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ASPECTS OF EQUITY IN LATIN LEGAL

MAXIMS AND THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

Goke Akinboye
University of Ibadan, Nigeria

ABSTRACT
Over the centuries, law practitioners have developed various legal phrases and expressions which
enable them to communicate with the precision that the profession demands. Some of these legal
expressions are written in Latin. Many of these have had their meanings refined or modified over
centuries of judicial interpretations. Others appear the same as the ones for everyday use with
meaning in law which differ from the everyday meaning. These expressions, numerous, succinct and
sharp as they are, have been rightly termed maxims. The intension of this paper is to examine the
classical background to the term maxim as an aspect of the language of law and then present in an
informative and easy to understand manner, some of the Latin maxims which focus on the aspects of
Equity in law. The method here will be, first, to translate the maxims from Latin into English and
then, to explicate on their meanings and usages within the purview of the modern law in Nigeria.

Key words: Maxims, Latin, Equity, Law, Nigeria

1. Introduction
Maxims are a collection of legal truisms which are used as rules of thumb by both judges and
lawyers, and are listed in the codified statutes of most states. They represent the concentrated
experience of generations of lawyers or, as Sir James Macintosh 1 puts it, they are the condensed good
sense of nations and a collection of maxims forms a summary of law. When compared with proverbs,
Cicero2 notes that they are pointed speeches (mucrones verborum) and salt-pits (salinas) from which
you may extract salt and sprinkle it where you will. Maxims are of comparatively late origin as it
takes some time for such good sense to be concentrated. This agrees with the view of Agricola 3 who
remarks that they are short sentences into which, as in rules, the ancients have compressed life.

1
Sir James Mackintoshs expression is quoted in William J. (1895), Latin Maxims in English Law Law
Magazine and Law Review, 4th Series, Vol. XX, No. CCXCVII, (1894 1895), London, Stevens & Haynes Law
Publishers, p.283
2
Sir Francis Bacon refers to Cicero in Bacon F. (1661), A Collection of Apophthegms, New and Old, London,
Sarah Griffin for William Lee and co. cf. sirbacon.org/apophthegms.htm,20/03/2013.
3
See Agricola in Edward Hulme F. (1902), Proverb Lore: Many Sayings, Wise Or Otherwise On Many Subjects,
Gleaned From Many Sources, London, Elliot Stock, Paternoster Row E.C., EBook edition by Project Gutenberg
eBook of Proverbs, 2010, p.6
According to Kodilinye4, maxims in law have two purposes: (i) to show the historical
development of rules and procedures; (ii) to guide the application of those rules at the present time
and in the future. Furthermore, and as far as the study of equity in law is concerned, they are a
convenient and meaningful way of classifying equitable principles and the many and varied areas in
which they are to be found. There are, accordingly, no maxims in the Twelve Tables, and they appear
but rarely in Gaius and the Ante-Justinian fragments5 or in the older English text-books and reports.
The word maximum or maxima6 does not appear in the Corpus Juris in any meaning
resembling that now borne by it, which seems to be the major basis of a syllogism from which point a
deduction is made for the case under consideration. In Roman Law, the nearest word is regula (rule).
Grotius7 defines law (lex) by means of regula, while a certain Du Cange states maxima as recepta
sententia, regula vulgo nostris et Anglis maxime. Lord Coke8 further gave what can also be regarded
as a standard definition of maxim as a sure foundation of ground of art and a conclusion of reason,
so called quia maxima est ejus dignitas et certissima auctoritas, atque quod maxime omnibus
probertur9, so sure and uncontrolled that they ought not to be questioned. He proceeds and submits
that a maxim is all one with a rule, a common ground, postulatum or axiom identified with regula.
However, the word regula, as in non est regula quin fallit10, appears not to convey quite the same
meaning as maxim. It is described in the Digest of Justinian as quae rem quae est breviter enarrat 11
which is more detailed than Lord Cokes definition.
Roman Jurists wrote many works under the name of regulae. Treatises written under the name
of regula were composed by renowned legal luminaries such as Gaius, Ulpian, Paulus, Modestinus,
Rufinus, Neratius and Scaevola; the principal source of regula is, of course, the title in the Digest
De Diversis Regulis Juris 12. The legal effect of regula was laid bare by Julianus 13 and supported by
Paulus at the beginning of the Digest14. The Glossators and their followers, and the Humanists also
wrote many things about regula which generally appeared under the word brocarda or brocardia,
that is regulae with comments attached; and all that is said about regulae were in tangent with
Roman Law.15

