You are on page 1of 16

3 FEBRUARY 2017: CONSTI II (15 CASES)

CONTINUATION:

SHU V. DEE

GMA V. COMELEC

DISMISSALS, SUSPENSIONS, REINSTATEMENT

CORONA V. UHPAP (PROFESSION: PILOT)

Regulation of Profession: a professional license becomes a property right after its issuance.
Cannot be taken away without due process, notice or hearing.

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment, which allows them to engage in pilotage until they
retire at the age 70 years. The Court declared that the pre-evaluation cancellation prescribed makes
the Order unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property
without due process of law.

The administrative order arbitrarily restricted the exercise of such profession without allowing the
harbor pilots to be heard.

SALAW V. NLRC (DISMISSAL IN PRIVATE SECTOR)

Dismissal in Private Sector V-H-C


Must be for a valid reason
Must be given the opportunity to be heard, due process
Any evidence derived from confession w/o counsel is inadmissible.
Right to counsel is a right even in civil and administrative proceedings. The Labor Code expressly grants
the right to counsel. (Salaw v. NLRC)
ORDINANCE/STATUTE/MEMO CIR./RULES
PEOPLE V. NAZARIO (MANAGER, VOID FOR VAGUENESS)

Ordinance/Statute/Memo/Rules
- When a statute lacks a comprehensible standard, it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially persons targeted by it, fair notice of conduct to avoid, and it leaves law enforcers with unbridled
discretion in carrying out provisions.

The lack of comprehensible standards means the statute is vague and amounts to a lack of due process
because of lack of FAIR NOTICE and there is UNDUE DELEGATION.

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.But the act must be utterly vague on its face; that is to say, it cannot
be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. (People vs. Nazario)

ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN (PLUNDER, VOIDE FOR VAGUENESS)

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."

The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes. To invalidate penal statues, an as applied challenge is
needed.
FEEDER V. CA (TAFIRFF ANC CUSTOMS CODE)

FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE PTE, LTD. VS. COURT OF Forfeiture proceedings-


APPEALS actions in rem

FACTS: The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned Note: Right to Counsel is
and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left dispensable in this case
Singapore on 6 May 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000
metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Nera vs. The Auditor
Zamboanga, Philippines. On 14 May 1986, the vessel anchored at the General:
vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs The right to the assistance
authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the of counsel is not
Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting indispensable to due
on said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a process unless required by
Customs team on 19 May 1986 to verify the report. The Customs team the Constitution or a law.
found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and Exception is made in the
shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of charter only during the
Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboan." custodial investigation of a
person suspected of a
In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of crime, who may not waive
Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. his right to counsel except in
Feeder International Line PTE Ltd, through its agent Feeder International writing and in the presence
(Phils.) Inc. then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of of counsel, and during the
Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order trial of the accused, who has
dated 12 December 1986. In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the the right "to be heard by
parties, through their respective counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts. himself and counsel," either
On 17 March 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, finding the retained by him or provided
M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and for him by the government
Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo at its expense. These
of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are found guilty of violating guarantees are embodied in
Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby the Constitution, along with
forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Feeder International the other rights of the
appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated person facing criminal
13 May 1987, affirming the decisin of the District Collector of Customs of prosecution, because of the
Iloilo in toto. On 25 June 1987, Feeder International filed a petition for odds he must contend with
review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs to defend his liberty (and
with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of before even his life) against
preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the the awesome authority of
Commissioner from implementing his decision. On 14 December 1988, the State.
the Court of Tax Appeals issued its decision affirmed the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs. Feeder International, on 19 January 1990, In other proceedings,
filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision with the however, the need for the
Supreme Court. On 21 March 1990, the Supreme Court issued a assistance of counsel is not
resolution referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in as urgent nor is it deemed
view of the Court's decision in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. essential to their validity.
Court of Appeals, et al. holding that final judgments or decrees of the There is nothing in the
Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Constitution that says a
Court of Appeals. On 8 May 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its party in a non-criminal
questioned decision affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. proceeding is entitled to be
Feeder International's motion for reconsideration having been denied on represented by counsel and
4 July 1990, it interposed the present petition. that without such
representation he will not be
ISSUE: WHETHER A FORFEITURE PROCEEDING IS PENAL IN bound by such proceedings.
NATURE, AND WHETHER THE CORPORATION CAN INVOKE THE The assistance of lawyers,
RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT. while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal
HELD: A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal profession was not
in nature, contrary to the argument advanced by Feeder International. In engrafted in the due
the case of People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court process clause such that
made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in without the participation of
relation to criminal proceedings, holding therein that "seizure and its members the safeguard
forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not is deemed ignored or
criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the violated. The ordinary
offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section citizen is not that helpless
3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, that he cannot validly act at
seizure proceedings are purely civil and administrative in character, the all except only with a lawyer
main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture at his side.
incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession.
The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal Petitioner does not deny
liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor that Torres is himself a
and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. Considering, therefore, that lawyer.
proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal
in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in
the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. The degree of
proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.

