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Imprint L 

Philosophers’
 volume 11, no. 8 ore has it that before 1963, many philosophers thought
 april 2011 knowledge was justified true belief, which view met its doom
in Edmund Gettier’s 1963 paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowl-
edge?” Gettier produced two cases wherein, intuitively, the subject
gains a justified true belief but fails thereby to know, demonstrating
that knowledge differs from justified true belief, the latter not sufficing

Manifest Failure: for the former. Examples in this mold we call Gettier cases.
Gettier cases follow a recipe. Start with a belief sufficiently justi-
fied (or warranted) to meet the justification requirement for knowl-

The Gettier Problem
edge. Then add an element of bad luck that would normally prevent
the justified belief from being true. Lastly add a dose of good luck that
“cancels out the bad,” so the belief ends up true anyhow. It has proven
difficult to explain why this “double luck” prevents knowledge.1

Solved Here are two Gettier cases to focus our discussion.

(ford) Sarah observes her trusted colleague, Mr. Nogot,
arrive at work driving a new Ford. Nogot reports to Sarah
that he is ecstatic with his new Ford. Sarah has no reason
to mistrust him, so she believes Nogot owns a Ford. From
this she infers that someone in her office owns a Ford. But
Nogot uncharacteristically is playing a practical joke on
Sarah: he doesn’t really own a Ford. Nevertheless, unbe-
knownst to Sarah, Mr. Havit, the newly hired clerk on his
first day in the office, does own a Ford.2

John Turri 1. My characterization is modeled on Zagzebski’s (1994: 66; 1996: 288–9; 1999:
100–1). (Compare Sosa 1991: 238.) My interpretation of Zagzebski’s analysis
University of Waterloo of Gettier cases is fairly standard (compare Pritchard 2005: 149), and Zagze-
bski informs me (personal communication) that the double-luck structure is
common to all Gettier cases she’s familiar with. But it’s worth noting, as an
anonymous referee pointed out, that at one point (1999: 115 n. 32) Zagzebski
says, “Not all counterexamples in the Gettier literature have the double luck
feature, although, of course, I have argued that cases with this feature can al-
ways be produced whenever there is a gap between truth and the other com-
ponents of knowledge.” It’s not entirely clear what this qualification amounts
to, but it at least suggests that Zagzebski doesn’t think the double-luck struc-
ture is essential to Gettier cases. In any event, I’m claiming that the double-
©  2011  John Turri luck structure is essential to Gettier cases.
<www.philosophersimprint.org/011008/> 2. I adapted the case from Lehrer (1965: 169–70).

