapu PEZA, G.R. No. 181756, June 15, 2015
Are Quezon City Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socia-
lized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, valid and constitutional?
Ferrer vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015
Is Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing
amusement tax on golf courses within the authority of Cebu City to enact under
the Local Government Code?
Alta Vista Golf & Country Club vs. Cebu City, G.R. No. 180235, Jan. 20, 2016

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2016 Public Corporation Law

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Public Corporation Law

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 1

U nder the 1987 Constitution, these municipal corporations are referred to as

Barangay10 A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 2

Municipality11 A municipality may be created if it has an average annual

Component City12 A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 3

Highly Urbanized City14 Cities with a minimum population of two

Province16 A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 4

A B O L I T I O NA local government unit may be abolished when its income, population,

Plebiscite Requirement No creation, conversion,20 division, merger,

1. Will the petition for quo warranto against the

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 5

4. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 6

Dinagat Province 6. Is RA 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 7

Autonomous Regions 10. Does the creation of the autonomous region

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 8

Plebiscite Requirement 14. Does the downgrading of Santiago City from

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 9

2 0 1 4 B A R From an existing province, Wideland, Congress created a new province,

In the plebiscite for the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City to a highly

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 10

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 11

1. Does the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 12

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 13

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 14

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 15

Police Power Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local

Local government units shall have the power to create their

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 16

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 17

Police Power 1. Cite some valid local police power legislations?

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 18

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 19

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 20

Inferior Domain 8. Is the city ordinance of Manila invalid for discrimina-

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 21

Subpoena Power? 13. There is no provision in the Constitution or in the

14. Cite some jurisprudence on the power of a local

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 22

Corporate Powers: 16. Can local governments settle and compromise a

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 23

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 24

1 9 8 9 B A R Pedro bought a parcel of land form Smart Corporation, a realty firm

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 25

1 9 9 0 B A R The City of Cebu passed an ordinance proclaiming the expropriation of a

1 9 9 1 B A R The province of Palawan passes an ordinance requiring all owners/operators

1 9 9 1 B A R The Municipality of Sibonga, Cebu, wishes to enter into a contract involving

1 9 9 5 B A R The Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal, passed a resolution authorizing the

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 26

2 0 0 5 B A R The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur passed

2 0 0 9 B A R The Municipality of Bulalakaw, Leyte, passed Ordinance No. 1234,

2 0 1 0 B A R True or False. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 27

2 0 1 0 B A R ABC operates an industrial waste processing plant within Laoag City.

2 0 1 0 B A R The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Pasay City passed an ordinance requiring

2 0 1 5 B A R Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of Sinagtala. Roads and bridges

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 28

SEDILLO: Public Corporation Law | 29