Further, a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the right to be


presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an
accused in a criminal case. Herein, the Court finds and so hold that the
Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at
least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel
M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo
pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Feeder
International is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to
unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence. The findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are in consonance with the findings of both the
Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of
Tax Appeals. The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the
elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of
the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to
great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
CB V. CA (CLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY) NOTE: COMPARE
PRESENT CASE WITH MENTIONED CASE OF BANCO FILIPINO

Closure proceedings are a valid exercise of police power of the State to protect the public from the
dissipation of funds and bank runs. It does not need notice and hearing as long as there is
subsequent judicial review. (CB v. CA)Procedure: E-R-E
Examination by Central Bank
Report by Monetary Board on the bank concerned
Prima Facie evidence about the banks bad financial condition

RELATIVE CONTITUTIONALITY

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid
as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.A statute valid at one time may
become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical
operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication,
is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. In the Philippine setting, this
Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence of
significant changes in circumstances.

BANCO FILIPINO PRESENT CASE


That Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 does not require a previous hearing before the Monetary Board can implement
its resolution closing a bank, since its action is subject to judicial scrutiny as provided by law

Only grounds to annul the Resolution of Monetary Board is that the action was plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith
That the closure of the bank was arbitrary and For here, what is being raised as arbitrary by
attendant with grave abuse of discretion, not private respondent is the denial of prior notice
because of the absence of prior notice and hearing, and hearing by the Monetary Board, a matter
but that the Monetary Board had no sufficient long settled in this jurisdiction, and not the
basis to arrive at a sound conclusion of arbitrariness which the conclusions of the
insolvency to justify the closure. Supervision and Examination Sector (SES),
Department II, of the Central Bank were reached.
There was in that case a manifest arbitrariness,
abuse of discretion and bad faith in the closure
of Banco Filipino by the Monetary Board.
(unfounded assumptions and deductions which did
not reflect the true financial condition of the bank)

Appeal to procedural due process cannot just outweigh the evil sought to be prevented; hence, We
rule that Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 is a sound legislation promulgated in accordance with the Constitution
in the exercise of police power of the state
The absence of notice and hearing is not a valid ground to annul a Monetary Board resolution
placing a bank under receivership. The absence of prior notice and hearing cannot be deemed acts
of arbitrariness and bad faith.
MB resolution placing a bank under receivership, or conservatorship for that matter, may only be
annulled after a determination has been made by the trial court that its issuance was tainted
with arbitrariness and bad faith.
THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD CAN COME BEFORE OR AFTER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS.
PEREZ V. V. MADRONA (NOT NUISANCE PER SE) UDHA R.A. 7279; SQUATTING; PROCEDURE
FOR RELOCATION; SUMMARY ABATEMENT

Standing jurisprudence and the law provides that: Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be
abated summarily without judicial intervention.