unobtrusively switched seats and got counted twice. Foley laments its “corrupting conse- 9.4 But few are fully are 53 attendees. Feldman 1974. concludes there knowledge. and infers that his 100 copies suffice.” and then walks into the den. Many assume talk. philosophers’ imprint –  2  – vol.9 Harman’s Solution Hans knows that his handouts suffice even though he infers this from Gilbert Harman’s solution to the Gettier problem is that reasoning a false belief. It resembles Chisholm’s sheep-in-the-field case (1989: 93). This accommodates cases where your belief is based on 5. husband’s chair. A familiar appearance greets her from her and Mary from My husband is in that chair. 7. Zagzebski’s Solution Linda Zagzebski’s solution to the Gettier problem is that knowledge 3. because any Gettier subject arguably bases her his brother. dozing in a different chair. john turri Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved (husband) Mary enters the house and looks into the Each subject reasons from a false belief: Sarah from Nogot owns a Ford living room. but is not fatal. 4. Matilal teaches us (1986: 135–7) that Gettier cases appeared long before Ed- multiple independent lines of cogent reasoning. But immune to its allure.. cover false implicit assumptions too. but helps us understand assumptions from beliefs. Harman’s view gives the wrong result in such cases. However. as I already noted. See also Lycan 2006: 153–8. and none denies its profound impact on contem.7 This objection identified the man in the chair. Hetherington 1999. (count) Hans brings 100 copies of his handout to the lenges us to diagnose why Gettier subjects don’t know.3 You can gain knowledge by reasoning from false beliefs. But count is not like this. In such a case. ing does not essentially involve falsehood. Hans’s head-count was wrong: there are only 52 attend- porary epistemology. But Mary mis. and so do not know. Harman specifies that knowledge precludes only reasoning essentially in- volving falsehood.6 If we distinguish implicit consistent with knowledge from falsehood. See Sosa 1991: Chapter 4. 11. Franz. See also Saunders and Champawat 1964. the course of epistemology” (1999: 386). then we might extend Harman’s proposal to why it is possible. however. The classical Indian philosopher ŚrīharÈa constructed similar You could know your conclusion provided at least one relevant line of reason- examples in the 1100s to confound his opponents. ing was sound. her husband was seated along man’s proposal naturally extends to exclude. One person. whom she had no reason to think was even belief on a false implicit assumption. She thinks. Some denounce or reject the challenge. He does a careful head-count. E. but Gettier subjects do rea- Later I propose a solution to the Gettier problem that not only is son from false beliefs. mund Gettier. even if others involved falsehood. g. The Gettier problem chal.5 ees. your reason- 6. 8 (april 2011) . Har- in the country. tier cases needn’t involve reasoning from false belief. 10. He wonders whether he brought enough for every that surmounting the challenge will lead to the correct theory of attendee. I adapted the case from Zagzebski (1996: 285–6). Saunders and Champawat quences” (2004: 69–70).8 which. each sufficing to fixate belief. and Weatherson 2003. Harman 1973: 195. Some contend that Gettier subjects do know. Harman’s proposal handles both Gettier cases described above. I adapted the case from Warfield 2005: 407–8. Matilal 1986: 137–40. Harman’s view faces a more pressing problem: it rules out too much. no. Consider: Gettier cases generate the Gettier problem. out of Mary’s sight. See also Clark 1963: 47. It’s not her husband. the opposite wall of the living room. “My husband is sitting in the Some object that the proposal fails to rule out enough because Get- living room. See also Sartwell 1992.10 from a false belief precludes knowledge. see 1964 also provide a nice example. Pollock calls the Gettier problem a mere “intriguing side issue” that “warped 8.