4
Kodilinye G. (1975) An Introduction to Equity in Nigeria, rep. 2005, Ibadan, Spectrum Books, p. 12.
5
Such as incertae personae legeri potest (Ulpian, Reg. XXIV, 18); ex nudo pacto inter cives Romanos actio non
nascitur (Paulus, Sent. ii, 14, 1); male nostro jure uti non debemus (Gaius i, 53).
6
With maxima, a neutral plural becoming in later Latin a feminine singular, compare biblia, opera, where the
same change has taken effect. The classical codicilli also became codicillum in Isidorus who further derives it
from the name of the inventor (Origines v., 24, 14).
7
Grotius, De Jure B. et P., 1., 1, 9 regular actuum moralium obligans ad id quod rectum est.
8
Lord Coke, Co. Litt. 11a.
9
Because maxim bears that dignity and extremely high authority and especially because it proves all things.
10
There is no rule without an exception.
11
Digest 50, 17, 1. See also, 35, 1, 86 which mentions regula Catoniana as also sententia. Sententa is used in
several texts as equivalent to regula see: Dig. 34, 2, 10; Gaius ii, 235. Isidorus (followed by Decretum) says of the
etymology of regula, eo quod recte ducit, nec aliquando aliorsum trahit. alli dixerunt regulam dictam vel quod
regat vel normam recte vivendi praebeat, vel quod distortum pravumque est corrigat Decretum, pt. i., dist. iii, 1,
2.
12
Dig. 50, 17.
13
In his quae contra rationem juris constituta sunt non possumus sequi regulam juris Dig. 1, 3, 15.
14
Dig. 50, 17 non ex regula jus sumatur sed ex jure quod est regula fiat?
On the development of maxims from Roman Law, there is the need to state that there are
scarcely any maxims in English and by inference, Nigerian Law, which are not ultimately derived
from Latin. The maxims of Equity evolved in Latin and were eventually translated into English as
the principles applied by Courts of Equity in deciding cases before them.
Basically, Latin legal maxims may be grouped into three, namely, 16 (i) Pure Latin/Roman (ii)
Latin/Roman modified (iii) Indigenous. It is impossible here to make, in any moderate space, an
exhaustive reduction of all maxims into any one of these groups, but to make a selection of some of
the more familiar ones which deal with our study- Equity is more realistic.
(i) The first categories of maxims (Pure Latin) are directly quoted or cited from the Corpus Juris
and are comparatively few. Generally, some have now, for one reason or the other, been either
improved upon, or turned into worse versions, in the process of adoption. Others have not
been transferred or transformed simply because they were incapable of being transferred. 17
(ii) The modified Latin maxims have come down from Roman Law as their original source but
have been altered in transmission, partly by a combination of two or more Roman texts, by
indirect adoption from Roman Law as altered by the Canon Law, the Glossators and other
authorities, by incorrect citation from memory by a judge or writer, and from conscious
attempts at improvement. Canon Law is probably the proximate source of many maxims
some of which were, no doubt, framed to suit a new state of society. How easily all these
classical maxims have been misdirected is shown in the way in which the familiar jus
publicum privatorum pactis mutari non potest 18 was treated by two eminent English lawyers
of the 18th century Sir William Follett and Dr. Lushington. The former quoted the maxim
as pactis privatorum juri publico derogari nequit19 while the latter put it a little differently
as pactis privatorum juri publico non derogatur 20. A few selection of some of the better
known modified maxims is appended below with their nearest classical analogues:
actor sequitur forum rei is from actor rei forum sequi debet; delegatus non potest
delegare is an extension of a judice judex delegatus judicis dandi potestatem non habet21.
Here, lawyers have applied to agency a maxim which originally applied only within very
narrow limits, and to a class whose duties were judicial, not commercial. impossibilium
nulla obligatio22 has been extended to lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The maxim volenti non

