G.R. No.

L-23004 June 30, 1965

MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and MANILA STOCK EXCHANGE,
respondents.
Hermenegildo B. Reyes for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent Securities
and Exchange Commission.Norberto J. Quisumbing and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando for
respondent Manila Stock Exchange.

BENGZON, C.J.:

This is a review of the resolution of the Securities and Exchange Commission which would deny
the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc., permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not
to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.

Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. contends that the Commission has
no power to impose it and that, anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust.
Under the law, no stock exchange may do business in the Philippines unless it is previously
registered with the Commission by filing a statement containing the information described in
Sec. 17 of the Securities Act (Commonwealth Act 83, as amended).
It is assumed that the Commission may permit registration if the section is complied with; if not,
it may refuse. And there is now no question that the section has been complied with, or would
be complied with, except that the Makati Stock Exchange, upon challenging this particular
requirement of the Commission (rule against double listing) may be deemed to have shown
inability or refusal to abide by its rules, and thereby to have given ground for denying
registration. [Sec. 17 (a) (1) and (d)].

Such rule provides: "... nor shall a security already listed in any securities exchange be listed
anew in any other securities exchange ... ."

The objection of Makati Stock Exchange, Inc., to this rule is understandable. There is actually
only one securities exchange The Manila Stock Exchange that has been operating alone
for the past 25 years; and all or presumably all available or worthwhile securities for
trading in the market are now listed there. In effect, the Commission permits the Makati Stock
Exchange, Inc., to deal only with other securities. Which is tantamount to permitting a store to
open provided it sells only those goods not sold in other stores. And if there's only one existing
store, 1 the result is a monopoly.
It is not farfetched to assert as petitioner does 2 that for all practical purposes, the
Commission's order or resolution would make it impossible for the Makati Stock Exchange to
operate. So, its "permission" amounted to a "prohibition."
Apparently, the Commission acted "in the public interest." 3 Hence, it is pertinent to inquire
whether the Commission may "in the public interest" prohibit (or make impossible) the
establishment of another stock exchange (besides the Manila Stock Exchange), on the ground
that the operation of two or more exchanges adversely affects the public interest.
At first glance, the answer should be in the negative, because the law itself contemplated, and,
therefore, tacitly permitted or tolerated at least, the operation of two or more exchanges.
Wherever two or more exchanges exist, the Commission, by order, shall require and enforce
uniformity of trading regulations in and/or between said exchanges. [Emphasis Ours] (Sec. 28b-
13, Securities Act.)
In fact, as admitted by respondents, there were five stock exchanges in Manila, before the
Pacific War (p. 10, brief), when the Securities Act was approved or amended. (Respondent
Commission even admits that dual listing was practiced then.) So if the existence of more than
one exchange were contrary to public interest, it is strange that the Congress having from time
to time enacted legislation amending the Securities Act, 4 has not barred multiplicity of
exchanges.
Forgetting for the moment the monopolistic aspect of the Commission's resolution, let us
examine the authority of the Commission to promulgate and implement the rule in question.
It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to
him by the statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
In its brief and its resolution now subject to review, the Commission cites no provision expressly
supporting its rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the power is "necessary for the execution of
the functions vested in it"; but it makes no explanation, perhaps relying on the reasons
advanced in support of its position that trading of the same securities in two or more stock
exchanges, fails to give protection to the investors, besides contravening public interest. (Of
this, we shall treat later) .
On the legality of its rule, the Commission's argument is that: (a) it was approved by the
Department Head before the War; and (b) it is not in conflict with the provisions of the
Securities Act. In our opinion, the approval of the Department, 5 by itself, adds no weight in a
judicial litigation; and the test is not whether the Act forbids the Commission from imposing a
prohibition, but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit. No specific portion of the
statute has been cited to uphold this power. It is not found in sec. 28 (of the Securities Act),
which is entitled "Powers (of the Commission) with Respect to Exchanges and Securities." 6
According to many court precedents, the general power to "regulate" which the Commission has
(Sec. 33) does not imply authority to prohibit." 7
The Manila Stock Exchange, obviously the beneficiary of the disputed rule, contends that the
power may be inferred from the express power of the Commission to suspend trading in a
security, under said sec. 28 which reads partly:
And if in its opinion, the public interest so requires, summarily to suspend trading in any
registered security on any securities exchange ... . (Sec. 28[3], Securities Act.)
However, the Commission has not acted nor claimed to have acted in pursuance of such
authority, for the simple reason that suspension under it may only be for ten days. Indeed, this
section, if applicable, precisely argues against the position of the Commission because the
"suspension," if it is, and as applied to Makati Stock Exchange, continues for an indefinite
period, if not forever; whereas this Section 28 authorizes suspension for ten days only. Besides,
the suspension of trading in the security should not be on one exchange only, but on all
exchanges; bearing in mind that suspension should be ordered "for the protection of investors"
(first par., sec. 28) in all exchanges, naturally, and if "the public interest so requires" [sec. 28(3)].
This brings up the Commission's principal conclusions underlying its determination viz.: (a) that
the establishment of another exchange in the environs of Manila would be inimical to the public
interest; and (b) that double or multiple listing of securities should be prohibited for the
"protection of the investors."
(a) Public Interest Having already adverted to this aspect of the matter, and the emerging
monopoly of the Manila Stock Exchange, we may, at this juncture, emphasize that by restricting
free competition in the marketing of stocks, and depriving the public of the advantages thereof
the Commission all but permits what the law punishes as monopolies as "crimes against public
interest." 8
"A stock exchange is essentially monopolistic," the Commission states in its resolution (p. 14-a,
Appendix, Brief for Petitioner). This reveals the basic foundation of the Commission's process of
reasoning. And yet, a few pages afterwards, it recalls the benefits to be derived "from the
existence of two or more exchanges," and the desirability of "a healthy and fair competition in
the securities market," even as it expresses the belief that "a fair field of competition among
stock exchanges should be encouraged only to resolve, paradoxically enough, that Manila
Stock Exchange shall, in effect, continue to be the only stock exchange in Manila or in the
Philippines.
"Double listing of a security," explains the Commission, "divides the sellers and the buyers, thus
destroying the essence of a stock exchange as a two-way auction market for the securities,
where all the buyers and sellers in one geographical area converge in one defined place, and
the bidders compete with each other to purchase the security at the lowest possible price and
those seeking to sell it compete with each other to get the highest price therefor. In this sense, a
stock exchange is essentially monopolistic."
Inconclusive premises, for sure. For it is debatable whether the buyer of stock may get the