15 Others total set of causal factors that give rise” to your true belief. Mary exhibits Greco’s Solution all the relevant intellectual virtues and no intellectual vic- John Greco’s solution is that knowledge is intellectually creditable true es in the process of forming the belief. For our purposes. So don’t know. you fail to believe the truth because cause of” relation. which she says “roughly Gettier cases centrally feature “abnormalities” that trump your abil- coincides” with the definition I discuss in the main text (2009: 127). reliable epistemic virtues. latedly. I restrict my discussion to Gettier cases that Greco says his view handles. Battaly 2008: 16. then she would not form the belief that she did via her stable and 33). 8 (april 2011) . because of virtue and having a true belief because of virtue. add a sensitivity condition to her virtue theory …” (Pritchard 2005: 197). Zagzebski 1999: 108. See also Greco 2002: 308–11. 16. Greco 2003: 131.19 even though Mary has the belief she has because of her Intellectual credit (“credit” for short) accrues just in case you be- virtues and the belief is true. but she is not led to belief. 13. Zagzebski admits it is a shortcoming that she lacks an account ski’s theory of it.14 Others object that Zagzebski’s in case (i) those abilities form “an important and necessary part of the view is uninformative absent an account of the distinction. not true. philosophers’ imprint –  3  – vol. the important point is that both definitions feature the crucial “be- ities’ “default salience”. 22. not because of her good eyesight or cautious con- the two main camps being “virtue responsibilists” and “virtue reliabilists”. But Zagzebski rejects defining because of counterfactually (1999: 111). Levin 2004. See Greco and Turri 2009 for more details. Pritchard 2005: 197. Greco 2003.18 Later I will make a suggestion Consider her diagnosis of why Mary doesn’t know in husband. 21. So construed. evant because relation. Murphy 1998: 212. but later re- stable and reliable epistemic virtues. 127–132.17 tive understanding of intellectual virtue. but she should also believe what she stricts his remarks to “at least many” Gettier cases (2003: 131). 11. of your abilities. this means that were what is believed his account will need refinement to handle some Gettier cases (2003: 132 n. Pritchard 2005: 196. Roberts and Wood 2007: 14–15.22 In husband Mary believes the truth because This disagreement needn’t concern us here. of causal discourse. pens to own a Ford. but Gettier subjects are not creditable for true belief. Baehr 2006: 487–8. as we might put it. “Zagzebski seems to have a modal claim in mind here. argue that there is no notion of because of suited to her purpose. so I won’t elaborate Zagzeb. See also Murphy 1998: 212. and suspects does because it is true where. derived from a general theory of the pragmatics lief.12 of the pertinent because of relation. helpful to her. 15. He advertises a “solution” to the Gettier problem. Virtue epistemologists disagree over what constitutes an intellectual virtue. 112. Greco 2002: 309. which is true. and (ii) no other factor “trumps” your abilities’ explanatory salience. Zagzebski 1996: 297. she does not have the truth lieve the truth “because” of your reliable cognitive abilities (“abilities” because of her virtues. so they the truth through those virtuous processes or motives.13 for short). Pritchard interprets Zagzeb- 18. 111. Zagzebski offers a different definition of knowledge. intuitively. Greco provides a detailed and principled account of the rel- Crucial here is the distinction. sumption of testimony. Not only should the agent form her true belief via her 19. Greco 2003: 123. Greco 2003: 131. no. john turri Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved requires you to believe the truth “because of” your intellectual virtues. Zagzebski seems to be wanting to 20. As a result. between having a be.21 In ford Sarah believes the truth because Havit hap- 12. because of virtue. some commentators object that Mary does believe the truth and so do not know. You believe the truth because of your abilities just Some find the distinction “obscure”. 17. ski as requiring sensitivity for knowledge.16 Re- but Gettier subjects do not believe the truth because of their virtues. 14.11 For present purposes we may rely on our intui.20 11.

and Lackey 2007: 347–8. but I still de- this difficulty. Likewise in tower. you know. 29. g. Passerby does most of the to be the most salient part of the explanation. john turri Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved of the strange confluence of the unexpected brother and the hidden truth. Lately Greco 24.” Greco says. Morris unhesitatingly forms the cor- responding true belief. It generally requires “In none of these cases. Sosa 2007: Lectures 2 and 5. “[the subject] does tended to mark a causal explanation” (2009: 18).29 Sup- because of” her abilities. Greco responds that Morris still deserves credit for learning the 28. Ernest Sosa’s solution to the Gettier problem is that knowledge is apt tribution is most salient in explaining why Morris learned the truth. so they do not know. Greco 2003: 130. Greco 2003: 130. line of thought advanced in his earlier work canvassed here. Here we set aside reflective knowledge. Greco 2007. east of the station. Pritchard 2005: 193. Greco 2003 doesn’t explicitly address husband. this modification arguably handles our sample Gettier appropriately involved. Later I will make a suggestion and offers impeccable directions: the tower is two blocks helpful to Greco.30 the first adult passerby he sees (“Passerby”) and asks for Lacking a better understanding of appropriate involvement. But what is appro- priate involvement? It requires more than believing the truth because (tower) Morris just arrived at the Chicago train station of your abilities.25 If correct. Passerby knows the city extraordinarily well will judge Greco’s proposal incomplete. He approaches their abilities. but Gettier subjects do not believe aptly. cases. This is hard to deny. 31. says. I find this response plausible. Lackey 2007: 352.24 They think the subject liant play to set me up for a goal.28 Credit for cooperative success can accrue to multiple individu- dozing husband. 2006: 38–9. “S knows p if and only if S believes the truth (with respect to p) because S’s belief that p is produced by intellectual ability.23 pose we’re playing ice hockey and you make an extraordinarily bril- Many find this last judgment implausible. because the Gettier subjects’ abilities are not most salient. I it is importantly because of them.26 Sosa’s Solution Morris gains knowledge of the tower’s location.” where ‘because’ is “in- 25. yet Morris still gets credit because his intellectual abilities were part. Your contribution dwarfs mine. which is effectively knowing that 27. yet their abilities are not appropriately involved. much testimonial knowledge. See. 23. philosophers’ imprint –  4  – vol. I detect no development of use reliable abilities or powers to arrive at her belief. 11. If you are to gain knowledge. On Sosa’s view. Perhaps sensing simply tap the puck in. Indeed they think his crease. but his ac- 30. as it will in many What is apt belief? Beliefs share the “aaa structure” common to all cases of testimonial knowledge.31 Greco’s theory gives the wrong verdict in this case. even ones who contribute less than others.. flective knowledge is “apt belief aptly noted”. “does the person believe the truth only that your “efforts and abilities” be “appropriately involved”. In particular it rules out problem does not survive the exchange.” See also Greco 2002: 309. Of cases like ford and husband he says. and the defensemen dizzy and confused behind the net. With the goalie prostrate outside clearly does believe the truth because of her abilities. Greco 2007: 65. 354. Greco’s latest work on these issues (2009) remains faithful to the same basic count is clearly intended to apply to it. 8 (april 2011) . no. most salient aspect of the case. But Greco’s solution to the Gettier But the modification rules out too much. Greco suggests that credit requires the subject’s abilities serve credit for the goal. e. but … this is not the additional resources that would help resolve the question raised here. animal knowledge is apt belief. Consider this case: your abilities need only be “appropriately involved”.27 belief. many directions. I adapted the case from Lackey 2007: 352. als. not because of her good eyesight and attentiveness. Re- 26. But Passerby’s con. For Gettier subjects believe as they do because of and wants directions to the Sears Tower. not just an important work.