15
For instance, Cujacius says ex crebis constitutionibus fiunt regulae juris Dig. 42, 1, 63. Elsewhere, he says
regulae juris constituuntur ex iis quae saepe fiunt, nec enim ullae sunt regulae perpetuae quae numqum nos
fallunt Codex 9, 12. Alciatus also adds that a regula non est recedendum nisi expresse probetur fallentia
Responsa iv, 4.
16
Consider the details of these groups in James Williams (1895) op.cit. pp. 283 295.
17
Among those which were adopted in England and cited in De Diversis Regulis Juris without transfer are: in
testamentis plenius voluntates testantium interpretamur (Dig. 50, 17, 12); Impossibilium nulla obligatio est (id;
185); nuptias non concubitus sed consensus facit (id. 30); quod initio vitiosum est non potest tractu temporis
convalescene (id. 29); in pari causa possessor potior haberi debet (id. 128); res judicata proveritate accipitur (id.
207); nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet (id. 54); expressa nocent non expressa non
nocent (id. 195); etc.
18
Dig. 2, 14, 38 The right of the public cannot be changed by private agreement.
19
See, Arguendo in Swan V. Blair, 3C. & F. 621.
20
Arg. in Phillips V. Innes, 4C. & F.241.
21
Cod. 3, 1, 5.
22
Dig. 50, 17, 185.
fit injuria, originally borrowed from the Roman Civil Law, has lost much of its literal form
since it has been paraphrased from nulla injuria est quae in volentum fiat23. quidquid
plantatur solo solo cedit is almost identical with omne quod inaedificatur solo cedit24.
Ulpians partus sequitur matrem25 by the change of one word becomes partus sequitur
ventrem. Paulus ex nudo facto inter cives Romanos actio non nascitur26 is now considerably
expanded as ex nudo pacto non oritur actio27. An Englishmans house is his castle is in legal
Latin domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium and is probably based on nemo de domo
sua extrahi debet28.
(iii) By maxims that have been categorised as indigenous, we mean those maxims that have
their roots in English Law. These include some which would have been possible in Roman
Law and others which would have been impossible, probably for historical, political or
etymological reasons in another law. Their forms are in Latin because modern jurists, as
opposed to ancient Roman experts, have expressed them in Latin, being the language of the
elite until the 18th century. Among those which, perhaps, existed in Roman Law but do not
appear to have been framed by Roman jurists are: aequitas sequitur legem; de minimis non
curat lex; ubi jus ibi remedium; in fictione juris semper est aequitas; interest rei publica ut sit
finis litium; locus regit actum; mobilia sequitur personam.

We can now turn attention to the examination of some Latin maxims which bear directly on
the aspects of Equity in law. However, it is expedient here to take a birds eye view at the meaning of
Equity itself for a proper understanding of the meanings or usages of the maxims. This excludes any
detailed account of the history of Equity and its relationship with the Common Law since this is
outside the scope of this study.

2. Equity: Conceptual Clarifications


The word Equity derived etymologically from the Latin word aequitas, meaning fairness,
impartiality, justice, evenness. Thus, it is a word capable of being rendered with many English
synonyms such as, fairness, just, right, impartiality, rectitude, fair play and justice, all of
which emphasise the idea of just or fair dealings in law. In technical terms, according to
Kodilinye29, Equity refers to that body of rules which, before 1873, was formulated and administered
by the English Court of Chancery which supplement the rules and procedures of the Common Law,
and which is one of the main sources of the law applied in Nigerian Courts. By the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act of 1873, the Court of Chancery was amalgamated with the Common Law courts to
form the Supreme Court, and rules of equity are administered alongside the Common Law rules in
all courts; where there is any conflict between the rules of law and equity, equity is to prevail 30.
Equity is often used, not only in its original broad sense merely denoting laws which are fair or just