PROPER REMEDEY OF PETITIONER TO THE FENCE: If petitioner indeed found respondents fence
to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after
respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove
respondents supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence.

JURISPRUDENCE: Lucena Grand Terminal and Pampanga Bus Co


LAW: Civil Code art 694-707

Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., on the need for judicial intervention when the
nuisance is not a nuisance per se: Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.

Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac: Suffice it to say that in the abatement of nuisances
the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed.

Respondents fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of
the community. It was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from
entering it. And as correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes
that respondents fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted
for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary
abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.

DEFINITIONS:

Nuisance per se: nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to
public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of
necessity.

Nuisance per accidence: depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being
a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.
AMERICAN INTER-FASHION V. OP (CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES)

DOCTRINE: Export quota allocation Glorious Suns export quota allocation was an initially a privilege
evolved into some form of property which should not be removed arbitrarily and without due process and
hurriedly confer it to another.
Cancellation: 1984
Granted: 1977
Period: 7 years

JURISPRUDENCE: Mabuhay Textile Mill Corporation

Mabuhay Textile Mill Corporation v Ongpin: While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the
Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have
been accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially

Glorious Sun was deprived of due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB Decision. (Garments and Textile
Board Board)

General Rule: Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality, and generally
should not be disturbed by the courts
they are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise
gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their jurisdiction
Exception: Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedures which
lead to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of
discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest.

In this case, the 1984 GTEB Decision, cancelling Glorious Suns export quota allocation and found guilty
of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of importations, denied Glorious Sun of due process because it was
not supported by evidence. In the said decision, GTEB failed to disclose the vital evidence in arriving
to such conclusion.

The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of the documents by GTEB to Glorious Sun in
1987 cured the defect of non-disclosure of evidence in 1984 under the constitutional provision of due
process enunciated in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations. MISLEADING
NO. The documents disclosed to Glorious Sun by GTEB in 1987 enhanced the charge that
Glorious Sun was denied due process
The price of Glorious Sun was below median and the four importer fixed were lower than
Glorious in order to show that Glorious Suns prices were higher

*the record clearly manifests that in cancelling the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated
the private respondent's constitutional right to due process.
*the decision and the resolution are not tainted in the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. They
outline in detail why the private respondent was denied due process when its export quotas were
cancelled by GTEB. The findings are supported by the records.
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO V. CAMACHO AND (MR) (CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES) (EXPANSIVE TAX CATEGORY)

British American Tobacco - The classification freeze provision addressed Congress's administrative
concerns in the simplification of tax administration of sin products, elimination of potential areas for abuse
and corruption in tax collection, buoyant and stable revenue generation, and ease of projection of
revenues. Consequently, there can be no denial of the equal protection of the laws since the
rational-basis test is amply satisfied.

ORIGINAL PETITION:

the price classification freeze results in lower tax rates for many popular cigarette brands because they
are taxed based on their 1996 prices rather their present prices. If there is one big hole in the Tax Code,
it is this one.

In British American Tobacco, the Supreme Court said that the price classification freeze "would give the
least amount of discretion to the tax implementers" and "would address the problems of tax avoidance
and tax evasion." According to the court, "periodic reclassification of brands [unlike a price classification
freeze] would tempt the cigarette manufacturers to manipulate their price levels or bribe the tax
implementers in order to allow their brands to be classified at a lower tax bracket even if their net retail
prices have already migrated to a higher tax bracket."

Why the tobacco companies like this decision, considering its implication that they are inclined to engage
in below-the-table practices, is confusing, but thats that. Going back to the case, we should ask: Did the
Supreme Court say that the tax classification freeze is a faultless tax design? Did it say that it is the best
policy?