more than mere Holmes also recognized that the scene would fool Wat- son. and tion of the crime scene would yield the conclusion that a true because competent. after years of tutelage. and ‘intellectual competence’. Holmes. john turri Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved evaluable performances. It may not necessarily follow that the Gettier subject’s belief is. but not in the right way. There’s no it is competent. Leaving Watson. even “in the slightest”. A carpenter’s skill might explain the existence of an where Hubble was. Holmes don. Hubble poi. As noted earlier. whose own inspection of the scene was proceeding 34. strode across the street to certain property. he also believes that the criminal had a limp at the time of the crime. We can assess performances for accuracy. his investigation. but it might nevertheless ever committed this brutal crime has a limp. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing 297. had. he hastily A might explain why B exists despite being irrelevant to B’s having a disguised himself as a porter. achieved competence in ap- adroit performances manifest competence. Knowledge requires more soned the victim under pretense of treating her. was thereafter permanently hobbled with a limp. “Because he’s proceed- plain her true belief’s existence but denies that this entails that her ing so competently. inspec. Holmes sprang into action.32 (Often I substitute ‘competence’ for between footprints. noting their comparative depth.) philosophers’ imprint –  5  – vol. On the most natural reading of the story. though not masterfully. out the potential for a misreading here. Watson adroitness. 11. though not materful. See also Sosa 2003: 171–2. Correct as far as it goes. For beliefs.” Watson concluded triumphantly. “measuring the distance being “true because competent”. then. A printing press’s efficient operation might explain the existence then quickly returned to find Watson wrapping up of a stolen book despite being irrelevant to its theft. nal has a limp. I’ll see to it he gets it right!” competence helps explain. and aptness. than merely being veridical because competent. Sosa 2007: 95–97. and aptness with “Look at him. the point does not take us far enough. competent. is belief that is true because a half dozen other things. But the latter belief isn’t 33. doubt where this will lead him — think how discouraged Regarding ford. Watson!” Holmes grinned. and apt performances are plying Holmes’s methods. adroitness with manifesting intellectual competence. no.” seem plausible. and compare Zagzebski 1996: relevant for present purposes. and kicked him so hard that Hubble abandoned house despite being utterly irrelevant to its state of aban. Sosa identifies accuracy with truth. Holmes saw Sosa could plausibly respond that Watson’s belief is true be- through it and had already deduced that Dr.” Holmes thought. “who- ever so slightly. true because it is competent.” (hobbled) A competent.34 man with a limp murdered Miss Woodbury. he will be. But it doesn’t amount to knowledge. Notice that Watson’s relevant belief is in the simple present tense: the crimi- 32. some think it’s plausible in husband. just as he ought to. sentimentalist.) Apt belief.” Holmes then resolved. Sosa concedes that Sarah’s competence helps ex. cause competent. even “I say. “I’m sure he does. why her belief is true. Sosa 2007: 22–3. admirably competently. 8 (april 2011) . he didn’t want Watson to be discouraged. and while Holmes was no accurate because adroit. It seems especially so in this case: “Capital. Accurate performances achieve their aim. Watson’s belief that the criminal has a limp is true. Generally speaking.33 Sosa is right about the lack of entailment.