23
Dig. 47, 10, 1, 5.
24
Dig. 41, 1, 7, 10.
25
Reg. V., 9.
26
Sent. ii, 14, 1.
27
See Dig. 42, 1, 63 and this seems in direct opposition to the Canon Law pacta quantumcunque nuda servanda
sunt (Decretals 1, 35, 1).
28
Dig. 50, 17, 103.
29
Kodilinye (op. cit) p. 1.
but importantly, in statutory provisions, the most notable instances in Nigeria being the High Court
Laws of the various states.
Moreover, Equity makes reference to the right of an equitable remedy, for instance, fraud,
mistake or where an estoppel arises. Equity is weaker than an equitable interest. By the adjective,
equitable, is meant; (a) that which is fair (in the non-technical sense) (b) that which arises from the
liberal construction or application of a legal rule or remedy (c) that which is in accordance with or
regulated, recognised or enforced by the rules of Equity. Thus a maxim of Equity is apt in describing
Equity as a certain perfect reason which interprets and amends the written law, comprehended in no
writing, but consisting in right reason alone.
As regards the reception of Equity into Nigeria, this development dates back to the pre 1900
English Laws or statutes. In fact, the entire English Common Law and Equity form part of Nigerian
Law. Section 45(i) of the Interpretation Act, Cap. 89 provides thus:

(i) Subject to the provisions of this section and except in so far as other provision is made
by any Federal Law, the Common Law of England and the doctrines of equity together
with the statutes of general application that were in force in England on the 1st day of
January 1900, shall be in force in Lagos and, in so far as they relate to any matter
within the exclusive legislative competence of the Federal Legislative, shall be in force
elsewhere in the Federation.

It is now convenient to explicate some generally accepted maxims of Equity with the view to
commenting on the meanings and usages of these expressions within the ambits of the law in
Nigeria. As Firth31 rightly observes on the explanation of the meanings of established principles such
as axioms, maxims or proverbs:

The essential thing about a proverb (axiom or maxim) is its meaning, and by this is to be
understood not merely a bald and literal translation into the accustomed tongue, nor
even a free version of what the words are intended to convey. The meaning is made
clear only when side by side with the translation is given a full account of the reason
for its use, its effect and its significance in speech. (Bracketed words mine)

3. Latin Legal Maxims: Interpretations and Reference to Nigeria

1. aequitas est perfecta quaedam ratio quae jus scriptum interpretatur et emendat, nulla
scriptura comprehensa, sed solum in vera ratione consistens:

Equity is certain perfect reason which interprets and amends


the unwritten law, comprehended in no writing, but
consisting in right reason alone.

30
See Judicature Act, 1925, SS 36 44. For definition of Equity, see: Leslie Rutherford & Sheila Bore (eds),
(1993), Osborns Concise Law Dictionary, (Eighth Ed.) London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, p. 132.
31
Firth R. (1926), Proverbs in Native life with special reference to those of the Maori, Folklore, Vol. 37, p. 134.
Equity is here considered in its nature of greatest width and elasticity. Further, it is capable
of directing application in new circumstances as they arise from time to time. This follows the
popular maxim of equity which states that Equity follows the Law (vide infra). Also, Equity
takes pity but on the clean, not the corrupt, and does not really exist to be taken for a ride
merely because it takes pity. See Oilfield Supply Centre V. Johnson (1987) N.W.L.R (part 58)
625/639-640. Consider also maxim 3 below.

2. aequitas factum habet quod fieri opportuit.

Equity regards as done that which ought to be done.

The most popular uses of this maxim are in the cases of contracts, conversion of property or
insurance policy. Under the doctrine in Walsh V. Lonsdale 32, one who enters the possession of
land under an agreement for lease which is specifically enforceable is in the same position (as
between himself and the landlord) as if the lease had actually been granted to him. In other
words, an agreement for a lease is as good as a lease. 33 Also, under the doctrine of
conversion, if a trustee is under a binding obligation to sell land and convert it to money, or to
invest some money on the purchase of some property, Equity regards that as done which
ought to be done and considers the property as being in its converted state from the time it
was agreed on when the duty to convert it arose. Another illustration of the application of
this maxim is in connection with an insurance cover. If through some lapse or omission, cover
is not in force at the time a claim is made, and if the policy holder has clearly been at fault in
this connection perhaps because he has not paid premiums when he should have paid
then, it is quite reasonable for an insurer to decline to meet his claim. However, it becomes
more difficult if the policy holder is no more at fault than the insurer. The fair and equitable
solution in such circumstance would be arrived at by applying the principle of the maxim
above. In other words, what would the position have been if what should have been done had
been done?