lowest price where all the sellers assemble in only one place. The price there, in one sale, will
tend to fix the price for the succeeding, sales, and he has no chance to get a lower price except
at another stock exchange. Therefore, the arrangement desired by the Commission may, at
most, be beneficial to sellers of stock not to buyers although what applies to buyers should
obtain equally as to sellers (looking for higher prices). Besides, there is the brokerage fee which
must be considered. Not to mention the personality of the broker.
(b) Protection of investors. At any rate, supposing the arrangement contemplated is
beneficial to investors (as the Commission says), it is to be doubted whether it is "necessary" for
their "protection" within the purview of the Securities Act. As the purpose of the Act is to give
adequate and effective protection to the investing public against fraudulent representations, or
false promises and the imposition of worthless ventures, 9 it is hard to see how the proposed
concentration of the market has a necessary bearing to the prevention of deceptive devices or
unlawful practices. For it is not mere semantics to declare that acts for the protection of
investors are necessarily beneficial to them; but not everything beneficial to them is necessary
for their protection.
And yet, the Commission realizes that if there were two or more exchanges "the same security
may sell for more in one exchange and sell for less in the other. Variance in price of the same
security would be the rule ... ." Needless to add, the brokerage rates will also differ.
This, precisely, strengthens the objection to the Commission's ruling. Such difference in prices
and rates gives the buyer of shares alternative options, with the opportunity to invest at lower
expense; and the seller, to dispose at higher prices. Consequently, for the investors' benefit
(protection is not the word), quality of listing 10 should be permitted, nay, encouraged, and other
exchanges allowed to operate. The circumstance that some people "made a lot of money due to
the difference in prices of securities traded in the stock exchanges of Manila before the war" as
the Commission noted, furnishes no sufficient reason to let one exchange corner the market. If
there was undue manipulation or unfair advantage in exchange trading the Commission should
have other means to correct the specific abuses.
Granted that, as the Commission observes, "what the country needs is not another" market for
securities already listed on the Manila Stock Exchange, but "one that would focus its attention
and energies on the listing of new securities and thus effectively help in raising capital sorely
needed by our ... unlisted industries and enterprises."
Nonetheless, we discover no legal authority for it to shore up (and stifle) free enterprise and
individual liberty along channels leading to that economic desideratum. 11
The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange may legally obtain a
permit (sec. 17, Securities Act); it is not for the Commission to impose others. If the existence of
two competing exchanges jeopardizes public interest which is doubtful let the Congress
speak. 12 Undoubtedly, the opinion and recommendation of the Commission will be given weight
by the Legislature, in judging whether or not to restrict individual enterprise and business
opportunities. But until otherwise directed by law, the operation of exchanges should not be so
regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the establishment of other stock
exchanges and thereby contravening:
(a) the organizers' (Makati's) Constitutional right to equality before the law;
(b) their guaranteed civil liberty to pursue any lawful employment or trade; and
(c) the investor's right to choose where to buy or to sell, and his privilege to select the brokers in
his employment. 13
And no extended elucidation is needed to conclude that for a licensing officer to deny license
solely on the basis of what he believes is best for the economy of the country may amount to
regimentation or, in this instance, the exercise of undelegated legislative powers and discretion.
Thus, it has been held that where the licensing statute does not expressly or impliedly
authorize the officer in charge, he may not refuse to grant a license simply on the ground
that a sufficient number of licenses to serve the needs of the public have already been
issued. (53 C.J.S. p. 636.)
Concerning res judicata. Calling attention to the Commission's order of May 27, 1963, which
Makati Stock did not appeal, the Manila Stock Exchange pleads the doctrine of res judicata. 14
(The order now reviewed is dated May 7, 1964.)
It appears that when Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. presented its articles of incorporation to the
Commission, the latter, after making some inquiries, issued on May 27, 1963, an order reading
as follows.
Let the certificate of incorporation of the MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE be issued, and if the
organizers thereof are willing to abide by the foregoing conditions, they may file the proper
application for the registration and licensing of the said Exchange.
In that order, the Commission advanced the opinion that "it would permit the establishment and
operation of the proposed Makati Stock Exchange, provided ... it shall not list for trading on its
board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange ... ."
Admittedly, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. has not appealed from that order of May 27, 1963.
Now, Manila Stock insists on res judicata.
Why should Makati have appealed? It got the certificate of incorporation which it wanted. The
condition or proviso mentioned would only apply if and when it subsequently filed the application
for registration as stock exchange. It had not yet applied. It was not the time to question the
condition; 15 Makati was still exploring the convenience of soliciting the permit to operate subject
to that condition. And it could have logically thought that, since the condition did not affect its
articles of incorporation, it should not appeal the order (of May 27, 1963) which after all, granted
the certificate of incorporation (corporate existence) it wanted at that time.
And when the Makati Stock Exchange finally found that it could not successfully operate with
the condition attached, it took the issue by the horns, and expressing its desire for registration
and license, it requested that the condition (against double listing) be dispensed with. The order
of the Commission denying, such request is dated May 7, 1964, and is now under, review.
Indeed, there can be no valid objection to the discussion of this issue of double listing now, 16
because even if the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. may be held to have accepted the permission
to operate with the condition against double listing (for having failed to appeal the order of May
27, 1963), still it was not precluded from afterwards contesting 17 the validity of such condition or
rule:
(1) An agreement (which shall not be construed as a waiver of any constitutional right or any
right to contest the validity of any rule or regulation) to comply and to enforce so far as is within
its powers, compliance by its members, with the provisions of this Act, and any amendment
thereto, and any rule or regulation made or to be made thereunder. (See. 17-a-1, Securities Act
[Emphasis Ours].)
Surely, this petition for review has suitably been coursed. And making reasonable allowances
for the presumption of regularity and validity of administrative action, we feel constrained to
reach the conclusion that the respondent Commission possesses no power to impose the
condition of the rule, which, additionally, results in discrimination and violation of constitutional
rights.
ACCORDINGLY, the license of the petition to operate a stock exchange is approved without
such condition. Costs shall be paid by the Manila Stock Exchange. So ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.Barrera, J., is on leave.

RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents.
Balgos & Perez and Bugaring, Tugonon & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
Juan G. Atencia for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:p

The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng mga
barangay or the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case.