and “deriving from the proper exercise” of a competence (1991: 292). Soon the water boils. In each case the outcome obtains because the glass is fragile. and aptness require? its breaking manifests its fragility. or it may break because it is fragile. his power the glass and its colorful contents. Dispositions include powers and susceptibilities. Outcomes include conditions. philosophers’ imprint –  6  – vol. 8 (april 2011) .35 Knowledge is belief properly apt. and insufficiently insulated wire in the control circuit to catch claim that aptness requires something more than being true because competent. manifests itself in the former case. in boil. outcome in fire does not. The magnetron generates microwaves that cause an 35. Alternatively Sosa could retain the thesis that knowledge is apt belief. it is this relation. down. Spoon in one hand. but not the latter. Glass is fragile. 11. I helplessly watched the glass tumble regularly smashes wicked forehands because of his skill. the microwave boils the water. he also within Mario’s reach. and excite its molecules. The 144–5). Consider these two cases. but only the latter outcome mani- My Solution fests its fragility. his skill manifests itself in the former case. In carafe the glass remains intact Watson exercises his competence in an environment normal for its because it is fragile. Compare also these examples. No metaphysical theory teaches us this distinction. Sosa 2007: 36. The magnetron generates microwaves that direction. and processes. I We excel at applying this distinction in a wide range of cases.”36 and the floor help out. Neither outcome obtains only because of fragility — in oj Mario of a performance succeeding “through the exercise of a competence. but not the latter. Maria turned to say something but in the process carelessly knocked (boil) You place a cup of water in the microwave and a glass carafe. A glass may remain intact because it is fragile. 1991: The outcome in boil manifests the microwave’s boiling power. which fire deactivates the magnetron and spreads to 36. lauded regularly because of his skill. His little hand darted out to retrieve receives intentional walks regularly because of his power. john turri Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved aptness. before it hit the ceramic tile floor. that makes for proper apt. but its remaining intact does not manifest its fra- exercise. Al- took a sip of orange juice and unwisely set the glass down bert Pujols crushes home runs regularly because of his power. penetrate the water. Elsewhere Sosa speaks gility. But what more does proper same way to fragility. It remained intact. (carafe) We just finished a delicious dinner. petence (1991: 288). but not fire. cf. so I reached out and caught it travel into the central compartment. fire. come manifesting a disposition and (b) an outcome happening merely ceed through the exercise of a competence? because of a disposition. in carafe my dexterity — but that doesn’t spoil (Zagzebski also speaks of succeeding “through” virtue. he is also down. no. It broke. sending it careening from the table in my press start. and “deriving sufficiently from a competence (2003: 172. We have a plain way to mark the distinction: 37. so requiring normalcy isn’t the answer. Soon the water boils. The examples highlight a general distinction between (a) an out- ness and thereby knowledge. down. (oj) I sat at the table feeding baby Mario his breakfast.)37 Presumably the point. Zagzebski 1996: 297. Roger Federer baby in the other. events. Yet we (fire) You place a cup of water in the microwave and press all recognize an important difference: the outcomes are not due in the start. 1999: 107. In oj the glass breaks because it is fragile. 31. lacking in Watson’s case. But what is it for a performance to suc. He also speaks of performances succeeding “out of” com- the central compartment.