3. aequitas sequitur legem.

Equity follows the law.

Equity, the maxim states, will not permit a remedy that is contrary to the law. The Court of
Chancery never claimed to override the Courts of Common Law. Indeed, Equity could never
have existed without the Common Law since the Chancellor originally merely interfered here
and there to do justice between the parties to a suit where the Common Law failed to provide
a remedy. It was only later that Equity developed into a distinct body of rules and principles.
Thus, where a rule, either of the Common or the Statute law, is direct or governs a case with
all its circumstances or the particular point, a court of Equity is as much bound by it as a
court of law. It is only when some important aspects are disregarded by the Common Law

32
Walsh V. Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch.D at 9.
33
The leading Nigerian case here is Savage V. Sarrough (1937) 13 N.L.R. 141.
that Equity interferes34. Thus, in Akilu V. Fawehinmi 1989, No. 2, 2 N.W.L.R (Part 102) 122,
p. 172 F.G, Justice Karibi-Whyte of the Supreme Court of Nigeria is quoted as saying
Equity follows the Law and is applied to ameliorate the rigidity and inflexibility of the
Common Law.

4. aequitas non facit jus sed juri auxillatur.

Equity does not make law but assists it.

This is similar to maxim 3 above, and it restates that Equity is not a clause which exists to
wage battles or compete with the Common and Statute Law. It is only a legal system that has
mixed well with the law and the admixture exists for the purpose of fairness and justice 35.

5. aequitas est quasi equalitas.

Equity is, so to speak, equality.

This is to say that Equity equally divides benefits or burdens where justice requires that this
should be done but the Law has not provided for its being done. Thus, Equity will presume
joint owners to be tenants in Common Law unless the parities have expressly agreed
otherwise. Equity also favours partition, if requested, of jointly held property. The application
of this may, however, be summarised into four illustrations, namely, (i) presumption of
tenancy in common (ii) severance of joint tenancy (iii) equal division by the court (iv) the
doctrine of satisfaction. Under the first illustration, Equity does not prefer joint tenancy, for
in it, the right of survivorship (jus accrescendi) operates i.e. the survivor of two 36 joint
tenants is entitled to the whole property and the estate of the deceased takes nothing. In a
tenancy in common however, the share of the deceased passes, not to the survivor, but to
those in the deceaseds will or intestacy. Under severance, a joint tenant may convert a joint
tenancy into a tenancy in common by severance 37. Where at both law and Equity two joint
purchasers, for instance, advance an equal amount of money, Equity will readily treat the
joint purchase/tenancy as severed and, thus, converted into a tenancy in common, thereby
excluding the right of survivorship. Equal division by the court applies to the explanation
earlier given. The doctrine of satisfaction maintains that if a father has more than one child,
it is unlikely that he would wish to provide for one child twice over to the detriment of the
others; hence, the sub-maxim, Equity leans against double portions.

6. aequitas est correctio justae legis qua parte deficit quod generatim lata est.
34
Kodilinye G. (op. cit) p.14 gave some illustrations and aspects where Equity follows the rules of the common
law.
35
Some examples include: Trans Bridge Co. Ltd. V. Survey Int. Ltd. (1986) 4. N.W.L.R. (part 37) at p. 597;
Cardozo Z.J. in Graf V. Hope Building Corporation (1930) 254 N.Y.I at 9.
36
Where there are more than two tenants, on the death of one, the whole property vests in the survivors and the
process continues until there is only one survivor who then holds the property as the sole tenant.
37
The term severance here means the process whereby a joint tenancy is converted into a tenancy in common.
Equity is a correction of a just law in that part which is defective because it has a
broad universality.

This maxim lends more credence to the definition and indeed, the purpose of Equity as in
maxim 1 above. Equity has regard for remarkable pure justice which is achieved by the
application of equitable rules in all its ramifications.

7. vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit.

Equity aids the vigilant, not the indolent.