Of course, that is not the case because the Judiciary is not the policy-making branch of the government.
When the court made those statements, it was merely echoing what Congress (the branch that DOES
policy) was saying at that time as the basis for the price classification freeze. You see, the British
American Tobacco Corp. (BAT) was assailing the Sin Tax Law for alleged violation of the equal protection
clause. (Old brands will be taxed lower based on 1996 prices, whereas BATs newer brands will be
slapped higher taxes based on their present prices.) In order to withstand an attack on equal protection
grounds, the Sin Tax Law should pass the rationality test; i.e., there should be a rational basis for the
difference in the treatment of old vs. new brands.

When the court made the statements quoted above, it was merely saying that Congress had logical
reasons for the price classification freeze enough to hold up against an attack on constitutional grounds.
It did not say that it was the best policy that Congress can come up with. In fact, the court even pointed
out that there are flaws in the law because to some extent it derogated its avowed goal of fair competition
among cigarette brands; but Congress decided that the benefits outweighed the flaws. As the decision
said, the court does not "sit in judgment as a supra-legislature to decide, after a law is passed by
Congress, which state interest is superior over another, or which method is better suited to achieve one,
some or all of the states interests, or what these interests should be in the first place. This policy-
determining power, by constitutional fiat, belongs to Congress as it is its function to determine and
balance these interests or choose which ones to pursue. Time and again we have ruled that the Judiciary
does not settle policy issues."

MR: British american Tobacco vs. DOF (GR 163583)

Petitioner argues that the classification freeze provision violates the equal protection and uniformity
of taxation clauses because Annex D brands are taxed based on their 1996 net retail prices while
new brands are taxed based on their present day net retail prices.
Citing Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, petitioner asserts that the assailed provisions accord
a special or privileged status to Annex D brands while at the same time discriminate against other
brands.

These contentions are without merit and a rehash of petitioners previous arguments before this Court.
As held in the assailed Decision, the instant case neither involves a suspect classification nor impinges
on a fundamental right. Consequently, the rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the
constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal protection challenge. It has been held that in
the areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect
lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Under the
rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally related to achieving some
legitimate State interest.

Tests/Standards (Strict Scrutiny, Rational Basis Standard, Heightened or Immediate Scrutiny)

Generally the judiciary will defer to the legislature unless there is discrimination against a discrete and
insular minority, or infringement of a fundamental right. Consequently, two standards of judicial review
were established:

1. Strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process.
2. The rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted for evaluating
classifications based on gender and legitimacy.

The SC has often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using
the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest.

Whereas in applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. In terms
of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality
and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race
as well as other fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Interest of public requires such interference and the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
Liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of public health, public order and safety, or
anything else within the scope of police power.
The requirement of substantive due process in not a rigid concept. The heart of substantive due
process is the requirement of reasonableness or the absence of exercise of arbitrary power.
They are necessarily relative concepts which depend on the circumstances of every case.
There is a presumption that when the State acts to interfere with life, liberty or property is that
such action is valid. (other cases: in the imposition of prior restraint, there is a presumption of
invalidity.
The allowable scope of reasonable interference with property is NOT the same as that with life
and property.

Power of Eminent Domain - Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate
private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty;
a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general
welfare.

Police Power is the power of the government to regulate behaviors and enforce order within its territory,
often framed in terms of public welfare, security, health, and safety. The exercise of police power can be in
the form of making laws, compelling obedience to those laws through physical means with the aim of
removing liberty, legal sanctions, or other forms of coercion and inducements.

Power of Taxation the power to impose and collect taxes and charges on individuals, goods, services,
and other to support the operation of the government.

UNITED STATES V. TORIBIO (CARABAO SLAUGHTERHOUSE)

It is the duty of the legislature to: I-R


1. Determine what the interests of the public require
2. Determine what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
The determination, of the legislature on what is a proper exercise of police power is subject to the
supervision of the courts

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province
of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a
carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter
of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in
the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he
contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his
carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private
property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle,
is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.


Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal
liberties. To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear (1) that the
interest of the general public requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, For to do
otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers. The act primarily seeks to
protect large cattle against theft to make it easy for the recovery and return to owners, which encouraged
them to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle.

Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the Philippine islands which
threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces seventy, eighty and even one
hundred percent of their local carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the prices of
carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft became rampant due to the luxurious
prices of these work animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the food production of the country which
prompted the government to import rice from its neighboring countries.

As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the production
of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work animals. The
purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them
throughout the entirearchipelago. It was also the same reason why large cattles fit for farm work was
prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. Most importantly, the respondents carabao was
found to be fit for farm work.

These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power.

Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not
constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a mere regulation for the
consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest. Thus,
the demand for compensation of the owner must fail.
CHURCHILL V. RAFFERTY (BILLBOARDS AS NUISANCE)

The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies
from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and
described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or
removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign,
signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the bond given
by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted soon after the
commencement of this action.

INJUNCTION ISSUE: The injunction is invalid because such cannot cover taxes. Taxes are the lifeblood
of the government and must be paid. The remedy for taxpayers is to pay under protest and then seek
judicial judgment afterward.

Standards of Police Power


1. Lawful Purpose- for the general welfare of the community.
2. Lawful Method- reasonable, non-oppressive and non-arbitrary means and methods employed
in connection to the accomplishment of the purpose.

Police power cannot interfere with private property for purely aesthetic purposes. But where the act is
REASONABLY within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety or comfort,
it should not be disturbed by the courts.

It has been held in previous decisions that the uses of private property which are offensive to senses of
sight and smell may be regulated.

Without entering into the realm of psychology, we think it quite demonstrable that sight is as valuable
to a human being as any of his other senses, and that the proper ministration to this sense
conduces as much to his contentment as the care bestowed upon the senses of hearing or smell,
and probably as much as both together. Objects may be offensive to the eye as well as to the nose
or ear. Man's esthetic feelings are constantly being appealed to through his sense of sight. Large
investments have been made in theaters and other forms of amusement, in paintings and spectacular
displays, the success of which depends in great part upon the appeal made through the sense of sight.
Moving picture shows could not possible without the sense of sight. Governments have spent millions on
parks and boulevards and other forms of civic beauty, the first aim of which is to appeal to the sense of
sight. Why, then, should the Government not interpose to protect from annoyance this most valuable
of man's senses as readily as to protect him from offensive noises and smells?

Hence, we conceive that the regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of
private property as it is a regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares.

If the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country,
and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which
encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power. A source of annoyance and irritation
to the public does not minister to the comfort and convenience of the public. And we are of the
opinion that the prevailing sentiment is manifestly against the erection of billboards which are offensive
to the sight.

The police power cannot interfere with private property rights for purely esthetic purposes. The
courts, taking this view, rest their decisions upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is disassociated
entirely from any relation to the public health, morals, comfort, or general welfare and is, therefore, beyond
the police power of the state. BUT we are of the opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly advertisements
or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general
welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well-recognized principle to
further application.
PEOPLE V. FAJARDO (NOT ALLOWED TO BUILD ON HIS LOT AS IT COVERS THE VIEW FROM THE
PLAZA)

The State may not under the guise of Police Power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance
of the community.

(OPINION: to do so, it must appeal to the consideration of general welfare: comfort and convenience.
There was no evidence showing that such construction would be a nuisance to the public to warrant the
confiscation thereof.)

OPINION: As opposed to Rafferty, the act of the mayor was not reasonable. As it fails to state any
policy, no purpose, no condition and lacks standard. Remember: the state may ONLY interfere with the
right to life, liberty and property of citizens if it is done in consideration of general welfare. In this case,
the mayor fails to do so.

An ordinance may be considered invalid if: L-NP-LS
1. It fails to state any policy to guide or limit the mayors discretion
2. It expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit
3. enumerates no condition for its grant or refusal
4. Lacks standards, conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power.

Fajardo constructed his house (without permit) on a property he owned in defiance of a municipal
ordinance passed his term as mayor of Baao, Camarines Sur. The ordinance prohibited the construction
of structures which destroys the view of the plaza. He was convicted.

