21. Soriano vs. Atty.

Manuel Dizon
January 25, 2006

Facts: The accused, Atty. Manuel Dizon, was on his way home with his
wife when a taxi driver overtook the care driven by the accused, along
albano street, without him knowing that the person he overtook was a
lawyer and of good repute to the community, who was under the
influence of liquor. The accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
had stopped to make a turn. The accused also stopped his car, got
down and berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To pacify
the aggressor, the taxi driver forced to open his door, hitting the
accused causing him to fall down. Taking pity on the accused who is an
elderly, got out of his car to help him get up, but the accused was
enraged and tried to punch him but the taxi driver managed to box the
accused on the chest causing him to fall down the second time. The
accused further tried to box the taxi driver until he was able to pacify
the accused. The accused then went to his car and got his revolver
making sure that the handle was wrapped with a cloth. When the taxi
driver was about to return the eyeglasses of the accused, he was met
by a barrel of the gun of the accused and shot the taxi driver on the
neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him off
and sped up. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes, whose
testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver.

It was the witness who came to the aid of the Soriano and brought the
latter to the hospital. Soriano would have surely died were it not for the
timely medical assistance of the attending surgeon. The complainant
also sustained a spinal cord injury which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabling him to his job.

The trial court promulgated its decision but the respondent filed for a
probation and was granted on several occasions, including the
satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed by the coirt in favor of the
offended party.

In her report and recommendation, the commissioner Herbosa

recommended the disbarment from the practice of law of the petitioner
for having been convicted of a crim involving moral turpitude. And said
that he not only been convicted, but also exhibited lack of good moral
character based on the following acts.

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only
because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,
Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out
and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence,
Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that
he was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons;
and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to
date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.

Issue: Whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral

turpitude, and whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Held: The Supreme Court upheld the findings and recommendation of

the IBP Commissioner.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a

crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become
unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary

to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.

Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the

degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal
act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances.

However in this case, Atty. Dizon was the aggressor, as he pursued and
shot the complainant when the latter least expected it. The Court also
considers the finding of treachery attendant in the situation when the
complainant was about to return the eyeglasses of the respondent
when the respondent shot him.
The totality of the acts unmistakable bears the earmarks of moral
turpitude.
It is also clear that the respondent transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibilities by his illegal possession of an unlicensed
firearm and his refusal to justify his civil liabilities. He violated the law
and the legal orders of the court.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude certainly relates to a

lawyers good moral character, where the misconduct outside the
profession is gross as to show them morally unfit for their office, the
court by be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.

As to the lack of good moral character of the accused, the Supreme

court again upheld the findings of the IBP. In the case at bar, when the
respondent displayed dishonest behavior when he sought the aid of
the vice mayor for an out if court settlement. But when the efforts
failed, the respondent concocted a lie making it appear that it was the
complainants family who sought conference with them. Another is that
when Atty. Dizon said that he was mauled by three men but it does not
show on the medical examination conducted upon him.

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar

membership is more important than truthfulness. The rigorous ethics of
the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior. Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in
good faith.

22. FACTS: A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land
owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten
(10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier
with the petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo
Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. During the pendency
of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its
sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation and on the same day,
the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and
Construction Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the same
properties with Banco de Oro wherein the lower court found that
private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and
transactions. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of
party as a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to
Service Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a
verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its
charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current
market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite
due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a
result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the,
Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the
certificates of title of the parcels of land.

Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on

quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments
between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it
had fully paid private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the
amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as
full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of
P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears that
private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner
in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00
but the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of
its charging lien for payment of its attorney's fee.

2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is n ecessary for the

enforcement of such lien.

3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of

the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a
quantum meruit basis.

HELD:
1. NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and
after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of
such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written
notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party;
and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements. Consequent to such
provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the
payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a
judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment
secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A
lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as
an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered
when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to
be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the
plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims."

2. NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly

recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case
and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. Court trying main
case will determine attorneys fees.

3. The Court refused to resolve issue but gave the elements to be

considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are:

(1) the importance of the subject matter in controvers

(2) the extent of the services rendered, and
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer order of the trial court is
hereby

REVERSED and SET.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and
the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988
affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be
brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees
and the amount the reof.

23. Welington Reyes vs. Atty. Salvador Gaa.

July 14, 1995.

Facts: On March 1971, the complainant reported to the National Bureau

of Investigation that he had been a victim of extortion by the
respondent, Asst. Fiscal Salvador Gaa of Manila City. According to him,
he had given the respondent 500 in March 1, 1971 and a total of 500 in
three separate occasions. And was another payoff was set at around 11
am that day.

An entrapment was set by the NBI. The complainant then furnished

them several bills containing 150. When the complainant wen to the
respondents office to there business, and when the complainant had
given the entrapment money to the respondent, the NBI agents then
apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and
Chemistry Division for the examination of the yellow florescent powder,
which accordingly was found on his. . The respondent then was
brought to the NBI Anti-Organized Division where he was
photographed, finger printed, and record checked.