On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of

Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the
Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in Virac,
Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its
officers.
Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of
Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres of Baras. The
Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial Government Operation
Officer (PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz,
Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the
Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer.
Chosen as members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales.
Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC:
President Ruperto Taule
Vice-President Allan Aquino
Secretary Vicente Avila
Treasurer Fidel Jacob
Auditor Leo Sales 1
On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,* protesting the election of the
officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the
manner it was conducted. 2
In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of
the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent Governor denying the alleged
irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the
election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting
for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the
duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. 3
On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the
officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be
conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the
Department of Local Government. 4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but it was denied
by respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989. 5
In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of
respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;
2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an election protest;
3) Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or
not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the
election;
The Katipunan ng mga Barangay is the organization of all sangguniang barangays in the
following levels: in municipalities to be known as katipunang bayan; in cities, katipunang
panlungsod; in provinces, katipunang panlalawigan; in regions, katipunang pampook; and on
the national level, katipunan ng mga barangay. 6
The Local Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan ng mga barangay
at all levels shall be organized:
Sec. 110. Organization. (1) The katipunan at all levels shall be organized in the following
manner:
(a) The katipunan in each level shall elect a board of directors and a set of officers. The
president of each level shall represent the katipunan concerned in the next higher level of
organization.
(b) The katipunan ng mga barangay shall be composed of the katipunang pampook, which shall
in turn be composed of the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the katipunang
panlungsod. The presidents of the katipunang bayan in each province shall constitute the
katipunang panlalawigan. The katipunang panlungsod and the katipunang bayan shall be
composed of the punong barangays of cities and municipalities, respectively.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government
Code empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars and the rules and
regulations to carry out the various administrative actions required for the initial implementation
of this Code in such a manner as will ensure the least disruption of on-going programs and
projects 7 issued Department of Local Government Circular No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989, 8 to
provide the guidelines for the conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga
Barangay at the municipal, city, provincial, regional and national levels.
It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction
upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the
FABC, the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's theory that under
Article IX, C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials.
On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent Secretary that any violation of the
guidelines as set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and would vest upon
the Department jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be filed in relation thereto.
Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Elections shall
exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987
Constitution expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 9
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to
appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, 10 the sworn petition
contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. A voter may
also contest the election of any barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines by filing a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Court within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of the election. 11
Only appeals from decisions of inferior courts on election matters as aforestated may be
decided by the COMELEC.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over
popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. 12 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. 13
Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of
the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes 14 which do not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan
ng mga barangay. "Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters
involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the
winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute 15 and in the case
of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of the
winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed. 16
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the
katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by
law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The COMELEC exercises only
appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials decided by the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of
the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the
election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level
conducted by their own respective organization. 17
However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain
any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set
forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, **
the respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and on
the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."
Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in See. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of
the Administrative Code, to wit:
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies,
functions, plans, programs and projects;
Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule-
making power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law. 18
Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction upon
the respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and
consequently declare an election null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered,
administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. 19 The jurisdiction of administrative
authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them;
they cannot confer it upon themselves. 20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their
determinations. 21
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary
implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction
over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An understanding
of the extent of authority of the Secretary over local governments is therefore necessary if We
are to resolve the issue at hand.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of
general supervision 22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 23 The
general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government. 24
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local government or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority. 25 Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight
over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. 26
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over
local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity
or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do
so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him
control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic
and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local
governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order
that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct
interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted
by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments. 27
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. 28 This state
policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the State shall
guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit
of national development and social progress." 29 To deny the Secretary of Local Government the
power to review the regularity of the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance
the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments.
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by
local government units of such issuances. 30 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check. 31
This is compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local governments which
as earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local
Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and
regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent
Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local governments, it is truly doubtful
if he could enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. 32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of
the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy
of the local government.
Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by respondent
Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and
void, the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not
having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of
the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear the protest. 33
The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which states that
"whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election shall be declared null
and void by the Department of Local Government and an election shall conduct and being
invoked by the Solicitor General cannot be applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July
3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989 elections of the FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory
construction that laws, including circulars and regulations 34 cannot be applied retrospectively. 35
Moreover, such provision is null and void for having been issued in excess of the respondent
Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot confer jurisdiction upon
itself.
As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court finds that respondent Governor has
the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the
membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor,
elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan
and the kabataang barangay provincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of
the sangguniang panlalawigan. 36
As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in
the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the
assembly. If the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable
circumstances and is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan the official actions of the
sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent
governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has already ruled that the respondent
Secretary has no jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the elections.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the validity of the elections should now be
resolved in order to prevent any unnecessary delay that may result from the commencement of
an appropriate action by the parties.
The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section 2.4 of DLG
Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President
shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." The rule specifically
provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-President who shall preside over the
meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., it must be imperative
or mandatory and not merely
permissive, 37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. If it had been intended
that any other official should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in the elections
at the town and city levels 38 as well as the regional level.. 39
It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over
the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision.
On this ground, the elections should be nullified.
Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants shall be constituted to oversee and/or witness the canvassing of votes
and proclamation of winners. The rules confine the role of the Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants to merely overseeing and witnessing the conduct of elections. This is
consistent with the provision in the Local Government Code limiting the authority of the
COMELEC to the supervision of the election. 40
In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the elections. There
was direct participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to what is
dictated by the rules. Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors to oversee the
elections in view of the walk out staged by its two other members, the Provincial COMELEC
Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. The objective of keeping the election free and honest
was therefore compromised.
The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null
and void for failure to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a supplemental petition alleging
that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990,
designated Augusto Antonio as temporary representative of the Federation to the sangguniang
panlalawigan of Catanduanes. 41 By virtue of this memorandum, respondent governor swore
into said office Augusto Antonio on June 14, 1990. 42
The Solicitor General filed his comment on the supplemental petition 43 as required by the
resolution of the Court dated September 13,1990.
In his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the supervening event alleged by petitioner as
something immaterial to the petition. He argues that Antonio's appointment was merely
temporary "until such time that the provincial FABC president in that province has been elected,
appointed and qualified." 44 He stresses that Antonio's appointment was only a remedial
measure designed to cope with the problems brought about by the absence of a representative
of the FABC to the "sanggunian ang panlalawigan."
Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) provides-
(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the vice-governor,
elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan
and the kabataang barangay provincial federation who shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states:
xxx xxx xxx
The sangguniang panlalawigan of each province shall be composed of the governor as
chairman and presiding officer, the vice-governor as presiding officer pro tempore, the elective
sangguniang panlalawigan members, and the appointive members consisting of the president of
the provincial association of barangay councils, and the president of the provincial federation of
the kabataang barangay. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Ignacio vs. Banate Jr. 45 the Court, interpreting similarly worded provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of the sangguniang
panlungsod, 46 declared as null and void the appointment of private respondent Leoncio Banate
Jr. as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing the
katipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay for he lacked the elegibility and qualification required
by law, not being a barangay captain and for not having been elected president of the
association of barangay councils. The Court held that an unqualified person cannot be
appointed a member of the sanggunian, even in an acting capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer, 47 the
appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo Jr. as representative of the youth sector to the sangguniang
panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was never the president of the
kabataang barangay city federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.
In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit.
To be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan is the
president of the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualifications set by
law. 48 The appointing power is bound by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic
qualifications of the appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the
Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint
anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of
barangay councils.
Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the federation but he
was not even present during the elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio was
appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since
Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of being president of the federation, his
appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such
appointment is merely in a temporary capacity. If the intention of the respondent Secretary was
to protect the interest of the federation in the sanggunian, he should have appointed the
incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity. For even under the guidelines, the term of
office of officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their election until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified, without prejudice to the terms of their
appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they may be correspondingly appointed.
49
Since the election is still under protest such that no successor of the incumbent has as yet
qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice but to have the incumbent FABC President sit
as member of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner since he was elected
the president of the federation but not Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the
protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's charge of political interference
by respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays should
be insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true meaning to
local autonomy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the resolution of respondent Secretary dated
August 4, 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held on June 18, 1989 is hereby annulled. A
new election of officers of the federation is hereby ordered to be conducted immediately in
accordance with the governing rules and regulations.
The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of Augusto Antonio as
representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity is declared null and
void.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City over a complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private
respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of title to a subdivision lot. The position of the
petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial court is null and void ab
initio because the case should have been heard and decided by what is now called the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board.
The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June
9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had already
paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid
Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the
corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later,
the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff
asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her
plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
the suit.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction,
this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied.
The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree
providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree." After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her
the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from
1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P
5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. 1
Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, 2 which also
berated the appellant for its obvious efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory
tactics during the trial. The petitioner was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the further
amount of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for realty taxes and registration expenses
despite its inability to deliver the title to the land.
In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of PD
No. 957 itself providing that:
SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition
to any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under existing laws.
and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the (petitioner's) pretension
that the court a quo was bereft of jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion
of the Secretary of Justice as impinging on the authority of the courts of justice. While we are
disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court on the dubious
conduct of the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it on the jurisdictional issue.
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions
Under Presidential Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is
vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority. 3
The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, which confers on
regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading in
part as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).
It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been
promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.
This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has
been held that-
The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act
is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the
land and the other as the law of the particular case. 4
xxx xxx xxx
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change
the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a
qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will
be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
implication. 5
It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.
The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD
No. 957, earlier quoted, is also unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting
concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the Board over the complaint mentioned
in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be lightly inferred or merely implied.
The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve. to the aggrieved party such other
remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of under
the Revised Penal Code. 6
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive
power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any
other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore erroneous for the respondent to brush
aside the well-taken opinion of the Secretary of Justice that-
Such claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer may have against the owner,
developer, dealer or salesman, being a necessary consequence of an adjudication of liability for
non-performance of contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included in
the phrase "claims involving refund and any other claims" used in the aforequoted
subparagraph C of Section 1 of PD No. 1344. The phrase "any other claims" is, we believe,
sufficiently broad to include any and all claims which are incidental to or a necessary
consequence of the claims/cases specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National
Housing Authority under the subject provisions.
The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are recoverable either by
agreement of the parties or pursuant to Art. 2208 of the Civil Code (1) when exemplary
damages are awarded and (2) where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff 's plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
xxx xxx xxx
Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which would deny the
HSRC the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for damages and for attorney's fees
would result in multiplicity of suits in that the subdivision condominium buyer who wins a case in
the HSRC and who is thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be
forced to litigate in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is obviously not in the
contemplation of the law. (Emphasis supplied.) 7
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create
more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities.
Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to
enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. 8
Following this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, 9 the Court
sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the
exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the
parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.
It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of Tropical Homes v.
National Housing Authority 10 is not in point. We upheld in that case the constitutionality of the
procedure for appeal provided for in PD No. 1344, but we did not rule there that the National
Housing Authority and not the Regional Trial Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the cases
enumerated in Section I of the said decree. That is what we are doing now.
It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. 11 The only exception is where the party
raising the issue is barred by estoppel, 12 which does not appear in the case before us. On the
contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court by the
petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to the respondent court.
We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify the
proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE, without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board. No costs.