He could answer that our ability is appropri- but Gettier subjects don’t believe adeptly. Bad luck ing carefully packed or otherwise specially treated. Zagzebski. This all prevents production of the outcome. the water’s boiling) is paradigmatic of the microwave’s boiling power. that” not “strongly believing that”. and others: the outcome fails to manifest the relevant they have a quadruple-A structure. I suggest in carafe. other times of reasoning. scure. when supplemented by our principal distinction between (a) and (b). it pack- I further propose that knowledge is adept belief. Recall the “double luck” recipe for generating Gettier cases (see associates with paradigmatic outcome types. john turri Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved I’ll now deploy this intuitive metaphysical distinction to solve the My proposal has several virtues. 40. (‘Truly believing’ means “having a true belief founded others. carafe and fire differ in why the outcome fails to manifest the disposition. which would normally result in the manifest fragility because it is atypical for fragility. easily convey it). ability. Exactly the same thing happens in Gettier cases. 11. are associated with fragility. In have proper aptness just in case the successful outcome manifests our a word. or tes- agree over just which features of the subject’s cognitive character are relevant timony. it’s impossible to say whether Smith 39. which is why I use ‘competence’ broadly. e. The fake-barn case (considered below) involves neither atypical nor inter- the outcome (i. resulting in the water’s boiling anyhow. believes the Pythagorean theorem through. other times of intuition. Gettier ately involved just in case the success manifests it. unworkable. philosophers’ imprint –  7  – vol. water’s not boiling. it involves environmental failure. We desired Greco to provide an account of our ability’s appropriate My solution to the Gettier problem is that knowledge is adept belief. since it can’t be settled dispositions. But then “good” luck strikes: the damaged circuit but it still fails to manifest the power because something intervenes in the starts afire.39 I treat ‘manifests’ as primitive. fire. involvement in success.. e. must be reliable.. at worst. He could answer that we (i. They actually have more than just a quadruple-A structure. their believing the truth) does not manifest their competence. familiar pattern. We recognize in them the same thing we recognize Sosa identified a triple-A structure for performances.38 To Sosa’s three I add adeptness.) I use ‘cognitive competence’ inclu. it illuminates what some out. particularly manifestation. since I cannot responsibly treat the issue here. The inclusion of ‘relevant’ doesn’t render the suggestion objectionably vague.. Gettier cases appear to be interventional failures. relying on our robust prethe. Absent details. A disposition. Absent details. See Section 7 for more details. Sosa. A disposition in fire. It’s included because there’s no informative way of specifying in ad- vance what the relevant disposition(s) will be.. 8 (april 2011) . carafe’s outcome fails to strikes: the magnetron is disabled. etc. ability. it’s here. no. oretical understanding of it. For beliefs. Breaking and cracking. Commentators criticized Zagzebski’s special because relation as ob- sively to cover any reliable cognitive disposition. of introspection. other times presently irrelevant details. The same is true generally of the relation between outcomes and to knowledge. and Greco (and others in the virtue epistemology camp) dis. you know Q just in case your truly believing Q manifests your attractive proposals got right. being carefully packed and remaining intact are not. it deepens our understanding of knowledge by performance is adept just in case its succeeding manifests the agent’s illuminating its relationship to other concepts fundamental to our way competence. but I set aside the of perception.. Section 1). I aim to avoid this dispute at present. But it avoids all those charges or virtue. I The manifest failure in Gettier cases resembles the manifest failure distinguish between atypical failure and interventional failure. Let me elaborate this fourth point. Fourth. etc. it places Gettier cases in a Gettier problem. e. The microwave initiates even if an item’s being fragile frequently causes it to remain intact by be- a process that would normally result in the water’s boiling. ventional failure. Sometimes it will be a power 38. etc. say. of thinking about the world. so they don’t know. intuition.40 Second. but this success to provide an account of proper aptness. skill. reasoning. the water’s boiling) from manifesting the micro. fire exemplifies that same pattern. First. and can explain phenomena that con- cognitive competence. or my engineering skill (I devised a lever to be. wave’s boiling power. Elsewhere I question whether impossible to say whether this outcome manifests my herculean physical the relevant disposition. the Gettier subject is a manifest failure. Third. and uninformative. so they succeed in a sense. The boulder resides at the top of the hill. power. More fully spelled ages an elegant theory of knowledge. adeptness is truth manifesting competence. Here I assume it must strength (I carried it up the hill). We desired Sosa subjects believe the truth. By contrast fire’s outcome (i.