It is a general principle of Equity that a person will not be granted an equitable remedy if he
has been guilty of undue delay in bringing his action into attention. Equity favours the
vigilant and not those who delay on their rights. Such delay is known as laches 38, an
equitable term used to describe a delay that is sufficient to defeat an equitable claim. This
maxim shares the same position with dilatio aequitatem vincet (delay defeats equity). Delay
is what the Common Law itself disfavours. On inordinate delay, Olatawura, Justice of the
Supreme Court in Usikaro V. Itsekiri Land Trustees (1991) 2 N.W.L.R. (part 172) 150,
pp.179-180, remarked:

when we talk of inordinate delay, there are many factors that contribute to the delays in
the trial cases: adjournments on the part of the court because of older cases, or due to
accumulation of too many part-heard cases, application on the part of counsel either due to
ill-health of counsel, or vital witnesses, or absence of witnesses even after they have been
duly served, or unforeseen urgent applications which from their nature must take precedence
over cases already fixed for hearing. Each application should be considered on its merit
bearing in mind the justice of the case (Italics mine).

8. aequitas injuriam non esse permittet sine remedio.

Equity does not permit a wrong to be without a remedy.

This contention here is that Equity exists on pity and it is meant to remedy a wrong caused
by the Law. This maxim is the root of all equitable jurisdictions. It means that in certain
circumstances where the Common Law failed to recognise a right or provide a remedy for a
wrong, Equity will not act passively while the wronged party suffers an injustice. This form of
remedy is usually one of specific performances or injunctions which are superior remedies to
those administered at Common Law such as damages.

38
On the principles governing the doctrine of laches, see the well known dictum of Lord Selborne in Lindsay
Petroleum Co. V. Hurd (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 221 at 239. Also cited by the Privy Council in Nwakobi V. Nzekwu
(1964) 1. W.L.R. 1019. See also, Kodilinye G. (op. cit) pp. 19 21 for the application of the doctrine.
9. aequitas, sicut natura, nil frustra facit.

Equity, like nature, does nothing in vain.

Since the rules of Equity is established on good sense, reason, pity and fairness as, often,
those of the Common Law, it is only proper to understand that law, especially as it relates to
Equity, will not direct that vain or impossible things be done. Rather, Equity has regard for
the order of nature as suggested by the maxim lex spectat naturae ordinem. Indeed, Equity
does not require an idle gesture.

10. aequitas in personam facit

Equity acts against a person.

Equity here acts against the person and not his property (in rem). It asserts jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant and enforces its orders against him/her by contempt or other
means. This is the tenet in the early days of the Court of Chancery whose decrees were
directed in personam. The maxim also meant that in property matters, Equity would act
against the person of the defendant by committing him to prison for contempt if he failed to
obey a decree rather than in rem i.e. against the property involved in the dispute. Today,
however, the court has numerous ways of enforcing its decrees and these include, not only the
imprisonment of a defendant or sequestration of his property, but also the appointment of
executors to transfer the property without the need for a conveyance.

11. in omnibus, maxime in jure, aequitas spectanda sit.

In all things, especially in law, Equity is to be regarded.

The maxim relates to the Common Law, and only re-emphasises many of the maxims already
explained above that, Equity should be held in deciding cases even though it follows the law.
It states that equitable doctrines must be applied in giving effect to all laws in order to
ensure absolute fairness39.

12. aequitas spectat interioram non formam.

Equity looks to the interior/intent, not the form.

Generally, at Common Law, observance of the correct forms or procedures in relation to the
execution of any transaction or contract was all important. Failure to do so often rendered a
contract or transaction invalid or led to a total loss of the legal rights of a party. However,
Equity, looking to the intents or motives of an action rather than the forms, considered it

39
Consider Akibu V. Oduntan (1991) 2 N.W.L.R. (part 171).
unfair for a party to insist on strict observance of form and thereby defeat the substance of
the transaction or contract and the true intention of the parties. Thus, if a contract is
missing a standard section that is usually present, Equity allows the contract as if it were
present. Similarly, if a party to a contract to the sale of a land fails to complete certain
conditions on the date of agreement, Equity will not accept a breach of time clause as a basis
for repudiation by the other party provided the party in default is ready and able to complete
the conditions within reasonable time. This maxim is similarly applied in the maxim -
Equity imputes intent to fulfill an obligation.

13. aequitas voluntario non subvenit.

Equity does not assist a volunteer.