The NBI recommended the prosecution of the respondent and the

administrative case before the Secretary of Justice. Thereafter, he was
suspended by Pres. Ferdinand Marcs from office pending investigation
and disposition of his administrative case.

In his answer, to the complaint for disbarment, respondent alleged that

the complainant planted the marked money in his pocket without his
knowledge. He further said that the criminal case against him by the
NBI was still pending at that he had filed a criminal complaint fro
incriminatory machinations, perjury, and corruption of public officials
against the complaint with the city fiscal of manila.

On a resolution by the Supreme Court, it resolved to refer the

disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation. However, by
virtue of Rule 139-B, the case was transferred to the IBP Board of
Governors for investigation and disposition. The IBP Board of Governors
Commissioner then recommended for the disbarment of the
respondent and was approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Salvador Gaa be disbarred from the practice
of law.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled to the affirmative. In the case at bench,
the respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving
the marked money from the complainant during the entrapment
operations, which resulted in his arrest.

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not

enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof
that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of him
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds.

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a

public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man
for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations
and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other
disciplinary action.
24. Sidra Ting-Dumalo vs. Atty. Roland Torres

Facts: The complainant is one of the six children of the spouses Julie
Reynate and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are, Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam
T. Saria; Felicima T. Torres, who is married to the respondent; Vicente
Ting; Eliseo ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of
land. One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, Lot
1603 of San Francisco de Malabon Estate; and Lot 1605 of the San
Francisco de Malabon Estate.

According to the Complainant, the respondent used his relationship

with her wife and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them
of what was due to the, even for some unlawful, illegal and immoral
means. The complainant avers the ff:

1. That the respondent participated, consented to, and failed to advise

against the perjury committed by his wife, Felicisima, and Miriam when
they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate wherein the
two made it appear that they are the sole heirs of the late spouses.,
knowing fully well that it was false.

2. That the respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to

advise agains the forgery of the complainants signature in the
purported Deed involving the lot 1603, when she was in Italy working
as an overseas worker. And that he even presented such falsified
document to the Registry of Deeds of Cavite that enabled them to sell
lot 1603 to antel holdings.

3. In an LRC case by the complainants sisters Marcelina and Felicisima,

the respondent made a gross misrepresentation and offered false
testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima was the sole heirs
of the late spouses for the purpose of obtaining a new title for Lot 1605
in their names and was able to sell the involved lot to Antel Holdings.

4. That the respondent made gross and false representations for the
purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer, through a
certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment within a month, even
though he knows it to be impossible because he only presented
evidence on Aug. 12, 1997 and even used a stationery of the Philippine
National bank to facilitate the release of the money.
In so far as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisim
and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the
sale and that neither can he be faulted in the execution of the deed of
extra judicial settlment of Lot 1603 and had no part thereon because
he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on
how to dispose the said lot. He further avers that he did not take
advantage of his profession to deprive them of what was due to them.
He also admits that he was the counsel for Miriam and Felicisima for
the reconstitution of the tile of Lot 1605, and that the false testimony
saying that his wifer and sister-in-law are the sole heirs of the late
spouses cannot be faulted to him because such was an oversight.

After due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both

parties, the commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline, found
the actuations of the respondent are in violation of Rule 1.01 and 1.02
of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended him be disbarred from the practice of
law. However, the Board of Governors reduced the sentence to
suspension from the practice for 6 years.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Roland Torres be disbarred from the practice
of law for.

Held: The Supreme Court held that indeed, he is morally and legally
unfit to remain in the Honorable and exclusive Legal Fraternity.

The Solemn oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn

agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a
mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten
afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust
that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing
the lawyers oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law,
as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our

legal system. When the respondent took the oath as a member of the
legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge.
In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.

The records show that Felicima and Miriam stated in the Deed of Ectra
Judicial Settlement that they are the only heirs of the late spouses.
Significantly, with the respondent being the husband of the
complainants sister, he knew, in fact, that it was false. He even
presented it to the Register of deeds of General Trias Cavite. It also
bears noting the respondent was consulted regarding the falsification
of the complainants signature which contains the waiver of his rights
towards the property, which is tantamount of falsification of public
documents. Instead of advising Marcelina and his wife to secure a
special power of attorney to give them authority on behalf of the
complainant, he still proceeded to present such documents to the
registry of deeds. Such acts are also attributed to him.

The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of

such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law
and legal processes. As such, he should make himself more an
exemplar for others to emulate. He should not, therefore, engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. He makes himself
unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming
act or conduct.

Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a

lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. This Rule was
clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted
Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from
Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for
reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
25. People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda
January 30, 1990

Facts: Respondent, Atty. Fe Tuanda, received from Hermania Marquez

several pieces of jewelry worth P36,000.00 for sale on commission,
with the condition that the unsold pieces would be returned and the
proceeds be turned over. But instead of returning the unsold pieces of
jewelry, res pondent instead issued 3 checks worth 26,500. Upon
presentment for payment, all three checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding the notice of
dishonor, the respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of the checks wich bounced.