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA
IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and
APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the
Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission
on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a
decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-
judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated
otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or
other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission
on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing
and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action.
These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or
otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance
of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to
act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to
them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged
at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary
of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at
the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives,
the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the
DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply
and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued
into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed
to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to
answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H).
An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with
P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants
Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others,
named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and
also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the
Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining
order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of
the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally
made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted
in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the
evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents,
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months
of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I).
Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said
dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and
peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition
before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were
filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-
members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too
numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September
27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly
without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . .
(DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No.
90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990,
and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario)
received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman
presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear
the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due
process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass
leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission
thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now
suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of
Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to
appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring
with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of
complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave
to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990
alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has
no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the
"striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-
082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9)
months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590
dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual
petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and
inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders,
file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision
on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion
to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits
within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the
case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking
teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a
chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and
political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its
"utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the
case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint
Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in
behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by
this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its
intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the
merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the
imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers,
(and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or
strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the
Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission,
this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take
appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial
agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear
and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil
or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the
Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its
constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights
existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the
following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within
the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect
for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of
its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to
the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It
may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of
any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or
the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to
conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out,
to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment
on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate,"
cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do
so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to
"resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged
in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not
the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the
Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them;
and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if
any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the
issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the
aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion
to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of
Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence;
whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed
upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil
Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and
making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may
well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of
the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would
be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful
purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary
Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof
can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the
Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to
the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members
thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and
Romero, JJ, concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome
the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case
and in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and
their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and
the latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who
defend the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of strikes
may be laid off because of financial repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the
Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called
"human rights' but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL
LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also
corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in
this case.

# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome
the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case
and in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and
their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and
the latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who
defend the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of strikes
may be laid off because of financial repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the
Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called
"human rights' but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL
LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also
corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in
this case.

G.R. No. L-22754 December 31, 1965

RUBEN A. VILLALUZ, petitioner,
vs.
CALIXTO ZALDIVAR, ET AL., respondents.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo and Juan T. David for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General for
respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office with payment of
back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964.