Basically, the person who is involved in an action usually has an important interest in the
issue under litigation. Equity will not assist if the Common Law requirements for a gift are
not met. The exception is if the doctrine of estoppel applies. Similarly, if a donor has made an
imperfect gift, that is, lacking the formalities required at the Common Law, Equity will not
assist the intended donee. Thus, the maxim is synonymous to Equity will not complete an
imperfect gift. Note that except in Strong V. Bird (1874) L.R. 18 Eq. 315; if the donor
appoints the intended donee as the executor of his/her will, and the donor subsequently dies,
Equity will perfect the imperfect gift.

14. in aequitatis paribus, lex superat

Between equal equities, the law prevails.

This maxim simply means that Equity will provide no specific remedies where the parties are
equal or where neither has been wronged. In other words, the maxim relates to where there
are competing interests in property, one of which is a legal interest and the other equitable.
Thus, when the claims of both parties are meritoriously equal, precedence is given to the
legal interest.

15. in aequitatis paribus, prior in tempore superat

Between equal equities, the first in time prevails.

The maxim is similar to the one above and concerns also the priority between two competing
equitable interests in property. The general rule is that equitable interests rank according to
the order of their creation. The maxim was developed in connection with interests in lands.
When a purchaser acquires property bona fide without notice of a defect in the vendors title,
the equities are equal and the legal estate will prevail. If the purchaser takes title with notice
of the defect, the earlier title, if valid, will prevail. The force of this maxim has been largely
displaced by the legislated system of land title registration40.

16. qui aequitatem quaereret, aequitatem agendum est.

He who seeks Equity must do Equity.

In order to receive an equitable relief, the plaintiff must be willing to complete all of his own
obligations towards the defendant. Moreover, the defence of unclean hands lies whenever
the conduct of a plaintiff in equity has been iniquitous. For example, if a mortgagor wishes to
exercise his right to redeem his property, he must be able to give a reasonable notice of his
intention to the mortgagee; or if a donor whether by will or deed gives some property to Mr X
and in the same document purports to give Mr Xs property to another Mr. Y, Mr. X will not
be able to claim the whole gift of the donor to him unless he too allows the gifts to Mr. Y to
take effect41.

17. qui ad aequitatem venit, puris manibus veniendum est.

He who comes to Equity must come with clean hands.

This means that one who seeks an equitable relief or remedy must evidently prove that his
conducts in a transaction under litigation have been fair, just and clean. This is
distinguished from the maxim, He who seeks Equity must do Equity in the sense that it
refers to behaviour prior to the suit as opposed to future conduct. For instance, if you desire
your tenant to vacate your house, you must not have violated the tenants rights. If a tenant
forfeits his lease for non-payment of rent and for continued use of the premises for immoral
purposes, he cannot expect to receive an equitable relief against forfeiture 42. An alternative to
this maxim is: Equity will not permit anyone to profit from his own wrong (aequitas
commodum ex injuria sua habere non permittet). An instance, in insurance cases, is where
the assured inflicts injury on himself or his property and then comes forward to make a
claim43. In Riggs V. Palmer (1889) 115 N.Y. 506, a man killed his grandfather in order to
receive his inheritance quicker (and for fear that the old man might change his will). He lost
all equitable rights to the inheritance.

40
See Kodilinye G. (op. cit) pp. 15 16 for brilliant illustrations and examples of the applications of this maxim.
41
See Kodilinye G. p. 16 17 for other instances.
42
This is enacted in Gill V. Lewis (1956) 2 Q.B. 1 at pp. 13, 14 and 17.
43
There have been cases such as this where husbands insured their wives for large sums of money and
thereafter schemed their murder to enable them claim benefits under their wives life policies. See: Prince of
Wales, etc. Association V. Palmer (1858) 25 Beave 605.
4. Conclusion
In the foregoing, it has been shown that Latin legal maxims constitute established principles or
propositions of law which have been globally to say the least - accepted as being in tandem with
logic and reason. They, therefore, serve as necessity tools in the conduct of legal processes. The
aspect of these maxims which relate to Equity technically refers to these propositions that
complement the procedures and rules of the Common Law and which connote or encourage fairness
and justice in statutory provisions. Equity constitutes a part of the Nigerian Law, which is
comprehended in non-written form and which advocates equitable remedies.

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