Greco speaks of true beliefs “revealing reliable cog- nitive character” (2003: 123. Totally unaware of our machinations. was a barn. and his belief is true. 2007). More recently Sosa has tarried over it.14. but we recently secretly populated the surrounding countryside premises. Greco and Sosa both mention “alternative” proposals that strongly suggest Meet Bad Henry. On that basis he knowledge. which is a virtue of the view. I don’t pretend that my discussion here settles all questions related to knowl. The latest experiments suggest the gravitation. He you “manifest” when believing conscientiously (2003: 127). Fortunately my pro. But had he instead set eyes on to be theoretically ideal in some ways.41 ordinary case Henry’s belief is adept — his truly believing manifests his My proposal also can help explain why knowledge from falsehood perceptual competence.7 x 10 – 11 m3/ks2 or that pi equals ex. But I recognize that some value for pi. nice barn … now was a nice barn — ha!” He destroyed the al constant equals 6.43 We might nevertheless reason from these false premises to from the ordinary case. action reveals character.693 x 10 – 11 m3/ks2 (Fixler et. retrieves his bazooka. (Thanks to Pavel Davydov for convincing me posed definition of knowledge can be adjusted to accommodate it without that it was worth mentioning this view in this context. indeed. truly believing Q manifests your cognitive competence. in the modified case Henry doesn’t know it’s a as opposed to approximately. 11. he would have falsely believed it doesn’t matter if we believe that the gravitational constant is exactly. ing accuracy at the roadside barn he sees. better) account of knowledge. Call this the approximation (or ity worth considering. Compare Warfield 2005: 414. So your view gives the wrong verdict. much to our benefit (2009). I begin with an has an area greater than fifty square meters. junct to my proposal in the main text: You know Q just in case either your A related issue is whether you can know a proposition that is approxi. I claim only that we have located a principled explana. My solution directly builds upon and enhances the in. strictly speaking. Now change the case — Henry still sees the is possible. ing Q manifests your cognitive competence. Now we can simply append a dis- tion for why it is possible. Indeed one might view my Objection: “Your view can’t handle the fake-barn case. when Henry sees a barn. fails but nearly succeeds an approximation. Intuitively. Or by relying on that deny that my view gives the wrong verdict. You can proceed competently despite relying on false barn. it’s reach a true conclusion. 6.” though he chooses to not “tarry over an hour. by relying on that value for the gravitational constant. See also Shope 2004: 306. I think this is a possibil. but compare: “what does it mean to say that an (hooligan) Bad Henry is a hooligan who does bad things.) philosophers’ imprint –  8  – vol. so I will try to say more.)42 And for some purposes it any of the numerous nearby fakes. he knows it’s a barn. in the ing the basic idea behind them. john turri Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved competence. So on your view. See Strevens 2008. sacrificing the ability to solve the Gettier problem. much of which is competent and confers to perceive the one real barn in the whole county. other than that the action results from character?” 120). 8 (april 2011) . false.44 argument that Good Henry does know that it’s a barn. and my preferred response is simply to will not crash into Earth due to Earth’s gravity. Greco understands “subjective justification” in terms of dispositions He wants to destroy a barn. adept in the modified case too.” For instance. (Some even consider falsification through idealization believes it’s a barn. and 42. “That sure is a 43. which outcome would manifest competence. Henry happens theorizing and reasoning. we could come to know that a ten-meter-diameter circle others will intuit otherwise. barn. al. Ordinarily solution as a charitable way of interpreting and consistently develop. no. He pulls over after success that “manifests competence. and takes aim with unerr- this promising alternative” (2007: 80). my way of putting things. He will destroy a barn. Sosa speaks of drives out into the country to find one. we I lack the intuition that Good Henry (as I shall call him) does not could come to know that within the next thousand years the Moon know in the modified case. it may even be correct. Call a performance that edge from falsehood. collected as he pulls the trigger. Falsehood in the form of idealization pervades scientific with fake barns. So if his belief is adept in the ordinary case. But nothing about his perceptual relationship to this barn differs actly 3. he thinks. 44. A Fake Objection sights embodied in these three proposals. or your approximat- mately true but nevertheless. 41. Calm. cool.