He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20, 1958 and two days
thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments; that on May 26,
1958 he took his oath of office as such after having been informed of his nomination by then
Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson; that in a letter dated January 28,
1960 addressed to the President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as
Chairman of the Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the latter
informed the former of the findings made by his Committee concerning alleged gross
mismanagement and inefficiency committed by petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office which are
summed up in the letter, as follows: (1) malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the
government; (2) failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the same,
facilitating thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and (3) negligence to remedy
unsatisfactory accounting; that as a result of said findings. Congressman Roces recommended
the replacement of petitioner and of his assistant chief Aurelio de Leon as well as the complete
revamp of the offices coming under the Motor Vehicles Office by the new chief who may be
appointed thereafter; that having been officially informed of the content of said letter, then
Secretary of Public Works and Communications furnished petitioner with a copy thereof
requiring him to explain within 72 hours why no administrative action should be taken against
him relative to the charges contained in the letter; that petitioner answered the letter as required
wherein he explained and refuted in detail each and everyone of the charges contained in the
letter of Congressman Roces; that on February 15, 1960, the then Executive Secretary Natalio
P. Castillo suspended petitioner as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, having thereupon
created an investigating committee with the only purpose of investigating the charges against
petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon, and to undertake the investigation a prosecution
panel was created headed by Special Prosecutor Emilio A. Gancayco; that after the
investigation said committee submitted its report to the President of the Philippines who
thereafter issued Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the removal from office of petitioner;
that as a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as acting
administrator; and that, after having been officially notified of his removal, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this was denied, he filed the instant
petition before this Court.
Respondents in their answer denied the claim of petitioner that the charges contained in the
letter of Congressman Roces were not directed against him but against his office in general for
the truth is that he was, specifically charged with mismanagement, gross inefficiency and
negligence in the performance of his duties as Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office, and as a
result he was required to the same within 72 hours to explain why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him. Respondents also denied that petitioner was investigated without being
accorded due process is required by law for in fact he was given every reasonable opportunity
to present his defense, to secure the attendance of witnesses, and to produce documents in his
behalf in a manner consistent with administrative due process. Respondent also averred that
the President of the Philippines, contrary to petitioner's claim, has jurisdiction to investigate and
remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260. Respondents finally averred that
the letter of Congressman Joaquin R. Roces is in effect a valid administrative complaint
because it contained specific charges which constitute just causes for his suspension and
removal; that said charges need not be sworn to for the Chief Executive, as administrative head
of petitioner, is empowered to commence administrative proceedings motu proprio pursuant to
Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, without need of any previous verified complaint. And
as special defense respondents averred that petitioner is guilty of laches for having allowed
almost four years before instituting the present action.
There is merit in the claim that petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government and is such he can only be investigated
and removed from office after due hearing the President of the Philippines under the principle
that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" as can be clearly implied from
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260. Such is what we ruled in the recent case of Ang-Angco
wherein on this point we said:
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the
power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such
can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint
(Lacson v. Romero, supra), but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong, to
the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with
the provision of our Constitution which says that the "Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the head of
departments" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., L-17169,
November 30, 1963).
Consequently, as a corollary to the foregoing ruling, we may state that the Commissioner of Civil
Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges filed against
petitioner because the authority of said Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension,
separation, or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and
employees in the classified service to which classification petitioner does not belong. This is
also what we said in the Ang-Angco case when, in interpreting Section 16 (i) of Republic Act No.
2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified
service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service.
There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as the investigation
and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if he is under the control and
supervision of the Department of Public Works, in view of the reason we have already stated
that he is a presidential appointee who comes exclusively under the jurisdiction of the President.
The following rationale supports this view:
Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all
officers and employees in the executive departments which is now involved by respondent as
justification to override the specific provisions of the Civil Service Act. This power of control is
couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner its extent and scope. Yes, this
Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra, occasion to interpret the extent of such power to
mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter," to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal government,
but the decision does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or
employee in the executive department. Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of
control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only
means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the
performance of his duties.
That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used in administrative law.
Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section 79 (c) is given direct control of all bureaus and
offices under his department by virtue of which he may "repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs
of said bureaus or offices," and under Section 74 of the same Code, the President's control over
the executive department only refers to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a
settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, body or individual,
and it cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of control
over a specific policy of government. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., supra)
With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings conducted against petitioner which
led to his separation are illegal simply because the charges preferred against him by
Congressman Roces were not sworn to as required by Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260, this
much we can say: said proceedings having been commenced against petitioner upon the
authority of the Chief Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the same may be
commenced by him motu proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to Executive
Order No. 370, series of 1941, the pertinent provisions of which are is follows:
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer or employee by the
head or chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or upon complaint of any person
which shall be subscribed under oath by the complainant: Provided, That if a complaint is not or
cannot be sworn to by the complainant, the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned may
in his discretion, take action thereon if the public interest or the special circumstances of the
case, so warrant.1
Finally, on the theory that the instant petition partakes of the nature of quo warranto which seeks
petitioners reinstatement to his former position as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, we
are of the opinion that it has now no legal raison d'etre for having been filed more than one year
after its cause of action had accrued. As this Court has aptly said: "a delay of slightly over one
(1) year was considered sufficient ... to be an action for mandamus, by reason of laches or
abandonment of office. We see no reason to depart from said view in the present case,
petitioner herein having allowed about a year and a half to elapse before seeking
reinstatement." (Jose V. Lacson, et al., L-10177, May 17, 1957).
WHEREFORE, petition is denied. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Bengzon,
JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President of Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muoz, Nueva
Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his
capacity as DECS Secretary; ATTY. RENO CAPINPIN, Director III, DECS, in his capacity as
Chairman, Investigating Committee; DALMACIO CASISON, in his capacity and as
Member, Investigating Committee; EDUARDO PARAY, LUIS CASTRO, HIPOLITO
MALAMUG, NEMESIO TORRES and NOLASCO HIPOLITO, respondents.
No. 103570 June 9, 1992
DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President, Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muoz, Nueva
Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as DECS
Secretary; MARINA S.J. PANGAN, in her capacity as Asst. Secretary of DECS and DR.
FORTUNATO BATTAD, respondents.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:p
I
The Court NOTED the sixth motion for extension of time to submit a comment to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition, (G.R. No. 101666) filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public
respondents Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports ("DECS"), and Resolved to DISPENSE with the comment required of the public
respondents, considering that the pleadings and other papers already filed by the other parties
in this case are adequate to enable the Court to act upon the present petition.
II
On 6 May 1991, President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order ("AO") No. 218
dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz for cause from his office as President of the Central Luzon
State University ("CLSU"). 1
In two (2) orders dated 2 July 1991 and 3 September 1991, the Executive Secretary, acting by
authority of the President, denied petitioner's first and second motions for reconsideration
therefrom, the first for lack of merit and the second for being pro forma. Consequently, AO No.
218 became final and executory. 2
On 1 October 1991, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) with the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-
12656. 3 Petitioner there sought to annul, as products of grave abuse of discretion, President
Aquino's order dated 13 September 1991 appointing Dr. Fortunato Battad as the new CLSU
President, as well as DECS Undersecretary Marina Pangan's order dated 24 September 1991
directing petitioner to turn-over the CLSU Presidency to Dr. Battad. The Court of Appeals issued
the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 4
Eight days later, on 9 October 1991, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the present petition
(G.R. No. 101666) for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO for the purpose of
annulling, for alleged grave abuse of discretion, the issuance of AO No. 218 as well as of the
orders of the Executive Secretary denying his motions for reconsideration therefrom. 5 The
Court did not issue the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 6 This petition made no mention of the
petition for prohibition with prayer for TRO filed 8 days earlier with the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. No. SP-21656).
On 9 January 1992, the Court's Circular No. 28-91 dated 3 September 1991 having gone into
effect on 1 January 1992, petitioner filed a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992,
where for the first time, he disclosed to this Court the other judicial proceedings which he had
commenced in connection with the issuance of AO No. 210. 7
On 29 January 1992, after due proceedings, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in
CA-G.R. No. SP-26165, dismissing the petition for lack of merit and finding the same to be a
case of forum shopping. 8 Petitioner sought review of this decision by way of a petition for
review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, which petition was docketed as G.R. No. 103570
and assigned to the Second Division. 9 This case was consolidated with G.R. No. 101666, by
this time pending with the Court En Banc, by a resolution dated 2 April 1992.
Meanwhile, on 28 January 1992, the Court issued a resolution requiring petitioner to show
cause why the petition in G.R. No. 101666 should not be dismissed as an apparent case of
forum shopping, considering that the parties involved, issues raised and the reliefs sought
therein are substantially identical with those in CA-G.R. No. SP-26165. 10
Petitioner submitted a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992 obviously in
anticipation of the 29 January 1992 Resolution of the Court, as well as an undated compliance
filed on 2 March 1992 in response to the same resolution. He denies having engaged in forum
shopping and contends: (1) his cause of action in CA-G.R. No. SP-26156 consists of the
illegality of the actions taken by the Office of the President and by the DECS in implementing
AO No. 218, which may render moot the Court's review of the intrinsic merits of AO No. 218, an
entirely different cause of action in itself; and (2) he never attempted to hide the fact, either
before this Court or the Court of Appeals, that he had instituted both actions "for separate
reasons, apart though related from each other," such candor being "an elementary
consideration in the determination of the issue whether he committed forum shopping or not." 11
Deliberating on the present consolidated Petitions, the Court finds the explanations proffered by
petitioner and his counsel as justifications for the procedural maneuvers undertaken in this case
to be completely unsatisfactory and considers the Petitions to be clear cases of deliberate forum
shopping.
The Court views with considerable disfavor the legal maneuvers undertaken by petitioner and
his counsel of record, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra, to defeat his removal from office. It is evident
that petitioner, in violation of Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, had split a single cause of
action consisting of the alleged illegality of his removal from office by the President through AO
No. 218, by seeking judicial review of (1) AO 218 with the Court and at the same time (2) having
the enforcement aspect of the President's action and the filling up of the resulting vacancy
reviewed by the Court of Appeals. It also appears to the Court that petitioner carried out these
acts in order to obtain a TRO (albeit with a limited twenty-day lifetime) from the Court of
Appeals, issued as a matter of course, in order to stop the execution and implementation of AO
No. 218, and afterwards, to try to get a TRO with an indefinite lifetime from this Court for the
same purpose, in case his petition in the main action of CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 would be
dismissed on the merits by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, during the period when the proceedings in G.R. No. 101666 and CA-G.R. No. SP-
26165 were simultaneously pending action before two (2) different for a petitioner created for
himself a situation where he could hope to get (after the 20-day life of the Court of Appeals
TRO) a judicial order from either forum which could stop the execution of AO No. 218 with more
permanency (i.e., either a TRO with an indefinite lifetime from the Supreme Court or the grant of
his petition for prohibition by the Court of Appeals). Thus the Court of Appeals, aware of the
institution of G.R. No. 101666, 12 committed no reversible error in considering the action before
it as another, independent case and as an instance of forum shopping.
Petitioner sought to maintain the two (2) segments of his single causes of action again by
instituting G.R. No. 103570, in a bid to ensure that the decision on the merits in CA-G.R. No.
SP-26165 will not attain finality and enforceability, even though the matters involved therein are
essentially the incidents of the case already pending review in G.R. No. 101666.
Forum shopping effected by a party litigant through the deliberate splitting of causes of actions