Consequently, four informations were filed against the respondent with

the RTC manila one for estafa and three B.P22 cases for each
dishonored checks. In due time, the trial court rendered its decision
acquitting the respondent of the charge of estafa; and convicted the
respondent for violation of B.P22 in all three cases.

The respondent filed an appeal to the CA but the latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court and in addition, suspended respondent from
the practice of law saying, being a member if the bar with the offense
being found guilty of involving moral turpitude, respondent is
suspended from the practice of law until further notice from the
Supreme Court, in accordance with Secs. 27 and 28 of the Rules of
Court.

Respondent then filed a notice of appeal with the CA but the latter
advised her to send such notice to the forum of the Honorable
Supreme Court, with the respondent saying that the suspension is
harsh if not a painful penalty aggravating the lower courts penalty
considering the accuseds lack of intention to cause damage to the
complainant.

Issue: Whether or not it is proper for the CA to suspend the respondent

for violation of B.P22

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA suspending

the respondent until further notice from the Supreme Court. The
offense of which he is found guilty involved moral turpitude. That the
violation of B.P 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously
affects public interest and public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private

interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interest of the community at large. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold,
can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest

Respondent was correctly suspended from the practice of law because

she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in
accordance with Sec. 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the rules of court wich
states, among others, that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as an attorney by the Supreme Court by
deceit, malpract ice, or gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by his reason of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Sec. 28 provides that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First
instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any causes named
in Sec. 27 thereof.

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also
import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey
the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
might not relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however,
it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person
convicted of such offense.

26. Re: Elmo S. Abad, Successful Bar Examinee. Atty. Procopio

Beltran Jr, President of the Philippine Trial Lawers Association,
Inc. vs. Elmo S. Abad.
A.M. No. 139, March 28, 1983

Facts: This case involves a Atty. Procopio Beltran charging Elmo Abad of
practicing law without been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar.
Herein Respondent explained that he had pad all the amount due as
per resolution of the Supreme Court, before taking the Lawyers oath.
On July 26, 1979 when Elmo Abad was about to take the lawyers oath,
he was made to sign the lawyers oath. While waiting there, Atty.
Romeo Medoza told hem that the Chief Justice Fernando wants to talk
to him regarding the reply of Mr. Jorge Uy to his answer to Mr. Jorges
complaint. Thus, suspending his oath taking.

Elmo Abad then filed his reply to Mr. Jorges Answer with a prayer that
the Honorable Court determines his fitness to be a member of the bar.
While waiting for further appropriate action, he received a letter from
the IBP, Quezon City Chapter informing him of the Annual General
Meeting and requiring him to settle hiss accont for the year 1980-1981.

With hom believing that with his signing of the lawyers oath and reply
to Mr. Jorge Uys answer and without the Supreme court striking his
name before the IBP, he then paid his dues to the IBP Quezon City
Chapter and such included his name as a qualified voter for the
election of officer and directors for the year 1981-1982. His belief was
bolstered by the death of the complainant Jorge Uy.

In this case, the respondent, as a successful bar examinee, should

know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute
his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law
thereafter. He should know that the essential requisites before
becoming a lawyer had to be performed, namely: The lawyers oath as
administered by the Supreme Court and the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys as provided by Rule 138 Sec. 17 and 19 of the Rules of Court.

27. Donna Marie Aguirre vs. Edwin Rana

FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations. Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared
as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate and filed
with the MBE s pleading dated 1 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to
the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in some Precincts for the Office
of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as
counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,
and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. Furthermore,
respondent also signed as counsel for Emily Estipona-Hao on 1 May
2001 in the petition filed before the MBE praying for the proclamation
of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. On 21 May 2001, one day Before the scheduled mass oath
taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a petition
for denial of admission to the Bar. On 22 May 2001, respondent was
allowed to take the lawyers oath but was disallowed from signing the
Roll of attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific

assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that
he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person
who knows the law.
The court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant. The OBC
the found that indeed, the respondent appeared as a counsel before
the MBEC even before he becomes a member if the Bar. The OBC then
recommends the denial of the respondent the admission to the
Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be denied admission to the Bar

RULING: Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBE and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
-Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority
to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member
of the Philippine Bar.

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service, which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a

privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 4he exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an
officer of the court. Bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice
law simply by passing the Bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in
the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The
fact that respondent passed the Bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the Bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely, his lawyers oath
to be administered by this court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.
28. In Re: Atty. Marcial A. Edillon
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing

Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended
to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing
the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2,
Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization
of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his

constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-
condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him
by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his
membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer

must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in which
membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to
comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar
including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the
requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual
dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet
the cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the

State. The right to practice law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as
arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the
Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.