And if he lacks the relevant competence. so he doesn’t know. To the four previously mentioned I add amplitude. in which case he does not know. Tiger Woods won the U. I offer three further fatal objection to the amended proposal because knowledge is bound responses to the original objection. Linda Zagzebski. ern Ontario. then his truly believ- that to overwhelm also requires amplitude. 8 (april 2011) . 2005: Chapter 5. Does knowledge alone require amplitude? If so. Open playing on a 45. so he fails to believe adeptly. philosophers’ imprint –  9  – vol. and especially Christopher Kane. For help with this paper. and two anonymous referees for Philosophers’ Imprint. But this response probably rules out too much. g. Nevertheless. Sosa requires such for apt performance (2007). Angelo Turri. to gracious audiences at Wayne State University and the University of West- 47. so he does not know. I imagine that those attracted to the view that your “practical environment” can affect what you know might have principled grounds for disagreeing. (You might think this victory manifests skill more than a victory under normal con- Bad Henry knowingly destroyed a barn. 11. See e. We then propose that knowledge is ample belief. bane of barns. it would not mark a But suppose I’m wrong about that. john turri Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved barn. 2007.) We should want to allow the same for more purely a barn as he pulled the trigger. from the very spot that Good Henry stood gazing. Those attracted to festation of competence in normal conditions. We begin with a natural extension to our theory just happened to shoot at the only barn around. He is forever after known as damaged knee and multiply fractured leg. A per- “barns” were holograms. you must not only succeed. understood as ample be- Another response is that adept performance requires the mani- lief.S. Bad Henry de- of performance-assessment. Thanks also 46. So knowledge. Sharifa Mohamed. he had to know it was a intellectual competences. So Good Henry cases the same way my earlier proposal did. To overwhelm an opponent ing cannot manifest the competence. the intuition remains: Bad Hen- formance is safe just in case it (i) succeeds and (ii) would not easily ry knew he was destroying a barn. He feels no remorse. knows too.46 safety manifesting your skill. If someone temporarily operates under conditions that make success unusually difficult.45 Bad Henry does know it’s a barn. A performance day. And since ample I submit that Bad Henry knows it’s a barn only if Good Henry belief requires adept belief. in competition. All the other is ample just in case its safety manifests the agent’s competence. Olivia Tang. shares its modal profile with another relation. Hawthorne 2004: Chapter 4. Performances have a quintuple-A struc- stroyed the very barn that Good Henry gazed upon earlier that same ture. Duncan Pritchard. but do so with a margin of and the view gives the desired verdict. I thank Pavel Davydov. One response is that while in Fake to be unique in some respect. To know that. Henry’s took aim. Greco suggests something similar (2007: section 5). he might nonethe- less perform adeptly. So he did know it was a barn as he have failed. Indeed. His victory manifested “Bad Henry. Glen Koehn. But locating something else with a simi- Barn Country. He knew he was destroying ditions does. I submit barns. Bruce Russell.” He is bad — very bad. skill despite the inhospitable abnormal conditions. no. barn as he took aim. the modified proposal handles our Gettier knows it’s a barn. So he did know it was a barn. Fantl and McGrath 2002. 48 abnormal environment for the perceptual discrimination of barns.47 Henry occupies an this third response thus might liken knowledge to overwhelming a fact. In that case. Henry lacks the perceptual competence to discriminate lar modal profile would add credibility to this third response. John Greco. and Stanley 48. A third response involves a natural but more radical change to my Now we add the twist: Bad Henry was in Fake Barn Country and theory of knowledge. belief is adept but not ample. Ernest Sosa.

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