and appeals in the hope that even as one case (in which a particular remedy is sought) is
dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open, is a deplorable practice
because it results in the unnecessary clogging of the already heavily burdened dockets of the
courts. 13
Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court on 11 January 1983, relative
to the implementation of section 9 of BP 129, granting the Intermediate Appellate Court (now the
Court of Appeals) equal original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, etc., whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, provides that if such a petition
is filed before the Court of Appeals and is still pending therein, a similar petition cannot be filed
in the Supreme Court. A violation of this rule has also been considered a clear case of forum
shopping, an act of malpractice proscribed as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. The Rule itself provides that a violation thereof constitutes: (1) cause for the
summary dismissal of both petitions; and (2) contempt of court for which the party or counsel
concerned may be held accountable. 14
The pretended candor of petitioner and his counsel here does not persuade. Petitioner never
informed the Court of the existence of CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 when he filed his petition in G.R.
No. 101666, the first opportunity available to him to be completely candid with the Court. It was
the private respondents in their comment to the petition filed on 16 November 1991, who gave
the Court first notice of the other proceeding. 15 It is obvious that petitioner filed his subsequent
manifestation because he was no longer able to deny the existence of the proceeding before
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's attempt to trifle with the highest court of the land in this
manner renders him liable for forum shopping. 16
III
In addition to the foregoing, the Court deliberated upon the merits of the consolidated Petitions
and considers that petitioner has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without
or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents in rendering the assailed
administrative orders.
Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to
an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented
against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. 17 There is no doubt that he has
been accorded his rights.
AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed from
office. Those findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive
Vice-President, offered new academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects resulting in
wastage of university property, all without the necessary approval of the Board of Regents; (b)
he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of chemicals unsuitable for the required school
purposes from a firm owned by him; (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales
agreement in favor of a company where he was holding a directorship; and (d) he collected
financial contributions from the faculty and students in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No.
5546. 18 These acts constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and furnish legal basis for
dismissal from the public service. 19
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. No. 101666, as well as the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 103570, are hereby DISMISSED as clear cases of forum
shopping and for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A,-G.R, No. SP-26165
dated 29 January 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra. is hereby ADMONISHED and WARNED that
repetition of the same or similar acts of forum shopping will be more severely punished. A copy
of this Resolution shall be attached to the personal record of Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra in the
office of the Bar Confidant. Costs against petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero and Bellosillo, JJ, concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25,
and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming
powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental
liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to
decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad
duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful
guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the
Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the
Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other
interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in
the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of
Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed
its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the
admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other
supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent
appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the
United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years
on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on
each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum
Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a
panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and
assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found
that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the
request and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through
counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers
submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall
have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the
proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access
to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic
Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13,
1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing
requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting
documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the
sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the
extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the
Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes
the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as
evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine
whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been
complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will
be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and
documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United
States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts
authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government
and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further
disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this
particular extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Department's
denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides
that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No.
1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are
a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be
effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the
extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment
on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly
and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United
States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to
Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared
in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was
denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents
and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts
complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United
States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition
with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the
petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of
this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed
upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition
to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS
COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO
THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION
TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION
FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS
TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES
UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE,
FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as
prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or
persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from
enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No.
99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed,
filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent.
However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel
us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of
notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial
court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us
now), while a negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this
Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the
filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that
private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments
and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And
assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private
respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the
substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition
therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition
Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law.
Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged
and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by
the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other
instruments having equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the
name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or
omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation
or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request
together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of
evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive
authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and
probable location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for
which extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the
execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4
of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable
cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying
documents received in support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or
consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No.
052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if
the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military
penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its
supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the
same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in
his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer
designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or
city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2],
ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall,
as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to
answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of
arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best
serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the
prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal,
civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the
hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable
and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the
hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon
application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and
giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss
the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose
decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules
of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the
aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable
based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for
which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition
Treaty).1wphi1.nt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query
presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice
is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to
him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the
extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to
determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly
provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the
ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was
failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the
extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the
following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request,
apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly
evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary
at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a
post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice,
indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its
responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the
completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with
the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner
ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to
evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able
to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this
stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be furnished the
request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a
reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the
opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of
private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one
abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign
Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the
instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the
extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of
evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of
Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that
it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the
requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not
privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys.
How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more
authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself.
It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an
exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to
make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b)
to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the
crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph
[3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an
administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence;
(b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993
ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also
known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the
records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its
jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records,
reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a
useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial
functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the
functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise
judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect
thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise
of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it.
Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on
the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate
extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and
obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to
determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and,
therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial
and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be
effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether
or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is
characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition
process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective
extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in
case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought
pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he
shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4).
Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested
person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on
this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State,
the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested
(Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request
is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the
Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for,
and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner
himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we
had occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as
pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly
available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings,
such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p.
135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against
self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a
criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is
charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if
found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]),
pointed out that the revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater
deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a
respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we
therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative
proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty.