The ordinance was void because it does not give sufficient standards to limit the mayors actions, thus
allowing him arbitrary use of power. It is also invalid because it oversteps the bounds of police power.
Instead, it is a taking of property without just compensation. It is like an unlawful confiscation of property.
Fajardos conviction was overturned.

But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may
prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the
case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty,
stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public
plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and
unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that
result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL A MOTEL OPERATOR V. CITY OF MANILA

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Power to tax- police power to regulate behavior. Congress can legislate morality through sin taxes.
YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (TRANSPORT OF CARABAO)

FACTS: On January, 13, 1984, Ynot transported six carabaos by using a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo.
The six carabaos, were, however, confiscated by the Police Station Commander of Baratoc Nuevo, Iloilo
for alleged violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits the inter-provincial transporting of
carabaos and carabeefs which does not comply with the provisions of Executive No.626;

That Section 1 of the said law provides that henceforth, no carabaos regardless of age, sex physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of the said law shall be subjected to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government to be distributed to charitable institution and similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
meat inspection Commission may see fit in the case of the carabeef, and to deserving farmers through the
dispersal of the Director of Animal Industry, in the case of carabaos;

Ynot filed a suit for recovery and the carabao were returned to him upon the issuance of a writ of replevin
upon his filing of a supersede as bond in the amount of P12,000.00;

After trial of the case, the Judge upheld the validity of the act of the Police Station Commander in
confiscating the carabaos. Ynot was ordered to returned the carabaos but since he could not do so, the
court ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the said
Executive Order on the ground of lack of authority to do so and also because of its presumed validity;

The petitioner appealed to the IAC but the said court upheld the decision of the Trial Court. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court where YNOT claimed that the penalty of
confiscation is INVALID the same was imposed without according the owner the right to be heard before a
competent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUES:
1. May a lower court (like the MTC, RTC, of the Court of Appeals) declare a law unconstitutional?
2. Is Executive Order No. 626-A constitutional?
Sub-issues under this are:
a. Was it a valid police power measure?
b. Was there an undue delegation of legislative power?

HELD:
1. While the lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional question, THEY
ARE NOT PREVENTED FROM RESOLVING THE SAME WHENEVER WARRANTED, subject only to
review by the supreme court. This is so because under Section 5,[2(a)], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court has the power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the rules of court may provide, final judgements and orders of the lower courts in all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that lower courts may declare whether
or not a law is constitutional.
2. In order that a measure or law may be justified under the police power of the state, it must meet
two tests:
a. the subject must be lawful; and
b. the means employed is lawful.

Since the prohibition of the slaughtering of carabaos except where they are at least 7 years old when male
and at least 11 years old when female is in furtherance of the public interest since said carabaos are very
useful to the work at the farm, it is conceded that the Executive Order meets the first test- it has lawful
subject.

But does the law meets the second requisite or test which is lawful method?

Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughtering of carabaos BUT ON THIER
MOVEMENT, providing that no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question measure is missing. We do not
see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in the other.
Obviously, retaining a carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
The law is unconstitutional because it struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guarantee of elementary fair play.

Since the Executive Order in question is a penal law, then violation thereof should be pronounce not by the
police but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed
penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

Also, there is no reasonable guidelines or bases of the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman of the
NATIONAL Meat Inspection Commission in the disposition of the carabaos or carabeef other than what
they may see fit which is very dangerous and could result to opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
even graft and corruption.

The Executive Order is, therefore, invalid and unconstitutional and not a valid police power measure
because the method employed to conserve carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse is unduly oppressive. due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. the conferment on the administrative authorities (like the police) of the power to adjudge
the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment of judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers.

Also, there is undue delegation of legislative power to the officers mentioned therein (Director of Animal
Industry and Head of the National Meat Commission) because they were given unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the property confiscated.