There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court,
citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or
criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture
can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be
civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be
criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not
involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or
property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does
the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected
rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited
property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond
recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual
extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the
process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both
procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the
person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary
investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can
possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's
Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his
preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty
in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It
had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced
by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of
the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserved
these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs.
California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-
compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord
common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in
exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their
respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed
and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which
make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from
earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The
requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not
denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to
avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the
due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the
course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78).
Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to
certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden
vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade
not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-
observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified
of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to
appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz,
Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting
him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting
documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten
days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public
servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the
padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments
which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of
a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the
person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent
taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not
been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite
noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based
on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition
proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty
to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing
statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the
return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged
with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the
requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional
facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation
that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was
committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that
prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S.
406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and
must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a
copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an
affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging
instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer
jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A
statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or
judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand or
requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the
right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410,
citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d
853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the
executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the
alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of
the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated
September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing
the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination
of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial
decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases,
requests for the provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine
Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a
provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the
diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the
Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration
confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that
under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition
proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and
that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures
admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective
extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to
consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the
foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and
jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the
applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having
received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with
having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country
requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions
pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary
examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the
alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's
extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of
State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an
individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may
present whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final
determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends
with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and
the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the
power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting,
it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request,
and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the
request to the Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition.
Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over
the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request
as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for
extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the
person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation
stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation
process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper
state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more,
than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no
right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution
but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it
is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution.
Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the
strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even
as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376
[1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted
persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked
proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do
not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a
disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there
is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In
interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory
statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the
extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly
jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the
executive authority of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting
state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he
shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition
since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with
jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in
assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the
U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in
Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to
take place between the lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department.
With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated
period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently
necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is
private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation
procedure. On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an
administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The
grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as
Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after
the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue
of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the
"accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed
with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes
Section 7 of Article III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines,
namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of
access to official records documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right
to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official
records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may
be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104)
and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1,
1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in
the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent
argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of
purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected
by the matters requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the
right is the one directly affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act
of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This
concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of
an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the
real party in interest is the people and any citizen has "standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a
direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he
actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly
the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding,
he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of
the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p.
337). Such information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government
action from the U.S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken.
Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.S.
Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the
extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a
Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the
interests necessary for the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation
procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence
the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing
would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have
already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow
Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy:
Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-
Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between
the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law
implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of
notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith.
The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international
law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such
rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p.
12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional
provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p.
13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to
or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international
law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute
and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land,
such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are
in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national
law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each
other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void
in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No.
1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the
extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights
of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto,
the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests
this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition
request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of
the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a
prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective
extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the
asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35
C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action
of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however,
overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage
would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court
concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is
truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings.
Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the
two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by
analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective
extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the
Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that
for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15,
Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall
not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"?
Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective
extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree
No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can
petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence
affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be
subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in
administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997];
Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc.
vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer
vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.,
283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional
guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State
may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under
the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four
corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of
Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447
[1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807
(Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of
the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and
Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National
Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary
System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes),
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected
without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still
operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee
may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is
equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him,
and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy
of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot
dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The
second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or
malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say,
his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his
defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due
process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition
request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as
"justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530
[1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the
case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction
over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant
and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request
and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment
with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot
and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice
Puno in his dissent.Puno, J., please see dissent.Vitug, J., see separate opinion.Kapunan, J.,
see separate concurring opinion.Panganiban, J., please see my dissenting opinion.Mendoza,
J., I join the dissents of Puno and Panganiban, JJ.Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion.
Pardo, J., I join J. Puno & J. Panganiban.Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of Justices Puno
& Panganiban.Ynares-Santiago, J., please see separate concurring opinion.

HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,

Culture and Sports, petitioner, vs. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
seeks to nullify through this petition for review the Decision of the Court of Appeals [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria for lack of merit, as
well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration thereof.
On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent Maria
Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent
Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian
Division (FAD) of the National Library which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief
and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items of
historical documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the National Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz,
Special Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented the DECS Secretary in the administrative
case while respondent was represented by her own private counsel. On 25 September 1996 Secretary
Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of
historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice of the national library in particular, and the
country in general." She was ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to
reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations.
On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, or on 1 October 1996,
she received another resolution correcting the typographical errors found on the first resolution.
Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most appropriate to take under the
circumstances."[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] Her petition was, however, denied.
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution dated September 25,
1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order of 23 October 1996. Respondent moved for
reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted" in view of the warning in the 23 October 1996 Order
that the denial of the request for the production of the Investigation Committee Report was final.[if !
supportFootnotes][3][endif]
As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996
dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the
regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until
she received a copy of the said report.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial
court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the trial court. In its assailed Decision of 24 November 1997 the appellate court
sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit holding that -
FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration of the
assailed order with the respondent judge before filing the instant petition to this Court. This constitutes a
procedural infirmity x x x x SECOND. Even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to be disregarded, the
petition at hand, nevertheless, must fail. The denial of the motion to dismiss is an option available to the
respondent judge. Such order is interlocutory and thus not appealable. The proper recourse of the
aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the objection(s) raised by him in said
motion to dismiss, then proceed with the trial and, in case of adverse decision, to elevate the entire case
on appeal in due course.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13 January 1998, Secretary
Gloria filed the instant petition for review.
Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter
substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.
The issues before us are: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for
failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss, and in
holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a motion for reconsideration as the trial courts order
denying the motion to dismiss is a patent nullity, and a motion for reconsideration would practically be a
useless ceremony as the trial court virtually decided the case, and that there is no law requiring the DECS
to furnish respondent with a copy of the Report of the DECS Investigation Committee so that the petition
for mandamus has no leg to stand on hence should have been dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
Excepting thereto respondent argues that the denial of the motion to dismiss is interlocutory in nature as it
did not dispose of the case on the merits, and petitioner still has a residual remedy, i.e., to file an answer,
thus her substantive rights have not been violated as she contends; that respondent is clearly entitled to the
remedy of mandamus to protect her rights; and, that petitioner has not shown any law, DECS order or
regulation prohibiting the release of the petitioned documents for reasons of confidentiality or national
security.
We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that
the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor -
After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion or order the amendment of the
pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not
indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor (underscoring supplied).
Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss "for
lack of merit." Such cavalier disposition often creates difficulty and misunderstanding on the part of the
aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the
issue, usually on certiorari.
The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements prescribed in
Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction
over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners motion to
dismiss was being denied. We are reproducing hereunder for reference the assailed Order -
This treats of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Gloria on 14 March 1997 to which petitioner
filed their (sic) opposition on April 8, 1997.
Respondent premised his motion on the following grounds: (a) Mandamus does not lie to compel
respondent DECS Secretary to release the Report of the DECS Investigating Committee because the
Petition does not state a cause of action; (b) The DECS Resolution dismissing petitioner is legal and valid,
and therefore, the writ of preliminary injunction cannot be granted to enjoin its execution; while petitioner
alleged among others that she has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its
main objective. "Purely ministerial" are acts to be performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. While the discretion of a Constitutional Commission
cannot be controlled by mandamus x x x x the court can decide whether the duty is discretionary or
ministerial x x x x
Generally, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of
judgment or discretion, and finding of fact. Findings of fact by an administrative board or official,
following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or
official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted
arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion or as when there is capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility
amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at
all in contemplation of law x x x x
WHEREFORE, in regard to the foregoing, the motion to dismiss by herein respondent is hereby denied
for lack of merit and is hereby ordered to file its (sic) responsive pleadings within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Order. Copy furnished petitioner who is likewise given ten (10) days to submit his (sic)
comment or opposition.
Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the discussion therein on mandamus, vis-a-vis
the ground relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e., lack of cause of action, and the
dispositive portion of the order. The order only confused petitioner and left her unable to determine the
errors which would be the proper subject of her motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in
crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are
necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any basis for
its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on
certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific
in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was
justified.
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for reconsideration, has been
given an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act or order. However, this rule is not absolute
and is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the act or order of the lower court is a patent
nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory provision of the Rules, as in this case, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower
court directly on certiorari.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of discussions in several
cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues
in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must
nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to
do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The
writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right
to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS
Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.
Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her
from the service.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from
becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful purpose now to compel petitioner to
furnish her with a copy of the investigation report.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a
copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon[if !supportFootnotes][8]
[endif]
that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is
entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of
the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.
Respondents assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on what action would be
appropriate to take under the circumstances,"[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] hardly merits consideration. It must be
stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal communication between the DECS Secretary
and the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any
other person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary. As correctly ruled by Secretary Gloria in his
Order of 2 October 1996 -
Respondents (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of the DECS Investigating Committee is not an
integral part of the Decision itself x x x x [t]he report is an internal communication between the
Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary, and, therefore, confidential until the latter had already
read and used the same in making his own determination of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be
expressed in the Decision he may make.
The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part - - although not controlling - - of
the basis for the decision. Only when the party adversely affected by the decision has filed and perfected
an appeal to the Civil Service Commission may all the records of the case, including the aforesaid Report
be forwarded to the CSC. In the latter appellate tribunal, the respondents counsel may be allowed to read
and/or be given a copy of the Report to enable the appellant to file an intelligent and exhaustive
appellants Brief Memorandum.
More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service
Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondents
removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis
of any further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced
by denying her access to the investigation report.
In fine, the trial courts Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioners motion to dismiss is not a mere error of
judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity for failure to comply with the provisions of
the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons
therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS
resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule which imposes a ministerial duty on
petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a
cause of action. In such instance, while the trial courts order is merely interlocutory and non-appealable,
certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 24 November 1997
sustaining the trial courts denial of petitioners motion to dismiss, as well as its Resolution dated 13
January 1998 denying reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for mandamus filed
by respondent before the court a quo to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report is DISMISSED for want of cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.